Gods Arraignment of Hypocrites, Religious tract 1 · Chapter 2 · Part 1

Gods Arraignment of Hypocrites · Religious tract 1 · Chapter 2 · Part 1

p. 126The collation of M. Perkins and Arminius in this point of Gods decree.

IT was well ſaide of Seneca, Lib…de ira. Vtrique pirti actiones dares, dares te apus, non ſemel audires: magis anim veritas elucet, quo ſaepius ad manum venit.that in matters of controuerſie, each partie ſhould hauehave time to trie his action, and be heard more then once; and the reaſon thereof as well giuen by him; becauſe the aftner the truth commeth to hand, (to be skauned) the more the light thereof appeareth. Seeing therefore it hath pleaſed the [Church] with ſome patience to heare, and I am afraid, to allow, the examination of M. Perkins, by Arminius the Coryphaeus of all the Lutherans, in the point of Predeſtination; I hope, for the louelove of that worthie man, and the acuteneſſe of his aduerſarie, ſhee will vouchſafe the reading of this Collation, to ſee how the Truth is more apparant p. 127by their oppoſition. If the oppoſition were but like an ouerblowne bladder, then would it burſt of it ſelfe, and vent the winde thereof, without any further pricking: but ſeeing the common fame, runnes through the world, that it is ſo learnedly and abſolutely done, that it may giuegive all men ſatisfaction, and that no man would euer be able, to make any ſound replie to it: it is become as the winde in the bowels, that will not be remooued, except the hoteſt medicines be applied, and that by the iudgement of the beſt Phyſitians. Theſe rumours may daunt a weake ſpirit, and make him deſpaire to encounter with ſuch a tempeſt, that ſtrikes all downe before it. But ſeeing God is in the calme, more then in the ruſhing wind, and that the truth is freely to be bought of all that meane not to ſell him, for the plauſible opinions of the world, I am bold in the confidence of my God, and the louelove of his truth, to reſcue a faithfull ſeruant of God out of the hands of as ſubtill an aduerſarie, as euer ſet pen to ſuch a worke. And why ſhould I be afraid, ſeeing he that walks in the midſt of the golden Candleſticks, holds eueryevery ſtarre in his right hand, to protect, guide, and defend them, as long as they walke with him: O therefore, thou which art the truth, teach me in thy truth, that I erre not: thou which art the way, guide me in thy way, that I wander not: and thou which art the life, quicken my ſoule with the life of grace, that I may ſpeake in the chiefe myſterie of my ſaluation, from the true experience of thy louelove ſhedde abroad in mine owne heart.

M. Perk. Predeſtination is firſt to be grounded out of Gods word, ſecondly out of true principles of reaſon.

I. Ar. It is true, that the word of God, and innate principles are the true foundation of all this doctrine: yet becauſe the fal hath blotted out theſe principles, we muſt alwaies hauehave recourſe to examine them by Gods word, which is, foreign, in ſtead of all.

Collation. This is Chriſtianly ſpoken on both ſides: indeed the Philoſopher ſaies, contra negantem principia non eſt diſputandum, he that denies principles, is vnworthie to be diſputed withall: yet mans principles, be they neuer ſo common, are p. 128not to be truſted without Gods word.

M. Perk. Firſt principle: God is alwaies iuſt, though man be not able to comprehend it in his owne reaſon.

I. Ar. This notion is moſt true, onelyonly caution is to be taken, that we iudge not the cauſe by the effect: it is iuſt, therefore God wills it; but from this antecedent, God wills it, therefore it is iuſt.

Collat. This confeſſion, as yet makes no breach betwixt them: yet this I would adde, that ſeeing we onelyonly vnderſtand God foreign, and not foreign, à poſteriore, and not à priore, his backeparts, and not his face, that it is lawfull to conclude from the effects to the cauſe: as this thing is done, and except God had willed it, it could not hauehave bin done, and therefore there is a iuſt reaſon for it in Gods will, though we can not perceiue it: which is the minde of M. Perkins, which he would hauehave corrected.

M. P. 2. Principle: God is independent from all ſecond cauſes; yet all ſecond cauſes are dependent vponupon him, euen when they doe vniuſtly.

I. A. Occaſion taken from the creatures, is not to make God depend on them for his will, but abſolutely to will that occaſion; yet if that occaſion had not bin giuen from them, God would neuer hauehave willed, decreed, or ordained it. The ſubiection of the creature to vanitie, is from him that ſubiected it; yet if man his cauſe, had not giuen this occaſion, God had neuer willed this ſubiection. It was Gods will, that Chriſt ſhould be ſent, which neuer had bin willed of God, but vponupon the occaſion of mans fall. It is Gods will that ſinne ſhould be puniſhed, yet mans fall gaue the occaſion, without which God would neuer hauehave puniſhed man. Gen. 18. Exod. 32.1. Sam. 2. The Iudge of the whole world, will doe iuſtly. 2. He that ſinnes ſhall be put out of my booke. 3. God forbid, but that they that honour me, ſhould be honoured of me; and they that contemne me, ſhould be contemned of me. Yet in all this irrogation, or impoſing of puniſhment, the Lord is abſolute and independent; otherwiſe the creature would leaue nothing vnaſſaied, to eſcape Gods hand.

p. 129Collat. M. Perkins meaning is, to make God independent eueryevery wayes; and therefore by a Synechdoche, he puts ſecond cauſes, for all kind of reaſon that can bee drawne from them. Now cauſation is the firſt, and moſt perfect reaſon that can be in things from God; therefore God is not onelyonly independent, as his creatures worke with him; but alſo for all other reaſon that can be drawne from them. Therefore occaſion giuen by the creature, beeing a reaſon, muſt either depend from God, or God muſt depend from it: if it depend from God, then Gods will was before it; but if God depend from it, then was this occaſion before Gods will: and to make any thing before Gods will, is to denie his will to be abſolute. For the three examples: Firſt, it is true, that the occaſion of the creatures ſubiection vntounto vanitie, was mans ſinne; but no occaſion of Gods will, who abſolutely willed as much as hee occaſioned. For the ſecond, mans fall was the occaſion of Chriſts ſending into the world; but not of Gods will to ſend his Son, which was before all occaſions. For the third, mans ſinne is the occaſion why God will puniſh, but no occaſion why hee ſhould ordaine to puniſh. For his admonition to diſtinguiſh betweene, to ordaine, and decree, is profitable, but not according to his expoſition: For, ſaith he, to ordaine, is to ſet an order in things done, and not to ordaine facienda vt fiant, things to be done, that they may bee: But he is to know, that diſcerno, is to ſee aſunder, and is as generall as all reaſon, wherby all Gods works are ſeene aſunder. Of the ſame ſignification is foreign, from whence comes dialectica, the art of reaſon; now reaſon is firſt to find out things: ſecondly, hauing found them out, to iudge them: which iudgement is either of truth or falſhood, as in propoſitions; or of conſequence & inconſequence, as in Syllogiſmes; or of order and confuſion, as in method. And in this laſt part, to ordaine is properly manifeſted, therefore is a ſpeciall branch of diſcerning: and by a Synecdoche, of the ſpeciall, for the generall, may be put for decreeing: yet properly to decree, is a worke of counſell, wiſely diſcerning of euerie ſpeciall reaſon, truth, conſequent, or any p. 130other thing, that may make for his ſcope prefixed: then to ordaine, is the wiſe laying together of all theſe things, that all confuſion and diſorder may be eſcaped, and eueryevery thing moſt ſweetly brought vntounto his end appointed of the Lord.

Here take notice of three kinds of knowledge diſputed among the Schoolemen: Knowledge poſſibile, actuall, conditional.1. poſſibilis intelligentia: 2. actualis: 3. conditionalis. The firſt is of all poſſible things, that neuer ſhall be: the ſecōd, of all things that are, or ſhal be: the third, of ſuch things as would bee, if ſuch and ſuch things went before; If Caine doe well, he ſhall be accepted, Gen. 4. if Dauid ſtay in Keilah, the lords of the citie will deliuer him: if I continue in beleeuing, then I ſhall be ſaued; if I continue in ſinne, I ſhall bee damned. And on this knowledge, for any thing that I can perceiue, doe the Papiſts and Lutherans hang all predeſtination: and ſo make Gods will the conſequent in decreeing, and mans will the antecedent in giuing God the occaſion. The deceit is this, that from the connexion of things, they iudge of Gods will about things; which is moſt indirect, and a knowledge that agrees not to God, but at the ſecond hand. It is true, that the firſt knowledge, beeing iudged according to logicall inuention, is of things poſſible: for arguments or reaſons afore they come to bee diſpoſed, are onelyonly in potentia ad arguendum, hauehave an affection to argue: and ſo many things that might be, hauehave this potentiall kind of reaſon; and ſo we ſay they are knowne of God, becauſe we ſo conceiue of them. The ſecond knowledge, which is more actuall, is properly ſcience; the laying together of thoſe things which before were onelyonly in affection to argue. The third is of theſe things, which beeing laid together, can no otherwiſe hauehave force of reaſon, but vponupon connexion and ſuppoſition: and in this head, would they tie Gods decree and knowledge; when indeed God followes no ſuch ſuppoſitions, but abſolutely knowes and wills what he pleaſeth: yet ſeeing his decree is as large as all reaſon, it cannot otherwiſe be imagined, but that in the manifeſtation of it, all reaſon ſhould appeare. And ſo we grant a connexion, ſuppoſition, condition, and occaſion in all Gods works that is in the effects of his will, but none of all theſe in the will p. 131it ſelfe. Therefore they doe amiſſe to put that vponupon his will, which is the cauſe, which ought to be in the effect of his will, and thereupon no antecedent of Gods will, but meere conſequents: That creation ſhould go before the fall, the fall before redemption, redemption before ſaluation, and ſinne before damnation, are all of them moſt neceſſarie ſuppoſitions, connexions, conditions, and if you pleaſe, occaſions. And thus much for that occaſion, which is to Arminius, delphicus gladius; but it cuts aſunder ſuch knots as God hath tied together, whoſe will in all things drawes the firſt linke, and cannot be drawne of any.

