Gods Arraignment of Hypocrites, Religious tract 1 · Chapter 2 · Part 2
II. Part in the ordering of ſinne, concerning his entrance and progreſſe.
This point would a little more be inſiſted vponupon, for the ſlanders that Bellarmine hath laid vponupon Calvin, Luther, Martyr, and ſundrie other of the greateſt Diuines of the Reformed Churches, making them to defend, That God by reaſon of his decree, is made the cauſe of ſinne. Of this ſinnefull, wicked, and lying report, we are ſure God is not the author, but the deuill. For the clearing of this point, two things offer themſelues to our conſideration: the firſt, entrance of ſinne; Entrance, pr… greſſe, cauſe… of ſinnes entrance principall, inſtrumentall, accidentall.and ſecondly his progreſſe. For his firſt entrance, ſinne had two cauſes; one blameable, the other holy and good. The blameable cauſe, is either principall, or inſtrumentall: principall the deuill and man. The deuills beeing Apoſtates and rebells, through their pride againſt God, and malice againſt man, became lyars and murtherers of man, by bringing him into his fall: man by his free receiuing of the tentation, and hearkning thereunto, contrary to the commandement of God, when he might hauehave reſiſted the ſame.
The inſtrumentall cauſes, were the ſerpent, and the woman: the ſerpent abuſed by the deuill, was vſed as an inſtrument of ſeducing Evah; the woman deceiued by the deuill and the ſerpent, became an inſtrument to deceiue man.
The vnblameable cauſe was God and his lawe; for as his law did it, ſo he himſelfe did it: and if there had been no law, there had been no tranſgreſſion: yet the law of it ſelfe, ſauoured nothing but life vntounto life, which thorough mans default, became the ſauour of death vntounto death. But how could this bee, ſeeing mans will was created good? How mans will beeing good, could produce euill.I anſwer; Firſt, it was created mutably good: ſecondly, though there was no imperfection for kind of beeing, yet his beeing was defectiue and imperfect, in regard of abſolute beeing; therefore man compared to God was defectiue, and imperfect, and ſo might come ſhort of his created perfection, and fall away from that wherein he was created: Hence man might fall, but how ſhould this power come into act? here diuines lay downe a ſubſtraction of grace, which they affirme to bee double: firſt of that without which man could not but fall, and without which he could not continue in his integritie; if God had denied man this grace, it could not bee imagined but that God ſhould hauehave beene the author of ſinne: ….this was debitum naturae, due to his nature, & this God gaue him, and would hauehave continued, with the ſupply of actual grace to hauehave liued for euer, if he had once pleaſed God. A ſecond ſubſtraction, or rather withholding of grace, was that without which God ſaw hee would not continue, though both in dutie he ought, … poſſe ſi ve… …t. ſed non veile ….and in reſpect of abilitie, he might if he would; God gaue him not a would to his might, yet a might if he would: neither was God bound vntounto this by law of creation: for it was expedient, giuing him freedome of will to trie him how he would exerciſe it, yet moſt certain hee would abuſe it: no man denies, but that God might hauehave giuen grace to Adam, in ſuch degree, meaſure, and kind, as might hauehave preſerued him from all poſſibilitie of falling, and hauehave holden him inſeparably to himſelfe for euer: which while he denied, he gaue way vntounto the fall of man.
