A Defense of English Writers and Preachers — Robert Crowley

A Defense of English Writers and Preachers · Robert Crowley

Marke here by the way, how al rulers be charged wyth tyrannie for puniſhing of male factors, firſt graūt thys propoſition which he affirmeth: That al offenders, as murderers, theues and traytours, cōmit their offences by the compulſion of predeſtination. Secondly, this aſſumpted minor (which he alſo affirmeth) that it is tyranny for one whych is an inferior power, and not theyr creator, to puniſh them which do commit crimes by ſuch compulſion. Then muſt it needes follow, that al rulers are tyrants which puniſh malefactors, and are no creators, but inferior powers, bicauſe all malefactors could not choſe but commit ſuch wicked offēces, being driuen therevnto by compulſion, through the neceſſitie of predeſtination.

Wo worth the ſinful generatiō of our age, which hath bred and brought forth ſuch a noiſome noueltie, and ſtraunge Paradox, to whom the handes of Gods merciemercy are ſtretched out all the day long: and yet they are euer defying him to the face, as the Prophete ſayth. Eſay. 65. Conſider I deſire thee, not the perſons of them that ſpeake, be they neuer ſo high, neuer ſo wiſe, neuer ſo many, but marke the opinion it ſelfe: euen in thy conſcience, and in the ſight of of God, whether any thing may be ſpoken more repugnant to the nature of God, more contrarie to the word of God, more defacing the iuſtice and merciemercy of God, than to ſay, that God puniſheth man with the torments of Hel, in euerlaſting fier, for doing thoſe thyngs whych he himſelfe hath predeſtinate, ordeyned, decreed, determined, appoynted, wylled and compelled hym to do: and that whych a man can not chooſe but muſt needes doe, by the force and compulſion of hys predeſtination.

All which thyngs in thoſe playne termes, they moſt euidently teach in diuers partes of theyr wrytings, but of all other this is moſt odious and horrible, where they affyrme that men ſinne by compulſion, through the neceſſitie of Gods predeſtination.

And the verie ſame ſayth Knoxe in the. 317. ſide of his booke, before named, affirming likewyſe in thoſe playne termes: that the wycked are not onelyonly left by Gods ſuffryng, but compelled to ſinne by power, and he citeth it as the ſaying of Auguſtine agaynſt Iulian. Lib. 3. Cap. 5. But very falſly (as I ſuppoſe) for I hauehave ſought the ſame place in Auguſtine, and he hath neyther thoſe words, neyther any ſuch like, that import the ſame or any like matter.

Wherefore, till ſuch time as they make better proufe: I muſt thinke that they hauehave forged a lye in Auguſtines name, ſuppoſing thereby to giuegive Authoritie to falſhode. But to cōclude, whether it were the ſaying of Auguſtine, or not, you ſee it is plainly their opiniō, not only that men can not chooſe, but do what wickedneſſe or miſchief ſoeuer they do, but alſo they are compelled wyth the power, force, or compulſion of Gods predeſtination, to commit all thoſe euils and wicked crymes, for the whych they are executed wyth the temporall ſworde, or damned with euerlaſting torment.

Crowley.

It doth here manifeſtly appeare, that Cerberus hys chiefe quarrell is againſt Crowley. For though there be other that hauehave written as plaine, and as open matter for the neceſſitie of Predeſtination as I hauehave, and to ſay the truth more plaine too: yet doth Cerberus lay the matter to no man charge ſo often & ſo openly as he doth to mine. For this is nowe the fift tyme y^• he hath made playne mention of mée in this his ſhort aunſwere to hys friendes Letter. No maruell therefore, though the malice of his minde, doe ſometimes cauſe him to miſconſter my wordes and writings, as in this place he doeth, placing my wordes ſo in this his aunſwere, that they ſéeme to hauehave a manifeſt meaning farre differing from that which they hauehave in y^• place where I wrate them in mine aunſwere to Shaxton. Firſt he ſayth, y^• vſing the terme of driuing, I hauehave ſayde, that Gods Predeſtination hath driuen them to it. Now (Gentle Reader) I muſt make thée iudge of the meaning of theſe wordes, in the place where they ſtande written by mée.

After I had declared, that the Adminiſtration of the common weale by publike Miniſters, lawes and ordinances, coulde not be other than profitable, and alwayes redounding to the glorie of God, notwithſtanding that the hauing of ſuch miniſters and miniſtratiōs, is a thing that commeth to paſſe of neceſſitie and can not but be: I laboured to make the matter more plaine by certain queſtiōs, wherof this is one. How could it hauehave bene, that ſo great and rude multitudes of barbarous nations, ſhould hauehave ſubmitted themſelues, to be vnderunder lawes & rulers: had not Gods Predeſtination driuen them to it?

Here be the words in that order y^• I firſt wrate them. Nowe iudge (gentle Reader) whether Cerberus meant ſimply, when he cited them thus: He ſayth, that Gods Predeſtination hath driuen thē to it. Adding ſuch words immediately after, that it might ſéeme that I had ſpoken theſe wordes in no ſuch meaning: but rather, that my whole meaning had bene, to affirme y^e God doth by his Predeſtination, forcibly driue men to do the things that they are damned for. For he ſaith, that I ſay: We are cō pelled by the neceſſitie of Goddes Predeſtination, to doe thoſe things, for which we are damned. And then to ſet a ſhew of indifferēce vponupon his doing, as though he meant nothing leſſe than to applie my wordes otherwiſe than my meaning was, he ſayth, that he will repeate y^e whole ſentence, in this maner. To this muſt we aunſwere. &c. As though the aunſwere that I make, were but an aunſwere to mine own words, which I hauehave before affirmed.

But y^e thou mayſt ſée (gentle Reader) what wordes they he that I doe there make aunſwere vntounto: I will ſet them downe here in writing, as they ſtande in my booke againſt Shaxton. They are theſe.

Well, here followeth yet another inconuenience, and that is this. If all things be done of neceſſitie: Why ſhould any man be blamed for miſſedoing? Why ſhould any man be damned, ſithens all they do is but the ordinaunce of God, and that more is, they can not auoide the neceſſitie, wherby they are conſtrayned to do al that they do. Wherfore if they ſhould endeuour to refrain the euil y^t they do, it were but al in vaine, for they are predeſtinated eyther to do it, or elſe to leaue it vndone. Iuſtly therfore can they not be condemned, bicauſe the euill they do, is not of themſelues, but of the ordinance of God.

And then follow the wordes that Cerberus hath cyted. But when he commeth to thoſe wordes that myght ſome thing ſhewe my meaning to be otherwyſe than he would hauehave it ſéeme to be: he ſtayeth. I will therefore ſet downe thoſe wordes which doe immediately followe, which are theſe. But foraſmuch as he is ſubiect to no ſuperiour power, and we be all his treatures: ſo that to what ende ſoeuer he hauehave framed vsus, we are his inſtruments to doe the work that he hath appointed to be done: why ſhoulde we ſtande vp and reaſon with him to know his purpoſe in creating vsus, or why he made vsus to this or that faſhion? to this or that vſe? to be precious or vils? For this one thing we may be ſure of, that God hath by his eternall wiſedome, created nothing, nor appointed nothing to be done, but the ſame ſhall redounde to hys glory in the ende: ſéeme it neuer ſo contrarie in y^e meane time. Let vsus hearken to the words of S. Paule to y^e Romanes Rom. 9.in this matter. What if God (ſayth he) willing to ſhew. &c.

Here thou mayeſt ſée (gentle Reader) what malice may doe. I ſayde that ſo many barbarous and rude nations woulde neuer hauehave ſubmitted themſelues to liue vnderunder lawes, if Goddes Predeſtination had not driuen them to it: meaning that God in hys wyſedome & euerlaſting prouidence, had appointed that all multitudes of peoples ſhould be gouerned by lawes and orders, and to bring thē thereunto, he vſed ſuch meanes, that they were driuen to chooſe rather to liue vnderunder lawes, and ſo to continue and flouriſh, than to liue without lawes, and ſo decay and come to naught. But Cerberus doth maliciouſly conſter my wordes, as though my meaning were, driuen to be vnderunder lawes, as ſhepe are driuen from the paſture to the folde. But I ſpake of men, and not of brute beaſts. We vſe to ſay that men are driuen, ſome by feare, ſome by frendſhip, ſome by affection, ſome by infirmitie, and ſome by pouertie and néede: and yet in all theſe caſes, we meane not that man hath not a will which conſenteth to the thing that he doeth: but that the will of man is by theſe meanes induced to chooſe that which it conſenteth vntounto, and to leaue the other which it refuſeth to do. Againe, in anſwering the inconuenience that Cerberus & ſuch as he is, do ſay wil enſue vponupon the doctrine of y^e neceſſitie of Gods predeſtination: I ſayd: If God were an inſerious to any ſuperiour power, or if we were of another creation, and not of his making: then might we charge him with tyrannie, bicauſe he condemneth vsus, and appointeth vsus to be puniſhed for the things we do by compulſion. Not meaning (as Cerberus doth maliciouſly affirme that I do meane) that man is cōpelled by force without the conſent of his will, to do thoſe actions which God doth condemne him for, and appoint him to be puniſhed for: For that were to denie God to be God, and man to be man. For God is not God, vnleſſe he be both iuſt and mercifull. But there ſhoulde appeare in him neyther merciemercy nor iuſtice, if he ſhould vſe ſuch compulſion, as Cerberus would hauehave me ſeeme to teach. And if man ſhould be ſo ſpoyled of the libertie of his will, that he ſhoulde be compelled to do actions without all conſent of will: then were man ſpoyled of his principall part, which is his reaſonable ſoule, without which he is not, neyther can be thought to be man.

I am not ſo beaſtly therefore, as to ſpeake of ſuch a compulſion. But I ſpeake of the ſame that Knoxe ſpake of in the place that Cerberus citeth, I now, for I dare not aſſirm vponupon his word, neither hauehave I ſéene the booke my ſelfe. But the matter that Cerberus ſayeth Knoxe hath cited out of S. Auſten. I hauehave ſéene in S. Auſtē, not in the. 3. booke and, 5. chapter againſt Iulian: but in the. 5. booke and. 3. chapter againſt the ſame. Bylike Cerberus had little leyſure and leſſe luſt to reade S. Auſtēs words. & therefore not finding them at the firſt chop, he thought it ſhould be enough for hym to ſay, that he muſt thinke that we hauehave forged a lie in S. Auſtens name. But to put thée out of doubt, gentle Reader, that Cerberus hys thought is a lying thought: I wil ſet downe S. Auſtens wordes in writing, and requeſt thée to reade the reſt of that Chapter, wherein I hauehave founde them writtē. And then I doubt not but thou wilt conſent to that compulſion that I hauehave ſpoken of.