M. Per. 3. Principle in ſenſe is this, that God does all by counſell, therefore he hath his ſcope, which he knowes, wills, and diſpoſeth vntounto moſt prudently: and therefore decrees eueryevery thing therevnto.

I. Ar. The moſt wiſe God doth all things for ſome ende and purpoſe, euen that which he doth not, yet hee permits it for ſome ende and purpoſe: therefore, firſt it is a fault to ſay, that God muſt either agere, be doing; or otioſe ſpectare, become an idle beholder; which is no good diſtribution: for agere and permittere, to doe, and permit, are really diſtinguiſhed; and both theſe are for good purpoſe; and therefore, God muſt either be doing, or an idle beholder, are too ſcant, for he may permit. Secondly, prudence is too ſhort a word to inlarge it ſelfe to all Gods wiſedome. Thirdly, adhibito certo fine, the ende applied, & finis gratia, and for the ende, are not all one: for no man workes for the ende applied; but for the good therein implied. Fourthly, Deus non vult, aut non decernit quod non poteſt, God neither wills, nor decrees that which he cannot: here no ſenſe, except it be further added, which he cannot do, or permit: and therefore the concluſion is moſt imperfect, ſo God decreed to doe, except this be added, or permitted.

Collat. Agere prudenter, to doe wiſely, will beare the ſenſe of permiſſion: for permiſſion comming from Gods wil, is conſidered of vsus as an effect; this effect is produded by counſell, therefore for a good ende and purpoſe: ſo then, that which God doth permittere, he doth prudenter agere: grant then, that p. 132Gods permiſſion comes from his counſell, and aimes at his glorie, and then it muſt bee more then a negatiue act. But to ſpeake the truth; permiſſion, as it is expounded of Arminius, maintaines nothing but abſurdities: Firſt, in regard of the cauſe; for ſaies he, permiſſion is voluntatis remiſſae: now ſuch a will as this cannot be in God, whoſe will is meere act, and therefore cannot admit of degrees: all remiſſiueneſſe of Gods will, is in regard of the ſubiect, which is quantum; and may be leſſe and more, but in regard of himſelfe it is impoſſible. Secondly, a remiſſe will, doth either will, or not will, or ſuſpend: to ſuſpend, is neither to hinder nor further the act, and ſo the Lord ſhould hauehave no ſtroke in ſinne, which is the deniall of his prouidence in the apoſtacie of man: if his prouidence did not ſuſpend, nor his power, then his wil was not to ſuſpend in that action: if he did more then ſuſpend, then it was either to will, or not to will; if not to will, then ſinne ſhould not hauehave beene: therefore God did will it, per modum actionis.

That this may appeare, Gods manner of working in ſinne.we are to conſider what manner of efficient cauſes true reaſon laies downe vntounto vsus: And the firſt manner of cauſes efficient, are either to beget, or preſerue: the ſecond to worke alone, or with others: the third by himſelfe, or by accident; and agere is giuen to eueryevery one of theſe. Let vsus then ſee where Gods action in ſinne comes in: and becauſe it is moſt apparent in the third; I anſwer, God is the cauſe of ſin by accident: And this will appeare, if we conſider how many cauſes wrought by an internal principle; & theſe were foure: the deuill, and Adam principally; the ſerpent, and the woman inſtrumentally; and all theſe were blameable cauſes. The externall cauſe was the lawe, and will of God; which in mans tranſgreſſion, did all they did by an externall facultie: for the lawe is made the ſauour of death vntounto death, not by his own facultie, but by the deuills and mans free will: and this work of the law was moſt holy and iuſt. And this is a working cauſe, iuſtified by the true rule of reaſon, and not a bare permiſſion. If a man take a knife, and thruſt it into his bowels, it is the cauſe of murder, and no permiſſion: if man therfore was thruſt thorow and wounded to the death by the law of God, it was no p. 133bare permiſſion, but a working cauſe, yet in all things vnblameable. And therefore to denie Gods will all cauſation, is impoſſible. If a man would faine kill himſelfe, and could finde no inſtrument to effect it withall, he would be kept from the fact for want thereof: ſo if the Law had not bin, man could not hauehave died. Therefore it is moſt true, when our Diuines ſpeake of permiſſion, that they doe not in the generall latitude of action, exclude it from comming vnderunder that Generall head, which Arminius doth in eueryevery place, and ſo takes all manner of working from God in ſinne.

For that which hee obiects of prudence, it is true, The ſiue intellectuall vertue.that this vertue is a ſpeciall one: for firſt, we define intelligence, that vertue whereby God vnderſtandeth eueryevery particular, concerning eueryevery thing. 2. his knowledge or ſcience, whereby he knoweth all truths in things; as it is of things to come, it is called his foreknowledge, or preſcience. 3. his ſapience, whereby he knoweth whatſoeuer may follow, or enſue of eueryevery thing. 4. his prudence, whereby he knoweth his fitteſt opportunitie for all things. 5. his skill, whereby he knoweth to effect eueryevery thing moſt skilfully. The firſt of theſe vertues, belongs to all kinds of reaſon, which we call arguments ſimply conſidered in inuention: the 2. is ſeene in axiomes, where all truths are contained; the 3. in ſyllogiſmes, that teacheth how to conclude out of truths knowne; the 4. is ſeene in method and order; the 5. in practiſe. Hence we obſerue, that theſe 5. vertues beeing diſtinguiſhed, yet one by a Synecdoche, may be put for all. And therefore when M. Perkins ſaies prudently, he vnderſtands, not onelyonly Gods orderly proceeding, but intelligence of all things, ſcience of all truths, wiſdome in all diductions, and the moſt skilfull handling of the matter that poſſibly can be imagined. For the third, it is but a meere Grammaticall enaſion: for M. Perkins meant no more but the ende it ſelfe, though he further added the application of it. For the fourth, God neither wills, nor decrees that which he cannot; is no imperfect ſenſe, ſeeing that God, fecit qua potuit, & quafecit & potuit decrevit, that is, God did it, as he could doe it, and as he did it, and could doe it, he decreed it. And therefore there was no p. 134neede of ſuch addition, ſeeing that Gods poſſe brings in his officere, and that poſſe and efficere bring in his decree. But I ſee if I ſhould follow him ſteppe by ſteppe, his acuteneſſe would make me heape vp an infinite writing; therefore I content my ſelfe with a generall view of him, becauſe a iuſt confutation of him ought to be in an other ſtyle. Therefore that I may onelyonly free the point in hand, I will generally labour to doe it in the maine points, and leaue the other to ſome more ſpeciall tractate hereafter.

4. God decree man table, graunted of both, yet Arminius by permiſſion, and occaſion taken, oppoſeth M. Perkins.Principle: Gods decree is immutable, euen in thoſe things which are mutable. This is confeſſed of Arminius, both in Gods decree of effectuall working, and permiſſion: the ſecret oppoſition lies in two things, firſt in that he exactly diſtinguiſheth betwixt to doe, and permit, and will graunt no efficiencie to permiſſion: which beeing defended, ouerturnes the nature of a decree: for if to permit, be to doe nothing; then God ſhould decree to doe nothing. If he anſwer, to doe ſome thing in himſelfe, but nothing in mans ſinne, then God ſhould decree ſome thing with himſelfe, which ſhould neuer be effected in the creature by himſelfe, & ſo God ſhould not perfect his owne will. But it may further be replied, God decrees to permit, Permiſſiion yeelds the creature his libertie, ver denies not God his worke in ſinne.that is, to giuegive the creature free libertie to fall into ſinne: this is true permiſſion, that God will not doe it himſelfe, but permit man to doe it; yet ſtill we are further to adde, that the wiſdom of God, which is his will reuealed in his law, did worke in the very ſinne: and therefore ſinne is cauſed by the law, not by any internall facultie or power in the law, but externall; which beeing accidentall, is alwaies reduced to other cauſes: and therefore the laſt reſolution of ſinne, is into the free will of man. For neither the abuſe of the law by the deuiil, or his temptation, had prooued ſinnes in man, except he had conioyned with them. Secondly, though Gods decree in both theſe be immutable, yet God follows the creature, in taking occaſion from him in his greateſt mutations to ſet forth his glorie. This cannot ſtand: for immutabilitie makes a neceſſarie truth, and all neceſſarie truths are eternall: therefore taken from no occaſion of ſuch things as ſhould be in p. 135time, which are mutable and contingent, and neuer to be the grounds of eternall truths, which onelyonly hauehave their originall from him that is immutable and eternall; No eternall or immutable truth that followes things … contingent, and therefore an immutable decree cannot be vponupon the contingent occaſions of God, creatures.and therefore before all occaſions, are conſidered: for it is impoſſible, either that Gods will, or the decree of his will, or the immutabilitie of that decree, or the neceſſarie truth from that immutabilitie, ſhould euer be vponupon occaſion taken from creatures mutable and changeable. For whatſoeuer follows vponupon contingent things, is contingent; and therefore if Gods decree ſhould follow vponupon contingent things, it would become contingent.

