Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 5
SECT. V. Of Futurity and its pretended Cauſes.
64. THe Poſſibility and Futurity of things, are not accidental notions, or relations of the things themſelves; but are termini diminuentes, Of Futurity, ſee Bonaventures diſtinction of futur. quoad ſucceſſionem temporis, & quoad ordinem temporalis ad aeternum ſecundum conſecutionem with the application, in 1. diſt. 38. dub. 2. Vid. Blank de Concord. lib. & decret. 1. n. 54. that futurity is nothing but reſpectus rationis, and needs no cauſe, but that of the thing future.as to the Things, and are ſpoken of Nothing. To ſay that a Thing May be, or Will be, which now is not, is to ſay that now it is nothing.
65. Nothing is no Effect; and therefore hath no Cauſe: Therefore things Poſſible and Future as ſuch, have no Cauſe.
66. Therefore Poſſibility and Futurity as they are taken for any attribute or accident or mode of Creatures, as objects, are miſtaken; Though they may be Conceptions in the mind of Creatures, concerning that which is not.
67. Therefore alſo God is no Cauſe of any Eternal Poſſibility or futurity.
68. Therefore the Poſſibility and futurity of things (conceived as an effect) hath no Eternal Cauſe: For there is nothing Eternal but God.
69. Though man Imagine Things which are not, and then think that they Can be, and Will be, becauſe that Is, which Can or Will Cauſe them, and thence frame notions and names of Nothing, and call it Poſſible and Future; we muſt be very fearful and not unreverent and raſh, in aſcribing ſuch a dance or luſus of notions to God, unleſs as uſed with great impropriety after the manner of weak man.
70. God knoweth his own Power, Knowledge and Will; And ſo knoweth what he can do, what he knoweth to be eligible, and what he will do. And if any will call this knowledge of God, by the name of the Poſſibility or Futurity of the thing known, or will denominate, Nothing, (as an Imaginary ſomething) as Poſſible and Future, relatively from Gods Power, Will or Knowledge, Let them remember, 1. That Nothing hath no relation. 2. That properly they ſhould but give the denomination to that which is, that is, to Gods Power, Will and Knowledge, and ſay God Can, e. g. make a World, or Will do it; and not to that which is not: And when they ſay that e. g. the world is eternally poſſible or future, they can juſtly mean no more, but that God can and will make it. 3. And that this is but lis de nomine, and not a real difference (whether futurition be thus from Eternity).
71. And eſpecially let them remember that nothing in God is Cauſed: There are no effects in God: Therefore as there is nothing from Eternity but God, and therefore poſſibility and futurition muſt needs be names of God himſelf, or ſome Divine perfection or conception (which is himſelf) if they be ſaid to be eternal; ſo ſuch Poſſibility and futurity can have no eternal cauſe. For God hath no Cauſe, nor any thing in God.
72. If the Futurity of ſin muſt have an eternal Cauſe, then God cauſeth Pennot. l. 3. c. 14. citeth many Fathers ſaying, that things are not future becauſe fore-known, but fore-known becauſe future: And Auguſtine, Greg. M. Boetius, Anſ…lm, Lomb. & Aquin. ſaying the contrary. And he citeth the four wayes of the Schoolmens reconciling them, and concludeth that in regard of the Creatures being, the firſt is true; and in regard of free acts, the ſecond. I think that in regard of ſin neither is true. Unleſs [Becauſe] ſignifie only rationem denominationis objectivam; And even if ſo it is dubious, whether they be not ſimultaneous as Relations are.the futurity of all ſin: But that is not ſo. For none is the Cauſe that ſin will be, but he that (mediately or immediately) cauſeth the being of it when it is.
73. Imagine (per poſſibile vel impoſſibile) that a thouſand years hence a free created agent (that can do otherwiſe) will cauſe ſuch an act; It may be denominated Future without the taking in of any antecedent cauſe into the notion. It is called Future becauſe it will be, and not becauſe there is at preſent exiſtent any cauſe from whence it will be mediately or immediately.
74. Though Futurity be Nothing, yet this Propoſition is ſomething, [This or that Will be.] And to know the futurity of a thing, is moſt properly to know the truth of that propoſition [It will be.]
