Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 18

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable · Section 18

p. 92SECT. XVIII. A Confutation of Dr. Twiſſe's Digr. 5. l. 2. ſect. 1. Vind. Grat.

575. I Come now to conſider of what is ſaid by them that go further about Gods will or Cauſality as to ſin. And becauſe Dr. Twiſſe hath a peculiar Digreſſion (Vindic. Grat. li. 2. p. 1. Digr. 4.) I will ſomewhat animadvert upon it. He beginneth [Sententia noſtra haec eſt, Deum hactenus dici poſſe Velle peccatum quatenus vult ut peccatum …iat—viz. ipſo permittente: And ſo he maketh the queſtion, An Dens Velit ut peccatum eveniat ipſo permittente? Arminius thought God willed only his own Permiſſion of the ſin: Twiſſe ſaith, that he willed that ſin ſhould come to paſs, God permitting it. Arminius his conceſſion cannot be proved (as I have ſhewed;) But Twiſſes muſt be diſproved. And 1. I will give you our Reaſons againſt it.Bonavent. in 1. d. 46. q. 3. reſolveth this queſtion very plainly and truly [Mala …ieri nullatenus bonum eſſe poteſt: ſed bene occaſio boni: And ſhewing the difference between Cauſa, Caſus & Occaſio, he ſaith that Cauſa eſt procedens & intendens: Caſus p…ivat Intentionem ſed non operationem: Occaſio privat utrumque. And he diſtinguiſheth Occaſion into that which hath ratio…m Acti…i & excitat agentem; and that which hath but rationem paſſivi, as one by anothers evil exciteth himſelf to do good. And alſo between the evil and the ordinability to good. And ſaith the evil is but the occaſio paſſiva of the good, and the ratio boni quod ſubſternitur, is occaſio aliquo modo activa—Vide locum.

576. Let the Reader remember, that what the Author ſaith of Gods Willing, he alſo in the point of Predetermination ſaith of his working: viz. that he Cauſeth as much as he willeth: But I paſs that by now becauſe I have largely confuted it elſewhere. And to ſpeak to One is to ſpeak to both.

577. 1. All ſober Chriſtians are agreed, on what ſide ſoever, that God is not the Cauſe of ſin, except ſome odd preſumers who are condemned by the generality: One or two ſpoke ſome hard words that way in Belgia, whom the Synod of Dort rejected: Mr. Archers Book was burnt for it by the Parliament or Weſtminſter Synod. Beza himſelf (in Rom. 8. 28. & paſſim) abhorreth it as intolerable blaſphemy. But this Doctrine in queſtion plainly maketh God the Willer and Cauſe of ſin: Yea more, very much more than wicked men or Devils are: which is not true.

578. For they make Men and Devils to be but a ſecond pre-moved predetermined Cauſe of the Act (of Volition and Execution) whence the formal obliquity neceſſarily reſulteth: But 1. God is certainly the Cauſe of the Nature which is the Agent: 2. He is the Cauſe of the Law which maketh the act in ſpecie to be ſin: His ſaying, Thou ſhalt not commit Adultery or Murder, maketh Adultery and Murder to be ſin, when they are committed, which they would not be without the Law. 3. God cauſeth and ordereth all the objects and occaſions. 4. And now they alſo ſay that God willeth ut peccatum fiat, (and is the firſt predetermining Cauſe, even the total Cauſe, of all that is in the act and all its circumſtances, without which predetermination it could not be.) So that man doth but will what God firſt willeth, and act what God firſt moveth him unavoidably to act, as the pen in my hand. 5. And the Law and the Act being put in being, the Relative obliquity is but the neceſſary reſult, and hath no other cauſe.

579. And note here what Eſtius before cited (after Aquinas) ſaith that to Will that peccatum ſit vel fiat, is all that the Sinner himſelf doth, when he willeth ſin. And therefore it's a vain thing here to diſtinguiſh between willing ſin, and willing the event, futurity and exiſtence of it, ut peccatum fiat vel eveniat: (Though I confeſs I was long detained in ſuſpenſe if not deceived by that diſtinction.) For he willeth ſin, who willeth the exiſtence of it, or that it be or come to paſs.

p. 93580. And note, that it is both matter and form, Act and obliquity which they ſay God willeth ut fiat: For it is ſin: And forma dat nomen. It is not ſin, but by the form of ſin. But if they had ſaid otherwiſe, it had been all one: For he that willeth the fundamentum, relate and correlate, Saith Twiſſe Vindic. Gra…. li. 1. P. 1. Sect. 7. p. 137. [Poſito quod velit per…ectiones iſtas manifeſtare, neceſſe eſt non impediat ingreſſum peccati, ſed permittat.] 1. As if he had proved that God was not able to manifeſt his Mercy and Juſtice by Laws, and Illuminating men to know them, without execution by the occaſion of ſin? 2. Yet doth he make Chriſts death unneceſſary and his ſatiſfaction to Juſtice ſo far as that God could have accompliſhed our pardon and ſalvation another way if he would: And is ſin better or more neceſſary than Chriſts ſatisfaction? 3. And methinks they that lay ſo little on Moral means and operations of Grace in compariſon of Phyſical, ſhould not give ſo much to ſin, which were it a means (as it is not, but a Paſſive and oppoſite occaſion) is but a moral means. And himſelf ſaith page 136. [Permiſſio peccati proprie medium eſt aſſequendi …inem à Deo praefixum: At peccatum non eſt Medium proprie dictum, ſive manifeſtandae Dei miſericordiae, ſive juſtitiae: Media enim ejus ſunt naturae, ut ad ea facienda, mov…atur quis ex intentione finis.] Would the Reader have a better confuter of him than himſelf? But he there addeth that it is Materia etſi non medium, as ſtone and Timber to an Houſe. And yet ſin they ſay hath no matter beſides the ſubject and object, but is a meer Privation of moral Rectitude. But if it be to the Devils Kingdom loco materiae, it is not ſo to Chriſts. Rather, if a beggar Want a houſe, is that Want the Materia domus? no nor the Materia of his mercy or bounty that buildeth it. Thus the defectiveneſs of the ſubtileſt wits abuſeth God and his Church, when the Chriſtian ſimplicity of modeſt ſouls with a holy life would honour him. So Sect. 9. pag. 137. Peccatum mihi videtur propri… dicendum eſſe materiam manifeſtandae Dei ſive miſericordi…, ſive i…ſtiti… poti…s quam medium: Permiſſionem vero peccati medium eſſe ejus manifeſtandae proprie dictum. But 1. how oft elſewhere doth he forget and contradict this? 2. Permiſſion it ſelf is nothing (being but non-impedire.) And is nothing, or non-agere, a proper means? But eſpecially I intreat the Reader to obſerve that in that very place Twiſſe and Arminius are herein profeſſedly agreed, that it is the Permiſſion of ſin, and not the ſin, that is the Divine medium (only one ſaith Praedeſtinationis, and the other providentia:) And yet they will differ while they agree: And I that differ from both, would agree with both.willeth the Relation.

581. There is nothing left to be ſaid then, but that God willeth that ſin be done, but not as ſin, or becauſe it is ſin; But this is nothing. For, 1. Either none or few of the Reprobate do will ſin becauſe it is Sin, but becauſe of the pleaſure of ſenſe or imagination, or for ſeeming good. 2. And if a man or Devil do maliciouſly Will ſin as ſin becauſe it is againſt God, ſo doing is but one of their ſins, which they ſay God willeth ut fiat before they willed it (and predetermined them to it:) ſo that here is nothing in it but what is firſt and chiefly of God.