The wordes of S. Auſten are theſe. Quid est autem August. lib. 5 Cap. 3. contr. Iulian.quod dicis, cum deſiderijs ſuis traditi dicuntur, relictiper patientiam intelligēdi ſunt, nòn per potentiam in peccata compulſi: quaſi nòn ſimul poſuerit haec duo idem Apostolus, & patientiam & potentiam, vbi ait. Sic autem volens Deus ostendere iram, & demonstrare Rom. 9.potentiam ſuam, attulit in multa patientia vaſairae, quae perfecta ſunt in perditionem. Quid horum tamen dicis eſse quod ſcriptum est? Et Propheta ſi errauerit, & locutus fuerit, ego Ezechi. 14.Dominus ſeduxi Prophetam illum, & extendam manum meam ſuper eum, & exterminabo eum in medio populi mei Iſrael: Patientia est, an potentia? Quodlibet eligas, vel vtrum que fatearis: vio des tamen falſa Prophetantis peccatum eſse, poenam que peccati. An & hic dicturus es quod ait. Ego Dominus ſeduxi Prophetam illū, intelligendum eſse, deſerui: vt pro eius meritis ſeductus erraret? Age vt vis. Tamèn eo modo punitus est propeccato, vt falſum prophetando peccaret. That is to ſay: What is the meaning of thy wordes, when thou ſayeſt, that thoſe men that are ſaid to be giuen ouer to their owne luſtes, muſt be vnderſtande to be left by patience or ſufferance, and not cō pelled or thruſt into ſinne by power: as though that ſame Apoſtle did not ſet downe both theſe two, both ſufferance and power, when he ſayeth. And ſo God being willing to ſhew forth his wrath, and to ſet forth his power, hath in much patience brought hyther the veſſels of wrath, which were made méete for deſtruction. And yet, whether of theſe things doeſt thou ſay that that is which is written? And if a Prophet do erre and ſpeake lies: I the Lord hauehave ſeduced that Prophet, and I will ſtrotch out mine hand vponupon him, and I wil vtterly roote him out from amongſt my people of Iſraell. Is this ſufferance, or power? Which ſoeuer thou doeſt chooſe: or if thou graūt both: yet doeſt thou ſée, that the falſe prophecie is ſinne, and the puniſhment of ſinne alſo. Wilt thou here alſo ſay, that where he ſayth, I the Lord hauehave ſeduced that Prophet: it muſt be vnderſtand, I hauehave left him, that being ſeduced according to his owne deſeruings, he he might erre? do as thou wilt. Yet is he in this ſort puniſhed for his ſinne: that by prophecying a lie he might ſinne.

Nowe, I trow, Cerberus will not ſay, that Knoxe hath forged a lye in S. Auſtens name, ſuppoſing thereby to giuegive authoritie to falſehod. And if Cerberus woulde take the paines to reade the whole Chapter wherin theſe words of Auſten are written: I doubt not but he ſhould vnderſtand how God may by power cōpel men to ſinne, and yet puniſh them iuſtly for their ſinne, which they cō mit by ſuch compulſiō. For they are not compelled without the conſent, yea the frée conſent, of their owne will.

But leaſt Cerberus ſhould thinke, that not being able to aunſwere that which he concludeth vponupon my wordes, I hauehave ſlily ſlipped it ouer: I muſt ſay ſome thing to that wherewith he chargeth me. That is, the charging of all Magiſtrates with tyrannie, for that they, not being Creators, do punyſh men for thoſe offences that they cō mit by compulſion. He frameth an Argumēt againſt me, the maior propoſition whereof is not affirmed by me (as Cerberus ſayth it is) for I hauehave not in any place writtē, that theues, murderers. &c. doe commit theyr offences by the compulſion of predeſtination: but by compulſion, thorow the neceſſitie of predeſtination, meaning that cō pulſion and neceſſitie that S. Auſten ſpeaketh of in the places that I hauehave before cited out of his workes, which is not without the frée conſent of the will.

The minor (which is, that it is tyrannie for one that is an inferior power, and not their Creator, to puniſh them that do commit crymes by ſuch compulſion) I do not in any part of my writings affirme. Wherefore Cerberus doth me open wrong, to conclude that I charge al rulers with tyrannie.

The rulers are commaunded of God (who is theyr Rom. …3.ruler, and to whom they ſhal render an accompt of their doings) that they ſhall puniſhe the breakers of Gods cō maundements, and to that ende hath God giuen them a ſword. Woe vntounto them therefore, if they do not punyſh ſuch, and defend the innocent. And when they do puniſh the offenders, and defend the innocent: then do they their dutie. So far of do I thinke them to be from the fault of tyrannie.

But Cerberus woulde fayne hauehave the Rulers angrie with vsus, and eſpecially with Crowley. And therefore he laboureth to make thē beleue that Crowley ſaith that which he neuer thought. The words that Cerberus hath cited out of my booke againſt Shaxton, when they be indifferently weyghed, ſhall be found none other in effect, than are thoſe wordes that Eſaie wrate in the. 45. Chapter of his Prophecies, where he ſayeth thus: Vae Eſai. 45.contendenti cum ſictore ſuo. Testa cum testis terrae contendat. An dicet lutum ſictori ſuo, quid facis? & opus tuum manibus destituitur. That is to ſay. Wo be to him that doth contende with his maker. Let the earthen veſſell contende with the earthen veſſelles. Shall the claye ſaye vntounto him that made it: what dueſt thou make? and thy worke is not made with handes?

What other thing can Eſaie meane by theſe words: but that as it is a thing farre vnſéemely for a piece of clay to ſtand vp and reaſon with him that tempereth it with his fingers, and to ſay vntounto him, why doeſt thou faſhion me after this ſort: ſo is it vnſéemely that man ſhould reaſon with God, concerning his purpoſe in making him after this faſhion or that, or to this vſe or that vſe? But if man wil reaſon this matter: let him reaſon it with him y^• is a man as he is: ſo were there ſome reaſon in his doings. For although one man hauehave by Gods ordinance, authoritie ouer other men: yet may not that man do with the reſt what he luſteth, as God maye doe with his creatures.

Wherfore, I conclude, that Cerberus his exclamation, with woe worth the ſinfull generation of our age. &c. is not worth the weighing, neyther would Cerberus if he had ſéene thus much before, hauehave thought it worth the writing as I ſuppoſe.

Cerberus.

Againſt which errour crieth out the word of God in a multitude of places: manifeſtly prouing, that through the grace & helpe of God, mē may chooſe, and are neyther driuen by abſolute neceſſitie, nor compelled by Gods Predeſtination, to commit murder, theft, treaſon or any ſuch flagitious offence, nor any maner of ſinne or euill, whatſoeuer it be. As for example: Moyſes ſayth: Therefore chooſe life. Deut. 30. And Ioſua ſayeth, chooſe whome you will ſerue. And after when the people promiſed to ſerue the Lord only, he ſayth vntounto them, you are witneſſes vntounto your ſelues, that ye hauehave choſen the Lord to ſerue him. Ioſua. 24. But afterward when the people forſoke the Lord agayne, and choſe other Gods: the Lord ſayth vntounto them. Goe, crie vntounto the Gods which ye hauehave choſen. Iud. 10. Chriſt ſayeth, Marie hath choſen hir that good part, which ſhall not be taken from hir. Luc. 10. Dauid ſayth: I hauehave choſen the way of truth: and againe in the ſame Pſalme: I hauehave choſen thy commaundements: Pſalm. 119. But the Lord ſaith by his Prophet Eſay: They did wickedneſſe before mine eyes, and choſe the thyng that pleaſed me not. Eſay. 65. and in the next chapter he ſayth. Et elegerunt quae ego nolui. And they hauehave choſen thoſe things whych I would not. Eſay. 66.

Thus it is playne, that as chooſe, and can not chooſe agree together, ſo doth their opinion agree wyth the Scripture, for ſuch direct contrarietie is betwene choiſe and meere neceſſitie, betwene violēt compulſion and chriſtian libertie, that blacke and white, may wyth more poſſibilitie, be coupled in a ſubiect.

But it is maruell to ſee, how ſcrupulous ſome mē are in theſe wordes of choyſe. I doubt whether they dare read theſe & many ſuch like places of ſcripture, which ſo plainly ſpeake of choyſe: But perhap they alway skip ouer that word, or reade ſome other in ſteade therof, as the Iewes do Adonai in ſteade of Iehouah, for ſurely manie are ſo afrayde of freewill, that they fall as the Prouerbe ſayth, out of the lime Kell into the cole pit, from high preſumption into depe deſperation, fiercelie following that olde ſpirite of wicked Pelagi, as before it is touched in the .ix. of his diueliſh errors, where he affirmeth, that if a mā hauehave neede of Gods helpe, then hath he no freedome or choyſe at all: Thus do they breake theyr ſhippe vponupon the perillous rocke, ſeeking to eſcape the daungerous Hurlepole. For an horrible preſumption it was of Pelagius, to thinke that a man by nature, had ſuch power to chooſe good, and refuſe euill, that he needed not the grace and helpe of God: and a deſperate opinion is this of other, to ſay that the predeſtination of God worketh all things in man, whether it be good or euill, and that a man can not chooſe, but do whatſoeuer he doth. For no doubt, thys opinion maketh a verie diſordered Chaos, and an vtter cōfuſion of al thyngs, as it were mixing & thruſting together, both heauen, earth and hell. Making one confuſed lumpe, of God, the Diuell and the world. Of ſinne, grace, and nature, turning all doings into dreames, all trueth into traunces, all veritie into ſables, all prayer and meditation into vaine imagination.

For if Gods predeſtination be the onlie cauſe of Adams fall and filthie ſinne, and conſequently the onelyonly cauſe and worker of all euill, yea euen wyth compulſion & ſorce, as they ſhamefully and plainly affirme, then will no man denie, that on the other ſide: Gods predeſtination worketh as violently in all thyngs that are good.

So then if Gods predeſtination work all, without all exception, both in euill and good, then all other things, whatſoeuer they be, although they appeare to worke, and doe ſome thing, yet doe they in dede vtterly nothyng. So that the Diuell doth nothyng, man doth nothing, lawes do nothing, doctrine doth nothing, prayer doth nothyng: but Gods predeſtination doth altogether, & is the efficient cauſe, yea and, the only cauſe of all thyngs.

Agaynſt thys opinion, the worde of God is exceding playne and manifeſt, not only in the places before rehearſed, but alſo in theſe folowing, here briefly noted, yea and abundantly throughout the whole Scripture. Gene. 4. a. Reg. 24. b. 1. Para. 21. b. Pro. 3. d. Eccle. 15. c. 4. Eſd. 7. b. d. &. g. e. &. 9. a. Luk. 10. d. &. f. Ioā 1. b. Act. 5. a. 1. Cor. 7. g. &. 9. a. &. 10. c. &. 14 f. 2. Cor. 13. c. Phil. 4. c. Heb. 11. Againſt this euill opinion, alſo doe all the auncient Doctors wyth one cō ſent vehemently write, as they by themſelues cannot denie, except only Auguſtine, whych bicauſe of his exceeding obſcuritie and darkeneſſe in diuers places, he is often alleaged of both partes.

Alſo againſt this opinion, writeth earneſtly Philip Melancthon the chiefeſt and beſt learned of all the Germaines: In like maner doth Bullenger, the chiefeſt and moſt excellent of all the Switcers. The ſame doth alſo Eraſmus Cercerius, and manie other of the beſt learned Proteſtantes, whoſe ſayings were profitable here to rehearſe, but that theyr iudgemēt in thys matter is well knowen to all the learned, and my determination is at this preſent, rather briefly and ſimplie, to declare what part of doctrine I and many other miſlike, than wyth long diſcourſe and manie authorities to diſproue the ſame.

Crowley.

In a multitude of places (ſayth Cerberus) the worde of God cryeth oute againſt the doctrine of the neceſſitie of Gods Predeſtination: manifeſtly prouing that, through the grace and helpe of God, men may chooſe, and are neyther driuen by abſolute neceſſitie, nor compelled by Gods Predeſtination, to commit murder, thefte. &c. As for example, Moyſes ſayth. Deut. 30. Chooſe lyfe. &c. HaueHave I ſayde that man is driuen by abſolute neceſſitie? Or that he is compelled by the compulſion of Gods Predeſtinatiō to commit murder, theft. &c? I am ſure Cerberus is not able to ſhewe it, in any of my writings. And I think he hath not ſéene it in anye of the writings of them that he writeth againſt.

But this is his maner, when we ſpeake of ſuch a kind of neceſſitie as followeth vponupon the preſcience of GOD, which can not be deceiued: then will he make y^• worlde beleue, that we affirme an abſolute neceſſitie, wherein the will wreſteling and ſtriuing to the contrarie, is enforced to giuegive place, and violently driuen to doe that it woulde not: And when we ſpeake of that compulſion, that God vſeth in deliuering the wicked and obſtinate ſinners into a reprobate ſenſe, to commit things that are vnſéemely: that by ſinning, their former ſinne might be puniſhed: then Cerberus woulde hauehave men to beleue y^• we meane of a violent compulſion, which man ſtriueth againſt, but is not able to reſiſt the force & violence of it.

