Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 17
SECT. XVII. Of Gods Cauſing, and Decreeing Sin.
526. BUt becauſe it is the avoiding of Gods Cauſing and Willing ſin Of too many ſuch enquirers it may be ſaid with Auguſtine, de Utilit. Cred…ndi cap. 18. Dum nimis quaerunt unde ſit malum, nihil reperi…nt niſi malum. Obj. Omnis determinatio di…ina eſt immutabilis: Omnia ſiu…t Deo determinante: Ergo omnia ſiunt immut…hiliter. Reſpondet M…lan…th. Ad maj. Eſt immut…bil…s neceſſitate conſeq…entiae. Ad minor. Diſſimil…s eſt determinatio in bonis & malis actionibus: Mala ſiunt, 1. Deo praeſciente & non impedi…nte, non autem adjuvante vel impellente: Item, Deo ſuſtentante naturam & ſuum opus: Item, Deo eventus certos decernente: Strigel. in Melancth. pag. 296. Carbo Compend. Thom. 1. q. 19. a. 9. Malum ut malum nullo app…titu poteſt appeti niſi per a…id…ns. Deus …ullo modo vult malum Culpae—Deus neque vult ſi…ri malum, …que non vult, ſed permitti. Ruiz de praedeſin. Tr. 2. diſp. 13. §. 3, 4. would prove a decree to permit mortal ſin in the unjuſt and juſt ex deſtitutione & circumſtantiis. And d. 16. §. 3. he tell…th us of many wayes by which God maketh ſin the occaſion of his Grace without cauſing or willing ſin, in form or neareſt matter.which is a great reaſon of theſe Controverſies, I ſhall ſay ſomewhat more particularly of that. About which there are various Opinions.
1. Some think (as Hobbs) that no acts of the will are ſo free as not to be neceſſitated, as the motions in an Engine, though unobſerved by our ſelves, who ſee not the Concatenation of Cauſes.
527. 2. Some Dominicans, and our Dr. Twiſſe and Rutherford held, that no act natural or free can be done by any creature, without the Predetermination of Gods Phyſical efficient immediate Premotion, as the firſt total Cauſe of that act: But yet that this ſtandeth with Liberty, becauſe God cauſeth contingentia contingenter fieri. And that he ſo cauſeth every Act of ſin in all its circumſtances; and the totum materiale peccati; and all that the ſinner cauſeth: But yet that he is not the Author of ſin, nor cauſeth the form; Becauſe 1. They ſay, that ſin hath no efficient cauſe, but a deficient, which God is not, being not obliged to act: And ſin is nothing, but a privation. 2. Becauſe God is under no Law: and therefore though he do the ſame things that man doth, it is ſin in man, but not in him: And ſaith Holkot, he is the cauſe of ſin, but not the Author, becauſe he commandeth it not by his Law. 3. At other times they ſay, that ſin is formally a Relation of diſconformity to the Law of God, and God cauſeth the whole act as circumſtanced, but not the relation, which reſulteth from it. 4. And God cauſeth not ſin as ſin, but as a means to his Glory, or as a puniſhment of former ſin.
528. 3. Others ſay, as Camero, that the Intellect neceſſitateth the will, and the Objects and temptations neceſſitate the Intellect, and God cauſeth the Objects and Laws, and permitteth the Tempter.
529. 4. Others ſay, that God only as the Cauſe of Nature, 1. By Support and Concurſe neceſſary to all agents, cauſeth the Act as an Act in general, 2. And giveth Power alſo to act or not act freely, 3. And as Governour of the World doth that which he knew men would make an occaſion of their ſin, 4. And alſo by his Providence cauſeth many effects, of which mens ſins are alſo a cauſe, 5. And after bringeth good out of their evil: 6. But as to the ſin it ſelf he is no cauſe of it, either as ſin or puniſhment, either of the form, or of the Act as morally ſpecified, that is, as it is about this Forbidden object (or End) rather than another. And this opinion I take to be the undoubted truth.
530. Let it here be noted, 1. That the five things here granted are all certain truths, 2. And that they are as much as is neceſſary on Gods part, in reſpect to the events which we ſee; And unneceſſaries are not to be aſſerted; 3. That they fully ſhew God to be the perfect Governour of the World, and all therein; 4. And yet to be no Author of ſin: Let us conſider of the particulars.
