Apology Against the Exceptions of Black and Kendall, Section Baxter 73 – Section Blake 75
§. 73.
R. B. 1. IF aſſurance be not of the nature or Eſſence of Faith, then it is not Faith: for nothing is Faith, but what is of the nature and Eſſence of Faith: But according to Mr. Bl. aſſurance is not of the nature or Eſſence of Faith (for he ſaith, its an error to hold it); therefore according to Mr. Bl. aſſurance is not Faith. But I ſuſpect by the following words, that by nature and eſſence, he means the minimum quod ſic.
2. That which is but either Purſued or Poſſeſſed by Faith, is not Faith it ſelf, (for nothing is the Purſuer and Purſued, the Poſſeſſor and Poſſeſſed; as to the ſame part: nor will Mr. Bl. I conjecture, ſay, that a leſs degree of Faith poſſeſſeth a greater) but according to Mr. Bl. aſſurance is but purſued or poſſeſſed by Faith; therefore is not Faith.
3. I know none that denyeth Aſſurance to be a Work of Faith, which Mr. Bl. here ſaith is a miſtake to ſay, Love and Obedience are wroks of Faith, but not Faith it ſelf.
4. I muſt have better proof before I can believe that it is Aſſurance of our own ſinceritie, or actual Juſtification, which the Apoſtle calls The full aſſurance of Faith, Heb. 10.22. Though how far this may concurr, I now enquire not.
5. And as hardly can I diſcern aſſurance of our ſinceritie, in the deſcription of Faith, Heb. 11.1. Unleſs you mean that hope is part of Faith, and aſſurance the ſame with hope; both which need more proof. Hope may be without aſſurance: and when it is joyned with it, yet it is not the ſame thing. Only ſuch aſſurance is a ſingular help to the exerciſe of Hope.
6. Its true that Faith may be ſaid, as you ſpeak, to Realize ſalvation to the Soul; that is, when the Soul doubteth whether there be indeed ſuch a Glory and Salvation to be expected and enjoyed by Believers, as Chriſt hath promiſed, here Faith apprehendeth it as Real or Certain, and ſo reſolves the doubt. But when the doubt is only whether I be a true Believer, Faith reſolves it not: and when the doubt is, whether this certain Glory and Salvation ſhall be mine, Faith only cooperateth to the reſolve of it, by affording us one of the Propoſitions, but not both, and not wholly the Concluſion.
7. I am of Dr. Ames minde that it is one of Faiths moſt eminent acts, by which it is there deſcribed: But ſo think not they that tell us that is none of the Inſtrumental Juſtifying act which is there deſcribed.
8. This which you took to be a good anſwer, is that great miſtake which hath ſo hardned the Papiſts againſt us; and were it not for this point, I ſhould not have deſired much to have ſaid any thing to you of the reſt, (about Conditional ſealing) as being confident that we mean the ſame thing in the main.
9. You forſake them that uſe to give this anſwer, when you confine it to thoſe only that with aſſured grounds and infallible demonſtrations can make it good to themſelves that they Believe, i. e. ſavingly. I doubt that anſwer then will hold but to very few, if you mean by Aſſured grounds, &c. ſuch as they are actually aſſured are good and demonſtrative.
10. Demonſtrations may be infallible, and yet not known to be ſuch to the perſon: but I ſuppoſe that by the word Demonſtration, you intend that the partie diſcerns it to be an infallible Demonſtration: which ſure intimates a very high kinde of certainty.
11. Yet even in that caſe, I deny that the general Premiſe, in the major, is equivalent to the Concluſion, I am Juſtified and ſhall be ſaved; though I ſhould acknowledge that the Concluſion may be ſaid to be de fide, in that the Major hath the predominant Intereſt in the Concluſion, if ſo be that the man have better evidence of his ſinceritie, then of the Truth of the Promiſe.
§. 74.
Mr. Bl. BƲt this is ſaid to be a groſs miſtake, and thus proved, as though the Major Propoſition alone were equivalent to the Concluſion: But here being in our Syllogiſm, both a Major and a Minor, there is added further, or as if the Concluſion muſt or can be meerly Credenda, a proper object of Faith, when but one of the Propoſitions is of Faith, the other of ſenſe and knowledge: Here the Major is confeſt to be of Faith; but the Minor, I ſincerely Believe, is affirmed to be known by inward ſenſe and ſelf-reflexion. Here I muſt enter my diſſent, that a Concluſion may be Credenda, an object of Faith, when but one of the Propoſitions is of Faith, and the other of ſenſe and knowledge: yea that it will hold in matters of Faith both fundamental and ſuperſtructive.
§. 74.
R. B. 1. IT was not this according to your limitations that was ſaid to be a groſs miſtake; but as applyed to ordinary Believers, though my reaſons make againſt both.
