A Defense of English Writers and Preachers, Text (3 of 4)

A Defense of English Writers and Preachers · Text (3 of 4)

Let Cerberus therfore loke vponupon his Logiek againe, and learne to frame a Syllogiſmus better. Peraduenture being in his mad moode when he wrote this anſwere to his friendes letter: he had quite forgotten the fourtene moodes of the thrée fygures, wherin the Logicians do vſe to forme their Syllogiſmuſſes. To giuegive him occaſion therefore, to call himſelfe to remembraunce: I wyll ſet downe thoſe ſhort memoriall Uerſes which the teachers of Arte vſe to print in the minds of their Scholers, to the end that they ſhould not in diſputatiōs be abuſed by ſuch as Cerberus is, which vſe to frame Arguments, without eyther fygure or moode. The Uerſes are theſe.

Barbara, Celarent, Primae, Darij, Ferio que .

Ceſare, Cameſtres, Festino, Baroco, ſecundae.

Tertia grandè ſonans, recitat Darapti Felapton

Adiungens Diſamis, Datiſi, Bocardo, Feriſon.

Now, if Cerberus be acquainſed with theſe Uerſes: Let him ſhewe in which of theſe fygures and moodes hys Syllogiſmus is formed. And if he find it in none of thē: then let hym deſire ſome more ſkilfull than hymſelfe, to take this matter in hande. For hys Arte wyll not ſerue him to goe thorowe withall, ſo long as he medleth wyth them that knowe what Arte is.

I know that the matter conteined in Cerberus Syllogiſme, may be brought into the forme of a Syllogiſme in the firſt fygure, and the thirde moode called Darij. After p. 53this maner. Whoſoeuer doth predeſtinate any thing, is the Author thereof. But God doth predeſtinate ſinne. Ergo, he is the Author thereof. Thus farre I hauehave holpen Cerberus to frame his Argument. But leaſt Cerberus ſhould thinke that I hauehave framed againſt my ſelfe ſuch an Argument as I am not able to ſalute: I wyll ſhewe the fallace of it. Firſt in the maior, the word Authour is doubtfull. For it may be vnderſtanded eyther of him that predeſtinateth or foreappointeth a thing to be done, or of him that is the doer of the ſame thing. And therfore in reaſoning it muſt be explaned and made voide of all amphibologie and doubt. For this is a rule in Logicke, that the termes which are vſed in reaſoning, muſt be plaine and voyd of all doubtfulneſſe. If we will therfore make a good maior in this Argument, we muſt ſay, that whoſoeuer doth predeſtinate or foreappoint a thing to de done, is ſo the Authour of it, that the acte or déede done, muſt be aſcribed to him, in as much as it is a déede or an act done. And then may we adde this minor, but God hath predeſtinated and foreappointed the acte or déede that is done by the ſinner: Ergo, ſo farre forth as it is an acte or a déede, God is the Authour of it. Here is not God charged with the ſinne that man committeth, for that ſpringeth of mās choyſe, which being corrupted and made bonde to ſinne by the ſinne that the firſt man firſt committed, can not of it ſelfe chooſe to do any thing in ſuch ſort, that the ſame ſhall not be ſinne. For mans wiſdome and choyſe, which S. Paule calleth the wiſdome of the fleſh, neyther is, nor Rom. 8.Rom 8can be ſubiect to the lawe of God. And ſo all that man thinketh, ſpeaketh or doth in his owne wiſdome & choyſe, is againſt the law & commaundement of God, & ſo ſinne by the cōmon deſinition of ſinne, as is mentioned before.

And to make this matter more plaine, let vsus take one example or two, whereof in the holie Hiſtories & bookes of the Prophetes, we hauehave many, and let vsus ſée how God is the Author of the acte or déede, and not of the ſinne that is in the acte. Firſt in the .xix. Chapter of the fourth booke 4. Reg. 19.of y^e Kings, we read, that when Sinacharib had blaſphemed God, and Ezechias the King had made his complaint and praiers to God: the Prophet Eſay was commaunded to ſay thus vntounto the King. Be not afraid of the wordes wherewith ye hauehave heard the King of the Aſſirians ſeruants blaſpheming me. Beholde, I will chaunge his minde, and he ſhall heare a tidings, and ſhall returne into his owne country, & I will ouerthrow him with the ſword in his owne land. And in the end of y^t ſame Chapter, the Hiſtorie ſayth thus. And when he was worſhipping in the Temple of Neſroch his God: Adramelech & Saraſer his owne ſonnes, ſlew him with the ſword. Here it is manifeſt, that God according to his promiſe made to Ezechias, hath killed Sinacharib: but yet by y^t ſword of his own ſonnes. The acte in this murder is Gods, and ſo it is exceeding good, for it is the performance of Gods promiſe, and the execution of iuſt iudgement vponupon the wicked blaſphemer. But the ſinne of the acte, was theyrs whoſe handes were inſtruments to murder their father. For they minded nothing leſſe than to fulfill Gods promiſe, or to execute his iudgement vponupon the blaſphemer.

The ſame example we read in the .x. chapter of Eſay the Prophet, ſet forth yet more plainely after this ſort. Eſay. 10.Isa 10Come Aſſur, thou rodde of my furie, and the ſtaffe of my wrath, amongſt theſe men. &c. And a little after. But he will not think ſo, and his heart will not be ſo perſuaded: but his purpoſe will be to deſtroy, and to bring many Nations to naught. &c. Here we ſee, how God vſed Sinacharib as his rod in chaſtiſing the Nations: and yet did he ſinne in thoſe actions that God wrought by him. And we ſée alſo how God vſed his ſonnes, in deſtroying p. 54him, and yet they ſinned in murdering their Father. So is God the Authour of the acte, which was good in him, and they Authours of the ſinne of the acte, which was euill in them.

Another example we hauehave written in the .xii. chapter of the ſecond booke of the Kings, where the Prophet Nathan 2. Reg. 12.2 Kgs 12ſayth thus to King Dauid. Thus ſayth the Lord. Beholde, I will ſtirre vp euill againſt thée in thine own houſe, and I will take from thée thy wiues, euen before thy face, and will giuegive them to thy neighbour, & he ſhall lie with them in the open ſunnelight. Thou haſte done this déede in ſecrete: but I will doe this that I hauehave ſpoken of, euen in the ſight of all Iſraell, and in the open ſunnelight. The fulfilling of this is written in the .xvj. Chapter of the ſame booke. The acte whereof wrought by Abſolome, was in God, who vſed Abſolome as his inſtrument, the iuſt puniſhment that Dauids ſinne, in abuſing Uries wife, had deſerued. But the ſame in Abſolome, was abhominable and inceſtuous whoredome, whereby Abſolome minded to make all Iſraell thynke, that he abhorred his father, and that he would vtterly roote him out.

Let this ſuffice for the making plaine of that whych I hauehave ſaid, concerning that which I hauehave ſaid, touching the acte in God, and ſinne of the wicked acte in man.

Thus much for the matter of Cerberus Argument reduced into forme.

Nowe let vsus ſée what may be ſayd to that one place, that in ſtede of ſo many, Cerberus citeth out of S. Auſten. Which doth not onelyonly reſolue clearely this matter betwene foreſight and predeſtination, but alſo moſte plainely teach all that is to be ſaid of Predeſtination.

And firſt, let vsus ſet downe al the words of S. Auſten, euen as they ſtande in the place whereout Proſper doth cite them. They are writtē in the eleauenth of thoſe Articles, which are falſly impoſed vponupon S. Auſten. The wordes of the Article are theſe. Quòd quando paires inceſtant Articulo. 11. fals. Aug. impſilias, & matres ſilij, vel quando ſerui Dominos occidūt, ideò fiat, quia Deus praedestinauit, vt ita ſicret. That when the fathers do abuſe theyr owne daughters, and ſonnes theyr owne mothers, and ſeruantes murder theyr owne maiſters, the ſame is done, bicauſe God hath predeſtinated that it ſhould be ſo done. To this Article doth S. Auſten aunſwere thus. Si Diabolo obijceretur, quòd talium facinorum ipſe Autor, ipſe eſset inuentor: puto quòd aliqua ratione hac ſe poſset exo…rare inuidia, & talium ſcelerum patratorem, de ipſorū voluntate vinceret: quia, etſi delectatus ſit ſurore peccantium, proharet tamèn ſe nòn intuliſse vim criminum. Qua ergo inſipientia, quaue dementia deſinitur, ad Dei referrendum eſse conſiliū, quod nec Diabolo in toto aſcribi potest: qui in peccantium flagitijs, illecebrarum adiutor, nòn voluntatum credendus est eſse generator? Nihil ergo talium negotiorum, Deus praedestinauit vt fieret, nec illam animam, turpitèr, nequiter que victuram ad hoc vt taliter vi…eret praeparauit, ſed talem futuram nòn ignorauit & de tali ſe iustè iudicaturum eſse praeſciuit. At que ita ad predestinationem eius nihil amplius referri potest, niſi quòd ad debitam iustitiae retributionem, aùt ad indebitam pertinet gratiae largitatē. That is to ſay. If i… ſhould be layd to the Diuels charge, that he were the Authour or inuentor of ſuch wicked déedes: I ſuppoſe he might by ſome reaſon vnburden himſelfe of this enuie, and to proue that the committer of ſuch wickedneſſes, commeth of the will of thoſe men that charge him withall. For although he be delited with the outrage of them that ſinne: yet might he proue that he had not enforced them to commit the faultes. By what folly, or what madneſſe therefore, is it agréed, that that thing ſhould be referred to the decrée of God, which may n… be altogether aſcribed to the Diuell, which may be p. 55thought to be an helper forwarde of the prouocations, in the wicked actes of them that ſinne, but not the begetter of their willes. God therefore hath not predeſtinated any ſuch things to be done, neyther hath he prepared that ſoule to liue filthily and wickedly, of purpoſe that it ſhould ſo liue: but he was not ignorant that it would proue ſuch a one, and he knewe before hand, that he him ſelfe ſhould execute iuſt iudgement vponupon ſuch a one. And ſo, nothing may be referred to the predeſtinatiö of God, more than that, which appertaineth to the due reward of iuſtice, or to the vndeſerued gyft of grace or mercy.

Theſe wordes (ſayth Cerberus) being thorowly weyghed: do plainly ſet forth, the full reſolution of this queſtion. It is very true, they do ſo. And therefore, I beſech thée good Reader, weigh them well, that thou maiſt by them be reſolued in this matter of Gods predeſtination. And that thou mayſt ſo be, thou nedeſt no more but to weigh the wordes of Auſtens concluſion, wherein he ſayth, that there can no more be referred to Gods predeſtination, but that only which doth appertaine eyther to the due reward of iuſtice, or elſe to the vndeſerued gift of merciemercy.

When Sinacharibs ſonnes ſlew their owne father: was not the acte in this murder y^t due reward of iuſtice, for that he had blaſphemed God? And had not God ſayd before, that he would ſlea him with the ſword for that blaſphemie? Why may we not then by S. Auſtens wordes, referre this déede to Gods predeſtination: Whē Abſolom abuſed his fathers wyues, was not the acte of that inceſtious whoredome, the due rewarde of iuſtyce, for that Dauid had abuſed the wife of his ſeruant Urias? And had not God ſayd before, that he would puniſh it ſo? Why ſhould not the acte therefore, in that inceſt, be referred to Gods predeſtination, euen by theſe wordes that Cerberus citeth for his purpoſe. In like maner may we ſay of all other actions, which in the men that do thē are wicked, although we know not what ſinnes God doth puniſh by them, whereby the ſame dedes in him are excéeding good and iuſt.