Thus then we conceiue of the entrance of ſinne. Firſt, God purpoſed eternally to make man a rationall and intellectuall creature, indued with knowledge of all things, Vnderſtanding.and facultie and power to make choice of what he would. Secondly, man could not be thus made, and be naturally free, Election.from poſſibilitie and danger of making an euill choice, diſpoſing himſelfe amiſſe, and offending againſt the lawes of his righteous Creator. Thirdly, Meanes.God wanted not gratious meanes whereby to hold him inſeparably to himſelfe, and to preſerue him infallibly from falling away, though he were not, nor could be, Fall contingentnaturally free from poſſibilitie of falling. Fourthly, God knew man beeing ſo left, would ſin…efully depart from him, not neceſſarily, but contingently, yet moſt certenly, not by any conſtraint, but by his owne created free will. Fiftly, God ſaw this to be the beſt for the manifeſtation of his glorie, and of that good, which otherwiſe the world could neuer hauehave knowne. Sixtly, God ſeeing man this way to determine his will, Mans… determination.made the determination thereof, a iuſt way for his owne glorie. God decreed mans fall, and he alſo decreed that he himſelfe would not be the cauſe, but that man himſelfe ſhould onelyonly cauſe his own ruine. Thus then God did abſolutely decree, but not abſolutely determine mans wil, for that was left vntounto man himſelfe; Determination no impulſion.yet the determination of that determination was abſolute, and that without impulſion, or coaction of mans will: for determination is alwaies of things vntounto their ends; therefore is called abſolute in regard of the end: but coaction is onelyonly of an efficient, which is not neceſſarie for an abſolute ende. All Gods ends are abſolute and neceſſarie, yet the meanes, that God vſeth are of all kinds, contingent, neceſſarie, dependent, independent. Suppoſe God had decreed to hauehave giuen man actuall grace, as alreadie the angels hauehave it in heauen, had it therefore been neceſſarie, that man could not hauehave fallen? or that God ſhould hauehave conſtrained his wil to hauehave imbraced this grace? no aſſuredly; therefore on the contratie God decreed not to giuegive man this actuall grace of ſtanding, is therefore his auerſion neceſſarie and conſtrained? no, but God by this meanes gaue way vntounto the ſinne of auerſion, and permiſſiuely, yet willingly did ſuffer it for to enter, (for otherwiſe it could not hauehave entred) and by a poſitiue decree reſolued, that auerting himſelfe from the fountaine of all goodneſſe, and the rule of all righteouſneſſe, he ſhould runne into innumerable dangerous euills, and grieuous ſinnes, both of commiſſion and omiſſion.
Omiſſion is alwaies the firſt ſinne; Omiſſion a priuation.for a man falleth firſt from the louelove of God, before he can louelove or deſire any other thing: now this ſin beeing a neglect, hath no poſitiue cauſe, it ſelfe being a priuatiō; neither need we ſeek any higher ſpring of it, Non ….then the will of ſuch a creature as is defectiue; and therefore doth not alwaies neceſſarily attend to the rule, it ſhould conforme it ſelfe vntounto: and thus of the firſt ſinne, we can find no cauſe in God, becauſe hee is no wayes defectiue. The ſecond ſinne is commiſſion, which is a poſitiue act, and therefore hath a poſitiue cauſe: now God that neuer ceaſeth to doe his worke of moouing, but alwaies carrieth forward all things with reſtleſſe motions, cannot but cauſe the verie ſubſtance of a ſinne of commiſſion: … of the Sch…olman.neither here am I of the opinion of the School-men, that defend the very deformitie of this ſinne, to be nothing but the act and very ſubſtance of it: for an act is a generall tearme, and hath ſpeciall limitations added vntounto it; therefore it is ſaid to be well done, when it keeps his rule; euill, when it miſſeth his rule: now the Lord in no action goeth againſt the rule of his wiſdome, therefore he can work no deformed act, only man that is defectiue may goe againſt the rule, and ſo cauſeth the deformitie. A cunning artificer makes a clocke, but he ſuffers his apprentice to helpe to ioyne it together, the deformitie of the motion is none of the artificers, but onelyonly from the vnskilfull apprentice; yet will the skilfull artificer hauehave his praiſe in correcting of that aberration, and turne the motion to his owne ende. The cauſes then why ſinne entred as efficient, are properly the deuill and man; as determined to an ende, properly Gods; who might well ſo determine of man, ſeeing he created him mutable.