582. If they ſay that God willeth it for the Glory of his Juſtice, and ſo do not wicked men, but for wicked ends or in enmity to God; I anſwer, That proveth that God hath a will which the wicked have not, but not that the wicked have any will which God hath not: For that Will and that Enmity to God ſtill is but one of their ſins which they ſay God firſt willeth ut fiat.

583. Obj. But it is only ut fiat ipſo permittente, non faciente.

Anſw. The hypocriſie of that addition maketh it but the worſe in the aſſertors. For 1. They uſually make Gods will effective of the thing willed. 2. They maintain that there is nothing in the act as circumſtantiated which God is not the total firſt efficient Cauſe of. 3. They confeſs that the formal relation neceſſarily reſulteth from the act and Law: And why then do they put in the word [permittente?] Would not that deceitfully inſinuate to the Reader that the ſinner doth ſomething which God doth not do, but only permit, when they mean no ſuch thing? For that is my ſecond reaſon againſt them.

584. 2. By their doctrine God never permitteth ſin (which is falſe:) For that which he Willeth and Cauſeth as the firſt total Cauſe, he cannot be ſaid to Permit: To do a thing, and move another to do it, will not ſtand with proper permiſſion.

585. Obj. But God preſerveth our own Liberty in acting.

Anſw. 1. By Liberty you mean nothing but Willingneſs as ſuch, that God doth not make mens Nilling to be a Willing or contra in the ſame act. Which is but to ſay that God cauſeth me to Will ſin, and not to Will-nill-it? 2. If you mean more, I deny that ever God gave Power to the Will, to Will or Nill contrary to the Volition and ph…ſical premoving predetermination of the firſt cauſe. 3. But if all this were ſo, it's nothing to the preſent caſe; and doth not prove that God is not the Cauſe of the ſin, but only that man is a Cauſe alſo, cauſed by the firſt Cauſe; and that God Willeth and Cauſeth us to ſin willingly and freely.

586. 3. By this means they make God equally to Will and Cauſe our Holineſs and our ſin: For they cannot poſſibly tell us what he doth more to Cauſe our Holineſs, than to Will it, and to predetermine the will of man to it, (beſides commanding it, which is a moral act, and we ſpeak p. 94only of proper efficiency.) He doth but will that Holineſs be, and cauſe all that hath any entity in it; And ſo they ſay he doth about ſin.

587. Obj. He loveth our Holineſs for it ſelf, and ſo he doth not ſin.

Anſw. The firſt is denyed by themſelves, if you ſpeak of Gods end: For they confeſs that God only is his own end, for which he loveth all things: 2. And his Love is either his efficient or complacential Volition. 1. The efficient which is all that is now in queſtion they muſt confeſs is equal to both, if he equally will the exiſtence of both.

Object. But he hath a Complacence in Good only.

Anſw. 1. He hath a Complacence in the fulfilling of his own will as efficient. Therefore if ſin be the fulfilling of his Will, he hath a complacency in it. The formal reaſon of a pleaſing object to God is, as it is the fulfilling of his own Will; And to break his Law they make to be ſuch: ergo, pleaſing. 2. But if it were not ſo, that's nothing to our Caſe, of the efficient Will.

588. 4. To avoid tediouſneſs, in ſum, This opinion ſeemeth to me, to leave very little or no place for the Chriſtian Religion. For 1. It overthroweth the formale objectum fidei, which is Veracitas Divina, and leaveth no certainty of any word of God: For if he do will and predetermine by premotion, ut fiat omne mendacium, quod fit, then we have no way to know that he did not ſo by the Prophets and Apoſtles. 2. It maketh the Scripture falſe, which ſaith ſo much of Gods hatred and unwillingneſs of ſin. 3. It obliterateth the notion of Gods Holineſs, which is made the great reaſon of our holineſs. 4. It maketh mans Holineſs to be no Holineſs, but a common or indifferent thing. 5. It maketh ſin, ſo little odious (as being a Divine off-ſpring) as will deſtroy the hatred of it and care to avoid it. 6. It will thereby nullifie all our Godly ſorrow, repenting, confeſſion, and all practice of means againſt any ſin. 7. It will hardly let men believe that Chriſt came into the world, and did and ſuffered ſo much to ſave men from ſin, and to deſtroy it. 8. Or that it is the work of the Holy Ghoſt to ſanctifie ſouls and mortifie ſin. 9. It will hardly let men believe that there is any Hell, and that God will damn men for ever, for that which they did upon his prevolition and predetermination, unavoidably. 10. It ſeemeth to give Satans deſcription to God, and more. For Satan can but tempt us to ſin, but they make God abſolutely to will that it be, and phyſically to predetermine us to it. And ſo Chriſt that came to deſtroy the work of the Devil, the father of lies, malice and murder, ſhould come to deſtroy the work of God. 11. It taketh away the reaſon of Church diſcipline, and purity, and of our loving the Godly and hating wickedneſs. 12. It would tempt Magiſtrates accordingly to judge of vice and vertue, good and bad in the Common-wealth.

589. Now to their arguments. 1. Rev. 17. 17. [God put it into their hearts to do his will, and to agree to give up their Kingdoms to the beaſt.]

Anſw. 1. He that readeth Dr. Hammonds expoſition applying this to Alaricus ſacking Rome, with the effects, will ſee that the very ſubject is ſo dubious and dark as not to be fit to found ſuch a doctrine on. 2. It was the effect of the ſin that God willed, and not the ſin. 3. He is not ſaid to put the ſin into their hearts, whether pride, covetouſneſs, cruelty, &c. but only to do his pleaſure and agree (or make one decree) to give up &c. which he could moſt eaſily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts, which with their own ſins, would have that effect which he willed: If a thief have a will to rob, God may put it into his heart to go ſuch or ſuch a way, where a wicked man to be puniſhed will be in his way.

p. 95590. But for brevity, beſides what is ſaid, I ſhall farther direct the …mpartial Reader, how to anſwer all ſuch objections: And withall let the …onfounding cavillers againſt diſtinguiſhing, ſee, what blaſphemy and ſubverſion of Religion may enter, for want of one or two diſtinctions which …onfuſed heads regard not.

1. Be ſure to diſtinguiſh the name of ſin, from the nature. 2. And …emember that no outward act is ſin any further than it is Voluntary (by privation or poſition of Volitions.) 3. Diſtinguiſh between the Act as it …s Agentis, and as it is in Paſſo. 4. And between the Act and the effect. 5. Between the effect of a ſingle cauſe and of divers cauſes, making a compound effect. 6. And between a forbidden object compared with the …ontrary, and one forbidden object compared with another.

591. And then all this ſatisfying Truth will lye naked before you. 1. That the ſame name uſually ſignifieth the ſin and the effect of ſin; or the Act as Acted and as Received. Adultery, Murder, Theft, uſually ſignifie the Acts of the Adulterer, Murderer, Thief, as done and as received …n Paſſo, and as effecting.

2. That the former only is the ſin, viz. firſt the Volition, Nolition, or Non-Volition, and ſecondarily the imperate act as animated by the Will: And no more. The reception of this act in Paſſo is not ſin (as ſuch;) nor the moſt immediate effect of this act: It is but the effect of ſin.

3. And you will ſee that the ſame effect may have ſeveral cauſes: a Good and bad; And ſo God may be a cauſe of that effect, which mans ſin alſo concurreth to cauſe: And God doth not therefore Will or Cauſe the ſin.

4. And you will ſee that God may morally cauſe the effect as it is on this object rather than another forbidden, though both make the act ſinful, and yet not Cauſe it as it is exerciſed on either of thoſe objects compared with ſuch as are not forbidden.

