Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 19

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable · Section 19

p. 106SECT. XIX. The ſame doctrine in Rutherford de providentia confuted.

625. I Have been too long in confuting this Digreſſion of Dr. Twiſſe which is contrary to the commoneſt doctrine of Proteſtants; and The ſumm of their opinion.I think ſoundeth not well in Chriſtians ears: The ſumm of which is this: [Neither God nor Devil do will ſin as it is evil; but God is the firſt willer of its exiſtence, becauſe it is in its own nature ſumme & unice conducibile to the manifeſtation of his Juſtice and mercy: And willing and Loving being all one in God, he thus ſingularly Loveth the exiſtence of ſin, above its contrary (holineſs) for this end: And by Predetermining premotion (which he much more largely writeth for elſewhere) he cauſeth as the firſt total Cauſe all that man Cauſeth; But it is ſin in man becauſe forbidden him, but not in God, becauſe not forbidden him; And therefore God is not to be ſaid to cauſe ſin (though he cauſe all that is cauſed) but to permit it, becauſe he cauſeth it not in himſelf; nor is he to be called a Deficient cauſe of our omiſſions, becauſe he is not bound to Actuate us; but man is to be called the efficient and deficient cauſe, becauſe he is under an obliging Law, Though God made that Law: And though he can no more than a ſtone act without phyſical predetermination, nor forbear acting when ſo acted, yet he is to be called free, becauſe he is actually willing (or his will doth act) and becauſe he is predetermined by none but God.] This is the true ſence of their opinion as opened by themſelves. I ſhall now briefly conſider what Rutherford ſaith to the ſame ſence.

626. Cap. 15. pag. 186. To Annatus charging Twiſſe as denying Gods permiſſion of ſin, becauſe he maketh him the **Nec omnino negari poteſt Voluntatem Dei eſſe Cauſam rerum omnium quas fieri velit. Twiſſ. recitante etiam Rutherf. de Prov. c. 15. p. 186. See all their Reaſons for Gods cauſing ſin, or willing its exiſtence anſwered by Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp. 26. p. 262, 263, 264, 265. As alſo againſt Gods predetermining to the immediate materiale peccati: disp. 27. p. 270, &c. disp. 28, & 29, & 30, &c. uſ que ad p. 580. As to the common ſaying that God willeth not ſin as ſin; all men will confeſs (Dr. Twiſſ. often) that neither doth a wicked man do ſo. Peccans ut ſic non intendit peccatum quoad illud quod eſt formale in peccato, ſeu carentiam conformitatis; ſed intendit actum ut eſt in genere moris, inquit Aureolus in 2. d. 42. a. 3. pag. 319. I will not conceal a more difficult argument than moſt of theirs, which may occurr to others: God cauſed (e. g. in Nathana…l, Peter, &c.) this act of ſaith before Chriſts coming; [the Meſſiah is to come hereafter.] When Chriſt was come, this was falſe, and ſo evil: God ſtill cauſed the faith which he gave them. Therefore he cauſed an untrue belief and evil, and that ſupernaturally. But I anſw. 1. God cauſed the habit of their faith, and the act. The nature of the habit was in general A belief of all divine revelations: and in ſpecial A belief in the promiſed Meſſiah. The termination of the act on the Meſſiah as future rather than as Incarnate, required nothing poſitive in the Habit: The ſame Habit ſerved to both acts, unleſs the latter being for the nobler act had ſome addition; but the former needed none. 2. And that this Habit might bring forth the act in that circumſtance, no more was neceſſary but 1. Gods word [Chriſtus venturus eſt.] 2. And Gods influx on the habited faculty to cauſe it to act according to that habit: So that when God had reverſed that word [Chriſtus venturus eſt] he was no longer the cauſe determining the mind to believe that word; but only the cauſe that the habit of faith was ſtill towards Chriſt: But not at all ſub ratione venturi. For the determining word was called in, and it was an imperfection not to know ſo much, where it was not a ſin.Prov 15Cauſe of the Act, the Liberty and the Prohibition, and to Cauſe is not to Permit; he hath no better anſwer than to ſay, that God doth not permit the Act, nor the Evil of the Act, but he permitteth the evil act: and 2. To ſay that the Dominicans and Jeſuits hold the ſame as he. Which is to jeſt with holy things, and not to argue. As if he ſaid, God made neither the ſoul nor the body, and yet he made the man. What! is it (as it's ſaid, that non animaſed unio eſt vita) ſo Doth God permit the Union of Actum and Mal…m? No, that he pretendeth not.

627. To prove that God willeth the exiſtence of ſin, he bringeth the inſtance of Joſeph's caſe, Gen. 45. To which I ſay that the text ſaith not at all that God willed the Will or Act or Sin of Joſeph's brethren; but only the Venditio paſſiva or effect and the conſequents; Nay only the conſequents are mentioned in the Texts: His replyes to the anſwers prove no more than the five things which I before aſſerted about ſin. Nothing ſo much deceiveth them, as not diſtinguiſhing between the ſinful act, and the effect or paſſion, when they are called by the ſame name (as Selling, Killing, &c.)

