Defense of Perkins Book Called a Reformed Catholic, Point 1
speaker W. P. The first point wherewith I meane to begin shall be the point of Freewill; though it be not the principall.
I. Our consent.
speaker W. P. Freewill both by them and vsus, is taken for a mixt power in the mind and will of man: whereby discerning what is good and what is euill, hee doth accordingly chuse or refuse the same.
speaker D. B. P. That I be not thought captious, but willing to admit any thing that M. Perkins hath said agreeable to the truth, I will let his whole text in As farre as you think, it makes not against you. You shall finde as much kindnes as you offer. You pare off the sense too sometimes. You meane properly. Is this your perspicuitie?places indifferent, passe, paring off only superfluous words, with adding some annotations where it shall be needfull, and rest onelyonly vponupon the points in controuersie. First then concerning free-will, wherewith he beginneth, thus he saith: Free vvill both by them and vsus, &c.
speaker W. P. Annot. If we would speake formally, it is not a mixt power in the mind and will, *That Master Perkins vvas not ignorant of this, it appeares in his treatise of Gods free grace, and mans free will. pag. 17.but is a free facultie of the mind and will only, whereby we choose or refuse, supposing in the vnderstanding, a knowledge of the same before. But let this definition passe as more populer.
Your correcting of Master Perkins definition passeth my vnderstanding: for if it be a a facultie both of the minde and will, out of doubt it is a mixt facultie. But it is more strange, that you adde only of the minde onelyonly, or of the will onelyonly, are speeches that hauehave some reason in them; but of the minde and will onelyonly is a phrase implying a contradiction, vnlesse there be some third part of the soule vnknown to ordinarie Philosophers, whereof free will may be suspected to be a facultie.
I. Conclus. Man must bee considered in a fourefold estate, as he was created, as he was corrupted, as he is renewed, as he shall be glorified. In the first estate, we ascribe to mans will libertie of nature, in which he could will or nill either good or euill: in the third, liberty of grace, in the last liberty of glory.
speaker D. B. P. Annot. Carry this in mind, that here he granteth man in the state of grace to hauehave free will.VVhere doth he denie it. W. P.
All the doubt is of the second estate: and yet therein also we agree, as the conclusions following will declare.
II. Conclus. The matters whereabout freewill is occupied, are principally the actions of men, which bee of three sorts, naturall humane, spirituall. Naturall actions are such as are common to men with beasts, as to eate, drinke, sleepe, heare, see, smell, taste, and to mooue from place to place: in all which we ioyne with the Papists, and hold that man hath free will, and euen since the fall of Adam by a naturall power of the minde doth freely performe any of these actions or the like.
III. Conclus. Humane actions are such as are common to all men good and bad, as to speake and vse reason, the practise of all mechanicall and liberall arts, and the outward performance of ciuill and Ecclesiasticall duties, as to come to the Church, to speake, and preach the word, to reach out the hand to receiue the Sacrament, and to lend the eare to listen outwardly to that which is taught. And hither we may referre the outward actions of ciuill vertues; as namely, Iustice, temperance, gentlenesse, liberalitie. And in these also wee ioyne with the Church of Rome, and say (as experience teacheth) that men hauehave a naturall freedome of will, to put them or not to put them in execution. Paul saith, Rom. 2. 14. The Gentiles that hauehave not the lawe, doe the things of the law by nature, that is, by naturall strength: and hee saith of himselfe, that before his conuersion touching the righteousnesse of the law, he was vnblameable. Phil. 3. 6. And for this externall obedience, natural men receiue reward in temporall things. Matth. 6. 5. Ezech. 29. 19. And yet here some caueats must be remembred. I. That in humane actions (he should hauehave said morall, saith D. B. P.) mans will is weake and feeble, and his vnderstanding dimme and darke; and thereupon he often failes in them. (This caueat is no caueat of the Protestants, but taken out of S. Thomas of Aquine, saith D. B. P.) And in Summe. 1. 2. q. 109. art. 4. & 8.all such actions with Augustine (you might hauehave quoted the place, …aith D. B. P.) I vnderstand the will of man to be onelyonly wounded or halfe dead.
speaker A. W. bSee M. P. of Gods free grace and mans free vvill, pag. 61.Humane is more generall, and more fit; because morall cannot comprehend the first ranke of actions, in the beginning of the section. Besides, it may be Master Perkins thought it not fit to giuegive that title to any actions of naturall men, because none of them are performed, according to the cArist. Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 3. & 6.Philosophers definition of morall vertue, by a habit with due obseruation of the circumstances required by him; howsoeuer they are magnified by you Papists.