If Cerberus would, he might hauehave ſéene ſome other places of S. Auſten, wherein this matter is made more plaine, than the bare wordes ſéeme to make it here. Firſt in his .xviij. boke, De Ciuitate Dei. He ſayth thus. Elegit diſcipulos, quos & Apostolos nominauit, humiliter natos, inhonoratos, August. de Ciuit. Dei. 18. Cap. 49.illitteratos: vt quicquid magnum eſsent & facerent, ipſe in eis eſset & faceret. Habuit inter cos vnum, quo malo vtens benè, & ſuae paſsionis diſpoſitum impleret, & Eccleſiae ſuae tollerandorum malorum praeberet exemplum. That is to ſay. He (that is to ſay Chriſt) did chooſe Diſciples, whom he called alſo Apoſtles, men borne of poore parentes, not called to honour, vnlearned: that he might be and do in them, what ſo euer they ſhould be, or do. Among theſe he had one that was naught, that by vſing well that euill and naughtie one, he might both fulfill the order of his owne paſſion, and alſo giuegive vntounto his Church, an example how to beare and ſuffer thoſe that be wicked.

Againe, in his firſt Sermon vponupon the firſt part of the. 34. Pſalme: S. Auſten ſayth thus: Ille videbat traditorem ſuum, & elegit illum magis adopus neceſsarium, illius August. in Pſalm. 34.Ps 34malo magnū bonum operatus est. Et tamèn inter duodecem electus est, nè ipſe duodenarius tā exiguus numerus eſset ſine malo: hoc ad exemplū nostrae patientiae, quoniam neceſse erat vt inter malos vineremus. That is to ſay: He (that is Chriſt) did ſée and know him that ſhould betraie him, and he did the rather chooſe him as one neceſſarie for that buſineſſe, and by the euill of that traytour he did worke a great good worke. And yet was the traitour choſen among the twelue, leſt that little number of .xij. ſhould be without a naughtie p. 56one: this was done for an example of our patience, bycauſe of neceſſitie we muſt lyue among ſuch as he euill. Againe in the. 59. tract. vponupon Iohn he ſaith. Quod ergo dico, August. in Iohn. tract. 59.inquit, beati critis, ſi feceritis ea, nòn de oībus vobis dico. Est inter vos qui nòn erit beatus, ne que faciet ea, & ego ſcio quos elegerim: quos? niſi cos qui beati erunt faciendo quae praecepit, ac facienda monstrauit, qui efficere beatos potest? Nòn est igitur traditor Iudas electus? Quid est ergo quod alio loco dicit? Nonnè ego vos duodecem elegi, & vnus ex v…bis Diabolus est? An & ipſe ad aliquid electus est, ad quod vti que erat neceſsarius? Nòn autem ad beatitudinem, de qua modo ait, Beati critis ſi feceritis ea. Hoc nòn de omnibus di cit, ſcit enim quos ad ſociet atem beatitudinis huius elegerit. Nòn est exeis iste, qui panem illius ſic edebat, vt ſuper eū leuaret calcancum. &c.

That is to ſay: Where as I ſay therfore (ſaith Chriſt) ye ſhalbe happie, if he ſhal do thoſe things: I do not ſpeak thoſe words of you al. There is one amongſt you y^• ſhall not be happie, neyther ſhall he do thoſe things. And I do know whō I hauehave choſen. Whō hath he choſen? None but thoſe, that ſhalbe bleſſed in doing thoſe things, that he which is able to make them bleſſed hath commaunded & ſhewed y^• they ought to be done. Is not y^• traitor Iudas elected then? What meaneth that then, that Chriſt ſaieth in another place? HaueHave not I choſen you .xij. and one of you is a Diuell? Was he alſo elected to ſome thing, wherevnto euen he was neceſſarie? Trulie, he was not elected to the bleſſedneſſe, whereof Chriſt ſpake before, when he ſayd: ye ſhall be happie if ye doe thoſe things. He ſpeaketh not this of all: for he knoweth whome he hath choſen to the fellowſhip of this bleſſedneſſe. This fellow, which did ſo eate Chriſtes bread, that he did lyft vp his héele againſt him, is none of that fellowſhip. &c.

Againe, the ſame Sainct Auſten in the. 62. treatiſe August. in Iob. tract. 62.vponupon Iohn ſayth thus. Niſi ergo ſe traderet Christus, nemo traderet, Christum. Quid habet Iudas niſi peccatum? Ne que enim in tradendo Christo ſalutem nostram cogitauit, propter quam traditus est Christus: ſed cogitauit pecuniae lucrum, & inuenit animae detrimentum. Accepit mercedem quam voluit: ſed nolenti est data quam neluit. Tradidit Iudas Christum: tradidit Christus ſcipſum. Ille agebat negotium ſuae venditionis: iste nostrae redēptionis. Quod facis facito citius, nòn quia tu potes, ſed quia hoc vult qui omnia potest. That is ſay. Except therefore Chriſt would deliuer vp himſelfe: no man coulde betraie him. What was there in Iudas more than ſinne? For in betraying Chriſt he minded not to work our ſaluation, for which Chriſt was betrayed: but his minde was vponupon the gaine of monie, and he founde the loſſe of his owne ſoule. He receyued the reward that he deſired: but that reward which he was not willing to hauehave, was giuen vntounto him being vnwilling to hauehave it. Iudas did betraie Chriſt: and Chriſt did deliuer vp himſelfe. The one applied his marchandize, the other, our redemption. That thou doeſt, doe quickly (ſayd Chriſt) not bicauſe thou art able to do it: but bicauſe he that is able to do all things, is willing it ſhould be ſo.

Againe, in the hundreth and .vij. treatiſe vponupon Iohn, he ſayth thus: Quos dedisti mihi custodiui, & nemo ex hijs perijt, August. in Iohn. tract. 107niſi filius perditionis, vt Scriptura impleatur. Filius perditionis dictus est proditor Christi, perditioni praedestinatus, ſecundum Scripturam, quae de illo in Pſalmo Centeſimo octauo maximè prophetatur. That is to ſay: I hauehave kept thoſe that thou haſt giuen vntounto me, and none of them is periſhed, ſaue only the childe of perdition, that the Scripture might be fulfilled. He that betrayed Chriſt is called the childe of perdition, bicauſe he was predeſtinated to deſtructiō, according to the Scripture, which in the Pſalme. 108. chieflye is prophecied of him.

Aſſaine in his queſtions vponupon Exodus, and the. 18. p. 57queſtion. S. Auſten ſayth thus. Aſsiduè Deus dicit, Indurabo August. lib. 2 Queſt. ſup. Ex. Questione. 18.cor Pharaonis: & velut cauſam inſert, cur hoc faciat, & implebo ſigna mea & portenta mea in Aegypto: tanquàm neceſsaria ſuerit obduratio Pharaonis, vt ſigna Dei multiplicarentur vel implerētur in Aegypto. Vtitur ergo Deus benè cordibus malis, ad id quod vult ostendere bonis, vel quod facturus est bonis. That is to ſay: God doth oftentimes ſay, I wil harden Pharaos heart: and he doth as it were bring in a cauſe why he would doe it, ſaying: And I will fulfill my ſignes and wonders in Egypt: as though the hardening of Pharao ſhould be neceſſarie to the multiplying and fulfilling of Gods wonders in Egypt. God therfore, doth vſe well thoſe hearts that be euill, for the fulfilling of that thing that he is willing to ſhowe to them that are good, or of that which he mindeth to do for them.

If Cerberus had had eyes to ſée: he might as well hauehave ſéen theſe places of Auſten, as that one place which he thinketh ſo ſufficient for the declaration of the whole matter. And there is not one of theſe places, that is not of equall authoritie with that one place of his. Yea, and the firſt of theſe places is of greater authoritie, as may appeare to them that will reade the bookes of S. Auſtens Retractations.

In theſe places S. Auſtē ſaith, that Chriſt choſe to be his diſciples, ſuch men as were born of poore parentage, not called to honour, and vnlearned: that he migh the and do in them, whatſoeuer they ſhould be, or do. The actions therefore, that were done by them, were his actions, and were in him exceeding good, although the ſame were in ſome of thē excéeding euill. This thing is made more plaine in the other places cited oute of S. Auſten. Firſt he ſayth: Chriſt know him that ſhould betraie him, and he choſe him ſo much the rather, as one neceſſary for his buſineſſe. And againe he ſayth, ſpeaking of Iudas, was not he alſo elected to ſome thing wherevnto he was neceſſarie? And againe. Except Chriſt would hauehave deliuered vp himſelfe: no man could hauehave betrayed him. What was there in Iudas but ſinne? As who ſhould ſay, the acte was Chriſtes, but the ſinne in the acte was Iudaſſes. Yea, he ſaith furder: That which thou doeſt, do quickly. Not bicauſe thou art able to do it: but bicauſe he that is able to do all things will hauehave it ſo done. And laſt of all he ſayth of Iudas, that he was called the child of perdition, bicauſe he was predeſtinated to deſtruction.

I ſuppoſe if Cerberus had ſéene and well weyghed theſe places of Auſten: he would not hauehave triumphed ſo greatly in that one place of his. Neyther would he hauehave derided the iudgement of thoſe that aſcribing the acte vntounto God, do iuſtly aſcribe the ſinne of the ſame acte vntounto ſinfull man, from whoſe frée choyſe conſenting vntounto euyll, the ſinne of the acte doth ſpring, and not from God from whom nothing can come that is not excéeding good (as it commeth from him.) But let vsus now ſée how this hell hound playeth with his owne tayle.

Cerberus.

But to returne againe vntounto thoſe, that contrarie to the Scripture, and all auncient writers: doe teach, that God doeth not onelyonly foreſee, but alſo predeſtinate both good and euill, as well the murder of Caine, as the holineſſe of Abell: and thereby make God plainly the Authour of ſinne. Whē they perceyue the outragious blaſphemie, to be ouermuch apparant and manifeſt: then doe they ſometimes cloſely rolle it vp in a riddle agayne. Which yet for the darke ſpeach thereof, may ſerue at the p. 58leaſt, to blind the eyes of ſome. As where (among many other wayes) they plainly make God the Author of ſinne is, ſaying that God is not only the principal cauſe, but alſo the Authour of al things without exception, both on the one ſide and on the other. If they be then vrged with the conſequence, that God is the Authour of ſinne: they will aunſwere, that in all abhomination, God is the Authour of the fact, but not of the crime, as of the fact, deede or worke of adulterie, Sodometrie, murder and Idolatrie, God is the Author ſay they, but not of the fault or crime. This Enigma hauehave I heard ſome men vſe, and it is alſo written in a booke, entitled, a briefe treatiſe of election and reprobation, lately ſet forth and printed in the Engliſh tong, where he ſaith thus. Though we be compelled to ſay, that God is the Authour of the fact: yet we muſt anſwere, but not of the crime.

Areade, areade, what is that? God is the Author of the very fact & deede of adulterie, theft, murder, and treaſon: and yet he is not the Authour of ſinne. And why? The ſubtilitie of the Riddle is this. That ſinne is nothing. The theefe is not hanged for the deede that he hath cōmitted (for God is the Author therof) but he is hanged for the ſinne, and that is for nothing. For whē they ſay, God is the Author of all things, then nothing is excepted. But ſin is nothing, & therfore he is not the Author of ſinne. The theefe is hanged for nothing. The murderer is put to death for nothing. The traitor loſeth his head for nothing. The wicked are puniſhed in euerlaſting fire for nothing. A maruellous ſophiſtication. A ſtraūge Paradox, & cautelous riddle. But to be ſhort, though many ways, this ſubtiltie might be anſwered: I wil take onelyonly the definition of ſinne, as I finde it written in the ſame booke, where he ſayth verie truly.

The nature of ſinne, is defined by the authoritie of Scripture, to be a thought, word or deede, contrary to the wyll of God.

Now, bicauſe they ſay, that God is the Author of all euil deedes, though not of the crimes: let vsus paſe ouer the euill thought, and euill words, and ſpeake onelyonly of the deede it ſelfe, whych he hymſelfe deſineth to be ſinne, and contrary to Gods wyll. If God then be Authour of the fact or deede, which deede is ſinne, and cōtrarie to Gods wyll: how can he then ſay, that God is the Authour of the fact, but not of the fault, ſoyng he hymſelf ſetteth forth, not only a thought or a word, but alſo a deede to be ſinne? And if God be the Authour of that ſame deede, whych deede is ſinne: is it not a thing moſt plain, that God is the Authour of ſinne?