Wel, I doubt not but the indifferent Readers of this Apologie, will hauehave a better opinion of vsus than ſo. For it doth plainely appeare by the words hereof, that we teach no ſuch neceſſitie, violent driuing, nor compulſion.

But we ſaye, with the Scripture, and auncient and all ſounde Fathers: that Gods preſcience, prouidence, & Predeſtination, can not be diſapointed, but muſte néedes come to paſſe, as he hath foreſeene, and in prouidence predeſtinated that it ſhoulde: and yet not without the conſent of the wyll, in thoſe whome God did knowe before woulde conſent, and in foreknowledge did appoint to conſent, and to chooſe the things which he knewe before that they woulde chooſe.

The Scriptures therfore, that Cerberus citeth out of Moiſes, Ioſua, Iudges, Dauid and Eſaie: are nothing againſt vsus, for we confeſſe as much as is taught by them. We confeſſe alſo, that man may by the grace and helpe of God chooſe to refuſe murder, theft, &c. What is it then that Cerberus hath ſayde againſt vsus? He woulde faine hauehave men think that we teach, that God is not able with his grace and helpe to make men able to refuſe y^• which is euill, and to chooſe to do that which is good. As though we ſhould think no better of our God, than the heathen Poets did of their Iupiter. Whome they bring in, lamenting that he was by the deſtinies letted ſo, that he coulde not doe that good for his deare children, y^• he would gladly hauehave done for them. But we knowe, that our God is able to doe what he will doe, and that he is preſent in all places, and doth in all places al that he is willing to doe. Yea, we doe confeſſe with S. Paule, that by Phil. 4.his helpe that doth comfort & ſtrengthen vsus, we are able to doe all things. So farre are we from thinking, that man is not, or may not be able by Gods helpe to refuſe to commit murder. &c.

But Cerberus ſayth it is playne, that as chooſe and can not chooſe doe agrée togither: ſo doth our opinion agrée with the Scripture. And then he ſetteth méere neceſſitie and violent compulſion, againſt Chriſtian libertie. That doctrine may be his owne. We refuſe it as none of ours. But if Cerberus would come to talke: a man might aſke him in what pointes the Chriſtian libertie doth conſiſt. Whether he meane that it conſiſteth in an abſolute power to do what we will, bicauſe he maketh mere neceſſitie and violent compulſion, the contraries to it. If he meane ſo, then doth he not meane as S. Galat. 5.Paule doth meane in his Epiſtle to y^• Galathiās, where he exhorteth them to ſtande in that libertie wherewith Chriſt hath made vsus free: As may well appeare to as many as will reade the Text. Well, I will leaue thys matter, tyll I may knowe Cerberus and talke with him mouth to mouth.

As for thoſe that be ſo ſcrupulous in the wordes of choyſe, let them (if there be any ſuch) aunſwere for themſelues. For my parte, I can be well contented to reade them and heare them too: but to apply them as Cerberus doth, I think no man can be to ſcrupulous, that will not agrée with Cotta, who woulde rather that God ſhoulde not know of things before they came to paſſe, than that man ſhould not hauehave frée choyſe to doe what he will. And yet do I not follow the ſpirit of Pelagius: as I hauehave ſhewed before vponupon that ninth Article that Cerberus ſpeaketh of: neyther hauehave I, in ſéeking to eſcape the daungerous Hurlepoole, daſhed my ſhippe againſt the perillous Rocke, as Cerberus woulde hauehave men to thinke that I and ſuch other hauehave.

But if Gods predeſtination be the cauſe. &c. Then, ſaith Cerberus. &c. This (if) is alreadie aunſwered. I wil not therfore trouble the Reader with it any more.

But if Gods predeſtination worke all: then the Diuell, man, lawes, doctrine, and prayer, do nothing. Thys is the very reaſon that Cotta and Cicero made (as S. Auſten declareth in his ſyft booke De Ciuitate Dei. Cap. 9.) And in the tenth Chapter of the ſame booke, he doth aunſwere this obiection, declaring to what vſe, lawes, doctrine and prayers do ſerue. His wordes are theſe: Malè autem viuitur, ſi de Deo nòn benè creditur: Vnde, abſit à nobis eius August. De Ciui. Dei. lib. 5. Cap. 10.negare praeſcientiam, vt liberi eſse velimus, quo adiuuante ſumus liberi, vel crimus. Proinde, nòn frustra ſunt leges, obiurgationes, exhortationes, laudes, & vituperationes: quia & ipſas futuras praeſciuit, & valent plurimum, quantum illas valeturas praeſciuit: & praeces valent ad ea impetranda, quae ſe praecantibus conceſsurū eſse praeſciuit: & iusta premia bonis factis, & peccatis ſupplicia constituta ſunt. Ne que enim ideo peccat home, quia Deus illum peccaturum praeſciuit: imò, ideo nòn dubitatur ipſum peccare cùm peccat: quia ille, euius praeſcientia fallinòn potest, nòn fatum, nòn ſo…túnam, nòn aliquid aliud, ſed ipſum peccaturum praeſciuit, qui ſi nolit, omnino non peccat: Sed ſi peccare noluerit: etiam hoc ille praeſciuit. That is to ſaye. The life of man is euill, when his beliefe concerning God is not good. Wherefore, be it far from vsus, that we, to y^e end that we our ſelues woulde be frée, ſhould denie the preſcience of him, by whome we are or ſhalbe frée. Therfore, lawes, reprehenſions, exhortations, commendations, and ſharpe rebukes, are not in vaine: bicauſe that both he did knowe before hand that they ſhoulde come to paſſe, and alſo they are of great force, euen of as great force as he did foreknow that they ſhould be. And iuſt rewardes are appointed for good workes, and puniſhments for ſinnes. Neyther doth man ſin, bicauſe God did knowe before that he ſhoulde ſinne. Yea rather, it is therfore out of doubt that he doth ſinne, when he doeth ſinne: bicauſe he, whoſe foreknowledge can not be deceyued, did know before, that it was not deſtinie, nor fortune, or anie other thing, that ſhould ſinne, but he himſelfe. Which if he be not willing: he ſinneth not at all. But if he ſhould not be willing to ſinne: God did alſo know that before.

Here may Cerberus ſée (as it were in a glaſſe) howe far vnlike S. Auſten he is in this matter: and how liuely he doth reſemble his olde friendes Cicero and Cotta. For feare of graunting anie neceſſitie to follow vponupon y^e preſcience and predeſtination of God: he will rather graunt that God may be deceyued, and that he is altogether careleſſe, and predeſtinateth nothing ſo certainely, but that man may by the power of his will alter and chaunge it. And this is in effect, as much as to denie that there is any God at all.

But the worde of God is excéeding plaine and manifeſt againſt this opinion (ſayth Cerberus.) For Geneſ. 4. 2. King. 24. &c. are places moſt manifeſtly againſt it. But al thoſe places I leaue to be weighed by y^e Reader, who keping in minde that which I hauehave written in the former part of this Apologie, may eaſily vnderſtād how they make againſt that opiniō that we hold. And to giuegive the Reader ſome occaſion to conceyue a good opinion of Cerberus in the citing of his Scriptures for his purpoſe: I wil ſet downe the iudgement of his owne Auſten, in thoſe queſtions ex vtro que testamento, that Cerberus and I hauehave ſpoken of before: wherein ſhall appeare how that Auſten vnderſtandeth the firſt of Cerberus Scriptures, which he citeth out of the fourth of Geneſ. His words be theſe. Ita que nō quia obtulit reprehenſus eſt, ſed quia indigna obtulit. Ne que ex co damnatus est, ſed quia factum noluit emendare cō monitus. Adte enim ait conuerſio cius, & tu dominaberis cius. Hoc est, me nòn accipiente, ad tuum dominium conuerſum eſt munus à te oblatum, vt de caetero ſeiret quid faceret. That is to ſay: Therefore he was not rebuked, bycauſe he did offer a ſacrifice: but bicauſe he did offer thoſe things that were too vile to be offered. No, he was not condemned for that neyther: but bicauſe he would not amend his fact when he was told of it. For he ſayth, thine offering ſhal return to thee againe, & thou ſhalt be Lord of it. That is, where as I do not receyue thine offering, it is returned againe to thine own rule, ſo that he might know how he ſhould vſe the reſt.

Nowe let the indifferent Reader iudge, howe thys place may by the iudgement of this Auſten: be applied as Cerberꝰ would here hauehave it to be applied. And if Cerberus will hauehave this place ſerue his purpoſe, he muſt ſight with his owne Auſten be he neuer ſo loth to do it. But leaſt this Apologie ſhould increaſe too much, and paſſe the quantitie that I would hauehave it to growe vntounto: I wil leaue the reſt of the places that he citeth, to the conſideration of the diligent Reader, aſſuring the ſame, that not one of thoſe places ſhalbe found to make againſt vsus.

All the auncient Doctors alſo (ſayth Cerberus) and the beſt learned of the Proteſtantes. &c. doe vehemently write againſt our opinion. And Auſten only bicauſe of his exceeding obſcuritie. &c. is alleaged on both parts. But when Cerberus ſhall cite their wordes that they hauehave ſo vehemently written againſt vsus: there ſhall none of them be found to maintaine his opinion. Which is, that in Chriſt all mankinde is elected. As it appeareth in the former part of this Apologie. Neyther ſhall any of them be found to write againſt that which we maintaine, whē their words and ours ſhal be well weighed, and our purpoſes perceyued, as all the learned may well vnderſtand and know, though Cerberus be blinde on that ſide.

Cerberus.

Wherefore, to conclude. Take thys one note, in this matter of cannot chooſe, or of neceſſitie, both for the better vnderſtanding of the thyng it ſelf, and alſo of thoſe which write therevpon.

They commonly ſpeake of two kindes of neceſſitie. The one is, of neceſſitie abſolute, and the other, of neceſſitie of conſequence, or mere neceſſitie, and neceſſitie vponupon condition, which diuiſion, all learned and good Authours do vſe, and it is verie profitable to be conſidered. For touching the one, there is neyther reaſon, law, counſell or doctrine, neyther fayre promiſe, nor ſharpe threatning, nor any other thyng whatſoeuer it be, which may helpe or hinder, adde or take away, hurt or profite. Wherfore, there is neuer any of al the aforeſaid waies or meanes vſed in any of all thoſe things, whych come to paſſe by abſolute neceſſitie.

As for example: It is of meere neceſſitie, that the Diuell is and euer ſhall be damned, that the ſoule of man ſhalbe euerlaſting, and not come to an end, like to the liſe of beaſtes: nor the life of beaſtes be immortall as the ſoule of man, and ſuch like. Wherein it were more than madneſſe, to endeuour, eyther by reaſon, law, or counſell, or anie other way whatſoeuer it were, to alter, chaunge, withſtand or remoue anie of thoſe thyngs, ſeing of meere neceſſitie they muſt needes be ſo, and can not be altered.

For as Auſtē ſaith: Omne enim quod prohibetur, ideo prohibetur, ne (quia potest ſicri) ſiat. Si autem fati eſset, nòn poſset fieri, ne que , prohiberetur. Vet. & noui testamēt. Quest. 115. Whatſoeuer is forbidden (ſayth Auſten) therfore it is forbidden, bicauſe it might be done, and yet ought not to be done. But if it were of deſtinie, then could it not be done, nor ſhould not be forbidden.

Theſe words of Auſten being few, conteine much matter, if they be truly weighed.

Now to the neceſſitie of conſequence, or neceſſitie of condition, wherof Melancthon ſayth: Ne que , enim haec conſequentia libertatem voluntatis tollit. Neyther doeth thys conſequence take away the libertie of the wyll. And thys neceſſitie is not repugnant to diligence, prayer, lawes and doctrine. For therfore (that I may vſe agayne the wordes of Auſten) thyngs are forbidden to be done, bicauſe they might be done, but ought not to be done. And thys neceſſitie groweth vponupon former cauſes, graunted or wrought. As it is of neceſſitie, or needes muſt be, that ſectes and hereſies ſhall growe in the Church, bicauſe the wycked ſeeke their owne glorie, and Sathan ſtirreth theyr heartes, to imagine & ſet forth abhominable errors, wherin they ſerue the Diuell, wyth all the diligence of their power. Wherefore, it muſt follow: that ſects and hereſies ſhall grow.