But to come more neerly, How Gods lawe works ſinne.we may expreſſe this moſt familiarly in a compariſon taken from an earthen pitcher, daſhed by the hand of a man againſt a ſtone wall; that the wall breaketh it, that is no fault of the walls, but rather the cōmendation of it, working according to his owne nature; but the fault is in the partie that daſhed it againſt the wall: ſo man being daſhed by the deuill, and himſelfe, and the ſerpent, and the woman vponupon the law of God, (too hard to bee ouerwraſtled of man) was broken in peices: yet the lawe was without all fault; onelyonly the fault was in the deuill, Adam, and the woman: the law therefore a moſt iuſt, and holy cauſe of mans fall: as the law cauſed mans ſinne, ſo I dare boldly ſay that God canſed it, yet moſt holily and iuſtly. Hence it followeth moſt plainely, that God was no bare permitting cauſe, or a forſaking cauſe; but a working cauſe, euen in the fall of man: now as God did it, ſo he was able to doe it, and ſo to decree it to his owne glorie, according as it ſeemed beſt vntounto his own wiſdome; and ſo might it be willed as abſolutely good and iuſt, and therefore no ſinne. God made them the beginners of their owne actions, beeing indued with free will; by well doing they might deſerue both praiſe and prize; and by ill doing might deſerue both diſpraiſe and puniſhment. But you will obiect, then God might both will it, and not will it. Very true, as God willed it, it had reſpect of good, and was iuſt, and therefore to be willed; but as they willed it, it was euill, and ſo God hated it, and his law forbad it. The ſonne may deſire the death of his father, and ſo may God too; but in ſo doing the ſonne ſinnes againſt God, yet God is free from ſinne: the Iudge deſires that a malefactor ſhould die, ſo doth the hangman, yet may be the hang-man is guilty of murther, when the Iudge is a true executioner of iuſtice.
Obſerue then for the entrance of ſinne theſe poſitions: Poſitions for ſinnes entranceFirſt that to ſinne, is directly beſide the ſcope, intent, and purpoſe of the law; and therefore if the law cauſe ſinne, it is by acccident; as to the law, ſo to Gods wil, which can neither intend, purpoſe, or will any impietie; and therefore ſinne is accidental and externall in regard of God: now an accidentall principle, is either in regard of neceſſitie or fortune: How a cauſe by accident may be giuen vntounto God.now for neceſſitie to ſinne, that cannot be giuen vntounto God, for he can ſuffer of no cauſing principle; and fortune is too ſtrange a tearme to ſtand with Gods prouidence, where then is this externall principle? I anſwer, if wee ſoberly conceiue of the nature of a cauſe by fortune, we ſhal not much ſwarue, if we ſay ſinne was chance in regard of Gods will: for chance and fortune according to true reaſon, is nothing but the accident or euent of any thing beſide his end and ſcope: now only good is the end and ſcope of Gods will, and therfore ſinne which is not good is beſide Gods ſcope and ende; therefore it is accidentall in Gods ſcope and end. But you wil ſay, then God was ignorant of mans ſinne: I anſwer, no; becauſe ſinne is not onelyonly accidentall to a good ende, but alſo an aberration from the true rule of wiſdome, and muſt ſtand to the iudgement and ſentence thereof; which cannot be done except wiſedome take notice of it, and moſt truely God vnderſtands the aberation: & from hence it followeth, that he cōceiued it could neuer touch that goodnes which was well pleaſing vntounto himſelfe: fortune and chance to men, is both in the ſcope and aberration to the intended ſcope: the ignorance neuer lies in the ſcope, but in the aberration: for a man that miſſeth his ſcope, intent, and purpoſe, knowes that it is ſo; but yet he conceiues not the means that brought that thing to paſſe; and ſo he is ignorant, not for the ſcope and end that hath happened, but he knows not how he came to that end: therefore ſinne being beſide Gods ſcope is accidental, and neuer intended of God: yet God cannot be ignorant of it, in ſo much as his eyes did ſee the aberration, & how it was the direct way to fruſtrate man of his good ende with himſelfe.
Poſition. 2 Secondly, ſinne is againſt Gods law, therefore in reaſon ſinne were no ſinne except there were a law: there could be no blindneſſe, except there were an eye: this makes contrarietie, hence enmitie, betwixt the law and ſinne; and from enmitie contention, therefore the law muſt plead for it ſelſe, and be earneſt in his own defence, ſo will ſinne on the contrarie part: Gen. 3. Sinne pleads, Hath God ſaid ye ſhall not eate of euerie tree? no it is not ſo, the lawe is your hinderance; God knowes when ye ſhall eate, that yee ſhall bee like God himſelfe. Hence riſeth an irritation or prouocation of the lawe, when man expounds him, as a bridle to his libertie, therefore he labours to pull his ne…ke from ſuch a yoke: now a worke of contrarietie comes from their natures; and here the law works by his owne force: for as often as we conceiue the lawe to be our enemie, it will wraſtle with vsus, and before we are aware the law giues vsus the fall; and this is called fighting againſt God, when men will be more wiſe and ſtrong then God; therefore Iob 9.4. he is wiſe in heart, and mightie in ſtrength: who hath been fierce againſt him, and hath proſpered? and in this regard no ſtrange accident befell the deuils and men, when they would become diſputers with the law of their maker. The Smith that hath his hammer often beating againſt the inward parts of his hands, hath them hardened euen by that mutuall oppoſition: ſo the heart of man often beating againſt the hammer of Gods law, is hardened and made ſenſeleſſe, vntill God mollifie it by his ſauing grace.