628. His next inſtance is of Chriſts death, of which I ſaid enough before: But 1. He underſtandeth his adverſaries as aſcribing only the Conſequents p. 107of Crucifixion to Gods will; which is his miſtake: It is Crucifixion it ſelf paſſivè ſumpta which they aſcribe to it (ſome of them at leaſt.) And let men too wiſe againſt God deride it as much as they will, God can will and Love that Chriſt be Crucified, and yet hate and not will the will and act of the Crucifiers, but only foreſee it, as aforeſaid. And let them jeer God as Idle or aſleep, if he neither will nor effectually nill the ſin; we will believe it to be his perfection and liberty, which they ſo deride. 2. And whereas he addeth that Active Verbs are uſed as Gen. 45. Miſit me Deus, Iſa. 53. Deus voluit eum conterere, Zech. 13. Ego percutiam Paſtorem: and God delivered Chriſt to death: I anſwer, It is too too groſs to perſwade us hence that any of theſe Texts ſay that God willeth the ſinners will or Act. [God ſent me] ſpeaketh Gods act, that is, his diſpoſal of the effects and conſequents of them: But doth this ſignifie, [God willed your malice or your act?] God did bruiſe Chriſt; which ſignifieth that he was a concauſe of his death: but not that he willed or Cauſed the Jews to will or act his death. And ſo of the reſt.

629. The reſt of his inſtances are ſuch as I have anſwered before, or as the former anſwers fully invalidate; And therefore I will not weary my ſelf and the Reader with them.

630. Cap. 18. p. 230. he aſſerteth, that [Sin is a Medium to Gods Glory, and that not per accidens but per ſe. Becauſe ſin by how much the worſe it is in genere mali inhoneſti, by ſo much the better and fitter means it is, in genere boni utilis & conducibilis to Gods glory, &c.] All which I have before confuted: and think not his defence of it worth repeating.

631. Many aſſertions he hath cap. 18. which all depend on the falſe ſuppoſition that Sin is a medium per ſe of Gods glory, and the unproved ſuppoſition that God poſitively willeth the Permiſſion of it (which is nothing:) whence he inferreth that God Intendeth it in this and that order, and much other vanity. And ſtill they confound ſin in eſſe reali which is no medium, with ſin in eſſe objectivo which may be a part of holineſs, and no ſin at all.

632. Cap. 19. he argueth, God uſeth men and devils in the very act of ſinning as his inſtruments, viz. to puniſh, to try, to humble, &c. ergo, he willeth the event that they ſin.

Reſp. Here is deceitful ambiguity in the words [inſtruments] and [uſeth.] Properly an Inſtrument is an efficient cauſe moved by the principal to an effect above its proper virtue. And ſo a ſinner in and by the Act of ſinning is no Inſtrument of God. For God moveth him not to that Act as ſpecified or circumſtantiated ſo as is prohibited; And being not at all ſo moved by him (as David to murder Urias, and to vitiate his Wife) he is not properly thus his Inſtrument. But ſometimes the word Inſtrument ſignifieth a preſuppoſed Agent, whoſe Action another can improve to his own ends: As the wind and water are improperly called the Millers Inſtruments of turning his Mill; and the ſpring and poiſe are the Clock-makers Inſtruments of moving his Clock or Watch; and a Maſtiff Dog is my Inſtrument to keep away Thieves; and a Greyhound is my Inſtrument to kill a Hare, and a Ferret to catch a Rabbet, and a Hawke to catch a Partridge, &c. And yet we cauſe not at all the Nature or Motion of the Wind, or Water (but we can hinder the Water,) nor the niſus of the ſpring, nor the gravitation of the poiſe (but ſet the recipients ſo as that the effect ſhall be done as we would have it:) nor cauſe we the fierceneſs of the Maſtiff, the inclination or motion of the greyhound, ferret, hawk, &c. but only tye them up and let them looſe as our ends require. p. 108But zeal maketh ſome men deride that God ſhould be ſaid to be no more the cauſe of ſinning; and they cannot allow him the skill of every dull Artificer, or at leaſt a will to uſe it, without willing and cauſing the thing which he forbiddeth.

2. And the word [uſing] ſignifieth, ſometime uſing by motion, as I do my pen; and ſometime by ordination, and adjoyning ſome concauſe, or fitting the receptivity of the patient to the effect as aforeſaid; as we uſe; wind, water, dogs, hawks: Thus only ſinners by ſinning are Gods uſed inſtruments: ſuppoſing his natural concurſe and ſupport.