Indeed there is a connexion or diſiunction of contingent things which is neceſſarie, not from the contingent things themſelues, but either from the connexion or diſiunction it ſelfe. As for example; if thou beleeue, thou ſhalt be ſaued, the connexion is neceſſarie; but that thou ſhould beleeue, or be ſaued, are both contingent. A man is either learned or vnlearned, is a neceſſarie diſiunction; but that thou ſhould be learned, is contingent; and ſo is the other. If God decree, then it muſt come to paſſe; but if the decree, ſhould follow vponupon the thing come to paſſe, though but occaſionally, yet would it croſſe the nature of immutabilitie. And we graunt him that which he ſaies, that the tearmes of the creatures mutation, which make a moſt certen determination, and by connexion, a neceſſarie truth: yet in ſimple conſideration, the Lord might hauehave done otherwiſe: which neuer can be in a neceſſarie truth.

5. Principle: All Gods iudgments are to be honoured & acknowledged. Exception: if they will agree with the word of God, and his iuſtice: and this cannot be, except they be inflicted vponupon man ſinfull: a iuſt exception, but not againſt the principle: for three things are to be conſidered in man: firſt, his workemanſhip, and that is Gods: ſecondly, the appointment of it for vſe vntounto his maker: thirdly, what may follow vponupon fault of the veſſell. Men are veſſels, and ſo they are Gods; ſecondly, they are prepared of God for his vſe: but the third, that they are veſſels of wrath, that is of themſelues. Therefore Auguſtine would not man to diſpute with God, either for his making, or p. 136for the ende of his making: for this can be reſolued into no higher a cauſe then his owne will. But if he will diſpute with God, for his wrath and vengeance executed vponupon him, he ſhal find no other meritorious cauſe, but his ſinns. That he ſaies Auguſtine was too bold with the place to the Romans, Arminius reprehends. Auguſtine of raſhneſſe, yet bona venia, with greater raſhneſſe.ſeeing the Apoſtle intended no ſuch thing as humane infirmitie to diſpute with God, but to muſle vp the mouthes of the refractorie and peruerſe Iewes, and ſuch like: but yet he is to know, that if the Apoſtle had brought his argument to that purpoſe onelyonly, then ſhould he hauehave dealt with them, as our Sauiour Chriſt did, Ioh. 8. the Iewes they ſay, we hauehave no neede to be made free; Chriſt tels them, Ye are the ſeruants of ſinne; & therefore in vaine doe you boaſt of your freedom: ſo here the Iewes might hauehave ſaide, we are caſt off and reprobates, for ſo was the will of God, and how ſhould we hauehave helped it? The Apoſtle might preſently hauehave ſtopped their mouthes, Yee are rebells againſt God, and therefore he hath caſt you off: what could fleſh and blood hauehave oppoſed to this? But the Apoſtle makes no mention of this, but reſolues all into Gods will, and that moſt iuſtly; ſeeing to make and prepare his veſſells, is his own will alone. When he ſhall come to the third, to handle them as veſſels of wrath, the cauſe ſhall eaſily be found out, to iuſtifie God and condemne man.

6. Principle: No mon can doe any thing, but where God workes the will and the deed: and it is done, according to that meaſure, leſſe or more, that God beſtowes vponupon vsus. Of the concourſe of Gods grace, both of them agree, onelyonly that word abſolute is diſliked; yet if in all effects the firſt cauſe bee abſolutely required, that the ſecond may worke, then God muſt abſolutely concurre to the effecting of any good.

Seuenth principle: No euill is avoided, that God doth not keepe vsus from in the working. Of this it is agreed; but the manner of working is doubted of: whether it bee by omnipotencie, cauſing a neceſſary impedition; or of counſell, cauſing an infallible impedition: the firſt mooues the will naturally, the ſecond voluntarily. To anſwer, the diſtinction is not good: for omnipotencie goes along with prouidence, in the preſeruation p. 137of the creature, as well as it did in creation for the production of the ſame; and therefore omnipotencie is ſeen in the creatures motions, whether naturall, or voluntarie. Secondly, that diſtinction of the wills naturall motion, and voluntary, is falſe: for I demaund, whether the will in both be an internall agent? if internall, then it ſuffers neither violence nor coaction, but acts moſt freely, and therefore by that modus efficiendi, which is counſell. Thirdly, a neceſſarie impedition, and infallible, are not alwaies diſtinguiſhed; nay a neceſſarie impedition is alwaies infallible, though infallible be not alwaies neceſſarie: and therefore to make diſtribution of a whole into a part, and a whole, is againſt reaſon, and oppoſeth thoſe which are not oppoſed. Fourthly, the naturall or voluntarie motion of the will to an externall obiect, is neuer neceſſarie, but contingent. Therefore if the Lord ſhould mooue the will, with a moſt certaine determination, vponupon ſome externall obiect, it ſhould not make the act neceſſarie.

Eigth Principle: Gods will is iudged of by his word, by reuelation, and by euent. Arminius excepts againſt the third, becauſe the euent may as wel belong to Gods permiſſion of it, as his action in it: the former teacheth vsus to reſolue the euent affirmatiuely vponupon the ſecond cauſe, but negatiuely vponupon Gods will; becauſe he would not hinder it, either by his power, ſecundum modum naturae, or perſwaſion, ſecundum modum voluntatis liberae. If wee graunt that God permitted ſinne (which before I hauehave ſhewed to bee falſe, in regard that a manner of working in ſinne is iuſtified of God without all blame) yet doth it not follow, but that the euent ſhould be Gods: Zach. 6.1. the foure charets of the world, that is, all euents, Eaſt, Weſt, North, and South, come from betweene mountaines of braſſe, Gods immutable decree, which is as immooueable as a mountaine of braſſe. Againe, that God muſt needes will the euent, it is plaine from the order of his wiſedome, which runnes before and after all euents: before to worke in them, and diſpoſe of them; without which two cauſes they cannot bee: he that is the firſt wiſedome, and the laſt, will not ſuffer any euent that ſhall not be from him, to him; for in as much as any thing p. 138is to him, in ſo much it is from him, ſeeing it is equally good to both, that is, as good for God, ſo good from God. Now ſurely, all euents fall between theſe two tearmes, and therefore from God to God. Againe, as after the euent, Gods wiſdome doth either approoue or diſprooue of the ſecond cauſes working it: and hence all euents are either ordered, limited, or puniſhed of God.

9. Principle: No man can doe that good which he might doe by grace, except God ſhould worke in him both the will, and the deede to effect the ſame. To this Arminius replies, that God neuer giues power, but ſecondly all things that might concurre to bring that power into act. This is moſt true; for before we ſhewed, that two things were required to produce any worke; facultie, and rule of working; and God neuer put any facultie into his creature, but he gaue him a ſufficient rule to worke by. But the ſtrait tying together of theſe two, makes the creature to ſtand firme and immooueable: therefore religion (which ſince the fall is properly ſo called) a tying againe of man vntounto God, is this ſtrait bond, that ties the faithfull ſoule for euer vntounto God; I will put my feare into their hearts, and they ſhall neuer depart from me: This is eternall life to knowe thee, &c. So then, beſide the rule, and the facultie, a third thing is required, not for ſufficiencie of working, but for certentie of working, and that is, when the Lord ſhall put into vsus his ſpirit of grace, which ſhall lead vsus into all truth, and keepe vsus from falling away. And this third thing Adam wanted, and therefore Phil. 2.13. It is God which worketh in you both the will & the deede, euen at his good pleaſure: Obſerue, firſt it is ſaid in you, that is, his faithfull ones: ſecondly, it is both will and deede: thirdly, it is his moſt free will and pleaſure, and therefore hee may doe it to whom he will, and when he will: therefore man had power and rule ſufficient to hauehave ſtood, but God did not ſo neceſſarily tie theſe together, but that man might, if hee pleaſed, denie his concourſe with the rule, and ſo ſinne againſt God.

10. Principle: The gouernement of the whole world, and all execution of iuſtice, is to be aſcribed vntounto God. The exception p. 139to this is of ſmall moment; God doth all not onelyonly in iuſtice, but alſo in merciemercy, and knowes where to beſtow both: this M. Perkins included in the gouernment of the world, wherein both iuſtice and merciemercy are manifeſted.

The definition of Predeſtination reprehended in the genus or common nature, in the ſubiect, and in the ende.

The next examination is concerning the definition of Predeſtination: wherein Arminius reprehends three things, Rather reconciled then …ppoſed in the firſt.firſt the genus or common nature in it: ſecondly the ſubiect: and thirdly the ende: for the firſt, Counſell cannot be the genus of predeſtination, becauſe it ſhewes the manner how Predeſtination is effected: ſo that Predeſtination is not Counſell, but that which is done by Counſell; Eph. 1.11. where predeſtination is ſaid to be wrought, after the counſell of his owne will. To this I anſwer, that by Counſell, M. Perkins vnderſtands the decree it ſelfe, by an vſual Trope of the cauſe for the effect, to wit, Counſell, for a decree by counſell; ſo then Predeſtination is a decree by counſell: and thus both of them are rather reconciled, then oppoſed.