Poſition. 3 Thirdly, in oppoſites, when the one is beeing, and the other no beeing, that which is being is alwaies to be conceiued for the knowledge of the other: I could not tell what darknes were but for the light: ſo ſinne being a priuation, can no otherwiſe be knowne but by his contrary, and that is the law; except it had bin for the law, there would hauehave bin no knowledge of ſinne: againe, beeing is before not beeing; therfore the law being before ſinne, detemins of ſinne long before he be, in his nature, in his vſe, or in his end: and why ſhould we denie vntounto God the determination of ſinne, long before he had any exiſtence? God muſt needs know mans fall long before it was, and determine of it.
Poſition. 4 Fourthly, where there is contrarietie, there is action and paſſion, therefore betwixt the law and ſinne, muſt there needs be action and paſſion, the weaker muſt alwaies ſuffer: and good reaſon that ſinne ſhould ſuffer of the law, yea and oftentimes puniſh it ſelfe with it ſelfe: but this is not for the firſt entrance of ſinne, for man was holy vntill his firſt ſinne, which could not puniſh a former ſinne: yet for action and paſſion, it is true in the firſt ſinne, for in that ſinne man did fight againſt God: hence no maruell if the lawe, ſtroke him out at the firſt brunt. A man that will fight with the ſtone wall, may hauehave his fingers eaſily ſtricken out of ioynt: & ſo man beeing compaſſed about with Gods law, as a wall of defence, might moſt cafily breake himſelfe in peices, when hee laboured either to leape againſt it, or elſe skippe ouer it.
Poſition. 5 Fiftly, in oppoſites, the ſtronger cannot be reſiſted, and the lawe of God beeing the ſtronger, wil hauehave his worke, neither can it any wayes be reſiſted of men: Rom. 9.22. what and if God would to ſhew his wrath, & to make his power knowne, ſuffer with long patience the veſſels of wrath prepated to …eſtruction? who hath reſiſted his will? Now if the queſtion be, whether the law was determined to refiſt man before he fel, it is eaſily anſwered: The lawe was not to prepare for man, when man tooke the battel in hand: he is an vnprouident Generall that hath all to do, when his enemies are in the field vp in armes againſt him: but the wiſe God of heauen and earth could not be out of readines, when the rebellious angeli, and mankind meant to wage warre with him and his lawe, he had prepared yrons, and harrowes, ſawes and gybets to bring all his enemies vnderunder them, and after to impriſon them in hell for euer. Rom. 9.23.Yet what and if he would declare the riches of his glory vponupon the veſſels of mercy, which he hath prepared vntounto glorie, long before they need any redemption? And this is a fift way for the entrance of ſinne, euen the manifeſtation of his power.
Sixtly, 6. Poſition.oppoſites beeing laid together, make things more eleare and euident; and one oppoſite ſtirres vp another, and they neuer ceaſe quarrelling, vntill one hauehave gotten the victorie, and ſo leads his enemie in fingular triumph. Pharaoh ſtirs vp God, and God ſtirres vp Pharaoh; now if the queſtion be, whether had the firſt purpoſe to the battell; the Scripture ſayes it for God, Rom. 9.17.yea and to Pharaoh too, that God may giuegive him the challenge; and why ſhould the warre be continued ſo long, but euen for this ſame purpoſe, that God might ſhe we his power in Pharaoh, and that his name might be declared thorough all the earth: neither is God in any fault, for he intended that Pharaoh alone ſhould fight for the kingdom of darknes; but God would fight for the cleane contrarie, for his owne name: and what is his name? ſurely his glorious attributes. Exod. 34.6.7. and what are his attributes? all his vertues: therfore God oppoſed Pharaoh for vertue; and the manifeſtation of his vertues was his glorie: but Pharaoh oppoſed God for vice, and therefore for his ſhame and confuſion. Contraries can doe no better then fight, but alwaies for a diuerſe end & purpoſe: therefore, O man, Rom. 9.20.who art thou which pleadeſt againſt God? will thou needs make the oppoſition worſe? conſider that thou art the thing formed, and therefore ſay not to him that formed thee, why haſt thou made me thus? thou art the clay in the potters hand, the lumpe is one, therefore be content to ſerue thy maker as a veſſell of honour or diſhonour.
