A Defense of English Writers and Preachers, Text (2 of 4)

A Defense of English Writers and Preachers · Text (2 of 4)

Theſe words of S. Auſten, do plainly declare of what minde he was when he wrate theſe queſtions. And thys booke of queſtions, with the reaſt, he hath retracted and Retractat. lib. 2. cap. 55.peruſed againe, allowing this ſentence of his therin as it appeareth in the. 55. chapter of his ſecond boke of Retractations. Cerberus had no cauſe therfore, to ſet Iohn Caluin againſt Auſten, for we take that to be vndoubtedlye the doctrine of Auſten, which we finde in his Retractations, and not reuoked.

But Cerberus purpoſe was, craftily to cauſe all that would harken vntounto him, to eſtéeme both Caluin & vsus, as moſt arrogant heretikes, that wyll not ſticke to compare one of our time with that auncient Father, and to accept his iudgement, without either reaſon or learning, directly againſt the iudgement of him, whom al the Church of Chriſt hath theſe many hundred yeres worthily reuerenced. For who ſéeth not, that Cerberus can not be one of thoſe Goſpellers that do accompt Caluin to be fully ſufficient in auctoritie to encounter with Auſten: ſith he writeth ſo bitterly, againſt all thē that eyther write or preach that, that Caluin hath in writing moſt euidently proued and defended: Yea, he alleageth Auſten againſt Caluins doctrine, and woulde ſeme thereby to triumphe ouer him and all that be of his minde.

As for the place that he cyteth out of Caluin, I leaue for Cerberus to ſeke out at his leyſure, and when he hath founde it, to note where it may be ſound…. But I beleue it will be harde for him to find in Caluines workes, that ſentence in thoſe wordes.

Cerberus.

p. 28There remaineth then, as before I promiſed, briefly to note thoſe thyngs, which I thinke worthye to be reproued, about the doctrine of Predeſtination, as it is now a dayes taught of many. Wherin leaſt I ſhould ſeme to ſpeake without aſſured grounde, and bicauſe wordes in preaching, in talke, or diſputation (wherof I hauehave heard great abundance in thys matter) may raſhly paſſe with ſmall aduiſement, and eyther eaſely be denied or ſoone forgotten: I am determined to touch nothyng but their very wordes, whych are ſet forth in Print. And bicauſe the taking and aunſweryng of their whole bookes were a matter long and tedious, being commonlye ſtuffed on the one ſide, wyth an heape of opprobrious and outragious wordes againſt ſuch priuate perſons as they take in hand to write agaynſt: and on the other ſide filled, rather wyth obſcure ſubtelties, than wyth plaine affirmations, I hauehave thought it beſt therfore, to take certayne ſentences whych contayne manifeſt affirmatiōs, out of diuers late printed Englyſhe bookes, wherein the ſumme and effect of this doctrine (which manye doe for iuſt cauſe miſlike, is fully, plainelye, and ſimplye declared.

Crowley.

Nowe Cerberus beginneth to growe to the performance of his promiſe, in noting thoſe things in the doctrine of predeſtinatiō now preached, as ſeme to him mete to be reproued. And by the way, he will not taunt vsus, but thus he ſayth, that in preaching, talking, and reaſoning, wordes may paſſe vsus raſhly and with ſmall aduiſement, and be either eaſely denied, or ſone forgotten: Wherfore he will touche nothing but that which we hauehave written and ſet forth in Print. Well, contented, but yet I would Cerberus ſhould knowe that we neither preache, talke, nor diſpute with ſuch raſhneſſe or ſmall aduiſement, but that we are able, and will, by Gods helpe, ſtande to all that we hauehave ſpoken therein, and he is able to charge vsus withall. As for the outragious wordes that we vſe towardes them that we write againſt, ſhalbe found modeſt inough, when they ſhalbe compared with the words that in this hys aunſwere he vſeth towards vsus. Let him therfore procede in noting thoſe things that he miſliketh.

Cerberus.

I reade in an Englyſhe booke ſet forth by Robert Crowley, and entituled, the confutation of .xiii. Articles. &c. theſe wordes. Adam therfore, beyng ſo perfect a creature, that there was in him no luſt to ſinne, and yet ſo weake, that of himſelfe he was not able to withſtand the aſſault of the ſubtile ſerpent: no remedye, the onelyonly cauſe of his fall, muſt nedes be the predeſtination of God.

Thou ſeeſt, dearly beloued, in the concluſion of this ſentence one point declared, wherin the controuerſie doth conſiſt. For where he plainlye affirmeth, that Gods predeſtination is the only cauſe of Adams fall, which is the ſountayne of all ſinne: other hauing a much more reuerend opinion of God and of hys holye predeſtination, do ſet their fote, or rather their heart and ſoule, agaynſt their ſayd concluſion. Eſtemyng it far better to be torne in manye thouſande pieces, than to thynke or ſay, that Gods foreordinance or predeſtination, is the cauſe of any ſinne or euil. I beſech thee, let not thine eies be blinded, or thy minde muſfled wyth malice, eyther agaynſt the p. 29one partie or the other, but in the ballāce of vpright iudgement, waye the difference. The one ſayth (as in this concluſion manifeſtlye appeareth, and as afterwarde, yet more plainly he affirmeth) that the predeſtination of God, is the onelye cauſe of Adams ſinne, and ſo conſequently of all euill. The other affirmeth directly contrary. That God or his predeſtination, is the cauſe of no ſinne or euyll, but the only cauſe of all goodneſſe and vertue. And herewyth agreeth the holye and diuine Apoſtle Sainct Iohn in hys Epiſtle ſaying. All that is in the worlde, as the 1. Iohn. 2.1 John 2concupiſcence of the fleſhe, the luſt of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father. Al good things that are in the worlde, are no doubt of God our heauenly Father: but whatſoeuer in the worlde, is concupiſcence, luſt, ſinne, euill or wickedneſſe, the ſame is not of God our heauenlye Father: S. Iohn doeth piainly and preciſely affirme. The lyke playneneſſe vſeth alſo the holye man Ieſus the ſonne of Sirach, in theſe wordes. Say not thou it is the Lordes fault, Eccle. 15.Sir 15that I am gone by, for thou ſhalt not doe the thing that God hateth, ſaye not thou, he hath cauſed me to go wrong, for he hath no neede of the vngodlye. The verye ſame thing is plainely declared, in theſe Scriptures folowyng, and in other places almoſt innumerable. Pſal 5. Pro. 19. Ieremie. 7. &. 19. Oſeae. 13. Iob. 34. &. 36. Rom. 7. 1. Corin. 14. Iacob. 1. Exod. 34. Deut. 5. 2. Reg. 14. Pſal. 81. &. 144. Prou. 1. Sap. 1. &. 2 11. 12. 15. Eccleſ. 2. & 18. Eſay. 5. & 30. 55. &. 65. Lament Iere. 3 Ezech. 18. 24. &. 33. Ioel. 2. 4. Eſdr. 1. 2. 7. &. 8. Math. 23. Act. 17. 1. Timoth. 2. &. 4. 2. Pet. 3. The ſame ſayth Auſten alſo plainely in theſe wordes. Non ergo caſus ruentium, nee malignitatem iniquorū, ne que cupiditates peccantium, praedestinatio Dei, aut exitauit aut ſuaſit, aut impulit: ſed plane praedestinauit iudicium ſuuin, quo vnicui que retributurus est pro vt geſsit ſiue bonum, ſiue malum, quod Iudicium futurum non eſset: ſi homines Dei voluntate peccarent. Neither the falles of them that fall, nor the wickedneſſe of them that be wicked, nor the luſte of them that offende, hath the predeſtination of God, eyther prouoked, moued or compelled, but without doubt he hathe forcordeyned his iudgement, wherby he will recompence euerye man, according as he hath done, whether it be good or euyll, the whiche ſhoulde be no iudgement, if men did ſinne by the will of God.

Crowley.

I do acknowledge that this Engliſh booke, that Cerberus ſaith he hath read, was of my writing. I acknowledge alſo, that Cerberus hath cited the wordes truely, euen as I wrate them. But that I ment by them as Cerberus doth conclude vponupon them: I vtterly deny. For he concludeth that I hauehave affirmed, that Gods predeſtination is the onelyonly cauſe of all euill. Whiche I neuer ment to teache, neither do my wordes, duely conſidered, giuegive any occaſion of ſuch concluſion.

I graunt, my words might hauehave bene more explaned, and my meaning ſet forth more at large, and all occaſions of ſuche calumniations cut off, if I had ſene that before I wrate that booke, whiche I thanke my Lord God, I hauehave ſene ſince. Wherfore I minde by the help of God to do that now y^e I was not ſo well able to do then, that the Reader may perceiue, that I hauehave with Auſten profited in writing. My words that Cerberus citeth, are theſe. August. prol. 1. lib. Retract.Adam therefore, being ſo perfect a creature, that there was in him no luſt to ſinne, and yet ſo weak, that of him ſelfe he was not able to withſtande the aſſault of the ſubtile p. 30ſerpent: no remedie, the only cauſe of his fall, muſt nedes be the predeſtination of God. Cerberus findeth no fault with any of theſe wordes, till he commeth to no remedy. And then no remedy, I muſt be condemned as one that affirmeth Gods Predeſtination to be the onelye cauſe of Adams ſinne, and ſo conſequentlye of all ſinne. But I hauehave not ſaide that Gods predeſtination was the onelye cauſe, or anye cauſe of Adams ſinne. My wordes be that Gods Predeſtination is the onelye cauſe of Adams fall. Nowe Cerberus can not ſée howe Adams fall may be good, and therefore he ſayeth that it is the fountaine of all ſinne, and that to be the cauſe of that fall, is to be the cauſe of all ſinne. But ſuche as hauehave eyes to ſée, do ſée, that as Gods predeſtination is the cauſe of Adams fall: ſo Adams fall is good. For it is the meane whereby God hath ſhut vp all vnderunder vnbeliefe, that he Rom. 11.Rom 11might hauehave mercye on all. And the meane whereby the Galath. 3.Scripture ſhutteth vp all vnderunder ſinne, that the promiſe which is of the faith of Ieſus Chriſt, might be giuen to the faithfull.

I write therefore now, as I wrate before in my Conſutation of Shaxtons Articles: that for aſmuch as there was in Adam nothing to moue him to ſinne (for luſt to do contrarie to Gods wil, was not yet entred into him) & Sathan the enimy had no power then, neither hath anye power yet, ouer anye creature of God, further than God doth limit and appoint him: it muſt nedes followe, that the only cauſe that Adam was aſſaulted & ouerthrowen by Satan, was the predeſtination of God, which is euer all one with his vnſearcheable will & counſel. The fall of Adam thus conſidered, neyther is, nor can be counted ſinne: for it is the performance of Gods purpoſe, whiche is euer good, although vnſearchable by mans feble vnderſtanding. And yet I do not denie Adams fall to be ſinno in Adam himſelf: for it was Factum cōtramandatum Dei. A dede done contrary to the commaſidentent of God. And ſo it had a cauſe in Adam himſelfe, which was the power of his wil, whereby he conſented to y^e enticement of Satan, who vſed the woman as his inſtrument therin. Of thys will and the power therof, Sainct Auſten writeth thus: De libero arbitrio, lib. 3. Cap. 18. Cum autem de libera voluntate rectè faciendi loqui…: de illa ſilicet in qua homo factus est, loquimur. When we ſpeak of the will that is frée to do wel, we ſpeake of that will wherein man was made. And againe in his booke De natura & gratia, Cepite. 43. ſpeaking of man, he ſaith. Quis enim eum neſcit, ſanum & inculpabilem factum, & libero arbitrio, at que ad iustè viuendum libera poteſtate constitutum? Who knoweth not that man was made found & vnblameable, and that he was ordeined with frée choyſe, and frée power or libertie to liue righteouſly? And againe in his boke De Correptione & gratia. Cap. 11. Istam gratiam non habuit homo primus, qua nunquam vellet eſse malus: ſed ſanè habuit in qua ſi permanere vellet, nunquam malus eſset, & ſine qua etiàm cum libero arbitrio, bonus eſse non poſset, ſed eam tamenper liberum arbitrium deſerere poſset. Nec ipſum ergo Deus eſse voluit ſine ſua gratia, quē reliquit in ſuo libero arbitrio: quoniam liberum arbitrium ad malum ſufficit, ad bonum autem nihil est, niſi adiuuetur ab omnipotenti bono: quod adiutorium ſi homo ille per liberum non deſeruiſset arbitrium, ſempereſset bonus: ſed deſeruit & deſertus eſt. Tale quippe erat adiutorium quod deſereret cum vellet, & in quo permancret ſi vellet, non quo ſieret vt vellet. The firſte man had not thys grace, whereby he ſhoulde neuer be willing to be euill: but yet he had that grace, whereby he might hauehave bene alwayes preſerued from euill, if he would hauehave continued therin, and without which alſo he coulde not by frée will, be good, but yet he was able by frée wil to forſake it. God therfore would not hauehave him to be without his grace, whō he had left in p. 31his owne fréewill. For fréewil is able inough to do euil, but to do good it hath no power at al, except it be holyē by the almightie goodneſſe: which helpe, if that man had not by fréewill forſaken, he ſhoulde hauehave bene good for euer, but he did forſake, and was forſaken. For the helpe was ſuch, that he might forſake it when he woulde, and ſuche wherin he might remaine if he woulde, not ſuch whereby it might come to paſſe that he ſhould be willing.

