Apology Against the Exceptions of Black and Kendall, Section Baxter 75 – Section Blake 77
§. 75.
R. B. THis is fully anſwered before, even in my laſt Section. 1. Dr. Go…d ſaith but the ſame that I ſay: only I diſtinguiſh 1. Between that which is purely de fide, and that which is only denominated de fide as the more debile of the Premiſes. In the latter ſenſe the Doctors concluſions are de fide, in the former not. 2. When a Concluſion is denyed to be de fide, it may be meant either as a Diminution of its evidence, or as magnifying its evidence above that which is purely de fide, or as equaling it thereto. When I ſay this Concluſion is not de fide, A. B. is Juſtified and ſhall be ſaved, I ſpeak it by way of Diminution of its evidence and authority. And I confidently ſpeak it, and doubt not to maintain it. But when I deny this Concluſion to be ſimply or purely de fide, I R. B. ſhall riſe again, I diſtinguiſh nothing of the evidence or neceſſity of it. And when I thus argue, Omne quod ſentit & ratiocinatur, eſt Animal. Ego R. B. ſentio & ratiocinor: therefore ego ſum Animal; though I ſay that here the Concluſion is not de fide, yet I intend thereby to extoll it for evidence above that which is de fide. And when I affirm this Concluſion to be de fide, I R. B. ſhall riſe again, as denominated à parte debiliore, I do ſpeak it in Diminution of its evidence, in compariſon of that which is more evident in nature: The Premiſes are theſe, All m…n ſhall riſe again: I am a man; therefore I ſhall riſe again (ſuppoſing we ſpe…k of men that dye). If the Major which is de fide, were as evident as the Minor, which is not, the Concluſion would be more evident then it is: and if neither were de fide, but both known naturally as the Minor is, the Concluſion would not be de fide, but would be more evident. This I ſpeak that you may not think that I deny the Certainty, Evidence or Neceſſity of every Concluſion, which I deny to be de fide, either pur…ly, or by prevalent participation.
3. For the Papiſts, though ofttimes they take the term de fide, as you and I do, for that which is by ſupernatural Revelation Divine, yet ſometimes they take it for any point which is neceſſary to ſalvation to be held, without reſpect to the ſupernaturality of the Revelation, How Fiſher uſed it, I know not.
4. I think your Concluſion, that Chriſt hath a true body, is purely de fide, and may be proved by meer Scripture Teſtimony, without your medium.
5. The advantage that you ſay the new Crew would have upon denyal of the uſe of Maximes of known reaſon, I know not who gives them (except Veronius and his followers, againſt whom its long ſince I read and conſented to Vedelius in the main). But once again, and once for all, let me tell you, that if the other of your Premiſes be leſs evident or proveable then the very Word of God, and be more to be doubted of, then your Concluſion is not de fide. For nothing that is truly de fide, is leſs evident then the truth of Gods Word, and that part of the word in particular. But yet though in ſuch a caſe we tell them that the Concluſion is not de fide, yet it follows not that it is untrue, yea or not evident: nor do we therefore deny the uſe of Reaſoning from mediums of lower evidence then Scripture; much leſs of clearer evidence. But many conſequences may be true, and yet not de fide when one of the Premiſes is de fide.
