Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 16

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable · Section 16

p. 66SECT. XVI. Of the Order of the Decrees called Reprobation. And of Election and Reprobation in themſelves.

448. ACcordingly in the order of execution we muſt reckon the objects of that which ſome call Reprobation, anſwerable to what D'Orbellis in …. d. 40. [Diſtinguuntur, Scientia, Praeſcientia, Providentia, propoſitum, electio, dispoſitio, praedeſtinatio & reprobatio. Haec differ…nt ſecundum rationem, licet ſint idem reali…er in Deo. 1. Scientia Dei eſt certa Cognitio omnium praeteritorum, praeſentium, futurorum, fieri que poſſibilium tam bonorum quam malorum. 2. Praeſcientia eſt futurorum praecognitio—Reprobati vero appropriate dicuntur Praeſciti—Providen…a eſt praeſcient…a futurorum in quantum …nt … praeſcient… in …in…m ordinabilia—3. Propoſ…t… eſt actus Voluntati… Divin… tam reſpec… …uturorum ag…ndorum, quam permittendorum. 4. Electi… ſupra Propoſitum addit diſcretionem electi à …uo contrario, ſ…il. boni à malo. 5. Dispoſitio eſt praeſcientia faciendorum, reſpiciens fi…ri rei, & cognitionem; ſicut provientia reſpicit eſſe rei poſtquam facta eſt—6. Praedeſtinatio eſt propoſitum divinae voluntatis, conferendi gratiam & gloriam praedeſtinatis. 7. Reprobatio eſt propoſitum permittendi reprobatos permanere in obduratione finali, & …etribu…n…i eis interminabilem p…nam, propter corum iniquitat…m.]is before ſaid of Election: But order requireth that I firſt ſpeak of Election and Reprobation as in themſelves, what they are.

449. Election as to the etymologie I need not explain. It is taken 1. For a Temporary actual Taking one rather than another by way of Choice. Which is 1. By meer Volition, or Election of the will. 2. Or alſo by manual Apprehenſion or Executive Election (As a man taketh a woman to wife.) 2. Or it is taken for An Eternal Electing Decree of God.

450. Gods Executive Election in Time is twofold 1. By giving one man converting effectual Grace which he giveth not to another. 2. By taking confequently that Converted perſon to be one of his Adopted and Juſtified ones, as his choice peculiar treaſure.

451. Gods Mental Election being an Act of his will, is either his meer Decree of the Event, 2. Or his Decree as efficient, 3. Or elſe his complacency. The firſt is eternal. The ſecond is eternal ex parte Dei, but not ex parte effectus. The third is eternal as it is Gods eſſence, but is denominated Temporary by connotation of the object; as alſo may the ſecond be: About theſe there needs no quarrel.

452. All the ſpecial grace which God giveth in Time, he decreed from Eternity to give: And though ſome decrees have ſpecial objects in eſſe cogni… ſuppoſed, none of them have a proper exterior cauſe.

453. It is not poſſible that any Creature can have any good which is not a pure gift of God, however he may require of man Conditions of Reception, in the order of Collation. Therefore the Decree muſt nee…s be free.

454. As to the queſtion whether God elect men upon foreſight of any good in them, enough is ſaid before to anſwer it. If the queſtion mean whether Gods Knowledge or Volition be firſt in themſelves? I anſwer, neither; For nothing in him is before or after other. But if God might be ſpoken of as man, we muſt ſay that his Underſtanding is the firſt ſpecifying primiciple, and the will the firſt quoad exercitium actus. And therefore that the Divine underſtanding repreſented to his will, the object i… its Eligibility. If the queſtion be what is the objects repreſented eligibility in eſſe cognito vel Ideali, it is anſwered, 1. We muſt diſtinguiſh of the Divine Volitions called Elections by the divers effects: 1. (To paſs by the reſt) It is one thing to Elect to Glory, or Velle Glorificare; And here the object of Actual Glorification, is a perſevering Saint: And you muſt diſtinguiſh Gods Volitions by his executions, or not at all (which you had rather.) 2. It is another thing to chooſe one to the firſt grace of faith or true Converſion. And here the object of the execution is, as is aforeſaid, ſometime one prepared by common grace (though without merit,) ſometime one extraordinarily wicked: Look over what I ſaid of the objects, and the queſtion of foreſight is anſwered, as far as it belongeth to our enquiry.

455. Thoſe that deny all ſpecial arbitrary Election, muſt deny all ſpecial arbitrary effectual differing grace: which I ſhall prove elſewhere by p. 67it ſelf; And now referr ſuch to Davenants Diſſertation de praedeſt. where it is fully proved, and defended.

456. One thing which deceiveth ſuch men is, that they forget that God ſtandeth to man, not only in the Relation of a Rector per Leges, (for ſo he dealeth equally with all that make not the inequality themſelves:) But alſo as a Proprietor and a Benefactor, in both which Relations he is free to do with his own as he pleaſeth. And free Lords and Benefactors uſe not to diſtribute equally their gifts. Nor do they conſider that de facto God viſibly maketh wonderful inequalities; He maketh not men as great or good as Angels, nor Stars as glorious as the Sun: The whole ſheweth us admirable variety, arbitrarily made by the great Benefactor, who giveth not to us a Reaſon of his will.

457. The word [foreign] Reprobus, in Scripture is uſed no where that Jer. 6. 30.Jer 6:30I remember, but Rom. 1. 28. 1 Cor. 9. 27. 2 Cor. 13. 5, 6, 7. 2 Tim. 3. 8. Tit. 1. 16. Heb. 6. And the word [Reprobation] is not uſed at all, as any act of God. But predeſtination and election are oft uſed on the better ſide, and rejecting, hating, forſaking on the other ſide. And electing implyeth that ſome are not elect.

458. About the object of that which many call Reprobation, be ſure to diſtinguiſh, between a true object of any Act, circa quod verſatur, and which is ſubjectum inhaeſionis, and a meer object of ſpeech, or ſubjectum praedicationis: Elſe you will with many be enſnared to think that every ſubject or object of a predication which in the ſeries of Gods judgements you meet with, is the object of ſome poſitive act of God.

459. And though we would quarrel with no man about meer words, yet leſt words deceive you I add, that as the word Reprobation ſeemeth to ſignifie a poſitive Act, and yet a great part of the deſertion of the Reprobates is by Gods preteritions and not-acting and privations; therefore it is not the whole ſeries that the word Reprobation aptly expreſſeth, but only ſome particular Acts.

460. The word Predeſtinate uſed Rom. 8. 29, 30. and Epheſ. 1. 5. The preſumption of the Schoolmen in defining the Act of predeſtination is tremendous: See Ruiz de provid. disp. 3. ſect. 9. ad 11. who concludeth that Predeſtination is an Act of Gods Intellect, and a Practical act, and is Actus affirmans D…i volitionem libere decern…nt…m de finibus rerum & mediis, &c. q. d. Volo Petrum beatificare & per talia media, &c. It is not this will, but the knowledge of it.1 Cor. 2. 5. (it's foreign though not ſpoken of perſons) Act. 4. 28. (tranſlated [fore-determined]) when applyed to perſons is ever taken in Scripture as an act of mercy: And the ancients Auguſtine, Proſper and Fulgentius uſe the words [Praedeſtinati & Praeſoiti, the predeſtinate and the fore-known] as of late men uſe among us the words Elect and Reprobate.

461. Though men differ as their opinions lead them in the expoſition of ſuch texts as **Vid. Bezam in Rom. 8. 28. de propoſito.Rom 8:28Rom. 8. 28, 29, 30. Epheſ. 1. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. and ſome take them to ſpeak of predeſtinating Individuals, and others only of ſpecies, that is, of believers, ſufferers, Lovers of God, &c. yet as to the matter it ſelf none that is judicious can or doth deny but that God eternally Predeſtinateth Individuals; The Jeſuits commonly confeſs it, though they differ on the queſtion, how far it is on fore-ſight of faith: But that foreſeen Believers individually are eternally elected to ſalvation, thev cannot deny. And the Learnedſt Jeſuits maintain that God giveth faith in time, and electeth Individuals to faith it ſelf from eternity: That is, eternally decreed to give them faith, or to give them that Grace by which he fore-knew that in the advantagious circumſtances in which he decreed to put them, they would freely, and he deereed ſhould infallibly, believe.

462. The conceit and ſuppoſition of many, that Election and Reprobation are ſuch perfect contraries, as that they run pari paſſu, and that God willeth in the one juſt as he doth in the other, End and means, for matter and order, is a groſs miſtake. Auguſtine, Proſper, Eulgentius p. 68and Davenant of late, with many more have ſhewed, that God predeſtinateth Leg. Dauen. Diſſert. de Praed. & Reprobat. copioſe hae… probant…m. Et Zumel Diſput. 5. §. 5. p. 335. & …. & objec…o elect. pag. 367, &c.men to Faith, and perſeverance, and to Glory, and not only to Glory upon the foreſight of faith and perſeverance: But that he p…edeſtinateth or decreeth men to damnation, only on the foreſight of final impenitence and infidelity, but not to Impenitence or Infidelity it ſelf.

463. The Grand difficulty that occaſioneth all our Controverſies herein is, How to diſcern that God is the Author of all our Good, and yet not the Author of Sin, nor of Damnation ſaving for ſin. And both parties are very deſirous to hold and ſee that both theſe are true: Nay, both believe them: But they differ only in the way and method of manifeſting it.