75. God knoweth not by Propoſitions (for that is the imperfect mode of man) But he knoweth Propoſitions when they are exiſtent, as humane inſtruments or conceptions: And therefore he knoweth the truth of all true propoſitions of futurity.
76. What man knoweth by Propoſitions, God knoweth otherwiſe by a more tranſcendent perfect, but incomprehenſible way; Therefore God knoweth that every thing will be, which will be.
77. There were …o Propoſitions from Eternity: (For man that uſeth them, was not: And God uſeth them not, though he know them as uſed by man): Therefore this propoſition [Hoc futurum eſt] was not▪ from Eternity; Becauſe non entis non ſunt affectiones.
78. But if there had been ſuch Propoſitions from Eternity, as, [The world will be made, Chriſt will be incarnate, &c.] they would have been true: And ſo the eternal Futurity of things, as commonly diſputed of, can be nothing but the Eternal Verity of a Propoſition de futuritione, which was no propoſition (becauſe then there was none); only in time mans brain Imagineth or feigneth that then there might have been Creatures, who might have uſed propoſitions de futuritione rerum, which if they had, they would have been true.
79. All Verity is either, 1. Rei, 2. Conceptus, 3. Expreſſionis; And 1. Ubi non eſt Res, ibi non eſt Veritas Rei: The thing which was not from Eternity, was not a True Thing from Eternity. 2. The Divine knowledge that ſuch and ſuch things will be, was True from Eternity, by an incomprehenſible way above propoſitions. 3. If there had been any Propoſitions Mental or Verbal de rerum futuritione, they would have been true. And this is all that can truly be ſaid of the Eternity of futurition.
80. Only this being added, that ſo far as Gods will was the firſt Cauſe determining of any thing that will be, ſo far he was eternally the Cauſe of the truth of this propoſition, Hoc erit, when ſuch a propoſition ſhall be.
81. But where Gods Will is not the firſt cauſe of the Thing which will be, there it is not his cauſing the truth of the propoſition that is the cauſe that it will be; (Though his Knowledge be a medium from whence it may Logically be inferred that it will be.)
82. Moreover, whatever is from eternity, muſt be Res, or modus rei, or Relatio. But from Eternity, there is no Res futura, no modus rei futurae, no Relatio rei futurae. *I know that the Judicious Greg. Arim. 1. d. 28. q. 3. pag. 122, &c. aſſerteth theſe four things: 1. That aliquid poteſt reſerri realiter ad non ens: 2. Non ens poteſt realiter referri ad ens: 3. Quod Deus aeternaliter referebatur ad Creaturam quae non erat: 4. Quod Deus realiter reſerlur ad creaturam ex tempore. And his reaſons are very conſiderable for three of them: But as to the ſecond which concerneth our caſe he faileth. For 1. his firſt reaſon, that relations are ever mutual or convertible, I deny his proof as vain, as to the reality of the relation. 2. And that res non exiſtens is cauſa I deny: Fuit cauſa, non eſt. 2. And remember that he inſtanceth only in things as cauſed or foreknown: Sin therefore can be called future but as fore-known. 3. Remember that his Maſter Ockam hath oft (in Quodl.) proved that Relations are Nothing, beſides the quid abſolution, and Reaſon Being nothing but Comparabilitas, all is but to ſay, that God fore-knew what would be, and therefore had there been ſuch a propoſition from Eternity as [This will be] it had been true. Vid. Aquin. 1. p. d. 38. q. 1. a. 1. Bonav. ib. a. 1. q. 1. & 2. Durand. 1. d. 38. q. 1. Scot. ib. q. 1. Cajet. Bannes, Rip. Zumel. Nazar. Molin. Vaſqu. Arrub. &c. 1. p. q. 14. a. 8. Greg. Valent. 1. p. d. 1. q. 14. punc. 5. ſ. 3. Alvar. de Auxil. disp. 16. Snarez de A…xil. l. 1. c. 13. Ledeſm. de A…xil. diſ. 2. Ruiz de ſcient. d. 15, 16, 33, 36, &c.For non entis non eſt Modus, vel Relatio. If you add that it is Denominatio extrin eca, I anſwer it muſt be then God himſelf only, as denominated Knowing, or Willing that This or that ſhall be, (which is not properly the futurity of the thing). For otherwiſe it muſt be a denomination of Nothing.