Note alſo for the underſtanding of what I have ſaid concerning the evidence of the objects of Faith, that whereas we do uſually ſo compare Science, Opinion and Divine Faith, as to conclude that Science is an aſſent both firme, certain and evident; Divine Faith is an aſſent, fi…me and certain, but not evident; Opinion is ſometime firme, but never certain or evident; I do not ſpeak in the language of theſe Divines and Philoſophers, when I aſcribe an Evidence to Divine Faith: But then you muſt underſtand that the difference is not (as I conceive) de re, but de nomine; For I take not the term evident, in ſo reſtrained a ſenſe as they do: As to inſtance in Rob. Baronius (that ſecond Camer… ) who ſaith, Aſſenſus evidens eſt cum quis per ſe, hoc eſt, vi ſui ſenſus aut rationis, abſque alterius informatione & teſtificatione percipit eam propoſitionem, cui aſſentitur, eſſe veram: and he makes that an inevident Aſſent, cum quis Aſſentitur propoſitioni, non quod ſenſus, aut ſolida ratio eam veram eſſe Demonſtret: ſed vel quod levis & inefficax ratio illud ſuadeat, vel quod alius teſtetur eam eſſe veram; Philoſ. Theol. an. p. 148. But I think the term evident, is here too much reſtrained; and that with great inconvenience, and ſome wrong to the Chriſtian Faith. I take that to be properly evident, which is to the underſtanding truly Apparent, or Diſcernable; which hath divers degrees: And the Negative addition (that it muſt be abſque alterius teſtificatione) is not only ſuperfluous, but unſound; And may appear even from the Authors words; 1. where he oppoſeth theſe two, in deſcribing inevident Aſſent; non quod ſenſus aut ſolida Ratio eam veram eſſe demonſtret, and ſed quod alius teſtetur eam eſſe veram. Where he grants that whatſoever ſolid reaſon demonſtrateth to be true, that is evident. Now I ſay, that he ſhould not have oppoſed all Teſtimony to this. For ſolid reaſon doth demonſtrate Gods Teſtimony to be true, and this to be his Teſtimony. 2. He aſcribeth Certainty to Divine Faith, which he deſcribeth to be an Aſſent, qui nititur certo aliquo aut ſolido fundamento, non vero levi aut fallaci ratione; and he noteth diligently, that ad certitudinem aſſenſus requiri, ut fundamentum quo mens nititur dum aſſenſum praebet, non ſolum ut ſit in ſe certum, ſed etiam ut aſſentienti tale videatur; niſi enim ille ſciat rationem qua nititur eſſe certam, ejus aſſenſus nullo modo erit certus & stabilis. Now he confeſſeth that the object of Science muſt be evident: and here he ſaith, niſi ſcia… rationem eſſe certam. If he muſt ſcire certitudinem, then he muſt ſcire eviden…iam, if all objects of ſcience are evident. And what is it to know, but to diſcern or underſtand a diſcernable, cognoſcible, or evident object? How then can we ſcire certitudinem, niſi ſciendo aliquam Certitudinis Evidentiam? I conceive therefore that it is true proper evidence which is allowed to Divine Faith, under this name of Certainty, even by them that ſay it is not evident; I know what a ſtir the School-men make about this point. The Queſtion is not only de Evidentia ſidei, but de Evidenti Theologie alſo, which they diſtinguiſh from fides, as habitus primorum principi…rum, & ſcientia Concluſionum are diſtinct. Though the moſt of the School-men go the other way, yet ſome (as Henricus Quodlib. 12. q. 2. and Beza Archiepiſc. Hiſpalenſ. qu. 1. prolog. art. 3. not. 3.4.) do affirm our Theology to have Evidence. Aquinas and his followers maintain it to be a Science; but that is, becauſe they ſuppoſe it to be ſubalternate to the Science of God and the Gloryfied. And therefore Aquin. 22. qu. 1. art. 5. c. denyeth thoſe things to be ſcita quae communiter & ſimpliciter ſ…b fide c…ntinentur, and that becauſe omnis ſcientia habetur per aliqua principia per ſe nota, & per conſequens viſa. But I think that per conſequens viſa, will not hold without exceptions and limitations; and I ſuppoſe it to be ex principiis per ſe notis originally: Yet in the foregoing Article, Aquinas grants that though quae ſubſunt fidei Conſiderata in ſpeciali non poſſunt eſſe ſimul viſa & Credita, tamen in generali ſub communi ratione Credibilis ſic viſa ſunt ab eo qui Credit. Non enim Crederet niſi videret ea eſſe Credenda, vel propter Evidentiam ſignorum vel propter aliquid hujuſmodi. And I eaſily confeſs that matters of meer ſupernatural Revelation are not in themſelves evident, nor ab Evidentia ipſius rei muſt we prove it; But that we have Evidence of the Veritie of the Concluſions, by the Evidence of the great Principles and the Conexion, I take yet for ſound Doctrine. The Scotiſts in oppoſition to the Thomiſts make much a doe on the queſtion Ʋirum Theologia ſit Scientia: And if properly Scientia, it ſeems it muſt be evident. Scotus lays down four things neceſſary to Science ſtrictly and properly ſo called; 1. Quod ſit Cognitio cer…a, i. e. ſine deceptione. 