Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 4
SECT. IV. Of Gods Relations to the Creature and denominations (thereupon) in his Power, Knowledge and Will.
36. THe Three Divine Eſſential Principles, Related to the Creature, ad extra are denominated, 1. His Omnipotence, 2. His Omniſcience or Knowledge of them, 3. His Volition and Love of them. He who is Potentiſſimus, perfectly Powerful in Act, in Himſelf, is denominated Omnipotent, becauſe he can do all things ad extra which belong to That Gods Power is Infinite, quia eſt ipſa Infinita Eſſentia, is paſt doubt: But whether it may be called Infinite, as reſpecting outward objects, is diſputed: And ſome prove the affirmative, by aſſerting Infinite Objects: But Gregor. Ar. n. 1. d. 43. q. 2. hath reaſons too ſubtile to be here recited: One of them Vaſq. uſeth in 1. Tho. q. 25. d. 103. c. 2. & diſp. 104. Vid. opiniones Gabriel. Scoti & Thomae de ratione nominis Omnipotentia Divinae.Power: 2. And he who is Intellectus ſe Intelligens ad intra, is denominated Omniſcient or Knowing all Creatures, from the exterior objects: 3. And he who is Voluntas ſe Volens, or Amor ſe Amans ad intra, is alſo denominated willing of exterior things.
37. But (by the way) how the Creature is called exterior to God who is Eſſentially every where and in all, and how God is not a Part of Univerſal Being, and how God and the Creature are no more than God alone, is elſewhere ſomewhat explained, but tranſcendeth mans Underſtanding to comprehend.
38. Gods Tranſient Acts are of two ſorts: 1. Effectively Tranſient (as Creation, Regeneration, &c.) which do cauſe ſomewhat without. 2. Objectively only Tranſient; which cauſe nothing, but ſuppoſe the Object.
39. It is a dreadful thing to be over-bold, raſh and preſumptuous, in ſpeaking and aſſerting any thing without clear proof, of Gods Knowledge and Will; eſpecially to reduce them to all the Modes and Methods of a man, even as to the order of his Acts: ſeeing we are forced to confeſs, that even Intellection and Volition are ſpoken of God with exceeding great impropriety, D'Orb…llis 1. d. 40. inquit […icet in Deo non ſit proprie Habitus, eſt tamen ibl aliquid intellectum à nobis per modum habitus, ſiquidem ſcientia in nobis eſt Habitus ad cognoſcendum, ſicut Virtus eſt habitus ad operandum. Cognitio Divina cum ſemper maneat, congrue ſignatur per modum habitus.]and mans Acts which are the prius ſignificatum, are further below Gods, than a Worm is below a Man. Therefore were it not that the preſumption of the Schools and Polemical writers, hath made that Neceſſary as Defenſive, which elſe would not be ſo, I ſhould ſcarce dare to ſay this little following:
40. I. The Power of God is denominated Relatively Omni-potency in three inſtants to Three ſeveral Objects: 1. In the firſt inſtant, as to All things which belong to Power: And ſo God can do all things, which are hence called Poſſible. 2. In the ſecond inſtant, to All things meet or Congruous to the Divine Intellect to be willed and done: And ſo we ſay, that God can do All that is meet to be done, and nothing that is unmeet. 3. In the third inſtant (of reaſon) as to All things which he willeth to do: And ſo we ſay, that God can do whatſoever he will do. And ſo Poſſibility hath various ſenſes.
41. II. Gods Intellect is Relatively denominated Omniſcient, in reſpect …eid. Rom. quodl. 3. q. 3. ſaith, That Gods ſpeculative knowledge is before his Velle; but his Practical determined ad o…s is after as we muſt conceive of it.to three ſorts of Objects alſo in three inſtants: 1. In the firſt inſtant he knoweth all Poſſibles, in his own Omnipotence: For to know things to be Poſſible, is but to know what He can do.
2. In the ſecond Inſtant he Knoweth all things, as Congruous, eligible and Volenda, fit to be Willed: And this out of the perfection of his own wiſdom: which is but to be perfectly Wiſe, and to know what perfect Wiſdom ſhould offer as eligible to the Will.
3. In the third inſtant he knoweth All things willed by him as ſuch (as Volita): which is but to know his own Will, and ſo that they will be.
42. In all theſe inſtances we ſuppoſe the Things themſelves not to have yet any Being: But ſpeak of God as related to Imaginary beings, according to the common ſpeech of men.
43. Theſe therefore are not properly Tranſient Acts of God; becauſe it is but Himſelf that is the object indeed, viz. His own Power, Wiſdom and Will, though it be de creaturis in that which is called his Idea's.
44. It is uſual with Divines to aſcribe Idea's to the Divine Intellect, after the manner of men, againſt which I quarrel not, but am my ſelf afraid of preſumption.
45. From what is ſaid, you may ſee, that the Common School diſtinction of all Gods Knowledge, into ſcientia ſimplicis Intelligentiae, & purae Viſionis, is not accurate, and the terms are too arbitrary and dark to notifie the thing intended; and that the ſcientia media added doth not mend the matter: And that a fitter diſtinction is plain and obvious.
46. III. Alſo the Will of God as Related to things not yet exiſtent, hath in ſeveral inſtants a threeſold object, (as we may conceive of God after the manner of men.)
1. The Poſſibility of things, which God is ſaid to Will, in Willing his own Power as reſpecting them.
2. The Congruity, Goodneſs and Eligibility of things, as in his own Knowledge; which is but to Will the perfection of his own Underſtanding.