531. I. It is certain that God as Creator hath made man a Vital Agent, and therefore a ſelf-actor (under him); and an Intellectual Agent, and therefore is not tyed to follow the perceptions of ſenſe alone; And a Free-willing Agent, and therefore hath a Power to Act or not Act hic & nunc, or to chooſe or refuſe, or to chooſe this rather than that as far as conſiſteth with his Neceſſary Volitions (which I acknowledged and enumerated before: which is part of Gibieufs and Guil. Camerarius Scot. meaning by their ſervato ordine finis: Though I think that Annatus doth not unjuſtly accuſe Gibieuf of confuſion and unskilfulneſs in the managing of that matter.)
532. II. It is certain that as Motus vel Actio is quid Naturale, it is of God as the firſt Cauſe of Nature: *Vid. Gregor. Arim. in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg. 8. & 12. whoſe judgement many Schoolmen follow: Vaſquez thus abbreviateth and reporteth him in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 4. [M… tionem Dei ordine cauſae priorem eſſe co-operatione & determinatione noſtra in operibus bonis: at in operibus peccati, etiam ſecundum ſubſtantiam & ſecluſa malitia priorem eſſe noſtram determination…m: & codem ordine baec inter ſe comparari in aeternita….—Ex quo inſerunt Deum praefiniſſe opera bona ante det…rminati…n…m noſtram ullo modo praeviſam; ſed mala ſecundum ſubſtantiam nequaquam, niſi praecognita determinatione noſtrae voluntatis. Vid. Marſil. in 1. q. 45. ar. 2. poſt 4. concluſ.And ſo when a ſinner acteth, it is not without this Univerſal firſt Cauſe: Whether God do it only, as Durandus thought, by the meer continuation of the nature of all things, Active and Mobile, or by any ſuperadded concurſe beſides, is nothing to our preſent buſineſs; which only ſheweth that God is the Cauſe.
533. III. It is certain that Governing Providence by doing good doth ſet before men that which they make an occaſion of all their evil: Every thing is turned into ſin by ſinners, †Titus 1. 15, 16.and to the unclean all things are unclean, through the uncleanneſs of their own minds and conſciences: As to the pure and holy all things are pure and ſanctified. Bad ſtomachs corrupt the wholſomeſt food. All Gods mercies are abuſed to ſin.
534. It is certain that God fore-knew this: And yet that he is no way obliged to deny men life, or take it away, leſt they abuſe it, or deny men all thoſe mercies, or remove them, which he foreſeeth that they will turn to ſin.
535. IV. It is certain that God often concurreth to the cauſing of the very ſame effect which ſin alſo cauſeth; and ſo is as a concauſe of it with ſin: And this effect is ſo near to the Act of ſin, as that the ſin it ſelf is oſt called by its name as if it were its neareſt matter (which it is not.) And this is the occaſion of the Great miſtake of men in this caſe, that canno… diſtinguiſh. Of which more anon in the inſtances.
536. V. And it is certain, that God as the Governour of the World, doth do much good by the occaſion of mens ſin. But this is not to turn the ſin it ſelf into good.
537. VI. And to theſe five operations of God, I add, as to his Volitions, that all this which he doth, he willeth or decreeth to do. And he hath no contrary will at all.
538. But that which we deny is, that He is any proper cauſe of the ſin it ſelf, efficient or deficient, culpable or not culpable, Phyſical or Moral; For the opening of which we muſt enquire what ſin is, and what goeth to its being or conſtitution.
539. All grant that God is our Ruler by a Law, and alſo our ultimate End as he is Optimus & Amabiliſſimus, and that he is our abſolute Owner: And that as rational free agents we that are his own, are alſo his Subjects and Beneficiaries, and made capable of Loving him as our ultimate end, and of obeying his Laws: And that ſin is our Diſobedience to theſe Laws, with our denying God our ſelves as his Own, and withholding or perverting the Love which we owe him as our End.