2. Quod ſit de objecto neceſſario, & non contingente. 3. Debet eſſe Cauſata à Cauſa Evidenti intellectui, id eſt, à principiis evidenter notis intellectui; by which he ſaith Science is diſtinguiſhed from Faith which is cognitio obſcura, aenigmatica… inevidens. 4. Quod hujuſmodi principia ſeu cauſa ex terminis evidens intellectui debet applicari per diſcurſum Syllogiſticum bonum & legitimum ad inferendam concluſionem: and ſo Science is defined Notitia intellectualis, cert… & Ev…dens alicujus veri, neceſſarii, evidenter deducti ex princ…p…is neceſsa…is pr…us Evidenter notis. Yet Rada ſaith, the fourth of theſe is accidental. And I ſee not but we have even ſuch a rigid ſtrict Science of the objects of Faith. 1. It may be Notitia Intellectualis certa, as all confeſs. 2. And de objecto neceſſario. Only let me add, that when we make uſe of infallible Tradition de facto, in proving the ſoundneſs of our Records, that this was Contingens à priori, yet is it neceſſary à poſteriore neceſsitate exiſtentiae; and that as to the verity, though it be contingent, whether this or that particular man ſpeak truth, yet conſidering but the force of objects and common natural inclinations in determining the Will, it may certainly be concluded that as to a whole Nation, or World, ſome voluntary actions are ſo Contingent, as that yet they are of a moſt certainly diſcernable event: Even men before hand may infallibly know that they will come …o paſs, (ſuppoſing the world to continue Rational): As that all this Nation, or all Europe will not famiſh themſelves willfully, and will not hang themſelves, &c. is a thing that may as certainly be foreknown, as if it were not Contingent: much more may the Verity of ſuch paſt actions be known. 3. And that it may have evident principles, ſhall be ſhown anon. 4. And then that it is diſcourſive, is clear. Though Credere it ſelf as it is the quieting and repoſe or confidence of the minde upon the authority or apprehended Veracity of the Reveale… ▪ is an effect of this diſcourſe ſeeing ſiducia is not purely or chieflly, an Intellectual act, nor ſidem alicui habere as it ſignifieth this repoſe: Yet the Truth received on the Speakers Truſt or Credit, is received by the Intellect in a diſcourſive way.
Rada granteth theſe Concluſions, 1. Theologia ſecundum ſe eſt verè & propriè ſcientic. 2. Theologia Dei reſpectu eorum quae funt neceſſaria ſecundem ſe, eſt verè & propriè ſcient…a. 3. Theologia in beatis eſt propriè & verè ſcientia quoad omnes. 4. Conditiones ſcientiae. Yet this eighth Concluſion is that Theologia prout eſt in nobis viatoribu… non eſt propriè & ſtrictè ſcientia. And the great Argument to prove it is, prout eſt in nobis eſt inevidens, quia principia noſtrae Theologiae ſunt tantum Credita, ſo that all the weight is laid on this inevidence Briefly, my reaſons for the Evidence of the Object of Divine Faith, are theſe. 1. If it be evident that Deus eſt Verax, & Deus haec teſtatur, that God is true of his Word, and that this is his Word or Revelation, then Faith hath evident principles. But the Antecedent is true; therefore▪ Into theſe principles we reſolve all points of Faith: Whatſoever God witneſſeth is true; but the Doctrine of the Reſurrection, judgment, &c. God witneſſeth or revealeth; therefore; That God is true, we have the ſame Evidence as that he is perfectly good, and that is, that he is God: and that there is a God, I take to be as evident a Truth as any in Nature to Reaſon, though God himſelf be ſo far above our comprehenſion. That this is a Divine Revelation, hath alſo its evidence, in evident miracles ſealing it to the firſt witneſſes; and in Evidently Infallible Tradition delivering down to us the Records with the ſeals. I doubt not to affirm that ſome humane Teſtimony affordeth ſuch a Certainty as is unqueſtionable, becauſe of the Evidence of that Certainty: as that King James was King of England, &c. and of the matter in queſtion we have as great, and in it ſelf far greater. But of this elſewhere. 2. If Divine Faith give us a Certainty without objective Evidence, then it is miraculous or contrary to nature, or at leaſt above it (not only as rectifying diſabled nature, which I grant, but) as moving man not as man, or the Intellect not as an Intellect, which knows naturally no other Action but upon fit objects, and what is wrought by them: It knoweth no apprehenſion of truth, but as it is apparent or evidenced truth. To underſtand this Axiom to be true, All men ſhall be Judged, and to ſee no Evidence of its truth, are contradictions. 