For the ſecond, The ſubiect of Predeſtination is of man qua peccator, as ſinnefull: and in this Arminius doth triumph, as the only ground whereby he ouerturnes all other opinions of predeſtination; ſo that if we be able to diſcouer an other ſubiect of Predeſtination, the cauſe wil eaſily be euicted in all the reſt. Now for this purpoſe, let vsus firſt ſee how God wrought his decree: and this muſt be done by reſolution, Analyſis and geneſis of Gods decree the only way to know it.which alwaies begins with the moſt ſpeciall, and goes backward to the moſt generall: ſecondly, when we hauehave brought it to the moſt generall, to carrie it along, as God wrought it. He that will view the bodie of a man by Anatomie, muſt firſt of all lay open the outward parts, and ſo by cutting, enter into the ſecrets of the bodie, vntill he come vntounto thoſe parts where ſenſe, life, and motion hauehave their beginnings: ſo wee that will looke into the ſecret decree of God, as it is reuealed in his word, muſt begin p. 140with the moſt ſpecialls, & ſo aſcend till we come to the higheſt: which though it be laſt in our reſolution, yet will it be the firſt in Gods working.

Geneſis

Gods knowledge direct

Αλφα, God, Ωμεγα

Glorie

Goodneſſe

His Vertues

Intellectuall

Morall

Iuſtice, Mercy.

Analyſis.

Gods knowledge indirect.

Creation.

A world.

Man.

Made.

Holy.

Vnholy.

Redeemed.

A Church.

à latere.

Faihtfull.

Singular.

Analyſis.

The moſt ſpeciall ſubiect that can be imagined, The firſt ſubiect in reſolution which is laſt in compoſition,is one indiuiduall and ſingular man; and in this regard men are ſaid either to be written or blotted out of Gods booke, that is, either choſen by name, or put out by name; as in a regiſter, wherein men are intitled vntounto ſome honour, he that brags of it, and yet when the regiſter is ſearched, hath not his name therein, is put to greater ſhame: and this book is called in the Scriptures, the booke of life, wherein God is ſaid to write and blot out mens names; not that any is blotted out, but that God manifeſts that he neuer had them in his election. And this is made of Arminius his fourth and laſt decree, wherein he inſerts two moſt vncomfortable points: Firſt, that the baſis and foundation of this, is nothing but Gods foreknowledge in the vſe of ſufficient meanes adminiſtred; which beeing receiued and kept, men ſhould be ſaued; Grat… praeueniens ſubſequent.if otherwiſe, damned. Secondly, though by preuenting grace, men might beleeue, and by ſubſequent grace perſeuere, yet he might looſe both, and of a beleeuer become no beleeuer; which firſt of all breakes in peices the chaine, Rom. 8.3. the conſequent of iuſtification is glorification: this is contradicted by Arminius: a man may be iuſtified, p. 141that neuer ſhall be glorified: for I am ſure, he that beleeues, is iuſtified; yet he that beleeues, may fall from grace: and therefore a man may be iuſtified, that neuer ſhall be glorified. But the Apoſtle ſaies the contrarie, Whome he hath iuſtified, them alſo he hath glorified. Againe, it breakes the next linke: for God calls all, ſeeing he giues meanes ſufficient to know and beleeue; and therefore effectuall meanes are vſed, whereby men are called, yet neuer ſhall be iuſtified: when the Apoſtle ſaies the contrarie, whome he calls effectually and ſufficiently, they are iuſtified. So then, a man may be called, but neuer iuſtified; and iuſtified, but neuer glorified.

Secondly, it makes againſt our redemption: Ioh. 10.27. My ſheepe heare my voice, and follow me, &c. Here he contradicts three maine things in v. 28. Firſt, eternall life; he that beleeues hath it; but he may looſe it; therefore eternall life, may ſuffer death, and ſo eternall ſhould become temporall, and immortall mortall. Secondly, they ſhall neuer periſh; a good conſequent from eternall life: yet Arminius contradicts it, and ſaies, Chriſts ſheepe may periſh. Thirdly, No man ſhall plucke them out of his hand: but they may fall, ſaies Arminius, and therfore ſhall they be taken from him: but he will ſay, it is of themſelues: but that makes the cōtradiction much the worſe. For then, 1. Chriſts ſheepe may not heare his voice. 2. Chriſt may not know them. 3. they may not follow him. 4. they may extinguiſh that life, for which they are content to looſe their naturall life: and their eternall life may be as ſubiect to caſualtie, as their mortall and miſerable life. 5. they that ſhall neuer periſh, may periſh of themſelues; therefore Chriſt ſhall not be as good as his word, that ſaid neuer. 6. Chriſt ſhall fuffer that of his owne, which he would neuer permit vntounto others; and therefore ſhould be weaker to oppoſe the violence of his owne, then the tyrannie of others. 7. his fathers gift, and greatneſſe ſhall be ſurpriſed; his Gift committed to the truſt of his Sonne, ſhall not faithfully be reſtored, and his Father that is greater then all, though he ſhall preuaile againſt all others, yet his owne ſhall ouercome him.

Thirdly, it takes away all Chriſtian confidence; how durſt p. 142Paul ſo triumph, Rom. 8.31.Rom 8:31challenge principalities and powers? Paul ſaies, If God be for vsus, who ſhall be againſt vsus? Why Paul, thou may be againſt thy ſelfe: God ſpared not his Son to giuegive vsus àll things; yet Paul he gaue vsus not perſeuerance. Who can charge Gods choſen? who? Paul there is an anſwer; They can do it theſelues. God iuſtifieth, who ſhall condemne? The anſwer is eaſie; they may condemn themſelues. Chriſt is dead, yea rather riſen, & makes interceſſion: but Paul, for all his dying, we may die; for all his reſurrection, we may riſe to condemnation; & for all his interceſſion, we may liue not onelyonly in purgatorie, but hell it ſelfe. But to ſtoppe the mouthes of ſuch diſputers, the Apoſtle in the 35.38, 39. makes an ennumeration of all that can befall vsus; as tribulation, anguiſh, perſecution, famine, nakednes, perill, ſword, death, life, angels, principalities, powers, things preſent, things to come, height, depth, or any other thing: and what more then theſe can be found. If thy ſelfe be more then all theſe, then thou art aſſuredly a moſt wretched perſon, that when all is taken away that might draw thee from Chriſt, then thou wilt draw away thy ſelfe: what more deſperate then this? In all theſe things, ſaies the Apoſtle, we are more then conquerours: and how ſhould more then conquerers, be conquered? and they that are thus perſwaded not in themſelues, but in him that loued them, euer turne this their perſwaſion into miſerable deſpaire. And thus much of the loweſt ſteppe in Predeſtination.

2. …delis cum infi….Subiect is a beleeuer, or an infidell. Hence the Scripture bids vsus make our election ſure; Prooue your ſelues, whether you be in the faith or no: know ye not Chriſt dwells in you, except you be reprobates? now this is in the ſecond application of our redemption. For firſt, application is made vntounto the Church: ſecondly, vntounto the members in the Church: ſo that this is more ſpeciall then that, and therefore by analyſis riſeth firſt, yet is after the laſt, not in Gods worke, but in our ſeeing and feeling: and to this, concurre preparation vntounto faith, infuſion of this grace, inſition into Chriſt, vocation, vnion, inſtification, imputation, reconciliation, regeneration, and glorification. Infidels on the contrarie, hauehave no participation of theſe mercies; and therefore forſaken of God. And this is the ſecond decree of p. 143God, according to Arminius, which he calls abſolute and preciſe, Electio & reprobatio qualatatu… non perſonaru….becauſe the other was but conditionall in ſingular perſons. To beleeuers and penitent, God giues ſaluation in Chriſt, for Chriſt and by Chriſt; but impenitent and infidels damnation, as ſtrangers from Chriſt. You are to vnderſtand, that this decree is preciſe, in regard of faith, and not of the perſon: for he may denie the faith, and become an infidell, and ſo be damned. And here againe he offers violence to the faith of Gods Elect, againſt which Chriſt hath ſaid, The gates of hell ſhal neuer preuaile. And thus by analyſing, by the way, we hauehave diſcouered two of Arminius decrees, with the falſhoods therein contained.