464. There are three opinions about Reprobation: 1. One is, that …od Poſitively decreed from eternity to glorifie his Juſtice in the damnation of the moſt, and to that end to occaſion and permit their hardning and unbelief: ſo that Reprobation is Poſitive both as to the Act and Object. 2. The other is the opinion of the Synod of Dort (as expreſſed) defended at large by Davenant and many others, that Reprobation is Gods Poſitive Decree not to give ſaith and and repentance to the ſame men, and to damn them for impenitence and infidelity: and ſo is Poſitive quoad Actum, but Negative quoad Objectum, (as to the firſt part, not giving faith.) 3. The third is the Opinion of ſubtile Scotus and his followers, that in primo inſtanti Reprobation is Negative quoad Actum & Objectum; So Albertine before cited.that is, It is no Act of God at all, but only a Non-election or preterition: which is I ſuppoſe the meaning of Dr. Sterne of Dublin Co…ledge, who hath written a Latin Tractate maintaining that God Reprobateth none, that is, by any Act.

465. The method laid down by Scotus is this, [Offertur Voluntati ſ… hunc peccaturum vel peccare: Primo voluntas ejus circa hunc non habet Scot. 1. d. 47. Vid. Signa Mayronis in fine. Againſt Scotus his foundation, that God knoweth future contingents only ut Volita, ſaith Alliac…in 1. q. 11. N. [Sed iſta propoſitio non eſt intelligibil…s, 1. Quia talia inſtantia & prioritatem & poſterioritatem eſſe in Deo no… eſt verum. 2. Quia impoſſibile eſt quod pro aliquo inſtanti talis complexio de futuro ſit neutra: Alias pro tune daretur medium in contradi…ione. 3. Quia pon… aliquid eſſe medium & rationem cog…oſcendi in Divino intell…lu.]Velle: Velle …nim ipſum habere peccatum non poteſt. 2. Poteſt intelligere Voluntatem ſuam non volentem hoc: & tunc poteſt velle Volunt… tem ſuam non velle hoc: & ita dic…ur Volens ſinere, & v… luntarie permittere: ſicut ex alia parte praeſentato ſibi Juda, primo Deu… habet non Velle ſibi Gloriam, & non primo Nolle—& poteſt tun… ſecundo reflectere ſuper iſtam negationem actus & Velle eam: & ita V… lens ſive voluntarie non eligit Judam finaliter peccaturum, & non nolitione… gloriae, ſed non-volitionem gloriae.

466. It is notable that both Dr. Twiſſe and Biſhop Davenant, do diſclaim this opinion of Scotus without offering us any one argument againſt it; which is ſo unuſual a courſe with one of them, as would perſwade one to think that they had not much to ſay againſt it, but (what they intimate) the harſh ſound of the words, that God ſhould be here a non-agent.

467. The truth ſeemeth to me, that as Davenant ſaith, Scotus was the firſt artifex of this ordering of various Acts in the mind of God: So here he ſaith too much, and is too bold, and feigneth a ſubſequent Volition of a former non-volition without cauſe or proof, meerly to ſcape the cenſure which yet he now incurreth, of making God too little active.

468. So far was Scotus from being the firſt Author of this Opinion, of a Negatio volendi peccatum in God, that their common Maſter Lombard Lombard. 1. d. 47.moſt expreſly aſſerteth it, and that more plainly and ſoundly than theſe over-ſubtile men. Upon which his Commentators copiouſly diſpute An in Deo p…ſſit eſſe pur… omiſſio abſque volitione & nolitione poſitiva? of which beſides the Scotiſts and Nominals, you may ſee Aquin. 16. a. 2. Durand. 1. …. 47. q. 1. Ruiz de Volunt. diſp. 8. ſect. 3. concl. 2. Albertin. To. 1. princip. 4. q. 4. dub. 2. Vaſquez 2. p. 1. diſp. 79. num. 17, &c. p. 69Suarez Metaph. diſp. 30. ſect. 9. n. 59. Fonſec. Metap. li. 7. c. 8. q. 5. ſect. 3. Aluiz Tract. 2. diſp. 6. ſect. 3. Montepil. 1. p. diſp. 33. a. 8. c. 1. & 3. Durandus diſtinguiſheth of contra & praeter Voluntatem, and ſaith that Voluntas etiam beneplaciti antecedens, quae eſt ſolum quaedam Velleitas, may be ſuch as many things are praeter & contra eam. But Voluntas beneplaciti conſequens is ſuch as nothing is contra eam, but ſin is praeter eam; etiam mala fieri. Neque enim vult fieri, nec vult non fieri. I like not what he addeth: Idem forte diceret aliquis de quibuſdam bonis quae fiunt merè à libero arbitrio, ſed non de omnibus, viz. quae fiunt à praedeſtinatis, &c.

469. And it is to be noted, that Durandus with other Schoolmen argue, that if ſin were willed by God, God would be the Author of it: Gods Volition, ſay they, being efficient. And Eſtius (a yet plainer Schoolman than Durand) ſaith, Quicquid ſit Deo Volente, fit Deo authore: who alſo citing Aquinas's conſent, ſaith, Omnimode tenenda eſt in hac parte doctrina magiſtri, mala nec eſſe nec fieri Deo Volente. And againſt the vain diſtinction of Aquin. 1. q. 19. ar. 9. ad 1. & 3.[Deus non vult malum, ſed vult malum fieri ſen eventre] he ſaith that [Velle mala, & velle mala eſſe ſeu fieri] idem eſt. Voluntas enim adrem ſimpliciter, eſt ad rem ut ſit.—Qui vult virtutem, vult virtutem eſſe; Qui vult peccatum, vult peccatum eſſe—neque aliud ſit velle mala, & velle mala eſſe aut fieri. 1. d. 47. ſect. 7. pag. 228. (It ſeemeth there were ſome then of Dr. Twiſſes and Rutherfords opinion.)

470. And that you may ſee Eſtius mind further in this, and alſo ſee all the Objections now uſed anſwered, I will here annex (though out of place) his anſwer to them.

Obj. 1. Sin is not committed Deo nolente: ergo Deo volente fit.

Reſp. Neque nolente, neque volente Deo fiunt, ſed permittente.

471. Obj. 2. Mala eſſe aut fieri bonum eſt 1. Ad perfectionem univerſi, Aquin. 1. q. 1…. art. 9. ad 3. anſwereth in the ſame manner.2. Ad decorem, &c. Ita Auguſt. Enchir. 10. & 11. & c. 96. Bonum eſt ut ſint mala.

Reſp. Neg. Major: Et 1. Mala ſunt Univerſi non ornatus & perfectiones, ſed id deformant, &c. 2. Auguſt. non dliud vult, quam Bonum eſſe mala permitti.

472. Obj. 3. They cannot be, unleſs God will them to be. Auguſt. Enchir. 95. Non fit aliquid niſi Omnipo…ens fieri velit.

Reſp. The reaſon aſſumeth a falſhood. And Auguſtine is interpreted as ſpeaking only of the Permiſſion as willed, and not the Event.

473. Obj. 4. Omne verum eſt à Deo: eſſe & fieri mal… verum eſt: Vid. Aquin. 1. d. 47. q. 2. ad 1.Ergo.

Reſp. Non Hugonis ſed ſophiſtarum eſt: Nam verum qua verum eſt à Deo: De rebus malis ſunt conceptus mentis veri. (Indeed malum qua objectum ſcientiae non eſt malum.)

474. Obj. 5. Aug. Enchir. 100. Peccatum non fit praeter Dei voluntatem, quod fit contra.

Reſp. Loquitur de permiſſionis voluntate, non ipſius mali.

Albertinus words To. 1. Princip. 4. q. 4. dub. 2. pag. 297. I cited before for a Negation of Will.

475. Suarez diſtinguiſheth of Gods Will Voluntarily determining to go Metap. diſp. 130. ſect. 9. num. 59.no further, and a will ſuſpended without ſuch a determination: And the firſt he denyeth not, but the latter he denyeth in God as imperfection: But upon reaſons ſo weak, likening God to man, that I think them not worth the reciting.

476. No mortal man can prove, that God muſt needs have actual Volitions p. 70of Nothings as ſuch. And conſequently that he hath any ſuch: And Yet let the Reader note, that though I hold that no man can prove a Poſitive Volition or Nolition of Nothings (ordinarily at leaſt) and ſo would ſhorten the Controverſie, yet my Conciliation doth not at all reſt on this, but will proceed ſufficiently if you ſay that God Poſitively willeth his Not-willing and his Permiſſions.that his perfection excludeth them not.

477. Yet I grant that he willeth the Truth of humane Negative Propoſitions: For thoſe are ſomething, though about Nothing.

478. That ſuch Decrees or Volitions de nihilo are not neceſſary, appeareth, in that 1. Either they are neceſſary in All inſtances de nihilo, or only in ſome. Not in All: Ergo, not qua tales: For if only in ſome, it muſt be from ſome ſingular accidental reaſons: A quatenus ad omne valet conſequentia. That they are not neceſſary in all, is granted in that no man (that I know of) ever aſſerted it. And to aſſert it, is great preſumption: For then there muſt be infinite Negative-Poſitive Decrees: As e. g. that there ſhall not be innumerable more Worlds, more Suns, more Atoms, that this and that and every particular atome or ſand ſhall not be a Sun, a Star, an Earth, a Man, a Dog, a Fiſh, &c. And infinite Decrees, about every Stone; as many about every pile of graſs, and as many about every creature, what they ſhall not be. And infinite Decrees about infinite (or innumerable) Poſſibles, that they ſhall not be exiſtents, that they ſhall not be thus or thus named, &c. Who can prove or dare affirm, that all theſe Infinite Nothings, have Poſitive acts of Decretive Nolition from Eternity in God?