Seuenthly contraries, 7. Poſition.though they can neuer agree to the ſame thing, according to the ſame part, or in the ſame reſpect, or in one and the ſelfe ſame time: yet they muſt both of them be about the ſame thing, or els the oppoſition ceaſeth. If I ſhould ſay, a man is blind and not blind, it were no contradiction, if I vnderſtand his blindneſſe of two diuers ſubiects, to wit, he is not blind in his body, but blind in his ſoule; therfore the law and mans ſinne, Gods wil and mans wil, are not oppoſed, except we conceiue it to be about one & the ſelfe ſame thing: therefore though ſin be againſt Gods decree, wil, and law, yet may both ſinne, mans wil, Gods decree, will, and law, all be about one thing, and that is Gods glorie: and ſo for Gods glory, ſinne may be decreed, willed, and approoued by the lawe, yet for all this hauehave no agreement at all with ſinne: and thus much for the entrance of ſinne.
The progreſſe of ſinne, is to be conſidered in the effects, Sinnes progreſſe.and conſequents of the firſt ſinne; for out of that did ſpring the whole miſerie of man. The effects are three blame, or guilt, or puniſhment: blame is the next effect of the fault committed; guilt is the tying of vsus to vndergoe puniſhment; puniſhment is the iuſt anger of God vponupon Adam and all his poſteritie.
The ſubiect of this puniſhment, is the deuill, his inſtruments, and man: to paſſe by the two former, and come to man. His puniſhment is either ſinne or death: ſinne originall and actuall originall, the exorbitation of the whole man, both inward and outward; inward in himſelfe, outward in the gouernment of the creatures: actuall, the iarring of man vponupon outward obiects, by reaſon of naturall, or originall exorbitation; eueryevery thing he meetes withall either in thought, word, or deede, is either a ſinne of commiſſion, or omiſſion: death is the depriuation and loſſe of life, and thereby ſubiection vntounto miſerie.
The progreſſe beeing cleare, let vsus ſee how God workes in it. For the blame, God is altogether to be freed; for the guilt, that likewiſe is a thing that nothing concernes God; let man looke to both theſe. Puniſhment.But the third, which is puniſhment, beeing an act of his iuſtice, and reſpecting his holy law, is a thing that onelyonly he acknowledgeth. For death, we neede make no queſtion, but the whole controuerſie is about ſinne as a puniſhment. Matter, contrat…etie… …onſe….In the puniſhment, we may note three things: the matter, with which a man is puniſhed; the contrarietie betweene the partie and the puniſhment; and the order of conſequence, that where ſuch an offence went before, ſuch an euill ſhall follow, to make the partie offending feele the ſmart of it. In thoſe puniſhments which be puniſhments onelyonly, and not ſinnes, God is the author of all theſe things, implied in the nature of puniſhment: in thoſe which be puniſhments and ſinnes, God is the author onelyonly of the order of conſequence, and the contrarietie betweene them, and the partie puniſhed: not of the matter, wherewith they are afflicted and puniſhed. As for example; pride is puniſhed by enuie; enuie is not of God, but the contrarietie betweene it and the ſoule of man, which maketh it bitter and afflictiue is; and the order of conſequence, that where pride went before, enuie muſt follow. The reaſon that iuſtifies this, is fetched from the rule of reaſon: all contrarietie is a wiſdome of God, for it is a logicall argument: and therefore if Logicke be Gods wiſdome, then eueryevery rule in Logicke. The other is iuſtified by method, which can not be without him that is the God of all order: the order of ſinne is, that originall ſhould follow the firſt actuall ſinne, and then all actuall ſinne, originall; this order is a wiſdome o… God: for ſinne in his owne nature is meere confuſion, and his order muſt needs be Gods: and ſo God profeſſeth that he will doe in this place, ſet mens ſinnes in order.