592. And you will here plainly ſee that God hath many wayes to Cauſe the effect without willing or Cauſing the ſin. As for inſtance, 1. He can do it by adding (as I ſaid before) a good act to the ſinners bad one. As when Caiaphas is willing to kill Chriſt, God can put into Caiaphas's De hoc vid. Ockam ubi ſupra.thoughts, the jealouſie of the Romans over the Jews, and the viſible danger they are in if they ſhould be thought to have another King: which thoughts in themſelves are true and good: So he can put into Pharaoh's thoughts the loſs of the Iſraelites ſervice, which was not ſinful of it ſelf.The wiſe Reader that can impartially receive truth without reſpect of perſons, may find much in Epiſcopii Inſtitut. Theol. li. 4. ſect. 4. de provident. in his anſwering all theſe Texts of Scripture, as miſ-expounded by ſome. And his moderate opinion expreſſed in Concluſ. 2. in the end of that Section, how far doctrines are or are not damning which ſubvert the foundation, is laudable, and his reaſon very good and clear, (viz. ſo far as they actually prevail with the will and practice: Even as our faith is ſaving as effectual and practical, and not as a dead opinion, ſo is error damning.) I think as he doth.

593. And 2. God can ſet that object before a ſinner which he is moſt inclined to abuſe: Which is not to Will his ſin: But may proceed from Gods Willing the Effect. As if Abſalom be by Pride and Luſt enclined to Adultery, his Fathers Wives may be in his eye and way. And God may will to puniſh David by their paſſive pollution, without willing his act of ſin at all, interior or exterior.

594. 3. And God can remove other objects out of the way, ſo that this object ſhall be ſolitary, or moſt obvious to the ſinner. As if a drunken man were reſolved to kill the next he met, God can keep Peter, John, &c. out of his way, and ſo Judas ſhall be the next.

595. 4. Yea God can ſuſpend his own intrinſick concurſe as to ſome one ſinful act by which it will follow that it will fall upon another object. Many other ſuch wayes God hath, which are unknown to us.

596. And if you ſuppoſe a man ſo inclined to Murder or Adultery as that he will exerciſe it on the next moſt provoking object, if God now did Cauſe the Act, as exerciſed on a forbidden object, compared with another p. 96it were to Cauſe the ſin. But if he only be the moral Cauſe that he e. g. kill Judas rather than Peter, this is not to Cauſe ſin: For to chooſe Judas rather than Peter for the object, is no ſin: For, as I ſaid, God c… do it only by removing Peter, and Willing that he ſhall be preſerved.

597. Suppoſe a King that hath made Laws againſt Murder forekno… that a Robber is waiting in ſuch a Road for a prey, and that a Traytor broke out of Priſon will go that way, and ſo will be rob'd and kill'd, He may will or deſire the Death of the Traytor as a puniſhment; He may reſtra… ſome that would travail that way before him; and may reſtrain ſome that would lay hold on the Robber, or drive him away, that ſo this Traytor may be killed: And yet only Permit, and not Will at all, the Robbers Will or Ac… as it is Agentis, but puniſh him for it, and hate it, and Will only the effect.

598. The next Text cited is, 1 Pet. 2. 8. Whereunto alſo they were appointed (viz. to ſtumble on the rock of offence.) Reſp. 1. This hath reſpect to Luke 2. 34. [he is ſet for the fall of many, &c.] and of Chriſts own words, that he that falleth on this ſtone ſhall be broken in pieces. And no more can hence be gathered, but that God hath decreed that as a Puniſhing Judge, 1. He will leave the rejecters of Chriſt to go on i… their own ſinful way, 2. And that their oppoſition to him ſhall be the… ruine. So that 1. He doth not ſpeak this of any but the rejecters of Chriſt that deſerved it. 2. He ſpeaketh not at all as willing their ſin, but only as one that penally denyeth them further grace. 3. But the thing that he is ſaid to Ordain them to, is not ſin, but Ruine the conſequent of their ſin: The word [ſtumbling and falling] ſignifying their deſtraction.

599. The next Text is, 2 Theſ. 2. God ſhall ſend them ſtrong deluſions (or the acting of deceit) that they ſhould believe a lye. Anſw. Here is nothing ſignified, but 1. That God ſhall permit Magicians and falſe Teachers to vent deceits, 2. And permit wicked men to believe them: which is mentioned as a permitted conſequent, and not as an end intended by God: And the word ſending is uſed becauſe the permiſſion was Penal for their ſin. And his puniſhing-providence might morally cauſe the deceivers rather to go towards theſe men than towards others.

600. The next is Rom. 1. 24, 26, 28. God gave them up to uncle… neſs, to vile affections, to a reprobate mind, &c.

Reſp. Here is nothing at all ſaid but a Penal deſertion and permiſſion, and no Will or Cauſe of ſin in God.

601. The next is Act. 4. 28. To do whatſoever thy hand and thy counſel determined before to be done.

Anſw. Here is nothing ſaid of ſin at all, but of the effect of it: All that was done on Chriſt, even all the effect in paſſo God fore-determined ſhould be done: But the Act ut volentis & agentis he neither willed nor cauſed as on this forbidden object. And though elſewhere the Doctor deride this anſwer (that God decreed Chriſt ſhould dye, or be ſacrificed, and yet decreed not that the Jews or any one elſe ſhould do it,) It is a great and neceſſary truth: He that willed the effect, and did much himſelf to cauſe it, willed not the murderers ſinful act: And permitting and foreſeeing it was enough.

602. The next is Iſa. 10. 6. and ſo Amos 16. 17. Prov. 22. 14. 2 Sam. 12. 11. 1 King. 11. 31. & 12. 24. God ſends the Aſſyrian as his rod. Thy Wife ſhall commit Adultery, and thy Children fall by the ſword.] They that are hated of God ſhall fall therein—] David was foretold his Wives ſhould be vitiated: The ten Tribes fell from Rehoboam: It was of God that he took not good counſel: Pharaohs heart was hardened by God.

p. 97Anſw. The firſt is only a Propheſie, and a penal effect of ſin, and nothing of Gods Willing or Cauſing ſin. And ſo is the ſecond: Though God can ſend afflicters by the wayes before mentioned, without willing their ſin. The third ſpeaketh only of a penal permiſſion of ſin. And the reſt all ſpeak only of Gods penal permiſſion of the ſin, and his decreeing and foretelling the effects of it, and his occaſioning the ſinner to take one ſinful object (not as ſuch, but) rather than another.

603. As the Wind hath its natural courſe, and ſo hath the Water, and the Miller Cauſeth neither of them, but ſuppoſing them, doth ſo ſet his Mill to Wind and Water that by the meer receptive qualification of the patient, they ſhall fulfil his will, and he is the Cauſe of the effect, viz. that they turn his Mill and grind his Corn: ſo is it eaſie for God to uſe mens ſins (permitted) to his ends without willing them **Even Vaſq. in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 49. c. 8. pag. 758. ſaith that Of mens [non respondere vocationi] God is Cauſa per accidens, ut removens prohibens, dum negat auxilium efficax congruum. But this is but a Controverſie about a Logical name [cauſa per accidens] which Gibieuf and many others do with as good reaſon deny to be fitly applicable to God, as to mans ſin..