479. 2. We muſt not feign unneceſſary Acts in God: But ſuch Poſitive Nolitions of Nothings ſeem unneceſſary: For Nothing will be nothing, without a Nolition, as well as with it: What need God Nill the Being of Petavius Vol. 1. li. 9. Theol. dogmat. de praedeſt. cap. 16. pag. 656. thus deſcribeth the old opinion of our Countrey-man Johan. Erigena Scotus, Docuit u…icam tantummodo pradeſtinationem eſſe in Deo, qua electos ad aeternam foelicitat…m deſtinat: nullam outem ad aeternam eſſe damnationem. How near is this to the other Joh. Scotus Duns. See what Biſhop Uſher ſaith of this Scotus Erigena and Goteſchalcus. Petavius ſaith, [Idem à Ca…olo Calvo unice dilectus erat.] See to this ſenſe the Decrees Synodi Cariſiacenſis contra Gott…chaltum, in 1 Tom. Concil. Gallic. p. 66.more Worlds, more Creatures, more Names, &c. when it is not poſſible that ever they ſhould be, unleſs he poſitively will and make them. Yea, if (per impoſſible) there were no God, Nothing would be Nothing ſtill. To feign or call for a Divine Nolition to keep Nothing from becoming ſomething, is too preſuming.

480. 3. All thoſe Schoolmen and Divines who tell us, that every Will of God, except his complacency and diſplicence, is effective, muſt needs be againſt a Poſitive Nolition of Nothings: For that effecteth nothing. If they ſay that they mean it only of Volitions and not of Nolitions, I anſwer, 1. Is not Gods Nolition a Velle non? What is it, but a Will that this or that ſhall not be? 2. And in man as Volitions are for ſome Good, ſo Nolitions are for the depulſion of ſome Evil: But Indifferent-Nothings, that are in eſſe imaginato neither Good nor Evil, have no Volitions or Nolitions even in man.

481. 4. Gods Will is his Eſſence, variouſly denominated as variouſly terminated on the objects: But Nothing is no object, and ſo no termination of Gods Will; and ſo no object to conſtitute an act in ſpecie velindividuo by connotation or extrinſick denomination: Therefore God is not to be ſaid to Will it, or Decree it. If you ſay, that it is ſomething in the Idea of Gods Intellect; I anſwer, It is preſumptuouſly aſſerted: Who can prove, or ought to feign that there is in God Idea's or Conceits of ſuch nothings as never will be any thing, in the forms of ſomethings? For Nothing as nothing, hath no form to be conceived of.

482. Object. Thus you deny Nothings as ſuch to be known of God. For if they cannot be the objects of his Nolitions, then neither of his Knowledge.

Anſw. Properly Nothing as ſuch, is not an object of Knowledge at all. But a Propoſition de nihilo is: But of this more anon.

483. 5. Certainly God doth freely ſuſpend or limit the Acts of his Power: Therefore he may for ought we know (that I ſay not, It is certain p. 71that he doth) ſuſpend or limit the Acts of his Will. God doth not make more Worlds, nor more Men, Birds, Beaſts, Fiſhes, Plants, Stones, Sands, Atoms, Names, &c. than are and will be. He doth not ſanctifie more than are and will be ſanctified; nor give more grace to the ſanctified than ever they will have: when he Could if he Would. And when the Principles of the Divine Nature are Co-equal, why ſhould we ſay, that he who undenyably ſuſpendeth the poſſible acts of one, freely, ſuſpendeth not the acts of the Free Principle (the Will) itſelf? or is it like that one ſhould be here active, and not the other?

484. 6. Poſitive Nolitions of Evil do ſeem in man to come from the Imperfection of his created nature; As being Paſſive, and Capable of, or obnoxious to evil, or in danger of it, and ſo needeth defence againſt it, and his Nolitions are the defenſive and depulſive principle. And though we muſt ſpeak of God according to our mode, we muſt ſay nothing needleſly which importeth weakneſs or paſſiveneſs or danger in him.

485. **Again let the Reader note that my Cauſe lyeth not on this, but becauſe I have ſaid ſo much of it, I think meet to take notice of the moſt that is ſaid againſt me: Vaſquez in 1. Tho. qu. 19. a. 3. diſp. 79. c. 3. doth purpoſely confute Scotus, and affirmeth, that Gods will is not to be conceived of as Negative quoad actum about any Negatives; but that he hath a poſitive act of Nolition of every non-entity and non-futurum, and ſo (ut alibi) hath infinite nolitions of infinite non-futures. He himſelf confuteth their reaſon that ſay, God is not in potentia ut, velit, and I need not anſwer it. But he layeth all his cauſe on this as a demonſtration, (and maketh it a very uſeful doctrine for the explication of reprobation) that Quodcunque non eſſe creaturae cujuſcunque referri poteſt ad divinam Voluntatem ut objectum appetibile, quod ipſa velle poſſit: Ponamus Deum velle rem aliquam non eſſe: deinde ut dicatur negative ſe habere, opus eſt variationem aliquam intrinſecam eſſe aut in Deo, aut in rebus non futuris: At non, &c. Voluntas autem Dei non neceſſario negative ſe debet habere, quia illud non eſſe eſt app…tibile: The ſumm is, God can Poſitive Will non-entity, ergo he doth. And this is his All, to which elſewhere he oft referreth us. But let the ſober Reader conſider, 1. He confeſſeth, that Gods Will is his immutable and ſimple Eſſence, and in it ſelf is not at all diverſified to or by objects, but only extrinſecally denominated diverſly: ſo that all this is but de relatione & nomint. 2. And is it not preſumption to frame a Logick of ſecond notions, and ſay, This and not that is applicable to God, as if it were to man, when their Logical notions as to man himſelf are ſo arbitrary? 3. He anſwereth none of the arguments to the contrary which I uſe. Nil fruſtra muſt be feigned of creatures: much leſs of God. 4. We being agreed that whoever be in the right, it inferreth no difference in God, but in our denominations of his Will, the ſeven caſes here granted him; may fully ſatisfie them that will ſo denominate Gods Will. 5. But in a Phyſical and proper ſenſe I deny his ſuppoſition. It is no Non-entity that is properly bonum & appetibile, though it may be Malum. Bonum as well as Unum & Verum are affectiones ſeu modi entis. Et ubi non eſt Ens non eſt modus. That which is not, is not Good; or appetibile. Morally we ſay improperly, It is good not to be ſick, not to have an enemy, not to dye, &c. But we mean but 1. It is Good to live, to be well, to have all that good which an enemy would deprive us of, and 2. That it is Evil to, dye, to be ſick, to have an enemy. We ſay, Its Good not to be erroneous, wicked, deprived of Heaven, &c. that is, It is Good to know truly, to be godly, to be glorified, and it is Evil to err, to be wicked, &c. 6. Gods Will is conſidered either as 1. Efficient, 2. Or as finally fulfilled and pleaſed. As Efficient it cannot Will nothing: for nothing is not made or cauſed. And impedit… ut …s fiat, may be by effecting the hindering Cauſe. And as final, or as fulfilled and pleaſed, Non-entity can properly be ſaid to be but the not diſpleaſing of it. Nothing is no object of the Will: though a Propoſition or in men an oppoſitive thought be ſomewhat. It ſeemeth to me a preſumptuous playing with the Majeſty of God to affirm, that we muſt aſcribe to him infinite Poſitive Volitions that infinite Atoms, Names, &c. ſhall not be; when even to men we only aſcribe reductively and morally, the nolition of things evil. 7. It is certain that God ſuſpendeth his Velle & facere about non-entities? And why not as well his Nolle? or Velle non eſſe? as aforeſaid. But here after others a late philoſophical Phyſicion ſaith, that Nothings may be Bona Moralia, though not Naturalia. I anſwer, It is not true ſave by a reductive improper ſpeech. Morality is Modality. The negative Commandments forbid evil, and command the nolivion and reſiſtance of it: To murder, &c. is evil: and to nill it and poſitively reſiſt and ſubdue all in us that tendeth to it, is good: But the bare non occidere is not moral Good. All moral Good is radically in the Will, and no farther in any forbearance of an act, than a poſitive act of the Will makes it Obedience: And yet here I go not ſo far as Ockam, as I have ſaid elſewhere. I grant that when the poſitive nolition and reſtraint of an act to which we are inclined or tempted, is the good of obedience, the not-doing of the Act is loco materiae circa quam, and ſo muſt go to an adequate conception of the duty, although it be no proper part, nor good in it ſelf: But Ockam goeth further, and maintaineth that the external act of duty with the internal Volition hath no more moral goodneſs than the Volition alone: But I think that the action is a ſubject (or loco ſubject…) of a derived ſecondary goodneſs, as Scotus aſſerteth.They that are againſt this, are moved with a fear, leſt we make God an Idle Spectator, and not the Governour of the World. But they conſider not, 1. That the ſuſpenſion of his Powerful Operation inferreth no ſuch thing: God is not Idle, becauſe he Cauſeth not, or maketh not infinite Nothings (or poſſibles to exiſt:) Not is he the leſs Governour of the World: And yet Idleneſs and Government are words that more directly ſignifie non-operation and operation, than any meer Volitions or Nolitions. Men may thruſt out words, but no rational anſwer againſt this argument.

486. 2. And note well, that Gods not knowing, or not-nilling nothing is from his Perfection; and not any privative Ignorance or Negligence: For he knoweth all that is an object of Knowledge; and willeth all that his Wiſdom judgeth meet to will (or nill reſpectively): So that to tell God that he is Ignorant if he know not an unintelligible object, or Idle if he Will or Nill not at our direction, is as much blaſphemy, as to tell him p. 72that he is Impotent if he cannot ſin, or cauſe Contradictions to be true: The caſe is the very ſame.