83. Obj. The Object is before the Act of Knowledge. Therefore a thing is future before God knoweth it to be future.
Anſw. 1. To be future is a word whoſe ſound deceiveth men, as if it ſignified ſome being; which is not ſo. 2. God cannot know that a thing will be, unleſs it will be; But this ſignifieth no more but that he cannot know this propoſition to be true [This or that will be] unleſs it be true: But 1. there were from eternity no propoſitions. 2. And the propoſition is not true before it is a propoſition. 3. And therefore not before it is conceived in the mind, whence it hath its firſt being. 4. But if you might ſuppoſe God to have eternal propoſitions, their Being is conſiderable before their Verity; and the Verity hath its Cauſe. But that cauſe is nothing but what is in God himſelf, which is either his Decree of what he will Cauſe, or his foreknowledge of what will be cauſed by a ſinning Creature: And neither of them as a cauſe of the truth of the propoſition, cauſeth that the Thing will be: nor yet is any other exiſtent Cauſe ſuppoſed; but only that God knowing that he will make the free agent, knoweth alſo that this agent will freely ſin: In all which the futurity is Nothing, nor is any exiſtent cauſe of it neceſſary: But only the truth of the propoſition would reſult from the Infinite perfection of Gods knowledge.
84. Obj. The futurity of things is True whether God or man know it or think of it or not. Anſw. 1. Futurity being Nothing is neither true nor falſe. *According to Greg. and the Nominals ſence of Relations before cited, two Nothings may eternally be Related to each other, One as a future Cauſe, and another as a future effect: And if there were now no Being, but hereafter (per impoſſibile) a Being would ariſe of it ſelf, it is future though there be none to know it. But this futurity hath no Cauſe: And it is no more, but that this Propoſition, Hoc erit, would be True if there were any to conceive it.2. But all that you can truly mean is but this, that whether it be thought on or not, this is a true propoſition, Hoc vel illud futurum eſt. Which is true when there are propoſitions, extrinſecal, which no man thinketh of. But 1. God hath no propoſitions; 2. Much leſs extrinſecal from Eternity. But if he had any, they would be nothing but the acts of his own knowledge. 3. And they have no Cauſe. 4. If they had been uttered by words, they needed no Cauſe but his perfect knowledge.
85. Obj. Futurity is the Object of Gods knowledge; and the object is a †To the Queſtion, An praeſcientia Dei ſit Cauſata à rebus? Bonavent. anſwereth (in 1. diſt. 38. q. 1. a. 1.) Praeſcita Cauſa ſunt praeſcientiae Divinae, non eſſendi, ſed aut Inſerendi, aut Dicendi—Secundum rationem eſſendi Praeſcientia poteſt eſſe Cauſa aliquorum praeſcitorum, licet non omnino: ſed nullo modo è converſo. Secundum rationem Inferendi ſunt mutuo cauſae, quia mutuo antecedunt & conſequuntur: & antecedens eſt cauſa conſequentis. Secundum rationem Dicendi, futurum eſt cauſa praeſcientiae, & non è converſo: Nam praeſcientia, dicitur ſcientia ante rem: conſtat ergo quod importat ordinem ad poſterius: & ſi ſcitum eſſet ſemper praeſens, eſſet ſcientia, ſed non praeſcientia. Bonavent. 1. diſt. 38. dub. 3. ſaith, Gods knowledge called Approbation connoteth & effectum & bonita…em: but when it is called ſimplex Notitia, it connoteth only the event, but in it ſelf is one. Thus denominations by Connotation and relation may be many wayes diverſified, both of Knowledge and Will.cauſe of the act. God knoweth things to be future, becauſe they are future; as he knoweth exiſtents, becauſe they exiſt.
Anſw. Still I ſay, 1. Futurity is Nothing; and Nothing hath no Cauſe. 2. Nothing is eternally in God but God: and God hath no Cauſe nor is an Effect. 3. At leaſt that which is Nothing cannot be the Cauſe of God. 4. It is not true that God foreknoweth things, becauſe they will be; but only that he fore-knoweth that they will be.