By theſe places of S. Auſten, we maye ſee of what minde he was concerning the frée will of man before his fall. It was ſuche that hée mighte conſent to what hée woulde. But the grace to be willing to conſent to nothing but that which was good, was not giuen vntounto mā, that man might hauehave experience of the power of his own will, and ſo for euer after aſcribe al the glory to him that worketh all in all.

The cauſe of Adams fall therfore, euen by the iudgement of S. Auſten (of whome Cerberus maketh ſuche boaſt) was not in himſelf: For God had fore appoynted, that by that meanes man ſhould hauehave experience of hymſelfe, and ſo learne to truſt in one ſtronger than hymſelf. But the cauſe that made his fall ſinne, was in himſelfe. For he did willinglye conſent to the perſwaſion of his wife, who alſo had in like maner conſented to the perſuaſion of the Serpent.

If Cerberus could conſider the fall of the firſt man after this ſort: he would neuer conclude, that I teaching that the Predeſtination of God was the onelye cauſe of mans fall, ſhoulde withall conclude, that it is the onlye cauſe of all ſinne and euill. For I do not teache that it is the cauſe of any euill or ſinne at all.

In vaine therfore, doeth Cerberus make his Antiteſis or compariſon of contraryes, when he ſayth. The one affirmeth that the Predeſtination of God is the onelye cauſe of Adams ſinne, and ſo conſequentlye of all euill: And the other affirmeth directly contrary, that God or his Predeſtination is the cauſe of no ſinne or euil. And much more vaine is it, that he citeth ſo manye teſtimonies of Scripture to that purpoſe. For I affirme that which he woulde make men beleue I denye, and denye that which he would hauehave men to thinke I do affirme.

But one thing I woulde gladly learne of Cerberus. That is, where he findeth, eyther in Scripture, or in auncient writer, that Adams fall is the fountayne of all euill. We may manifeſtly proue by Scripture, that ſinne was before Adam fell, otherwiſe there coulde hauehave bene no tempter to entice him to ſinne. For God tempteth no man to euill. And man had in himſelfe no concupiſcence Iacob. 1.or luſt to ſinne: therfore euill was before Adam fell. And conſequently, Adams ſal was not the fountain of al euil.

Sainct Auſten in the .ix. Chapter of his firſte booke of Retractations ſayth, that when he with others had diligently ſearched from whence euill might ſpring: it was agréed vponupon amongſt them, that it had none other fountaine than the frée choyſe of the will. Mans fall can not then be the fountaine of all euill: for there was euill in Aungels before man was made, and that ſprang out of the frée choyſe of the will that was in the Aungelles.

But graunt, that the fall of man had bene the fountayne of all euill: might not Gods predeſtination be the cauſe of mans fal, but it muſt ſtraight waye follow conſequentlye that the ſame is the cauſe of all the euill that ſpringeth therof? Then tell me (maiſter Cerberus) how it may be, that Gods predeſtination is not the cauſe of all the euill that ſpringeth of the frée choyſe of will. For this ye wil not deny, I am ſure, that God hath predeſtinated, both men and Aungels to hauehave the frée choiſe of wil. And his will alone, according to which he hath predeſtinated p. 32all things, is the cauſe why men and Aungels hauehave the frée choyſe of wil. Shal we ſay therefore, that conſequently it is the cauſe of all euill? bicauſe it is the cauſe of that whereout all euilles do ſpring? No thou hell hound, not ſo. God is altogether good, and the fountaine of all goodneſſe, and from him can ſpring nothing that is not good. All thoſe things therfore that ſpring out of the frée choiſe of the will, are exceding good, as God, or his predeſtination is the cauſe of them, and the euill that is in them, commeth of the inſtrument whereby God doth worke thoſe things. I pray you therfore, loke better vponupon your conſequently. &c.

As for the ſentence that Cerberus citeth oute of S. Auſten: Non ergo caſus ruentium. &c. I thynke if a man ſhould vponupon a MonethMonth warning, require to ſée the place where S. Auſten writeth thoſe wordes: it would be hard for Cerberus to ſhewe it him. And therfore I blame him not, though he hauehave not quoted the place. But to do him a pleaſure, I hauehave ſought it in S. Auſtens workes and founde it In decimo. articulo falſo Augustino impoſito. In the x. of thoſe articles that were falſlye aſcribed to S. Auſten. Of what auctoritie that booke of S Auſten is, may eaſely appeare to them that will reade his Retractations: for it is not mentioned among the bookes that he retracted, and reformed in ſuche pointes as he himſelfe miſſeliked. But leſt maiſter Cerberus ſhould ſaye (as the Papiſtes vſe to ſay of the Proteſtantes, and as ſome Frée wil men hauehave ſaid of vsus that teache the doctrine of predeſtination) that this is the common ſhift of all heretikes and obſtinate defenders of vntruthes, to diminiſh the auctoritie of Scriptures and ſayings of Doctours that are alleaged againſt them, by ſaying that the ſame are not autentike, or that they maye be ſuſpected not to be the writings of them in whoſe name they be ſet abrode: I will admit this ſaying of S. Auſten as his owne, and that therein he ment as he wrote, and that his meaning is true. Let vsus weigh the wordes of S. Auſten therfore, and ſee how his meaning may be true, & yet agrée wyth the doctrine that we teache. The predeſtination of God (ſayth he) hath neither ſtirred vp, counſelled, nor enforced, the falles of thē that do ruſh downe headlong, nor the malignitie of them that be wicked, nor the deſiers of them that do ſinne: but doubtleſſe he hath predeſtinated his iudgement, whereby he will rewarde euerye man according to his doings, whether the ſame be good or euill. Whiche iudgement ſhould not be, if it were the will of God that men ſhoulde ſinne. I hauehave tranſlated theſe wordes ſomewhat otherwiſe than Cerberus doth. But whether of vsus both better expreſſe the meaning of S. Auſten, let the learned iudge. And whether I hauehave not tranſlated theym ſo that they may ſerue better for Cerberus purpoſe, than as they are tranſlated by himſelfe. Let vsus therefore loke to the meaning, and howe they make with vsus or againſt vsus.

Sainct Auſten teacheth that Gods predeſtinatiō, doth not ſtir vp, entice or enforce any man to ſal, to be wicked, or to hauehave a deſire to ſinne. And which of vsus doth teach y^e cōtrary? Euen you ſir (ſaith Cerberus) when ye ſay that y^e Predeſtination of God, muſt nedes be the only cauſe of Adams fall. To this I hauehave ſufficiently aunſwered before, if any aunſwere wil ſatiſfie Cerberus. But yet for further aunſwere I ſaye nowe, that I hauehave not at anye time ſaide or written, that Gods predeſtination did ſtirre vp, entice or driue Adam to fall. Wherfore I hauehave not taught contrary to S. Auſten in thys pointe. But Cerberus will ſaye that our meaning is not alone with S. Auſtens. Let vsus therefore examine S. Auſtens meaning. I vnderſtand his meaning to be, that when man doeth fall, is wicked, or deſireth to ſinne: his will is not by p. 33Gods Predeſtination ſtirred vp, enticed or compelled thervnto, but doth fréely conſent therevnto being ſtirred vp, prouoked and driuen forwarde by the tempter, and by none other meane, if we ſpeake of the firſt man, for in him was not, before his fall, that concupiſcence that is nowe in vsus, & was in him after his fall. Whether thys be y^e true meaning of S. Auſten or no, let the learned iudge. And why may not the ſame meaning be gathered of my wordes, when I ſaye, that Adam being ſo perfect a creature, that there was in him no luſt to ſinne, and yet ſo weake, that of himſelfe he was not able to withſtand the aſſault of the ſubtile ſerpent: no remedie, the onlye cauſe of his fall muſt nedes be the Predeſtination of God. I ſay not, that Gods Predeſtination did ſtir, prouoke, or dryue him forward to fall: And why maye I not meane as S. Auſten doth in the eleauenth chapter of his booke, De correptione & gratia, where he ſayeth (as I hauehave cited before) Nec ipſum ergo Deus eſse voluit ſine ſua gratia, quem reliquit in ſu… libero arbitrio: quoniam liberum arbitrium ad malum ſufficit, ad bonum autem nihil est, niſi adiuuctur ab omnipotēti bono: quod adiutoriū, ſi homo ille, per liberum non deſeruiſsaet arbitrium, ſemper eſset bonus, ſed deſeruit, & deſertus est. Tale quippe erat adiutoriū quod deſereret cum vellet, & in quopermaneret ſivellet, non quo fieret vt vellet.

God therfore (ſayth Auſten) would not ſuffer him to be without his grace, whom he had left in hys owne frée choiſe: for free will is able inough to do euill, but to do good it hath no power at all, except it be holpen of the almighty goodneſſe: which help, if that man had not by his frée wil forſaken, he ſhould hauehave bene good for euer, but he did forſake & was forſaken. For the help was ſuch that he might forſake it when he woulde, and ſuche wherein he might remaine if he woulde, not ſuch whereby it might come to paſſe that he ſhould be willing.

Doth not S. Auſten affirme here, that the help of God which Adam had, was not ſuche, that by it he might be willing neuer to forſake it? And what other cauſe of this can you find: thā the Predeſtination of God, which is according to his euerlaſting will, vntounto the whiche all things are and muſt be ſubiect.

If Cerberus will not be ſatiſfied with thys: let him remember the ſaying of S. Paule, which S. Auſten doth Rom. 11.Rom 11ſo often vſe, to ſtop the mouthes of the vnaunſwereable enimies of Gods frée grace and predeſtination. O altitudo diuitiarum, ſapientiae & ſcientiae Dei. Quám incomprehenſibilia ſunt iudicia cius, & inuestigabiles viae cius? O the depeneſſe of the richeſſe of the wiſedome and knowledge of God. Nowe incomprehenſible are hys iudgementes, and hys wayes paſt finding out? Stay here, maiſter Cerberus, go no further I charge you, leſt ye be thruſt headlong into hell for your proube preſumption.

Cerberus.

And although there be ſome places of Scripture, whervpon they would ground this opiniō, that men ſhould ſinne by the wyll of God, or that God ſhould predeſtinate or ordeyne men to ſinne, as where it is ſayde, that God hardened the heart of Pharao, and ſuch like: yet partayneth it nothing to that purpoſe, if it be wayed with the reſt of the Scriptures. For as Auſten ſaith. Ipſe quaſi cos indurat, quia iusto iudicio indurari ſinit. Lib. de eſsentia Diuinitatis. He doth (ſaith Auſten) as it were harden them, bicauſe, that with his iuſt iudgemēt, he ſuffreth them to be hardened. And in his booke, De libero arbitrio & gratia. Cap. 21. he ſayeth: Where at any time we reade in the ſcripture, that mē be ſeduced, or their hearts hardened of God: there p. 34may we not doubt, but that their wicked deſeruings went before, leſt ye runne (ſayth he) into the ſaying of Salomon. Inſipientia viri violat vias cius. Deum autem cauſatur in corde ſuo. The fooliſhneſſe of a man defileth his wayes, but he ſayeth in his heart, God is the cauſe of this hardening of heart.