The caueat is not taken out dThomas 1. 2. q. 109. art. 4. & 8.of those places, wherein Thomas shewes no more, but that a man cannot, by his naturall strength, either fulfill the law, or auoide sinne. The place is quoted eEdition 1598in the margin Hypognostic. lib. 3. which you shal finde in tome 7. of Austins works; though indeed the book be thought to be none of Austins.
speaker W. P. II. That the will of man is vnderunder the will of God, and therefore to be ordered by it: as Ieremie saith, chap. 10. vers. 23. O Lord I know that the way of man is not in himselfe, neither is in man to walke or direct his steps. (Who knowes not this? saith D. B. P.)
speaker A. W. If there be no man that knowes it not, perhaps eueryevery man remembers it not; and it is a caueat necessarie for this question. The fIere. 10. 23.Prophet in the place brought by Master Perkins so speakes of it to God, as if it were not knowne to all men. O Lord I know that the way of man &c. And to say the truth, how can any man bee said to know it, gBo…ius de consol. ph…losoph. lib. 5 pro… 6. & Thomas …bi.that fetches the knowledge, which God hath of things depending on mans will, from the sight of the things from all eternitie, present to him? For the thing must needs be, in the order of nature at least, before it can be knowne to be. But of this point, when iust occasion shall be offered, about Predestination.
speaker W. P. IV. Conclus. The third kinde of actions are spirituall, more neerely concerning the heart and conscience, and these be twofold: they either concerne the kingdome of darknes, or else the kingdome of God. Those that concerne the kingdome of darknesse are sinnes properly: and in these we likewise ioyne with the Papists and teach, that in sinnes or euill actions, man hath freedome of will. Some paraduenture will say, that wee sinne necessarily, because hee that sinneth cannot but sinne: and that free will and necessitie cannot stand together. Indeed the necessitie of compulsion or coaction, and freewill cannot agree: but there is another kinde of necessitie which may stand with freedome of will: for some things may be done necessarily and also freely. A man that is in close prison, must needs there abide, and cannot possibly get forth and walke where he will: yet can he mooue himselfe freely, and walke within the prison: so likewise, though mans will be chained naturally by the bonds of sinne, and therefore cannot but sinne, and thereupon sinneth necessarily, yet doth it also sinne feely.
speaker D. B. P. Annot. The example of a close prisoner is not to the purpose, for it puts necessitie in one thing, and liberty in an other. The solution is, that necessarily, must be taken for certainly, not that a man is at any time VVhat is your certainly but infallibly?compelled to sinne, but his weakenes and the crafte of the Diuell are such, that he is very often ouer reached by the Diuell, and induced to sinne, but with free consent of his owne will.
speaker A. W. The example is to the purpose: as he that is in prison, if he will walke, must of necessitie walke in the prison, and yet walkes freely there, because he may chuse whether he will walke or no: so he that is chained by sinne, may chuse whether hee will doe such an action or no: but, if hee doe it, he shall necessarily sinne in doing of it: and thus, necessitie and libertie are alike, in both parts of the similitude.
There is nothing in your solution, that was not in Master Perkins distinction, saue that you hauehave put it in other words; you say certainly, he infallibly; you say man sinnes with free consent, and is not compelled; he saies he sinnes freely, and not of compulsion.