3. At leſt it cannot be concluded in general, that the objects of Faith are not evident to any, in that they were evident not only to the Prophets and Apoſtles themſelves, but to all the Churches in that age where they wrought their miracles. For as the formale fidei objectum, viz. Veracitas Revelantis, is evident to Nature, and ſo to all that have not loſt reaſon; ſo that God himſelf was the Author or Revealer, was evident to all them whoſe eyes and ears were witneſſes of the frequent Miracles, Languages and Gifts of the Spirit, whereby the truth was then ſealed by God. 4. That which hath no Evidence, cannot be Rationally preached to the world: But the Doctrine of Faith may be Rationally preached to the world; therefore Preaching hath a natural tendency to mens Converſion. It is a ſhewing men the Evidence of Goſpel Truth, and the goodneſs of Goſpel objects, and ſo thereby perſwading men to Believe the one, and Love and Accept the other. He that doth not praedicare Evidentiam veritatis Evangelicae, doth not preach the Goſpel, in the firſt reſpect, as he that preacheth not the goodneſs of Chriſt and his benefits, doth not preach it in the other. Preaching is not like Chriſts laying on clay and ſpittle, which hath no natural tendency to open the eyes: For the effect of Preaching, as ſuch, is not miraculous, no nor ſupernaturally otherwiſe then as the Doctrine preached being of ſupernatural Revelation, may be ſaid to be a ſupernatural Cauſe, and ſo relatively the effect called ſupernatural: though the ſame effect as proceeding from the Spirit which is a Concauſe, or ſuperior Cauſe, may be truly called ſupernatural. 5. That which may be diſcerned to be certain Truth, without ſpecial or extraordinary Grace, even by wicked men and Divels, hath ſome evidence which cauſeth this diſcerning or belief: But ſuch is the Doctrine of Faith; therefore. I know ſome Divines to the no ſmall wrong of the Chriſtian Faith, ſay, None can really believe it, but the Regenerate. But the Jews believe the ſupernatural Revelations of the Old Teſtament, and the Divels and many a thouſand wicked men believe, both old and new; experience tells us ſo: Chriſt tells us ſo, that many believe who fall away in perſecution. James tells ſuch men, that they do well in believing▪ but the Divel doth ſo too: elſe men could not reject or perſecute the known Truth. To conclude it is commonly ſaid that infuſed Habits, infunduntur ad m… dum acquiſitorum; and therefore the habit of Faith in the Intellect muſt be cauſed by an Impreſs of evidence: Though the Spirits ſupernatural act be moreover neceſſary, yet that makes not other cauſes unneceſſary.
Rada, who concludes, that Theologia noſtra non eſt evidens, gives but theſe two poor reaſons (and I ſhould as ſoon look for ſtrong ones from him, as almoſt any man of his Religion or party) 1. Principia Concluſionum noſtrae Theologiae non ſunt nobis Evidentia, ſed Condita: therefore nec Concluſiones, &c. I deny the Antecedent, which he proves nor; Veracitas Divina eſt formale objectum fidei, and that is evident, ſo is the Revelation, as is ſaid. 2. He ſaith, Si concluſiones noſtrae Theologiae eſſent Evidentes, poſſemus convincere Infideles, ut fidem noſtram ſuſciperent, quia Evidentia convincit Intellectum. I anſwer, 1. The greateſt Evidence ſuppoſeth other neceſſary concurrents for conviction, as a Will to underſtand, and divers other things which the wicked want. As it is not for want of Evidence of preſent Objects, but for want of good eyes that a blinde man ſeeth not; ſo it is here. 2. Many Infidels do Believe without ſpecial Grace: though not ſo deeply and clearly as to prevail with their Wills for a through converſion; yea the Divels themſelves believe. And whereas he adds Pauls words, 2 Cor. 5. We walk by Faith, not by ſight; it ſpeaks not of Rational Evidence, but of ſenſitive, and that we confeſs is wanting. Faith is the Evidence of things not ſeen, Heb. 11.1. Were it not for digreſſing too far, I would examine the 9. Queſt. Mater. 14. de fide of Aquinas de Veritate, and ſhew how ill he anſwers the nine Arguments, which he undertakes to anſwer, and how weak his own Arguments are for the proving that fides non poteſt eſſe de rebus ſcitis. And I ſhould ſhew that Faith is a kinde of Science; or if we will diſtinguiſh it from Science, it muſt not be ſo widely as is uſual, nor upon the reaſon that it wanteth Evidence. But I ſuppoſe he that will impartially read Aquinas ubi ſup. will without any help ſee the weakneſs of his anſwers, and how he ſeemed to ſtagger himſelf.