Melancthon, in his common places, ſpeaketh very plainely, ſaying: Nec figure illae verborum offendunt. &c. Neither, ſayth he, do theſe figuratiue ſpeaches offēd. As I wil harden the heart of Pharao & ſuch like. For it is certaine, that in the Hebrew phraſe, they ſignify a permiſſion or ſuffring, and not an effectuall wyl of God, as, Lead vsus not into temptation, that is to ſay, Suffer vsus not to be led into temptation. Theſe are Melancthons woordes. And marke what he ſayth of the Hebrew phraſe, for al men know him to be a man learned. But to be ſhort, it is ſurely to be maruelled at, that although they do thus accuſe Gods Predeſtination, to be the only cauſe of Adams fal (which is in dede, not onelyonly ſinne, but alſo the very welſpring of al wickedneſſe, and the filthy foūtaine of all our vncleāneſſe) yet they dare affirme themſelues to be the only friendes and louers of Gods Predeſtination, & al others to be the enimies of Gods holy Predeſtination, which doe not ſubſcribe to this their fantaſticall imagination. Moreouer, if it ſhould be ſaid, that they make God the Autor of ſinne, they would crie naye, and ſaye they were ſlaundered. But, whether God be not the autor of that, whereof he is the onelye cauſe: let the vncorrupted heart iudge. Alſo to ſaye the truth, when they ſee their time and place, they are bolde inoughe, yea, euen to vſe the terme Autor, in that ſame manifeſt ſenſe, as in a boke ſet forth by Iohn Knox, againſt an aduerſarie of Gods Predeſtination (as he calleth hym) where, in the. 158. pagine he ſayth thus.

Therfore, whatſoeuer the Ethnickes and ignorant did attribute vntounto Fortune, wee aſſigne to the prouidence of God. And ſtraight way he ſayth. We ſhall iudge nothing to come of fortune, but that all cōmeth by the determination of hys counſell. And furder, it diſpleaſeth him when we eſteme any thing to procede from any other, ſo that we do not behold hym and know him, not only the principall cauſe of al things: but alſo the auctour, appointing al things, to the one part or to the other by his counſell.

Marke well his wordes, and the very ſenſe therof. All commeth of God, ſayth he, God is the principal cauſe, and God is the auctour of it whatſoeuer it be. God appointeth al things, both to the one part and to the other, both to the wicked and to the godly all things, nothing is excepted, aſwell damnation as ſaluation, as well ſinne as vertue, as well wickedneſſe as holyneſſe, yea, if it happen to be murder it ſelfe, for that a little before he rehearſeth. Whatſoeuer it be, it procedeth from none other (ſaith he) but frō God, God ſo hath appointed it. God is the principal cauſe of it. Yea, and not onelyonly the principall cauſe: but alſo the auctor of it. Here ſeeſt thou thoſe playne termes, which ſometime for a little nice liſpyng, they can not, or will not ſpeake, that God is the auctour of all murder and miſchiefe. As for fortune, I knowe it to be an Heatheniſh fable, but where he ſaith, that God is not onelye the principall cauſe, but alſo the auctour of all things, without any exception: and that whatſoeuer the Ethnickes attributed vntounto fortune, that ſame we ought to aſcribe to the prouidēce of God: it is ſuche a wide wandring and large blaſphemye, p. 35as hath not bene lightlye heard. For who knoweth not, that vntounto fortune the Ethnickes aſcribed treaſon, and craftie conſpiracie. As where they call her Inſidioſa, Perſida & Maleſida. VntoUnto fortune they aſcribe cruell murder, and tyrannicall miſchiefe. As when they call her Aspera, Dura, Saeua, Truculenta. VntoUnto fortune they aſcribed filthy luſt and impudent bawdrye: as when they call her Lenocinaus, Bruta and Impudens. VntoUnto fortune they aſcribed, ſcornefull pride, and vaine glory, calling her, Imperioſa, Procax and Superba. VntoUnto fortune they aſcribed, beaſtly blindneſſe, & rude ignoraunce, calling her Coeca, and Exoculata. To conclude, vntounto fortune, the Ethnickes aſcribed all peruerſe and peſtilent wickedneſſe, and all abhomination deteſtable, calling her Nefaria, Abhominanda & Improba. Yet ſaye theſe profeſſors of deſtiny: whatſoeuer the Ethnickes aſcribed vntounto fortune, that ſame ought we to attribute to the prouidēce of God: yea and God is the very auctor, the principal cauſe, and the only cauſe therof.

Crowley.

Cerberus ſuppoſeth nowe, that he hath pulled from vsus y^• foūdation of our faith. For he ſaith, that thoſe ſcriptures that we would ground our opinion vponupon, appertaine nothing to that purpoſe, when they be weighed with the reſt of the ſcriptures. For the triall of this matter it ſhalbe mete for me at this time, plainly to ſet down in writing, what the opinion is, that I and other of my minde in this matter of Predeſtination, doe holde. And then, what thoſe Scriptures be that Cerberus meaneth of, conferring the ſame with as manye other places of ſcripture, as hauehave any ſhewe of a contrarye meaning: ſo ſhall it appeare what Cerberus hath wonne by that he citeth out of Auſten and Melancthon. Firſt, we hold that what ſoeuer hath bene from the beginning, is nowe, or ſhal be to the ende and for euer: was in Gods purpoſe without beginning, and predeſtinated or foreappointed to be in the time and order that it hath ben, is, or ſhal be: ſo that nothing hath, doth or ſhal come to paſſe otherwiſe than he hath withoute beginning purpoſed and foreappointed the ſame. The reaſons that we ſtay vppon, are theſe. Gods power is abſolute, ſo that what he will do, hé is able to do, and what he will hauehave done, can not be letted by any cōtrary power, & what he wil not hauehave done, can not by anye power be done. But his power coulde not be abſolute. &c. if ought might be done otherwiſe thā he hath purpoſed & appointed. Therfore, all things come to paſſe, euen as he hath without beginning purpoſed & appointed the ſame. Another reaſon is thus. Gods wiſedome is moſt perfect; ſo that whatſoeuer he doeth, is ſo done, that the doing thereof cannot be repented: But if ought that he doth, might fal out otherwiſe, thā he ment it ſhould, whē he did it, it ſhould folow that his wiſdome were not moſt perfect, for it is not y^• point of a wiſe man to ſaye, I thought not that it woulde hauehave ſo happened. Therfore nothing hath, doeth, or ſhall happen otherwyſe than he ment it ſhould, when he did firſt ordeine it. The third reaſon is; that his foreknowledge can not be deceiued, but euen as he did foreſée, and know before hande, that things ſhould come to paſſe, ſo they hauehave, be, and ſhal be brought to paſſe. But this coulde not be, if things ſhould be done, otherwiſe thā by his appointmēt. Therfore al things hauehave, are and ſhal be done by his appointment. Theſe be the chief reaſons that we ſtay vponupon. The ſcriptures that we do moſt ſtay vpō, are theſe. Conuenerunt enim in ciuitate ista, aduerſus ſanctum filium tuū Ieſum quem p. 36vnxiſti, Herodes & Pontius Pilatus, cū gentibus & populis Iſrael: ad faciendum quaecun que manus tua & conſilium tuum prius decreuer Act. 4.Acts 4unt fieri. There gathered together euen in this Citie, againſt thy holy childe Ieſus, whome thou haſte annointed, both Herode and Pontius Pilate, with y^• Gentiles and peoples of Iſraell: to doe whatſoeuer thyngs thy power and coūſel had before decreed to be done. Actes the iiij. Chapter.

Againe in the .vij. of Exod. it is thus written. Dixit que Exod. 7.Exod 7Dominus ad Moſen. Ecce constitui te Deum Pharaonis, & Aaron frater tuus erit Propheta tuus. Tu loquêris ei omnia quae mando tibi, & ille loquêtur ad Phamonē, vt dimittat filios Iſrael deterra ſita. Se dego indurabo cor eius, et multiplicabo ſigna & ostenta mea in terra Egypti, & non audiet vos. And y^• Lord ſaid vntounto Moſes. Behold I hauehave appointed thée to be Pharaos God, & Aaron thy brother ſhalbe thy Prophet. Thou ſhalt ſpeak vntounto him all thoſe things that I ſhall commaunde thée, and he ſhall ſpeake vntounto Pharao, that he let the children of Iſraell depart out of his land. But I will harden his heart, and will multiply my wonders and ſignes in the land of Egypt, and he ſhall not hearken vntounto you.

Moreouer, in the .xix. Chapter of the .iiij. booke of the 4. Reg. 19.Kings, we reade thus. Venerunt ergo ſerui Regis Ezechiae ad Iſaam, Dixit que eis Iſaas. Haec dicetis domino vestro. Haec dicit Dominus. Noli timere à facie ſermonū quos audiſtis, quibus blaſphemanerunt pueri Regis Aſsyriorum me. Ecce ego immittam ei▪ ſpiritum, & audiet nuntium, & reuertetur in terram ſuam, et deijciam eum gladio in terra ſua. And in the ende of the ſame Chapter it is written thus. Cum que adoraret in templo Neſroch Deum ſuum: Adramelech, & Saraſer filij eius, percuſserunt eum gladio. &c. The ſeruauntes of King Ezechia came vntounto Eſay. And Eſay ſaid vntounto them. Thus ſhal ye ſay vntounto your Lord. Thus ſayth the Lorde. Be not thou afraide of the wordes that ye hauehave hearde, wherewith the ſeruauntes of the King of the Aſſirians hauehave blaſphemed me. Behold I wil put a ſpirit into him, and he ſhal heare a tidings, and he ſhal returne into his owne country, and in his owne countrye will I ouerthrowe him with the ſworde. And in the end of the ſame Chapter it is written thus. And when he was in the Temple worſhipping Neſroch his owne God: Adramelech and Saraſer hys owne ſonnes ſlewe him with the ſworde. &c.

Furthermore, in the .xlv. of Geneſis, we reade thus, Geneſ. 45.Gen 45Praemiſit que me Deus, vt reſeruemini ſuper terram, & eſcas ad viuē dum habere poſsitis. Non vestro conſilio, ſed Dei voluntate miſsus ſum: qui fecit me quaſi patrem Pharaonis, & Dominum vniuerſae domus eius. &c. God ſent me before, that you might be reſerued vponupon the earth, and hauehave foode to lyue by. It was not by your aduiſe or counſel, that I was ſent hither, but by the will of God, who hath made me to be as a Father vntounto Pharao, and Lorde of all his houſe. &c.

To conclude, in the laſt chapter of the ſame booke, we reade the matter repeated after this ſort. Nolite timere, num Dei poſsumus reſistere voluntati? Vos cogitastis de me malum: ſed Deus vertit illud in bonum. &c. Feare not, are we able to reſiſt Gods will? you did deuiſe euill for me: but God did turne it to good.

By theſe Scriptures it appeareth plainelye, that all thoſe thinges that Herode, Pilate, and the Iewes did to Chriſt: that Pharao did in the hardneſſe of his heart: that the ſonnes of Sinacharib did to their Father: and that Ioſephes brethren did vntounto him: were all done by the determinate purpoſe and Predeſtination of God. Whervpon, it ſemeth to me, that we may conclude that all other actions are done according to the ſame purpoſe and predeſtination. Otherwiſe, we muſt nedes confeſſe, that God is either diſapointed of his purpoſe oftentimes, or elſe that he createth many things, not knowing before p. 37what ſhall become of them. Which obſurdities may in no caſe be graunted.