3. Subiect more generall then both theſe, is the Church: Eccleſia … zanijs.and here is the proper place, of the manifeſtation of Gods decree. The Church conſiſts of mon, and angels: and ſo both men and angels, are the ſubiect of Gods decree; Reprobation, the manifeſtation of his hatred, both vponupon men and angels, which are excluded from the true ſocietie and communion that is in his Church: Election, the true declaration of his louelove, both vponupon men and angels, which he hath receiued into communion with himſelfe vnderunder Chriſt Ieſus the head of the Church. I muſt deſcend a little in this, that I may diſcouer a third decree of Arminius, which onelyonly belongs vntounto this place; but yet I am not come to the ſpeciall head of it. The Church is militant, or triumphant: for the triumphant Church, in which God hath manifeſted his election, as wel as the militant, conſiſts of ſaints and Angels. Here then obſerue, that ſinne and miſerie, do not goe before election, and reprobation: for ſo ſhould they agree to the whole ſubiect, and eueryevery member of the ſame; but ſinne and miſcrie, agrees not vntounto the holy angels, Angels elect in the Church, and yet neuer miſerable.and yet they are elect: now as many as were elect, could not fall into the ſinne of apoſtacie, and therefore the reſt were not elected; if not elected, then reiected in Gods decree, and that before they fell; and therefore reiection before ſinne. But to deſcend to the Church militant, which is with the tares; firſt in Adam, election and reprobation appeared in Cain and Abel: in Abraham, in Iſmael and Iſaac: in Iſaac, in Iacob and Eſau: p. 144in Iacob, called Iſrael, the true Iſrael of God, and the fleſhly ſeede: and now in the time of the Goſpel, here and there as it pleaſeth God to reueale his will and counſell, which long before was ſet down with himſelfe: and for the gathering together of his Church here vponupon earth, he hath left means ſufficient. And here comes in the third decree of Arminus, that God hath left in his Church ſufficient, neceſſarie, and effectuall meanes, to bring men to faith and repentance. And this we graunt, onelyonly we deſire that theſe meanes may be vnderſtood as onelyonly reſting in the boſome of the Church, where God hath laid open the riches of his treaſuries, and onelyonly to bee effectuall where Chriſt will apply them by the gratious worke of his ſpirit: for the Church is not compounded of tares and wheat: but the militant Church is wheate with tares; as the ſores of a bodie, are not the part of a bodie, but with the bodie, and all cures are applyed for the bodie againſt the ſores: and ſo all theſe meanes are for the welfare of his Church, but againſt the tares; and the meanes are applied to both, to the one for ſaluation, but to the other for damnation. 2. Tim. 2.19. Hymeneus and Philetus hauehave erred concerning the truth, and meanes of their ſaluation: this might make weake Chriſtians ſtagger, but the Apoſtle takes away all theſe doubts, the foundation of God remaineth ſure, and hath this ſeale, The Lord knoweth who are his: and therefore wil apply theſe meanes onelyonly effectually, to his owne; for that opinion of vniuerſall grace is damnable: greater louelove then this hath no man, to lay downe his life, &c. If then he hauehave laid downe his life for the wicked, he hath no greater louelove for his own, then he hath for the damned: & if Gods iuſtice be ſatisfied for the wicked, how ſhould he puniſh them? and if Chriſt died for them, then God wil acknowledge a ſatisfaction. But they ſay, all the fault is for want of application: To this I anſwer, that applicetion is as neceſſary an effect of redemption, as burning is of the fire; and there can be no redemption, but of neceſſitie it muſt bring in application: firſt, in regard of Gods iuſtice, which being appeaſed, cannot but be reconciled to all thoſe offenders, with whome he is well pleaſed in his ſonne. Secondly, in regard of Chriſts p. 145ſacrifice, Dan. 9.24. Meſſiah muſt bee ſlaine to reconcile the iniquitie, and bring in euerlaſting righteouſnes: this cannot be done without application, for both iuſtification and reconciliation belong to application. Thirdly, in regard of beleeuers themſelues who are his members, and therefore cannot be without the deriuation of grace, from their head Chriſt Ieſus.

4. Subiect, is man captiuated vnderunder ſinne, Homo redimendus or redemptus.and ſtanding in neede of a redeemer. Here comes in redemption, which is in nature before application, either to the Church, or faithfull: and therefore going backeward, we come moſt orderly vntounto it in the next place; and here ſhall we finde Arminius building vp his firſt decree; and hauing detected him here, Arminius his foure decrees.we ſhall neuer find him a ſtep higher. Hee hath fowre degrees, which all of them are to be found, not in the apoſtaſie or falling of man, but in his anaſtaſie, or riſing againe. The firſt is in redemption; Volo Chriſtum eſſe Mediatorem totius mundi, I will hauehave Chriſt to be the Sauiour of the whole world. The ſecond is in ſpeciall application; Volo reſipiſcentes & credentes in gratiam reoipere, eoſ que perſeuerantes ad finem vſque, ſaluos facere in Chriſto, propter Chriſtum, & per Chriſtum, impenitentes vero, & infideles in peccato, & ſub ira relinquere atque damnare tanquam alienos à Chriſto: that is, I will receiue vntounto my grace and mercy, all that repent and beleeue, perſeuere, and continue vntounto the end, in, thorough, and for my Chriſt: On the contrarie, all that are impenitent, & infidells, leaue them in their ſinnes to their euerlaſting condemnation: and both theſe are peremptorie. The third decree is to be found in the Church militant; & that is, Volo omnia media ad reſipiſcentiā & fidem neceſſaria, ſufficienter, adminiſtrare, &c. I will decree all meanes neceſſarie to repentance and faith, and ſufficiently and effectually adminiſter them, &c. Fourth and laſt is of euerie ſingular perſon, which belongs to the opening of the books at the day of iudgment, ſpeciall or generall: and this is all that he can ſay for Gods decree. And becauſe wee are come to his firſt decree, which is that which he preſſeth in all his book, we wil ſhew that when he hath preſſed all his arguments, he prooues no more, then Chriſt to be the cauſe of redemption, but none of election.

p. 146Epheſ. 1.4. Elegit nos in Chriſto, he choſe vsus in Chriſt: v. 6. he accepted of vsus in his beloued: Rom. 8.39. 2. Cor. 5.16. the argument is framed thus; If God can will any to hauehave eternall life, without reſpect of a mediator; then can he giuegive eternall life without ſatisfaction of a mediator; but this is impoſſible. Secondly, if God can louelove no man but in Chriſt, then can hee elect no man but in Chriſt; for he elects none but thoſe which he loues. Theſe and all other places concerning Chriſt, & the redeemed in Chriſt, Chriſt a meanes of election, but a principall cauſe of redemption.are thus to be anſwered: Chriſt is either conſidered as a means appointed of God, or as a principle and proper cauſe: in the firſt he is ſubordinate: in the ſecond, ſupreame: as a meanes appointed of God, ſo he is ſubordinate to Gods decree of election: and therefore neither as cauſe, nor meanes, nor condition, goes before the decree: but as Chriſt is conſidered in redemption, he is the principall, ſupream, and maine cauſe of all that come within the limits of redemption: we are choſen in Chriſt, not to be elected, but redemed; not as the cauſe of election, but as meanes appointed of God in our election; yet a meritorius cauſe of our ſaluation and redemption: ſo then it is moſt true, that God elects no man but in Chriſt, loues, ſaues and redeemes no man but by Chriſt: in the one, the cauſe; in the other, the effect. So then election can not preſuppoſe faith in Chriſt, remiſſion of ſinnes by Chriſt, renouation of the ſpirit, and perpetuall aſſiſtance, becauſe they follow election, the cauſe of redemption, and redemption the cauſe of all theſe. So then while Arminius diſputes his decree in redemption, he commits theſe errors: firſt, he makes the cauſe to follow the effect, as election to follow redemption: ſecondly, he makes Chriſts louelove in redeeming, to be the cauſe of Gods louelove in electing: thirdly, he makes the meanes appointed for the ende, to goe before the end it ſelfe: fourthly, hee makes the fruits of redemption, as faith, remiſſion of ſinnes, renouation by the ſpirit, perſeuerance, &c. occaſions antecedent, to Gods decree of election. So that theſe ſhalbe no fruits of our election; which if he graunt on the contrarie, then muſt they as occaſions follow our election: for the fruit is no wayes before his cauſe, neither any occaſion why the p. 147cauſe ſhould produce them: fiftly, though he denie it, yet he muſt confeſſe that theſe occaſions as they are holden of him, muſt be cauſes for Gods decree to ſaue vsus by Chriſt, by faith, by repentance, by remiſſion of ſinnes, by renouation, by perſeuerance in weldoing: what are theſe but cauſes of eternall life? I am ſure ſaluation is giuen vntounto Chriſt as a meritorious cauſe, Arminius forgets him ſelfe when he ſaies we are choſen in Chriſt as a meritorious cauſe, for ſo his occaſion at vn… wares ſlips into a cauſe.& ſo in Chriſt to all the reſt. Theſe then going before Gods election to left and ſaluation, can no wayes be conſidered, but as cauſes: and indeed his words ſound ſo much, when he ſaies, we are choſen in Chriſt, not as a meanes, but alſo as a meritorious cauſe; of what effect I beſeech you? if he ſay of redemption, then we are all of one mind; but if he ſay of election, then we reiect him: but his meaning is, we are choſen in Chriſt, as a meritorious cauſe of that choice, and ſo the occaſion was not taken from thence, but the true and onelyonly cauſe.

Many other abſurdities followe from this, but I paſſe them ouer: and yet before I aſcend to the next ſtep, let me tell you how Arminius contradicts himſelfe: Firſt, hee ſaies, that the ſubiect of election is man fallen: but how can that be, ſeeing no men are elected before they be in Chriſt? I am ſure that he dare not denie, but that they were ſinners before they were in Chriſt, and therefore they were elected before they were elected. Secondly, he ſaies, that we are elected in Chriſt as a redeemer; and yet Chriſt is a redeemer before we be in him, for application followes redemption. Againe, both man fallen, & man to be redeemed are all alike, and Chriſt is equall to all, where then is election? Thirdly, a man muſt be in the Church, before he can be of the number of the faithfull, and vntil he be faithfull he cannot be elected, therefore election comes after the fall, redemption, and the Church. Fourthly, a faithfull man may fall, and ſo election may change, and therefore no certaine election but of ſingular perſons. Thus then the firſt ſubiect of election that he can finde, is either a faithfull perſon or a ſingular perſon: ſo that it is lower then the Church, redemption, or the fall. And hee may as well begin with the creation of the world, as with any of theſe three; for all are but media precedanea: and though ſome of them ſhewe more iuſt occaſion p. 148for election or reprobation, yet the proper ſubiect by his doctrine cannot be found out, vntill we come to the conſideration of a man as a beeleeuer or an infidel: neither here is it fixed, but it muſt skip againe to a ſingular perſon: for ſaith hee, that former decree is rather qualitatum then perſonarum, of qualities then perſons: ſo that he is vncertaine in all his notions.