3. The Future exiſtence of things Good and Eligible, to be produced in their fitteſt ſeaſon.
47. They that ſay God can do no more than he doth, muſt mean only in the ſecond and third inſtants or ſenſe; or ſpeak very preſumptuouſly, if not blaſphemouſly.
48. That God doth not all that he Can do, is no note of imperfection in his Wiſdom or Will, but is from the perfection of both.
49. Nor doth it hence follow that he hath either a Vain or an Unactive Power. For his Power is his perfection, and therefore not Vain: And it is ever eſſentially Active in himſelf, as he is the Living God: And was neither Vain nor Unactive when there was yet no Creature.
50. Gods Power doth not therefore Create or operate ad extra meerly as Power; For then it ſhould do ſo ad ultimum poſſe, and from Eternity: But as it Voluntarily puts forth the effect.
51. Gods Knowledge meerly as Knowledge, or as the Knowledge of Congruities, Future things, yea, or things Exiſtent, is not Efficient, nor yet as it concurreth with his Will ut finis (or his Will of Complacency;) But only as it concurreth with his Efficient Will.
52. Gods Knowledge and Will effect nothing ad extra, but by and with his Active Power, as efficient.
53. Therefore Bradwardine and many other Schoolmen, do not congruouſly ſay, that Gods meer Volition without any Effective Power is all his Cauſing Influx: Unleſs they thruſt two Conceptions into one word, and mean a powerful active Volition. For, 1. By the ſame reaſon that we muſt aſcribe to God Intellection and Volition, we muſt alſo aſcribe Active Power; Theſe being three principles in his Image. 2. And in Man Meer Willing effects not. 3. And they that ſay God willeth ut eveniat peccatum ipſo non efficiente, ſed permittente, ſuppoſe that he willeth ſomething which he effecteth not. But againſt them in this Suarez and others have ſaid enough.
54. Though Gods Nature have no Real Accidents, but ſimple eſſential perfection, yet Relations, or Relative Accidents are not to be denyed of him. For indeed (as Ockam hath copiouſly proved) *That Relations have no entity extra intellectum prae…er abſolutum, Ockam in many diſputes in his Quod lib. ſheweth.Relations have no real Entity, or are nothing beſides the Abſoluta and the Act of Reaſon about them. †Relation is but comparabilitas.Relation is but rerum Comparabilitas, which Reaſon uſeth by actual comparing conceptions of them.
55. Though the Thomiſts ſay, that man only is Related to God, *An Relationes reales ſint in Deo ad Creaturas, e. g. Creator, Dominus, &c. Affirmatur ab Ockam & Gabr. 1. d. 30. q. 5. Durand. q. 3. Marſil. 1. q. 32. a. 1. Greg. Ar. 1. d. 28. q. 3. a. 1. Pet. Hurtad. Negatur à Thomiſtis: ſed eſt Lis de nomine ut notat Vaſquez in 1 Tho. q. 13. a. 7. Nullum quippe fundamentum de novo eſt ex parte Dei, ſed creaturae: Ideo Thomiſtae …ocant Relationē rationis.relatione rationis, and not God to man, yet Pet. Hurtado de Mendoza and others ſtrongly aſſert, that God himſelf hath not only Relationes rationis and Tranſcendental, but predicamental Relations alſo; as Creator, Dominus, Rector, &c. which the Scriptures conſtantly aſcribe to him; And which indeed are no way notes of Imperfection. For if it be no Imperfection in God to Create, Redeem, Sanctifie, Rule, &c. it can be none to be related to us as a Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, Ruler, &c. For it is nothing more.
56. As Gods Immanent Acts are his Eſſence, but not ſimply as Eſſence; but as Eſſence in the diſtinct Acts of ſelf-living, ſelf-knowing, ſelf-loving, related to Himſelf: ſo his Actions ad extra are his Eſſence as Related to the Creature, but not ſimply as Eſſence, but as Eſſence-Acting.
57. Gods Will as meerly Ordinant or Dirigent effecteth only Order and Direction, but not the Subſtances ordered.
58. His Will quà Finis is not Efficient.†Bonavent. in 1. d. 45. q. 2. Reſol. Deus non dicitur Omni-volens, ſicut Omnipotens & Omniſciens, cum Voluntas abſtrahat & à ratione actualitatis, & à ratione cauſae. See his plain explication of it. Vide Alliac. in princip. 1. At è contrà Bradward. l. 1. c. 10. cor. pag. 197. But not accurately enough; though it ſeems but lis de nomine.
59. His Will quà Finis is his Will as Pleaſed by being Fulfilled.
60. All that is Good is Pleaſing to God, and ſo is the final fulfilling of his Will.
61. God willeth efficiently all that is Good, which cometh to paſs; For all Good that is ever done, is done by him, though not by him only.
62. But he willeth the various production of things, as they are variouſly produced; ſome ſolely by Himſelf, and ſome by Creatures and means; ſome neceſſarily by neceſſitated agents, and ſome freely by free agents.
63. As Gods Efficient Will cauſeth the thing willed (whether ſubſtance, accidents, rule, order, &c.) ſo his Final Will or Complacence ſuppoſeth the Pleaſing thing in Being: That is, If it be the Thing it ſelf, that he is Pleaſed in, it is ſuppoſed Exiſtent; If the thing as Paſt, it is ſuppoſed Paſt, or that it was exiſtent; If the thing as future, or fore-known, or fore-willed, it is not the thing it ſelf that is in that inſtant properly ſaid to Pleaſe him, but his own Knowledge and Will concerning it: Though we uſe to call this, The Thing in eſſe Cognito aut Volito.