Yet let me add this caution or two; 1. I do not mean that every man who hath true Faith, doth diſcern the great and chiefeſt Evidence of the Truth of the Doctrine of Faith. 2. Where there is the ſame Evidence in the thing, there may be ſuch different apprehenſions of it, through the diverſity of Intellectual capacities and preparations, as that one may have a firme Belief, and certain, and another but a probable opinion, and another none at all. 3. Though I take the Evidence of the Doctrine of Faith to be as full as I have mentioned, yet not ſo obvious and eaſily diſcerned as ſenſitive evidence; and therefore (as one cauſe) there are fewer believe, 4. Alſo the diſtance of the objects of Faith makes them work leſs on the affections, and the preſence and other advantages of ſenſual Objects for a facile moving the Spirits, makes them carrie men away ſo potently, by making greater Commotions in the paſſions; ſo that no wonder if ſenſe do prevail with moſt. I confeſs alſo that men have need of good acquaintance with Antiquity and other Hiſtory, and the Seal of the Church in moſt parts of the world, to ſee the ſtrong Evidence that there is of the Infallible Tradition of the Scriptures down to us: and to ſome obſcure men, this may be inevident; as it may be to one brought up in a ſecret Cloiſter, whether ever we had a King or Parliament or Laws in England. But the thing is not therefore inevident to the induſtrious; No though it depend on that verity of Report, which as proceeding from each particular perſon is contingent; ſeeing there is Evidence of Infallible Verity even in the Circumſtances of theſe Contingent reports. And as Rada, when he concludes boldly that Cognitio Dei reſpectu Contingentium non eſt proprie & ſcientia, &c. yet ſeems to grant that God may ſcire Contingentia u… neceſſaria, & ſi non ut Contingentia: ſo it may be ſaid in our preſent Caſe: the ſame Reports which are Contingent, are yet in other reſpects of Evident Verity, and ſo we know them.
But I finde I have been drawn beyond my intent to digreſs far on this point: but it is becauſe it tends to clear the main point in queſtion. To return therefore to Mr. Blake, I do not know the meaning of his next words, where he ſaith, that This Argument Well followed, would put me to a great loſs in ſome of my Arguments for Scripture, &c. Doth he think that I argue to prove the Divinity of Scriptures, from themſelves alone as the Teſtifier thereof to our Faith? or that, I take it to be meerly or primarily de fide, that Scripture is Gods Revelation? when I have profeſſedly publiſhed the contrary, before thoſe Arguments? where I have alſo added theſe words of Mr. Rich. Hooker, wherewith I will conclude this Section. Truly it is not a thing impoſsible, nor greatly hard, even by ſuch kinde of proofs ſo to manifeſt and clear that point, that no man living ſhall be able to deny it, without denying ſome apparent principles, ſuch as all men acknowledge to be true. Again, Scripture teacheth us that ſaving Truth which God hath diſcovered to the world by Revelation; but it preſumeth us taught otherwiſe, that it ſelf is Divine and Sacred. Again, Theſe things we believe, knowing by Reaſon that Scripture is the Word of God. Again, It is not required, nor can be exacted at our hands, that we ſhould yield it any other Aſſent then ſuch as doth anſwer the Evidence. Again, How bold and confident ſoever we may be in words; when it comes to the tryal, ſuch as the Evidence is which the Truth hath, ſuch is the Aſſent; nor can it be ſtronger if grounded as it ſhould be; ſo far Mr. Hooker cited once more; Eccleſ. pol. p. 102, 103, &c.