The next ſteppe that we aſcend vntounto, Homo peccator the fift ſtep in aſcending.is man fallen: where God ſhewes theſe attributes: Firſt, his holineſſe, in that the Lord was free from all fault: Secondly, his iuſtice, whereby he beeing moſt iuſt in himſelfe, cannot but execute iuſtice: as in wel-doing to them which doe well; ſo in inflicting puniſhment on them which do ill: as it burnes more remiſſely againſt ſinne, it is called anger; as more ſharpely, wrath; as it doth giuegive ſentence, iudgement, as it doth execute, vengeance. Thirdly, he ſhewes merciemercy, not that which is properly vnderſtood in Chriſt: but that which is vnderſtood in my text, compaſſion, gentleneſſe, patience, longanimitie, bountifulneſſe, &c. and theſe moſt properly appeare in the fall: yet the fall beeing more generall then all that follow, hath his vſe in them all, and is ſubordinate with all the reſt to the decree of God. And euen here God manifeſts his decree of election, euen before the ſending of Chriſt: Ioh. 3.16. God ſo loued the world, that he hath giuen his onelyonly begotten Sonne, that whoſoeuer beleeueth in him, ſhould not periſh, but hauehave euerlaſting life. 1. Ioh. 4.9. In this appeared the louelove of God toward vsus, becauſe God ſent, &c. in both theſe places, the louelove of God is the cauſe why Chriſt was giuen and ſent; and therefore this louelove went before Chriſt, elſe ſhould the cauſe followe the effect; this louelove was decreed. So then, God loued the world, before he either gaue or ſent his Son: actually he loues none but in Chriſt, neither doth any feele his louelove, but he that is in Chriſt: and therefore for the comfort of the Church, the fitteſt place to teach the decree in, is application of Chriſt; yet the determination of his louelove, was before all this, and the onelyonly cauſe why Chriſt was ſent into the world.

6. H…mo ad imaginem dei. gradus 6.Steppe, is a man according to Gods image: and in this eſtate man was holy and righteous, and to this image we are reſtored p. 149againe in Chriſt, Rom. 8.29. and therefore God decreed to maintaine this image in ſome of his creatures, that ſo he might hauehave the glorie of his creation maintained for euer: and this is the thing that made God hauehave a Church from the beginning of the world, and no Church wherein there is not Gods election, and the decree of his euerlaſting ſaluation. Hence man in his innocencie, was of Gods election; ſuch a one as then was ordained of God, could not die without the renouation of his image, therefore our euerlaſting ſaluation was decreed in the eſtate of our integritie.

7. Steppe is man made, Homo creatus a… per creat…onem ſe ctus. gradn. 7.and this is the firſt manner of conſideration that we can find in a man; and in this likewiſe appeares the decree: for God made man for the manifeſtation of his glorie: not onelyonly in regard of generall goodneſſe, wiſedome, and omipotencie, ſeene in all the creatures, neither of that which was ſeene in the angels, to wit, goodneſſe communicated from an infinite good, to which being ioyned their obedience, brought Gods rewarding iuſtice, to confirme them in an euerlaſting eſtate: and this is called, bonitas cum iuſtitia coniuncta, goodneſſe conioyned with iuſtice, wherein appeared the election of the good angels. Againe diſobedience, to diſſolue and breake off the cōmunication with that infinite good, brought in puniſhing iuſtice, euerlaſting and eternall, wherein appeared the reprobation of the bad angels. Thus farre then it pleaſed God generally to ſhewe his goodneſſe, omnipotencie, wiſedome, &c. Secondly, more ſpecially his goodneſſe and rewarding iuſtice vponupon the bleſſed Angels; and the loſſe of his goodnes, with the inflicting of his puniſhing iuſtice vponupon the accurſed angels: but as yet no ſubiect to ſhew goodnes, iuſtice, and merciemercy; and therefore man muſt bee made the ſubiect on which he will ſhew all his goodnes; in what order, you ſhall heare when I come to ſhew the ends in Gods decree.

8. Is man, more generall then all theſe: For man made, Homo generale ſubiectum o…i bus adiunctis praeſuppoſitum. grad. 8hath a ſpeciall ende, to wit, happineſſe of creation: man made holy, happineſſe with the creator: man made vnholy, miſerie with himſelfe: man redeemed, ſaluation by Chriſt: and ſo of all the reſt, ſpeciall ends may be aſſigned; which can be nothing elſe, but p. 150the manifeſtation of Gods glorie in his iuſtice and merciemercy.

9. Mundus exnihilo. gradus. 9.A world, made of nothing, exceeding good, whereof man is a part, and the moſt principall, and therefore made for man. Now euen before this ſubiect, was election, Come, receiue the kingdome prepared for you before the foundations of the world: So then, God intended a kingdome for his elect, before he made this world.

10. Creatio omnium or goad extoriora: gr…dus vl…mus, & ſup…mus.Creation, the originall of all things, and before which there was nothing, & without this man could not be: ſo then, when they ſay, man was by creation, it is true, that man there tooke his originall; and creation is more generall then man, but ſo creation is taken actiuely; but paſſiuely as in man, it is more ſpeciall; therefore man created, is a ſpeciall conſideration of man; but man in Gods creation, is more generall. Hence the Lord in making of him, appointed him all his ends. To conclude, the creation of man, was for the manifeſtation of all Gods diuine attributes, as wel iuſtice and merciemercy, as the reſt. And now beeing come to the higheſt ſtaire in creatures, wee ſlippe preſently out of them, and lay all the reſt on Gods will, as the onelyonly ſubiect. This is as it were, the bodie of Gods decree, the reſt is as the ſoule: this externall, that which followeth internall; in this is manifeſted Gods indirect knowledge, in the other, his direct and proper knowledge: the loweſt ſteppe of this is iuſtice and merciemercy; and the ſubiect in which theſe two reſt, is his will; I will hauehave merciemercy on whom I will hauehave merciemercy, and compaſſion on whom I will hauehave compaſſion, Rom. 9.15. and v. 18. He hath merciemercy, on whom hee will hauehave merciemercy; and whom he will, he hardeneth. … in … re… 2. …irtus mor…s. 3 intellectuals. 4 …. 5 bo mitas. 6. Gloria 7. Deas ipſe: …l pha & om…ga.Second head we call morall vertues, whereby God willeth eueryevery thing moſt readily that is good, and is moſt prompt in the performance thereof: ſo that iuſtice and mercy comming vnderunder this head, according to our capacitie, are moued to nothing but that which is good: third, intellectuall virtues, whereby God is moſt prompt in the performance of eueryevery act of vnderſtanding: fourth, vertues, whereby God is knowne vntounto vsus to bee abſolutely good: fifth, goodneſſe, the head and fountaine of all theſe: ſixt, glorie, the perfection of goodneſſe: ſeuenth, God himſelfe, which is knowne vntounto vsus p. 151by all theſe. That this is the Scripture, ſee all in the 33. of Exod. and alſo in the 34. Chap. 33. ver. 18. I beſeech thee ſhewe me thy glorie: v. 19. God anſwers Moſes, my glorie is too excellent for thee, but my glory, which is ſeene in my goodneſſe, ſhall goe before thee: I will make all my good goe before thee: that is, thou ſhalt ſee the backe-parts of my glorie: theſe backeparts are Gods vertues, which are able to proclaime his name: for vertue is the onelyonly thing, to blaze abroad the name of Iehouah: theſe vertues are mercy and compaſſion: more ſpeciall, Chap. 34.6.7. ſtrength, merciemercy, grace, patience, bountifulneſſe, longanimitie, gentleneſſe, &c.

Here you ſee is ſpeciall mention of merciemercy and iuſtice, Mercy and iuſtice Gods cheife glorie.as though in regard of them, all the reſt were obſcured: theſe are as the two great lights, the one to rule the day of his election, the other to rule the night of mans miſery. Now all theſe are ſimply willed of the Lord; and therefore as we hauehave come vpward by analyſing, ſo now may we boldly compoſe againe the whole matter.

Firſt, God wills his glory, ſecondly his goodneſſe, Genefis, or the order of Gods proceeding as farre as the Scripture guideth vsus.thirdly his verues, fourthly the vertues of vnderſtanding, fiftly the vertues of will, ſixtly the principall vertues of his will, iuſtice, and merciemercy: this is all done in himſelfe abſolutly without all reſpect vntounto the creatures. But God wil manifeſt all this out of himſelfe: Firſt, therefore he will create: ſecondly by creation, he will make a world: thirdly in the world, he will hauehave a man: fourthly that he may hauehave him, he will make him: fiftly he will make him in his owne image: ſixtly man thus made, may by his own free will become vnholy: ſeuenthly man beeing vnholy, may be receiued vntounto merciemercy, or plagued with iuſtice: eightly that mā may be receiued vntounto merciemercy, Chriſt ſhall redeeme: ninthly that Chriſt may redeeme him, he muſt bring him to his ſheepefold, and ſaue him in the arke of his church: tenthly that he may be ſaued in the Church, he muſt create in him the ſpirit of faith: laſtly, he muſt bring him to thoſe heauenly manſions, where his name was written long before the foundations of the world; the reſt beeing left in their ſinnes, muſt dwell out of heauen, where there names are written in the earth. And thus p. 152much of the ſubiect.