Neyther doth this neceſſitie proue, that they could not chooſe but commit ſuch euilles: but ſeeing they do refuſe the light, and embrace the darkeneſſe, thys muſt neceſſarily follow, thys muſt needes be the end, that hereſie & much miſchief ſhal ſpring. Or as when a man preſently beholdeth with his eyes murder, theft, drūkenneſſe, or any other wickedneſſe, it muſt nedes be true, that ſuch things are committed according to that whych a man doth ſee plainly before hys eyes. Yet doeth it not follow, that thoſe wicked doers coulde not chooſe but commit thoſe outragious crimes. But ſeeyng that they do commit ſuch thyngs, it muſt needes be true by the neceſſitie of conſequence, that ſuch things are committed of them. Theſe two kindes of neceſſitie, doeth Auſten notably declare, how, & after what ſort they ſpring out of Gods predeſtination. Lib. De Praedest. Dei. Cap. 2.

Firſt of all (ſayth Auſten) it is horrible iniquitie to ſay, that God doeth predeſtinate anie thing: ſauing only that whych is good. But of predeſtinations, ſome be of bynding or of bondage, and other be of condition. Theſe are of iuſtice, and thoſe of power. And that it may be the more manifeſt, it ſhal be declared (ſayth he) by example, which are of binding and power: and whych are of condition and iuſtice. God created heauen and earth, ſunne and moone: Furder, he did foreordeyne or predeſtinate that the heauen ſhould euer be turned, and the vnmoueable earth ſhould be in place of a center vntounto the turning heauen. The Sunne and Moone ſhould rule the day and night. The day & night ſhould ſuccede one another in certain times appoynted. Theſe predeſtinations are of power and of bynding. For euerie one of thoſe thyngs aforeſayd: is ſo bounde vntounto hys worke, by the predeſtination of God, that it can not be moued from the ſame. But God created man, and did predeſtinate him, that if he were obedient, and did abſteyn from the taſt of the forbidden apple: he ſhould liue, but if he were diſobedient, he ſhould abide the ſentence of death. Thys predeſtination is of condition and of iuſtice. For God before the fall of man, dyd not by the power of binding ſo predeſtinate him to die, that of neceſſitie he muſt nedes die, but vnderunder that cōdition, if he ſinned. Bicauſe therfore mā did ſin, it was a righteous thing, that he ſhould die. If he ſinned not, he ſhould not be boūd to death by any chayn of Gods predeſtinatiō.

All theſe are the wordes of Auſten. And thys diuiſion, is often repeated and commended, by the beſt learned of the Proteſtantes.

Crowley.

Now Cerberus will ſhortly come to an ende. For he will conclude with one note in this matter of can not chooſe or neceſſitie. &c. And this note is of the two ſortes of neceſſitie, one abſolute, and the other of conſequence. Or méere neceſſitie and neceſſitie vponupon condition. &c.

And to make men beleue, that all that we doe, is to perſuade mē, that al things do come to paſſe of méere neceſſitie: he putteth for example the damnation of the Diuell, the immortalitie of mans ſoule, and the mortalitie of the brute beaſtes. As though the thoughts, words and déedes of men were like vntounto theſe. And therfore it ſhould as little auaile, to vſexeaſon, law, counſell, doctrine, faire promiſes or threatnings, to pull men from euil thought, words or déedes, and ſo from damnation, which doth neceſſarily follow vpō thoſe doings, as it were by the ſame meanes to goe about to make the Diuell a ſaued ſpirite, mans ſoule mortal, & the life of a brute beaſt euerlaſting.

But we ſpeake not of that neceſſitie which is méere or abſolute: but we ſpeake of the other, which is of conſequence or condition. And therefore his Auſtens wordes are cited out of place (I ſaye his Auſtens wordes, bicauſe they are the words of the ſame Auſten that I hauehave noted before not to be the Biſhop of Hippoe) for theſe wordes of this Auſten are ſpoken of the thoughtes, wordes and déedes of men, which, though they do come to paſſe by a certaine neceſſitie, as God dyd without beginning foreſee that they ſhould: yet doth man vſe the libertie of his wil therein. For he doth neyther thinke, ſpeake, nor doe anie thing without the conſent of his will. And there is no impoſſibilitie in man, but that his thoughtes, wordes and déedes may be contrarie to that they are.

As for example. There was no impoſſibilitie in Cerberus but that he might hauehave refrayned, both y^• weiting, and publiſhing and caſting abroade of this aunſwere to his friendes letter. Neyther was it impoſſible for me to refraine from writing this Apologie. And Cerberus and I both hauehave herein vſed the libertie of our will. And yet did God foreſée & predeſtinate both his doings herein and mine. And as he did foreſée that we ſhould chooſe to do as we hauehave done: ſo did he alſo predeſtinate oure doings herein. So that chooſing to doe as God did foreſée and predeſtinate that we ſhould chooſe to doe: we hauehave done it by that neceſſitie that all learned Authours do call the neceſſitie of conſequence or condition.

And God doeth foreſee, whether this Apologie ſhall perſuade Cerberus to be of one minde with vsus or not. And if it ſhall be ſo: then hath God predeſtinated my labours ſo that end. If not: then ſhall my labours ſerue to ſome other purpoſe that God knew before. And yet do I herein vſe the libertie of my wi…, and ſo ſhall Cerberus. vſe his. For neyther of vsus is or ſhalbe enforced to do that which our will would not hauehave vsus do.

This is all the matter that the wordes of Cerberus his Auſten do conteine, when they be truly weighed.

As for the ſentence of Pelancthon, it maketh nothing againſt vsus, for we ſpeake of the ſame neceſſitie that he ſpeaketh of: and we affirme with him, that it taketh not away the libertie of mans will.

The ſame Melancthon, writing De neceſsario, in hys booke which he doth entitle Erotematum dialectices: ſayeth that there be foure ſortes of neceſſities. One abſolute. As that God is true, liberall, iuſt. &c. Another of deſinitions or demonſtrations: as a thrée cornered ſtone muſt of neceſſitie hauehave thrée corners, and vertue muſt néedes be a thing that agréeth with the rule of Gods will. The third is natural, in things which are ſo ordered in nature, that they can not otherwiſe be, in and by that order. But this neceſſitie may be altered at Gods pleaſure, as by examples we ſée it hath. As at the redde ſea when the water ſtoode ſtill on heapes like hilles, and when at the word of Ioſua, the ſunne ſtoode ſtil and moued not. &c. The fourth and laſt, is that which al the buſineſſe is about. And Cerberus would faine make all men beleue, that we make no difference betwéene this fourth and the firſt.

Of this neceſſitie, doth Melancthon write thus. Quartus gradus est mutabilium, quae tamen vocantur neceſsaria, neceſsitate conſequentiae, id est, quae ſuns quidem re ipſa mutabilia: ſed nòn mutantur, vel quia ſic à Deo decreta ſunt, vel quia ſequū tur ex cauſis, quae nòn mutantur, cum tamen mutari potuiſsēt, vel quia cum ſu…t, contradictoriae ſimul verae eſse nòn poſſunt. &c. That is to ſaye. The fourth degree of neceſſities, is of thoſe things which are mutable, which are notwithſtanding called neceſſarie, by the neceſſitie of conſequence. That is to ſay, which are in déede mutable: but are not chaunged, eyther for that they be ſo decréed of God, or elſe for that they doe follow vponupon cauſes that are not chaunged, where as notwithſtanding they might hauehave bene chaunged. Or elſe, for that when they be done, the fiat contraries of them, can not at the ſame time be true.

What hauehave I written againſt Shaxton more than this? The thoughts, the wordes, and the déedes of men, are of themſelues mutable: but as God hath decréed, ſo ſhall it come to paſſe, in all mens thoughts, wordes and déedes.

It followeth therfore, that though y^e teachers of ſects, the muderers, the theues and the drunkerds, might hauehave withholden the conſent of their willes from thoſe wicked doings: yet God hauing decréed to puniſh eyther them or others by that meane, the thing muſt fal out according to that decree: and yet God remayne iuſt, and mans wil vnconſtrained, as I hauehave before ſufficiently declared.

As touching the Text of Auſten, that Cerberus citeth out of his booke De Predestinatione Dei. Cap. 2. I will firſt note what Eraſmus and the reſt of the learned ſort, doe thinke of that booke. Hoc opuſculum de Praedestinatione Dei, nō eſse Augustini, vel ipſa breuitas arguit. Deinde, hoc docot, quod Augustinus fortiter refellit, praedestinationem eſse ex operibus nostris. Videtur fragmētum alicuius libri, cuius ſtudioſus quiſpiam, prooemium & clauſulam attexuit. That is to ſay. This little worke of the predeſtination of God: is by the verie ſhortneſſe thereof, ſhewed not to be of Auſtens writing. Moreouer, it doth teach that predeſtinatiō is of our workes, which thing Auſten doth mightely refell. It ſéemeth to be a ſcrap of ſome booke, wherevnto ſome man, beyng deſirous therof, hath faſtened a proeme and concluſion.

Here thou mayſt ſée (gentle: Reader) of what authoritie this booke is, that Cerberus maketh ſo much of. I wil not therfore ſpend any time in aunſwering theſe words.

Cerberus.

Many things do offer themſelues in this matter to be ſpoken, but my purpoſe of briefneſſe cauſeth me to growe to an ende. I hauehave thought good therefore in few wordes, to note one point more of euill doctrine, which now a dayes is taught, and it ſpringeth alſo out of this foreſaid propoſition, that Gods predeſtination cauſeth all ſinne and wickedneſſe, & this it is, that ſinne is not the cauſe of Reprobation, nor of Gods hatred towardes the wicked which are damned, which thing in deede, to be ſhort, I graunt muſt needes follow, if the former concluſiō be true, that ſinne commeth of Gods predeſtination, or that Gods predeſtination was the cauſe of Adams fall, which was the originall of ſinne. For if ſinne, or the orignall thereof came of God, or of hys ordinance, and from God commeth nothing but that which is holie, iuſt and good, then is ſinne, no ſinne, and cannot be the cauſe of Gods hatred towardes them that periſh, except we ſhould ſaye, that God hateth them for that thing, which is holie, iuſt, and good.

And leaſt I ſhould be thought, through pretence of breuitie, to paſſe ouer, wythout plaine proufe of that which I ſay, that thys part of doctrine, is alſo ſet forth and taught. I will rehearſe one ſentence of theirs publiſhed in print, which is ſo open and manifeſt, that it may ſerue as well as a thouſand: I read in the forenamed booke tranſlated out of French into Engliſh, toward the latter end of the booke, vppon this place, thus noted in figures, and theſe verie words follow. Rom. 9. c. 11. 12. 13. He ſayth not onelyonly that Eſau was ordeyned to be hated, before he did any euil: for in ſo ſaying, he ſhould not ſeeme to exclude any thing, but an actual ſinne & incredulitie. But he ſaith expreſſely, before he was borne: whereby he excludeth originall ſinne, and all that whych might be conſidered in the perſon of Eſau by hys byrth from the cauſe of hate.

Touching the Text, whervpon it is ſpoken, aſſuredly Inke ſerueth not worſſe to make Iuorie white: than theſe words, to open the minde and ſence of the Apoſtle, as it were eaſy to proue, if ſhortneſſe would ſuffer to make a digreſſion, but touching that parte of doctrine: thou feeſt that he ſpeaketh of two opinions: the one that actual ſinne or incredulitie, ſhould be the cauſe of Gods hatred toward the wycked: The other, that originall ſinne, is the cauſe of Gods hate toward them. Thys man agaynſt them both, taketh occaſion vponupon thys exāple of Eſau: to exclude all that is in man, eyther outward ſinne or inwarde, eyther originall ſinne or actuall, from the cauſe of Gods hate, ſo that (if it be true which they ſay) God doth hate men: neyther for their outward wicked life, nor for their inwarde diueliſh luſte, but for hys owne pleaſure onelyonly.