And they are not his Inſtruments thus neither in the ſame ſence as theſe creatures are ours: For their fierceneſs, craft, inclination, action, is good, and we do and may will it for our ends: But ſin is not good; And therefore God willeth not it at all, but only the conſequent of it, or effect: And that Effect is not Good, as it is the effect of ſin, but as God ſetteth in, and cauſeth the ſame effect which a ſinner cauſeth (as in generation per concubitum illicitum.) But when God willeth and cauſeth the effect, and foreſeeth and permitteth the ſinful Volition and act, which concurreth to that effect, ſuch a ſin is improperly called his uſed inſtrument or medium, but properly is none.

633. To Gibieuf and others ſaying that God acteth not by ſin as an inſtrument, and willeth it not, but the effects; he anſwereth that It's abſurd, becauſe the ſin it ſelf is caſtigatory, and hath ſuch like effects; and therefore God need not will that effect as after it. But all this is from the fore-noted confuſion: It is not only the diſtant effect, but the very immediate effect, which is the Act it ſelf ut recipitur in paſſo, which God ſometime is ſaid to Will. As he willed that Jobs Cattle were taken away, and that Chriſt were killed, and that Malchus eare be cut off, and that Paul be ſcourged, and ſmitten on the mouth, and that the Apoſtles were oft impriſoned, &c. And yet God only foreſeeth but willeth not that will and act of the agent, which he forbiddeth.

634. And here note, that when the name of the Effect or Paſſion connoteth the ſinfulneſs of the Act, then it is leſs meet to ſay that God willeth it: As to ſay that he willeth that we be perſecuted, murdered, ſlandered, belyed, &c. But if any will ſo ſpeak, they muſt mean only the Paſſion, as diſtinct from the action: And then the difference is but in nudo loquendi.

635. To thoſe that object that thus he maketh God the chief author of ſin, the effect being more to be aſcribed to the Principal Cauſe than to the inſtrument, he firſt ill-applyeth ſome frivolous diſtinctions, and inſtanceth thus: [The hangman as the Judges inſtrument hangeth a man in malice or revenge: Ergo, the Judge much more, in revenge: Non ſequitur.] Putting in Revenge which is but a Cauſe, as if it had been the Effect, which was in queſtion.

And thus [The Sword that killeth a man is not culpable: ergo, nor the ſtriker: Non ſequitur.] As if the queſtion had been of the Negation of an effect, and not of the poſition of it.

And thus [If two ſervants role a ſtone, one being commanded and one forbidden, one being father to the other; The Son (forbidden) roleth it unlawfully: ergo, the father (commanded) much more: non ſequitur.] Reſp. 1. As if the act of the Father and the Son were the ſame act, becauſe the effect is the ſame, which is notoriouſly falſe: unleſs de ſpecie. 2. Whoſe Inſtrument do you ſuppoſe the Son to be? If the Fathers, it is becauſe the Father commanded him contrary to the Maſter; And if ſo, the argument is good: The Sons act was a fault who obeyed: ergo, the fathers p. 109more who commanded him: ſaving that commanding maketh another no neceſſary Inſtrument, becauſe he can diſobey: But Gods premotion is ſuppoſed by you unavoidably to predetermine us.

636. But pag. 255. he giveth the true anſwer, that the conſequence holdeth, not of a metaphorical improper Inſtrument, who hath ſomewhat of his own which he hath not from the principal agent, yea ſuch have ſomewhat of Principal Cauſality, and ſomewhat mixt of their own which they have not of God, beſides the nature of a pure inſtrument: ſuch are ſinners to God. Therefore it holds not, that the horſe halteth: ergo, the rider halteth (no nor cauſeth it.) Thus inſciouſly he unſaith what laboriouſly he writeth a Book to prove: and the very ſame that I ſay. The Rider doth not cauſe the halting as it is halting at all; but only as it is Motion in genere: ſo doth God by ſinful acts: That they are exerciſed on the forbidden object rather than another, is not at all of God, but that they are Actions in genere is of God.

637. So p. 256. he well ſayeth that the fault of the pen is not to be aſcribed to the Writer, nor the effect as from that fault; nor of the Saw to the Sawyer; And ſo of the Sabeans robbing Job: And he aſſerteth, p. 257. that Diabolus & Impii homines ſunt cauſae principales in actu peccandi. And what need we more? Remember then that ſin is an effect, and hath a Cauſe, and to make man a Principal Cauſe in actu peccandi is not to deifie him: And he ſaith p. 256. that if God were the moral impeller as a principal agent, he were the principal cauſe of ſin. But if you mean by moral impulſe, only commanding it, let others judge whether Phyſical premotion be not much more than command: And whether I cauſe not my pen to write, though I command it not: And quoad terminum, to impel a man phyſically to moral acts, is moral impulſe.