Now I come vntounto the end: Concerning the third thing in the definition which is about the ende.where I wil ſhew three things: firſt the end it ſelfe; ſecondly, the manifeſtation of it; thirdly, the order. The end, on all parts is graunted, to be Gods glory: for as he is the ſupreame efficient cauſe of all things, ſo is he the laſt end; and before him, and after him, nothing is to be found. Secondly, all agree, that the manifeſtation muſt be in regard of his eſſentiall properties; only all the queſtion is of the laſt, in what order they are to be manifeſted. That this may appeare, we will ſhew what the order of endes is: Subordination of ends to ſome laſt.ſecondly, which ende is exactly the laſt in this order: thirdly, the order of the meanes: fourthly, the order of ſubiects, out of which, theſe meanes are produced. Order of ends, is the ſubordination, or bringing vnderunder of all ends to one laſt ende: the reaſon of this is, becauſe order is alwaies of things comming betwixt an abſolute firſt, and an abſolute laſt: this the heathen Philoſophers called foreign, eruditio in cinculo, wiſdome running round in a circle. In a circle you know, that there muſt be the ſame beginning and ending: ſo God, the beginning and ending of all things, makes his wiſdome in all his creatures runne round from him to him. This the heathen Poet Homer, called, foreign, auream catenam, quae de coelo vſque ad terram deſcendebat, a golden chaine, comming from heauen to earth; in which eueryevery footſteppe or impreſſion of Gods wiſdome, is as a golden lincke, coupled with ſome-other from the beginning to the ende. So then, the firſt point is plaine, that all things are vnited together for ſome laſt ende. Many lines meete in one center, and ſo all make but one; yet being drawn vntounto the circumference, ſpread themſelues abroad.

For the ſecond, The laſt end conſiſts in all Gods attributes which are one as himſelfe is one.all Gods attributes, are the laſt end; his glorie is the laſt, his goodneſſe is the laſt, his vertues are the laſt, and ſo of the reſt. If it bee inquired which of all theſe wee are to conceiue of, as the laſt exactly; I anſwer, iuſtice and merciemercy. This ſhall the better appeare, if we conſider how God is the beſt in eueryevery thing. If we ſpeake of beeings, then God is the beſt, and moſt abſolute beeing: if we ſpeake of life, then God p. 153is the beſt life: therefore will and vnderſtanding, which belong vntounto the beſt life. Now will and vnderſtanding, are conſidered of vsus, either for facultie, or vertue: for facultie, then the Lords vnderſtanding beeing the beſt, muſt be able to vnderſtand together and at once all truths, and his will moſt free to will all good: facultie we ſay, makes able, but vertue makes prompt and readie; as the intellectuall vertues make a man prompt and readie to vnderſtand, the morall vertues prompt and readie to wil that which is good. Vertue is whereby God is knowne vntounto vsus, to be abſolutely good, therefore abſolute happines, both for vnderſtanding, and will. Theſe beeing premiſed, let vsus ſee where we may note the greateſt perfection and excellencie. Firſt, vertues are more excellent then faculties; and ſo the Lord had rather ſhew his goodneſſe, then his omnipotencie. Secondly, morall vertues, are better then intellectuall, in ſo much as the will is better then the vnderſtanding; therefore I dare boldly ſay, the Lord had rather ſhew his morall vertues, then intellectual: The beſt vertues iuſtice and mercy.for it is a greater praiſe to be iuſt and mercifull, then wiſe and vnderſtanding. Laſtly, among morall vertues, none comparable to iuſtice, and merciemercy: why then may I not conclude, that exactly the laſt ende that God would hauehave manifeſted, is the glorie of his iuſtice and merciemercy: and if this be the laſt, then all other muſt be brought vnderunder theſe, and aime at theſe principally.

Reaſons of this aſſertion, are many. Firſt, that which brings out of the creature the ſpeciall manifeſtation of Gods glorie, is the laſt and beſt ende; but iuſtice and merciemercy doe this: Exod. 33.19. I will proclaime the Name of the Lord before thee: and what is eſpecially proclaimed? iuſtice and merciemercy: and merciemercy more then iuſtice: ſo, Rom. 9. God will get him a name on Pharaoh, a reprobate by his iuſtice; and a name on his Elect, by his merciemercy: and therefore God is often ſaid in the Scriptures, to delight himſelfe in iuſtice and merciemercy.

Secondly, iuſtice and merciemercy, are the chiefe, becauſe they are the vertues of the will, which is properly conuerſant about good. Thirdly, theſe make vsus conceiue of God, as the chiefe good. It is worth our obſeruation, to ſee euen how by the p. 154light of reaſon, the Heathen hauehave aſcended to this conſideration: they referred all things to foure heads. 1. Such as hauehave onelyonly beeing. 2. that hauehave beeing, and life. 3. that hauehave beeing, life, and ſenſe. 4. that hauehave beeing, life, ſenſe, and reaſon: backeward again, 4 returne into 3. 3 into 2. 2 into one: ſo all theſe, though diuers, yet foūded in one. Now this one once was not, & therefore when it was, it was by the power & force of ſome chiefe and firſt beeing; and this they tearmed abſolute eſſence: this beeing alwaies, they tearmed it eternall eſſence. Againe, to beeing finding life, the next they called God, foreign, a liuing God. In the third place, becauſe life was in trees, and the beaſts of the field, they gaue vntounto God the name of foreign, minde, or vnderſtanding. In the fourth place, becauſe they thought the minde of man to be bare and naked, hauing nothing written in it, yet capable of all things, and therefore imperfect, they called God further, foreign & foreign, power and act, and ſo a perfect minde. 5. Becauſe power & act might be abuſed, and ſo the greater and the worſe, they called God, foreign, goodneſſe it ſelfe. 6. Becauſe they thought the chiefe good to be according to all vertues, they gaue vertues vntounto God, both intellectuall and morall. 7. Becauſe vertues were qualities, and ſo comprehended within the limits of ſubiects, they called God infinite in beeing, liuing, vnderſtanding, working, infinite goodnes, and infinite vertue. Now in the 8 place, becauſe infinite vertue muſt be one moſt ſimple vertue, and comprehend all in it, they ſaw not how Gods prouidence, ſhould rather be counted prouidence, then iuſtice; and iuſtice rather iuſtice, then merciemercy; & merciemercy more merciemercy, then knowledge; knowledge then life, and life then eſſence.

True it is, God ſimply one, to vsus diuerſe.God is ſimply one in himſelfe, yet apprehended of vsus as diuers. For ſo we define him in his attributes; that he is one God, diuerſly apprehended of vsus. Therefore the manifeſtation of himſelfe in his creatures, is to be conſidered in diuers heads: yet the greateſt meeting together of all his attributes, is moſt to be ſeene in his iuſtice and merciemercy. Therefore both Scripture and reaſon, prooue God eſpecially glorified in his iuſtice and merciemercy. If then iuſtice and merciemercy, be moſt exactly p. 155the laſt end, then muſt all ends, and meanes, and ſubiects, be ſubordinate vntounto this ende: and this ende muſt be decreed before all the reſt. Hence we may conclude, that God intended to manifeſt his iuſtice and merciemercy, before all things.

For the third, the order of the meanes, The order of meanes.it muſt thus be conceiued, that that which is firſt in execution, is laſt in the intention of the workeman, and moſt remote from the ende; and the lower we goe, the neerer we come vntounto the ende. M. Perkins makes creation and permiſſion of the fall, two generall meanes of Gods predeſtination. This Arminius reprehends: for, ſaies he, both creation and the fall, goe before predeſtination: it is true in the execution; but if predeſtination reſt vponupon the laſt end, intended of God, it muſt needs goe before as an end, and hauehave all theſe meanes come vnderunder him. As for example; I would determine a iourney to London, to ſpeake with ſome deare freind; this is before all the meanes that I vſe to come vntounto him: yet before I can accompliſh this, I muſt come where he is; and that I may come where he is, I muſt get me a horſe, and all things neceſſarie for my iourney: then muſt I goe from place to place, vntil I come where he is: ſo that the firſt in intention, is laſt in execution; and in the progreſſe, the further I goe, the neerer I am to conſider the meanes ſubſequent vntounto the end. In like manner, God intends the manifeſtation of his iuſtice and merciemercy; therefore this is the firſt with God, and the laſt, that all meanes driues at. That this may be brought about, God will create, create a world, man in this world, man holy, man holy may by his owne freewill become vnholy, man vnholy may bee puniſhed with the iuſtice of God, but redeemed may be receiued vntounto merciemercy.