604. Next the Doctor cometh with Reaſons: And the firſt is, becauſe ††Pet. Alliac. Cam. 1. q. 14. A. [Secundum Bradward. & alios qui tenent quod Deus vult mala culpae, & quod respectu cujuſlibet rei habet Velle vel nolle, nec habet ſolum non velle; Deus illo modo non permittit mala culpae fieri; ſed ideo ſecundum hunc modum dicitur permittere, quia non approbat ea, ne… impedit ea fieri cum poſſ…t—ſed ſecundum Magiſtrum Deus permittit ea, quia nec vult ea fieri, nec vult ea non fieri; quia ſi nollet non fierent, ſed ſolum non vult: & per conſequens non habet actum voluntatis reſpectu hujus quod eſt malum culpae fieri—] Saith Bonaventure, (that plain and honeſt Schoolman) li. 1. diſ. 47. dub. 2. Di…nd…m quod non eſt ſig…um quod De… velit illud quod … …i…itur; ſed quod velit illud quod ex …o elicitur. Alli…co … q. 14. A. 1. Permittit qui. nec pr… cipit, nec …, nec conſulit, ſed indul…t: & talis Permiſſio eſt ſignum Voluntatis Dei: quia aliquem actum ſignificat in ſi… permittente: & ita Deu… non permittit mala culpae—… Permittit fieri quia nec habet Velle, nec habet nolle, ſed ſolum non Velle ut flat: Et talis Permiſſio non eſt ſignum Divin… Voluntatis: quia …ullum actum Volendi ſignificat in ſic permittente: & iſto modo ſecundum Mag. Deus permittit mala culpae.Permiſſion is a ſign of Willingneſs as well as command: And what is permitted (and that for good) infallibly cometh to paſs.

Anſw. All this is before confuted. **If he really hol… with Bradward. li. 1. c. 33. that God willeth all that he permitteth, why is it denyed that he willeth the formale peccati as much as the materiale, ſeeing he permitteth it? But his citation of Bradwardine I think not my ſelf obliged to regard; nor do I co…ſent any more to that doctrine in Bradwardin… than in him. See Alliaco before of Bradward.It's falſe that non impedire efficaciter is a ſign that one wills the thing. The King that only forbiddeth drunkenneſs or murder by a Law with penalties, could alſo lock up or guard ſome men, and effectually keep them from the ſin. And doth he Will it becauſe he doth not ſo? And it's falſe that all cometh to paſs, that is not hindered.

605. His ſecond argument is ſpoken very plainly and groſly, viz. [Both ſides confeſs that the ſubſtrate act is done, God not only willing it, but effecting it, v. g. Abſalom's congreſs with his Fathers Concubines: Yea not only the congreſs as an exerciſed imperate act, but that the Volition of congreſs, the internal elicite act, was efficiently and Principally of God: why then ſhould it be denyed that the very evil and deformity of the act was done, God willing it, though not effecting it, or any way failing of his duty? Eſpecially when the Malice and Deformity doth neceſſarily follow the ſubſtrate act, in reſpect of the Creature though not of God.]

Anſw. Hobbes could deſire little more. But we vehemently deny that the ſubſtrate act is of God as it is morally ſpecified, that is, as it is exerciſed on this forbidden object rather than another lawful one ex parte eligentis: God did not as a principal efficient cauſe Abſalom to Will that Congreſs with his Fathers Concubines, nor to Act it. The nature of the Wind and Water, and God as the Cauſe of Nature, cauſe the wind and water to act, and to act as they do, on their own part: But that they turn this wheel and milſtone, and run in this Channel rather than another, is long of the Miller. Abſalom's Motus qua motus, and qua cupido ordinata, was natural from God: but not as acted hic & nunc towards this object: And the Reception of the Act by that Object ſuppoſing his luſt and action, might be morally and penally from God.

606. If you here bring forth the common Meduſa's head, and tell me, that It is injurious to God that his act be determinable by a Creature, and ſo dependent; I confidently anſwer you for God, 1. No man is injurious to himſelf: And God did not wrong himſelf, when by making a Creature with free ſelf-determining Power, he reſolved ſo far (partially) p. 98to ſuſpend his own operation, ſo as not to neceſſitate the will: no more than he wrongeth himſelf by a Greater ſuſpenſion, in making no more Worlds or Creatures.

2. You quite miſtake: We do not at all alter or limit Gods Acts or influx, nor determine it, but terminate it, and determine of that effect which requireth both Cauſes, God and Man, and cannot be (ordinarily) by one alone, becauſe God hath otherwiſe appointed. And again I beſeech the adverſaries to note, How great and innumerable changes are made in the world, by the various Diſpoſition of Recipients? The Roſe and Vine and Weed and Dunghill, do not at all Change the Action of the Sun: but their various Reception and co-operation is the Cauſe, that its Act hath ſuch various effects. And it is the Millers work in making a various and ſpecial Receptivity in his Channel, Wheels, &c. which cauſeth the variety of effects. And God hath enabled men Variouſly and freely to Receive his Influx.

607. His third Argument is, God giveth not that effectual Grace, without which he fore-knoweth ſin will not be avoided: ergo he is willing that it be done.

Anſw. I deny the Conſequent: It only followeth that he doth not Abſolutely and effectually Nill it. If the King have ſeveral ſubjects inclined to eat a luſcious poyſon; And his Children he effectually keepeth from it; one he locketh up, another he committeth to a Keeper, another he keepeth the poiſon from: But to a Traytor he ſaith, [I once forgave thee, and ſaved thy life, and I now command thee that thou avoid this poiſon, and if thou do not, it will torment and kill thee; but if thou wilt take no warning, take what thou getteſt by it.] Can you prove that it is his Will that this man eat the poyſon prohibited?

608. Next he citeth Auguſtines thred-bare ſayings, and blameth Aquinas and Arminius for denying his Authority, and commendeth the greater reverence of Bellarmine: And ſo Anſelm, Hugo, &c.

Anſw. 1. We ſtick not on one mans Authority; God holdeth not his Holineſs and the Church its Religion on Auguſtines authority. 2. Auguſtine hath ten times more plain enough for what I hold: See the places cited in Paul. Eiren. Triad. Patrum. 3. He knew it's like that Eſtius and many more expound Auguſtines words as terminating Gods Volition on his own permiſſion, and not on the ſin, or fieri. 4. I think plainly that Auguſtine there ſpake not of inward Volitions, but outward Acts, and that not as Agentis but in paſſo or the effects. And ſo it is true, that no murder, theft, treaſon, or other effect is produced in the world, but what God poſitively decreeth ſhall be produced, either by doing ſome effects himſelf (as drowning the world,) or permitting ſinners to do them, while he cauſeth not their act but the Receptivity of the Paſſum, and ſo the effect, &c.

609. Pag. 194. Retorting on Aquin. he thus argueth Becauſe God doth will his own Goodneſs, therefore it is neceſſary that God will that ſin be done, he permitting it. For it is not to will his eſſential Goodneſs, which needeth no acquiſition, but he willeth to manifeſt his Goodneſs. But the evil of ſin is not oppoſite to the manifeſting of Gods Goodneſs: Yea nothing is more **So Twiſſ. contr. Armin. pro Junio pag. 91. diſſenteth from J…niu… that ſaith peceatum ad rationem univerſi facere per accidens, and ſaith Mibi vero dicendum videtur Peceatum conducibile eſſe per ſe ad bonum univerſi quatenus conducit ad illuſtrandos tales divinae majeſtatis radios—And if ſo, it muſt per ſe be Loved of God as Good. Yet contr. Corvin. he ſaith, that No ſober man ſaith that ſin is a medium of the execution of Reprobation, but only the Permiſſion of ſin. Reconcile them that can.conducible to it than this; I ſay to the manifeſting of Gods Goodneſs by way of mercy in ſparing or by way of Juſtice in puniſhing.