speaker W. P. V. Conclus. The second kind of spirituall actions or things, concerne the kingdome of God: as repentance, saith, the conuersion of a sinner, new obedience, and such like: in which we likewise in part ioyne with the Church of Rome and say, that in the first conuersion of a sinner, mans free will concurs with Gods grace, as a fellow or co-worker in some fort. For in the conuersion of a sinner three things are required: the word, Gods spirit, and mans will: for mans will is not passiue in all and eueryevery respect, but hath an action in the first conuersion and change of the soule. When any man is conuerted, this worke of God is not done by compulsion, but he is conuerted willi gly: and at the very time when he is conuerted, by Gods grace he wills his conuersion. To this end said Augustine, He which made thee without Serm. 15 de verb. Apost. de grat & l. a. bitr. 1.thee, will not saue thee without thee. Againe, that is certaine, that our will is required in this, that we may doe any good thing well: but we hauehave it not from our owne power but God works to will in vsus. For looke at what time God giues grace, at the same time he *Posse velle, & a… velle recipere.giueth a will to des…e and will the same grace: as for example, when God works faith, at the same time he works also vponupon the will, causing it to desire faith, and willingly to receiue the gift of beleeuing. God makes of the vnwilling will, a willing will: because no man can receiue grace vtterly against his will, considering will constrained is no will. But here we must remember, that howsoeuer in respect of time, the working of grace by Gods spirit, and the willing of it in men goe together: yet in regard of order, grace is first wrought, and mans will must first of all be acted and moued by grace, and then it also acteth, willeth and moueth it selfe. And this is the last point of consent betweene vsus and the Romane Church touching Free will; neither may we proceede further with them.
speaker D. B. P. Now before I come to the supposed difference, I gather first that he You gather that vvhichwhich is not scattered by M. P.yeeldeth vntounto the principall point in controuersie, that is freedome of will, in ciuill, and morall workes in the state of corruption, and all good workes in the state of grace, for in his first conclusion distinguishing foure estates of man, he affirmeth that in the third, of man renued, or (as we speake iustified) there is liberty of grace, that is, grace enableth mans will to do if it please such spiritual works, as God requireth at his hands. Yet lest he be taken to yeeld in any thing, he doth in shew of words contradict Pag. 16. VVe shall see that vvhen vve come to it.both these points in another place: For in setting downe the disference of our opinions, hee saith: that mans will in his conuersion is not actiue, but passiue, which is flat opposite vntounto that which himselfe said a litle before in his first conclusion; that in the conuersion of a sinner, mans will concurreth not passiuely but is co-worker with Gods grace.
The like contradiction may be obserued in the other part of libertie That is iust none at all.in morall actions: for in his third conclusion he deliuereth plainelie man to hauehave a naturall freedome, euen since the fall of Adam to doe, or not to do the acts of wisedome, Ius…ce, Temperance, &c and proues out of S. Paul, that the Gentiles so did: Yet in his first reason, he assirmeth as peremptorily out of the 8. of Genisis, that the whole frame of mans Pag. 19.heart is corrupted, and all that he thinketh, deuiseth, or imagineth, is wholy euill, leauing him no natural strength to performe any part of morall duty.
speaker A. W. It is neither the principall point in controuersie, nor any controuersie at all, according to Master Perkins, whether man hauehave freedome of will in morall workes, before grace; and in all good workes after grace. For of the former Master Perkins makes no question, but onelyonly hConclus. 3. Caueat. 1.giues a caueat, of the feeblenes of the will, and dimnes of the vnderstanding, in such matters: with the latter he deales not at all, professedly restraining the question to iConclus. 1. in the end.our dissent about the second estate. Libertie in the state of grace, to will spirituall good, wee thankfully acknowledge: but neither is it of kRom. 7. 18.so large extent as your exposition makes it; and, lPhil. 2. 13.without the speciall worke of Gods spirit, by it selfe it brings no good thing to passe.
He doth not say simply, that mans will in his conuersion is not actiue; but that, in it selfe it is not actiue, but passiue: Of which his other speech is not a contradiction, but rather a confirmation; That mans will concurres with Gods grace, as a co-worker, in some sort: and a little after, mans will is not passiue in all and eueryevery respect, but hath an action in the first conuersion of the soule. Now what action it hath, and in what respect it is actiue, and passiue, he shewes presently after: the words are falsely alleadged by you, viz. that it wils well onelyonly, as it moued by grace, being in it selfe neither actiue, nor passiue.