540. As Logick hath confounded us in moſt other caſes by arbitrary unſuitable ſecond notions (making us a Shoo not meet for the Foot,) ſo that it's eaſier to know Things without thoſe unfit notions than with them; ſo hath it done here. Men may more eaſily know what ſin is, and what it is to diſobey a Law, and that either by doing what we ſhould not, or by not doing what we are commanded, than they can know by what Logical or Metaphyſical name it ſhould be called: Whether a privation, or a relation, an act or no act, &c. But it is not only for Logicians that God made his Laws; nor is it only a Metaphyſical Conſcience that will accuſe men or condemn them, and torment them for their ſin.
541. No Act meerly as an Act in genere is forbidden of God. For the ſoul is an Active nature, and can no more ceaſe all action, than to be: though it can forbear a particular act as to this object, and at this time. And God is the Cauſe of Acts as ſuch.
542. I have ſhewed before that as Action it ſelf is no ſubſtance, but the mode or motion of a ſubſtance, ſo to chooſe this object rather than that, hath no more of Action in it than to have choſen the other, or than Ex to verb quod D…us conc… at nobiſcum ad actum peccati, prout facultas liberi arbitrii poſtulat, ſive prius, ſive poſterius, ſive ſimul, non ſequitur malitiam Deo eſſe tribuendam, cum illa ſolum ex modo operandi creaturae ſequatur. Vaſquez in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. cap. 4.the general nature of action when exiſtent hath: So that this Moral ſpecification addeth not to the natural generical entity.
543. It is therefore 1. Acting, 2. Not acting, 3. Moral diſpoſition, which are Commanded and Forbidden by God: And not any one only: and theſe not in themſelves, but about the Materials commanded or forbidden Objectively, in the Law. To Act on a forbidden object; Not to Act on an object when commanded, and to be viciouſly diſpoſed to either, is a ſin.
544. You may ſee then, that ſin is a Connotative notion, yea, and a Relative notion; It connoteth a Ruler, a Law, and End, a Subject, and is thus variouſly Related.
545. As Subjection is the Root of Obedience, and all obedience Virtually, being A Conſent to obey, and Love is the Root of benefits; ſo to forſake God ſimply as our Rector or our End, or our Owner, is Atheiſm practical, and all ſin in one: But to violate only a particular precept de mediis, is but a particular ſin.
546. God is the Cauſe of the Law which commandeth and forbiddeth, and God is the Cauſe of Nature, and Objects, and Action as Action: That therefore which he hath made mans part is to Love God and Holineſs, and not to over-love the creature, nor to love it as our End or in his ſtead: and to do all that he commandeth, and not to do the particular acts about ſuch particular objects as he forbiddeth.
547. The remote ſubject or relatum then of ſin, is the perſon ſinning; But the neareſt is the Act, Omiſsion or diſpoſition; The fundamentum or ratio referendi is the ſaid Acts, Omiſsions or diſpoſitions, as ſuch or ſuch, about ſuch or ſuch objects, commanded or forbidden; which is a Relation; And the form of ſin is the Moral Relation of Diſobedience, or Diſconformity to the Law. So that if you muſt needs have it in Logical notions, Sin is a Moral Relation, reſulting from a Phyſical relation of Actions, Omiſsions or diſpoſitions of Gods ſubjects, which are modified contrary to his Law.
548. It is a Moral Relation as it is Diſobedience, found in a Moral agent againſt a Law and Rector as ſuch. It is a Phyſical Relation as the Act, &c. is prius naturâ quid naturale, about an object that is quid naturale. Its fundamentum (of both relations: And one Relation may be ſounded in another) is the Mode of the Act, Omiſſion or diſpoſition, as to an undue object, &c. as it is forbidden by the Law. Of the ſubjects and relatum I have ſpoken before.
549. So that the form of ſin being Relative can have no Cauſe but that which cauſeth its fundamentum: and cannot poſſibly but reſult when that is laid.
550. It were an injury to God to feign him to make ſuch a Law as ſhould ſay, [Though thou hate me, ſee that that hatred be not Related formally as a breach of my Law,] or [I forbid thee not to commit Adultery, but only forbid that thy Adultery be quid prohibitum or a ſin.] For if God forbid not the act, it cannot be a ſin: and if he forbid it, it muſt needs be ſin; And ſo of omiſſions.