Anſw. Horreſco recitans, 1. Gods Volition of his Eſſential Goodneſs is his Neceſſary Volition. 2. God hath no End to acquire, but alwayes hath his end, and is never without it. 3. If God had neceſſarily willed p. 99the particular way of manifeſting his Goodneſs, then he doth all things neceſſarily, and could do no otherwiſe, and it ſeems by you could not manifeſt it without ſin. 4. Doth he not manifeſt his Goodneſs as much to the Innumerable Glorious Angels, who never ſinned? And would it not have been as much manifeſted to us if we had been as they? 5. The very indetermination of the will, and its mediate Liberty is not the higheſt excellency of his Creatures: It is better than the ſenſitive Neceſſity of Bruits, and lower than the confirmed Neceſſity of the bleſſed: It is our defectibility. And the excellenteſt or Beſt of his works moſt honour Gods Goodneſs. 6. Is it not the ſtrongeſt temptation that men have in this world to doubt of or diſhonour the Goodneſs of God, to think how he permitteth the world to be drowned in wickedneſs, and be ſo like to hell? 7. Doth not Chriſt turn the Prayers of all Chriſtians againſt your doctrine, viz. that Gods name may be hallowed, his Kingdom come, and his will done on earth as it is in Heaven (which is not by any ſin?) 8. Do not your words tempt men to be indifferent to ſin, if not to love it, if nothing be more conducible to honour Gods Goodneſs? 9. Is not that concluſion a great wrong to Chriſt, Scripture, Miniſtry and Holineſs, as being no more conducible to manifeſt Gods Goodneſs than ſin is? 10. It is not true that ſin is any Cauſe, or true Means at all of glorifying God or doing any good. It is but a preſuppoſed Evil, by delivering us from which God is glorified. As your eating poyſon may occaſion the honour of an Antidote and Phyſicion: It is no Cauſe or proper medium of it, but only an occaſion, and miſchief ſine quo non; But if God had not ſaved us from ſin committed, he could have glorified himſelf in ſaving us from committing it: God loveth and is glorified moſt in that which is moſt like him as his Image, which is, the Holieſt ſinleſs ſoul. To be a medium to Gods glory is to be good: To be as conducible to it as any thing, is to be as good as any thing ſave God and his glory. But ſin hath no Good, much leſs ſuch good. Why elſe doth not God equally delight in ſin, and in the death of the wicked, as in holineſs, repentance and our life? ſeeing all things are for himſelf, and that which glorifieth him moſt, is beſt. 11. Here alſo confuſion cauſeth miſchief: one diſtinction might have ſcattered this miſt, viz. Between ſin indeed and ſin in notion. Sin indeed, or eſſence and exiſtence never did good nor honoured God. Sin in notion or in eſſe objectivo is no ſin, but the Matter of Vertue and 80 Joh. à Combis compend. Theol. l. 3. c. 1. tells us that ſin is profitable three wayes, 1. Ut bene ordinatur, ut fur in patibulo. 2. Propter co-actionem, & amaritudinem. 3. Propter mall conſiderationem: And many popular Books ſay the like: But this is but abuſive language tending to deceive: As if ſin did good, becauſe puniſhing ſin, and repenting of it, and hating it do good: As if hating ſin were ſin. Thus unhappily is the world troubled by abuſed words.Holineſs, and doth much good. When you ſay God knoweth ſin from eternity, you'l ſay with Scotus, that in eſſe cognito ſin was in God from Eternity: But ſo ſin is not ſin. David ſaith, My ſin is ever before me, Pſal. 51. And we daily Repent of it, and confeſs it: But this is but to have the Idea or conception of it in the mind, and ſo it is not ſin indeed but the notion of it, which is in eſſe objectivo. Elſe it would defile us to think of it, and repent of it; whereas thus ſin objectively is the matter of the grace and duty of Repentance, Hatred, fear, watchfulneſs, prayer, confeſſion, &c. And ſo ſin in eſſe objectivo as a grace may glorifie God.

610. To Aquin. that ſaith Malum non eſt appetibile he ſaith, that Malum moris quod opponitur bono, eſt proprium uniuſcujuſque; meum malum bono meo—Though the ſin of a man willing that which is forbidden him be his ſin,—yet it followeth not that God may not will this Evil of another: The Reaſon is, becauſe it is not forbidden to God to will it: wherefore though it be evil and diſhoneſt in man to will it to whom it is forbidden, yet not to God—And ſeeing that Moral Evil or ſin is ſummè conducibile, chiefly or moſt conducible to make way to repreſent p. 100Gods Goodneſs, this abundantly ſufficeth to prove it deſirable to God—We ſay that this evil which we affirm to be willed of God, is not at all evil as it is objected to the will of God, but as to the will of the creature, being forbidden the creature, but not forbidden God.

Anſw. Shall we preach thus to the people? Will this Doctrine convert ſouls to repentance or faith in Chriſt? 1. The queſtion is not, Whether to will ſin be ſin in God? But Whether he will and cauſe the ſin of man? which you ſadly aſſert.

2. Gods Glory is our End, and to forbear things prohibited is but the means: If ſin conduce as much as Chriſt and Holineſs to Gods Glory, why may we not deſire it ſub ratione medii, though not as praeceptum? We muſt deſire that which is moſt conducible to Gods Glory.

3. Though God be under no Law, his Perfection of Nature and Will is the fountain of all Laws, and inſtead of a Law to him. And we muſt be Holy becauſe our God is Holy.