This latter contradiction is indeede like the former, that is, no contradiction at all. For hee doth rightly expound mGen. 8. 5.that place of a pronenes to that which is as ill, and to nothing that is fully good: not simply excluding that which is ciuilly good, but that onelyonly which is properly referred to God himselfe, the soueraigne good: and the other, in regard of it perfect goodnes.
II. The difference, or dissent.
speaker W. P. The point of difference standeth in the cause of the freedome of mans wil in spiritual matters, which concerne the kingdome of God. The Papists say, mans will concurreth and worketh with Gods grace in the first conuersion of a sinner by it selfe, and by it owne naturall power; and is onelyonly helped by the holy Chost. We say, that mans will worketh with grace in the first conuersion, yet not of it selfe, but by grace. Or thus; They say will hath a naturall cooperation: we denie it, and say it hath cooperation onelyonly by grace, beeing in it selfe not actiue but pas…; willing well onelyonly as it is mooued by grace, whereby it must first be acted and mooued, before it can act or will. And that wee may the better conceiue the difference, I will vse this comparison; The Church of Rome sets forth the estate of a sinner by the condition of a prisoner, and so doe wee: marke then the difference. It supposeth the said prisoner to lie bound hand and foote with chaines and fetters, and withall to bee sicke and weake, yet not wholy dead, but liuing in part: it supposeth also that beeing in this case, he stirreth not himselfe for any helpe, and yet hath ability and power to stirre. Hereupon if the keeper come and take away his bolts and fetters, and hold him by the hand, and helpe him vp, hee can and will of himselfe stand and walke and goe out of prison: euen so (say they) is a sinner bound hand and foote with the chaine of his sinnes: and yet he is not dead but sick, like to the wounded man in the way betweene Iericho and Ierusalem. And therefore doth he not wil and affect that which is good: but if the holy Ghost come and doe but vntie his bands, and reach him his hand of grace, then can he stand of himselfe and will his owne saluation, or any thing else that is good. We in like manner graunt, that a prisoner fitly resembleth a naturall man, but yet such a prisoner must he be, as is not only sicke & weake but euen starke dead: which cannot stirre though the keeper vntie his bolts and chaines nor heare though he sound a trumpet in his eare: and if the said keeper would hauehave him to moue and stirre, he must giuegive him not onelyonly his hand to helpe him, but euen soule and life also: and such a one is eueryevery man by nature; not onelyonly chained and fettered in his sinnes but starke dead therein: as one that lieth rotting in the graue, not hauing any ability or power to moue or stirre: and therefore he cannot so much as desire or doe any thing that is truelie good of himselfe, but God must first come and put a new soule into him, euen the spirit of grace to quicken and reuiue him: and then being thus reuiued, the will beginneth to will good things at the very same time, whē God by his spirit first infuseth grace. And this is the true difference betweene vsus and the Church of Rome in this point of free will.
speaker D. B. P. See how vncertaine the steppes be of men that walke in darkenes, or that would seeme to communicate with the workes of darknes. For if I As it is very like you vvill doe for your aduantage. Pag. 16. True: but not of the Popish Church.mistake him not, he agreeth fully in this matter of free will, with the Doctrine of the Catholike Church: For he putting downe the point of difference, saith that it standeth in the cause of the freedome of mans will, in spirituall matters: allowing then freedome of will with vsus, in the state of grace, whereof he there treateth; for he seemeth to dissent from vsus, only in the cause of that freedome. And as he differeth from Luther, and Caluin, with other sectaries, in graunting this liberty of will: so in the very cause also he accordeth with Catholikes, as appeareth by his owne words. For (saith he) Papists say mans will concurreth with Gods grace by it selfe, and by it owne naturall power: we say that Mans vvill He differs not from Luther and Caluin.worketh with grace; yet not of it selfe, but by grace: either he vnderstandeth not what Catholikes say, or else accuseth them wrongfully: For we say