Crowley.

The purpoſe to be briefe, cauſeth Cerberus to cut of many things that offer themſelues to be ſpoken. Yet for all the haſt, he muſt néedes note one poynt more of euill doctrine. Which is, that ſinne is not the cauſe of Reprobation. &c.

I would faine know how Cerberus could aunſwere this Argument. All cauſes are in order before their effectes: but ſinne was not before Reprobation: Ergo ſinne could not be the cauſe thereof. Cerberus will denie the minor. For he holdeth that ſinne was before Reprobatiō. The minor therefore muſt be proued thus. Whatſoeuer was before Reprobation, is eternall: but ſinne is not eternall, Ergo ſinne was not before Reprobation. If Cerberus wil doubt of y^• maior, it ſhal be proued thus. Whatſoeuer was before Electiō, is eternall: but Election and Reprobatiō are of like antiquitie: Ergo, whatſoeuer was before reprobation is eternall. The maior is manifeſt by the wordes of S. Paul to the Epheſians. Cap. 1. Sicut elegit nos in ipſo ante mundi constitutionem. As he elected vsus in him before the worlde was made. And if Cerberus wyll doubt of the minor (as perhaps he will) then let him ſhew vsus, how there can be a choyſe where none are refuſed.

This might ſuffiſe for our deſence in this matter that Cerberus doth now charge vsus withall. But bicauſe he ſayth that this our concluſion is the ſequele of a propoſition that we affirme, that is, that Gods predeſtination cauſeth all ſinne and wickedneſſe: I muſt take ſome what more paine in the defence of that which we hauehave written.

Firſt, I muſt ſay that Cerberus hath belyed vsus: For we ſaye not that Gods predeſtination doeth cauſe any ſinne. Then I muſt alſo denie, and hauehave alredie proued, that Adams fall was not the originall of ſinne. Thirdly, we denie that the originall of ſinne came of God: wherfore the concluſion that Cerberus maketh is not againſt vsus.

But Cerberus hath found one ſentence of ours ſo open and manifeſt, that it maye ſerue as well as a thouſand. It is in the latter ende of the forenamed Engliſh booke tranſlated out of French, vponupon the words of Paul Rom. 9. c. He ſaith not only. &c. Cerberus can not ſée how this Text of Paul may by thoſe words be better opened, than Iourie may be made white with ynke. But for haſt to come to an ende, he will not ſtande to proue this, although he might eaſely do it, as he ſayth.

But touching the two opinions, one that actuall ſinne or incredulitie, the other that originall ſinne, is the cauſe of Gods hatred towardes men: this fellow (ſayth Cerberus) taketh occaſion vponupon the example of Eſau to exclude all that is in man. &c.

A little helpe woulde make this man of one minde with Origine, who writing vponupon this parte of Paules Epiſtle to the Rom. and theſe verſe wordes, Iacob hauehave I loued, but Eſau I hauehave hated: ſaith, that Iacobs ſoule being yet without a bodie, did purge it ſelfe, and when God ſaw the pureneſſe of it, he tooke it, and put it into that bodie wherin Iacob was borne, and Eſau his ſoule which had not cleanſed it ſelfe, he put into a bodie made out of the ſame lumpe, but not to honour as the other was, bicauſe the ſoule of Eſan was not worthie of ſuch a bodie. So he loued Iacob (as Origine thinketh) bicauſe Iacobs ſoule had cleāſed it ſelf before it came into y^• body: & he hated Eſay, bicauſe his ſoule had not cleāſed it ſelfe.

If a man ſhould aſke this queſtion of Cerberus: why did God louelove Iacob and hate Eſau? what could he aunſwere, if he wyll not ſay, Quia voluit? bicauſe he woulde, If he will ſaye, that God reſpected the actuall righteouſneſſe and ſinne that was in them: then ſhall he be found to ioyne with Origine. If he ſhall ſaye that he reſpected originall ſinne in Eſau, and did therfore hate him: then may it be aſked why he did not hate Iacob for the ſame. For both were defiled therw^t alike. But if Cerberus wil ſay, that God had reſpect to y^e workes that they ſhould do in the time of their life; then doth he ioyne with the Papiſtes: And that he would not ſéeme to do.

His beſt waye therfore, ſhalbe to ioyne with vsus, and ſay: That God loued Iacob and hated Eſau, bicauſe it pleaſed him ſo to doe. And if any man ſhall ſtand vp to diſpute the matter any further: then to aunſwere with S. Paule. O homo tu quis es, qui respondeas Deo? O thou mā, who art thou, that dareſt take vponupon thée to reaſon wyth God?

Cerberus.

That verie ſame thyng ſayth Knoxe in the. 141. pag. of hys foreſayd booke: where his wordes are theſe. Further I ſaye: that if Eſau was hated for his euill deſeruing, then muſt it needes follow, that Iacob was loued for hys well deſeruing, by the Argument following: of the nature of contraries.

As well it might be ſaid, it muſt needes follow by the contraries: that if a King or Prince hate one mā, whych hath well deſerued his hate, by ſtealing from him his ring, his chain, or ſome great Iuel, thē doth he not louelove any other man, but he whych hath well deſerued hys louelove, by giuing to hym a ryng, a chain, or ſome great treaſure, as though he ſhould ſay: bicauſe iuſtice worketh on the one ſide, therfore merciemercy hath nothing to doe on the other ſide, or as though God were not both iuſt & mercifull: Iuſt in damning for their offence, thoſe which are damned: and mercifull in ſauing without their deſert thoſe which are ſaued.

And who ſeeth not that neyther ſimile, nor diſsimile, neyther like thyngs, nor thyngs contrarie, do holde in all poyntes, for nothing is ſo like, whych in ſomethyng is not vnlike, neyther any thing ſo contrarie, whych doth in all things varie. Chriſt is likened to a Lion, but did he euer rauiſh, or deuour, and ſhedde any innocent bloude? Latimer wyſheth, that al Byſhops were like Byſhop Diuell in diligence, thē ought not the Diuell and a Byſhop to differ in all thyngs. And moſt ſpecially and plainely, doeth the Scripture beate in our heads: aboue al other things, that the nature of contraries, doe not holde in both ſides of Gods reward, & mans deſeruing. For as they are inſeparable relatiues in the one part, ſo on the other ſide, the one hath neuer any relation to the other, for as Gods hatred and vengeaunce, hath euer relation to mans deſeruing: ſo hath Gods louelove and merciemercy neuer any relation to mans merite. Yea, all the Scripture teacheth vsus, that God neuer hateth, or puniſheth man wythout his owne deſeruing. For as the wyſe man ſayth: Et cum qui nullam poenam commeritus Sapient. 12.ſit cōdemnaſse, a tua potentia iudicas alienum. And thou Lord (ſayth he) eſtemeſt it a thyng contrarie to thy power, to hauehave condemned him whych hath not deſerued puniſhment.

What ſhould be ſayde of the Cananites and the Iſraelites, if the nature of contraries do alway hold, and hauehave ſuch relation of the one to the other, muſt it not then neceſſarily follow (as he ſayth) by the nature of contraries: that if the Cananites were caſt out of the fortunate land that floweth wyth milke and hony, for their euill deſeruing: that on the other ſide the Iſraelites were brought and planted into that ſame happie and bleſſed reſt, for their well deſeruing? But what ſayth the Scripture? Speake not in thy heart, after that the Lorde thy God hath caſt them out before thee, ſaying: for my righteouſneſſe Deut. 9.the Lorde hath brought me in, to poſſeſſe thys lande, naye, but for the wickedneſſe of thoſe Nations, the Lorde doth caſt them out before thee. So plainly ſpeaketh the holie ghoſt here, that thou mayſt eaſily perceyue, how groſſe and vayne their ſaying is, which affirme: That if God hate an euill man for his owne euill deſeruing, then muſt it nedes follow, that he loueth a good man for hys owne well deſeruing. For the hatred of God and euerlaſting damnation are iuſt rewardes of mans euil deſeruing: but the louelove of God and euerlaſting life are free gyftes Rom. 6.of God, for Chriſtes ſake wythout any part of mans owne deſeruing.

Take therefore this ſaying of theyrs: No ſinne neyther originall nor actuall, is the cauſe of Gods hate or eternal death, and put the ſame into the one ſide of the ballaunce, then take, and put into the other ſide, this ſaying of S. Paul to the Romanes: was Rom. 7.that then that was good, made death vntounto me? God forbid, but ſinne was made death vntounto me. Then wey both theſe ſayings together with the hand of good aduiſemēt, in the indifferent ballāce of vpright iudgement, and put not in aboue three graynes of wilful partialitie: thus ſhalt thou plainly ſee, that the Apoſtle agreeth farre better with the Maieſtie of God, and hath a much more reuerent opinion of hys iudgements, than theſe men hauehave, yea, thou ſhalt eaſily perceyue (whatſoeuer they ſay) that neyther Gods pleaſure, nor Gods ordinance, or predeſtinatiō, nor none other thing that is good, is made death, or the cauſe of Gods hatred, agaynſt any man, but ſinne is the very grounded cauſe, why God hateth, taketh vengeaunce, and puniſheth man by death and deſtruction, according to that which the ſame Apoſtle ſayth: Death is the reward of ſinne. And the wordes Rom. 6. Oſee. 13.of O ſee are alſo manifeſt & plaine where he ſaith: O Iſraell thou doeſt deſtroy thy ſelfe, but in me onelyonly is thy helpe. In which words of the holie ghoſt, thou ſeeſt how manifeſtly God doth, as it were purge him ſelfe, from being the cauſe or worker of mans deſtruction, ſo that the perdition and deſtruction of man, is altogether to be attributed vntounto hym ſelfe: And God being cleare, neyther acceſſarie, nor partaker thereof, as the chiefe and hygh Iudge of heauen and earth, vnſpotted and wythout blame, gyueth the ſentence of euerlaſting death vponupon man, for his own wicked deſeruing and offence.

But on the other ſide ſayth God vntounto man, in me only is thy helpe. In God onelyonly, onelyonly in God is our helpe and ſaluation, in him onelyonly, and of him altogether, and not of our ſelues: commeth our ſaluation, and all whatſoeuer belongeth therevnto. The ſame is alſo ſet forth by all thoſe Scriptures, whych are before rehearſed, to proue that ſinne and euill, commeth not of Gods predeſtination, for vponupon that concluſion dependeth alſo thys propoſition, that ſinne is not the cauſe of Reprobation, or of Gods hatred towards man.

Crowley.

Yet once againe hath Cerberus a ſnatch at Knoxe. Whether he do report his words truly or not, I knowe not: for I hauehave not ſeene that booke of his, neither hauehave I cauſe to thinke, y^t al is Goſpel that Cerberus ſaith. Much more adoe than néedeth doth Cerberus make, to proue that an Argument à contrarijs, ſimile and diſsimile: doth not alwayes conclude neceſſarilie. For as he ſayth, who ſéeth not, that they do not holde in all pointes? This therfore that Cerberus hath here written, is but dalliaunce, and as it were dauncing about the buſhe. The queſtiō is, whether the ſequele be good in the matter that Knoxe doth vſe it in, or not. We muſt therfore conſider the matter, and how Knoxe doth applie this maner of reaſoning to this matter. The matter therfore, is a queſtion moued concerning the cauſe why Eſau ſhoulde be hated of God, and Iacob beloued, before any of them had done eyther good or euill, yea and before they were borne, and therfore, before there could be in them any deſeruing at all. Now, Knoxe ſayth, that if Eſau were hated for his euill deſeruing: then muſt it néedes follow, by an Argument following of the nature of contraries, that Iacob was beloued for his well deſeruing.