638. But the plauſibleſt argument is Cap. 20. p. 261. viz. God willeth ſin as it is a Puniſhment of ſin: **Vid. Aureol. in 2. d. 37. p. 300, 301. ſhewing ſix wayes how ſin is a puniſhment of ſin, without God's willing the ſin: But if we make it ſin, he will make it be a puniſhment.ergo he willeth that the ſin come to paſs or be. And indeed Auguſtine ſaith much contr. Julian. to aſſert Gods willing of ſin as a Puniſhment of ſin. But I anſwer this, 1. Even theſe men themſelves oft ſay that God willeth not the formale peccati, but the materiale: And forma dat nomen: ergo he willeth not ſin as a puniſhment, in proper ſence.

2. Sin it ſelf (though denyed by many Arminians) is verily a Puniſhment, and more to the Sinner himſelf than to any other. ††Gab. Bid in 2. d. 36. concludeth, 1. Omne peccatum eſt poena. 2. Non omnis culpa eſt peccati alterius poena (viz. non prima.) 3. Omne peccatum poſterius poena eſt prioris, & cauſa (niſi ultimum fuerit) poſterioris. And Bonavent. there cited by him ſheweth how ſin bringeth poenam damni & ſenſus. And he ſheweth there how each ſin is its own puniſhment, the formale peccati being firſt, and the formale poena next in the ſame act: And how the latter ſin is the puniſhment of the former, as being an effect of it; For when we have caſt away the Intention of the right end, there is nothing ſufficient to hinder more ſin. Biel. ib. In a word, God antecedently ſo formed nature, that if we will ſin, that ſin ſhall be our miſery, and as a voluntary ſelf-wounding, cauſe our pain, and let out our blood and life.And it is the moſt difficult part of the queſtion, how God maketh ſin a Puniſhment to the ſinner himſelf; which yet I have plainly opened before, and here repeat it. To be ſin or diſobedience and to be Puniſhment are no abſolute entities, but are two Relations of one and the ſame Act; but not as referred to one and the ſame correlate. God is not at all the Cauſe of the Act which is ſinful, in its forbidden mode and circumſtances (as Claudicatio equi before ſaid) but only in genere actus, or hujus actus when two ſins are compared: But that the Act when done is ſin and is puniſhment, God is the Cauſe of both: That is, he maketh mans nature firſt, and in that and by revelation, his Law: by which he firſt maketh mans duty, and telleth him what ſhall be ſin if he do it: And next he doth by his threatning tell him, that this ſin it ſelf ſhall be the ſinners own miſery if he do it: As if (as aforeſaid) God firſt made man of ſuch a nature as that poyſon would torment him ex natura rei: And then commandeth him to avoid it; And then threatneth that it ſhall torment and kill him if he eat it. Here now God maketh the Man and the Law: God maketh not the Act of ſin as modified or oblique, or as that circumſtantiated act. But when the act is cauſed by Man, God by his Law cauſeth two Relations to reſult, p. 110firſt that of ſin, and then that of puniſhment. So that man firſt cauſeth the ſinful act, and then that it is quid prohibitum, and quid poenale reſult from Gods Will and Law made before.

Now if God cauſe not that ſin which is a puniſhment to our ſelves, he cauſeth not that which is a puniſhment to others; And yet ſuppoſing it, he maketh it a puniſhment to us and them, on ſeveral accounts.

639. But though God cauſe not the ſin, yet when he hath before in his Law threatned to withhold his grace and ſpirit if we ſin, without which grace and ſpirit we will ſin, If God now for former ſin do deny us, or withhold that grace or help which we need to keep us out of it, he is morally and improperly ſaid to cauſe that ſin as a puniſhment, becauſe that penally he refuſeth or forbeareth to ſave us from it, and ſo permitteth it (as is ſaid.)

640. The Arminians groſly erre, if he cite them juſtly, Remonſt. in Script. Synod. art. 1. p. 202. ſaying that God may predetermine and pre-ordain the obſtinate and rebellious to ſin by his penal judgement, and yet thoſe ſins are not be reckoned to them for ſins, nor increaſe their guilt: unleſs the word [ſin] be uſed equivocally: For to have ſin and no ſin, are contraries. Whether God determine Ideots and Madmen to thoſe acts which would be ſin in others, as he doth Bruits, I leave to others.

641. I am weary of purſuing this ungrateful diſpute. As to his controverſie Q. Whether things be good becauſe God willeth them? or he will them becauſe they are good?againſt Camero cap. 22. Whether God will Juſtice and holineſs becauſe it is good, or whether it be good becauſe God willeth it? It troubleth me to read bitter and tedious diſputes about that which one eaſie diſtinction putteth paſt all controverſie. Of things ad extra Gods will is firſt the efficient, and then the ultimate end, as is oft ſaid: Gods will as efficient giveth firſt the Being and then the Order to all things: or elſe they could never be what they are. All created Juſtice and Holineſs is ſuch, that is, Good (for Goodneſs is their eſſence) becauſe Gods efficient will made them ſo: And then Gods final will taketh complacency in them or Loveth them becauſe they are ſo. But if they talk of Goodneſs or Juſtice, &c. as it is in God, there is in him no effect and ſo no cauſe of himſelf or any thing in himſelf.