Crowley.

Marke gentle Reader, I pray thée, how this Puppie playeth with his owne tayle. He imagineth that all, euē as many as do hold, that God doth not only foreſée, but alſo predeſtinate al things both good and euill: do therin holde that God is the Authour of all ſinne and abhominable wickedneſſe. The contrarie whereof is in the former part of this Apologie, ſufficiently proued. But he hath heard, he ſayth, yea and ſéene in an Engliſh booke, an Enigma, a maruellous ſophiſtication, a ſtraunge Paradox, and a cautelous Riddle, which is this. Though we be compelled to ſaye, that God is the Authour of the fact: yet we muſt aunſwere, but not of the crime.

Areade, areade, what is that? ſayth Cerberus. The Curre can not ſmell how the acte may be Gods, and the p. 59ſinne that is in the acte: his that is the inſtrument in the working of the acte.

But the ſubtiltie of this Riddle, ſaith he, is this. That ſinne is nothing. And then the theefe is hanged for nothing, the murderer is put to death for nothing, the traytour loſeth his head for nothing, and the wicked are puniſhed in euerlaſting fire for nothing. But this is ſome thing. That Cerberus ſayth that there is ſome thing wherof God is not the Authour. And ſo it followeth vponupon his wordes, that eyther there is another being beſides God, whereof thoſe things that God is not the Authour of, hauehave their being: or elſe that thoſe things hauehave theyr being of themſelues, and are therein equall with God, whoſe greateſt honour is, in that he is and hath his being of himſelfe. But Cerberus muſt be borne withall, whatſoeuer be ſayth. For if he be contraried: all hell ſhall ring of his bauling. We may not conclude vpō his wordes as he doeth vponupon ours. But for this once I will be bolde to ſay, that if God be not the principall cauſe and Authour of al things wythout exception: then there be ſome things, whereof God is not the principall cauſe and Authour. And ſo muſt it needes follow, whether Cerberus will or no, that the words in the beginning of S. Iohns Goſpell are not true, Omnia per ipſum facta ſunt, & ſine ipſo factū est nihil quod factum est. By him Iohannis. ….were all things made, and nothing that was made, was made without him. But we knowe this ſaying to be true. Wherefore we are bolde to conclude, contrarie to the iudgement of Cerberus: that God is not onelyonly the principall cauſe, but alſo the Authour and maker of all things. And bicauſe Cerberus ſayth that we holde a Paradox contrarie to al the auncient writers: let him read that which S. Auſten writeth in the. 26. Chapter of hys August. lib. Retrac. cap. 26firſt booke of Retractations. His wordes be theſe. Viri… Deus Autor mali nòn ſic? vbi videndum est, nè maè intelligatur quod dixi. Mali Autor nòn est, quia omnium qua ſunt, Autor est, quia in quantum ſunt, in tantum bona ſunt. Et nè hine putetur, nòn abillo eſse poenam malorum, quae vti que malum est ijs qui puniuntur. Sed hoc ita dixi, quemadmedū dictum est. Deus mortem nòn fecit. Cum alibi ſcriptum ſit. Mors & vita à Domino Deo est. Malorum ergo poena quae à Deo est, mala est quidem malis, Sapient. 1. Eccleſ. 11.Eccl 11ſed in bonis Dei operibus est, quoniam iustum est vt mali puniantur, & vti que bonum est, omne quòd iustū est. That is to ſay: Whether God be not the Authour of the thing that is euill? where men muſt take héede, that they do not miſcō ſter that which I hauehave ſayd, that is: That God is not y^• Authour of that which is euill, for he is Authour of all thoſe things that hauehave any being, for in aſmuch as they be, they be good. Alſo men muſt take héede, that hereby they take not occaſion to thinke, that the puniſhment of the wicked cōmeth not of God: which puniſhment, is alſo euill vntounto them that be puniſhed. But I ſpake this, euen as it is ſayd, that God made not death. Whereas in another place it is written. Death and life are of the Lord God. The puniſhment therefore of the wicked, which commeth of God, is euill vntounto them that be euil. But yet it is among the good workes of God. For it is right that the wicked be puniſhed, and eueryevery thing that is right, is good.

I ſuppoſe that when Cerberus hath reade and well weighed theſe wordes of S. Auſten: he will not ſay that we hold a Paradox, vnleſſe he minde to match S. Auſtē with vsus. Which if he ſhall do, he ſhall ſhake his owne building verie ſore. For it ſtandeth well moſt altogether vponupon S. Auſtens groūd, although without Sainct Auſtens conſent.

But Cerberus will looke, that ſome thing ſhould be ſayd to the aunſwere that he maketh to our ſubtile ſophiſticatiō. p. 60For he ſéemeth to himſelfe to hauehave ſayd ſo much that will we nill we, it muſt be cōfeſſed that God being the Authour of the thing that is euill, he is alſo the Authour of the euill and ſinne that is in the thing.

Cerberus ſaw many wayes, whereby the ſubtiltie of our Riddle myght be aunſwered: but he would vſe only the definition of ſinne, whiche he found written in the ſame Engliſh booke that our Enigma is written in. Oh what a valiant champion is this, he will vſe none of his owne weapons: he wil be able to wound vsus, yea vtterly to beate vsus downe and conquer vsus with our owne weapons. Uerie trulie hath that Engliſh writer ſayd (ſayth Cerberus) that the nature of ſinne, is defined by y^• authoritie of Scripture, to be a thought, word or déede contrarie to the will of God. And bicauſe he will not ſéeme to take too much vauntage: he paſſeth ouer the thoughts & words, and taketh only the déedes done againſt the will of God. And with them he wil beate vsus down flat to the ground.

The reaſon that he vſeth, is this. If God be the Authour of that déede that is ſinne and contrarie to the will of God, how can he ſay that God is the Authour of the fact and not of the fault? Here is a ſubſtantiall anſwere. Bicauſe Cerberus can not tel how it ſhould be ſo: therfore it is not ſo, neyther may any man ſay it is ſo. And yet I hauehave proued it to be ſo, both by the example of Sinacharibs death and other. As Cerberus may ſée, if he will, in the former part of this Apologie.

Cerberus.

And all thys their trauell is to proue, that the ordinaunce and predeſtination of God, doth ſo carrie men euen headlong, vntounto all actions, though they be neuer ſo miſchieuous: that of neceſſity they muſt needes and can not chooſe but commit the ſame. As though Gods predeſtination were like a tempeſt of winde, ſo blowing in the ſayles of a mans heart, that by it he is caried headlong to all things, whatſoeuer he doth, according to the ſaying of the Poet, Iam magis at que magis, praeceps agit omnia Fatum. Nowe, more and more deſtinie hurleth al things headlong. But ſurely, this Stoicall neceſſitie, maketh ſuch a confuſion of all things: that let them colour vp the matter, with as much cunning as they can, and qualifie it with as fayre wordes as may be: yet ſhall there neuer the ſtate of a common wealth in England ſtand, if thys perſuaſion may once take roote amōg the people, beſide that it is vtterly repugnant to the holie Scripture, and againſt all the auncient wryters, as ſhalbe hereafter briefly proued.

Crowley.

Nowe Cerberus is bolde to affirme, that all that we do, is nothing elſe but to proue, that Gods ordinance and predeſtination doth carrie headlong all men into all actions, be they neuer ſo miſchieuous, as a tempeſt carrieth all afore it. &c. Surely Cerberus is too bolde herein: and doeth much miſtake the purpoſe of our trauaile. If he would, he might ſée (except y^e ſmoke of Hell hauehave marred his ſight) that our purpoſe i…, to proue that God in wiſdome doth knowe, foreſée and order all things. And that nothing can be done by any creature otherwiſe than as by his inſtruments, which he doeth vſe in wiſedome, merciemercy, and iuſtice, and that ſo all actions are his, as the chiefe worker in all things. And that the ſame actions, as they are wrought by him, are excéeding good: although p. 61in the creatures that God vſeth for his inſtruments, ſome of them be excéeding euill. But Cerberus ſayth, we doe maintaine Stoicall Fatum or deſtinie. And that if thys perſuaſion may once take place in the people: there ſhall neuer ſtate of a Commonwelth ſtand in England. Beſides that, it is contrarie to the holie Scripture, and againſt all the auncient writers, as he will briefly proue. Well good Reader. Marke I praye thee, how Cerberus ſhall proue that he promiſeth to proue: and how he ſhall be aunſwered againe. And then doubt not but thou ſhalt ſée how well that blind Curre ſtandeth in his owne conceyte, and thinketh himſelfe to hauehave a cleare ſight.

Cerberus.

And where they denie this doctrine of theirs to be the Stoicall opiniō, bicauſe the Stoikes (ſay they) fayned, that nature, wyth ſuch order of cauſe as ſhe hath tyed together, doth bring all things to paſſe by neceſſitie. But they affirme, that God by his eternall predeſtination, foreordinance, and prouidence, bringeth all things to paſſe by like neceſſitie. Thus doe the beſt learned of them make the difference. But a playne diluſion it is, to blinde the eyes of men withall. For (as Priſcianus ſayth) Fatum, (which we call deſtinie) is deriued of the particple Fatus, whych is as much to ſay, as ſpoken. Bicauſe it is nothing elſe (ſaith he) but that which is ſpokē or appointed of God. As if a mā ſhould ſay, it muſt nedes be ſo, for God hath ſpoken the worde. Euſebius alſo citing the definitiō of Chriſippus, ſayth, that Fatum is nothing elſe but a certain decree, ordināce or determination of God. Which thyng (to make no more rehearſall of many mens ſayings) Auguſtine plainely declared in his booke, De Ciuitate Dei. Lib. 5. Cap. 1. Thus ſayth he is it proued, that they dyd call the will of the high God, Fatum. Gods wyll ſayeth Auſten, they called Fatum, or deſtinie. It is manifeſt therefore that the Stoikes did not imagine, that nature by an order of cauſes brought all things to paſſe by neceſſitie. But rather that God, foreordeining and appointing in order all cauſes in nature or otherwyſe: brought all thyngs to paſſe by neceſſitie. Whych thyng together wyth the order of cauſes, Tullie ſpeaketh of plainly, ſaying: Fati neceſsitas. &c. The neceſſitie of deſtinie (ſayth Tullie) is that, which of God is ordeyned and appointed that it come to paſſe by an euerlaſting order of cauſes.

Crowley.