Now what thoſe Scriptures be, wherewith Cerberus would hauehave theſe and ſuch like ſcriptures to be weyghed, we muſt geſſe: for Cerberus citeth not ſo muche as one, I will therefore geſſe as nere as I can▪ what ſcriptures thoſe be that he meaneth of. One as I ſuppoſe, is written by Sainct Paule to Timothe. The woordes are theſe. Deus vult omnes homines ſaluos fieri, & ad agnitionem veritatis 1. Tim. 2.1 Tim 2venire. God would hauehave al men ſaued & come to the acknowledging of the truth. Let vsus firſt weigh this place with the other afore cited, and ſee how this maye make the other to ſerue nothing to y^• purpoſe that we alleage them for. God would hauehave all men ſaued, and to come to the acknowledging of the truth: But if he did foreappoynt Herode, Pilate, and the Iewes, to accuſe and condemne his ſonne Chriſt, and did harden Pharaos heart, kyll Sinacharib with the ſword of his ſonnes, and ſende Ioſeph into Egypt by the trecherye of his brethren: he would not hauehave all men ſaued: for the rewarde of theſe workes is damnation: therfore God neuer appointed anye of theſe things to be done. I am ſure Cerberus can not applye this place better to his purpoſe, than it is in this argument applied. Now let vsus ſée what may be ſaid to the contrarye, without eyther denying or wreſting of S. Paules wordes. Firſt, S. Auſten doth interprete theſe wordes of S. Paule after this ſort. Libro de voluntate Dei, Cap. 2. Occurrit enim, cùr pereant ex hijs aliqui, quum omnipotens Deus, omnes homines ſaluos fieri velit, & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Deinde, cur rursùs induret alios, miſertus aliorū, aùt quomodò omnes ſaluos fieri velit homines, quum ipſe nonnullos, nè ſaluentur induret? Hoc quantum ad humanam iustitiam videtur iniuſtum: ſed quis ità deſipiat, vel potiùs quis ità blaſphemet, vt dicat de iustitia Dei, lege humanae iustitiae diſputandum? Quae profecto, ſi iustitiae Dei aduerſatur, iniusta est. Ab illo enim qui ſummè iustus est, omne quod qualitercun que iustum est, manare manifestum est. Quis ergo crit, qui incommutabiliter manentem, & omnia quae ſunt condentem, regentem, at que ſeruantem Dei ſapientiam, pendit humanae ſapientiae arbitrio? De qua idem Apoſtolus dicit, Quia ſapientia carnis, inimicae est Deo. Et alibi. Sapientia huius mundi, ſtulititia est apud Deum. Non est ergo de illa maiestate diuinae ſapientiae, humanae vanitatis arbitrio diſputandū. That is to ſay. For this is obiected. Why ſhould any of theſe periſhe, ſeing that God that is almightye, is willing that all men ſhould be ſaued, & come to the acknowledging of the truth? Moreouer, why doth he on the contrary part, harden ſome, taking mercy on other ſome: or howe is he willing that all men ſhoulde be ſaued, when he himſelfe doth harden ſome, leaſt they ſhould be ſaued? As touching humaine iuſtice, this thing ſéemeth vniuſt. But who would be ſo fooliſhe, or rather who woulde ſo blaſpheme: as to ſay, that we ſhould reaſon of y^• iuſtice of God, by the order of y^• iuſtice of man? which no doubt, if it be againſt the iuſtice of God, it is vniuſt. For it is manifeſt, that whatſoeuer hath in it anye iuſtice at all, doeth ſpring from him that is iuſt in the higheſt degrée. Who ſhall it be therfore, that will weigh by the arbitriment of mans wiſdome, the wiſedome of God, which remaineth immutable, and hath made, doeth gouerne and preſerue al things that be? Of which wiſdome, the ſame Apoſtle ſaith. That the wiſdome of the fleſhe, is enimie vntounto God. And in another place. The wiſedome of the world is fooliſhneſſe with God. We maye not therfore, by the arbitriment of mans vanitie, diſpute of that ma…y of the wiſedome of God.

Againe, in his booke De ſpiritu & litera, Capite. 32. the ſame Auſten ſayth. Si credemus, vt impetremus hanc gratiam: … vti que voluntate credimus, De hac quaeritur, vnde ſit voluntas. p. 38Si natura, quare non omnibus: cum ſit idem Deus omniū creator? Si dono Dei, etiam hoc, quare non omnibus, cum omnes homines velit ſaluos ſieri, & ad agnitionem veritatis venire? Prius igitur illud dicamus & videamus, vtrū huic ſatis faciat quaestioni, quod liberum arbitrium naturaliter attributum à creatore animae rationali: illa media vis est, quae vel intendi ad fidem, vel inclinari ad inſidelitatem potest. Et ideò, nec istam voluntatem, qua credit Deo, dici potest homo habere, quam nòn acceperit, Quandoquidem vocante Deo, ſurgit de libero arbitrio, quod naturaliter cum crearetur, accepit. Vult enim Deus ōnes homines ſaluos fieri, & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Nòn ſic tamen, vt eis adimat liberū arbitrium, quo vel benè vel malè vterites, iustiſsime iudicentur. Quod cum fit, infideles quidem contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cum eius Euangelio nòn credunt: nec ideò tamen eam vincunt, verùm ſcipſos fraudant magno & ſummo bono, malis que poenalibus implicant, experturi in ſupplicijs potestatem eius, cuius in donis miſericordiam contempſerunt. Ita voluntas Dei ſemper inuicta est. Vinceretur autèm, ſi nòn inueniret, quod de contemptoribus faceret: aut vllo modo poſsent euadere, quod de talibus ille constituit. That is. If we do beleue, to the end that we may obtaine this grace, and do alſo by the conſent of our will, beleue: hereof a queſtion is moued, whence we hauehave this wil. If it be of nature, why is it not in al mē: ſeing one God is the creator of all men? If we hauehave it by the gift of God, why is it not giuen to all men: ſeing he is willing that all men ſhould be ſaued, and come to the acknowledging of the truth? Let vsus therfore affirme the firſt, and ſée whether it may ſatiſfie this queſtion, bicauſe fréewill, whiche the Creator hath naturally giuē to the reaſonable ſoule: is that indifferent power, which may eyther be bowed to faith, or inclined to infidelitie. And therfore, it can not be ſaid, that man hath not receyued this wil, whereby he beleueth in God, bicauſe, whē God calleth, it riſeth of fréewill, which he receiued when he was naturallye created. For God is willing that all men ſhoulde be ſaued, and come to the knowledge of the truth: and yet not ſo, that he would take from them fréewill, whereby they may be iuſtly iudged, whē they vſe it wel or otherwiſe. In which doing, the Infidels do worke contrary to Gods will, bycauſe they beleue not his Goſpell. And yet doe they not therfore ouercome it, but they do defraude them ſelues of the great and moſt excellent goodneſſe, and do entangle them ſelues with euilles, wherewith they are puniſhed, and ſhal in the puniſhments hauehave experſēce of his power, whoſe mercye they did in his giftes contemne. So is the will of God alwayes vnconquered. But if he coulde not finde howe to vſe theſe deſpiſers, or if they could by anye meanes eſcape that which he hath appointed to become of ſuch: then ſhould his will be ouercome in dede.

Againe, in his booke entituled Enchiridion ad Laurentiū. Capite. 103. he ſayeth thus. Ac per hoc, cum audimus, & in ſacris litteris legimus, quod velit omnes homines ſaluos furi: quamo uis certum ſit nobis, nòn omnes homines ſaluos ſicri, nòn tamen ideò debemus omnipotentiſsimae Dei voluntati aliquid derogare, ſed ità intellegere quod ſcriptum est: qui vult omnes homines ſaluos ficri: tanquam diceretur, nullum hominem fieri ſaluum, niſi quem ſaluum fieri ipſe voluerit: nòn quod nullus ſit hominum, niſi quem ſalitum ſicri velit, ſed quod nullus ſiat, niſi quem velit, & ideò ſit rogādus vt velit, quia neceſse est ſuri ſi voluerit. De orando quippè Deo agebat Apostolus vt hoc diceret. Sic enim intelligimus id quodin Euangelio ſcriptum est: Qui illuminat omnem hominem: nòn quia nullus est hominum qui non illuminetur, ſed quia niſi ab ipſo nullus illuminator. Aut certè ſic dictum est. Qui omnes homines vult ſaluos fieri, nòn quod nullus hominum eſset, quem ſaluum ſicri nollet, qui virtutes miraculorum facere noluit apud cos, quos dicit actitros fuiſse poenitentiam, ſi faciſset: ſed vt omnes homines omne genus hominum intelligamus per quaſcun que differentias distributum, Reges, priuatos, nobiles, ignobiles. &c.

p. 39That is to ſay. And hereby when we heare and reade in the holy ſcriptures, that he is willing y^t all men ſhould be ſaued, although we knowe aſſuredly that all men are not ſaued? yet may we not therefore derogate any thing from the almightye will of God, but vnderſtande that which is written, on this ſort. Not that there is no man, but that he woulde the ſame ſhoulde be ſaued; but that none cā be ſaued, but ſuch as he wil hauehave ſaued. And that therfore he ought to be prayed vntounto, that he woulde be willing, bicauſe it muſt nedes be, if he be willing that it ſhould be. For when the Apoſtle ſpake theſe wordes, he was in hande with the prayers that are to be made vntounto God. And after the ſame maner we vnderſtād that which is wrytten in the Goſpell. Whiche lightneth euerye man. Not that there is no man that is not illumined, or lightned: but for that there is none illumined, otherwiſe than of him. Or els vndoubtedly the wordes hauehave thys meaning. Which is willing that all mē ſhould be ſaued, not that there ſhoulde be no man whome he would not hauehave ſaued, which would not worke his miracles among them that he ſaith would hauehave repēted, if he had done ſo: but that we ſhould vnderſtand by all men, all ſortes of men, by what differences ſo euer the ſame be ſeuered, Kings, priuate perſons, noble perſons, and ignoble. &c.

And againe in his booke. De correptione & gratia. Cap. 14. S. Auſten ſayth thus. Cum autèm homines per correptionem in viam iustitiae ſeu veniunt, ſeu reuertuntur, quis operatur in cordibus eorū ſalutē, niſi ille, qui quolibet plantante at que rigante, & quolibet in agris at que arbustulis operante, dat incrementum Deus, cui volenti ſaluum facere, nullum hominum reſistit arbitrium? Sic enim, velle vel nolle, in volentis aut nolentis est potestate, vt diuinam voluntatem nòn impediat, nec ſuperet potestatem. De hijs enim qui faciunt quae non vult, facit ipſe quae vult. Et quod ſcriptum eſt, quod vult omnes homines ſaluos fieri, nèc tamèn omnes ſalui ſiunt: multis quidèm modis intelligi poteſt, ex quibus in alijs opuſculis nostris, aliquos commemorauimus, ſed hic vnum dicam. Ita dictum est. Omnes homines vult ſaluos ſicri, vt intelligantur omnes praedestinati, quia omne genus hominum in eis eſt, ſicut dictum eſt Phariſaeis. Decimatis omne olus, vbi nòn eſt intelligendum, niſi omne quod habebant. Ne que enim omne olus quod erat in toto terrarum orbe decimabant.

That is to ſay. When men doe by chaſtiſement, eyther come or returne into the way of righteouſneſſe, who is it that worketh health in their hearts, but he who giueth the encreaſe, whē any man planteth or watreth, and when any man worketh in the fieldes or orchards, which is God, againſt whome, being willing to ſaue, no mans frée will doth make reſiſtāce. For to be willing or vnwilling, is after ſuch ſort in the power of him that is willing or vnwilling, that it be not a let to the will of God, nor do ouercome his power. For of them that do thoſe things that he willeth not, both he make thoſe things that he is willing to make. And where as it is written: that he is willing that all men ſhould be ſaued, and yet all be not ſaued: it may be vnderſtanded many wayes, whereof we hauehave in our other little workes made mention of ſome, but I wil now ſpeake of one moe. This is the ſaying. He is willing that all men ſhoulde be ſaued, that therby, all that be predeſtinated might be vnderſtande, for that among them are men of all ſortes. As it was ſayd to the Phariſeis, ye doe pay the tenth of euerye garden hearbe. Where we may not vnderſtande, …oe than all that they had. For they did not giuegive the tenth of al the hearbes that be in the whole circle of the earth.