642. But ſome things God maketh moral duties by the very work of Creation, and Ordination of the World, without any other Law: And theſe are called Duties by the Law of Nature, becauſe the very Natura rerum is a Law, that is, a ſignification of Gods will conſtituting mans duty. It is mans eſſence to be an Intellectual-free-agent; It is impoſſible that ſuch an agent Created of God ſhould not be Gods Creature, and Gods own, and diſpoſitively a Moral governable agent, and that he ſhould not owe God all that he is and hath and can do, and that God ſhould not have the Jus Dominii & Imperii over him, and Jus ad ſummum ejus Amorem **Deus non poſſet obligare nos ad hoc quod teneatur ſibi non obedire: Quaero enim an tenetur obedire, an non? ſi ſic, habetur propoſitum: quia tenetur & non tenetur, quod eſt impoſſibile—Conſequentia patet, Quia teneri non obedire, eſt teneri ad aliquid. Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. T. Yet after he thinketh it poſſible for God to have made a Reaſonable creature not obliged; As if his very nature were not obligatory: His inſtance of the Mad is vain; for they are not actually Reaſonable. Ockam preſumptuouſly concludeth that God could command a man to hate God and make it meritorious, it being no contradiction: His follower Greg. Arim. confuteth him; And Cameracenſis invalidateth the confutation, and leaveth it doubtful. But it is a contradiction to be a man, and not obliged by Nature to Love God; And a contradiction to be bound by nature to Love him, and yet ſtante natura bound to hate him: And a contradiction to hate God and be good or happy.It is a contradiction to be a Created Man, and not Gods Own, and his obliged Subject and Beneficiary. Therefore it is a contradiction that ſubmiſſion, obedience and Love ſhould not be his Moral duty and good, and that ſelf-alienation, rebellion, or diſobedience and hatred ſhould be no ſins.

643. To diſpute then (as he doth with Camero and his followers) Whether it be good ex natura rei, or by Gods meer free-will? is a ſtrange diſpute, and of moſt eaſie reſolution. Either they ſpeak of Gods creating will, or of ſome other ſubſequent Volition. Man is made man by Gods free creating will: And the foreſaid Relations, and duties are made ſuch by making him Man. And the duties of Love and Juſtice to others are made ſuch by his Creators placing him in a world where p. 111his Neighbours are about him, who are due objects; as a part of the ſociety, This he himſelf confeſſeth pag. 329, 330.like a Wheel in a Clock: The Creators will is before Nature, and therefore before natural duty, as the Cauſe before the effect. God could have made beaſts inſtead of men, who had owed him no more than beaſts can do. But from the Nature of a Man coexiſtent with God, his ſaid duties to God ſo neceſſarily reſult, that it could not be otherwiſe; nor did there need any ſubſequent act of Gods will to make that duty.

644. But thoſe that are not Duties by Nature, muſt have moreover a Vid. Durand. 1. d. 38. qi 4. n. 9, 10, 11. Scot. 3. d. 37. q. 1. Gabr. 3. d. 37. a. 2. Suarez de Legib. l. 2. c. 15. Aquin. 1, 2. q. 94. a. 5. & q. 100. a. 4.further act of Gods will as ſignified to make them ſo; As the Moſaical Ceremonies, our Sacraments, &c.

645. And many Natural Laws and duties are mutable, towards one another, becauſe the very Nature and Natural Location or Order of the Things from which they did reſult, are mutable; And a word of God can make a change: when yet before ſuch antecedent mutation, the duty muſt be duty ſtill.

646. As to Mr. Rutherfords oft ſaying that Omnis actus entitativus ſimplex eſt moraliter de ſe indifferens, neque bonus neque malus; And then that per actum ſimplicem he meaneth ſuch as include not the object, It is ludicrous or vain talk. There is no ſuch Act as hath not an object, any more than phyſical form without matter. Quicunque movet, aliquid movet; Quicunque intelligit, aut vult, aliquid intelligit aut vult, (vel ſeipſum vel aliud.) An Act without its object is but a partial or inadequate Generical conceptus of that Act which hath an object; or an abſtract partial notion of an act. Why then doth he talk of that which is not? Had he ſaid that every act is in the firſt inſtant rationis, or abſtract-partial conception, an Act in genere, before it be intelligible as this or that act, about this or that object, he had ſpoken intelligibly as other men do.