The Stoikes & we (as Cerberus ſayth) do differ only in this. That they affirme al things to come to paſſe by y^e neceſſitie of deſtinie: & we, by y^e neceſſitio of Gods eternal predeſtination, foreordinance, & prouidence. And this is the difference that the beſt learned amongſt vsus do make. Who theſe beſt learned be, Cerberus doeth not tell vsus. But this I am ſure, that none amongſt vsus that is learned, wyll ſay that there is none other difference betwene the Stoicall opinion and ours, thā that which Cerberus hath ſet downe. For the Stoikes helde, that the willes of men are not vnderunder the neceſſitie of their Fatum or deſtinie, bicauſe they could not ſée how it ſhould ſo be, and yet be frée alſo, as it may well appeare by that that S. Auſtē writeth in the .x. Chapter of his fift booke. De Ciuitate Dei. where his words are theſe. Vnde, nec illa neceſsitas formidandaest, August. De Ciuit. Dei. lib. 5. Cap. 10.quam fermidando Stoici laborauerunt: cauſas rerum ita distinguere, vt quaſdam ſubtraberent neceſsitati quaſdam ſubderent: p. 62at que in his quaes eſse ſub neceſsitate noluerunt, poſuerunt etiā nostras voluntates, nè videlicet nòn eſsent liberae, ſi ſubderentur neceſsitati. &c. That is to ſay. Wherefore, that neceſſitie is not to be feared, the feare whereof cauſed the Stoikes ſo to deuide the cauſes of things, that they pulled away ſome things from neceſſitie, and thruſt ſome things vnderunder it: and amongſt thoſe things that they would not ſuffer to be vnderunder neceſſitie, they hauehave placed our willes, leſt they ſhould not be frée, if they ſhould be ſubiect to neceſſity. &c. But we hold, that al things, our willes & altogether, are ſubiect to Gods prouidēce: Ergo, there is more difference betwéene the Stoikes and vsus, than Cerberus ſayth that there is. And it is no diluſion at all that we vſe in y^t we refuſe to cal it Fatum or deſtinie: although we know that Priſcianꝰ & Tullie, Euſebius, Chriſippus & other, do in their ſorts ſpeake of Fatum, after ſuch ſort, that to the negligent Reader there may ſéeme ſmal difference betwene them and vsus, in the matter of Gods eternal and euerlaſting prouidence and predeſtination. For we follow herein S. Auſten, whoſe ſentence Cerberus would faine frame againſt vsus. But I pray thée gentle Reader, marke well the wordes of S. Auſten, euen in the ſame booke, out of which Cerberus citeth matter againſt vsus. Yea and in the ſelfe ſame Chapter, which is the firſt of the fift booke: where the wordes that he fathereth vponupon S. Auſten, are not found. But theſe wordes are found there. Prorſus diuina prouidentia, regna constituuntur humana. Quaeſi propterea quiſquam fato tribuit, quia ipſam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem ſati nomine appellat, ſententiam teneat, linguā corrigat. Cur enim nòn hoc primum decit, quod postea dicturus est, cum ab illo quiſquā quaeſierit, quid dixerit Fatum? Nam id homines quando audiunt, vſitata loquendi conſuetudine, nòn intelligunt niſi vim poſitionis ſyderum, qualis est quandò quis naſcitur, ſiue concipitur: quod aliqui alienant à Dei voluntate, aliqui ex illa etiam hoc pendere confirmant. That is to ſaye. The Kingdomes of this worlde, are altogether ordeyned by the prouidence of God. Which if any man hauehave giuen vntounto deſtinie, bicauſe he doeth call the will or power of God it ſelfe, by the name of deſtinie: let the ſame continue in his opinion, but let him reforme his tong. For why doth he not at the firſt ſay that, which afterward he will ſay, when any man ſhal aſke him what he doth call deſtinie? For when men do heare that thing: they do not by the common maner of ſpeach vnderſtande any other thing, than the force of the poſition of the ſtarres, as the ſame is when any is borne or conceyued: which ſome men do ſeperate from the will of God, and ſome do proue that the one doth hang vponupon the other.

In theſe wordes S. Auſten doth plainly affirme, that euen Kingdomes of this world are appointed by Gods prouidence: and yet he denieth that the ſame ſhould be ſaid to be appointed by deſtinie. Wherefore in affirming the one, and denying the other, we doe but as S. Auſten doeth.

How aptly Tullie is cited for the purpoſe of Cerberus: ſhal plainly appeare in mine anſwere to that which here followeth.

Cerberus.

The ſame order of cauſes alſo, is not forgotten of our mē, that in al points their doctrine might agree wyth the Stoicall doctrine. As in an Engliſh booke, tranſlated out of French, lately ſet forth in print, & entitled, a briefe declaration of the table of predeſtination, where he ſayth. Seyng God hath appointed the end: it is neceſſarie alſo, that he ſhould appoint the cauſes which leade vntounto the ſame ende. As p. 63if he ſhould ſaye. Like as God hath appointed ſome man to be hanged: ſo hath he appointed him alſo to ſteale, as a cauſe leading vntounto the ſame end whervnto he hath appointed him. Or elſe, it was his deſtinie to be hanged: Ergo, it was his deſtinie to ſteale. Or thus (which is all one) he was appointed by Gods predeſtination to be hanged: Ergo, he was appointed by Gods predeſtinatiō to ſteale. For ſeyng God hath appoynted the ende (ſayth he) it is neceſſarie alſo, that he ſhould appoint the cauſes that leade vntounto the ſame ende. As for enſaple. If thys be true, which they ſay, that God doth predeſtinate all things, or that God doth both appoint the end of all things, and alſo the cauſes which leade vntounto the ſame end: then doth it follow & may truly be ſayd, that Marten Swarth wyth hys men, was appointed and predeſtinate of God to be ſlaine at the battel of Stoke. And furder, it foloweth, as God appoynted Marte & his fellowes to this end: ſo was ſir Richard Symō the Prieſt, appointed & predeſtinate of God, to poure in the peſtilent poyſon of priuie conſpiracie, & traiterous miſchiefe of vayne glorie into the heart of Lā bert his ſcholer, as a cauſe leading to the ſame ende. Item that the ſayd Lambert, was appointed & predeſtinate of God, to conſent and agree vntounto the peſtiferous perſuaſion of his maſter Sir Richard, in the pride of Lucifer, to aſpire vntounto the high type of honor, in depoſing (if it poſſible were) the ryght and moſt noble heire of England, and eleuating hymſelf lyke a trayterous villaine, into the royall throne of the ſame, and that thus he was appointed of God to doe, as another cauſe leading vntounto the ſame ende which God ordeyned. Item, that the Iryſh men were appointed of God to be Rebellious traytours againſt their Soueraigne Lord the King of England, and to maintayne the falſe and filthy quarrell of the ſaid Lambert, as another cauſe leading to the ſame end. Item that the Ladie Margret ſiſter vntounto King Edward the fourth, was appoynted and predeſtinated of God, to be a traytoureſſe to Englande, and to employ all hir wyt, ſorce and power, to the vtter deſtruction of hir naturall countrie, as another cauſe leading vntounto the ſame end. Item that the ſayd Ladie Margret was appoynted of God to conduct and hire Marten Swarth and hys men, to inuade the Realme of England, as another cauſe leading to the ſame end. Item that the ſayd Marten Swarth, the Earle of Lincolne, the Lord Louell, the Lorde Gerarde, and diuers other Captaines of the Rebels, were appointed or predeſtinated of God, to be of ſuch valiant courage, in maintayning the falſe quarrell of trayterous Lambert, that they were ſlaine: on the other ſide, many a true Engliſh mans bloud, at the battell of Stoke, which was the ende of this wofull Tragedie, and by this, theyr manifeſt forme of doctrine, was altogether and eueryevery part, appointed and ordeined of God, both the end and alſo the cauſes aboue rehearſed, and other innumerable, whych did leade vntounto the ſame ende.

Crowley.

Here are many words and little matter. Great Items and ſmall ſummes. A great deale of deſcant and no good plaine ſong. Seing God hath predeſtinated the ende: it is neceſſarie alſo that he ſhould appoint the cauſes which leade vntounto the ſame end, ſayth an Engliſh booke entitled a declaration of the table of Predeſtination. And what p. 64hath Cerberus ſaid here, to diſproue this conſequence? So far as I am able to iudge: we may graunt him all that he hath ſaid: and yet affirme ſtill, that if God hauehave appointed the ende: he hath alſo appointed the cauſes that leade to the ſame end. But I will vnderſtand Cerberus, as I ſuppoſe he meaneth: that is, that God doth neither appoint the end, nor cauſes that leade therevnto. If this be not his meaning: then hath he ment nothing, but to make ſimple men ſuppoſe that he is able to ſaye much. And ſée, gentle Reader, how well he agréeth wyth S. Auſten, whoſe authoritie he woulde faine vſe, both in ſteade of a ſword and buckler. In the eyght chapter of his fift booke. De Ciuitate Dei. S. Auſten ſayth thus. Qui verè nòn astrorum constitutionem, ſicut est eum quid que concipitur, vel naſcitur, vel incoatur, ſed omnium connexionem ſeriem que , cauſarū, qua fit, omne quod fit, Fati nomine appellant: nòn multum cum cis de verbi controuerſia laborandum at que certandum est: quandoquidem ipſum cauſarum ordinem, & quandam connexionem, Dei ſummi tribuunt voluntati & potestati. Qui optimè & veraciſsimè creditur, & cuncta ſcire antequam ſiant, & nihil inordinatum relinquere: à quo ſunt omnes potestates, quamuis ab illo nòn ſint omniū voluntates. That is to ſay. As for thoſe men, which do call by the name of deſtinie, not the conſtitutiō or order of the celeſtial ſignes, as y^• ſame is at the conception, birth, or beginning of any thing, but the knitting together & order of all cauſes, whereby euerie thing that is done, is brought to paſſe: we néede not much to labour and contende with them about the controuerſie of that word: bicauſe they do attribute to y^• wil & power of God, that order and certain knitting together of cauſes, which is verie well and truely thought to knowe all things before they come to paſſe, and to leaue nothing vnordered: of whom al powers hauehave their being, although all mens willes doe not ſpring of him.

Here mayſt thou ſée (gentle Reader) howe Cerberus falleth out with him, whoſe authoritie he woulde ſéeme chieſly to leaue to. Auſten ſayth, that whatſoeuer is done commeth to paſſe by that knitting together and continuall order of cauſes which the Stoikes call deſtinie. But Cerberus will hauehave al ſet at ſix and ſeauen, and that nothing ſhould come to paſſe by any ſuch order. Auſtē ſayth that it is verie well and truely thought, that God doeth knowe all things before they come to paſſe, and that he doth leaue nothing vnordered. But Cerberus will none of that. For then muſt Marten Swarth & his men, Syr Richard Simon Prieſt, and his ſcholler Lambert, the Iriſh men, Lady Margret, the Earle of Lincolne, the Lorde Louell, with the reſt that rebelled in King Edwarde the fourthes time, be appoynted and ordeyned of God to doe as they did. But rather than it ſhould be ſo, Cerberus wyll ſay with Cotta, that there is no God at all. For ſo doth S. Auſten conclude vpō Ciceroes diſputation that he hath agaynſt the Stoikes. His wordes be theſe. Quomodo igitur ordo cauſarum, qui praeſcienti certus est Deo, id efficit, vt nihil ſit in nostra voluntate, cū in ipſo cauſarum August. lib. 5 De Ciui. dei. 9ordine, magnū habeant locum nostrae voluntates? Contendit ergo Cicero cum cis qui hūc cauſarum ordinem dicunt eſse fatalem, vel potiùs ipſum fati nomine appellant, quodnos abhorremus: praecipuè propter vocabulū, quod nòn in re vera conſueuit intelligi. Quod vero negat ordinem omnium cauſarum eſse certiſsimum, & Dei praeſcientiae notiſsimum: plus eum quam Stoici detestamur. Aut enim deum eſse negat, quod quidem inducta alterius perſona in librii de Deorum natura, facere molitus est: Aut ſi eſse conſitetur Deum, quē negat praeſcium futurorum, etiam ſic dicit nihil aliud, quàm quod ille dixit inſipiens in corde ſur, non est Deus. Qui enim non est praeſcius omnium futurorum: non est vtique Deus. That is to ſay. How doth the order of cauſes then, which is certayne to God that knoweth them before, bring to paſſe, p. 65that there ſhould be nothing in our will: ſeing …wils to beare a great ſway euen in the order of cauſes it ſelfe? Let Cicero therefore ſtriue with them that ſay that this order of cauſes is fatall, or rather that do giuegive it y^• name of deſtinie, which thing we do abhorre: chiefly for the name, which is not accuſtomed to be vnderſtanded in the thing it ſelſe. But where as he doth denie that the order of all cauſes is moſt certaine and knowen to the preſcience of God: we do deteſt him more than the Stoikes did. For either he doth denie that there is a God, which thing in his bookes concerning the nature of the Gods, he doth vnderunder an other mans perſon endeuour to do: or elſe, if he do confeſſe that there is a God, whom he denieth to know of things before they come to paſſe: euen ſo ſaying, he doth none other thing than did that fooliſh mā which ſaid in his heart, there is no God For he that doth not knowe afore hand all things that are to come, doubtleſſe the ſame is not God. If Cerberus had had ſo much leyſure as to read ouer this ninth Chapter of S. Auſtens fift booke, out of the which he would faine finde matter againſt vsus: no doubt he would not hauehave bragged ſo much of S. Auſtens authoritie. But by like he truſted ſome other mens notes gathered out of S. Auſten, and neuer ſaw the bookes of S. Auſten himſelfe. I ſpeake this in his fauor. But ſée gentle Reader, how well Cicero ſerueth for the purpoſe that Cerberus doth alleage him for. And as thou findeſt him in this point, ſo truſt him in the reſt. Cicero doth not only reaſon againſt them that ſay there is a deſtinie called in Latine Fatum: but alſo againſt all that ſay there is a God that hath knowledge of things to come. And ſo conſequently he affirmeth that there is no God at all. Spoyling God of his foreknowledge (as S. Auſten ſayth) rather than he would ſuffer August. lib. … De Ciuit. 9.man to be ſpoyled of his frée will. But y^• religious minde (ſayeth S. Auſten) doeth chooſe both, doeth confeſſe both, and with the faith of godlineſſe doth cōfirme both. That is to ſay, the foreknowledge of God, and the libertie of mans will. So that whatſoeuer man doth, we ſay and beleue, that he doth it with the conſent of his will.