487. Object. But Scripture oft aſcribeth both Nolitions of Nothings, and Knowledge of them unto God.

Anſw. And ſo muſt we in that ſenſe as the Scripture doth: We will ſay, and muſt ſay of ſome Nothings, that God Nilleth them. I hope the Learned will not take it amiſs, if I ſpeak where the Schoolmen are too ſilent, as well as deſire ſilence where they unprofitably ſpeak, as long as the caſe is, 1. Weighty, 2. And made plain, 3. And I go the middle healing way.

488. In all theſe caſes and reſpects we aſcribe Nolitions unto God… I. He that by a Poſitive operation cauſeth a limited cauſe, may be ſaid to cauſe the limitation of effects by conſequence. And he that poſitively willeth realities with ſuch limitations, from whence the conſequence neceſſarily followeth [Nothing elſe will ever be] is ſaid Morally, or …reputatively or by Conſequence to Will that Nothing elſe ſhall be. And he that knoweth all things that belong to the perfection of knowledge, is improperly ſaid to know all Nothings, in that he knoweth that Nothing more is or will be. And ſo as knowing Beings is by conſequence reputatively or morally called the knowing of Nothings by men, we are ſain to uſe ſuch terms of imperfection even of God, leſt we ſeem to make him Idle or Ignorant. When we ſay, that God is the Cauſe that th…re is no more creatures, we mean but that he cauſeth not more creatures. And ſo to ſay, that God willeth that there ſhall be no more Worlds, meaneth but that God willeth not that there ſhall be more.

489. II. This Interpretative conſequential Act, which is but morally ſo called, is fitlier expreſſed in the groſs of univerſal Nothings, than of millions of imaginary particulars. It is fitter to ſay, that by willing a limited or finite World, God willed that there ſhould be nothing more, than to ſay, He willed that there ſhould not be a Sun in every mans pocket, or Heaven and Earth in every mans fiſt, &c. Though as to the truth all is one.

490. III. When God poſitively willeth the Poſitive hindering of a thing, he may morally be ſaid to Nill the thing, or to Will that it ſhall not be. That there are Poſitive Impeditions of God (by Dr. Twiſſes leave) I have elſewhere proved: But then you muſt ſuppoſe that as the fountain of Nature, as it were by a Decree, he hath reſolved to continue the Nature of things and his natural Concurſe: which ſuppoſed, their Natures may incline them to ſuch Action as needeth Poſitive Impedition. So God hindered the fire from burning, and the Lyons from killing Daniel (it's like) Dan. 3. & 6. Certainly if a man can ſtop a Cart-wheel with a Stone, or bind a man in chains, God can do the ſame. And mens Inclination to ſin needeth a Poſitive Impedition. Now though non-agere is nothing, and hath no cauſe, yet he that deſtroyeth or hindereth the Cauſe of Action, is morally ſaid to be the Cauſe that there is no Action: Though ſtrictly it be but deſtroying the Cauſe of Action, and ſo preventing further action. And this moral language even of God is the fitter, becauſe it is of Moral things.

491. IV. And here Gods Law being called his Will, though it be formally but de debito, yet being materially de re ipſa, a double reaſon will thence ariſe. For when God forbiddeth and condemneth ſin, &c. 1. He doth very much to hinder it, and that poſitively (and ſo he doth by his grace), 2. And his prohibition may be called his Nolition ſignified.

p. 73492. V. And God properly willeth the Being and Truth of Negative propoſitions, [viz. This or that will not be.] and knoweth them (as made by man at leaſt). And as I ſaid, ſin as the ſubject of a propoſition is not ſin, or hath no harm in it. As ſin repented of, or the object of repentance and hatred maketh up a Virtue, and is not ſin indeed, but the knowledge of it: So here. But yet hence the phraſe may be borrowed, and it may be ſaid, that God Nilleth the exiſtence of ſuch Poſſibles, becauſe he willeth the truth of the propoſition, They ſhall not be.

493. VI. But here note, that when God is Morally and moſt fitly ſaid to Nill ſuch Nothings, it is not as Nothings, but as Poſſible Evils: For only Evil is the proper object of Poſitive Nolition: ſo that it may be ſpoken fullier of ſin, than of other Nothings, even fitly in a Moral ſenſe.

494. VII. Laſtly, Acts of Will are ordinarily aſcribed to God, when it is meer operations or privations that are meant; and ſo the phraſe is as they ſay ab effectu ad affectum. When a man 1. Denyeth his aid, 2. And actually hindereth, it is a ſign of nolition. And ſo from Gods 1. Not cauſing, 2. And his hindering, he is ſaid to Nill that Nothing (that never ſhall be.) So much of the phraſe.

495. Now for application. 1. Non-dare fidem, aut gratiam, not to convert, is Nothing; Therefore it is not Poſitively willed or decreed of of God: or at leaſt no man can prove it ſo to be: So not-to give the Goſpel, the Spirit, &c.

496. Yet note, that when mans ſins have ſo forfeited ſuch gifts that they are penally withheld, this non-agency hath the denomination of a Moral Act. And alſo that the making of the Penal Law, which maketh this Privation due as a puniſhment, was a poſitive act of God, and had a poſitive Volition. But Negations not-penal are not ſo.

497. 2. Not to hinder ſin, or to Permit ſin (barely as permiſſion) is Nothing: (As elſewhere I have proved.) Therefore it hath no Poſitive Decree or Will: ſave that when it is penal, and the execution of a Law, that Law being a real natural being, and the Jus thence reſulting a real relation and the executive Privation quid Morale, they are Willed and Decreed anſwerably as they are. To permit a man to be ſpiritually Dead is [not-to make him alive:] To permit his Darkneſs or Ignorance, [is not-to give him Light or Knowledge:] To permit his unbelief is [not-to cauſe him to believe.] To permit his want of Love, is [not-to give him Love.] To permit his poſitive ſins of Malignity or Carnality, is but [not-to cure and hinder them by Grace or Providence,] ſuppoſing the Natural ſupport and concurſe, whith the Author of Nature giveth to all things.

498. Therefore when Gods Acts in themſelves are his Eſſence and all one, and are diverſified but by connotation of divers objects, relatively and denominatively; when he knoweth all things uno intuitu, and willeth all that he willeth unica Volitione; when nihil phyſicum is no denominating terminus, of a phyſical act, (though ſo far as it may be called Moraliter, id eſt, Reputative aliquid, as a Privation, it may be ſaid to denominate reputatively, as a quaſi aliquid;) and that which is moraliter vel imputative nihil, cannot morally denominate; when both Non dare ſpiritum, gratiam, fidem, vitam, &c. and permittere infidelitatem; peocatum, &c. are truly Nothing, and even in Reputative Moral ſenſe, are wihil morale, when they are not penal; (And as antecedent to ſin, they are not penal;) Judge now impartially whether 1. Thoſe men deal not preſumptuouſly with God, 2. And troubleſomely with his Church, who aſſert the Being of Poſitive Decrees and Volitions in God about ſuch Nullities, p. 74and raiſe Controverſies about the Reaſons and the Order of them, yea, unto dangerous inferences; when as 1. They can prove no ſuch thing in God as they aſſert. 2. Nay, when we ſay ſo much to prove the contrary.

499. And here conſider, whether Scotus himſelf aſſert not without all need or proof, that God hath a poſitive knowledge and reflexive Volition of his own Non-Volition? and ſo that a Nullity as to his own act, muſt be the terminus of a poſitive act? When that Nullity is neither God, nor a Creature, nor aliquid vel Dei vel Creaturae; and ſo ſeemeth to be no denominating terminus of a diſtinct act. Yet no doubt, God is not to be called Ignorant of ſuch Nullities or Idle; for thoſe are terms of privation: If God be ſaid either not to Know nothings or not to Wil… or Nill them, it is becauſe it ſignifieth his Perfection: And no part of perfection is wanting to him. But we muſt not place his perfection in a conformity to our imperfect mode of knowing or willing.

500. For we dare not here preſume peremptorily to determine Negatively, that God doth not poſitively Will his own non-agency or non-volitions; becauſe we know how dark we are and diſtant from God, and unfit to ſay any thing but certainties of him, as certain truth: But we abſtain from the contrary aſſertion, as utterly unproved, and we will impute no needleſs acts to God as his Perfection: Though we yield to reputative moral denominations.

501. And ſo I contradict not the language of Aquinas 1. q. 14. 9. who ſaith, that God knoweth ſuch non-entities as never will be, ut poſſibili…. And eſſe in potentia quamvis non in actu is more than nothing. But remember that eſſe in potentia ſpeaketh the eſſe Potentiae, but the poſſibile is a pure nothing. So that this is but to know the Potentia, and not any thing elſe. Yet no doubt but God knoweth all things as they are in himſelf; that is, he knoweth that he can do all things, and knoweth what he knoweth and willeth; but this is no eſſe creatum but God himſelf, at leaſt as to that which never will be. But if any will call it a knowing of things poſſible which are nothings, when God knoweth his own Power to make them, we quarrel not with words, while the ſenſe is known.

502. But remember that it is not the Knowledge, but Decrees and Volitions of God that our enquiry now is about: And Aquinas and his followers commonly ſay, that Gods will goeth not ſo far as his knowledge; and that he knoweth indeed mala ex bon… of which they are the privation (as no doubt he doth ſo far as it is not imperfection to be ſaid to know them, or as they are objects of knowledge) but yet that Mala neque vult, neque … lit, ſed tantum non-vult, as Lombard ſaid.