647. Such another queſtion many called Arminians much uſe, Whether Whether Juſtice &c. be eternally good or have rationem boni aeternam?Juſtice &c. be eternally good? Or An dentur rationes boni & mali aeternae & indiſpenſabiles? which needs no other ſolution than this laſt. There is no ſuch thing as an Univerſal, exiſtent per ſe and not in ſome Individual: And ſo no ſuch thing as Love, Juſtice, &c. Bonum, Malum, which is not alicujus Juſtitia, Bonum, &c. There was no Creature from Eternity being Juſt or unjuſt, good or bad. But Gods perfect Nature But that Gods own eternal perfection hath in it that root of humane virtue (truth, juſtice, &c.) which therefore analogically have the ſame name (our holineſs being Gods Image) I would prove to the Reader by this weighty reaſon: Becauſe elſe we have no certainty that Gods word is true: For all our certainty is hence, that God cannot lye. But if Veracity be not in God, we cannot prove that. And if he have not that which is eminenter Juſtice, mercy, &c. how can we prove that he hath Veracity?might be called Eternally Juſt, in that he muſt neceſſarily be Juſt, if he had been a governour: And neceſſarily was Juſt, when he freely became a governour. And alſo this propoſition was Eternally true, (if there were eternally propoſitions) [Si Homines exiſterent, Juſtitia in ipſis debita foret: & quandocunque Homines fuerint, Juſtitia in ipſis debita fuerit.] But when all the ſenſe of theſe queſtions is no more, but what Duties are natural, and what ſuperadded (called Poſitive,) and what natural duties are immutable and what mutable, it's an unhappineſs that the world muſt be troubled with ſuch uncouth forms of ſpeech as make the queſtion unintelligible, till unravelled.

648. As to Rutherfords charge of Camero and his followers in France, Amyraldus, &c. with Semipelagianiſm and Arminianiſm and filthy opinions, it is but the effect of the good mans overweening, and conceitedneſs of his own apprehenſions, which muſt be allowed or endured in moſt of theſe contenders; And the fruits of ſuch diſputes is like to be little better. But the worthy praiſes of Blondel, Dallaeus, Placeus, Capellus, Amyraldus, Teſtardus, &c. ſhall ſurvive ſuch reproach. And a thouſand pitties it is, to read a good man Voluminouſly proving God to be a Willer of ſins exiſtence, and a prime-predetermining Cauſe of all prohibited Volitions and acts, and reproaching the Jeſuits, Lutherans, Arminians and Socinians p. 112as the great enemies of Gods Providence for denying this; As if he would tempt the World to think that Socinians were in the right, and that Jeſuites, Lutherans and Arminians were the only defenders of the Holineſs of God, whilſt Calviniſts made him the Lover of all the ſin in the World, as the moſt appetible conducible Medium to his Glory.

649. But (to proceed) his next Argument is, cap. 23. Sin conferreth ſomething to the ſplendor, ornament, and plenitude of the Univerſe: E… go, See Bonavent. well confuting this in 1. d. 46. q. 3. Malum fieri nullatenus bonum eſſe, ſed bene occaſio boni.God willeth its exiſtence: This is anſwered before. The antecedent is utterly unproved. Sin addeth nothing to the ornament or perfection of the World. His word is no proof.

650. Afterwards he heapeth up many frivolous arguments againſt that which he calleth reproachingly, The Idle Permiſſion of ſin; and ſaith, that it fruſtrateth the prayers of the Saints, and their patience, their gratitude, truſt, hope, fear, joy, alloweth the arrogance of the perſecuters, fighteth with Gods Wiſdom, Clemency, Juſtice, Providence, with the Miniſtry of the Word, the Promiſes, Threatnings, with Miniſters confirming … againſt ſufferings, and it is blaſphemouſly injurious to God, and contrary to the order of things in the world, that he ſhould permit ſin, and not will the being of it.

Reſp. What is it that a man, yea, a pious man in a blind zeal of God and ſelf-conceit, may not pour out confident words for? What a caſe is the poor Church in, when the unlearned people muſt be on both ſides charged by their Teachers with blaſphemy, what way ever they go? This man will tell them that they are **Pag. 370.blaſphemous, and overthrow all reaſon and Religion, if they ſay that God only Permitteth ſin, and doth not himſelf will the being of it, and move unavoidably all wills, and tongues, and hands, to all the blaſphemies, perſecutions, and murders that are done, and damn men for it when he hath done. And others will as confide…ly ſay that he is a Blaſphemer, for charging God to be much more the cauſe of all forbidden acts of wickedneſs than Devils and men are, and the… damning them for it, and for putting God into the ſhape of the Devil, and painting him odious to humane nature, that man may not love him: What ſhall poor people think when they are thus torn and tormented by their holy Guides? But all his arguments are before anſwered, when I ſhewed him how many wayes God hath to ſecure the Effects and Events in the world, and attain all his Ends, and yet only Permit, and neither Will, nor Love, nor Cauſe the ſin.