Nowe, I muſt thinke well of Knoxe, for I knowe hym to be not only learned but alſo godlie, and therefore not like to ouerſhoote himſelfe ſo farre, that he woulde ſtretch an Argument, taken out of the place of contraries, further than the nature thereof will ſuffer. I muſt thinke therfore, that he meant, that if God do in chooſing and refuſing, in louing and hating, reſpect nothing but the well deſeruing of one ſort, and the euill deſeruing of y^e other (as the common opinion of the Papiſtes is) then it muſt néedes follow, by an Argument of the nature of contraries, that if he hated Eſau for his euill deſeruing, he muſt needes louelove Iacob for his well deſeruing.

If Cerberus be not ſatiſfied with this, let him looke for furder aunſwere at Knoxes owne hand, for he is yet liuing and able to aunſwere for himſelfe.

As for the ſimilitude of a King or Prince, that Cerberus vſeth to deface Knoxes Argument withall: may ſerue him among ſuch as know not that God is frée frō al mens affections, and that he can not be moued to louelove vsus the better for the giftes that we beſtow vponupon him, nor the worſſe, for that we take from him and ſpoyle him of any treaſure that he ought to hauehave.

The nature of God is not to hate but to louelove. For S. Iohn ſayth, God is louelove. And as the wiſe man ſayth, he 1. Iohan. 4. Sapient. 11.loueth all things that be, and he hateth none of the thinges that he hath made. Neyther hath he ordeined or made any thing, hating the ſame that he ordeyned or made. For in that he made or ordeyned them, they are all excéeding good. Wherefore, when we ſay, or when it is ſayd in the Scriptures, that God doth hate any of his creatures, (as it is ſaid that he hated Eſau) it is meāt that he loued not Eſau or thoſe other creatures, whome he is ſayde to hate, ſo well as he loued the others, of whome it is ſayd that he loued them.

It can not be denied, but muſt néedes be confeſſed, that God loued al his creatures, in that he would make them ſome thing, where as before they were nothing, and in that he would giuegive them ſome part of that which is proper to himſelfe. For to be, is proper to God. And whatſoeuer hath any being: it hath the ſame of God. When God giueth a being to his creatures, he ſheweth that he loueth them: but when he giueth them an euerlaſting and bleſſed being, then he loueth them ſo, that the other louelove in compariſon of that, ſeemeth but an hatred. And therfore it is ſayd that he hateth them, whom he appointeth not to that euerlaſting bleſſed being, but leaueth thē to themſelues, that in them he may hauehave occaſion to exerciſe his iuſtice, and by them to gyue occaſion to hys dearlie beloued to ſée and conſider the excéeding greatneſſe of his louelove and merciemercy towardes them.

But Cerberus ſéemeth to hauehave the whole Scripture on his ſide. For he ſayth, that all the Scripture teacheth vsus, that God neuer hateth and puniſheth vsus without our owne deſeruing. Which ſaying, I graunt to be true, but not in that ſenſe that Cerberus would hauehave vsus to vnderſtande it. For Cerberus woulde hauehave vsus to thinke that God could not be compted iuſt, if he ſhoulde refuſe any man in whome there were not ſinne, that might moue God to refuſe him, and to that ende he citeth the wordes of the wiſe man. For this is his opinion, as it appeareth Sapient. 12.before, that in Chriſt all mankinde is elected, and ſo conſequently, that Eſau was elected in Chriſt. But by ſinne he made himſelf a reprobate, and was not refuſed before he ſinned.

But let vsus ſée, how this place of the wiſe man maketh for his purpoſe. The words are theſe, as Cerberus citeth them. Et cum qui nullam poenam commeritus ſit condemnaſse: a tua potentia iudicas alienum. And thou Lorde, eſtemeſt it a thing contrarie to thy power, to hauehave condemned him that hath not deſerued puniſhment. All the Scripture is nowe, by Cerberus, brought into a ſhort ſumme. For it is knit vp in leſſe than two lines, written in the .xij. Chapter of the booke of wiſdome.

Of what authoritie that booke hath awayes bene thought to be: I thinke Cerberus is not ignorant. And how diuers readings there be of that place which he cyteth: I ſuppoſe he knoweth. The Tygurine Bible is it that Cerberus followeth. Other tranſlations there be, that differ from that, and from the olde alſo. The olde tranſlation hath it thus.

Cum ergo ſis iustus, iustè omnia disponis: ipſum quo que qui nòn debet puniri, condemnas, & exterum aestimas à tua virtute. That is. Foraſmuch as thou thy ſelfe art iuſt, thou doeſt diſpoſe all things iuſtly: him alſo that ought not to be puniſhed, thou doeſt condemne, and doeſt eſteeme him as one exiled from thy power or dominion. Bylike, when Cerberus cited this place, he ſuppoſed that no mā ſhould ſée his booke, but ſuch as were not able to diſcerne Chalk from Chéeſe. What place can make more manifeſtly againſt him and for vsus, than this place doeth? For by theſe wordes it is plaine, that though God do condemne him, that hath not by any déedes deſerued to be condemned: yet is God neuer the latter, iuſt, and doth diſpoſe all things iuſtly.

Yea, and the circumſtance of the Text doth ſhew that this tranſlation is more nigh the meaning of the writer, thā is that which Cerberus followeth. For the ſentence going immediatly before, is thus. Ne que Rex, ne que tyrannus, in conspectu tuo inquirent, de hijs quos perdidiſti. That is: Neyther King nor tyrant, will in thy preſence make inquiſition for them that thou haſt deſtroyed.

And the ſētence that doth immediatly follow, is thus. Virtus enim tua, iustitiae initium est: & ab hoc quod omnium Dominus es, omnibus te parcere facis. That is. For thy power is the beginning of iuſtice, and bycauſe thou art Lord of all, thou doeſt make thy ſelfe to ſpare all.

But bicauſe there is ſuch diuerſitie of tranſlations in the Latine, and peraduenture Cerberus wyll ſaye he hath loked in the Gréeke, and findeth that the Tygurine tranſlation, which he followeth, is moſt agréeable to the Gréeke Text, out of which all our Latine tranſlations are taken. It ſhall not be amiſſe therfore to ſet downe the Gréeke Text, that ſuche as hauehave any ſkill therein, may iudge betwixt vsus.

foreign. That is to ſay (ſo far as I am able to vnderſtād it) Thou being iuſt, doeſt diſpoſe all things iuſtly, cōmaunding to condemne ſtraunge from the land of thy power, him y^t is not to be iudged ignominious. If any cā ſée any other meaning in this Gréeke text: I wil not contende, for I ſée that many men of great learning, hauehave varied in opinion about the tranſlation therof.

But graunt that Cerberus hauehave cited that tranſlation that is according to the true meaning of the Text: what hath he wonne thereby? Shall all the Scripture be on his ſide, bicauſe it is written in y^e booke of wiſdom, that God eſtemeth it a thing contrarie to hys power (or more truly after the Latine Text that Cerberus citeth) a thing ſtraunge from his power, to condemne him that hath not deſerued puniſhment? I thinke not. For the booke of wiſedome, is of that ſort of bookes that muſt be made to agrée with y^e Canonical bookes: the Canonicall bookes muſt not be enforced to agree with it: For it is Apokryphe, that is a booke permitted to be read priuatly, but not of ſuch authoritie that we may builde our fayth vponupon euerie ſentence in it.

But graunt that this booke were of as great authoritie as any other booke of Scripture is: ſhould we thinke that God might not iuſtly refuſe ſuch of his creatures as it pleaſeth him not to chooſe, vnleſſe the ſame creatures had firſt by ſinne made them ſelues vnworthie to be choſen? We muſt not reſtraine God of his libertie, to doe wyth his creatures what he himſelfe will. Neyther muſt we ſay or thinke, that any thing that he doth, is or can be other than iuſt, albeit that we can not vnderſtand howe the ſame ſhoulde be iuſt. We muſt therefore, wyth reuerend ſeare, ſeeke another meaning of thys place than Cerberus doth teach vsus: let vsus thinke therefore, that God ſpeaketh here of therecution of his iudgement, and not of election. And it ſhalbe good for vsus to ſay always wyth S. Auſten, that the cauſe of Gods doings may be ſecrete, ſo Aug. Paulino Quest. 6.that we can not know them: but vniuſt they can not be.

But Cerberus ſéemeth to himſelfe to hauehave gotten a great aduauntage by the example of the Cananites and Iſraelites. The Cananites were driuen out for theyr ſinnes, and this was iuſtice: but the Iſraelites were put in their place without deſeruing, and that was merciemercy. Wherefore in refuſing, God worketh by iuſtice, and in chooſing, he worketh by merciemercy. As though there were no difference betwene chooſing and refuſing of creatures, and the vſing of them when they be choſen or refuſed. God chooſeth and refuſeth without reſpect of good or euill deſeruings: but he maketh not his refuſal knowen vntounto men, till the refuſed hauehave by theyr ſinnes ſhewed them ſelues worthie to be refuſed. And though the choſen ſort, neyther do nor can ſhewe themſelues worthie for theyr good workes to be choſen: yet before they receyue the great bleſſing promiſed, they ſhewe themſelues by theyr workes, leſſe worthie to be refuſed than the other.

And to this do the Scriptures that Cerberus hath cited out of Moſes, Paule, O ſée and the reſt: full well agrée. But it followeth not hereof that therefore God had not refuſed the wicked ſort before they ſinned.

It is true, that death is the rewarde of ſinne: but it is not true that euerie one that ſinneth, receyueth that reward, for Chriſt came to ſaue ſinners, and the frée gift of euerlaſting life is beſtowed vponupon ſuch ſinners, as were elected in Chriſt before the beginning of the world.

It is true alſo, that man deſtroyeth himſelfe, by the frée conſent of his will, to do contrarie to the commaundement of God, & that his helpe and ſuccour commeth of God alone: & yet doth it not therfore follow, that no man is refuſed of God before he hauehave cōmitted ſinne, whereby he deſtroyeth himſelf. For when the elect were choſen in Chriſt, then were the reſt refuſed. For otherwiſe, it could not be an election, but a generall acceptation.

As for the ſaying that Cerberus ſayth is ours, and would hauehave his friend to lay it in the one ſide of the ballaunce againſt S. Paules wordes to the Romaines: I leaue to himſelfe to be weyed wyth the hand of good aduiſement. &c. And let him put in as many graines of wilfull partialitie as he will: for the ſaying is none of ours. For we teach, that ſinne is the cauſe of eternall death, in thoſe that be not Gods elect, and were it not that Chriſt hath waſhed his choſen ſlocke in his owne heart bloud: ſinne would be theyr deſtruction too.

It is but for his owne pleaſure therfore, that Cerberus doth thus turne round after his owne tayle.

Cerberus.

And vponupon the ſame Article dependeth alſo an other part of doctrine, which they teach, worthy to be miſliked of all men, as wel for that it importeth a ſophiſticall ſearch of bottomleſſe ſecretes, in the verie eſſence and nature of God, as alſo, for that it clearely withdraweth vsus from Chriſt, the only ſtaie, and comfort of our weake conſcience, deliuered vntounto vsus in the word of God, for that they might be ſure to holde faſt the former principle, that all things come of Gods predeſtination, as running ſtreames out of a deepe fountaine. They affirme, that the free merciemercy of God in Chriſt, is but an inferiour cauſe of Election, and that we are taught to aſcende vntounto a higher cauſe, as vntounto the eternall purpoſe and predeſtination of God, which he determined onelyonly in himſelfe. So ſayth the printed booke before named, tranſlated out of French into Engliſh.

That ſame thing we reade alſo, lately ſet forth in Engliſh print, in the gloſe of the laſt trāſlated Bible. Rom. cap. 9. wyth theſe wordes. As the only wyl and purpoſe of God, is the chiefe cauſe of Election and Reprobation, ſo his free merciemercy in Chriſt is an inferiour cauſe of ſaluation. &c.