that Mans will then only concurreth with Gods grace, vvhen it is stirred and holpen first by Gods grace. So that Mans vvill by his ovvne naturall action, doth concurre in eueryevery good worke, otherwise it were no action of Man: But we farther say, that this action proceedeth principally of grace, whereby the will was made able to produce such actions: for of it selfe it was vtterly vnable to bring forth such spirituall fruit. And th… I take to be that, which M. Perkins doth meane by those his words, that the will must be first moued and acted by grace, before it can acte or will. He mistook…, thinking that we required some outward helpe only to the will, to ioyne with it, or rather, that grace did but a it were vntie the chaynes of sin wherein our will was …eted, an… t…en will could of it selfe turne to God. No… vnderstanding how Catholikes take that Luk 10. The hol… Ghost intended not to describe the state of man in that p…able.parable of the man wounded in the way, betweene Ierusalem and Ierico who was (not as the Papists only say, but as the holy Ghost …aith) le…te halfe, and not starke dead. Now the exposition of Catholikes is not, that this wounded man, (which signifieth all Mankind) had halfe his spirituall strength left him, but was robbed of all Supernaturall riches, spoiled of all his originall Iustice, and wounded in his naturall powers of both vnderstanding and will, and therein left halfe dead, not being able of his owne strength, either to know all natural truth, or to performe all morall duty. Novv touching supernaturall vvorkes, because he lost all VVhat is bec…me of your m… of coag…? Luk. 15.povver to performe them; not being able so much as to prepare himselfe conueniently to them; he in a good sense may be likened vntounto a dead man, not able to moue one finger that vvay of grace; and so in holy Scripture the Father said of his prodigall Son, he was dead, and is reuiued. Yet as the same sonne liued a naturall life, albeit in a deadly sinne: so mans will after the fall of Adam, continued somewhat free in actions conformable to the nature of man, though vvounded also in them, as M. P. shevves that the vvill is passiue in receiuing this invvard fortifying.not being able to acte many of them, yet hauing still that naturall facultie of free vvill capable of grace, and also able, being first both outvvardly moued, and fortified invvardly by the vertue of grace, to affect and do any vvorke appertaining to saluation: vvhichwhich is asmuch as M. Perkins affirmeth.
speaker A. W. You vtterly mistake the matter; he speakes not of will in the state of grace, but in the state of nature, namely in the first conuersion of a sinner; as his plaine words are in this place. The difference stands in the cause of freedome: for it is impossible that a man should beleeue without freedom of will, beleeuing being an action of the will. But the question is, whether the will work with Gods grace, by it selfe, by it owne naturall power, or hauehave this operation from grace, being in it selfe not actiue, but passiue. And this is the very opinion of Luther, Caluin, and generally all Protestant Diuines: who in this point thus dissent from you, that they ascribe the very act of the will, in repenting, beleeuing, &c. to the especiall worke of Gods spirit in their hearts, that repent and beleeue: whereas you contrariwise, hauing furnisht man with freedome of will, by nature, or I know not what grace, make his assent (for I must speake of faith as you doe) to proceede, not from the spirit of God, inclining him certainly to beleeue, but from the good vse of his free will, yeelding of it selfe to the good motion of Gods spirit: yet so as that it might for all the motion and operation of Gods spirit forbeare to assent, if it were not led to it by the goodnes of free will. In a word, you ascribe no more to God, but the power that the will hath to will that which is good: wee acknowledge, that the very act of willing well, both before and after grace, is caused by the spirit of God, to, and in eueryevery good desire that wee bring well to passe.
It is more than Master Perkins affirmes, that the will, being outwardly moued, and inwardly fortified with the vertue of grace, is able to effect, and doe any worke appertaining to saluation. For this vertue is not of such strength, but that it needes the particular assistance of Gods spirit, to incline and frame it to eueryevery good worke of that nature.