Cerberus.

Alas who ſeeth not the deſtruction of England to follow this doctrine? who ſeeth not the confuſion of all common weales, to depend herevpon? What Prince may ſit ſafely in the ſeat of his kingdome? What ſubiect may liue quietly poſſeſſing hys owne? What man ſhall be ruled by right of a lawe: if thys opinion may be perfectly placed in the heartes of the people? But to be ſhort: thou ſeeſt here by example, the ſame which Tullie calleth Series cauſarum, the continuall order of cauſes appointed of God. And our men euen in like maner, call it the cauſes appointed of God, to leade vntounto the ſame end which he hath ordeyned. Whereof followeth the force of cannot chuſe, which is called Fati neceſsitas, Fatall neceſſitie, or the neceſſitie of Gods ordinaunce: for as you hauehave heard, Fatum is nothing elſe but a decree or ordinance of God. Which neceſſitie is ſet forth of ſome men vnderunder the name of Gods predeſtination, & now oftentimes the ſame thing is ſet forth alſo by thys word prouidence. Which name of prouidence likewiſe the Heathen Stoikes vſed for the ſame purpoſe, as Cicero ſayth. Pronoca anus fatidica Stoicorum, quam Latinè licet prouidentiā dicere. Pronoca in Greke, ſaith he, the olde wyſe of the Stoikes that ſetteth forth theyr deſtinie, which in Latine was called Prouidētia, the prouidence of God. But let them cal it prouidence, predeſtination, p. 66preordinance, or what they will: this is (no doubt) the very Stoikes opiniō, that God hath ſo appoynted and preordeyned all thyngs, that of meere neceſſitie they come to paſſe. And whatſoeuer men do, whether it be good or euill: they can not choſe but do it. Which neceſſitie Seneca alſo manifeſtly declareth in theſe wordes. Neceſsitates omnium rerum quas nulla vis rumpat: fatum existimo. The neceſſitie of all thinges, ſayth he, which no force or violence can breake: that ſame I holde to be deſtinie.

Crowley.

Nowe Cerberus can no longer kéepe it in. He muſt néedes breake out in an exclamation againſt the doctrine of prouidence, predeſtination & preordinance. For (ſayth he) it is none other thing than the very opinion of y^t Stoikes, call it what we will. Who ſéeth not the deſtruction of England? &c.

If God doe by his prouidence gouerne all things: If God hauehave predeſtinated or preordeyned all things, ſo that they ſhall come to paſſe in ſuch time and order as God by his prouidence, predeſtination and preordinance hath appoynted that they ſhall: then muſt no man be ſo blinde as not to ſée, that Englande muſt be deſtroyed. Then muſt all Commonweales come to confuſion. Then ſhal no King ſit ſafely in his kingdome, nor any ſubiect in his poſſeſſion. Yea, no man ſhall be ruled by the right of a law: but if God do leaue the matter to mans diſcretion, to vſe the matter as he ſhall ſée cauſe, and doe but put to his helping hand when he ſéeth that man goeth about to bring things to good effect, but in any caſe determine vponupon nothing, tyll the ſame ſhall be by mans wyſedome deuiſed and enterpriſed: then ſhall England and all other Commonweales ſlouriſh ſtyll, then ſhall all Princes ſafely ſit in their Kinglie ſeates, then ſhall all ſubiectes quietly enioy their poſſeſſions, and eueryevery man be ruled by the right of a lawe. Thus much followeth vponupon the pityfull complaynt that Cerberus maketh vponupon the doctrine of Gods prouidence, his predeſtination, or preordinance: but I would gladly know, what Cerberus thinketh to be the cauſe, that in King Edwarde the fourthes dayes, Marten Swarth, Syr Richard Simon, and the reſt, made ſuch a ſtyrre in England. Was it for that they were perſuaded in this doctrine that Cerberus ſeemeth to make the cauſe of all ſuch doings? Surely I ſuppoſe there was not one of them that did once dreame of any prouidence of God. For thoſe that take ſuch matters in hand, are cōmonly as great enimies to Gods prouidēce, as is Cerberus himſelfe. And ſhall Cerberus wordes make vsus afrayde, to ſay that God in his prouidence had predeſtinated & preordinated all thoſe things to be done? yea, & that it could not otherwiſe be, but that thoſe things muſt then be done? Surely, I can ſée no cauſe why we ſhould feare ſo to ſay: Let Cerberus and his fellowes conclude what they wil. For I am ſure S. Auſten in the x. Chapter of his fift boke De Ciuitate Dei: will take our parte herein. His wordes are theſe. Si autem illa definitur eſse neceſsitas, ſecundum quam dicimus, neceſse eſse vt ſit aliquid August. lib. 5 10. Cap. de Ciuit Dei.velità fiat: neſcio cùr eam timeamus, ne nobis libertatem auſerat voluntatis. That is to ſay. If we call that thing neceſſity, whereby we ſay of anie thing that it muſt needes be, or that it muſt néedes be ſo done, then do not I ſee why we ſhould feare, leaſt that ſhould take from vsus the libertie of our will. When we ſay therefore that of neceſſitie Marten Swarth and the reſt, muſt make ſuch a ſtyrre as they did in King Edward the fourthes dayes: do we take frō them the libertie of their wil? No ſayth S. Auſten. For p. 67they did whatſoeuer they did, with the frée cōſent of their willes, and felt no conſtraynt at all: But Cerberus is not ſo ſatyſfied, he wyll be inquiſitiue to knowe what ſhoulde be the cauſe why God woulde in his prouidence predeſtinate theſe men to doe theſe things. I wil anſwer with S. Auſten, I can not tell. God doth know a cauſe: but he hath not made Cerberus and me priuie to it. Occulta Epist. 59. ad Paulinum.cauſa eſse potest, iniusta nòn potest. That is. The cauſe may be ſecrete: but it can not be vniuſt. Is there any iniquitie with God? God forbyd. What Seneca thought of deſtinie, we paſſe not. But with S. Auſten we ſaye. Omnia verò fato fieri nòn dicimus, imò nulla fieri fato dicimus: Aug. De Ciuit. lib. 5. cap. 9quoniam fati nomen vbi ſolet à loquentibus poni, id est, in constitutione ſyderum, qua quiſ que conceptus aut natus est: quoniam res ipſa inaniter aſseritur, nihil valere monstramus. Ordinem autem cauſarum, vbi voluntas Dei plurimum potest, ne que negamus, ne que fati vocabulo nuncupamus, niſi fortè vt fatum à fando dictum intelligamus, id est, a loquendo. Nòn enim abnuere poſsumus, eſse ſcriptum in litteris ſanctis: ſemel locutus est Deus, duo haec audiui: quoniam potestas est Dei: & tibi Domine miſericordia: quia Pſalm. 62.Ps 62tu reddes vnicui que ſecundum opera eius, Quod enim dictum est, ſemel locutus est: intelligitur immobilitèr, hoc est, incommutabilitèr est locutus, ſicut nouit incōmutabilitèr omnia, quae futura ſūt, & quae ipſe facturus est. Hac ita que ratione poſsumus à fando fatū appellare, niſi hoc nomē iam in aliare ſoleret intelligi, quo corda hominū nolumus inclinari. That is to ſay. We ſay not that al things do come to paſſe by deſtinie: yea we ſay that nothing is done by deſtinie. For we do plainely ſhew, that the name deſtinie is of no value, in the place where men vſe to place it in ſpeaking, that is in the conſtitution of the heauenlie ſignes, wherein euerie man is conceyued and borne, bicauſe the thing it ſelfe is vainely affirmed. As for the order of cauſes, wherein the will of God is of great force and power: we doe neither denie, nor call it by the name of deſtinie, except it be ſo as we may vnderſtand Fatum to be deriued of the word For faris, that is of ſpeaking. For we can not denie but it is wrytten in the holie Scriptures: God ſpake once, theſe two ſayings, I my ſelfe hearde it: that power belongeth vntounto God, and vntounto thée (O Lord) belongeth merciemercy: for thou wilt giuegive vntounto euerie man according to his workes. And where as it is ſaid, he ſpake once: we vnderſtand that he ſpake vnmoueably, that is vnchaungeably, euen as he did vnchaungeably know al things that are to come, and that he himſelfe will do. After this ſort therfore, we may ſay that Fatum or deſtinie, is deriued à fando, or ſpeaking, if this name had not now bene accuſtomed to be vnderſtā ded of another matter, wherevnto we are not willing that mens hearts ſhould be enclined.

Now if Cerberus hauehave ought to ſay againſt this, let him make S. Auſten one of vsus. For we are in this point all one with him.

Cerberus.

And as for that which the Heathen did attribute to the ſtarres or planets, they meant none other, but that God ordeined the planets in nature to worke ſuch things, as he before had decreed & appointed: Euen as we alſo iudge, that God vſeth the operatiō of the planets in ſending ſuch rayne & tempeſt, faire weather or ſoule, as his pleaſure is, let them ſay therfore what they cā or wil. This meere neceſſitie which our men do teach, is the verie ſame which the Stoikes did hold, which opinion bicauſe it deſtroied the ſtate of a common wealth, it was baniſhed out of Rome, as Auguſtine declareth. Lib. Queſt. vet. & no. Teſt. Where he notably refelleth that opinion in theſe p. 68few words, ſaying. Qua ratione nati dicuntur. &c. By what reaſon (ſayth Auguſtine) were they borne which baniſhed Mathematicos, the ſetters forth of deſtinie out of Rome, which law was kept, and they were but Heathen, howe were thoſe things done by deſtinie which make agaynſt deſtinie? But ſurely if there be a deſtinie, it doth nothing againſt it ſelfe, ſaith Aug. For ſo were deſtinie, no deſtinie, or at the leaſt, deſtinie fighting agaynſt it ſelfe: Or to ſpeake the ſame in thoſe wordes, which our men by abuſe take out of the Scripture, to maintain the very ſame matter. If it be Gods predeſtination that men ſhould write and ſpeake agaynſt hys predeſtination, as they ſaye ſome men do, then is Gods predeſtination a Kingdome, not only deuided, but alſo fearcely fighting agaynſt it ſelfe. O miſerable abſurditie which any child may perceyue muſt needes follow, if all things come to paſſe with abſolute neceſſitie by Gods predeſtination as they teach. Thys ſame doctrine alſo that all euill ſpringeth out of Gods ordinance, or that Gods predeſtination was the cauſe of Adams fall and of all wickedneſſe, is plainly maintained in an Engliſh boke lately ſet forth and entitled agaynſt a priuie Papiſt. &c. where among many open and plaine ſentences vpō this matter. I find an argument made in theſe words: Whatſoeuer was in Adam was in him by Gods wil & ordināce: ſinne was in Adam, Frgo ſinne. &c. was in him by Gods will & ordināce. The maior of which argument being vnderſtand of Adam after his fall, is manifeſtly falſe, & therefore the cōcluſion alſo is falſe, for if it may be ſayd of Adam after his fal (as by the minor you wel perceyue that he ſo doth vnderſtand it) then may it alſo be ſayd now of any man, that what execrable wickedneſſe ſo euer is in any mā, that ſame is in him by Gods wil & ordināce. He goth about alſo to proue the ſame by another argumēt which he maketh ſpeaking of the lying ſpirit, ſaying: God cōmaūded him to ſinne, but God commaūded nothing which he ordeineth not, ſo he ordeined him to ſinne. Which argument it was maruel that any man could be ſo blind as not to ſee how it might with more ſtrength and force, and much more manifeſt truth be turned againſt him in this ſort: ſpeaking of Adam, yea and of all men ſaying, God commaunded Adam, and doth commaunde all men to abſteine from ſinne, but he commaundeth nothing which he ordeineth not. Ergo God ordeined Adam and all men to abſteine from ſinne. If God then ordeyned Adam and all men to abſteine from ſinne, than did he not ordeyne Adam or any man to commit ſinne, ſo was not ſinne in Adam, or in any man by Gods will and ordinance, nor Gods ordynance the cauſe of Adams fall, or of any mans ſinne. And therefore their opinion is vtterly falſe: alſo if God in hys ſecret counſell do predeſtinate, appoint, and ordeine man to ſinne, and yet gyue vntounto him a ſtraight law and commaundement not to ſinne: is not then his ſecret wyll contrary to his open word? and hys eternal ordinance, repugnant to his written law: All theyr ſayre wordes and ſine framed fetches can not auoide it.