551. They therefore that tell us, that ſin is nothing, but a Privation, ſpeak not ſatisfactorily, nor altogether truly. It is no ſubſtance indeed; nor any ſuch Reality as Man cannot Cauſe without Gods Cauſing it (ſuppoſing his Univerſal Natural Support and Concurſe.) But the thing forbidden is often Acts and Diſpoſitions as well as Omiſsions: and the form of ſin, is a Moral Relation, which hath ſo much reality as a Relation hath (if that be any). And that Relation hath a poſitive name; It is not only a meer Non-conformity, but alſo a Diſconformity, becauſed founded in See Dr. Wallis againſt the Lord Brooke of this, very well.Actual Volitions and Nolitions as forbidden, and not only in Omiſſions.
552. Subtile Ockam Quodl. 3. q. 15. diſputing Utrum rectitudo & deformitas actus differant à ſubſtantia actus? denyeth it; and after a Confutation of the common ſaying, that Deformitas eſt carentia rectitudinis debitae, & diſtinguitur ab actu, quod in peccato Actus eſt materiale, & carentia juſtitiae debitae ineſſe eſt formale, concludeth, [Quod deformitas non eſt carentia juſtitiae vel rectitudinis debitae ineſſe actui, ſed eſt carentia rectitudinis debitae ineſſe voluntati: Quod non eſt aliud dicere, niſi quod voluntas obligatur aliquem actum elicere ſecundum praeceptum Divinum quem non elicit; & ideo rectitudo actus non eſt aliud quam qui debuit elici ſecundum rectam rationem.] But I conceive, 1. That the rectitude of the Will can be nothing elſe but the rectitude of its acts, ſuſpenſions and diſpoſitions; 2. That Ockam here deſcribeth only ſins of omiſſions, whereas the Rectitude of the Will is ofren alſo materially in not doing or willing what is forbidden. And with theſe two animadverſions I am reconciled to Ockam: who addeth, [Ad aliud dico, Quod illud dictum de Materiali & Formali eſt falſum; Quia aut eſt peccatum commiſſionis aut omiſſionis: ſi primo modo, eſt Materiale ſine formali: quia ibi non eſt carentia rectitudinis, debitae ineſſe actui: ſi ſecundo modo, tunc eſt ibi carentia quae eſt formale ſine materiali.] Reſp. 1. To the firſt I add, that It had been true, if it had been the Act as an act that had been forbidden, or elſe the ſpecies of the act as quid naturale; But it being the Act not as an act in genere, but as this act thus modified or ſpecified by an undue object, that Act with its Relation as quid phyſicum are preſuppoſed as the relatum to the moral relation of Pravity or Diſconformity. And to the ſecond I ſay, that it's true that Omiſſion is not Materia Phyſica; but it is an inadequate firſt conception of ſin, and ſo is materia moraliter dicta vel loco materiae. And the Omiſſion being conſiderable, 1. Quatenus Non-agere, 2. Qua privatio naturalis, 3. Qua & Privatio & diſconformitas moralis, theſe three inadequate conceptions take up the whole nature of the ſins of omiſſion.
553. The ſame Ockam Quodl. 1. qu. 20. Utrum actus exterior habeat propriam bonitatem vel malitiam moralem? even as dependent on the Will? And he denyeth it againſt Scotus who affirmeth it: I will not trouble the Reader with their reaſonings; not doubting but Ockam erred, and that it's true, 1. That no exterior act is Morally good or evil primarily, 2. But that ſecondarily and participatively as it is voluntary, there is a morality in the acts. Words, and deeds, and paſsions are under Law next to the Will, and in dependance on it. As the body conjunct with the ſoul is a ſecondary part of the man, ſo are our exterior acts of ſin.
554. The conceit that making ſin a meer nothing, doth ſeem to juſtifie God as not Cauſing it, is a meer vanity. For, 1. It juſtifieth the ſinner more; who no more is the Cauſe of nothing than God. 2. Either man is able to do that Something or Act which ſin is the privation of, without any other Power than he hath, or not. If he be, then even the Act of ſin is not imputable to God: If he be not, then every ſin is like our not making of a Sun, or Moon, or World: which if it be a culpable defect, they make God the firſt deficient.