503. Ockam Quodlib. 3. q. 6. hath the queſtion, Utrum Cognitio intu… tiva poteſt eſſe de objecto cognito? And he 1. concludeth that per potentiam divinam poteſt eſſe de object… non exiſtente; but he meaneth only quod fuit vel fuerit. 2. That naturally it cannot be. And faith that Contradictio eſt quod viſ…o ſit, & tamen illud quod videtur, non ſit in effect… nec eſſe poſſit: Ideo contradictio eſt quod chimaera videatur intuitive: fed non eſt contradictio quod illud quod videtur nihil ſit in actu extra ca… ſom ſuam, dummodo poſſit eſſe in effectu, vel aliquando fuerit in rerum natura—Unde Deus ab aeterno videt omnes res factibiles, & tamen …unc null… fuerunt—By which it is plain, that he meaneth as Aquinas, that it is not as Nothings, but as Poſsibles and Futures they are known even by God, ſaving that Aquinas and his followers judge that they are from eternity fore-known in their proper exiſtence, by reaſon that all times and things are preſent in Eternity. Now to know a Poſſibility of a thing, is p. 75not to know the Thing: But to know the Power. For Poſsibile is nihil. And as Ockam proveth, that Univerſale is qualitas mentis, and is nothing elſe, nor any where elſe exiſtent, ſo we may much more clearly ſay de Poſſibili that beſides Potentia it is nothing but the Conceptus mentis what that Power can do.

504. And if an Artificer get the Idea of a fabrick or frame which never was in the World, and Reſolve to make ſuch a real thing, that which is in his mind, is but his own Thought or Imagination, and nothing elſe: And to call it Domus vel Navis Poſsibilis, ſignifieth nothing elſe, or it is deluſory.

505. Holkot Quodlib. li. 2. qu. 2. lit. C. D. E. ad primum dicit [Dico plane quod aliae res à Deo nullum eſſe habuerunt ab aeterno diſtinctum à Deo: Neque eſſe quidditativum, neque eſſe Potentiale, neque eſſe repraeſentativum, ſecundum quod diverſi antiquit us opinati ſunt.] Quod probat. Ad art. ſecundum he ſaith, that the Creatures had no being in God from eternity, but improperly good men have ſo ſpoken, becauſe he knoweth them, and can produce them.

And ad art. 3. q. Whether it be true, that Roſa e. g. non exiſtens, concipitur aut intelligitur? he reciteth twelve arguments for the affirmative, and then reciteth the negative as the opinion of others: And though he ſay not which ſide he taketh, yet he confuteth the arguments for the affirmative, and bringeth nine arguments for the negative, which he ſaith nothing againſt.

Thomas's opinion of the queſtion you may ſee in his Interpreters in 1. d. 36. & 1. q. 14. ar. 9. Ruiz de Scient. d. 17. Valent. 1. q. 14. punct. 7. Tanner. 1. d. 2. qu. 8. dub. 8. Gran. 1. p. Cont. 2. d. 5. Aluiz. tr. 2. d. 9.

506. Yet let it be ſtill remembred that all this Controverſie is not properly de re, but de modo loquendi; or of the extrinſick denomination of Gods Will, and not of his Will as in it ſelf, which is his Eſſence, and but One. But yet here denominations muſt be carefully uſed.

507. And by the way, that you may underſtand what I mean by denominations, from connotation and relation to the terminating object, note what Ockam ſaith in Quodlib. 5. q. 25. that Conceptus eſt vel 1. Abſolutus e. g. hominis, 2. Connotativus, e. g. albi, 3. Relativus, ut patris: & differunt in hoc: 1. Conceptus abſolutus omnia ſua ſignificata ſignificat aeque, primo, & uno modo,—in recto—2. Nomen Connotativum proprie ſignificat primo unum, & aliud ſecundario, & unum in recto & aliud in obliquo—3. Conceptus relativus maxime concretus habet omnes praedictas conditiones quas habet connotativus: ſed differunt in hoc quod quandocunque conceptus connotativus vere praedicatur de aliquo, convenienter poteſt ſibi addi ſuum abſolutum, in aliquo ſolum: quia nihil eſt album niſi ſit album albedine: ſed Relativo poteſt addi caſus obliquus qui non eſt ejus abſolutum—ut ſervi dominus—Omnis Conceptus Relativus eſt Connotativus: at non è Converſo.

508. If any ſhall think that he hath any advantage againſt what I have ſaid by Scotus his opinion, that Voluntatis objectum non eſt Bonum tantum, ſed & E…s; & Voluntas poteſt Velle Malum qua Malum; and that the Will hath other objects, praeter finem & media, viz. Entia abſoluta not ſo related in the apprehenſion, and conſequently that there may be a Nolition of Non Enti…, and not only as Mala; And the like of Ockam in 3. d. 13. qu. 13. ad dub. 3. Gabr. Gregor. &c. Let him remember that the greater part of the Schoolmen are againſt this opinion; And that the owners of it, aſſert not this conſequence of Divine Nolitions, commonly, but p. 76ſay as Guil. Camerar. ibid. p. 1. q. 2. pag. 158. that between Volitions Leg. Guil. Camerar. diſp. moral. li. 1. q. 2. & 3. pag. 156. &c. & Phil. Fab. 1. d. 3. qu. 3. cap. 2. & q. 4. c. 7. Scot. 1. d. q. 4. ad 4. & q. 1. a. 2. & 2. d. 3. qu. 10. & d. 6. q. 1. & de Anima q. 19, 20, 21.and Nolitions there is this order, that Volitions go firſt, and we nill things only, becauſe they conſiſt not with what we firſt Willed. And Gods will need not to riſe up with an actual oppoſition eſpecially againſt its own acts or ſuſpenſions, where a non-agency will do the ſame thing.

An Additional Explication of Divine Nolitions.

LEſt all this ſeem not clear enough in ſo myſterious a buſineſs, and becauſe I have oft inſiſted on it, I will yet add this further explication of my thoughts in theſe following Theſes.

1. Underſtanding and Will in God being not the ſame thing as in man, we muſt not think that we have any other conceptions or expreſſions of them than Metaphorical or Analogical.

2. Therefore we muſt not ſay, Thus and Thus God underſtandeth and willeth, but After the manner of men we muſt thus conceive of it.

3. But there are ſeveral degrees of impropriety of ſpeech: and in a greater degree repentings, wrath, hating, grief, &c. are in Scripture ſpoken of God; but in ſtrict diſputes the leſſer degree muſt be choſen, that is, ſuch conceptions as have leaſt of imperfection.

4. In man the Will is an Appetite, and eſſentially connoteth the want of what we have an appetite to, or a ſelf-inſufficiency: but ſo it doth not in God.

5. And Nolitions in man yet ſignifie greater imperfection, viz. that there is ſome evil or hurtful thing which is at enmity to him, or againſt his good, and which he would be delivered from, or overcome: and it is in the will the beginning of a war, or reſiſtance: But it is not ſo in God.

6. That which is Good we Will, and that which is Evil we Nill, and that which is neither, we neither Will nor Nill. Accordingly we muſt after the manner of men aſcribe to God, 1. Volitions of Good, 2. Nolitions of Evil, 3. A Non-velle and Non-nolle of that which is neither.

7. Nothing is Good, but 1. God himſelf ſimply and primitively, and 2. The works of God ſecondarily and derivatively as the glory or ſplendour of his perfections is found in them, and as they are the products of his will: 3. And the Acts or Works of his creatures in a third degree.

8. The Goodneſs of the creature being eſſentially relative to Gods will, that is, Its conformity to it as its product, the creature is eo nomine Good becauſe it is that which God willeth.

9. Hence the grand difficulty is reſolved, Whether God could have made the World Better? No: not in the firſt and propereſt ſenſe of created Goodneſs, becauſe he cannot make it any other than what he willeth it to be: But he might make it otherwiſe and might diverſifie it, and make particular creatures Better to themſelves and one another, which is a lower ſenſe of Goodneſs: But in all diverſifications they would be ſtill perfectly Agreeable to his Will, and ſo be ſtill equally Good or Beſt.

10. The Goodneſs of the third rank of beings (The Acts of Free-Agents) is their Conformity to his Law or Governing Regulating Will.

11. God hath as Creator and Motor become the Voluntary Root or Spring of Nature and natural motion, and accordingly ſtabliſhed all ſecond cauſes as natural agents under him, and doth by them operate in a natural neceſſitating and conſtant way: And this is antecedent to his Laws p. 77to free agents: And this natural courſe of agency we muſt not expect that he ſhould alter, but rarely by miracles.

12. Nothing is at enmity and Actively opponent to Gods natural agency or motion: for elſe there ſhould be ſomething beſides God and his works which he muſt overcome: Though ſome natural motions may oppoſe each other, yet all concurr to one end.

13. Non-entity or Nothingneſs, is not contrary to God as an opponent.

14. Therefore ſeeing **Saith Alliac. Camerac. 1. q. 12. a. 1. B. [Reprobatio ſecundum aliquos eſt non-propoſitum dandi vitam aeternam. Et ille dicitur Reprobatus ſecundum aliquos cui Deus non propoſuit dare vitam aeternam.] Et poſtea [Certum eſt de multis quod Deus non vult quod in bonis meritoriis perſeverent—Et non vult quod conditio impleatur; Quia ſi vellet uti que impleretur:] But he ſaith not [Vult non impleri, &c.] Gregorius non debuit inferre quod non miſereri eſt effectus Reprobationis, cum ſit ipſa Reprobatio. Id ibid.Nolle is not a meer Non velle, but a Velle-non, which is the war of the will againſt an opponent, and the root of oppoſition ad extra, it is an unmeet phraſe to ſay that God doth Nil any Non-entity, or any meer Natural oppoſition to him: or that he Willeth any natural entity or motion which he effecteth not.