Crowley.

Let vsus ſay what we can or wyll (ſayth Cerberus) the méere neceſſitie that we teach ſhall be all one wyth that which the Stoikes helde, affirming their Fatum, or deſtinie. To this I hauehave ſufficiētly anſwered before, ſhewing p. 69plainly by S. Auſtens words, that we teach none other doctrine herein, than did S. Auſten in the ſame booke De Ciuitate Dei, out of which Cerberus citeth matter againſt vsus.

But nowe Cerberus hath founde another authoritie of ſaint Auſten agaynſt vsus, in his booke (as Cerberus ſayth) which he wrate, and entitled: Questiones ex vtro que Testamento. In the queſtion. 115. he ſayth thus. Qua autem ratione nati dicentur, qui Mathematicos vrbe Roma prohibuerūt, quod ius ſeruatum non ignoratur? Et certè Pagani fuerunt. Quomodo fato fiunt quae contra fatum ſunt? Sed ſi est fatum, non facit contra ſe. &c. That is to ſay. By what order ſhall it be ſayd that thoſe men were borne, which did forbydde the Mathematicks (that is to ſay) y^e tellers of mens fortunes, or deſtinies to come within the Citie of Rome. And it is wel knowen that that lawe was kept. And doubtleſſe theſe men were Heathen men. Howe are thoſe thinges done by deſtinie, which are againſt deſtinie? But if there be a deſtinie, it worketh agaynſt it ſelfe. &c. ſayth Auſten. But ſtay there Maſter Cerberus: and proue that Auſten was Authour of that booke. So may it be of ſome authoritie with vsus. But Eraſmus hath alreadie proued by ſū drie good reaſons, that S. Auſten did neuer write it. As may appeare to as many as wyll reade his iudgement ſet forth before the beginning of this booke. Where wryting of this parte of that booke, out of which Cerberus hath cyted the wordes aboue wrytten, he ſayth: Disputat contra Mathematicos, quo que altius ingreditur opus, hoc licentius ineptit. That is to ſay. He diſputeth agaynſt the Mathematicks, and the déeper he doth enter into the worke, the more outragiouſly doth he play the parte of a foole.

But Cerberus wyll not ſet a Louſe by the iudgemēt of Eraſmus. He wyll conclude vponupon the wordes of hys Auſten, that ſo deſtinie ſhoulde be no deſtinie, or at the leaſt, deſtinie fighting againſt it ſelfe. Nay, he wyll not ſtay there, but as though deſtinie and Gods predeſtination were all one thing: he wyll conclude, that it is alſo a Kingdome, not onelyonly deuided, but alſo fiercely fighting agaynſt it ſelfe. And then knitte vp the matter with hys maner of exclaming. O miſerable abſurditie. &c. Cerberus his heart would hauehave bruſt, if he might not hauehave borowed his fellowes bable to fetch one flouriſhe wythall. EueryEvery childe may ſée (ſayth Cerberus) what abſurditie muſt néedes follow. And eueryevery wiſe man may ſée (ſay I) that there can no abſurditie followe vponupon that neceſſitie that we teach. For it taketh away no fréedome that mans will hath, or euer had. Neyther doth Gods predeſtination ſight againſt it ſelfe, bycauſe Cerberus wyth his fellowes, were predeſtinated before the worlde was in this time of the world, thus to go about to deface thoſe that doe truely teach, that Gods preſcience, prouidence, and predeſtination is infallible. For what wiſe man wil ſay, that the Potmaker is contrarie to himſelfe, bycauſe he maketh of his clay ſome veſſels to ſerue in honourable vſes, and ſome other to vſes cleane contrarie? Or who wil ſay that God is contrarie to hymſelf, bycauſe he hath made, and doeth daylie make ſome of his creatures to be deuourers and deſtroyers of the reſt: or that nature doth fight againſt it ſelf: bicauſe it doth bring forth both helthſome foode and poyſon? Surely I thinke there is no man of that minde but Cerberus and his fellowes, and that Auſten that Cerberus citeth for his purpoſe. But how worthy credit that Auſten is: is afore ſufficiētly declared.

But Cerberus hath found in an Engliſhe Booke entitled againſt a priuie Papiſt, two Argumenes: one in theſe words. Whatſoeuer was in Adam, was in him by Gods wil & ordinance: ſin was in Adam: Ergo, ſinne. &c. The other ſpeaking of the lying ſpirite, in theſe words. p. 70God commaunded him to ſinne: but God commaundeth nothing which he ordeyneth not: ſo he ordeyned him to ſinne. Cerberus miſlyketh much with theſe two Arguments. The maior propoſition in the firſt Argument is falſe, ſayth Cerberus. Wherfore, the concluſion can not be true. But S. Auſten in his Enchiridion ad Laurentium: ſayth that the maior is true: Ergo it is lyke that Cerberus ſayth not truely. Saint Auſtens wordes be theſe. Haec ſunt magna opera Domini, exquiſita in omnes voluntates eius: & Enchirid. ad L…tur. cap. 100.tam ſapientèr exquiſita, vt cū angelica & humana creatura peccaſset .i. non quod ille, ſed quod voluit ipſa ſeciſset: etiā per eandem creaturae voluntatem, qua factum est quod Creator noluit, impleret ipſe quod voluit, benè vtens & malis tanquam ſummè bonus, ad eorum damnationem, quos iustè praedeſtinauit ad poenam: & ad eorum ſalutem, quos benignè predestinauit ad gratiā. Quantum enim ad eos …tinet, quod Deus noluit fecerunt: quantū verò ad omnipotentiam Dei, nullo modo id efficere valuerunt. Hoc quippe ipſo quod contra voluntatem Dei fecerunt: de ipſis facta eſt voluntas eius. Propterea nam que magna opera Domini, exquiſita in omnes voluntates eius, vt miro, & ineſtabili modo, non fiat praeter eius voluntatem, quod etiam ſit contra eius voluntatē. Quia non fieret, ſi non ſineret: nec vtiquè nolens ſinit, ſed volens. Nec ſineret bonus malè fieri: niſi omnipotens etiam de malis facere poſset benè. That is to ſay. Theſe are y^• great workes of God, ſought out, according to all his wylles: and yet wyſely ſought out, ſo that when the nature both of Angels and man had ſinned: that is, had done, not the thing that he wylled, but that it ſelfe wylled, euen by the ſame will of the creature, wherby that thing was done, that y^•. Creator was not willing ſhould be done, he fulfilled that which he would hauehave done, euen as he that is beſt of all, vſing well, euen thoſe things that are euill, to the condemnation of thoſe whome he hath iuſtly predeſtinated to paine: and to the ſaluation of thoſe whom he hath louingly predeſtinated to frée mercy. As touching themſelues, they did y^• which God was not willing they ſhould do: but as touching the almightie power of God, they were by no meanes able to bring that to paſſe. For euen in the verie ſame thing that they did contrarie to the wil of God: his will was wrought vponupon them. For that cauſe therefore, the workes of the Lord are great, & ſearched out according to all his willes. So that after a maruellous and vnſpeakable maner, that thing that is done euen contrarie to his will: ſhould not be done without his will. For if he would not ſuffer it, it ſhould not be done: neyther doth he ſuffer it being vnwilling, but willing. Neyther would he that is good, ſuffer a thing to be euill done: except the ſame being almightie, were alſo able to worke a good effect of thoſe things that be euill.

Thou maiſt ſée here, gentle Reader, how great cauſe Cerberus hath to miſlike with this Argument. S. Auſten ſayth, that after a maruellous and vnſpeakable maner, that thing that is done contrarie to the will of God, is not without his will. And thou mayſt be bolde, rather to conſent vntounto that which was written againſt a priuy Papiſt, hauing Auſten alſo on thy part: than by Cerberus his miſliking to be perſuaded that that writer hath taught an vntrueth.

Of the other Argument, Cerberus ſayth, that it was maruell that any man coulde be ſo blinde, as not to ſée how the ſame might with much more ſtrength and force, and manifeſt truth be turned againſt himſelfe that made it, in this ſort. God commaunded Adam, and doth commaund all men, to abſtaine from ſinne: But he commaundeth nothing which he ordeineth not: Ergo God ordeyned Adam and all men to abſteyne from ſinne. But what hath Cerberus wonne by this: I graunt the Argument to be good. But that the concluſion is againſt vsus p. 71I denie. For we affirme that when man abſtaineth frō ſinne, the ſame is done by Gods will and ordinance, as whē he committeth ſinne, the ſame is alſo by the wil and ordinance of God: as by the words of Auſten afore written doth plainly appeare. As for Cerberus his argumēt, and the concluſion that he inferreth therevpon: I referre to the iudgement of all wiſe men that will weygh the afore written words of S. Auſten. Who ſhall thereby eaſily perceyue, that no ſuch concluſion can follow vponupon ſuch premiſſes. But to his, Alſo if God in his ſecret counſell. &c. I muſt ſay ſome thing. Elſe will Cerberus ſay that Gods ſecret will and eternall ordinance, is contrary to his open word and written law.

When Ionas was ſent to Niniue, the open word & cōmaundement of God was, that he ſhould ſay vntounto thē: Yet fortie dayes and Niniue ſhalbe deſtroyed. The effect doth declare, that his eternall purpoſe was not to deſtroy them, for they were not deſtroyed. Neyther was this cō maundement contrarie to his eternall purpoſe: but he did vſe it as a meane whereby to bring his eternall purpoſe to paſſe, which was to ſhew merciemercy in forgiuing the ſinnes of the Niniuites.

When Moſes was ſent to Pharao, the open word and commaundement was thus. Say vntounto Pharao, let my people go, that they may offer ſacrifite vntounto me. But his eternall purpoſe was, that by the ſtubbornneſſe of Pharao in refuſing to do his commaundemēt, he might hauehave iuſt occaſion to ſhew his power vponupon him, in pouring out vponupon him and his people, the manifold plagues that we reade of in the holie Hiſtories, and that thereby his name might be made knowen in all partes of the earth. So that this cōmaundement was not contrarie to the eternal purpoſe, but did concurre & run together with it, to that ende, that in the eternal purpoſe was prefixed.

When Ieſus Chriſt began to preach, the open word was, Repent and beleue the Goſpell: but the eternall purpoſe was, that for his doctrine & miracles, he ſhoulde be hated of his countriemen and kinſemen (for the moſt part) and by them be deliuered to the Heathen to be crucified, and made a ſacrifice for the ſinnes of the world. So that this open word was not againſt the ſecret purpoſe of God: … as S. Paule doth terme it) it was to them that periſhed, the ſauor of death vntounto death, and to them that be ſaued, the ſauor of life vntounto life. For in the one ſort it did worke beliefe, and by beliefe ſaluation: and in the other it did manifeſt and make open the vnbeliefe that was in their heartes before, and ſo make them vtterly without excuſe. As our Sauiour himſelfe ſayth: Now hauehave they nothing to pretend for excuſe.