555. He that would ſee more of this queſtion of the eſſence of ſin, may read Rada lib. 2. contr. 16. (who firſt ingenuouſly confeſſeth that Tho. and Scotus differ but in words and not in ſenſe, and then layeth down eleven concluſions of little uſe.) And Marius Scribonius Coſmo. diſp. 18. Scotus in 2. d. 37. Bonavent. in 2. d. 35. dub. 6. Henric. Quodl. 1. qu. 25. Alm…in. Moral. tract. 3. cap. 17. Richard. in 2. d. 34. ar. 1. qu. 7. Alex. Ale…ſ. 2. q. 94. memb. 2. Durand. 2. diſ. 31. q. 2. Medin. 12. q. 71. ar. 6. Specially Vaſquez 12. diſp. 95. cap. 9. Guil. Camerar. Scot. Diſput. Philoſ. Part. 1. Mor. q. 3. pag. 162, &c. Argent. in 1. d. 35. q. 1. ar. 2. Gabriel Biel 2. d. 36. q. unica. Valent. 1. 2. d. 2. q. 14. p. 3, &c. Suarez 1. 2. tract. de act. hum. d. 2. ſect. 2. Azor. li. 4. c. 24. Tanner. 1. 2. diſp. 2. q. 5. dub. 2. & 3. & diſp. 4. q. 1. dub. 1. Vega in Trident. 6. c. 39. & li. 14. c. 13. Cordub. l. 3. q. 10. & Cajet. Zumel. Curiel, & alios in 1. 2. q. 19. ar. 4. & q. 71. ar. 6. And, who is uſually ſounder than moſt of them, Lombard himſelf Diſt. 35. & Ripalda opening him and citing others diſt. 34, 35.
But the ordinary Chriſtian that underſtandeth but what Diſobedience ſignifieth, needeth none of them all.
556. *It is not only Dr. Twiſſe (after confuted) that ſuppoſeth ſin to be willed of God as conducible to the perfection of the World, but even Ruiz the Jeſuite de Provid. diſ. 2. ſec…. 4. p. 27. maintaineth that Minus perfectus evaſiſſet Mundus ſi nulla permitterentur peccata; nune autem …aſit perfectior occaſione peccatorum: and citeth Aquin. Alexand. Albert. Bonav. Richard. Agid. Caiet. Ferrar. Marſil. for the ſame. But 1. An occaſion is no cauſe nor medium, as ſuch, and therefore never the more willed, if that were true. 2. But I have before briefly confuted the Schoolmen on both ſides about this queſtion, viz. Particular Creatures would be to themſelves better, were there no ſin: but whatever poſſible alterations were made by God, the Univerſe would be neither worſe nor better than it is, as to that proper Goodneſs which muſt abſolutely denominate it: For the Goodneſs of all Creatures is to be conform to the Creators Will, which is the denominating meaſure of fundamentum; And ſo they are, and ſo they would be, were they altered: But ſin is diſform to his Commanding Will, and not conform to his Complacence or Efficient Will. He argueth, Had there been no ſin, there had been no ſuch exerciſe of Liberty, no Saviour, &c. Anſw. And are t…e Angels worſe than man? And had not all this been as good, if God had willed it?Though the five acts of God forementioned about ſin, are as far as we need to go, to the common Ends which we agree in, yet many objections are made againſt this much as not ſufficient, but God muſt have a greater hand in ſin: And 1. They object, that to make God but an Univerſal Cauſe, is to put ſomething in being, viz. the Act in ſpecie morali, which God is not the Cauſe of; And ſo, 1. To make Him idle and unactive as to that: 2. To deifie man by making him a firſt Cauſe of that moral ſpecies. To which I ſhall lay down ſuch anſwers as I think will ſatisfie the conſiderate, to this Objection which is indeed their All: But I am ſorry that the ſubject occaſioneth me to repeat what I ſaid before.
557. 1. Remember that even an Act in genere is not a ſubſtance; And that the moral ſpecification is leſs as to natural entity than it; indeed making no addition of Entity to it, as was ſhewed. And Dr. Twiſs aſſerteth, that this moral ſpecification is not a proper ſpecification of acts.
558. 2. Note that few dare ſay, that God is not Able to make a free agent with Power to chooſe or refuſe without Gods further predetermining premotion. And if God can do it, we have no reaſon to debaſe his work, and think he did not.
559. 3. Note, that for God to make a ſelf determining agent that ſhall act without his predetermination, is but to put forth his own Active Power with limitation or ſuſpenſion, that is, To Will and Act or Operate, ſo far and no further.