15. But God being ſecondarily the Rector of free-agents, and making them Laws to Rule their own Volitions and actions, he doth by thoſe Laws oblige their reaſon and will, to reſtrain and reſiſt ſome natural or ſenſitive appetites and inclinations, and ſo to reſiſt ſome natural motions of God in nature, in which he is pleaſed to operate by ſecond cauſes but in tantum and reſiſtibly (as a ſtronger natural motion may reſiſt a weaker.)

16. And God doth by his grace and help internal and external, aſſiſt them in that reſiſting agency which he obligeth them to.

17. Therefore God may two wayes be ſaid to reſiſt his own natural motion, by his Laws, and by his aſſiſting grace: (But his Laws contradict not one another.)

18. To God as meer Rector therefore two things may be ſaid to be opponent, 1. Such ſenſitive and natural inclinations and actions as are by Grace to be reſiſted; 2. And all moral evil.

19. And therefore as God may be ſaid to Reſiſt theſe, ſo alſo firſt to Nill them: And ſo to have Decrees againſt them.

20. Gods Volitions and Nolitions here are his eſſential will denominated from the effects and objects. And that effect of God from which he is ſaid to Nill both theſe, is as is ſaid, 1. His Laws, 2. His grace or help. And in this we are agreed, 1. That he forbiddeth ſin and commandeth us the reſtraint of appetites and ſenſes, &c. 2. And that he helpeth us ſo to do: Therefore the reſt of the School-Controverſies here that trouble the world, are but logomachies, about the Names of Nolitions and Nolitive Decrees.

21. The thing properly willed by God in a Law, is but the debitum, the duty of the ſubject to do what is commanded, and not to do what is forbidden.

22. It is not a meer non-agency that is meant by a prohibition, but a poſitive nolition of the ſubject, reſtraining him from the forbidden act: And all proper moral obedience or diſobedience, Good or Evil, is primarily in the will, and no further ſecondarily in the exteriour act or reſtraint, than as they are Voluntary; and in non-agency but in a third ſenſe or inſtance as the conſequent of nolition and the refraining act.

23. If any therefore will ſay in this ſenſe, that God doth poſitively Nil the forbidden Act, and ſo will a non-entity ſub ratione mali moralis in this remote ſence, we will not contradict him but ſay as he.

24. And accordingly we may ſay that God hath a poſitive Decree of non-entities, or againſt moral evil; where non-agency is loco materiae, that is, in tantum, ſo far as to do all that he doth againſt it; but not abſolutè ne eveniat, ubi evenit.

25. But we may not therefore ſpeak ſo unaptly as to ſay that he willeth p. 78poſitively all or any non-entity or non-futurity of meer naturals that are non-futura.

26. Therefore we may much leſs ſay it of his own Natural Impeditions, that he poſitively willeth non-impedire ubi non impedit: For he is not to be thought of as a reſtrainer of himſelf by Law or ſelf-oppoſition. It is enough to ſay that non-vult impedire.

27. Much leſs may we ſay that poſitively vult non velle-impedire, leſt we make another Velle neceſſary to that Velle, and ſo in infinitum.…annes in 1. q. 23. a. 3. p. 2…. confe…eth that the ſenſe of all this queſtion is but which way God, who is one pure act, unvaried about all varieties, is moſt conveniently to be mentioned by us: and that Deus respect… culpae quae futura …at in reprobi… non habuit a…um voluntatis affirmati…um quo voluerit eſſe pec…ata, a… illos p…ccaturos. (Whence it followeth that All futures or exiſtents are not poſitively willed: Even the formale p…cati is quid …uturum.) But he thinks it moſt fit to ſay that God poſitively willeth the permiſſion of ſin, 1. Becauſe it is Good. Anſ…r. Nothing is …ther Good nor bad. 2. B… auſe elſe the difference between the predeſtinate and reprobate would not fall under providence. Anſw. As if giving that grace to on… which is not given to another, made no diffe…e. 3. Becauſe elſe …n would come by cha…e as to Gods foreknowledge. Anſw. As if nothing would not be nothing without a poſitive d…r…e that it ſhall be nothing? or God could not know a nothing, or a crime, as ſuch, ſo far as it is quid intellect…i perfe… …im… intelligibile, without poſitive willing it: How then knoweth he the fo…male peccati?

28. It is proper to ſay that Deus non vult permittere peccatum, ubi id non permittit; and that vult permittere aliquid indifferens quod per legem poſitive permiſsum eſt: quia permiſſio iſta eſt quid poſitivum.

29. After the manner of men it may be ſaid that conſequentially he willeth or decreeth a thing, when he willeth or decreeth that from which it neceſſarily followeth, though it could not be proved that the will of God is directly terminated on that conſequent thing it ſelf: And ſo it may be ſaid, that Qui vult quid majus, conſequenter vult minus illud quod in majore includitur. And ſo as when God commandeth duty he doth more than politically permit it, he may be ſaid eminenter to permit it, and ſo he may be ſaid to will or decree his own permiſſion of it: But that is not formaliter as permiſſion, or a negative non-impedition, but eminenter, becauſe he formally willeth the quid majus, viz. the command.

30. So God may be ſaid eminenter to will his non dare gratiam, aut Gloriam, when he penally as a Judge, denyeth it to a ſinner. But here the thing formally willed is a poſitive judicial denyal, rejection or excluſion of the ſinner, which the privation followeth.

And now for the application of all this to our caſe it may be perceived, 1. That the very Controverſie is ſuch, as a ſober Chriſtian ſhould be afraid to reſolve on either ſide. ††Ariſtot ad Nichom. inq…it, Eſt hominis modi…ati non majorem in disputando certitudinem aut ſubtilitatem explicationis diſ…derare, quam rei ipſius de qua diſſeritur natura …tur. Han… ſludioſis in m…oriam r…co, …t qu… ſit …imis argu… in diſſerendo contra Eccleſia d…ri…an de cauſa peccati, & contingentiae. Strigelius in Melan…th. Loc. pag. 297. Quiſqu… plus …ſto non ſa…it, ill… ſapit.It is a tremendous thing to poor ſinful worms, who know not the nature of one arenula or pile of graſs, or the ſoul of an inſect, nor how the perceptions of a poor Bee is ordered in gathering her Honey and Wax, and making her Combes, &c. to determine inſolently and contentiouſly in what order God conceiveth of things, or willeth them? which firſt and which ſecond, and what reaſons move him? and for what uſe and end each thing is willed? and whether he have poſitive Volitions of every non-entity that it ſhall not exiſt then? &c. I am afraid leſt my very oppoſing and rebuking of this preſumption ſhould be found guilty of bold prophaneneſs, while I ſo much meddle with ſo unſearchable a thing; which I ſhould avoid, had not diſputers and railing cenſurers made it neceſſary.

2. That though while we talk together familiarly and popularly, men may leave each other to liberty to ſay that God Decreeth non-entities, or willeth that Infinite ſpecies and individual nothings ſhall never be, yet to make this the matter of a Church-diſpute, and cenſure thoſe that ſay not as they ſay, and calumniate them as favouring ſome perillous errour, ſeemeth to me no better than diabolical.

3. All men that have the brains, hearts and faces of Chriſtians who hold that all theſe diſtinctions ſignifie no true diverſity in Gods will exparte ſui, ſhould openly tell the world in the beginning, middle and end of ſuch diſputes, that It is but about words that we diſpute, even what Logical terms Artiſts muſt uſe in diſtinguiſhing of that which hath no real diverſity? even about the dreadful Majeſty of God and what Names to put on his ſimple volition?

4. And they ſhould well bethink them how far it is ſafe, to think of that as divers which is not divers; and to multiply conceptions and diſtinctions p. 79of Gods ſimple eſſence beyond true neceſſity: and whether then to contend about the priority of ſuch conceptions be more holy or prophane?

5. For all the reaſons before given, If they will ſay that God Decreeth penally to deny or not to give Grace or Glory or any good thing to them that forfeit it, there is reaſon for the expreſſion according to Scripture, after the manner of man: But if they will fly higher and ſay that Gods Simple eſſential will, is to be called A poſitive Decree or Volition that Judas, e. g. ſhall not be named John, Thomas, &c. that there ſhall be millions of diſtinct non-entities, &c. or that any poſitive Volition is of neceſſity to non-futurities or non-exiſtences in meer phyſical reſpects, where no poſitive action is neceſſary, (ſave only that by conſequence he that decreeth and willeth to make ſuch and ſuch finite creatures, may conſequentially and improperly be ſaid to will that there ſhall in general be no more, in that he willeth not that there ſhall be more, and they cannot be without his will,) I fear ſuch are over-bold with God. And ſo are they that ſay that he hath a Poſitive Decree or Will, non dare Chriſtum ante lapſum Adami, non dare fidem, non impedire peccatum, in ſuch inſtances or caſes wherein the [dare] is no Act of a Rector, nor the [negare] the poſitive Law, judgement or penal denyal of a Judge, but only the dare belongeth to a free Dominus-benefactor.Bannes ubi ſup. p. 272. argueth [Omne ordinabile in bonum finem quod invenitur exiſtens, eſt volltum à Deo: ſed Permiſſio peccati eſt, &c.] Anſ. Permiſſio illa quae nihil eſt, ne que exieſtens eſt neque ordinabile: De permiſſion… autem activa verum eſt. So Ruiz de Praedef. Tract. 2. disp. 12. copiouſly proveth a poſitive will or decree of Permitting ſin: But then he defineth Permiſſion ſo as to include both Production of circumſtances and general concurſe; And who denyeth that ſuch poſitive beings muſt have poſitive Cauſes? But what's that to meer non-impedition? (Thus ſtill words are the matter of our quarrels.) Yet ſect. 7. he confeſſeth that he findeth none of the ancient Schoolmen that expreſly ſay that the Permiſſion of ſin is fore-decreed, nor that the Later deliver it ſub iiſdem verbis. Adrian in q. de Clav. ſol. 982. [Ret…nere nihil poſitivi dicit, ſed ſolum non ſolvere: & ergo non oportet Claves eſſe, ſicut nec Deum cauſam effectivam eſſe.] See Alliaco before cited ſhewing that Lombard took Permiſſion of ſin to be no Act, either Velle or Nolle, but a non-velle & non-efficere, which he himſelf contradicteth not.