Furthermore, God doth not onelyonly puniſh one ſinne with another, where there is ſuch a dependance of one vponupon the other, that where one goeth before, the other muſt follow; but oftentimes, when there is no ſuch neceſſarie dependance, yet he withdraweth his grace, and for the puniſhment of one ſinne, letteth men runne into another. In this ſenſe, there are three things attributed to God, in the puniſhment of wicked and godleſſe men. 1. the blinding of their vnderſtanding. 2. the hardening of their hearts. 3. the giuing of them vp vntounto a reprohate ſenſe: Eſa. 6.10. Make the heart of this people fat, their cares heauie, and ſhut their eyes, &c.
Theſe things God is ſaid to doe three waies. 1. in denying grace, which ſhould lighten the vnderſtanding, and ſoften and mollifie the hearts of men. 2. permitting Sathan to worke vponupon them, and no way either ſtrengthening them againſt him, or weakning his force. 3. occaſionally and by accident, when God doth that which is good, which yet he knoweth through the euill diſpoſition that is in men, will increaſe their wickednes, and make it greater then it was before. Efficienter … effecta, moraliter vt iudi…ia, permiſſiue vt peccata, non concedendo ſed non unpediendo.To this agree other Diuines, that ſay God works in the progreſſe of ſinne, 1. poſitiuely, as it is a phyſicall act. 2. morally, as he makes it a iuſt puniſhment of ſinne. 3. permiſſiuely, as it is a ſinne, not by giuing his conſent vntounto the doing, but in not hindering of them from the execution.
Laſtly, for both entrance and progreſſe, a double action is giuen vntounto God: 1. limitation, 2. direction. For the firſt, that God ſetteth bounds to wicked men in their wickednes, not onelyonly in reſpect of the effect and euent, but alſo in the very inward purpoſe, affections, and deſignes, and at his pleaſure ſtoppeth them when he will, is a thing denied of none that confeſſe a God. Iob. 1.12.The deuill was limited how farre he ſhould proceede in afflicting Iob: neither Matth. 8.31. could he enter ſo much as into a heard of ſwine, without leaue obtained of Chriſt: the proudeſt ſea muſt ſtay her waues, where Gods laies his command.
Secondly, for direction that is moſt neceſſarie, he puts no ſinne into men, yet he directs it for the kind, that it ſhould be rather this ſinne then another, rather againſt theſe perſons then others, and the time when it ſhall breake forth, and for what end and purpoſe it ſhall be committed. For often men are wicked in that ſort, which had rather ſhew it in another kind; it breakes forth at ſuch a time, when they would faine hauehave kept it cloſe; and it falls vponupon ſuch men, which they had rather ſhould hauehave beene done to others, whome they more maligne, and deſire to deſpite, if they were left to themſelues. God may ſtoppe all waies of ſinning, and open onelyonly one, yet without all fault. As for example: ſuppoſe a man were in an high tower, and were fully determined to caſt himſelfe downe yet among many paſſages onelyonly one is open, and at that he caſts himſelfe headlong; now why he fell rather this way then another, is becauſe the reſt were ſtopped; yet he alone is guiltie of his owne death. …. Sam. 16.10.Shemei is ſaid of Dauid, to curſe, becauſe God commanded; yet did God neither inwardly nor outwardly fill his heart with malice: onelyonly Dauid reſpects the time, that God rather ſuffered it at this time to breake forth, then at any other, becauſe now Dauid was in extremitie, and fit for him to be humbled, ſeeing that Shemei durſt not ſo much as open his mouth all the time of Dauids proſperitie. Iob 1.21.Iob was robbed by wicked men, yet he confeſſeth that God hath taken, becauſe he directed that for his triall and patience. The Iewes crucified Chriſt, yet was it the determinate counſeil of God, turning their wickedneſſe and furious malice, Acts. 2.23.to the effecting of his owne purpoſes.