560. 4. And note, that this reſtriction of the Divine operation is not from any finiteneſs of his power, as if he could do no more, but from the freedom of his Will, and the Conduct of his Wiſdom, who ſeeth it good to do no more.
561. 5. Above all note, that as all Divines agree, that God doth not Act ad ultimum poſſe, as natural agents do, ſo the truth is moſt evident in the finiteneſs of the World, and the effects of his Power: For God doth not make as many men or other creatures as he could do: He doth not make every man as ſtrong, or wiſe, or good, or long-lived as he could do: He doth not make every Stone, or Clod, or Tree as Active as he could do, nor move every thing as ſwiftly as he could do. Now all that is undone which God could do, all poſsibles which are not exiſtent or future, do tell us plainly that God doth freely ſuſpend the action or operation of his Power, totally as to them: which is much more than to ſuſpend it but in part with free agents, and to give them a Natural ſelf-determining power, without further pre-moving predetermination of them. If all the World tell us, that he hath the far greater ſuſpenſion, why ſhould we think the leſs abſurd?
562. 6. And Reaſon telleth us (what the Schoolmen oft ſay) that God who ſheweth us that he delighteth in wonderful variety of his creatures, doth very fitly thus beautifie the Univerſe by a middle rank of creatures, that ſtand between Confirmed Angels, and the Brutes, viz. Intellectual-free-agents, left to a natural Power of free chooſing or refuſing, without neceſſitation, in the midſt of various objects, to prepare them by tryal for a better ſtate.
563. 7. And note too, that we ſay not that Gods predetermination of mans will deſtroyeth its beſt Liberty: God can predetermine the will to Good as he doth the Angels, as a great bleſſing and felicity: To predetermine the will phyſically, is to end that Liberty to that particular act, which conſiſted partly in being undertermined: But that Liberty which conſiſteth in deliverance from all true evil, is increaſed by ſuch a Gracious predetermination: And therefore Janſenius pleadeth only for the neceſſity of predetermination to Good by medicinal Grace, and not to Evil, or meer Natural actions. Yet we ſay, that even to Good, God can procure the will to determine it ſelf, by moral means, which infinite Wiſdom can ſufficiently improve. But it is only 1. A natural power to act without predetermination from God or Others, 2. And a Liberty of Condition, from all predetermination ab extra, to evil (from God or Creatures) which I here aſſert and plead for in this cauſe.
564. 8. Much leſs do we take the Will from under the Power and Government of God: For, 1. It could have no ſelf-determining Power but of God, one moment. 2. He giveth it this power, to make us capable ſubjects of Moral Sapiential Government. 3. He giveth us Governing Laws accordingly. 4. And he attaineth all his Ends and fulfilleth all his Will, as perfectly in conſiſtency with our power and freedom as if we had none ſuch at all: ſo that God hath his proper Will, whether men Will or not.
565. But the turning point of difficulty here is, Whether God is ever Cauſa partialis? and if we ſo make him, is it not injurious to his perfect operations? All our Controverſies turn upon the deciſion of this one queſtion. See the End.For if we may conceive of God, as Scotus ſpeaketh, like one that draweth at the ſame Ship with another; and the act of both muſt concurr to the effect; then all is eaſie, and we may ſay when men Love not God, repent not, believe not, &c. that God did his part, but the ſinner did not his, and ſo the effect failed. As if a Father did reſolve that he will help I remember one derideth John Goodwin for this ſimilitude or the like, (Mr. Roborough.)his little Child to lift up a weight, and will put to nine hundred ninety nine parts of the ſtrength that is neceſſary, but no more, becauſe the Child ſhall do ſomething (one part) to ſhew his willingneſs and obedience; Here if the thing be done, it is the Father that deſerves nine hundred ninety nine parts of the praiſe: If it be undone, the Child only doth deſerve the blame. But we have more to ſay.