speaker D. B. P. And this to be the very Doctrine of the Church of Rome, is most manifestly to be seene in the Councell of Trent, vvhere in the sixt Session Cap. 1.are first these vvords in effect, concerning the vnablenesse of man to arise from sinne of himselfe. EueryEvery man must acknowledge, and confesse, that by Adams fall we were made so vncleane and sinfull, that neither the Gentiles by the force of nature, nor the Ievves by the letter of Moses lavv, could arise out of that sinfull state. After it shevveth, hovv our deliuerance is vvrought, and hovv freedome of v…ill is recouered in special, and vvherin it consisteth, saying. The beginning of iustification, in persons vsing reason, is taken from the grace of God, preuenting vsus through Jesus Christ, that is, from his vocation, vvhereby vvithout any desert of ours vve are called, that vve vvho vvere by our sinnes turned avvay from God, may be prepared by his grace, both raising vsus vp, and helping vsus to returne to our ovvne Justification, freely yeelding our consent vntounto the said grace, and vvorking vvith it. So as God touching the hart of man by the light of the Holy Ghost, neither doth man nothing at all, receiuing that inspiration, vvho might also refuse it: neither yet can he vvithout the grace of God, by his free vvill, moue himselfe to that, vvhichwhich is iust in Gods sight. And that you may be assured, that this Doctrine of the Councell, is no other then that vvhichwhich vvas taught three hundred yeares before, in the very middest of darknes, as heretikes deeme: See vvhat Saint Thomas of Aquine one of her principall 1. 2. q. 109. art. 6.pillers hath vvritten of this point in his most learned Summe. Where, vponupon these vvords of our Sauiour, No man can come to me, vnlesse my Father dravv him. He concludeth it to be manifest, that man Ioh. 6.cannot so much as prepare himselfe to receiue the light of grace, but by the free and vndeserued helpe of God, moouing him inwar…ly therevnto.
speaker A. W. nSell. 6. cap. 5.The Councill of Trent, as closely as it carries matters, could not but bewray it selfe in this point; wherein it leaues to the will of man, inlightened by the holie Ghost, oInspirationem …llam: bi… ce…e potest.the act of refusing and receiuing grace. Which must needs be naturall; because there was no former worke of God, whereby this power to receiue grace was bestowed vponupon it. And this doth p1. 2. q. 109. art 6. Ad hoc, quod praepar… …e homo ad susceptionem h…s dont, non oportet …nere aliquod aliud donum habituale in anima.Thomas by you alleaged make more plain, denying that there is any grace in the will of man, as from God, for the preparing of himselfe to receiue habituall grace: because then we should need another grace for the former, and another for that before the former, and so without end. What then doth God in this case? He moues the heart inwardly (saith Thomas) or he breathes into vsus a good purpose. A man would thinke that Thomas hereby acknowledged the receite of some speciall grace: but it is not so, he meanes no more but this, that God puts a good motion into vsus, for the receiuing of habituall grace; which it is in the power of our will by nature either to receiue, or refuse. So that still, in the matter of iustification, the reason that this man is iustified, that is not, shall be from man, and not from God. Are they not in the middest of darknes that write such things?
III. Our reasons.
speaker W. P. Now for the confirmation of the doctrine we hold, namely, that a man willeth not his owne conuersion of himselfe by nature either in whole or in part, but by grace wholy and alone: these reasons may be vsed. The first is taken from the nature and ….measure of mans corruption, which may be distinguished into two parts. The first is the want of that originall righteousnes, which was in man by creation: the second is, a pronenes and inclination to that which is euill, and to nothing that is truly good. This appeareth, The frame of mans heart (saith the Gen. 8. 21.Lord,) is euill euen from his childhood: that is, the disposition of the vnderstanding, will, affections, with all that the heart of man deuiseth, frameth, or imagineth, is wholly euill. And Paul saith, The wisdome Rom. 8. 5.of the flesh is enmity against God. Which words are very significant: for the word [foreign] translated wisdome, signifieth that the best thoughts, the best desires, affections, and indeauours that be in any naturall man, euen those that come most neare to true holines, are not only contrary to God, but enmitie it selfe. And hence I gather, that the very hart it selfe, that is the will and mind, from whence these desires and thoughts doe come, are also enmity vntounto God. For such as the action is, such is the facultie whence it proceedeth: such as the fruit is, such is the tree: such as the braunches are, such are the rootes. By both these places it is euident, that in man there is not only a want, absence, or depriuation of originall righteousnes, but a pronenes also by nature vntounto that which is euill: which pronenes includes in it an inclination not to some few, but to all and euerie sin: the very sinne against the holy Ghost not excepted. Hence therefore I reason thus.
If eueryevery man by nature doth both want originall iustice, and be also prone vntounto all euill, then wanteth he naturall free will to will that which is truely good:
But eueryevery man by nature wants originall iustice, and is also prone vntounto all euill.
Ergo: EueryEvery man naturallie wants free will to will that which is good.