Penal permiſſion or non-impedition of ſin, and denying or not-giving grace, may be ſaid to be decreed or willed, becauſe God threatned them antecedently by a Poſitive Law, which ſhould make them due, and that Law was the product of Gods will. Though ſtrictly it is but the Poſitive Law and the Debitum poenae here that God willeth, which the non-impedire & non-dare gratiam follow.

But Gods not making men Angels, or Stars, or Suns, and his making us men, free and defectible, and his permitting the firſt ſin, and his giving men no more grace antecedently (before forfeiture) as free benefactor & dominus ſuorum, none of theſe have the ſame reaſon on which to found ſuch denominations of Gods will and eſſence.

And ſeeing Nolitions in man are the reſults of his Inſufficiency and war againſt noxious evils, we muſt not aſcribe ſuch Imperfections to God; but only ſuch Nolitions as his Actions as Rector per Leges & Judicia have made to ſignifie no imperfection, as being not contra nocumenta, but only contra injurias as againſt himſelf, & contra nocumenta as againſt his creatures, i. e. contra peccatum.

And now I may anſwer the ſolitary argument of Vaſquez, mentioned in the Margin (that non entia, non dare gratiam, non impedire peccatum, &c. may have aliquam rationem boni & amabilitatis, and ſo may be Willed, Loved or Decreed.)

Anſw. 1. In meer Naturals, Negations are not properly any way good or evil; but Privations are Natural Evils, and not good.

2. To be occaſio ſinè qua non of good, (as ſickneſs is of the Phyſicions honour, and ſin of Gods,) is not any true ratio boni vel amabilis: The bonum & amabile is only the good that on that occaſion is done: The occaſion is neither efficient, conſtitutive or final cauſe of any good, nor any cauſal proper medium.

3. In Morals, meer Negations are neither good nor evil, nor have any Morality, but only Poſitives and Privations.

4. In morals God judicially doth that whence Penal privations follow, and he may penally non agere, non dare gratiam, to execute his Law, and demonſtrate his truth and Juſtice on ſinners, and occaſion the perception p. 80of his mercy to others. And here the non-agere, non-dare, permittere, being loco materiae volitae, may after our mode be ſaid to be Volita ſeu decreta, & bona. But properly it is not the non-entity, that is bonum or Volitum, but the poſitive Law and Judgement, and the relatio debiti p… nae, and the ratio poenae in the privation, and the demonſtration of truth, juſtice, holineſs, &c. therein.

5. But ſinful privations, that is, ſinful Volitions, nolitions, or non-V… litions of the Creature, are not properly per ſe or per accidens, propter ſe vel propter aliud good or amiable, or willed or decreed of God. And they that prove that God cannot be the Author of ſin, becauſe he cannot be Cauſa deficiens, muſt mean as much, or ſpeak impertinently and deceitfully.

It is not impertinent which Judicious Strangius ſaith, Lib. 3. c. 13. p. 677, 678. If Scientia Media be an uſeleſs conceit, how much more cum extenditur ad ejuſmodi infinitas & vaniſſimas connexiones rerum diſparatarum quae nunquam futurae ſunt? (He inſtanceth in many, and addeth [De hac re Ariaga diſp. to. 1. d. 21. ſect. 7.—dicit, non ſibi videri in Deo eſſe ſcientiam harum, quia talis ſcientia videtur plane impertinens: Ad quid enim noſceret Deus quid Chimaera eſſet factura ſub tali conditione impoſſibili, &c.] Et ipſe D. Twiſſus de Scient. Med. p. 472. Si plures Angelos Deus condidiſſet certe decreviſſet ut etiam illi agerent aliquid in Gloriam Dei: Nec tamen decretum aliquod hujuſmodi Deo decenter tribui poteſt, &c.

I know the caſe is not juſt the ſame with that before us: but the reaſon is the ſame for both.

But ſtill I profeſs that If it be not an injurious imputing imperfection to God to aſſign him poſitive Volitions of every negative, I ſhall concurr with them that do, and extend Gods Volitions as far as ever the object and his perfection will allow; And ſay of them as Judicious Blank doth of Gods knowledge (De Concord. lib. cum decret. 1. n. 64.) [Saltem ille minus periculoſe errat qui putat Deum ſcire ea quae forte ſcibilia non ſunt, quam qui negat Deum ſcire quae revera ſcit, & quae intra Divinae omniſcientiae objectum continentur.] So here; ſo be it that God be not feigned to will ſin, I contend the leſs againſt them that ſay He poſitively willeth Infinite numerical Nothings, and his own non-acting.††Bradward. l. 1. c. 13. Cor. 10, 11. brings in (too profoundly like one of Thom. Anglus his Ergo's) that God is the Cauſa prima of every nothing (non eſſe) becauſe he is ſo of negations: As if Nothing could be an effect and have a Cauſe: or as if a negative conception or propoſition were not ſomething, viz. a Thought or a Word, as well as an affirmative: Such workmen make the world with words.

509. BEing afraid of wearying the Reader I paſs by other School-controverſies here, and only propound to each mans Conſcience, whether 1. He that is the affirmer of unproved acts of God, 2. And that about his ſecret unſearchable Volitions, 3. And of ſuch acts as make the difficulties inextricable about Gods being the Cauſe of ſin, be not on the far unſafer ſide, than he that only ſaith, Quae ſupra nos nihil ad nos? If theſe be not certainly falſe, they are certainly unproved, and therefore not to be here received.

510. And I ſay here as Buridane ſaith about the forementioned nature of Liberty, Ethic. li. 3. qu. 1. p. 152. Simpliciter & firmiter credere volo—quod Voluntas caeteris omnibus eodem modo ſe habentibu…, poteſt in actus oppoſitos—Et nullus debet de via communi recedere propter rationes ſibi inſolubiles, ſpecialiter in his quae fidem tangere poſſunt aut mores: Qui enim credit ſe omnia ſcire, & in nulla opinionum ſuarum decipi, fatuus eſt. De feſtuca enim tibi ſenſibiliter praeſentata, formabuntur centum rationes, vel quaeſtiones, de quibus contraris ſapientiſſimi doctores opinabuntur: propter quod in qualibet harum deceptus p. 81erit alter ipforum vel ambo: Ideo non miror ſi in hac altiſſima materia non poſſum per rationes & ſolutiones ſatisfacere mihi ipſt.]

511. To proceed in the application, **Vaſquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. d. 95. c. 1. Sunt non-nulli Thomiſtae qui tam ſevere hanc ſequuntur opinionem ut affirment, …undem ordinem ſervaſſe Deum in reprobatione quem in praedeſtinatione tenuit; ſcil. ut ante praeviſa peccata ſola ſua Voluntate decreverit quoſdam à regno Coelorum excludere, licet non ad poenam ſenſus deſtinaverit.—Deinde quos voluit excludere permiſerit labi in peccatum ea intentione ut eos excluderet à regno ſicut decreverat. Et c. 2. Parum ab hac ſententia diſſert Scotus, qui qu. 1. d. 41. aſſerit in Deo duplicem eſſe Reprobationem; alteram vocat Punitivam, alteram permiſſivam—Et punitivae dari cauſam, & ex praeviſis peccatis factam fuiſſe;—Permiſſivae non dari cauſam, quia quod homo permittatur labi in primum peccatum, nulla ex parte illius datur cauſa: hujus enim ſolum nititur Scotus cauſam negare—Hinc ordinem hune in mente Divina aſſignat: (&c. ut alibi.) Scotum ſequuntur Baſſolis, Corduba, &c. Objicit Bradward. Privationes ut eclipſes, mors, &c. habent poſitivas cauſas. To which what I have ſaid is a ſufficient anſwer. And 1. Sometimes they have not; but only the ceſſation of a cauſation: 2. They never have a poſitive efficient of themſelves, (for nothing is not made) but only a poſitive remover of the cauſe of that which the ſubject is deprived of, or an interpoſer or hinderer of the cauſation of it, e. g. of Light or life; And death hath no cauſe but that which ceaſeth the cauſes of life.Reprobation is commonly looked at in the two moſt notable parts (as called,) 1. Gods Reprobating men to unbelief and impenitency; 2. His Reprobating men to final damnation. The laſt of theſe alſo is conſidered in the execution, 1. As Privative. 2. As Poſitive, called Poena damni & ſenſus. And both (eſpecially the Privative part) are conſiderable, 1. As executed by man himſelf on himſelf freely. 2. Or as executed by God: Concerning each of theſe obſerve,

512. 1. Not to Believe and Repent is no real entity: And not to Give faith and Repentance (as is ſaid) is no real entity: And to Permit Infedelity and Impenitency is no real entity (as is proved:) And not to Decree the Giving of ſaith, and the hindering of unbelief is nothing: And (moſt clearly) beſides theſe four nothings, nothing can be proved either exiſtent or needful. All that cometh to paſs, will come to paſs without any more ado. Therefore.