566. Note therefore, 1. That here the Child hath in himſelf a Power independent on his Father, and therefore the whole effect is not to be aſcribed to the Father. But man hath no Power but of God, and what he holdeth, yea, and uſeth in dependence on him. And therefore the praiſe of all his Power and his Acts as Acts are due to God. 2. And all the good Inclinations of his will, and all the Laws, promiſes, perſwaſions, threatnings, mercies, afflictions, examples, convictions, which tend morally to turn his will, are from God; ſo that in every good Volition or action man doth no more than God did both enable him, command him, perſwade him and help him to do, and ſo procure the actual determination of his will. So that de re we ſee how much God doth alwayes (beſides that Grace may ſometimes for ought I know otherwiſe predetermine:) And we ſee what man doth: And all that you can deſire more is, that no man that doth any good act, ſhould be able at that inſtant not to do it, or to do otherwiſe; and then it muſt follow that no man that omitteth a good act, or that ſinneth, could do otherwiſe: which are falſe. *Molina maketh God Cauſam partialem 1. p. q. 14. a. 3. diſp. 6. Sotus li. 2. Phyſ. diſput. de cauſis denyeth it; And Zumel diſputeth againſt it in Diſp. in 1, 2. Thom. p. 43. Concl. 2. And ſo do many others; And great diverſity here is among them while ſome affirm and ſome deny, but none of us underſtand the myſterie of divine concurſe.So that here is only the lis de nomine left, An Deus ſit Cauſa partialis? I think it fitteſt to ſay, that he is Cauſa totalis of his own Act, and of the effect as it is an Act, and of all that is laudable in it too, for the reaſons aforeſaid. But yet he is not the Cauſa ſola, nor in that ſenſe totalis of the Moral ſpecification, as if when he giveth his Creature a Power of chooſing or refuſing freely, it could not be done, without his further phyſical predetermination.
567. And (under favour) I take the name Cauſa partialis, to be improper, and that it ſhould properly be called Pars Cauſae: For when divers concurr in efficiency, all make but one proper efficient Cauſe. †So ſay Ockam and Gabriel Biel though Zumel call it a moſt improper mode of ſpeaking, becauſe ſo no one Cauſe could be called Total: And why ſhould it, if it be not? (except that God is above our order, and ſo not a Part.) Bonavent. in 1. diſ. 38. q. 2. inquit, Futurum triplex eſt: Quoddam eſt cujus Deus eſt tota Cauſa, ut Creata: Quoddam cujus Creatura, aut Voluntas eſt Tota Cauſa, ut ſunt defectus & peccata: Quoddam cujus Deus & Creatura ſimul ſunt Cauſa, ut ſunt opera naturalia & moralia; quia Deus cooperatur creaturae: Reſpe…u primi futuri Divina praeſcientia eſt tota cauſa: ſecundi non cauſa: tertii eſt Cauſa ſed non tota. Gab. Bi…l in 2. d. 37. bringeth in Scotus ſaying [Licet Deus Volendo cauſat omnia quae cauſat, non tamen ideo eſt Cauſa totalis: quia vult etiam ſecum concurrere alias cauſas, & utrumque vult, & effectus eſſe, & ſecum concurrere Cauſas ſecundas, non diverſis, ſed una Volitione, nec unum plus alio, ſed aeque utrumque & ſimul—Et nulla Creatura eſt Cauſa totalis—Quia ſemper concurrit Deus ut Cauſa partialis—Et ad dub. 2. ex Greg. Arim. Nobiſcum …anquam Cauſa partialis producit actum malum. Gregor. Arim. his words are (in 2. d. 34. a. 3.) Actus mali quem efficit Peccator, Deus eſt immediata Cauſa: Partialis tamen, co-efficiens actum eundem. Of Greg. Arim. ſee more in the concluſion of this Chapter.Now I ſuggeſt to the Learned Reader that is againſt me, How he will decide the forementioned hard queſtion, Whether there be more Entity in God and the Creature than in God alone? It is dangerous ſaying Yea or Nay: and we know not well what to ſay: But for my part, as I ſaid, I will not ſay that God is Pars Entitatis, nor yet that the Creature is not Ens, nor yet that it is God: But the ſolution muſt be either from the Equivocation of Entity, or from the Creatures Inexiſtence in God, or from ſomewhat rather which I know not. And juſt ſo here; the queſtion is, Whether Gods Cauſation and Mans be more than Gods alone? And I will not ſay that Gods is a Part; nor yet that Mans is none, nor that it is the ſame with Gods: But that Gods acting and concurſe are quite above the reach of Mortals.