By theſe places of S. Auſten may Cerberus ſée, how this place of ſcripture (God is willing that al men ſhould be ſaued. &c.) being wayed with the places that we builde vponupon, doth make that they ſerue nothing to our purpoſe. p. 40For in expounding of theſe wordes of S. Paule, God is willing that al men ſhould be ſaued & come to the knowledge of the truth: S. Auſten doth affirme as much as we do, as may wel appeare to as many as will way theſe places of his, with indifferent iudgement.

One other place for this purpoſe, is written in the. 33. Chapter of Ezechiell. The words are theſe. Viuo ego dicit Dominus. Nolo mortem impij, ſed vt conuertatur impius à via ſua, & viuat. Conuertimini, conuertimini, à vijs vestris peſsimis, & quarè moriemini domus Iſrael? That is to ſay. As truely as I liue, ſaith the Lord, I deſire not the death of the vngodly, but that the vngodly be conuerted frō hys owne way and liue. Be conuerted, be conuerted frō your moſt wicked wayes, why will ye die, O you houſe of Iſrael?

Saint Hierome expounding this place, beginneth at Super. Ezech. Cap. 33.theſe wordes in the ſame Chapter. Tu ergo fili hominis, dic ad domum Iſrael: ſic locuti estis dicentes. Iniquitates nostrae & peccata nostra ſuper nos. &c. Therefore thou ſonne of man, ſpeake thou to the houſe of Iſraell and ſay: thus hauehave ye ſpoken, ſaying: Our iniquities & ſinnes are vponupon vsus. &c. By occaſion of which wordes, S. Hierome ſayeth thus. Sinegligenter legamus, videtur nobis eadem prophetia eſse quae ſupra, in qua dicitur. Nunquid volens cupio mortem iniqui dicit dominus: niſi conuerti eum à via ſua mala & viuere? Et in fine eiuſdem propheti…e. Conuertimini & redite ab vniuerſis impietatibus vestris, & non erunt vobis in tormentum iniquitates. Ibi enim ad eos ſermo fit qui volunt agere poenitentiam, & iustitia peccata delere, vt cum fiducia conuertantur, & pleno animo agant poenitētiam. Hic autèm ad eos loquitur, qui magnitudine peccatorum, imo impietatum ſuarum deſperant ſalutem & dicunt: Iniquitates nostrae & peccata nostra ſuper nos ſunt, & in ipſis tabeſcimus, quomodo ergo viuere poterinites? Et est ſenſus. Cum ſemel nobis mors propoſita ſit: & vulneribus nostris nulla medicina poſsitreſtituere ſanitatem: quid neceſse eſt laborare & fruſtra conſumi, & praeſentem vitam nòn cum desperatione tranſigere, vt ſaltèm hac fruamur: quia futuram perdidimus? Quibus respondet Deus, nòn velle ſe mortem impij, ſed vt reuertatur & viuat. Et Apostropham ſacit ad impios deſperātes: cōuertimini à vijs veſtris peſsimis. At que vt ſciamus, qui ſint impij ad quos loquitur, ſequēs ſermo demōstrat, Quarè moriemini domus Iſrael? Vita autem & mors in hoc loco nòn haec ſignificatur, qua omnes communi cum bestijs, lege naturae, vel viuimus, vel morte diſsoluimur: ſed illa de qua ſcriptum est. Placebo Domino in regione viuentium.

That is to ſaye. If we reade this negligently, it ſéemeth to be the ſame prophecie, that is before, wherin it is ſaid, do I willingly deſire the death of the vngodly, ſayth the Lorde: or, but that he be conuerted from his owne euill waye and liue? And in the ende of the ſame Prophecie: Be ye conuerted and come backe againe from all your vngodlineſſes, and your iniquities ſhall not turne you to tormentes. For in that place he ſpeaketh vntounto thoſe which are willing to repent, and by righteous life, to blot out their ſinnes, that they might with ſure confidence returne vntounto God, and with full mindes repent. But in this place he ſpeaketh vntounto thē, that throughe the greatneſſe of their owne ſinnes (yea their owne impieties) do diſpayre of ſaluatiō, and ſay. Our iniquities and our ſinnes are vppon vsus, and in them doe we conſume away: how can we therefore liue? And this is their meaning. Seing that death is once ſet before vsus, and no medicine is able to heale our woūds: what nede we labour and be conſumed, and not paſſe ouer thys life with deſperatiō: ſo, that at the leaſt way we may enioy this life? For the life to come we hauehave already loſt. Unto whome God maketh aunſwere, that he willeth not the death of the vngodly: but that he be conuerted & liue. And he turneth his ſpeach to the deſperate vngodlye ones: ſaying, turne you from your owne wayes, whiche are moſt wycked. p. 41And that we might knowe who thoſe wicked ones were to whome he ſpake, the wordes that follow do declare. O ye houſe of Iſraell, why wyll ye dye? And that life and that death, wherby we do by the order of nature, with the brute beaſtes eyther liue or die, is not in this place ſignified: but that life whereof it is written. I will pleaſe the Lorde in the land of the liuing.

By theſe wordes of S. Hierome: it appeareth, that he vnderſtoode not the wordes of Ezechiell, in ſuch ſorte as Cerberus would hauehave vsus to vnderſtande them, that is, that by them is taught a doctrine contrarie to that which we teache, and ſo conſequently, the places that we builde vponupon, proued to make nothing for our purpoſe. For Hierome ſaith, that in the .xviii. Chapter of his Prophecie, Ezechiell ſpeaketh to them that be penitent, and woulde by righteous life blot out their ſinnes paſt. Theſe doth he there encourage, with bolde courage and aſſured hope of forgiueneſſe at Gods hand, to go forward with their repentance begon, ſaying: Be ye conuerted, and returne againe from all your vngodlineſſes, and your iniquities ſhall not turne you to torment. But in this place, in the 33. of his Prophecie (ſayth S. Hierom) the Prophete ſpeaketh to the deſperate people of y^• Iewes, which ſaid: Our iniquities and ſinnes are vponupon vsus. &c. Giuing them ſelues to continue in wickedneſſe, as thoſe that diſpayred of forgiueneſſe of that which was paſte, although they ſhould frō thenceforth endeuour amendment. To theſe (ſayth the Prophet) ſpeaketh God, ſaying: Turne from your owne moſte wicked wayes. Why wil ye die, O ye houſe of Iſraell? The greatneſſe of our ſinnes can be no cauſe why we ſhould diſpaire of Gods mercy. Wherefore we teache with Ezechiel, Ieremie, Eſaie, and the reſt of the holye Prophetes, that God is ready to receiue to mercy as many as by repentance and amendmēt of life turne to him, beleuing the promiſe that he hath made in the death and bloudſhedding of his only ſonne Ieſus Chriſt. I conclude therefore that this place maketh for our purpoſe, and not againſt vsus. And leaſt I ſhoulde trouble the Reader ouer much, with ſuch places as this: I … referre all ſuch places to the aunſwere I hauehave here made, not doubting but the diligent Reader, who ſeketh nothing but the ſimple trueth, ſhalbe therewithall ſatiſfied.

Nowe, as touching the places of S. Auſten, whyche Cerberus citeth out of his boke: De eſsētia Diuinitatis: And De libero arbitrio & gratia: I will firſt rehearſe all the wordes that S. Auſten wryteth in thoſe places, concerning this matter, and then weigh them, that we may ſée how they may ſerue for Cerberus purpoſe. The wordes are theſe. Indurare dicitur Deus quorundam malorum corda, ſicùt de Pharaone Rege Egypti ſcriptū est: nòn … omnipotens Deus, ppotentiā Augusti. De eſsentia Diuinitatis.ſuā corda corum induret, quod eſt impiū ità credere: ſed exegē tibus corū culpis, quam duritiā cordis, quā ipſi ſibi mala perpetrando nutriūt, nòn auſert: quaſi ipſe cos induret, quià iuſto iudicio indurari ſinit. That is to ſay: It is ſaid that God doth hardē the heartes of certaine euill men, as it is written of Pharao King of Egypt: not that the Almightye God doeth by his almightie power harden their hearts, which thing to beleue, is an vngodly thing: but when theyr faultes requiring the ſame, doeth not take from them that hardneſſe, which in committing euilles, they themſelues doe nouriſhe to themſelues: he doth as it were himſelfe harden them, bicauſe he doth, by his iuſt iudgemēt, ſuffer thē to be hardened.

If Cerberus woulde hauehave weighed theſe words wel: he woulde neuer hauehave applyed them againſt vsus. For we teach not, that the almighty God, doth by his almightie power harden mens hearts, for we know that it were an vngodly thing ſo to teach or beleue: but we teache as S. p. 42Auſten doth, that theyr ſinnes requiring the ſame, he leaueth them in the hardneſſe of their hearts, which by committing of euilles, they do nouriſh vntounto themſelues. For by the ſinne of the firſt man al mens hearts are hardned, and of them ſelues they can do nought elſe but nouryſhe that hardneſſe, and Gods hardning of their hearts, is nothing elſe but the withholding of the deawe of his grace from them, without which they can not be ſoftned. And this he doth in iuſt iudgement, for the ſinne of oure firſt Father hath deſerued no leſſe in vsus all. But here I muſt let the Reader vnderſtande, what places Cerberus pycketh for his purpoſe. Eraſmus ſuppoſeth, that rather Hugo Victorinus than S. Auſten ſhould be y^• Autor of this booke. Well, I will not ſtriue wyth him for the matter. But let him conſider it better before he applie it againſt vsus againe.

The woordes of the other place that Cerberus citeth out of the .xxj. chapter of S. Auſtens booke. De gratia & libero arbitrio: are as faithfully handled as y^• other. Cerberus August. De gratia & libero arbitrio. Cap. 21.feared to ſet downe to many of Auſtens wordes, leaſt the Reader ſhoulde ſee that they make with vsus againſt Cerberus and his fellowes. I will therfore ſet downe ſo many of hys wordes as may make his meaning knowen to the diligent Reader. Firſte, in the beginning of the ſame Chapter, he ſayth thus. Quis nòn ista iudicia diuina contremiſcat, quibus agit Deus in cordibus etiàm malorum hominum quicquid vult, reddens eis tamèn ſecundum merita eorum? Roboam filius Salomonis reſpuit conſiliū ſalubre Seniorum quod ei dederant. &c. Who would not (ſaith Auſten) tremble at theſe iudgementes of God, wherby he doth in the heartes euen of wicked men, worke what he luſteth, and yet rendring vntounto them according to their deſeruings. Roboam, the ſonne of Salomon, refuſed the holeſome counſell of the Elders which they gaue him, which was that he ſhould not deale roughly with the people, and he hearkened rather to the wordes of them that were of his owne age, giuing a rough aunſwere to them, whom he ſhould hauehave aunſwered gentlye. And ſo forth, citing many examples out of the Scriptures, to proue, that God is he, that worketh in the hearts of euill men, thoſe things wherby his purpoſe is performed in puniſhing of ſinne.