4. It is ſtill falſe that ſin is any Medium to Gods Glory, or deſirable, or hath any good.

5. God is Good and delighteth to do good. And he is the Juſt Ruler Of which vid. Gibieuſ at la…ge.of the World: And I would not have Kings take ſuch Juſtice for a pattern as you deſcribe, as if God vehemently forbad ſin, and ſent his Son, and Spirit, and Miniſters as an Army againſt it into the World, and will da… men for it for ever, and yet willeth and cauſeth it, as ſummè conducibils Auguſt. de Nat. & Grat. c. 25. fol. 314. Non hoc eis dicimus quod ſibi iſte (Pelagius) oppoſuit, ut eſſet Cauſa Miſericordiae Dei, neceſſarium fuiſſe peccatum: Utinam non fuiſſet miſeria, ne iſta eſſet miſericordia neceſſaria. Id. ibid. cap. 31. Et altius Dei conſilium fateor me ignorare, cur etiam ipſam ſuperbiam, quae in re…e factis animo inſidiatur humano, non cito Deus ſanet, pro qua ſananda illi piae animae cum lacrymis & magnis gemitibus ſupplicant, ut ad …am ſuperandam & quodammodo calcandam & obterendam dextram conantibus porrigat. Even Vaſquez the Jeſuite ſaith of Gods denying men grace, and of non-entities that God willeth them, thus [Non-eſſe alicujus rei ſecundum ſe quat…nus malum quoddam ipſius rei eſt, non placet Deo—Sed ſub alia ratione placere poteſt; nec enim in eo eſt omnis ratio mali. Nam in non-eſſe alicujus rei, poteſt comparatione ad reliquum univerſum, vel ad juſtitiam vel ad poten…iam D…ialiqua ratio boni apparere, ob quā non tantum poteſt placere Deo, ſimplici complacentia, ſed etiam efficaci volunta…, qua diſcernat rem illam non facere: Similiter cum Deus alicui negat gratiam ſuam au… gloriam non placet ut malū quoddam ipſ…s eſt, … Quia ſicut non diſp… cet perſona, ſic nec malum illius ut il…ius eſt placet … ſed placet ſub alio reſpect…, ſub quo etiam non poteſt non placere: qui… ſcili…t o…tenditur in eo potentia Dei, miſer…cordia in elcctos, &c.] By this he will teach men to ſay ſo of ſin: But 1. He confeſſeth that this controverſie is not of any thing real in God; (as if he had diſtinct real acts); but only of the extrinſecal denomination of Gods Eſſence. 2. He can give no reaſon why the malum poenae of a …reature as ſuch may not …e willed of God, as much as non-entity, though not finally for it ſelf. 3. Non-entity hath not omnem rationem mali, but it is enough that it hath nullam rationem boni. 4. It is the imperfect conception of man that taketh Nothing to be any way Good. A n…gatione ſubjecti ad negationem modi valet argument…m: Non-entities are no true modes of the Univerſe. It is improper to ſay that Gods Power, Wiſdom or Mercy is glorified by any nothing or non-entity: It is by ſome being that God is glorified. 5. It's a contradiction to ſay Voluntate efficaci vult aliquid non eſſe: How is that efficax quae nihil efficit?—But God doth efficaciouſly hinder many inclined agents to act according to their inclination. And that impedition may be a Poſitive act. So diſp. 95. c. 9. he ſaith that the end of Gods Permitting ſin, is oftendere divitias gratiae ſuae & liberalitatem qu… uſus fuit erga praedeſtinat…s: denegans congruas vocationes reprobis, oſtendit praedeſtinatis, eaſdem vocati… nes, quibu… fu…runt ad gloriam praeparati, grat… omnino ipſis fuiſſe donatas. But 1. Mans act comparing himſelf with another is quid reale, & v…lltum à Deo: And the propoſition [that the other hath no grace] is quid reale, or …ns rationi…. But nothing declareth nothing. …. If Gods will be his ſimple eſſence, only diverſly denominated from effects and objects, how can nothing denominate it but as non-efficient or not-willing? Indeed it might denominate a Nolition exiſtentiae, if an Act of Gods were neceſſary to hinder exiſtence; but not where non-efficere is enough. Antonine better ſaith, l. 1. §. 17. foreign, &c. Ut, quantum ad Deos attinet ac ſuggeſtiones, adjutationes, inſpirationes ab ipſis profectas, nihil obſtet omnino quo minus juxta naturae praeſcriptum confeſtim vivam, niſi ipſe tandem in culpa ſim, qui Deorum ſubmonitiones, & tantum non claras praeceptiones, neutiquam obſervem. I marvel the Doctor inſiſteth not on his own great Reaſon, viz. Futurity is eternal, and therefore hath an eternal cauſe, which is God: And he that willeth the futurity of ſin, willeth the ſin, that is, that ſin ſhall be. This ſeemeth ſtronger than all the reſt, if the antecedent were true: And ſo he might prove that the futurity of the very form of ſin is God: For nothing is eternal but God: But the futurity of the form of ſin (according to theſe men) is eternal (or ab aetern…): Ergo it is God. But ſaith excellent Le Blank de Concord. lib. cum decret. 1. n. 55, 56. Praeſertim nullo modo probare poſſum quod Gu. Twiſ…us pluribus locis aſſerit, Decretum Dei & ejus Voluntatem eſſe ſolam & unicam Cauſam futuritionis cujuſlibet eventus: e. g. inobedientiae Adami, &c. At inquit doctus ille vir, Futuritionis quae ab aeterno fuit, nulla Cauſa dari poteſt quae ab aeterno non fuit. Reſp. Hoc ſupponit futuritionem eſſe aliquid reale à re ipſa diſtinctum, & quod cauſam aliam habeat quam res ipſa futura: At hoc falſiſſimum: Nam futuritio nil aliud eſt quam reſpectus quidam rationis & extrin…eca denominatio rei futurae—Recte ponitur arg… mentum, Ab aeterno nihil fuit praet…r Deum: Ac pro…de futuriti… quae ab aeterno fuiſſe dicitur vel nihil reale fuit, vel fuit ipſe Deus.—Quod eſt Cauſa cur res in tempore exiſtat, idem plane Cauſa eſt cur res ab aeterno extitura fuerit. Sicut quod Cauſa eſt quod res aliquando fuit, Cauſa eſt cur in aeternum dicetur praeterita—Ad effectum futurum ſufficit Cauſa futura, ſicut ad praeteritum ſufficit Cauſa praeterita—This is plain and eaſie truth.to his Ends, and ſaith [It is not evil to me, though it be to you. I'le … ment you for doing it, though it was by my Will and predetermination.] And what Juſtice ſhould Kings rather imitate than Gods?

6. Sin is not malum Deo ſo as to Hurt him, or make him Guilty: But it is, ſo as to be a Violation of his Laws, and a contempt and diſhonour to his Wiſdom, Goodneſs, Greatneſs, Authority, Juſtice, Mercy, Truth, &c. If all the World joyned in hating and blaſpheming God that made them, though you ſay, that this is not malum Dei, but malum noſtri, and therefore God may will it ut fiat as a deſirable thing, we cannot be content with ſuch confuſion. Malum is either Phyſicum vel morale; and either in aliquo or contra aliquem. God is not capable 1. Of Phyſical Evil in himſelf, and therefore we cannot hurt him; 2. Nor of Moral Evil, and therefore he can have no ſin or malignity. 3. But he is capable objectively of Injury; we can wrong him when we cannot hurt him. 4. And we are capable of being Reputativè vel moraliter Hurters and deſtroyers of God, whom we cannot hurt: Becauſe the ſinner doth it quantum in ſe; and therefore is called an Enemy to God. It is no thanks to the wicked that there is a God, who would have none (as to his Holineſs and Juſtice) if it were in his power.

Moreover, God is Good and doth good. And though he made Man freely, yet ſuppoſing that he will make him Man (a Rational free agent in his Image to Know and Love him)▪ it neceſſarily followeth that he muſt make him Holy. God cannot make a man in the Image of the Devil, and call it his own: As Parents generate Children in their own likeneſs, ſo God doth regenerate his own in his Image: He that thought it a good argument, [What Communion hath light with darkneſs, Chriſt with Belial, &c.] would ſure have taken our part in this, that God cannot be the Author or Cauſe of the Image of the Devil, and of the works of darkneſs.

611. Therefore where he addeth, that God Willeth Malum eſſe that ſin be, as the Matter of exerciſing his mercy and juſtice, not as his ſin, but tantum vult fieri malum alterius, I deny it with horror as a reproach of Gods holineſs. The terminus à quo is not the Materia miſericordia vel p. 101juſtitiae exercendae. God willeth the glory of his Mercy and Juſtice, in pardoning and puniſhing foreſeen preſuppoſed ſin: But he willeth not the ſin, but only our deliverance from it, or puniſhment for it. Suppoſe (per impoſſible) that the King had power to reſtrain all men from offending him, and yet ſaith, [I will do only what is Congruous to the Rational free nature of my ſubjects as ſuch, and not all that I can do, and therefore will reſtrain them only by Laws, except ſome few beloved ones; but I will honour my Mercy and Juſtice on offenders.] Can you hence prove, that he willeth, decreeth or loveth ut appetibilia all the Treaſons, Rebellions, Murders and Blaſphemies that are committed? It is not theſe that he willeth ut Materiam, but deliverance from theſe as from the malum à quo. If your prodigal Son be addicted to Robbing, and you could lock him up, but you reſolve that you will try him once more, and if he ro… you will let him ſuffer impriſonment and come to the Gallows, and then beg his Pardon, that ſuffering may hereafter be his warning; Here if you chooſe rightly it is not his Robbing that you will, no not ut ſit vel fiat (for you had rather he would forbear:) But only his forſaking it, and his ſuffering to that end, on ſuppoſition that he rob again.

612. Pag. 105. He ſaith that [By the ſame reaſon as God might not will the being of ſin, by his permiſsion, he might not permit it.]

Anſw. A raw unproved aſſertion: God might not make an Indifferent free-will, left to its own liberty, with a thouſand warnings and helps againſt ſin, unleſs he may alſo Deſire them to ſin. Prove this, elſe you ſay nothing.