86. Gods meer fore-knowledge, nor his meer Will without efficient Power or Action, cauſeth not the thing future, and therefore is not the Cauſe that It will be. But where Knowledge and Will with Active Power cooperate, they are true Cauſes of the thing. And nothing is a proper Cauſe that It will be, but what will Cauſe its being.
87. By all this it is evinced that God Cauſeth not the futurity of ſin; And that there needeth no Decree of God to make Sin paſs è numero poſſibilium in numerum futurorum; And conſequently that the Learned and pious Dr. Twiſſe his Achillean argument, which is the ſtrength of his Book de Scientia Media is but deluſory: As the excellent Strangius alſo hath fully manifeſted. And his admired Bradwardine is as weak in his attempts on the ſame ſubject, and proveth God the Cauſe of all futurition by no better reaſons than he proveth, that without him there would be no impoſſibles; yea that non poſſet eſſe impoſſibile: When it were impoſſible any thing ſhould be, were there no God; and yet that impoſſibility is nothing and needeth no cauſe. It's ſtrange how ſome Learned men confound Things and Nothings, and the Notions and Names of Nothings with the Nothings named. So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 18. p. 221. will tell us how God knoweth complex objects, and diſtinguiſheth thoſe that are antecedent to Gods Intellection from thoſe that are conſequent: The former ſort are ſuch as theſe [God is God, is eternal, omnipotent, &c.] Theſe he ſaith are the Cauſes that God knoweth them, being before his knowledge of them: The other about Creatures are after it and cauſed by it. Yet doth the good man thus humbly Preface [Non proprie & diſtincte ſed ſimilitudinarie balbutiendo vix tenus poſſum vel ſcio, ignarus homuncio, excelſa ſcientiae Dei mirabilis reſonare.] But ſee how the world is troubled with this prophane *Hervtus in his Quodlib. puts the queſtion, Whether it be not a Mortal ſin in a Divine to omit things neceſſary, and to treat of curioſities? But he was too guilty himſelf to anſwer it as plainly as he ought.preſumption, and how juſtly Paul cautioned us againſt ſeduction by vain Philoſophy: and what danger the Church is in of loſing Faith, Religion and Charity, and peace in a game at words. What is this Complexe object [Deus eſt]? Is it any thing or nothing? If nothing, it is not before Gods knowledge and the Cauſe of it. If any thing, Is it God or a Creature? A Creature is not before God, nor a cauſe of his knowledge, which is God himſelf. If it be God is it his Eſſence as ſuch, or his Eſſential properties, or the Perſons? None of theſe: For Gods eſſence is the prime Incomplexe Being, and not a Complexe propoſition, [Dens eſt]: His Properties, primary, are Omnipotent-vital-power, Intellect and Will; But theſe alſo are the ſame Incomplexe eſſence, and not propoſitions: And his Intellect as an object of it ſelf is not before his Intellect as an Actual Knowledge of himſelf, nor the cauſe of it: All the ſenſe he can make of it is, that this propoſition [Deus eſt, & eſt Aeternus, &c.] if it had had an eternal being, would in order of nature have been conceivable to us before this [Deus ſcit ſe eſſe] or before his knowledge it ſelf: or that if man had been the Knower, it had been firſt a true propoſition that He is, before he knoweth that he is. But God knoweth not himſelf by propoſitions. Words (in mente vel ore) are but artificial organs for blind creatures to know by. And doth God need ſuch to know himſelf? Doth he know by Thinking and by Artificial means, as we do? Hath he Entia rationis in his Intellect, as man? (as Propoſitions are). And had he an Intellect and theſe Entia rationis or propoſitions in his Intellect (Deus eſt, &c.) before he knew them? yea, and his ſelf-knowledge (which in Act is his pure, eternal, neceſſary Eſſence) cauſed by theſe? All that you can ſay is, that poor creatures know by Propoſitions, and phantaſms, and diverſe thoughts; and that God knoweth man, and therefore knoweth all our propoſitions and thoughts as ours: but not that he had the like eternally in himſelf, and knoweth them in himſelf; and that Himſelf as a propoſition, is the Cauſe of himſelf (or ſelf-intellection) as in Act. He can know that you ſee by Spectacles, and yet not eternally uſe Spectacles himſelf as the Cauſe of his ſight.