And towards the end of the Chapter, he ſaith: Hijs & talibus testimonijs diuinorum eloquiorum, quae omnia comemorare …s longum est, ſatis, quantum existimo, manifestatur, operari Deum in cordibus hominum, ad inclinandas corum volūtates quo▪ cun que voluerit, ſiuè ad bona, pro ſua miſericordia, ſiuè ad mala, pro meritis corum, iudicio vti que ſuo, aliquando aperto, aliquādò occulto, ſempèr autèm iusto. Fixum enim debet eſse & immobile in corde vestro, quia nō est iniquitas apud Deum. Ac per hoc, quādò legitis in litteris veritatis à Deo ſeduci homines, aùt obtudi vel obdurari corda corum, nolite dubitare praeceſsiſse mala merita corum, vt iustè ista paterentur: ne incurratis in illud Prouerbium Salomonis. Inſipientia viri, violat vias eius: Deum autèm cauſatur in corde ſuo. That is to ſay. By theſe and ſuche like teſtimonies of holy Scriptures, wherof it were too long to make a whole recitall, it is, as I ſuppoſe, ſufficientlye ſhewed, that God doeth woorke in the heartes of men, to encline their willes whither it pleaſeth him, whether it be to good things, according to his merciemercy, eyther to euill things, according to their merits, and according to his own iudgement, which is ſometime open, and ſometime ſecrete, but alwayes iuſte. For this perſuaſion ought to be fired and vnmoueable in your hearts: that there is none iniquitie with God. And hereby, when ye reade in the writings of the truth, that God doth leade mē out of the way, or that he doth dull or harden their heartes: do ye not doubt, but that their euill deſeruing went before, that they might iuſtly ſuffer theſe things, leaſt ye ſhould runne into that p. 43Prouerbe of Salomon, which ſayth. The fooliſhneſſe of a man doth defile his wayes: but in his heart he layeth the blame in God.

If Cerberus would hauehave ſet downe all theſe wordes of S. Auſten: I ſhoulde not hauehave neded to write any aū ſwere to that whiche he did ſet downe. For S. Auſtens wordes are ſufficient for aunſwere, when he ſayth that God worketh in the hearts of mē to encline their willes, whether it be to good things, according to his mercy, or to euill things, according to their deſeruings, & that which way he him ſelf is willing to encline them. Now let Cerberus finde contradiction in S. Auſtens words, if he can. As forme, I can ſée none. But if Cerberus can finde none, then hath he applied S. Auſtens wordes againſt vsus, contrary to S. Auſtens meaning.

Nowe let vsus ſée what Cerberus hath founde in Melancthons common places. Melancthon ſpeaketh verye plainly (ſaith Cerberus) and ſayth, Nec figur… illae verborum offendunt. &c. Neither ſaith he, doe theſe figuratiue ſpeaches offend. As I wil hardē the heart of Pharao, and ſuch like: for it is certain, that in the Hebrew phraſe, they ſignifie a permiſſion or ſuffering, & not an effectuall will of God. As leade vsus not into temptation, y^• is to ſaye, ſuffer vsus not to be lead into temptatiō. Theſe are Melancthons wordes, ſayth Cerberus: and marke (ſayth he) what he ſayeth of the Hebrew phraſe, for all men know him to be a man learned. Here Cerberus beginneth to triumphe, and ſemeth to himſelfe to hauehave wonne the ſtelde. Melancthon hath ſaid it, therfore it muſt nedes be ſo. I reuerence Melancthon, and do acknowledge that he was learned: but let vsus ſée whether, in this point, Melācthon hauehave not ſhewed him ſelfe to loth to offende ſuch as Cerberus is, and therfore ſéemed to hauehave giuen them vaūtage againſt himſelfe. In the ſame booke of common places, in the firſt title, which is De Deo: he deſcribeth God after this ſorte: Deut est eſsentia ſpiritualis, intelligens, aterna, verax, bona, pura, iusta, miſericors, liberrima, immenſaepotenti…e & ſapientiae. &c. That is to ſaye: God is a ſpirituall eſſence, vnderſtanding, euerlaſting, true, good, pure, iuſte, mercifull, moſte frée, & of vnmeaſurable power and wiſdome. &c. Nowe, if God do permit any thing to be done which he is not willing ſhould be done, how is he almightye? Other therefore, as learned as Melancthon, hauehave ſayd, & in my iudgement, truly: that to permit and to will is alone, in him that can not be enforced to permit or ſuffer that which he is not willing ſhould be. But as I hauehave declared before, we affirme not, that the actions, wordes, and thoughtes of man, as they are willed or permitted by God, are or can be ſinne. For he being altogether good, and nothing elſe but goodneſſe; can not will or permit anye thing that is euill. The euill therefore that is in mens thoughtes, wordes or actions, commeth of the Deuil and mens own willes: which God doth will or permit, as a meane, eyther to ſet forth his merciemercy in forgiuing, or his iuſtice in puniſhing, whiche in that reſpect can not be other than good. What Cerberus hath wonne by citing theſe words of Melancthon: let y^• learned that hauehave read other mens writings vppon this matter, iudge. I hauehave ſayde that I thinke to be true.

But now Cerberus thinketh to paye vsus home. To be ſhorte, ſayeth he, it is ſurelye to be maruelled at, that althoughe they doe thus accuſe Gods Predeſtination to be the onelyonly cauſe of Adams ſall (which is in dede not onelyonly ſinne, but alſo the very welſpring of all wickedneſſe, and the ſilthy fountaine of all our vncleanneſſe) that yet they dare affirme themſelues to be the onelyonly friendes and louers of Gods Predeſtination. &c. Cerberus will be ſhorte now. Well let him be aunſwered as ſhortly. He hath all p. 44this while laboured to proue that was neuer denied, that is, that the ſinne of Adam in his firſt fall, is the cauſe of al the ſinne that hath bene, is, or ſhalbe committed by his poſterity. For we hold, that after Adam had once ſinned, neyther he nor anye of hys poſteritie, being naturallye brought forth in this worlde, could of them ſelues do any other thing than ſinne. The cauſe wherof we ſay, is that concupiſcence and luſt to do euil, which entred into him, & from him is deſcended into his poſteritie. But what is this to the cauſe of Adams fall. Thys concupiſcence was not in Adam before his fall. It could not therefore be the cauſe therof. And as I hauehave declared before: Adams fall coulde not be the cauſe of all ſinne: for ſinne was before Adam fell. We knowe that ſinne is not a creature: but it is a falling away of the creature from that order that the Creator did commaunde the creature to continue in. But this was in y^• Aungels, Ergo before the fall of mā. By y^• fall of man therfore was declared what mans fréewill was able to do. It was able to admit ſinne, and ſo by freewill ſinne entred into man, and by man into the world, that is into all naturall men. And yet we ſay not, that either mans freewill or man himſelfe is euill, as he is Gods creature, and fréewill Gods gifte. I conclude therfore, that as the fall of Adam was the performance of Gods purpoſe, ſo was it no ſinne, but excéeding good, as eueryevery performance of Gods purpoſes muſte néedes be. And ſo the Predeſtination of God being the cauſe therof, is no cauſe of ſinne. Let Cerberus maruel as much as he will, how we can graunt God to be the cauſe and not the Autour of ſinne. For we do not ſay that Gods Predeſtination is the cauſe of ſinne. Much leſſe doe we ſay that he is the Autour, as Cerberus doth charge vsus by occaſiō of certayne wordes written by Iohn Knoxe againſt an aduerſarie of Gods Predeſtination.

Although Iohn Knoxe being yet liuing, & able to defend his owne writings, I might refer Cerberus to his aunſwere: yet I wil not ſticke to write a few lines in the defence of his doctrine in this point. Cerberus ſéemeth to miſlike with Knoxe for two things: one is, for that he ſaith that we aſſigne to the prouidence of God, all things that the Ethnickes and Ignoraunt attributed vntounto fortune. And the other is, for that hée ſayth that we know and beholde God to be, not onelye the principall cauſe, but alſo the authour of all things, appointing them to the one parte or ſo the other by hys counſell. Thys is (ſayth Cerberus) ſuche a wyde wandring blaſphemie, as hath not lightly bene hearde of. And although Cerberus would hauehave vsus marke the wordes, & the very ſenſe of thē, as though he would ſet forth the ſame ſo plainely, that al men might eaſely perceyue the meaning of thē: yet with his leaue, he ſheweth that he himſelfe did not ſée that he would hauehave other to marke. For what mad man woulde write words in ſuch meaning, as Cerberus would hauehave vsus thinke that Iohn Knoxe wrate his? That is, to call God deceyiſull, vnfaythful, and vntruſty? Rough, hard, ſierce and cruel? Bawdy, beaſtly, and ſhameleſſe? Imperious, malapert, and proude? Blinde, and wythout eyes? Wicked, to be abhorred, and altogether naught? Was there euer man ſo farre beſide himſelf, as to wryte of God in this meaning? I durſt appeale to Cerberus himſelfe (though he be the dogge of Hell) whyther in conſcience he doe thinke that it were poſſible that any reaſonable man may ſo far forget him ſelfe, as to write words in any ſuch meaning. Let Cerberus therfore, loke better vpō Iohn Knoxe words, and ſeke a better ſenſe in them than this. If he wil do ſo, he ſhall finde that Iohn Knoxe meaning is, that where as the Ethnickes and Ignorant attributed vntounto fortune, a power to giuegive or take away, p. 45to preſerue or deſtroy, to helpe or to hinder. We which know y^• there is no ſuch power in any other thā in God, do aſſigne all theſe things to his prouidence: knowing y^• nothing commeth to paſſe by Fortune or chaūce, but that God by his prouidence doth gouerne and rule all things, appoynting them to the one parte, or the other, by hys counſell. And when he appointeth anye to that thing which in them is ſinne (as was the murder of Sinacharib in his owne ſonnes) yet in Gods purpoſe it is good, for it is the execution of his iuſt iudgement, or the meane whereby his glorie ſhal be the more aduaunced in ſhewing merciemercy. If Cerberus be not certified with this aunſwere, let him ſeke for further aunſwere at the hands of him whoſe writings he hath ſo maliciouſly peruerted.

Cerberus.

But now to returne againe to Crowley. After that he hath written, that Gods predeſtination is the onlie cauſe of Adams fall, then goeth he foorth in the ſame boke, and the ſame Article, vntounto the next execrable wickedneſſe, committed in the world, ſaying: Now, what ſay we to Cain: was he not predeſtinated to ſlea his brother? No, ſaye the freewill men. Here thou ſeeſt dearly beloued, who they are that ſo odiouſlie are noted with the name of freewyll men. Not only the Papiſtes, againſt whom he pretendeth there to wryte: but namely all thoſe that ſaye, God hath not predeſtinate any man to cōmit murder, or ſuch like wycked abhomination. Theſe call they freewill men, theſe cal they Pelagians. In dede ſuch as ſo maintayn freewil, that a mā by freewyl wythout the grace and helpe of God, may abſtayne from euill, or do good, as the blinde Papiſtes doe, and as before it is proued, that Pelagius did holde, or as before is rehenrſed, that Willyam Samuell ſayth: that man maye deſerue God: thoſe I ſaye, might worthily be called Pelagians, bicauſe they hold, eyther al, or ſome part of hys errours. But thoſe which teach, that all murder and miſchieſe ſpryngeth out of Gods predeſtination, or that any manſleaer is predeſtinate of God to kyll hys neighboure, or any adulterer to lye with his neyghboures wyfe, or any traytour predeſtinate of God, to conſpire againſt hys Prince, or any rebell to ryſe againſt his Soueraigne, as theſe men moſt plainly aſſyrme: they holde in thys poynt the errour of the Manicheans, whych was as ye hearde before, by the wordes of Auſten. Hominem peccatum vitare nòn poſse. That a man can not eſchewe euill, or can not chooſe but commit ſinne. Theſe men, I ſay, whych affirme that Caine was predeſtinate to murder hys innocent brother Abell. And as in the ſame boke and the ſame Article alſo, he ſayth, that the moſt wicked perſons that hauehave bene, were of God appointed to bee wycked euen as they were. They hold the errour both of the Stoikes, and alſo of the Manicheans. That is to ſay, as Auſten declareth in the ninth & .xvi. chapter of the firſt boke of his Retractations: that euil hath his original of Gods ordinance, & not of mans freewil. For if murderers, theues, adulterers, traitours, & Rebelles be of God predeſtinated and appoynted to be wicked euē as they are, and can not chooſe but of mere neceſſitie by the ordinance of God commit, al ſuch wickedneſſe, euen as they do: then what is our lyfe but a mere deſtinie, all our doyngs Gods ordynaunces, and all oure imaginations, braunches of Gods predeſtinatiō? And I doubt not, but the Stoikes and Manicheans, would alſo temper the matter p. 46wyth a great diſcretion of wordes, as theſe men wyll ſaye, that we muſt ſpeake more reuerentlie of the matter. But ſeyng they plainely holde theſe principles, and when they ſee theyr tyme, ſpeake plainely thereof them ſelues, as you maye well perceyue by that whych hath alredy, and ſhal yet be more largely rehearſed: I ſee no cauſe why it ſhould not of al mē be plainely declared. Agayne, if it be a trueth, why ſhould it not be plainly ſpoken, if it be a truth, that traitours be predeſtinate of God to conſpire the deſtructiō of their Princes, and Rebels predeſtinate of God to make inſurrectiō againſt their ſoueraines: If (I ſay) it be a trueth, that God hath ſo predeſtinated thē, & that they muſt of neceſſity, & can not chooſe but commit ſuch wyckedneſſe: why ſhoulde it not be plainly ſpoken? except a man ſhould be aſhamed to ſpeake the trueth. But in what Scripture is that written? Or is it not rather written. For thy lyfe, ſhame not to ſay the trueth. And ſurelye to ſay as Eccleſ. 4.Eccl 4it is: I ſee not well howe any man can ſpeake more plainely in thys matter than they them ſelues doe. For what can more plainly be ſpokē: thā that Gods predeſtination is the cauſe of Adams fall? And that Caine was predeſtinate to ſlea his brother? And that God is both the principal cauſe, and alſo the author of all thyngs, both on the one ſide and on the other, appoynting al things to al men. And whatſoeuer the Ethnickes aſcribed vntounto fortune: that ſame we ought to attribute vntounto the prouidence of God. And that the moſt wycked perſons that hauehave bene: were of God appointed to be wicked euen as they were.