651. Cap. 26. he cometh to plead for Predetermination, and ſaith p. 385. God predetermineth us (to the Act of hating God) in linea me… phyſica, & non morali. Meer deluſory words. He maketh it by the Law of Nature a ſin to hate him, and then he maketh men hate him … linea phyſica & non morali! as if the moral ſinfulneſs reſulted not from the Law and act; that is, here from Nature it ſelf, viz. of the Man and act, both which God made.

652. Pag. 386. he ſaith, that [Directa & expreſſa & efficax Dei V…litio, qua Vult ut ſit ſeu fiat actus Dei odii, non facit Deum Malitia q… I confeſs Gab. Biel in 2. d. 37. ſpeaketh too like theſe ſeveral atheological aſſertions: as do many others.per accidens ſequitur actum, authorem.] Reſp. But that per accidens is no reaſon of the denyal, if God cauſe that accident alſo, as the firſt cauſe. If he make a Law, and make the forbidden act, the relation of ſinfulneſs is an Accident indeed, but ariſeth from the ſaid fundamentum ſo neceſſarily that it cannot be otherwiſe. But it ſhould have made a holy Divine to tremble to have ſaid, that God directly, expreſly and effectually willeth mens Act of hating God, viz. that it exiſt or be.

p. 113653. And it is falſe that he ſaith, that God is equally the Cauſe that men hate him, if he will the Act hypothetically, ineffectually and determi…ably by anothers will, as if he willed it efficaciouſly. And ſo when he maketh the Doctrine of Univerſal Concurſe and Cauſation, as guilty as …is predetermining pre-motion. As if God could not make man a free-…iller and agent, and as the ſpring of Nature, enable him and concurr …o his Act as an Act, in genere, without cauſing it to terminate on the forbidden object in ſpecie. As if it were impoſſible for the Sun to be …n univerſal cauſe of the ſtinking of a Dunghill and Weed, without being …he ſpecial: or as if God muſt be made the cauſe of every blaſphemy, unleſs …e will make the blaſphemer ſpeechleſs, and of every villany, unleſs he will ſtrike men dead to prevent it. This is not reverent and holy judging of the moſt holy God the Judge of all.

654. The ſumm of all his Vindication of God from being the chief Author of all ſin (pag. 387. & paſſim) is but this one reaſon, God is under no Law. But if this be all, why do you not ſpeak out what you mean, but hold that which you dare not name, viz. [That God is the chief So Bannes in 1. q. 23. …. 3. p. 270, 271. Voluntas hominis mal… eſt quia exercet actum odii Dei ſine regula rationis, immo contra legem Dei; Deus autem bona vol untate vult fieri illum actum, permittens defectum Cauſ… ſecund… in ipſo, ut inde aliquod majus bonum faciat: which is true of the act in genere, but not as it is Odium Dei. For ſo if he will it and cauſe it, he doth more than permit: and the defectus Cauſae ſecundae is that very odium as againſt God. And doth God cauſe the greateſt ſin that he may do good by it? He can do as much good without cauſing the evil.…nſuperable cauſe of all the ſin of Devils and men for which he damneth …hem, and that both as to the matter and form; but yet thus to do is no ſin in God himſelf, becauſe he is under no Law.] This is your moſt …lain undoubted ſenſe, or elſe your Book is non-ſenſe; What need we then any further enquiry what you hold? It is deluſion to pretend that you are accuſed for making God a ſinner. We charge no ſuch thing on you: But only for making him the chief inſuperable cauſe of all the ſins of men and Devils.

655. Pag. 400. he plainly profeſſeth that the Will as a phyſical agent is the cauſe of the act as phyſical, and as under a Law, and that act is againſt the Law, ſo he is the cauſe of the Malitia actûs, and culpablo. So that God cauſing by his own confeſſion both Act and Law, there is no modeſt ſubterſuge left for his not openly profeſſing that he aſſerteth God to be the cauſe of all ſin, the principal cauſe, both as to matter and form.

656. The reſt of that Diſputation ſtriketh me with ſuch horror in the reading, that I confeſs I have not the patience to proceed any further …n it, nor ſhall further thus exerciſe my Readers patience. The caſe is plain. Either Hobbs, or Free-will permitted, muſt carry the cauſe in the caſe of ſin: There is no middle way. He that will read Ruiz and Rutherfords anſwer impartially, needeth no more of mine for the confutation of his vain reſponſes.