613. He addeth that ſin be or exiſt is not only Bonum per accidens, becauſe God will make it the matter of glorifying his mercy and juſtice; but it is ex natura ſua quoddam ordinabile ad Gloriam Dei, & conſequenter Bonum eſt ex natura ſua in genere conducibilis—

Anſw. All unproved and falſe. 1. Sin is not ſo much as Bonum per accidens. 2. God doth not make it the Matter of glorifying himſelf, but only glorifyeth his Mercy and Juſtice againſt it as the terminus à quo, and not by it as the matter, though it may be called an Occaſion ſine qua non, as to this particular act and way of his ſaid glorification. 3. Much leſs is it conducible hereto, which implyeth a Medium that hath ſome natural or moral cauſality. 4. And leaſt of all is it ex ſua natura conducibile. It is not ſin, but 1. Some effects or conſequents of ſin, 2. Our deliverance from ſin, and the puniſhing of ſin, which are conducible to Gods glory.

614. Next he inſulteth over Aquinas twice, as unhappy and vain in his cenſures, with a Magna eſt Veritas & praevalebit: laborare poteſt, vinci non poteſt: And argueth that becauſe ex permiſſione infallibiliter ſequitur peccatum, therefore to permit ſin is the ſame as to will that ſin ſhall be ipſo permittente.

Anſw. 1. It's pity that ſin ſhould have ſo good an Advocate, and Gods Holineſs ſo good an Adverſary, through miſtake. And that ſo unhappy a Cauſe ſhould be managed ſo confidently and triumphantly, though it's well that it's done ſo weakly. 2. The falſhood of his aſſertion about permiſſion as general I have opened before. 1. Three ſorts of things may be ſaid to be Not hindered (which is all that Permiſſion ſignifieth.) 1. Things bent to a certain motion, 1. By Natural inclination (as a Stone in the Air to deſcend) 2. Or by Moral Vitioſity, as the Will of a wicked man. 2. Things meerly indifferent; (1. Naturally, as ſome think the Air is to motion: 2. Morally: as ſuppoſe a Will ſuch, to Good or Evil.) 3. Things averſe to that Motion (as 1. Naturally a Stone to aſcend, 2. Morally, as the will of an Angel or Saint to hate God, or the will of p. 102a wicked man to Love him.) Alſo you muſt diſtinguiſh between Not-hindering at all, and not hindering effectually.

And ſo it's clear, 1. That in the firſt caſe, the Motion will be if it be not hindered. But that it is not cauſed by not-hindering it, but by its proper moving cauſes. In the ſecond caſe the conſequence of futurity is falſe: And where the inclinations to good and evil (that is, to ſuperiour and inferiour prohibited good) are equal; yea, though antecedently ſomewhat unequal: Yet bare permiſſion aſcertaineth not futurity. 3. Much leſs in the third caſe; where the ſoul muſt have poſitive help or provocation. Sure he did not think that all or any ungodly men would infallibly Love God, if God did but Permit them.

But Gods Permitting or not hindering ſin may reſpect divers acts. 1. I… God continue not his natural ſupport, man will be no man, but be a… lated, and ſo will neither do good nor evil. 2. If God uphold mans n… ture, in its Integrity as it was in Adam, and give him not Moral means and helps of Grace, and his natural concurſe, Adams ſin would have neceſſarily followed. 3. If God give Adam both ſuch ſupport and means to ſtand, and do no more, Gods permiſſion would not have inferred the certainty of Adams ſin, when he fell, any more than before: For God withdrew no grace from him which was neceſſary to his ſtanding. 4. I… God give a lapſed ſinful man Nature and common grace, it followeth not neceſſarily becauſe God doth no more, that he will commit every ſin that he is not further hindered from: but it's certain that he will not do the works to which ſpecial grace is neceſſary. 5. If God give to the faithful the Holy Spirit, and continue his influx neceſſary to the continuation of the Power and Habits of holy actions, with neceſſary means, and do no more, this man will do ſome good and ſome evil, and though he may be equally ſaid to be Permitted to do this ſin as another, yet he may do one and not another. 6. God totally permitteth no man to ſin, but hindereth them many wayes, though he hinder not all alike. 7. It's poſſible for two men to have equal helps to duty and equal hinderances to ſin (or the ſame man at ſeveral times,) and yet for one to do the duty and forbear the ſin, and the other to commit the ſin and omit the duty; As many Schoolmen have copiouſly proved. Yet in this caſe Permiſſion would be the ſame thing to both.

But if you uſe the word [Permiſſion] as connoting the Event, then indeed you may ſay that the event (from another cauſe) will follow. And Gods non-impedition will ab eventu actionis be extrinſecally denominated Permiſſion in the one caſe and not in the other. But this is but from your arbitrary uſe of the word.

615. Next the Doctor aſſaulteth Durandus who thus argueth, Gods will followeth only his approving Knowledge. But he knoweth not ſin approvingly; being of purer eyes, &c. He anſwereth, 1. God approveth that ſin be, though he approve not ſin. 2. God willeth the manifeſtation of his mercy and juſtice: Ergo, he willeth the exiſtence of ſin as that which is neceſſarily required to it.

To which I reply, 1. The firſt anſwer is unproved and falſe. God approveth not that ſin be. If he did, few wicked men do more, as Eſti…s ſaith: For it is not ſin as ſin or evil that they will, but that it be for other ends which ſeem good. 2. He phraſeth it with his [ad qu…d neceſſario, &c.] as if God firſt willed this manifeſtation of his Juſtice, &c. as the end, and then ſins exiſtence as the means (yea, the neceſſary means): But this is falſe, as I have fully ſhewed. 1. And his own opinion ſhould confute it, that maketh one Decree only de mediis: And this p. 103particular Manifeſtation being ſome Acts of God, and not God himſelf, …or the Complacency of his Will, muſt needs be part of the media ad finem …timum. 2. And indeed ſins exiſtence is not a neceſſary means willed for …ods glory: but it is a preſuppoſed miſchief, our Deliverance from which … puniſhment for it, is willed for his glory: It is indeed neceſſary, but …ly neceſſitate exiſtentiae in eſſe praecognito as a foreſeen evil, and ſo pre…ppoſed to thoſe acts of God which are the Means of his glory.

Therefore his aſſertion of a Notitia approbationis rei tanquam Bonae in …nere Conducibilis, etſi non honeſti, is deteſtable.

616. Ibid. p. 196. He again ſaith, that Though it be diſhoneſt in the …eature to ſin, becauſe forbidden, it is not diſhoneſt in God to will that he … it by his permiſſion, it being unice conducibile to his glory—…nſw. 1. Fie upon this conducibile and unicè too. 2. Fie upon this oft …peated [permittente non efficiente;] It is utterly luſory or immodeſt: …or a man that maintaineth that no ſinner doth any thing in ſinning, but …hat God as the firſt total cauſe predetermined his will to, even as to all …e entity in act and circumſtances imaginable; and that in all omiſſions, … was a natural Impoſſibility to have done one omitted act without this …edetermining premotion: And for the man that in the next ſaith that …alum non eſt Objectum Volentis aut facientis, but ipſa effectio rei, I …y for this man yet to ſay, that the creature effecteth ſin, and God effecteth … not, is too too groſs. The common evaſion is, that ſin is not any …ing, and therefore not effectible: But why then do they ſay, that the …eature effecteth it? when they have ſaid and defended, that the crea…re doth nothing but what God doth, and what he unavoidably maketh …m do.

617. Durandus argueth, that Sin cannot be judged convenient by a …ght underſtanding: Ergo, not by God. The Doctor anſwereth, That …es own ſin cannot be judged convenient, but anothers may. He in…anceth 1. When a man willeth that an Uſurer lend him money on uſury: … When a Chriſtian Prince willeth a Turk to ſwear to a League by Ma…met: 3. When God willed that Abſalom ſhould defile his Fathers Concu…nes. And he addeth, that for us to ſin, is contrary to our right rea…n, becauſe it is forbidden and hurtful to us: But for God to will that …e ſin, is not contrary to his right reaſon, as not forbidden or hurtful … him.