The Law and the Goſpell are both written & preached, and the open word is, do this, and thou ſhalt hauehave this: but the eternall purpoſe of God is, that thoſe that hauehave cares to heare, ſhould heare and obey, and ſo enioy the reward promyſed: and that they which lacke ſuch eares, ſhould hauehave the iuſt condemnation of their owne conſciences. Theſe two therefore be not contrarie the one to the other, but doe concurre and runne together to one ende.

Much more might be ſaid to this effect, without either faire words or finely framed fetches: and ſo the inconuenience that Cerberus would conclude, clearely auoyded. But I will content my ſelfe with one ſaying of Auſten, writing vponupon the ninth Pſalme. His wordes be theſe. Non in toto corde conſitctur Deo, qui de prouidentia eius in aliquo dubitat. Sed quia iam cernit occulta ſapicutiae Dei, quantum ſit inuiſibile premium cius, qui dicit, gaud… in tribulationibus, & quemadmodum omnes cruciatus, qui corporaliter inferuntur, aut vt exerceant conuerſos ad Deum, aut vt conuertantur admoneant, p. 72aut iustè damnationi vltimae praeparent obduratos: & ſic omnia ad diuinae prouidētiae regimen referrantur, quae ſtulti quaſi caſu & temere, & nulla diuina administratione fieri putant, ait. Narrabo omnia mirabilia tua. &c. That is to ſay. That man which doth doubt of the prouidence of God in anye thing: doth not ſhew himſelfe thankful or praiſe God in all his heart. But bicauſe he doth now ſée the ſecretes of the wiſedome of God, how great the inuiſible reward of him is which ſayth, we reioyce in troubles: and how all afflictions which are brought vponupon the body, eyther to exercyſe thoſe y^• be conuerted vntounto God, or that they may admoniſh them to conuert, or that they may prepare to the laſt damnation, thoſe that be iuſtly made hard hearted, and that ſo all thoſe things might be referred vntounto the gouernement of Gods prouidence, which fooliſh men do ſuppoſe to be wrought by chaunce, at aduenture, and by no diuine prouidence: he ſayth. I will declare all thy wonderous workes. &c. We maye be bolde therefore (I thinke) to ſay, that this which Cerberus hath done, in writing this ſpitefull aunſwere to his friendes Letter (if any ſuch were) was gouerned by Gods prouidence. And yet we are not Genethliaci, or declarers of mens fortunes or deſtinies, ſuch as were baniſhed out of Rome: for we ſay not y^• it is Cerberus his fortune or deſtinie to be hanged or drowned, or that he ſhal die a natural death before he ſhalbe as great a fauourer of Gods predeſtination, as he doth now ſhew himſelf to be a mortall foe therof. But we knowe, that if God hauehave predeſtinated any of theſe things, the ſame ſhall vndoubtedly come to paſſe, in ſuch ſort as he hath appointed. And yet ſhal not Cerberus his will be enforced. But if he hang himſelfe, it ſhall be with the full conſent of his will. And if he ſhalbe a fauourer of our ſide, it ſhalbe with the frée choyſe of his owne will, gouerned by the prouidence of God. As there be ſome yet liuing, that can teſtifie, that once they were of the ſame minde that Cerberus is now, and that with conſent of will. And now they be of one minde with me: and that with aſſent of will alſo.

We leaue Cerberus and his fellowes therefore to him that by his prouidence gouerneth al things. And yet do we our ſelues vſe the meanes that God in prouidence hath appointed to be vſed, and we teach all other to do the ſame, committing the ſucceſſe to him that knoweth what he hath determined to worke in all his creatures. And we conclude this matter with Auſten, ſaying: Quapropter, Aug. De Ciuit. lib. 5. cap. 9& voluntates nostrae tantum valent, quantum Deus eas valere voluit at que praeſciuit: & ideo, quicquid valent certiſsimè valent: & quod facturae ſunt ipſae, omninò facturae ſunt: quia valeturas at que facturas ille praeſciuit, cuius praeſcientia falli nòn potest. Quapropter, ſi fati nomen, alicui rei adhibendum placeret: magis dicerē fatum eſse infirmioris, potentioris voluntatem qui eū habet in potestate, quàm illo cauſarum ordine, quem nòn vſitato, ſed ſuo more Stoici fatum appellant, arbitrium nostrae voluntatis auſerri. That is to ſaye. Wherefore, this is the cauſe why our willes are able to doe, as much as God would & did know afore hand that they ſhould do, and therefore, loke what they are able to do, that are they moſt certainly able to do: and what ſo euer they ſhall do, they ſhall in déede do: bicauſe he whoſe preſcience or foreknowledge cannot be deceiued, did know afore hand that they ſhould do it. Wherefore if I could allow the name of deſtinie to be giuen to any thing: I would rather ſay that deſtinie were a thing belonging to the weaker, and will to the ſtronger which hath it in his power, than that the liberty of our will, ſhould by that order of cauſes, which y^• Stoikes, not after the common cuſtome, but after their own maner, do cal deſtinie. But Cerberus is not yet aunſwered. We muſt yet ſolue him one other queſtion. Which p. 73now he will propone.

Cerberus.

Yet would I further aske them a queſtion, ſeeing it is the decree, ordinance, and wyll of God expreſſed in his word, that man ſhould not ſin, how crepte they into that ſecret councel, where God ordeined, decreed, and willed the contrarie? that is to ſay, that man ſhould ſinne. But I heare their anſwere already publiſhed in print: ſtanding in the third leafe & ſeconde page, of the firſte Blaſt in that traiterous trū pet, ſet forth agaynſt the regiment of women, where Fol. 2. Pa. 2. briefly and couertly toucheth this cloſe and priuie counſell of God in theſe wordes. The ſecrete counſell of God excepted. But in Fol. 3. Pag. 2. he ſayth. I am ſure that God hath reuealed to ſome in this our age, that it is more than a Monſter in nature, that a woman ſhall raigne and hauehave Empire aboue man.

This may be the Apocalips of ſome men in thys our age: but ſure I am, it is not the reuelation of S. Iohn the Euangeliſt, nor of any other olde Apoſtle or Prophet. Theſe new reuelations which are reuealed vntounto men of our age out of a ſecrete counſel, decree, and ordinance of God, contrarie to the open worde and commaundement of God, are meete for thoſe which delight in the dānable dreames of ſome doting deſtinie, and may well be called inſpirations of olde Arrians, reuelations of blinde Anabaptiſtes, or vnwritten verities of ſuperſtitious Papiſts, rather than the ſecrete counſel of God, reuealed vntounto men of our age. But to conclude: That Angell or ſpirite, which contrarie to the manifeſt word of God, hath reuealed vntounto men of our age, that a woman bring right inheritour to the Crowne of a Realme, ought not to be ruler thereof, that ſame ſpirit and Aungell of darkneſſe, hath reuealed vntounto mē of our age, that Caine was predeſtinate to murther his brother Abel, and the moſt wicked traytours, murtherers, & theeues that lyue, are ordeyned of God, in his ſecrete counſell, contrary to his open worde, to be wicked, euen as they are, and to commit ſuch murther, theſe and treaſon, euen as they doe. The ſame concluſion and newe reuelation, is alſo playnly ſet forth in the other late printed Engliſh boke before named, tranſlated out of French into Engliſh, where an on after the beginning, ſpeaking of Gods wyll, he ſayth: By the vertue wherof, al things are made, yea euē thoſe thyngs whych are euill and execrable. Yet when he hath plainly affirmed that by the vertue of Gods wil euill and execrable things are made, leaſt the horrible face of Sathan ſhould be perceiued, in the burning flame of thoſe terrible wordes: The matter is afterward trimly couered with a cloke of vnſauerie ſubtiltie, for he declareth his mind to be, that thoſe euil and execrable things, which are wrought by the vertue of Gods will, are not euill and execrable, in that they are wrought by his diuine counſell. As if he ſhould ſay, though they be in deede euil and execrable things, which the counſell of God worketh, yet are they not in that reſpect or therfore euill, bicauſe God worketh thē. But for as much (ſayeth he) as they proceede from the Prince of ayre. &c. Or to ſpeak it in more vſual termes, bicauſe the diuel or wicked men do work it, which neuertheleſſe, as they plainly hold and affirme, are the inſtrumētes of God appointed her vntounto, & in doing the ſame, do nothing p. 74elſe but that which God hath ordeyned them to do, & ſo ordeyned that they can not choſe but do it, euē as they do, which opinion Prosper, defending the ſentence of Auguſtine, writeth vehemently againſt, in theſe wordes. Praedestinationem Dei ſiuè ad malum ſiuè ad bonum &c. That the Predeſtination of God (ſayth he) d… worke in all men eyther vntounto good or vntounto euill it is moſt fooliſhly ſayd, as though a certaine neceſſitie ſhould driue men vntounto both, ſeyng in good things, the will is to be vnderſtande not wythout grace, & in euill things, the will is to be vnderſtand without grace. Reſpō. ad obiect. Gal. cap. 6. But that which Proſper, and Aug. do here moſt truly call a moſt foliſh ſaying. The ſame do theſe men call the moſt hygh & profoūd wiſdom, for God ſay they, predeſtinateth al things, Ergo al things muſt come to paſſe of neceſſitie.

Crowley.

A man might maruell, what moued Cerberus to moue that queſtion, the aunſwere whervnto, he himſelf ſayth is alredie publiſhed in print. But when I conſider, what ſpirit it is that hath moued him in this ſort to aunſwere his friendes letter: I leaue off that maruell. For I ſée his purpoſe is, by this meane to entangle and trouble vsus with by matter, neyther pertinent to the thing we hauehave in hande, nor tending to any good ende. What hauehave we to do with the matter of the Blaſt (which booke I neuer reade of) or with Reuelations or Apocalipſes? We hauehave the queſtion of Gods Prouidēce, Preſcience & Predeſtination in hande. To diſpute of thoſe matters did neyther appertaine to Cerberus in hys aunſwere, neyther doth it appertaine to me in this Apologie. I wyl therefore paſſe ouer both thoſe queſtions: and ſhape him another maner of anſwere to his demaund than y^• which he imagineth that he hath ſéene ſet forth in print. His queſtion is, how we crept into y^• ſecrete counſell, where God ordeyned, decréed and willed, that mā ſhould ſinne? He imagineth that this can not be aunſwered otherwiſe than by an Apocalips or Reuelatiō. But Cerberus ſhall well vnderſtande, that we can aunſwere him by playne Scripture, & proue that it is not againſt Scripture, that God ſhoulde ordaine, decrée and will, that man ſhoulde ſinne.

Firſt, S. Paule writing to the Romanes ſayth thus. Annō habet potestatem Figulus luti, ex eadē maſsa facere, aliud Rom. 9.Rom 9quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam? That is to ſaye. Hath not the Potmaker power ouer his Claye, out of one lumpe to make one veſſell to honor, and another to diſhonor? And in the ſame place he ſayth thus. Nunquid dicit ſigmentum ei qui ſe ſinxit, quid me fecisti ſic? That is. Doth the earthen veſſell ſay vntounto him that made it: Why haſte thou made me ſo? And the ſame S. Paule writing to Timothe ſayth. In magna autem domo, non ſolum ſunt vaſa aurea & argentea, ſed & lignea & fictilia: & quaedā 2. Timoth. 2.2 Tim 2quidem in honorem, qu…dam autem in contumeliam. That is to ſay. In a great houſe, there be not onelyonly veſſels of Golde & of Siluer, but alſo of Timber and of Earth: ſome ſeruing to honor, and ſome to diſhonor. Theſe Alegories doth S. Paule vſe, to ſhew that there is no iniquitie with God, though he do appoint his creatures at his good will and pleaſure, ſome to honor, and ſome to diſhonor. To the ſame purpoſe doth S. Paule cite the wordes that are written in the. 33. of Exodie. Miſerebor, cuius miſercor: & miſericordiam praestabo, cuius miſerebor. That is. I will hauehave compaſſion vponupon him, on whome I hauehave compaſſion: And I will ſhewe mercy, to whome I will ſhewe mercy. It lyeth not in the willer nor in y^• runner, ſaith S. Paul: p. 75but in God who taketh mercy. For the Scripture ſayth vntounto Pharao: Quia in hoc ipſum exitaui t…, vt oſtendum in t… potentiam meam, & vt annuntietur nomen meu… …n vniuerſd terra. That is. For this cauſe hauehave I ſtyrred thée vp, that I might ſhewe my power vponupon thée, and that my name might be declared through the whole earth. And then S. Paule concludeth thus. Ergo, cuius vult mi…, & quem vult indurat. That is. On whome it pleaſeth him, he taketh mercy, & whome he luſteth, he maketh harde hearted. I knowe the common aunſwere to this. Which is: God doth not hearden the hearts of any: but he doth ſuffer them to harden their owne hearts. But it … good for them that ſtande vponupon this common aunſwere, to cō ſider what S. Auſten writeth concerning Gods ſuffering of things to be done.