513. As far as any mortal man can prove God hath no ſuch Act of Reprobation at all, as is, 1. Either a Decree that a man ſhall not eventually Repent. 2. Or a Decree not to give him Repentance. 3. Or a Decree to Permit his Impenitence. 4. Nor can we prove an after Volition of his own former non Volition which is aſſerted by Scotus. But the three firſt we have great reaſon to lay by; and ſo not only to ſay as Davenant that this part of Reprobation is an Act negative quoad objectum, but that it is no Act, and there is no other Reprobation as to this part ſave, 1. Gods not decreeing to give faith, 2. And his not giving it.

514. 2. And as to Damnation, ſo much of it as conſiſteth in ſin it ſelf, God no otherwiſe cauſeth than as he doth all ſin, which is properly, not at all; It being but the Act as an act which he cauſeth as the Cauſe of Nature, and not as ſinfully qualified: and ſo no more decreeth this than other ſin.

515. And moſt men little think how much of damnation lyeth in ſin it ſelf, and the privative conſequents which need no other cauſe. 1. To be ignorant of God and Goodneſs. 2. To be void of the Love of God and Holineſs, and Holy perſons, and all the Holy employment of Heaven. 3. To be thereby void of all the Delights of Holy ones, which conſiſt in ſuch Knowledge, Love and Employment, Praiſe, Obedience, and holy Communion. 4. To be uncapable of the Reception of Divine complacency; as he that maketh himſelf blind is uncapable of the light, or he that maketh himſelf unlovely is uncapable of immediate Love. 5. To be defiled and diſeaſed with all kind of ſinful luſts, and malignity, and made like the Devil. 6. To have all ſorts of Luſts in violence when they can have no fewel or ſatisfaction, and ſo to be tormented with theſe luſts. To have extream ſelfiſhneſs and Pride, when they have caſt themſelves into the utmoſt ſhame and miſery. 7. To ſee that no Creature can deliver them, and to deſpair of ever being better, as having no hope from God or any other. 8. To ſee or know that others enjoy the Glory and everlaſting felicity which they have loſt. 9. To think how eaſily once they might have attained it; and how it was offered freely to their choice. 10. To think of all the ſolicitations of mercy that importuned them, and all the time and means they had. 11. To think for how baſe a vanity they loſt it, and that miſery was their wilful choice. 12. To p. 82be tormented with envy and malice againſt God that forſaketh them, and againſt his Saints; And to feel conſcience awakened ſetting home all their former folly; All this is nothing but ſin and its own effects, which hath no Cauſation at all from God, but to continue the nature which he gave them, and is not bound to deſtroy. And how great a part of hell is this?

516. Nay we know not how much ſenſible Pain may be the conſequent of their own ſin, without any other Act of God, than his common continuation of nature it ſelf: As a man that eateth Arſnick, or unwholſome meat, is tormented by it, without any other act of God, than as the univerſal Cauſe of Nature.

517. All this much of Damnation then being meerly the work of the ſinner himſelf, ſo far as there is no Act of God in the execution, ſo far no man can prove any Poſitive Act of Volition or Decree.

518. But 1. As God in theſe is the univerſal cauſe of Nature, and ſo of natural acts, 2. And as in other inſtances he actually further puniſheth them, 3. And as he actually made that Law which made theſe penalties the ſinners due; ſo far God hath a Poſitive Decree and Volition, that theſe perſons ſhall be damned: And moreover, as improperly or morally his not ſanctifying them, and not ſaving them is called his Act, and is really their penalty, even ſo may his not-willing to ſave or glorifie them be called his Decree and will to damn them, if you will.

519. By this time we are ready to anſwer our firſt queſtion, What are the objects of theſe ſeveral acta of God, ſo far as connotatively we muſt call them ſeveral.

And 1. **Beſides all before cited againſt Volitions de nihilo, ſee Ruiz de Vol. Dei, diſp. 6. §. 1. p. 36. [Antiquorum graviſſimi ſentiunt Deum non omnia Velle, ſed ea duntarat bona quae in aliqua differentia temporis exiſtunt: proinde poſſibilia que nunquam futura ſunt non amari à Deo, … Mala: & inde Deum not eſſe omni-volentem: & n…llam creaturam à Deo amari neceſſario: Ita Albertus, Alexand. Bo…vent. Richard. Gaby. Bannez, Zumel, Molina, Valentia, Scotus Againſt which he bringeth frivolous reaſons, and aſſerteth, that God willeth as a material object, the Goodneſs which the Creature would have if it were made, and this as to all Creatures which never will be. What putid contradictions are here? to will Goodneſs which is no Goodneſs, of all Creatures which are no Creatures, as material objects, which are nothings? God willeth his own Power, whence man calleth that Poſſible which is nothing. But was there from Eternity any Poſſibles not-future to be willed? What was there from Eternity but God? And are all the…e Nothings God himſelf?Gods not giving the Goſpel to any perſons, is no Act, and ſo hath no object. But reductively or improperly the object is, Man ſinning againſt the grace of the firſt edition of the Law of Grace: that is, Theſe are the ſubject de quo, of which it is truly ſaid, They are without the Goſpel.

520. 2. Gods not converting effectually ſome that have the Goſpel, is no Act, and hath no object: But the ſubject of the Privation, called the Object, is, Some part of thoſe men who have forfeited the helps of ſpecial Grace by their abuſe or neglect of the Goſpel and the Commoner grace which was given them.

521. 3. Gods not Pardoning, Juſtifying, Adopting and Sanctifying men, is no Act and hath no object: But the ſubject of the Privation, and object of the Laws contrary ſentence, is, Impenitent, Unbelievers, or the non-performers of the condition of Juſtification, &c. in the Covenant.

522. 4. Gods not Glorifying men, is no Act, nor the damnation which conſiſteth in ſin as aforeſaid, is none of Gods act: But the ſentence of condemnation is Gods Act, and no doubt ſome other Poſitive Execution. And the object of theſe is, All finally Impenitent Unbelievers, and unholy ones, that is, who performed not the Condition of that Edition of the Covenant of Grace which they were under.

523. And it being paſt all denyal that theſe are the objects of the Executive Acts, we muſt ſay that theſe alſo are the objects of the Decrees accordingly, where a Decree is proved, and when we ſpeak of them only juxta ordinem executionis, and not Intentionis, which I laid by before.

p. 83524. And leſt you recurr to it, once more I will recite (more of) Davenants words de ordine Intentionis. De Praed. & Reprob. cap. 1. p. 107. [1. Sciendum & tenendum eſt ſi Dei naturam & perfectionem in ſe conſideremus, illum non prius unum videre, deinde aliud, neque prius hoc decernere aut velle, deinde illud; ſed unico & ſimpliciſſimo actu, &c.—2. Ex parte tamen Rerum quae decrevit ſigna quaedam prioritatis & poſterioritatis diſtingui poſſunt,—Hic tamen obſervandum eſt, inter ipſos Scholaſticos non admodum certam & conſtantem eſſe hanc doctrinam de hiſce ſignis ſeu inſtantibus prioritatis—Scotus, qui primarius eſt ad haec ſigna fabricanda artifex, videtur non-nullis non ſolum eadem poſuiſſe priora & poſteriora ſecundum noſtrum intelligendi modum, ſed etiam ſtatuiſſe unum eſſe in ipſo Deo prius naturâ alio. (But from this he vindicateth him.) Ex adverſa parte Occamus noſter haec ſigna quocunque modo conſiderata negavit, in 1. d. 9. q. 3. Et Biel ejus ſententiam amplexus haec ſigna oppugnavit. in 3. d. 2. q. 1. dub. 3. [Prioritates, in Divinis non ſunt ponendae, ſicut nec pluralitates actuum ordinatorum. Unus eſt enim Actus in Divinis, re & ratione indiſtinctus, qui eſt ipſa eſſentia Divina.—ne ſecundum noſtram quidem conſiderationem talem ordinem Prioritatis & poſterioritatis concipi poſſe in decretis Divinis, ut talis conſideratio non ſit falſa ſpeculatio.] If this hold, our Controverſie of the order is at an end.

525. And he added the words even of a rigid Thomiſt [Domin. Bannes, quamvis non omnino explodat haec ſigna cum Biele, perpendens tamen diſcordiam Theologorum in his aſſignandis [Animadvertendum eſt, inquit, quam pro libito in negotio praedeſtinationis & reprobationis multiplicentur inſtantiae à Theologis, & quam parum illa conferant ad aſſignandam rationem differentiae inter praedeſtinatos & reprobos. Liceat itaque hic paucis monere, non eſſe nimis confidendum, aut certo dogmati adhaerendum, ulli certo ordini decretorum divinorum, ſive à Proteſtantibus, ſive à Pontificiis aſſignato, cum difficile ſit duos reperire, ſive inter noſtros, ſive inter adverſarios, qui ad amuſſim per omnia conſentiant in hac ſerie decretorum divinorum deſcribenda. Caveat it aque un…ſquiſque ne talem conſiderationem praedeſtinationis & reprob inducat quae vel Divinae juſtitiae, vel gratiae gratuitae adverſetur, & t…m non multum refert quo ordine prioritatis, &c.]