657. But cap. 29. p. 484. he falleth alſo on our moſt Learned and Judicious Dr. Field, becauſe in his lib. 3. c. 3. of the Church he contradicteth his opinion; and it muſt move juſt indignation in the Reader that he addeth [idque probare conatur contra reformatas Eccleſias.] Unworthy injury to the Reformed Churches, more than to the worthy Dr. Field! How falſly are they intereſſed in your unhappy cauſe! See the Synod of Dort, where there is not a word for it. Is one Twiſs with his Rutherford, or Maccovius, or a few ſuch, the Reformed Churches? Let the Reader peruſe the Articles of the Churches of England, Scotland, France, and all the reſt, and ſee where he can find your Doctrine of Predetermination unto ſin. Even Janſenius himſelf is againſt it among the Papiſts, when his Dominican Predeceſſors are the Fathers of it. Nothing more common with Engliſh Divines than (as you did before your ſelf) to explicate Gods cauſing the acts of ſinners, by the ſimilitude of the Riders ſpurring a halting Horſe, or the Suns making a Dunghill ſtink; which only ſpeak the cauſe which we call univerſal, and is the very thing which we aſſert. p. 114And it is moſt unſavourily done, to get into the Chair and magiſterially ſay [Fieldus vir alioqui doctus, in his controverſiis minime ſe verſat… eſſe prodit—& Zumelem **Zumel in Diſp. 1. Thom. de Voluntat. hom. & lib. arb. pag. 219, 220. Quod D…s non ſit cauſa peccati, though he ſpeak cauteſouſly and as in other mens names, yet concludeth plainly, that God is but the Cauſa Univerſalis of ſin, and that man is the ſpecifying determining cauſe, even que univerſalem determinat ad ſpeciem concurſus & actus ipſius, ſive ſolum determinet eam formaliter ad ſpeciem, &c. Yet this is a high Thomiſt and defender of abſolute grace.non ſatis intelligit, quippe non ſatis g… rus controverſiarum Arminianarum, & ſcripſit dum aulam Armini… plus aequo faventem haberent. ††Thus magiſterially did good Dr. Twiſſe cenſure Junius and Voſſius (his Son-in-law) as men unskilled in Scholaſtick Divinity, who were both moſt excellent men, and hit upon the reconciling truth, above moſt in their age. Junius his Diſcourſe of predetermination is one of the firſt that ever I found that excellency in, and with his Irenicon is moſt worthy of great eſteem.] But how eaſie is it for a man to overvalue himſelf, and contemn another? I highly value the piety in Mr. … therfords Letters. I am no fit arbiter ingeniorum: But when I hear other men ſay that one Field was more Judicious than many Rutherfords, I c… feſs by reading their ſeveral writings I find no temptation to deny it; And why ſhould Field and conſequently Davenant, Uſher, Carlton, M… ton, Hall, the Synod of Dort, and I think the far greateſt part of Proteſtants (I verily think fifty if not an hundred for one) who are againſt you, be made odious by the ſuppoſition of being not far enough from Arminians, rather than Maceovius, Twiſſe and Rutherford take it for a diſgrace, to hold the ſame opinions againſt Gods Holineſs, which the D… nican Fryars hold, who have been the bloody Maſters of the Inquiſition, and murdered ſo many thouſand Proteſtants or Waldenſes and Alligenſes?

And that which he ſaith of Fields writing when the Court favoured Arminianiſm, is notoriouſly falſe, and ſuch inſinuations unworthy of ſo good a man as the ſpeaker. Fields Works were printed ſingly before they were printed together in Folio. And his fifth Book was printed A… no 1610. and the words cited are in the third printed before. And the Synod of Dort was called An. 1618. and ſate 1619. alſo; And King James was a zealous ſuppreſſor of Arminianiſm, and ſent five or ſix Divines thither to that end. And long after in King Charles his dayes, Pet. Heylin in the life of Archbiſhop Laud will tell you, that the Armini… Biſhops then were but five, Neale, Laud, Buckeridge, Corbet and Howſ…, to whom Learned Montague was after added: So that they durſt not truſt their Cauſe with a Convocation. Field then ſhall be a moſt Judicion worthy Divine, when partiality hath ſaid its worſt.

658. And what is his error? Why he ſaith that it's a contradiction to ſay that God cauſeth the Act (in all its ſtate,) which is the Material… peccati, and cauſeth not the formale, which is inſeparable. A foul error indeed, to tell you that he that cauſeth the ſubjectum, fundament…, rationem fundandi & terminum cauſeth the relation; and that he that maketh an European white and an African black cauſeth the diſſimilit…de, and ſo doth he that maketh the ſtraight Rule and the crooked line, th… forbidding Law, and the forbidden act.

659. Were it not that the neceſſity requireth ſuch work, becauſe ſuch Books are in mens hands, I ſhould think I had injured the Reader, by th… much: For my work is not to confute Books, but to aſſert ſure reconciling truths. Otherwiſe the confutation of the reſt of that Book (for Gods willing and cauſing all forbidden acts in their full ſtate, and the exiſtence of ſin) is moſt eaſily anſwered.