Nec dubitādum eſt Deum facere benè, etiam … fieri quae…ū … Enchirid. ad Laur. cap. 96.fiunt …: Non enim hoc niſi iusto iudicio ſinit. Et profecto bonum eſt omne quod iustum eſt. Quamuis ergo ea qu… mala ſunt▪ in quantum mala ſunt, non ſint bona: tamen, vt non ſolam bona, ſed etiam ſint & mala, bonum eſt. Num niſi eſset hoc honum, vt eſsent & mala: nullo modo eſse ſinerentur ab omnipotent… bono. … proculdubiò, quam facile eſt quod vult facere? tum facile eſt, quod non vult eſse, non ſinere. Hoc niſi credamus, periclitatun ipſum noſtrae fidei confeſsionis initium, qua nos in Deum patrem omnipotentem, credere conſitemur. Nequè enim venicitèr ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, niſi quia quicquid vult poteſt, nec voluntate cuiuſpiā creaturae, voluntatis omnipotentis, impeditur effectus. That is to ſaye. It is not to be doubted that God doth well, yea, when he ſuffreth to be done, whatſoeuer things are euill done. For he doth not ſuffer this, otherwiſe than by iuſt iudgement. And ſurely, all that is iuſt, is good. Although therfore thoſe things that be euill, in as much as they be euill, be not good: yet is it good, y^• there ſhould be things, not onelyonly that are good, but alſo that are euill. For excep…t were good, y^• there ſhould be things that are euill: the almightie goodneſſe would by no meanes ſuffer them to be. To whome, no doubt, it is as eaſie a thing not to ſuffer that thing to be which he would not ſhould be: as it is to doe that which he is willing… to doe. Except wée beleue this▪ ſhe very beginning of the confeſſion of our ſayth, wherein we confeſſe y^• we beleue in God y^• Father Almightie, is in daunger & like to be foſid vntrue. For he is not truely called Almightie for any other cauſe, but for that he is able to do what he will, & the effect of his wyll, being Almightie, is not by the wil of any creature letted.

By theſe wordes of Auſten it is playne, that God, being Almightie can not be ſayd to ſuffer ought to be done, which he is not willing ſhould be done. The hardening of hearts therfore, and that wickedneſſe that is wrought by the hard hearted, is not done without his wil. And although thoſe things be euill, in aſmuch as they are done by thoſe euill perſons, yet in as much as the ſame are done by the will of God, it is good that they be done. By thys it is plaine, that when God doth ordeyne, decrée, and will that man ſhoulde ſinne: he doth not contrarie to Scripture, which doth witneſſe, by the teſtimonie of S. Auſten, that it is good that man ſhould do euil, in ſuch ſenſe as S. Auſten hath declared the ſame.

Moreouer, Salomon in his Prouerbes ſayth thus. Prouerb. 16.Vniuerſa propter ſemetipſum operatus est Dominus: impiū quo que ad diem malum. That is: The Lord hath made all things for himſelf… the vngodlie man alſo againſt the euyl day.

Eſay the Prophet ſayth. Nunquid gloriabitur Securis cō tra Eſay. 10.Isa 10cum qui ſecat in ea? Aut exaltabitur Ser… contra eum, à quo trahitur Quomodo ſi elevetur Virga contra eleuantem ſe, & exealtetur baculus qui vti que lignum est. That is to ſay: Shall the Are boaſt it ſelfe againſt him that heweth with it? Or ſhal the Saw ſet by it ſelfe againſt him that draweth it? p. 76That were as much as if the Rod ſhould be lifted vp againſt him that lifteth it, and as if the ſtaffe that is but timber, ſhould be aduaunted.

The vngodlie man, ſayth Salomon, hath the Lorde made for himſelfe, euen againſt the euill day: that is, againſt the day of vengeance, wherein the vngodly ſhall hauehave theyr iuſt reward at Gods hand. By this, not onelyonly the vngodlie is iuſtly puniſhed for his vngodlineſſe, but the godlie is alſo occaſioned to acknowledge, that it is merciemercy alone that doeth preſerue him frō the like puniſhment. For he ſeeth in himſelfe no cauſe why he ſhould not ſuffer the ſame condemnation. Thus by the wicked, both the iuſtice and mercy of God are made manifeſt vntounto man. But the purpoſe of the vngodlie is nothing leſſe than that Gods iuſtice and merciemercy ſhould be ſet forth by him: therfore he is iuſtly puniſhed for his wickedneſſe. And Eſaie the Prophet, comparing Nabuchodonoſor to an Axe, a Sawe, and a Rodde: doth plainly teach, that it was God that wrought all the plagues and deſtructions that were by that wicked inſtrument brought, not onelyonly vponupon the people of the Iewes, but vponupon other Nations alſo. And that that bloudie and ambitious tyrant, was but as an Axe, Saw, or Rod in the Lords hād. And therfore when he began to boaſt of his owne power and policie, as though he had by his own wiſdom and ſtrength ouercome kingdomes, and ſet himſelfe aboue them: the Lord (to let his people know that it was not Nabuchodonoſors power that could hauehave done, or that ſhould doe thoſe things to them, which the Prophetes did tell them ſhould come vponupon, by the Kings of Babilon) doeth tell them by the mouth of the ſame Prophets, that the worke was his, and that the Kings of Babilon were but hys fooles or inſtrumentes to worke withall.

But this can not Cerberus abide: God muſt be but a looker on, and no … any of theſe things. For if God ſhould be a worker, he muſt needes be the Authour of the ſinne that is in the deede. For the old Curre hath his eyes ſo blinded with the filthie …dder of Hell fire: that he can not ſée how God may be the Authour of the fact, and not of the ſinne that is in it. But when he heareth that ſaying: he crieth … Areade, Areade, what is this? In Cerberus his iudgement, eyther Iob muſt be a liar, or elſe God muſt be a théefe. For when word came to Iob that the Sabeis had ſlaine his ſeruauntes, and driuen away his cattle: he ſayd, the Lord hath taken thē away. But to take away Iobs cattle was felonie, Ergo, eyther God was a Felon, or Iob a liar, if Cerberus his opinion beleue.

But how God doth worke in the heartes of euill and wicked men, and vſe them as his inſtruments, and yet is not partaker of their ſinne: is ſufficiently declared afore, out of S. Auſten, De gratia & libero arbitrio.

Nowe Cerberus will looke that I ſhoulde ſay ſome thing to the words of Proſper. Otherwiſe he wil make reckning that he hath the victorie. For a little occaſion maketh him to brag. The obiection that the Frenchmen made againſt the ſentence of S. Auſten, in the place that Cerberus ſpeaketh of, is this. Quòd liberum arbitrium in homine nihil ſit: ſed ſiue ad bonum ſiue ad malum, praedestinatio … in hominibus …perctur. That is to ſay. That S. Auſten ſhould holde that frée will in man is nothing: but that Gods predeſtination doth worke in men, whether it be to good or to euill. The anſwere to this obiection is thus. Liberum arbitrium nihil eſse, vel non eſse, perperam dicitur: ſed ante illuminationem fidei, in tenebris illud, & in vmbra mortis ac gere, nòn rectè nog…tur. Quoniam priuſquam à dominatione Diaboli per Dei gratiam liberetur & in illo profundo iacet in quod ſe ſua libertate demerſit. Amas ergo langores ſuos, & profanitate p. 77habet, quòd agrotare ſe neſcit, donec prima haec medela conferati… aegroto, vt incipiat noſse quòd langueat, & poſsit opem medici deſiderare, qua ſurgat. Iustificatus ita que homo, idest, ex impio pius factus, nullo praecedente bono merito, accipit donum, quo medio, adquirat & meritum: vt quod in illo inchoatum est per gratiam Christi, etiam per industriam liberi augeatur arbitrij, nunquam remoto adiutorio Dei, ſine quo, nec proſicere, nec permanere in bono quiſquam potest. Praedestinationem autem Dei, ſiue ad bonum ſiue ad malum in hominibus operari, ineptiſsimè dicitur, vt ad vtrum que homines quaedam neceſsitas videatur impellere: cum in bonis, voluntas ſit intelligenda degratia, in malis autem intelligenda ſine gratia. That is. To ſay that frée will is nothing, or that there is no frée will at all, is euil ſayd: but that the ſame doth wander in darkneſſe and in the ſhadow of death before it is illumined by faith, is not well denied. For before it is by the grace of God deliuered from the domination of the Diuell: it lyeth in that déepe dongion, into which by it owne libertie it did caſt it ſelfe. It doth therfore louelove it owne ſore ſickneſſes, and doth compt it helth, not to knowe that it is ſicke, vntyll this firſt medicine be miniſtred to it being ſicke, that it may begin to know that it is ſick, and be able to deſire the helpe of the Phiſition, whereby it may aryſe. When man therefore is iuſtified, that is to ſay, made godlie of vngodlie, without any good deſeruing going before, he receyueth a gift, by which meane he maye alſo get merit or deſeruing: that that thing which is by the grace of Chriſt begonne in him, may alſo by the induſtrie of frée will be encreaſed, neuer without the helpe of God, without which no man can eyther go forward, or ſtay in that which is good. But it is moſt fooliſhly ſaid, that the predeſtinatiō of God doth ſo worke in men, eyther to good or to euill, that a certain neceſſitie may ſéeme to force men forward vntounto both: ſeeing that in good, the will is to be vnderſtanded to come of grace, & in euill, the will is to be vnderſtanded without grace.

Now (gentle Reader) thou ſeeſt what it was that the French men obiected againſt: S. Auſten. Thou ſéeſt alſo what Proſper doth anſwere in S. Auſteus defence. Cō ſider nowe what occaſion Cerberus hath to conclude againſt vsus as he doth.

The French men obiect, that S. Auſten ſhould hold that fréewill in man is nothing, but that Gods predeſtination doth worke in men, whether it …to good or euyl. Proſper aunſwereth, that it is an euil ſaying: to affirme that fréewill is nothing, or that there is no fréewill at al. And that it is moſt fooliſhly ſayd, that the predeſtination of God doth ſo worke in the heartes of men, either to good or euill, that a certaine neceſſitie may ſéeme to force men forward vntounto both. But we do neyther ſay that fréewill is nothing, or that there is none at all: neither that predeſtination doth ſo worke in men, that a certaine neceſſitie may ſeme to force them forward both to good and euil: No, we do not affirme that predeſtination doeth worke in men any thing at all. Ergo, Proſper hath written nothing againſt vsus.

Cerberus.

And further, Crowley in the ſayd booke of confutation before named, and the ſame article, vſing the very ſame terme of driuing, he ſayeth that Gods predeſtination hath driuen them to it. And yet not therwith content, anone after he ſayeth: We are cō pelled by the neceſſitie of Gods predeſtination, to do thoſe things for the which we are damned, but to repeate the whole ſentence. To this muſt we anſwere (ſayth he) in thys wyſe. If God were an inferiour to p. 78anie ſuperior power, to the which he ought to render an accompt of his doings, or if anie of vsus were not his creatures, but of another creation beſides his workmanſhip, then might we charge him with tyrannie, bicauſe he condemneth vsus, and appoynted vsus to be puniſhed for the things we doe by compulſion through the neceſſitie of his predeſtination.