§. 76.
Mr. Bl. TO winde up all, though there be ſome difference in the way between me and my learned friend, yet there is little in the thing it ſelf. Mr. Baxter ſaies that the Propoſition to which God ſealeth, runs thus, If thou believe, I do pardon thee and will ſave thee. The ſoul muſt aſſume the Minor. But I believe; from whence the Concluſion will follow, I ſhall be pardoned and ſaved. And I infer, the Major being ſealed, the Concluſion that rightly iſſues out of it, having its ſtrength from it, is ſealed likewiſe; ſealed to him that can make good that Aſſumption, But I Believe, and upon theſe terms that he be a believer.
§. 76.
R. B. 1. THe difference is ſo ſmall that were it not for ſome ſcattered by-paſſages, I ſhould ſcarce have replyed to you. 2. All the quarrel ariſeth from the divers underſtanding of the term ſealed. I ſuppoſe that you include the confirming of the Receiver, and the conferring of Right to the Benefit, both which I have ſaid are done Conditionally, as being to follow the Delivery and Reception; whereas I take it for the Teſtimonium ſecundarium, or that Obſignation whereby the Inſtrument is owned: the following effects belonging to it in a further reſpect. I ever granted that by the ſealing of the Conditional Promiſe, the Believer hath a ſingular help to raiſe the Concluſion, and be confirmed in it; but not a help ſufficient, without the diſcerning of his own Faith, which is the Aſſumption. So that if you will, participaliter and conſequenter, the Concluſion may be ſaid to be ſealed to him that hath the Condition (whether he ſee it, o… not). But totaliter & directè only the Conditional grant is ſealed. 3. The Concluſion iſſues from, and hath its ſtrength from both Premiſes jointly, and no more from one alone, then if it were none at all: and therefore where only one of the Premiſes is ſealed, and the other unſealed, there the Concluſion can be but as I ſaid, participaliter & conſequenter ſealed: And though I grant thus much to you for reconciliation, yet I conceive it unfit to ſay at all, as in proper ſpeech, that the Concluſion is ſealed: which I make good by this Argument. Concluſio ſequitur partem debiliorem, vel deteriorem. At Propoſitio non obſignata est pars debilior vel deterior: therefore Concluſio ſequitur Propoſitionem non obſignatam. And ſo it is on the ſame grounds to be denominated, not ſealed; as a Concluſion is to be denominated Contingent, when one of the Premiſes is Contingent and the other Neceſſary; or to be Negative, when one of the Premiſes is Negative and the other Affirmative; or to be Particular, when one of the Premiſes is Particular and the other Univerſal; And therefore I ſtill ſay, that it is fitteſt for you and me to ſay, that this Concluſion, Thou A. B. art Juſtified, and haſt Right to Salvation, is an unſealed Concluſion: till you can prove the Minor ſealed, Thou A. B. art a ſincere Believer. For my part, I know not what objection can be made againſt either part of the fore-recited Argument, (the major being a Common Canon or Rule that holds in all Figures, and the Minor being yielded by your ſelf) elſe I would anſwer to it.
§. 77.
Mr. Bl. MR. Baxters fourth and fifth Poſitions in the cloſing up of his Diſcourſe ſhould be conſidered, The Sacrament ſealeth to Gods part of the Conditional Covenant, and ſealeth this Conditional Promiſe, not Conditionally but abſolutely, as of an undoubted Truth. To which an eaſie anſwer may be given, in order to a fair Reconciliation. When the Covenant tyes to the Condition, and the Sacraments ſeal upon the ſame terms that the Covenant tyes, the ſeal is properly Conditional, in caſe there is any ſuch thing in the world as a Conditional ſeal. Neither is this Conditional Promiſe any abſolute undoubted Truth, but upon ſuppoſal of the Condition put, and ſo both Promiſe and Seal abſolutely bind.