But Bradwardine ſaith, that God knoweth illa vera complexa quae voluntatem divinam praecedunt, per ſolam ſuam eſſentiam, ſicut alia vera incomplexa; Illa vero quae voluntatem ejus ſequuntur, non ſcit Deus per illa complexa neque per aliquid aliud à voluntate ejus ſemota, ſed per ſuam voluntatem, vel per ſuam ſubſtantiam cum voluntate, &c. More preſumption ſtill! He ſaith God knoweth complexa ſed non complexe; And who knoweth what ſenſe thoſe words have? What meaneth he by complexa but Notions, that is, names and propoſitions, as diſtinct from the Things? And what is it to know propoſitions complexe, but to know them as they are? And what is it to know them incomplexe, unleſs it be to know quid phyſicum a propoſition is, or to know that it is no propoſition, that is, to err? If God know a Complexum or a propoſition, that Propoſition is in being: And where was it in being before God knew it? If in God (or no where) 1. God then is a propoſition; 2. And God is before he knoweth himſelf; 3. And a propoſition being in intellectu an act of knowledge, it is to ſay, that [God knoweth that he is, before he knoweth that he is: and his knowing that he is, cauſeth him to know that he is].
If it be ſaid, that by complexa he meaneth not organical notions, words nor propoſitions, but the Verity of Gods Being, Eternity, &c. I anſwer; To know things, is ſaid to be [to know ſome Truth] becauſe by knowing the thing, we can make this propoſition [This is] or [This truly is.] But Gods knowledge of Things is not as ours, but by pure perfect intuition, and ſo maketh not propoſitions in himſelf by knowing things: But if it be the Truth of this propoſition [Deus eſt] that you mean, it ſuppoſeth that propoſition to exiſt (for, quod non eſt, non verum eſt); and ſo to exiſt in God; which is denyed: And it is that propoſition that Bradwardine ſpeaketh of.
But if by Truth, you mean nothing but Gods Eſſence; that is not a Complex object, which he ſpeaketh of: And he ſaith not, that God knoweth ſuam eſſentiam, & creata vel futura, but that he knoweth per ſuam eſſentiam quod Deus eſt, & eſt Omnipotens, Aeternus, &c. & per ſuam eſſentiam cum voluntate quod mundus futurus eſt. So that it's a propoſition that he calleth complexum incomplexè cognitum by contradiction; when he cannot prove that Gods Intellect made propoſitions in it ſelf, and that antecedently to themſelves, and the Cauſes of themſelves.
And all this which men talk in the dark about God is non-ſenſe, to trouble themſelves and the world with, on falſe ſuppoſitions that Gods knowledge is ſuch as ours, or that we can have formal conceptions and deſcriptions of it: when we ſhould tremble to read men thus prophanely take Gods Name in vain, and pry into unrevealed things.
I have purpoſely been the larger on this inſtance, to warn the Reader to take heed of the common cheat of Scholaſtick Word-mongers, who would obtrude on us humane entia rationis, or Thoughts, as real Divine entities, and would perſwade us that every nothing which they make a name for, is therefore ſomething, yea, ſome of them God himſelf.
What I have ſaid of Divine Intellection, I ſay of his Volitions, of which cap. 20, 21. Bradwardine ſaith, that Voluta priora, viz. Deum eſſe, omnipotentem eſſe, bonum, cognoſcentem, &c. ſunt Cauſa. But, 1. It is too bold to ſay, that Gods Will is an Effect. 2. If it were ſo, it muſt be his Eſſence, Omnipotency and Intellect that is the Cauſe of his Will, and not a Complex verity, as [Deus eſt, omnipotens, bonus eſt, &c.] For Gods Will is not cauſed by Propoſitions. 3. If you ſay that his Volition as terminated objectively on his Eſſence, Goodneſs, &c. is his Will in act (ſe Velle; which ſome call the third Perſon) yet here would be no Cauſe and Effect, but our diſtinct partial conceptions of that incomprehenſible ſimplicity, which hath no real diverſity or priority.