2. You deal more eaſily to your ſelf, then fairly with me, in your entred Diſſent. 1. I ſaid meerly Credenda, as confeſſing it is partly of Faith, and partly of knowledge, as the Premiſes are: and you leave out meerly, and put in Crendenda alone, as if I denyed it to participate of Faith. 2. I denyed it therefore to be a proper object of Faith; that is, a meer Credendum or Divine Teſtimony; acknowledging that it may be participative and partially, and leſs properly called an Object of Faith; and you leave out properly, and only affirm it an Object of Faith, of what ſort ſoever, in general.
3. I have anſwered this ſufficiently, in telling you my opinion: i. e. The Concluſion ſtill partakes of the nature of both Premiſes: and therefore when one is de fide, and the other naturaliter revelatum vel cognitum, there the Concluſion, is not purely either ſupernatural or natural, de fide, or ex cognitione naturali; but mixt of both. That its truly a Concluſion, following thoſe Premiſes, is known only by Rational diſcourſe, and is not de fide: but that it is a true Propoſition, is known partly naturally, partly by ſupernatural Revelation (which is that we mean, when we ſay it is de fide). But becauſe it is fitteſt in our common ſpeech to give this Concluſion a ſimple and not a compound Denomination (for brevitie ſake) therefore we may well denominate it from one of the Propoſitions, and that muſt alwaies be a parte debiliore: And therefore when it is principia naturaliter nota that make one propoſition or ſenſible things, or what ever that is more evident then the truth of the Propoſition which is of Divine Teſtimony, there it is fitteſt to ſay, The Concluſion is de fide, or of ſupernatural Revelation; As when the one Propoſition is that there is a God, or I am a man, or God is Great, or Good, or True. But when the other Propoſition is leſs evident then that which is of Divine Revelation, then it is fitteſt to ſay, that the Concluſion is ſuch as that Propoſition is, and not properly de fide. For the Concluſion being the joynt iſſue of both Premiſes as its parents or true Cauſes, it cannot be more noble then the more ignoble of them. This explication of my opinion is it that I referr you to as the ſubſtance of my anſwer to all that follows.
§. 75.
Mr. Bl. WHen Fiſher the Jeſuite told Dr. Featley that it was ſolid Divinity, that a Concluſion de fide muſt neceſſarily by inferred out of two Propoſitions de fide, Dr. Goad (being preſent as Dr. Featleys Aſſistant) interpoſed in theſe words, I will maintain the contrary againſt you or any other: That a Concluſion may be de fide, although both Propoſitions be not de fide, but one of them otherwiſe evidently and infallibly true by the light of Reaſon or experience; giving inſtance in this Concluſion, Chriſtus eſt riſibilis, which he ſaid and truly, was de fide, though both Propoſitions whence it is inferred be not de fide. Omnis homo eſt riſibilis, is not a Propoſition de fide, or ſupernaturally revealed in Scripture; yet thence the Concluſion follows in this Syllogiſm. Omnis homoeſt riſibilis: Chriſtus eſt homo: therefore Chriſtus eſt r…ſibilis, which is a Concluſion de fide, affirming that Melchior Canus had judiciouſly handled and proved this tenent, which he ſaid he could otherwiſe demonſtrate to be infallible: To whom Dr. Featley aſſents, ſecond Daies diſpute, pag. 85. It were caſie to frame many ſuch Syllogiſms. If an Heretick ſhould affirm that Chriſt had only a phantaſtick body in appearance only, how would you prove the contrary but with this Syllogiſm, He that is truly man, hath a true body, and not a phantaſtick body only. This is a Poſition in reaſon, Chriſt is truly a man: this is a Poſition de fide in Scripture, whence follows the Concluſion de fide, that Chriſt hath not a phantaſtick body; If one ſhould deny that Chriſt had a reaſonable ſoul, affirming that his body was informed by the Dietie inſtead of a Soul, muſt it not be thus proved? Every true man hath a reaſonable Soul: Chriſt is a true man, and therefore Chriſt hath a reaſonable Soul. The Citie that ruleth over the Nations of the earth, and is ſeated on ſeven hills, is the ſeat of the Beaſt. This is a Scripture Propoſition: But that Rome then ruled over the Nations of the Earth, and was ſeated on 7 hills, we know by Hiſtory and Geography: Whence the Concluſion follows, that Rome is the ſeat of the Beaſt. Abundance of theſe may be framed, where the Propoſition oppoſite to the Concluſion, is either an Hereſie or at leaſt an error in Faith. The Concluſion is of Faith Diſputing againſt the Ʋbiquitarians and Tranſubſtantiation; to hold up the Orthodox Faith, we are neceſsitated to make uſe of maximes of known reaſon. If they were denyed us, the new Crew now ſtart up, that deny all conſequences from Scripture, and will have none but Scripture words, had here a notable advantage. This Argument well followed, would put Mr. Baxter himſelf to a great loſs in ſome of his Arguments (for which yet I give him thanks) to prove that the Scripture is the word of God.