But for my part, I truſt in minde, neuer to aſcēd vntounto that high cauſe of Election, and in heart neuer to taſte of that eternall purpoſe or predeſtination, which God hath determined only in himſelfe, without or aboue his free merciemercy, which is in Chriſt. For ſurelie, that eternall purpoſe, whych cometh not of Gods free merciemercy in Chriſt, is to deſtroy, and not to ſaue. Agayne, if that eternall purpoſe ſpring out of Gods free merciemercy, then is that free merciemercy of God, the chiefe cauſe, and not an inferiour cauſe why he purpoſeth to ſaue vsus, for a great diſhonor it were to the merciemercy of God: to be put to an inferiour place, touching election and ſaluation of man. For if euer Gods merciemercy be aboue all, it is in the ſauing of miſerable man: and merciemercy there is not in God towarde man, but onelyonly in Chriſt.

Therefore S. Paule Epheſ. 3. b. calleth it the eternall purpoſe, which he purpoſed in Chriſt Ieſus our Lord: In Chriſt therefore was this eternall purpoſe, and for hys onelyonly ſake, God the Father eternally purpoſed to elect and ſaue vsus. Conſider and marke it well, whence commeth thys purpoſe or wyll of God to ſaue vsus: but of his free merciemercy? If hys purpoſe to ſaue vsus, ſpring out of his free merciemercy, why is then his merciemercy inferior to his purpoſe, or how is the fountaine inferior to the ſprings that come therof?

Alſo, what may be ſayd in God at any time, or in any reſpect to be higher or greater than his merciemercy, ſeeing it is written, that his merciemercy is as great as him ſelfe. Eccleſiaſt 2. d. Yea, and moſt ſpecially it is ſo to be ſayd, that his merciemercy paſſeth all, when we ſpeak of this matter: For of thys it is written, that merciemercy Iacob. 2. b.reioyceth agaynſt iudgement, and why? all the iudgementes of God in thys behalfe are not to be compared vntounto hys merciemercy, for though it were not true, whych Dauid ſayeth, that his merciemercy is aboue all his Pſal. 45. bworkes, yet were it cleare, that in Election and Redemption and ſaluation of man, Gods merciemercy in Chriſt, hath euer the higheſt place: and thoſe which in the ſaluation of our ſoules, make the free merciemercy of God an inferiour cauſe, how baſe a roume will they aſſigne vntounto hys free merciemercy, in nouriſhing and preſeruing our bodies. Let them reach as hygh as they can, I truſt to go no furder, but to hold me faſt by the euerlaſting merciemercy of God, and by the hemme of Chriſtes garment, for the Scripture deſcribeth God vntounto me, wythout Chriſt as a wrathfull and moſte terrible Iudge, but in Chriſt, and for hys ſake, as a father whoſe wrath is pacified, and he well pleaſed, reconciled, agreed, and at one: and to ſpeak of a hygher cauſe or purpoſe, to elect and ſaue only in God, beſide or without this free merciemercy in Chriſt, or that Chriſt and Gods free merciemercy in hym, is not the chiefeſt cauſe which worked and obteyneth the decree, and purpoſe of God, to elect and ſaue, it is plainely nothing elſe, but to deny the mercy of God in election, reconciliation, redemption and ſaluation, by Chriſt, in Chriſt, and for Chriſt: As eaſily it may be perceyued, if a man do but weigh and conſider, what eternall purpoſe an Election, and a reconciliation is, ſeing Chriſt is our Aduocate, Mediator, Peace, Reconciliation & Atonement, as in theſe Scriptures following, and many other, it doth plainly appeare. Pſal. 84. a. Math. 1. a. Ephe. 1. a. 2. b. Rom 5. a. b. Coloſſ. 1. c. 2. Corin. 5 d. 1. Ioā. 2. a. Heb. 5. b. c. and. 7. a. b. c. d. e. 2. Timoth. 1. c.

And although it be true according to the Scriptures, that God ſo loued the worlde, that he gaue his onelyonly begottē ſonne. &c. yet did he neither louelove the world, nor gyue hys ſonne wythout the interceſſion & mediatiō of his ſonne, for if God loued the world without the reconciliation and mediatiō, or before he was reconciled, intreated, and pacified by Chriſt, then is Chriſt in vaine come to late to be our mediatour, ſeing God the Father is without him alredy reconciled. But horrible falſe is thys opinion: For like as the ſonne of a King might entreat his Father for the ſeruant, whom for hys offences, the King in hys diſpleaſure, were ready to caſt, not onelyonly out of hys ſeruice, but alſo into perpetuall priſon: euen ſo Chriſt our onelyonly Sauiour, and Gods only ſonne, did offer vp himſelfe, as a raunſome vntounto his Father for vsus, whereby he pacified the wrath of hys Father, and adioyned vsus with himſelfe, to be ſonne and heyres of hys Fathers glorie. And this hath Chriſt done, not only now in tyme, but alſo euerlaſtingly in the moſt hygh and eternall purpoſe of God, before the foundation of the world was layde.

Thus I end, thinking it ſufficient for this preſēt, that I hauehave in theſe few wordes pourged my ſelfe of thoſe thīgs which you lay to my charge, & ſet forth vntounto your iudgement, the errors of Pelagius, that you may the better diſeerne, who they are, whych are worthie to be called after that ſect: and alſo plainly declared, in what pointes my conſcience differeth, from certayne teachers of our time: and vponupon what groūd, I am moued ſo to miſſlike ſome part of their doctrine, whych thyngs if you diligently weye and conſider, readyng the ſame wythout partiallitie: then hauehave I my deſire.

Crowley.

I am glad, that Cerberus is nowe come to an ende. Much adoe he had to let ſlip ſo manie things as offered themſelues to be ſpoken off. But now he hath cōcluded, concenting him ſelfe wyth fewe wordes, in purging him ſelfe of thoſe things that his friende charged him with, and ſetting forth the Pelagians errours. &c.

Yet, euen in the winding vp of y^e matter, he hath found one part of doctrine, hanging vponupon the Article of Gods eternal predeſtinatiō, which is to be miſliked of al mē (if Cerberus be not deceyued) and that is: That as the only will & purpoſe of God is the chiefe cauſe of Election and Reprobation: ſo his free merciemercy in Chriſt is an inferiour cauſe of ſaluatiō. &c. Here Cerberus doth of purpoſe leaue out the ende of that gloſe, ſhutting vp the matter wyth his. &c. I will therefore ſet downe the words that follow, which are theſe: and the hardening of the heart an inferiour cauſe of damnation. Now this gloſe is ſome thing more plaine than it was before, as Cerberus hath cited it with his. &c. He thought belike, that the Bible wherin he findeth this gloſe, is not in euerie mans hande, and therefore his. &c. ſhould cauſe men to thinke that the reſt of the gloſe muſt be as good ſtuffe as he thinketh the firſt part to be. That is worthy to be miſliked of all men, importing a ſophiſticall ſearch of bottomleſſe ſecretes, and drawing from Chriſt. Such ſhifts doth Cerberus vſe, to make mē miſlike with that which he himſelfe liketh not.

But to proue this part of doctrine to be ſuch as Cerberus aſſirmeth it to be: he vſeth two reaſons. One is, that the eternall purpoſe of God, ſpringeth out of hys frée merciemercy in Chriſt: wherefore that frée merciemercy cannot be inferiour to Gods eternall purpoſe, more than the fountaine, from which ſtreames of water do ſlowe, can be inferiour to the ſtreames that flow from it. The other is of the mediation of Chriſt. For if God did in his eternall will and purpoſe, elect vsus before Chriſt had appeaſed his wrath, by his mediation: then was it but a vaine thing for Chriſt to be a Mediatour, neyther had we any neede of his mediation.

Although I would gladly content my ſelf, to hauehave defended mine own writings, and other mens wherewith Cerberus findeth fault, euen with as fewe wordes as he vſeth in purging himſelfe and other, of that which his friend layeth to his charge: yet may I not ſo ſhortly ſlip ouer this matter wherewith Cerberus hath ſhut vp his aunſwere.

For if Cerberus would hauehave ſought how to hauehave ſet forth to be ſéene, his owne wilfull ignorance, and errour in the chiefe pointes of our Religion: he could not hauehave found a better meane, thā he hath vſed in theſe two reaſons that he maketh againſt the doctrine conteyned in the gloſe wherewith he miſliketh.

For what greater errour can there be, than to holde that with God there is time paſt, and time to come: and that any of the eſſentiall properties of God do ſpring out of other in time, as though there had bene or could hauehave bene a time, wherein God lacked thoſe properties? Or that the ſonne of God, the ſeconde perſon in Trinitie, ſhould in his diuine nature in time, make mediation to God the Father, that thereby he might purpoſe to ſaue man, whom he was before purpoſed to deſtroy. For ſtriuing againſt him that hath ſayde, that the only will and purpoſe of God, is the chiefe cauſe of Election and Reprobation: and that his frée merciemercy in Chriſt is an inferiour cauſe of ſaluation. &c. He ſayth that the purpoſe or will of God to ſaue vsus, muſt néedes ſpring out of the frée merciemercy of God, and that therefore the will or purpoſe of God in ſauing, muſt of force be inferiour to his merciemercy, euen as ſtreames that iſſue from fountaines, are inferiour to the fountaines that they come from.

And to proue this, he citeth the words of Eccleſiaſticus the. 2. Chapter. Secundum enim magnitudinem ipſius: ſic & miſericordia illius cum ipſo est. That is: Euen according to his owne greatneſſe, ſo is his merciemercy with hym. He citeth alſo the ſaying of S. Iames. Cap. 2. of his Epiſtle, where he ſayth. Iudicium enim ſine miſcricordia: illi qui nòn ſacit miſcricordiam. Gloriatur autem miſcricordia aduerſus iudicium. That is: He that ſheweth no merciemercy, ſhall hauehave iudgemēt without merciemercy. But merciemercy reioyſeth againſt iudgement. And againe, he citeth the words of Dauid in the Pſalm. 145. Miſcricordia eius ſuper omnia opera eius. That is: His merciemercy is vponupon all his workes.

All this ado he maketh, to proue that Gods will and purpoſe are inferiours to his merciemercy. But how well that is by theſe Scriptures proued, I referre to the iudgement of the indifferent Reader. Sirach ſayth, that thoſe which feare the Lorde will prepare their heartes, and humble their ſoules before the Lord. Let vsus fall into the handes of God, and not into the hands of men: For euen as his greatneſſe is, ſo is his mercy. Sirach his purpoſe is to ſet forth the effect of y^e feare of God, which worketh in y^e hartes of mē, a true turning to God, with an aſſured hope of forgiueneſſe at his hande, bicauſe they be perſuaded, that he is no leſſe readie to forgiue penitent ſinners, than he is able to puniſh the impenitent.

S. Iames ſayth, that the merciful ſhall finde merciemercy, minding to perſuade all men to ſhew merciemercy one to another. Aſſuring themſelues, that vnleſſe they do ſo, they can finde no merciemercy with God, and on the contrarie, if they do ſhew merciemercy, they ſhall not néede to feare iud…ement, for merciemercy ſhall preuaile againſt iudgement.

And Dauid the Prophet hath ſaid, that Gods merciemercy is vponupon all his workes, although it pleaſe Cerberus to cite his wordes otherwiſe, for his purpoſe. For he ſayth, that Dauid hath ſaid, that the Lordes merciemercy is aboue all his workes. Which words though they be true, yet hath not Dauid ſo ſayd, neyther maye I ſuffer Cerberus, to cauſe the Prophet Dauid to ſpeake as he woulde hauehave him, that his fantaſie might be maintained by the Prophetes words. Dauids meaning is to teach that the Lord God ſheweth merciemercy vponupon all his works, ſo that there is not one of the works of God, that hath not cauſe to praiſe him for his louing kindneſſe and merciemercy. Both y^e Hebrue and Gréeke Text, and al the tranſlations in Latine, and Engliſh too (ſo many as I hauehave ſeene) do giuegive thys ſenſe of the Prophetes wordes.