Crowley.

Here it appeareth, that the chieſe quarrell that Cerberus had, when he wrate this aunſwere to his friendes letter, was againſt Crowley. If the ſpirit of louelove had led him, he might hauehave had conference w^t Crowley (for belike he knoweth him well ynough) & not thus maliciouſly by ſetting out his anſwere in print, hauehave gone about aſmuch as lieth in him, not only to diſcredit the doctrine y^t Crowley preacheth: but alſo to bring him in diſpleaſure with his Prince, as one y^e teacheth theues, murderers, traitors & rebells, & al other naughty perſons to defend their wickedneſſe by Gods predeſtination & ordinance. But Crowley ſhal by Gods helpe, be able to cleare him ſelfe of all this, & to make the malice of Cerberus ſo knowne to al men, that he ſhal from henceforth hauehave little credit amōg ſuch as doe not fauour the errour of our new Pelagians.

For anſwere to al y^• Cerberus hath in this his returne to Crowley, written, I might referre the Reader to that whiche I hauehave already written. But leaſt Cerberus ſhould thinke that that were but a ſhift, I will aunſwere to his Taùtologie, or repeticion of the ſame wordes and matter that is before written and anſwered, and chieſly bicauſe he doth here inferre more playnely that which before he meaneth to conclude.

I hauehave ſaide, that Gods predeſtination was the onelyonly cauſe of Adams fall, that Caine was predeſtinate to ſlea his brother Abell, and that the moſt wicked perſons that hauehave bene, were of God appointed to be wicked, euē as they were. For the firſt, I referre the Reader to that which I hauehave alreadie written thereof. For the ſeconde, I ſay: that as God predeſtinated Abell to be a figure of Chriſt and his Churche in ſuffering, ſo he predeſtinated Caine to be a figure of the cruell perſecuting Iewes & other, that hauehave, do, & ſhall perſecute Chriſt & his Church. And as Caine in ſleaing his brother Abell was a figure p. 47of the cruell perſecutours, ſo was not the murder euill: but as it was the execution of Caines wicked will, it was abhominable ſinne, and deſerued no leſſe puniſhment at Gods hand, than it had in deede. And as concerning the power of Caines will, whereby he conſented to do this deede: it was altogether bound to the will of Sathan, by the ſinne that his Father Adam had firſt committed, & was not deliuered from that bondage, bicauſe he was none of them whome Ieſus Chriſt, the ſonne of God had deliuered and made frée: as doeth well appeare by that he ſayeth: My ſinne is greater than that it can be forgiuen. He had not receyued the ſpirite of Adoption, whereby he might cry Abba, Father. Wherefore, it is manifeſt, that whatſoeuer he did, was abhominable in Gods ſight, for he lacked fayth whereby mennes workes are made acceptable before God. For without it, it is impoſſible to pleaſe God. As it is written. Sine fide impoſsibile Hebr. 11.Heb 11eſt placere Deo. Without fayth, it is not poſſible to pleaſe GOD. And hereof it came, that is written Ad Cain enim & munera eius Deus nòn reſpexit. God had Geneſ. 4.Gen 4no regarde to Caine and his oblations. For euen his verie oblations which he offered, were ſinne in the ſight of God, according to the wordes of Saint Paule. Quicquid ex Rom. 14.Rom 14ſide nòn eſt, peccatum eſt. Whatſoeuer is not of faith, the ſame is ſinne. How can it be then, but that the murder of his brother muſt be ſinne, as it was the execution of his malicious purpoſe: but as it is the performance of Gods purpoſe, it can not be but good. The lyke is to be ſaide of the murder y^• the ſonnes of Sinacharib committed vponupon their own father, and the rebellion of Abſolom, 4. Reg. 19. 2. Reg. 16.2 Kgs 16the whoredome of the ſame, the thefte of the Sabines, and whatſoeuer wickedneſſe we reade of. For God had ſayde before, that he woulde ſlea Sinacharib with the ſworde, and that the ſworde ſhould not depart from Dauids houſe. And Iob ſayde: The Lorde hath taken away. 2. Reg. 12. Iob. 1.2 Kgs 12Job 1In that Cerberus therefore, hath taken vponupon him to write thus maliciouſlye againſte me and others that teach the true doctrine of Gods euerlaſting predeſtination: he is not by our doctrine iuſtified from ſinne therin, althoughe in the purpoſe of God the ſame be good (for it is the ſtirring vp of me and others, to loke more diligently to the teaching of that doctrine, in ſuche ſorte that the weake Chriſtians be not offended, neyther the enimies occaſioned to blaſpheme) but when Cerberus and we ſhall ſtand before the iudgement ſeat of Chriſt togither: then ſhall it appeare with what mynde wée hauehave both written. For his malice towards Crowley can not then be couered.

And where as Cerberus woulde know, where it is written that all truth ſhould not be playnely ſpoken: let him aſke Sainct Paule why he would firſt féede his hearers with mylke, and afterwarde with ſtronger meate. And let him aſke our Sauiour Chriſt, why he ſayd that olde bottles coulde not holde new Wyne, and that therfore men vſe to put newe Wyne into new veſſelles that both maye be preſerued togither. And as for hys place that he citeth out of Sirache, (For thy lyfe ſhame not to ſay the truth) I reſer to the Reader to cōſider and weigh Eccleſ. 4.Eccl 4by the circumſtance of the place. Wherby it ſhal appeare how well it maketh for hys purpoſe. Sirach ſayth: For thy lyfe ſhame not to ſaye the trueth, for there is a ſhame that bringeth ſinne, & there is a ſinne that bringeth glory & fauour. Now, how can Cerberus proue by this place that a preacher muſt without diſcretion vtter all truth at all times & in al places? It is manifeſt that Sirach meaneth to inſtruct all men, that ſhame ſhould not ſtaye vsus from confeſſing the trueth of our owne euyll, when we are deprehended therein: for that ſhame bringeth ſinne. p. 48(That is, cauſeth vsus to lie in hyding our owne faults before committed) but the other ſhame, that is, to doe that which is not honeſt, bringeth glorie and fauour. Shame therefore ſayth Sirach, to do euil: but for thy life, ſhame not to confeſſe the euyll that thou haſt once done, and art taken withal, or vehemently ſuſpected therof. But (ſayth Cerberus) how can any man ſpeake more plainly of this matter, than they thēſelues doe? For what can be more plainely ſpoken: than that Gods Predeſtination is the cauſe of Adams fall? And that Caine was predeſtinated to ſlea his brother? And that God is both the principall cauſe & alſo the Author of al things, both on the one ſyde and on the other. &c. Al this is ſufficiently aunſwered already. But y^• cauſe, why in our writings we vſe ſo plaine wordes in this matter: is, for that we hauehave not to doe with babes that néede milk, but with open enimies, that vnderunder colour to cleare God of iniquitie, go about to take from him the glorie of his almighty power, and libertie, to do what he will do with his owne creatures, without checke or controlement: And to aſcribe to the power of their owne fréewil, that glory that the frée mercy of God deſerueth. We doe not this therefore in our common order of teaching, but being enforced by the malice of ſuch as Cerberus is.

Cerberus.

And furder, in the ſame boke and the ſame Article. Yea, I am ſure (ſayth he) that you will graunt, that if God doe predeſtinate a man to do things raſhly and without any deliberation: he ſhall not deliberate at all, but runne headlong vponupon it, be it good or euyll that he doth. He maketh alſo an argument after this ſort, ſaying: Whatſoeuer God foreſeeth and prededeſtinateth: muſt neceſſarily come to paſſe (for his preſcience and predeſtination are infallible) but he foreſeeth and predeſtinateth al things: Ergo al things muſt come to paſſe of neceſſitie. The minor of which Argument is apparantly falſe. For though God doe foreſee all things: yet doeth he not predeſtinate all things. For his foreſight doeth extende both to good and euill: but his predeſtination is onelye of things that be good. As the Scriptures and all auncient writers proue. And here againe it is to be noted alſo: how plainely they make God the Authour of ſinne. For if this maior be true, that God doth not onelyonly foreſee, but alſo predeſtinate all things: Yea, euen ſinne and euill, as the fall of Adam, and the murder of Caine, and the wickedneſſe of all them that hauehave bene moſt wycked: then may this minor be truely annexed: That God is the Authour of al that he predeſtinateth. And ſo muſt this concluſion needes follow: that God is the Authour of all ſinne and euyll. The firſt parte, that God: predeſtinateth all thinges, or all that he ſoreſeeth: is a propoſition of their own aſſertiō, without any ambiguitie or doutfull meaning. The ſeconde part, that God is the Authour of al that he predeſtinateth, is mine aſſertion. Which is ſo manifeſt and true, that they hauehave ſcarce any maner of colour to deny it. For what is it to predeſtinate any thing? but firſt to purpoſe, decree, and appoint, and ordeine it to be done? Now, he which firſt purpoſeth, decreeth, appointeth, ordeineth, or inuēteth a thing to be done: is not he the Author of the ſame? Or is not he rightly to be called Cauſa, Origo, Fons: Radix, Principium, Autor? The Cauſe, Originall, Fountaine, Roote, Beginning or Authour of the ſame? He which firſt purpoſeth, decreeth, apointeth, p. 49and ordeineth an Inſurrection or Rebellion to be made againſt his Prince: is not he to be apprehē ded as the very Authour of al the ſedition, and worthily and rightly to be iudged and called? What mā can be ſo ignorant: as not to perceiue it? For all the worlde knoweth, that for none other cauſe, one is ſayde to be the Authour of any thing, but onelyonly, for that he is eyther the firſt inuētor, or elſe the firſt purpoſer, appointer, & ordeiner of the ſame. And alſo, whoſoeuer is the firſt inuentor, or elſe the firſt ordeiner of any thing: moſt properly he is ſayd to be the Authour of the ſame. Nowe, marke againe the Argument, and ſee how the concluſion followeth. God predeſtinateth all things, yea, euen ſinne and euyll: And God is the Author of all that he predeſtinateth, as hath bene plainely proued: Ergo, he is the Authour of ſinne. This muſt needes follow, if the firſt propoſition be graunted. That God predeſtinateth or ordeineth al things, or al that he foreſeeth. Wherfore, the olde writers, in confutation of the Manicheans, laboured in nothing ſo much; as to proue, that although God did foreſee all things, both good and euyll: yet dyd he onelyonly foreſee, and not predeſtinate thoſe things which are euill. As by an infinite number of places, out of the auncient writers, if ſhorteneſſe woulde ſuffer, I coulde eaſely proue. But one place of Auſten, I wil rehearſe, which doth not onelyonly reſolue clearely this matter betwene foreſight and for cordinaunce: or betwene the preſcience and predeſtination: but alſo moſt plainely teacheth, al that is to be ſayde of predeſtination. Prosper. Ad obiectio. Vince. Rehearſing the words, and defending the opinion of Auſten, where he proueth that the Diuell can ſcarcely be called the Authour of ſinne, by cauſe it came of mans owne will, and asketh by what madneſſe and frenſle men doe attribute that vntounto God, which can not be altogether aſcribed vntounto the Deuill. And at the laſt he concludeth with theſe words of Auſten.