Repl. 1. No man ſhould will unlawful uſury: He that willeth to Bor…w, though he cannot have it without uſury, doth not will the uſury, …ut the money non-obſtante uſura. As he that chooſeth to travell with Blaſphemer, rather than to go alone in danger, he doth not will his …laſphemy, but his company, non obſtante blaſphemia. 2. The ſame is to …e ſaid of ſwearing by Mahomet: It is only the Oath as an Oath that is … be willed, and not as by Mahomet; that is not willed but unwillingly …dured. 3. Abſaloms inſtance is anſwered before: God willed only …avids puniſhment, and the Paſſive Conſtupration as an effect of ſin, …n a foreſight of Abſaloms active Volition and ſin, and not as willing …is at all.

And we have hitherto thought that Gods holy Wiſdom and will is the Cauſe of his holy Law, and much more againſt ſin than mans is: And that God willeth not, and cauſeth not the ſin of man: And is it now come to …his, that ſin is contrary indeed to our right reaſon, but not to Gods, becauſe …e is no ſubject: You may next ſay, that Holineſs is meet for man, but not …or God.

p. 104618. Pag. 197. Again he is at it, Bonum eſſe ut ſint mala: Quia bonum eſt ut Deus finem ſibi praefixum aſſequatur: At hoc ſine intervent… mali & peccati nullo modo poteſt.

Repl. 1. It is not per peccatum ut medium, though not ſine peccat…. 2. Interventus therefore implyeth a falſhood. For in eſſe cognito ſin is antecedent or preſuppoſed to the way of glorifying Juſtice and Mercy upon ſinners; ſinners are the object: And conſequently you muſt take it (as before proved) for antecedent to the Volition or ſimultaneous.

619. He urgeth, Oportet haereſes eſſe, ut qui probati ſunt manifeſti fiant.

Anſw. That neither meaneth that men ought to be Hereticks, nor yet that God loveth, willeth or approveth that there be hereſies: But only 1. God decreeth to manifeſt the difference between the ſound Chriſtians and the reſt: 2. And he foreſeeth that there will be hereſies. 3. Therefore he decreeth to try them by the occaſion of thoſe hereſies which he foreſeeth (and hateth.) The ſame is the caſe of all tryal by perſecutions: And God willeth not the ſin of active per…ecution, but only the effect or paſſive part. So that the oportet (by your own confeſſion of it) ſignifieth no more than a Logical neceſſitas conſequentiae, which …oreknowledge without Volition will inferr.

620. He addeth [Obj. It ſufficeth that God permit ſin, (and not will it) Reſp. But either the exiſtency of ſin infallibly followeth the Permiſsion of it, or not: If not, Gods Intention may be fruſtrate: If yea, What matter is it, whether God will that ſin ſhall be, he permitting, or ſ… permit it as that infallibly it will be? ſo we obtain either of theſe, it's all one to our cauſe of predeſtination.]

Repl. 1. If it be all one, take up with that agreement; and make … further difference with them that grant you enough. 2. In caſe of ve… ment Inclination to a ſin, it would follow upon Gods total permiſſion: (but God never totally permitteth ſin.) But in other caſes, it will not follow: that is, It is not a good conſequence, that This or that ſin will be done, becauſe God doth no more to hinder it, than that which ſometime hindereth it not. And yet Gods Intention is not fruſtrate: For … will infallibly come to paſs, from its proper cauſe, which God foreknoweth: And the conſequence is good from his fore-knowledge. And is not that all one, as to the certainty of Gods intentions? 3. You phraſe it as if ſin followed Gods permiſsion, as a deficient cauſe, or as that which cannot be otherwiſe, unleſs God do more to hinder it, and ſo we… neceſſary thence neceſſitate conſequentis (or as others call it neceſſitate … tecedente) which is falſe, and oft denyed by your ſelf. 4. The very truth is, Permiſsion is a word of ſo great ambiguity and laxity, as relating to ſo many ſorts of Impedition, that it is but deluſory with… much diſtinguiſhing, to ſay ſin will or will not follow it. If you reſtra… it to a non efficaciter impedire, as is uſual, it taketh not away the amb… guity much. For ſtill the queſtion is, What muſt make it effectual, unleſs you call any impedition effectual meerly ab eventu, whatſoever it be … it ſelf.

621. He ſaith that the Univerſe would not be perfect, if there wer… perfect holineſs and no ſin, and ſo no pardon or puniſhment. But … giveth us no proof, but confident aſſertion, at all. I need not ſay, th… It would be more perfect if there were no ſin; It ſufficeth me to ſay, tha… It would be as perfect: And ſo that it is not Neceſſary to the World perfection, that there be ſin or Hell. God could have freely willed the contrary. And Gods Goodneſs could have been as fully manifeſted if i… p. 105had ſo pleaſed him, and his Holineſs too, without ſin or Hell. It's unpleaſing to me, that this good man pleadeth ſo hard againſt a neceſsity of Chriſts ſatisfaction for ſin, (in another digreſſion) and yet pleadeth as hard for a neceſsity of ſin; As if it were more neceſſary to Gods Glory than Chriſt.

622. It is very obſervable in all this controverſie, that he aſſerteth pag. 198. [That it's paſt all controverſie, that neither God, nor the moſt ſinful creature, do will any thing, but as Good. And that no man can be inſtigated to malice (or evil) but only to the Act which is evil; becauſe he that is inſtigated, is inſtigated to do ſomething. But to the evil of an act, no efficiency is neceſſary, but deficience only.] How far this is true or falſe, I have opened before. I here only note, that he confeſſeth that he that cauſeth the Act of ſin, (which he ſaith God doth more than man) cauſeth all that is cauſable.

623. Yet p. 199. he ſaith, Sin is of man only as the cauſe, when he profeſſeth that man doth nothing but what God doth to cauſe it (yea, as the firſt total cauſe) and that as to Deficiency, man can do no more than he doth without predetermination, which if God withhold, man can no more help it, than make a World. So that all the myſterie of his language is this; that becauſe man is under a Law, and God is not, therefore man doing the ſame act as moved by God, muſt be called the only cauſe of ſin, becauſe it is no ſin in God. But, if we ſpake as plain men ought to do, ſhould it not rather be thus expreſt by you [God is the chief cauſe of ſin in man, but not in himſelf?]

624. Pag. 200, & 201. he hath the ſame over and over again, that Non abhorret à recta ratione Dei velle peccatum fieri ab hominibus—Quod ex ſe habet quod conducibile eſt ad …onum tanquam Materia ſcilicet, non tantum idonea, ſed & neceſſaria exercendae divinae juſtitiae & miſericordiae: and that this manifeſtation conjunct with ſin is Deo multò appetibilius, than that Good which ſin depriveth us of (that is, Holineſs:) Becauſe this Holineſs is only the Creatures Good, and the other is the Creators Good. Anſw. But as the aſſertion is all falſe, ſo the reaſon is vain: For if he diſtinguiſh the Creator and Creature as ſubjects, he is quite miſtaken: For both is the Creatures good, and neither the Creators: For to manifeſt Juſtice and Mercy is not Gods Eſſence as in it ſelf, but his Work of Puniſhment and Mercy. And the glory of this, is but the reſplendent excellency of it as it is the appearance or Image of God. And all this is in the Creatures Holineſs: The Holineſs of Chriſts Humane Nature, and of Angels and Saints in Heaven is as much the Creators, as is his Works of Mercy and Juſtice; And Gods glory ſhineth as much in them: And it is the glory of his Goodneſs, if not of Mercy which preventeth ſin and miſery: yea, and of Mercy too: For though mercy relate to miſery, it is as well to poſsible miſery prevented, as to exiſte… miſery removed: And if he ſpeak not of Subjects, but Proprietors, the Bo…um Creaturae is alſo Creatoris.