How can Cerberus proue then, by theſe Scriptures, that the merciemercy of God is the fountaine of his wil & purpoſe? All that he doeth therefore is nothing elſe but a ſetting forth of his owne wilfull ignoraunce, whereby he is fallen into the filthy errour of them that imagine of God, as of a man, and that he is moued with affectiōs as men be. Whereas, in God: His vnderſtanding, his vnmeaſurable power, his vnſearcheable wiſedome, his mercifull goodneſſe, his truth and iuſtice, his chaſteneſſe and fréedome in all poyntes, to wyll what he luſteth, to do what it pleaſeth him, and to purpoſe & appoynt what liketh him: are eſſentiall properties, without which he neyther is, nor can be God. To imagine therefore, that there was a time wherein God was purpoſed to deſtroy man, and that his merciemercy in Chriſt hath chaunged that purpoſe, and cauſed him now to purpoſe and will to ſaue man: is to imagine y^t there was a time wherin God was not ſo mercifull as he is now, & ſo, not ſo perfectly God as he is now. And that by experiēce he hath learned ſome what more wiſedome than he had at the firſt, and therefore, may be wiſer hereafter than he is now. How great abſurdities theſe are, I leaue to the iudgement of the indifferent Readers.

But Cerberus will ſaye, that though I hauehave ſayde ſome thing againſt him, yet I hauehave ſayd nothing for him whoſe wordes I hauehave taken in hande to defende: but in my wordes I ſéeme to fight againſt them both. I aunſwere: I hauehave not taken vponupon me to defend, eyther mine owne or other mens wordes, ſucder than in conſcience I thinke them to be true. And if I did thinke that the wryter of that gloſe did meane as groſſely, as I perceyue by his open wordes that Cerberus doth: I would not ſpare him more than I hauehave ſpared Cerberus: but for as much as his wordes ſéeme not to me, to hauehave any ſuch meaning as to teach that there was a time, wherein God was mercileſſe towards mā, & that his mercy firſt ſprang out of his will and purpoſe (as Cerberus doth plainely teach, that his wil and purpoſe ſprang out of his merciemercy) I muſt not refuſe to take that good meaning of his wordes, which may ſéeme to me to be according to the truth of Chriſtian religion.

The wordes of Paule, whervpon this note is made, are theſe. I will hauehave merciemercy on him, to whō I wil ſhew merciemercy. Upon this it is noted in the margine, that as the onlie will and purpoſe of God is the chiefe cauſe of Election and Reprobation: ſo his frée merciemercy in Chriſt is an inferiour cauſe of ſaluation: and the hardening of the heart an inferiour cauſe of damnation. I vnderſtand the meaning of theſe words to be, that as the only wil & purpoſe of God is the chiefe cauſe, that there was an Election and choiſe of ſome, and a refuſall of other ſome: ſo the ſhewing forth of his merciemercy in Chriſt, is an inferiour cauſe, that is, an inſtrumentall cauſe whereby ſaluation is wrought in the elected, according to Gods will and purpoſe, and the hardening of the hearts of the reprobates, an inſtrumentall cauſe of damnation, in the reprobates, according to the ſame eternal wil and purpoſe.

He therefore that ſayth we muſt aſcende to an higher cauſe of Election, than that which appeareth in the execution of Gods merciemercy in Chriſt, doth not teach to ſet vp the eſſentiall properties one aboue another, as thoughe one were fountaine of another, and that God lacked the one till it ſprang out of the other: but he teacheth that the ſame merciemercy that we ſée executed in Chriſt in time, was decreed in the eternall will and purpoſe of God before all time, and ſo was the refuſall of thē whoſe heartes we ſee hardened in time. If any man do ſée cauſe to iudge otherwiſe of this gloſe: I am well pleaſed that the ſame vſe his owne iudgement in enterpreting the meaning therof. And if I may perceyue any mans iudgement herein to be ſounder than mine, I truſt I ſhalbe ready to condeſcend to that.

And leaſt any man ſhould thinke, that herein I doe followe mine owne fantacie, without example of any thing that I ſée in the auncient Fathers: I will ſette downe the wordes of S. Auſten, that hauehave bene a meane to confirme me herein.

In his. 14. booke, De Ciuitate Dei, …. 11. Chapter: S. Auſten writeth thus. Sed quia Deus cūcta preſciuit, & ideo hominē quo que peccaturum ignorare nòn potuit: ſecundum id quod praeſciuit, it que dispoſuit, ciuitatem Dei debemus aſserere, nòn ſecundum illud quod in nostram cognitionem peruenire nòn potuit, quia in Dei dispoſitione nòn fuit. Nec enim homo peccato ſuo, diuinum potuit perturbare conſilium, quaſi Deum, quod ſtatuerat, mutare compulerit: cum Deus praeſciendo vtrū que preuenerit, id est, & homo quem bonum ipſe creauit, quam malus eſset futurus, & quid boni, etiam ſic de illo eſset ipſe facturus: Deus enim etſi dicitur, ſtatuta mutare: Vnde tropica locutione in Scripturis ſanctis, etiam poenituiſse legitur deum, iuxta id dicitur quod homo ſpera…rat, vel naturalium cauſarum ordo gestabat: nòn iuxta id, quod ſe omnipotens facturum eſse praeſci…rat. That is to ſaye: But bycauſe God did know all things before hand, and therfore could not be ignorant that man ſhould ſinne: we muſt teach that the holie Citie is ſuch a thing as he did foreſée and appoint that it ſhould be, not ſuch as we could not come to the knowledge of, bicauſe it was not in that diſpoſition or order that God made. Neyther was man, by his ſinne able to diſorder the purpoſe of God, as though he ſhoulde hauehave conſtreyned God to chaunge the thyng that he had once decréed: ſéeing that God by his foreſight did preuent both, that is to ſay, both how the euill man ſhould become (whom he had created good) and alſo what thing he woulde make of him, euen when he ſhoulde in ſuch wiſe become euill. For although it be ſayd that God doth chaunge his purpoſes (whereof it commeth that by a figuratiue ſpeach, it is reade in the holie Scriptures, that God did repent) the ſame is ſpoken according to that which man hoped for, or that which the order of naturall cauſes did import: not according to that, which the almightie did know before hand that he himſelf would do.

Againe, the ſame Auſten in his booke De diuerſis questionibus. 83. and the. 15. 16. 17. queſtions ſayth thus. Deus omnium quae ſunt cauſa est. Quod autem omnium rerum cauſa est: etiam ſapientiae ſuae cauſa est. Nec vnquàm Deus ſine ſapientia ſua: Igitur ſempiternae ſapientiae ſuae, cauſa est ſempiterna, nec tempore prior est quam ſua ſapientia. Deinde, ſi patrem ſempiternum eſse inest deo, nec ſuit aliquandò non pater: nunquam ſine filio fuit. Omne praeteritum iam nòn est. Omne futurum nòn dùm est. Omne igitur & praeteritum & futur… non deest. Apud d…m autem nihil deest: Nec praeteritum igitur, nec futurum, ſed omne praeſens est apud deum.

That is to ſaye: God is the cauſe of all thoſe things that be. And in aſmuch as he is the cauſe of all things: he is the cauſe of his owne wiſedome. Neyther was God at any time without his owne wiſedome: therefore he is the euerlaſting cauſe of his owne euerlaſting wiſedome, neyther is he in time more auncient than his owne wiſdome. Furthermore, if to be an euerlaſting Father, be a thing that is in God, and that he hath not at any time not bene a Father: then hath he neuer bene without a ſonne. Whatſoeuer is paſt, is not now. Whatſoeuer is to come, is not yet. Therefore, whatſoeuer is paſt or to come, is wanting, but with God there is nothing wanting. There is with God therefore nothing paſt or to come, but all preſent.

Theſe ſayings of Auſten do ſéeme to me ſufficient to ſtaie a man in that minde that I am of, concerning the cauſe of Gods Election and Reprobation. His will and purpoſe which could neuer be wanting in him, neyther can by any meanes be altered, chaunged or letted, maye well be called the cauſe why he hath choſen ſome, and reiected ſome other ſome. And this Election is in him euerlaſting as he himſelfe is: neither may it be thought that there was euer any time wherein he had not elected thoſe that be elected, and refuſed thoſe that be refuſed. But we holde not that this is done without Chriſt, and therefore Cerberus laboureth more than néedeth to proue by Scriptures that our Election is in Chriſt. For we accompt Chriſt to be eternall as his Father is, and his incarnation to be alwayes preſent with God. And therefore, that the Election that is in Gods purpoſe and wil, is not without Chriſt the mercyſeate and mediatour betwixt God and man. Thus much for the firſt of Cerberus his two reaſons.

Now a fewe wordes to his ſecond reaſon, and ſo an end. Firſt, Cerberus doeth in this reaſon flatly affirme, that God did not louelove the worlde, nor giuegive his ſonne for the worlde, before his wrath was appeaſed by the mediation of his ſonne. Wherevpon it followeth, that there was a time, wherein God was wroth with the worlde, and not pacified by his Sonne. Which doctrine is as muche as to denie Chriſt to be a mediatour. But in the cloſing vp of the matter, he ouerthroweth that againe, affirming that Chriſt hath pacified the wrath of his father, not onelyonly nowe in tyme, but alſo euerlaſtingly in the moſt highe and eternall purpoſe of God before the foundation of the worlde was layed.

Hitherto he hath fought againſt vsus: but nowe in the concluſiō he ioyneth with vsus, calling the purpoſe of God eternall and moſt high. And what is that but to affirme all that we teache concerning the cauſe of Election and Reprobation.

As touching the mediation of Chriſt: we holde that which S. Auſten wryteth in his Homelie, De ouibus. Non mediator homo praeter Deitatem, Non mediator Deus praeter humanitatem. Ecce mediator. Diuinitas ſine humanitate non eſt mediatrix. Humanitas ſine diuinitate, non eſt mediatrix. Sed inter diuinitatem ſolam, & humanitatem ſolam, mediatrix eſt, humana diuinitas, & diuina humanitas Christi.

Man without the Godhead, is not mediatour. God without the manhode is not mediatour: Loe here is the mediatour. The diuinitie without the humanitie is not mediatrix. The humanitie without the diuinitie is not mediatrix: but the humane diuinitie and the diuine humanitie of Chriſt, is the mediatrix betwéene the diuinitie alone and the humanitie alone. And this mediation doe we holde (as in his concluſion, at vnwares I think, Cerberus hath confeſſed) to be euerlaſting in the eternall and moſt highe purpoſe of God: according to the ſaying of Saint Iohn in the ſeconde of his firſt Epiſtle. We hauehave an Aduocate with God the Father, which is Ieſus Chriſt the righteous. To whome with his Father and the holy Ghoſt be all honour and glorie. Amen.

Thus in as fewe wordes as I could: I hauehave defended that doctrine of Gods Prouidence & Predeſtination, which I and others, hauehave taught, and as occaſion ſerueth, doe teach, both in preaching and wryting. Beſéeching the Chriſtian Reader to call vponupon God, for the ayde of his holy ſpirite to aſſiſt vsus, and to make vsus able to continue in the teaching of true doctrine, in this and all other Articles that concerne Chriſtian religion, that by vsus, as the miniſters of God, the congregation of Ieſus Chriſt maye be edified.

And if the Authour of the anſwere, doe finde himſelfe grieued for that I hauehave talked of him vnderunder the name of Cerberus: my deſire is, that he woulde make his right name knowne to me eyther by worde or wryting, and if he thinke himſelfe able to diſproue ought that I hauehave written in this defence, he ſhall eyther finde me able to mayntayne my wryting by good authoritie, or elſe readie to yelde to better. But if he will lurcke ſtill in ſecret, and caſt abroade ſuche libelles as is this anſwere to his friends letter: I wil not trouble my ſelfe any more in defending my ſelfe & others againſt him that dare not ſhew his face. Farewell. If thou profite in reading, I hauehave the gayne that I ſought in writing.

Seene and allowed according to the order appoynted.

End of the text · Robert Crowley, A Defense of English Writers and Preachers (1566)

A Defense of English Writers and Preachers, Text (4 of 4)