Concerning the fourth, order of ſubiects: The order of ſ…biects manifeſting Gods diuine attributes.The firſt ſubiect is nihilum, nothing, out of which God muſt bring ſomething; and here ſteps out to our viewe, omnipotency. The ſecond ſubiect is a world, admirable for beauiie, and perfect for goodneſſe: and here ariſeth the manifeſtation of Gods wiſedome, and goodneſſe. Thirdly, in this world there ſhall be creatures, either to communicate with a finite good, or an infinite good: in thoſe that communicate with a finite good, God ſhewes his p. 156wonderfull louelove to men and angels, that made all in heauen, and earth for them: ſecondly, with an infinite good, that is, with God himſelfe, as men and angels; where he meant to lay open all the treaſurie of his glorie; goodneſſe, and vertues. And here firſt of all, he made them all in his own image, and therefore able to expreſſe any of his attributes: God is a ſpirit, ſo are they ſpirituall: God is vnderſtanding and will; and ſo they hauehave both vnderſtanding and will. The vnderſtanding and will of men and angels are ſpeciall ſubiects to declare his goodneſſe.Hence may men and Angels ſhewe forth both his intellectuall vertues, and morall vertues; they hauehave intelligence, to conceiue of principles; ſcience, to iudge of truths; ſapience, to make diductions from thoſe truths; prudence, to carrie all things orderly; and art or skill, to practiſe in any ſubiect the excellencie of their reaſon: Againe, for morall vertues, as compaſſion, gentleneſſe, patience, longanimitie, bountifulneſſe, liberalitie, magnificence, fortitude, but eſpecially iuſtice and mercy. So then; in that God made them with holy & righteous vnderſtanding… and wills, they were to ſet forth all his vertues: and therefore Saints reſtored are commaunded, to ſet forth the vertues of him that hath called them into his maruailous light.

To deſcend firſt to angels: Angels ſet forth goodneſſe and iuſtice.God by creation did communicate with them infinite goodneſſe, wherein did conſiſt their happineſſe; now in reaſon it was neceſſarie, that this communication ſhould be by compact, and the ſquare of iuſtice; wherefore a law muſt be giuen them, according to which, this communication was to be maintained. Hence commination, as well in the loſſe of this goodneſſe, as participation for the obſeruation of the rule. Here then may the Lord manifeſt his iuſtice; to obedience, remuneration and euerlaſting communication; and this is the manifeſtation of infinite goodnes, conioyned with Gods rewarding iuſtice, wherein appeared the election of the good angels: to diſobedience, the loſſe of this infinite good, wherein appeared puniſhing iuſtice, peremptorily inflicting damnation on all the bad angels; and here appeared their reprobation: but in both theſe could no mercy be ſhewed: not in the firſt, becauſe in the good angels, there was no miſerie: except we coneciue poſſible miſery, which is not a fit ſubiect p. 157for merciemercy, ſeeing there was no want for the perfection of a creature: neither could it be vntounto the bad angels, for though by their fall, they became miferable, and ſo might hauehave receiued merciemercy; yet becauſe they ſinned againſt the holy Ghoſt, their ſinne was vnpardonable, and vncapable of merciemercy.

Leaue we the Angels, and come to men, where more eſpeciall communication is to be obſerued from the diuine wiſedome of God. Firſt, Men ſet forth goodnes, … and mercy.God did communicate with them infinite goodnes, but it muſt be receiued by a rule of iuſtice, Doe this, and thou ſhalt liue: and alſo a commination of the loſſe of it, But if thou doe not, thou ſhalt die the death: here no man communicated with God in obſeruing of the Law, and therefore could there not be found in man any rewarding iuſtice, as was found in the good Angels: ſo that man was now for euer put out of the poſſeſſion of happineſſe, by the Law of God: and if euer he receiue this happineſſe againe, it muſt be by merciemercy. O therefore, for the louelove of God, you Papiſts, conſider this one thing; That man is not now to be ſaued, as the Angels are in heauen: and therefore denie all your workes, if it were for no more then Adams ſinne: for now will he hauehave it vnderunder the condition of merciemercy. Man then hauing put himſelfe out of Gods fauour, and not by a ſinne againſt the holy ghoſt, may be receiued vntounto merciemercy. So here is a fit ſubiect for God to ſhew his goodneſſe, iuſtice, and merciemercy: and where he had decreed, the manifeſtation of his merciemercy, it ſhall appeare when he hath ſent his Sonne, gathered his Church, and ingrafted eueryevery faithfull ſoule into the myſticall bodie of this Sauiour. Againe, where he hath decreed the manifeſtation of his iuſtice, it ſhall appeare in all thoſe that are paſſed ouer of Chriſt, and hauehave not his blood ſprinkled vponupon them. This ſhall make all ſpirituall Egypt, euen at the midnight of their miſerie, to crie out moſt lamentably: but Iſrael ſhall then receiue the beſt Iewels, coſtly attire, and eueryevery pretious thing that heart can wiſh. I ſhould follow Arminius in the reſt, but becauſe I heare ſome other are about it, that are worthie men, I breake off: for I confeſſe, that I was drawne vntounto it, by conſidering how many runne after Arminius. If the learned of the Land, ſhall approoue p. 158this which I hauehave done, and no others ſhall hauehave taken it in hand, I will be readie to ſtand at their command, to proceede in the reſt. And I can not but breake out, to bleſſe and praiſe God, that hath lately raiſed vp ſuch worthie Biſhops, the true Defenders of the Orthodoxall truth, and reſolute enemies to all that oppoſe it. I am at their command to ſtay, or goe forward: and if I hauehave ſlipped in any thing, (for I confeſſe my ignorance may ſoone draw me into error, and error may plunge me in hereſie it ſelfe) I am willing to heare any, and yeild preſently: but I hope it is the truth, and then it will ſtand. We hauehave great cauſe to bewaile the miſeries of theſe wretched times, in which Atheiſme, clouds of hereſie, worldly policie, (faſly ſo called, beeing indeede little better then plaine villenie) and temporizing, hauehave like a canker, fretted out the very heart of pietie: they are but a few which ſeeke to ſearch out the certaintie in matters of Religion, or which care to hauehave eſtabliſhed hearts, and know preciſely which is the true God, Baal or the Lord. We had rather halt betweene two opinions, that ſo we may be for all times, then vndergoe the labour of gayning aduiſed reſolution. Some ſlippe into Poperie, beeing lead captiue (God in iuſtice ſending them ſtrong deluſions) by thoſe falſe brethren, which are priuily crept into eueryevery corner, through the remiſſenes of theſe euill times. Others runne headlong to prophanneſſe, and that which is of all other the worſt, luke-warmenes. This brings in want of louelove to the truth, and want of this, hereſie: ſo that we may well ſay, except the Lord of hoſts had reſerued vntounto vsus, euen a ſmall remnant, culling out (as it were) one of a citie, and two of a Tribe, as the ſhepheard taketh out of the mouth of a lyon two legges, or a peece of an eare, according to the election of grace, we ſhould long ere this hauehave beene as Sodome, and like vntounto Gomorrha: we had bin (as it is ſaid of a curſed tongue) a very world of wickednes. And ſurely except the good Gouernours and Shepheards of our Land, be vigilant and carefull, we ſhall not ſo much hauehave the ſheepe, in the mouth of the lyon, as the Shepheards themſelues; and then, woe be to the flocke. It is reported, that Beza conferring with Arminius, and ſeeing in his young yeares p. 159ſuch ripeneſſe of wit, brake out into theſe words, Goe thy way, for I am fully perſwaded, that thou wilt either prooue an excellent inſtrument of Gods Church, or a moſt peſtilent heretike; which propheſie we ſee now come to paſſe. God deliuer our Shepheards out of his mouth, and eſtabliſh them in ſoundneſſe of doctrine, that ſo the ſilly ſheepe may not be deuoured by their owne Paſtors.

Propoſitions.

1 Gods will his glorie.

2 His glorie is his goodneſſe.

3 His goodneſſe is all his attributes.

4 His attributes are his vertues.

5 His vertues are intellectuall and morall.

6 His morall vertues, are his iuſtice and merciemercy.

7 All theſe he wills abſolutely.

8 That which he wills, he can doe.

9 That which he can doe, and wills, that he decrees.

10 That which he decrees, is done by counſell.

11 That which is done by counſell, is wiſely done.

12 That which is wiſely done, is for ſome good ende.

13 That which is for ſome good ende, hath all good meanes.

14 Creation, is a good meanes of Gods ende.

15 The world is made for Gods ende.

16 Men and Angels are made for this ende.

17 Angels ſhew forth his goodneſſe and iuſtice.

18 Men ſhew forth goodneſſe, iuſtice, and merciemercy.

19 Chriſt is a meanes to declare Gods merciemercy.

20 Men onelyonly receiue merciemercy from Chriſt.

21 All out of Chriſt, are iuſtly condemned.

22 A iuſt condemnation is for ſinne.

23 All this God hath done.

24 That which he hath done, he could doe.

25 From both theſe, he decreed.

26 That which he decreed, he purpoſed.

27 That which he purpoſed, reſpected his glorie.

p. 16028 His glorie was agreeable to his wiſdome.

29 That which agreed with his wiſdome, was good.

30 That which was good, he abſolutely willed: therefore he abſolutely willed all theſe things.

Obſerue that the end confiſts not in vſe, but in his goodneſſe and fitneſſe for vſe: the ende of an houſe is not habitation, for that is after the houſe is made; now the ende is before the making of the houſe; and therefore that a houſe ſhould be good & fit for habitation, that is the ende; though the houſe it ſelfe were neuer inhabited. The world was made for man, yea, and that before man was exiſtent; yet that goodneſſe and fitneſſe which reſpected man, was put into the creature, and ſhould be brought forth after the creation of man, according as he had vſe of them. So God made all theſe things fit for his glorie; this fitneſſe was good, and abſolutely willed of God; and the vſe that God made of this fitneſſe was likewiſe good; but no excuſe for mans ſinne: no more then the fitneſſe of an houſe for habitation an excuſe, when it is made a denne of theeues, whores, and prophane perſons.