568. But here again note what I ſaid even now, 1. That it is no more ſign of finiteneſs in God, nor diſhonour to him, to be a limited or Partial Cauſe, than to be no Cauſe, and limited totally by ſuſpenſion of the whole act: And yet ſo he is as to all Poſſibles which he doth not make or move. 2. And that it is his own free will only that thus limiteth him; As it doth from giving all men more grace, &c. So that really here is matter of ſatisfaction.
569. Though he offend me by making God the Cauſe of ſin, I will here cite the words of our Countrey-man, Holkot Quodl. lib. 2. qu. 1. [Eſt ſententia omnium Theologorum quod Deus eſt Cauſa immediata omnis rei productae, ſic quod omni creaturae agenti, ſive ſit Natura ſive Voluntas, Deus coagit: & ſic imaginandum eſt quod in omni actione creaturae qua aliquid producit, Deus & Creatura ſunt duae cauſae Partiales illius producti: Non ſic imaginando quod Deus producit unam partem effectus, & creatura aliam, & ob hoc dicatur Cauſa partialis—ſed ideo quia concurrunt in agendo vel cauſando—Unde tam cauſa univerſalis quam particularis dicitur communiter cauſa partialis: & ideo etiam Sol & Hom… ſunt duae cauſae partiales hominis generandi; & ſimiliter Vir & Mulier: Quia ad hoc quod aliquid dicitur cauſa partialis ſufficit quod ſit tale quod propter ipſum & quoddam aliud vel quaedam alia res ponatur in eſſe, ſit quod illis poſitis res eſt, & aliquo iſtorum ablato res non fiet.]
570. Further I deſire that it may be ſpecially noted, that God is our Creator in order of Nature before he is our Ruler; And that Nature is before Morality, (obedience or ſin.) And that God as Creator firſt ſetled the order of Nature ſo, as that the Alteration of that Law or ſetled Order ſhould not be ordinarily expected by us, though he can alter it: And therefore that man is man, and hath a Natural Power of Self-determination, and that God upholdeth him, and concurreth as an Univerſal Cauſe, belongeth to this fore-ſetled natural order, and is preſuppoſed to moral determinations and ſpecifications, either as from God or man.
571. And note, that to Good Acts we have need of more Help from God, than this meer Natural Cauſality and Concurſe. And therefore God affordeth us more accordingly; but not to all alike.
572. It is further objected, againſt this way, that our making Reprobation to Infidelity, Permiſsion of ſin, not-giving faith, &c. to be no Acts of God, cometh all to one as to mens ſin and damnation; becauſe man cannot believe, nor avoid ſin, without thoſe Acts of Grace which God withholdeth?
Anſw. I confeſs it were all one if the ſuppoſition were true, as it is not: For we have proved after, that man hath power without thoſe acts of Grace which God ſuſpendeth, by that Common Grace which he giveth, to do more good and forbear more evil than they do: Of which in due place.
573. It is objected alſo, that while we make Gods Providence to fill the World with occaſions of ſin, which he fore-knoweth men will take to their damnation, yea, as long as God could prevent all ſin, and ſave all ſouls, and yet will not, it cometh all to one which way ſoever you go in theſe Controverſies.
I anſwer, 1. Undoubtedly Gods Judgements are unſearchable. But when we come into his Light, we ſhall be perfectly reconciled to them all. 2. And undoubtedly God doth whatſoever he will, and all that he thought meet to Decree or Will, ſhall come to paſs in deſpight of ſin. 3. And when we have ſaid all, fleſh and blood will be unſatisfied, till faith and the will of God do ſatisfie us. 4. But yet be it known to you, that there is a great difference between Gods permitting ſin (after great means againſt it) and his cauſing it: Between the making of a free agent, and putting life or death in his choice; and his cauſing men unavoidably to ſin, and then to damn them for it. The Holineſs of Gods Nature will ſtand with the Being of ſin, by mans cauſing; but not with Gods cauſing it. And the Truth of Gods Word muſt be conſidered.
574. If this were all one (to Damn men unavoidably, and to give them their free choice of Heaven or Hell, in the means) it is ſtrange that ſo many Learned men as among the Jeſuits, Arminians, Lutherans and Greeks, do hold no other Grace at all, but what leaveth man to ſuch a free Choice, could ever be ſo ſatisfied: (when others hold that the Elect have more.)