Nihil ergo talium negotiorum Deus praedestinauit vt ſuret: nec illam animā nequitèr turpiter que victinam, ad hoc vt taliter viueret praeparauit: ſed talem futuram nòn ignorauit, & de tali iustè ſe iudicaturum eſse praeſciuit: at que ita ad praedestinationem eius nihil aliudreſerri poiest, niſi quod aut ad debitam iustitiae retributionem, aut ad indebitam pertinet gratiae largitatem.

Therefore (ſayth he) God hath predeſtinated no part of any ſuch doings, neither the ſoule, which afterwarde liued wickedly and filthily, hath he prepared to that ende that it ſhould ſo liue: but he was not ignorant that ſuch a one it woulde be. And ſo nothing may be referred to the praedeſtination of God: but onelyonly that which pertayneth vntounto the due recompēce of his righteouſneſſe, or to the vndeſerued gift of his grace. Theſe are the wordes of Auſten. which ſurely are maruellous ful of pith, conteyning the whole ſumme of that which may be ſayde in this matter of Gods predeſtinatiō, and are therfore moſt worthie to be noted, yea, and to be committed to heart, or kept in perpetual memorie. For being thorowely weyghed, they do plainely ſet forth, the full reſolution of all this queſtion.

Crowley.

Cerberus is ſo maliciouſly bente agaynſt Crowley, that he can kepe no order in charging him with that that he hath written agaynſt Shaxton. For this (yea, I am ſure) wherwith he chargeth me here, ſtandeth in my boke p. 49more than eyghte whole leaues after the Argument that he findeth ſuch fault with. Yea, it is parte of that which I doe inferre vponupon the confeſſion of Shaxton himſelfe, in his Article that I confute, after I had by many Scriptures proued the minor propoſition of that Argument. But who can hope that Cerberus can with his thrée mouthes kepe order in his barking? Let me (if I can) aunſwere him in order, vntounto that wherewith he doth ſo vnorderly charge me.

Firſt he ſaith, that I ſay that I am ſure that Shaxton will graunt, that if God doe predeſtinate a man to doe things raſhly and without any deliberation, he ſhall not deliberate at al, but runne headlong vponupon it, be it good or euyll that he doth. Nowe let vsus ſee what Cerberus hath ſayde to this. He ſéemeth to make a great matter of it: For he beginneth thus: And furder. As though y^e wherewith he wyll nowe charge Crowley, is more to be deteſted than the reſt that is already ſpoken of. And yet when he hath made rehearſall of the wordes: he ſéemeth by ſilence to allowe them. Wherefore, I will be bolde to ſay to Cerberus, as I dyd to Shaxton. I am ſure that you will graunt. &c.

But as one that vnaduiſedly had gone about to finde fault with words that he was not able iuſtly to diſproue: Cerberus leaueth theſe wordes, and returneth to an Argument that I wrate well moſt nyne leaues before, and ſaith. He maketh alſo an Argumēt after this ſort, ſaying: Whatſoeuer God foreſéeth and predeſtinateth, muſt neceſſarily come to paſſe (for his preſciēce and predeſtination are infallible) but he foreſéeth & predeſtinateth al things. Ergo, all thinges muſte come to paſſe of neceſſitie. Here Cerberus hath found matter to brabble about. The maior propoſition of this Argument he findeth no fault withal. Wherefore I wyll ſuppoſe that he thinketh it to be true, that whatſoeuer God foreſéeth and predeſtinateth, muſt neceſſarily come to paſſe. But by Cerberus owne confeſſion, God foreſéeth & predeſtinateth all good things. Ergo, all good thinges come to paſſe of neceſſitie. Thus much hauehave we gotten of Cerberus. So that if it be a Stoicall opinion, to ſay that al things come to paſſe of neceſſitie: yet Cerberus ſhall not be ſo cleare from it as he woulde ſéeme to be.

But my minor propoſition muſt be apparantly falſe. For though God do foreſée al things, yet doth he predeſtinate only thoſe things which are good, as the ſcriptures & auncient writers doe proue. So that nowe there remayneth no more to be proued by me, but that God predeſtinateth thoſe things that be euyll. Which thing if I can proue: Cerberus and I are agréed.

Well, If Cerberus would be entreated to beléeue all that I hauehave written in the former part of this Apologie: then ſhould the controuerſie betwixt vsus, ſone be ended. For I hauehave ſayde, that euen thoſe things, that are worſt in mans doings, are good in Gods purpoſe. As the conſenting to the perſuaſion of the Serpent in the firſt man: the murder of Abel in Caine, & thoſe wyckedneſſes that others hauehave wrought: were in Gods purpoſe good, although in thoſe that did thoſe things, they were excéeding euyll. For then hath Cerberus graunted, that God doth predeſtinate them, and ſo conſequently he hath graunted that they come to paſſe of neceſſitie, as thoſe things that God predeſtinateth muſt néedes doe. But whether Cerberus wyll beléeue that which I hauehave written or no: I will by Gods help proue that thoſe actions which in man are moſt wicked, were predeſtinated by God to be done: And then I trowe mine Argument ſhal conclude aright, notwithſtanding ought that Cerberus ſhalbe able to ſay to the contrarie.

p. 51And leaſt we ſhoulde varie aboute predeſtination, as not agreing vponupon the definition what it is: I am contē ted to take that deſcription which Cerberus hym ſelfe hath made of it. He ſayth, that to predeſtinate any thing, is firſt to purpoſe, decree, apoynt, or ordeyne it to be done. But God hath firſt decreed to be done all the euil things as euer were done by men: Ergo, he hath predeſtinated euils. The minor in this argument is proued by that that is written in the fourth Chapter of the Actes of the Apoſtles. Conuenerunt enim in Ciuitate ista, aduerſus filium tuum Ieſum, quem vnxisti, Herodes & Pòntius Pilatus, cum gentibus & populis Iſrael: ad faciendum quaecunque manus tua & conſiliū tuum decreuerunt fieri. That is to ſay. In this ſame Citie (meaning Ieruſalem) Herode and Pontius Pilate, with the Heathen and the people of Iſraell, gathered themſelues together, agaynſt thy childe Ieſus whome thou haſt annoynted: to doe vntounto him whatſoeuer things thy hand and counſell hauehave firſt decréed to be done. What thoſe things were, it is manifeſt in the hyſtorie of the Goſpels. They called him a Samaritane, they ſayd he had a diuel, they ſought to take him in his aunſweres, they went about to ſtone him to death, they accuſed him, they condē ned him, and faſtened him to a Croſſe, & then rayled vponupon him. What could men do worſſe than to vſe themſelues ſo towardes the ſonne of God? But S. Peter ſayth, that all theſe things were done according as the hand & counſel of God had firſt decréed to be done: Wherfore I think my minor in my firſt Argument that Cerberus findeth ſuch fault withall, to be ſufficiently proued.

But nowe Cerberus hath made of my minor, a maior, and framed an Argument for his purpoſe, which I muſt ſay ſome thing to, otherwiſe wyll Cerberus glorie in his Arte.

God doth not onelyonly foreſée, but alſo predeſtinate all things, yea, euen ſinne and euyll. &c. But he is Authour of all that he predeſtinateth: Ergo, he is the Authour of ſinne. The firſt part (ſaith Cerberus) is their owne aſſertion. And for my part, I acknowledge it ſo to be. But not in that meaning that Cerberus ſayth it. For it is not our hare aſſertion without proufe, but we are able by playne Scriptures and reaſōs, to proue that God doth both foreſee and predeſtinate all things, as I hauehave before proued in the confirming of this ſame propoſition, being the minor in mine Argument. But for more ample proufe: the Reader may conſider that which is written in the Pſalm 138. where Dauid the Prophet ſayth thus. Lorde, thou Pſal. 138.Ps 138haſt proued me, and haſt knowē me. Thou haſt knowen my downeſitting and my vpryſing. Thou vnderſtandeſt my thoughts long ſince. Thou haſt ſearched my path and my coutch rounde about, and haſt foreſéene all my wayes. For loe, there is not a worde in my mouth: Beholde, thou Lord knoweſt all things. This is ſufficient for the proufe of the firſt parte of this propoſition. Which is, that God foreſéeth all things. For the proufe of the ſecond part, which is, that God predeſtinateth all things: I hauehave cited the words of Peter in the fourth of the Acts: wherin is affirmed, y^t the power & counſel of God did firſt apoint thoſe things to be done, which were done to Chriſt by Herod, Pilate, the Gentiles, & y^e people of the Iewes.

Reaſons alſo we hauehave to proue the ſame, which are theſe. If God ſhould not foreſée all things, he could not be prouident in all things: but it muſt néedes be graunted that he is prouident in al things: Ergo, he doth foreſée all things. If God did not predeſtinate all things, then might his prouidence be deceyued: but his prouidence cannot be deceyued: Ergo, he doth predeſtinate all thinges. This may ſuffice for the proufe of our aſſertion. Now let vsus ſee, howe Cerberus annecteth hys minor to this maior, p. 51which is this. But God is the Author of all thoſe things that he predeſtinateth. And to proue this doth Cerberus make much a doe, yea and much more than néedeth. For we will not ſticke to graunt him that God is the Author of all that he predeſtinateth. Well ſayth Cerberus, then I conclude, that God is the Authour of all ſinne & euyll. I denie that Argument.

It were but follie to reaſon much with this bawling Curre, about the rules of Logicke: For it ſeemeth by his concluſion that he knoweth no Logicke at all. For if he did, he would not ſo ſhameleſſely inferre a neceſſarie cō cluſion vponupon the graunting of pure particulers. For it is a generall rule among Logitians, that A puris particular ribus nòn neceſse est ſequi veram concluſionem. It is not a thing of neceſſitie, that a true concluſion ſhoulde followe vponupon thoſe propoſitions that be pure particulers. As in thys Argumēt that Cerberus hath made, the maior and minor are. Agayne, he concludeth more than is graunted in the Antecedēt (which is alſo contrary to the rules of Logick) For though it be graunted, that God is the Authour of all that he predeſtinateth: yet is he not the Authour, as Cerberus doth conclude that he is: That is to ſay, the cauſe, the ſpring, the fountaine, the roote, the beginning and Authour of any thing that is not good. For none euil thing can ſpring of him that is altogether good & nothing but goodneſſe it ſelfe. As I hauehave ſayd already therefore: ſo I ſay agayne. God is the cauſe, ſpring, fountaine, roote, beginning and Author of al things that hauehave any being. For he only hath his being of hymſelf: & all other things hauehave their being of him. And he alone is the worker of al actions: Nam in eo viuimus, mouemur & ſumus. In hym we lyue, moue, & hauehave our being. And as theſe things ſpring of God the fountaine of goodneſſe, ſo are they al excéeding Act. 17.Acts 17good. And as the actiōs are wrought by him ſo are they excéeding good alſo: although in thēſelues they be excéeding euyll, as is the Diuell and al his Angels and members, and all thoſe works that are wrought contrary to the cō maundement of God. And the wordes and thoughts that are of the ſame kinde. As I hauehave ſufficiently proued before, by examples taken out of the holy hyſtories.