Reason. II. 1. Cor. 2. 14. The naturall man perceiueth not the things of the spirit of God, for they are foolishnesse vntounto him, neither can know them, because they are spiritually discerned. In these words S. Paul sets downe these points. I. that a naturall man doth not so much as thinke of the things reuealed in the Gospell. II. that a man hearing, and in mind conceiuing them; cannot giuegive consent vntounto them, and by naturall iudgement approue of them: but contrariwise thinketh them to be foolishnesse. III. that no man can giuegive assent to the things of God, vnlesse he be enlightened by the spirit of God. And hence I reason thus.
If a man by nature doth not know and perceiue the things of God, and when he shall kn…w them, cannot by nature giuegive assent vntounto them: then hath he no power to will them.
But the first is euidently true. Ergo.
For first the mind must approue and giuegive assent, before the will can choose or will: and when the mind hath not power to conceiue or giuegive assent, there the will hath no power to will.
Reason III. Thirdly the holy Ghost auoucheth, Eph. 2. 2. Coloss. 2. 13. that all men by nature are dead in sinnes & trespasses: not as the Papists say, weak, sicke, or halfe dead. Hence I gather, that man wanteth naturall power not to will simplie, but freelie and frankly to wil that which is truely good. A dead man in his graue cannot stirre the least finger, because he wants the very power of life, sense, and motion: no more can he that is dead in sinne, will the least good: nay if he could either will or doe any good, he could not be dead in sinne. And as a dead man in the graue, cannot rise but by the power of God: no more can he that is dead in sinne rise, but by the power of Gods grace alone, without any power of his owne.
Reason IV. Fourthly in the conuersion and saluation of a sinner, the scripture ascribeth all to God, and nothing to mans free will. Iohn 3. 3. Except a man be borne againe, he cannot see the kingdome of God. Ephes. 2. 10. We are his workemanship created in Christ Iesus to good works. And chap. 4. vers. 24. The new man is created to the image of God. Now to be borne again, is a worke of no lesse importance then our first creation: and therefore wholy to be ascribed to God as our creation is. Indeede Paul Phil. 2. 12. 13. biddeth the Philippians worke out their saluation with feare and trembling: not meaning to ascribe vntounto them a power of doing good by themselues. And therefore in the next verse he addeth, It is God that worketh both the will and the deede: directly excluding all naturall free will in things spirituall: and yet withall he acknowledgeth, that mans will hath a worke in doing that which is good, not by nature, but by grace. Because when God giues man power to will good things, then he can will them: and when he giueth him a power to doe good, then he can doe good, and he doth it. For though there be not in mans conuersion a naturall cooperation of his will with Gods spirit, yet is there a supernaturall cooperation by grace, enabling man when he is to be conuerted, to will his conuersion: according to which S. Paul saith, 1. Cor. 15. 10. I hauehave laboured in the faith, but least any man should imagine, that this was done by any naturall power: therefore he addeth, yet not I, that is, not by any thing in me, but Gods grace in mee, inabling my will to doe the good I doe.
Reason V. The iudgement of the auncient Church. aAugust. de corrept. & grat. c. 12.August. The will of the regenerate is kindled onelyonly by the holy Ghost: that they may therefore bee able because they will thus: and they will thus because God workes in them to will. And, bEpist. 105.Wee hauehave lost our freewill, to louelove God by the greatnesse of our sinne. Serm. 2. on the wordes of the Apostle. Man when hee was created, receiued great strength in his free will: but by sinning he lost it. cFulg. lib.Fulgentius, God giueth grace freely to the vnworthy whereby the wicked man beeing iustified is inlightened, with the gift of good will, and with a facultie of doing good: that by mercy preuenting him he may begin to will well, and by merciemercy comming after, he may doe the good he will. Bernard saith, dBernard. de lib. arb.It is wholy the grace of God that wee are created, healed, saued. Concil. Arausic. 2. cap. 6. To beleeue and to will is giuen from aboue by infusion, and inspiration of the holy Ghost. More testimonies and reasons might bee alleaged to prooue this conclusion, but these shall suffice: now let vsus see what reasons are alleaged to the contrarie.
speaker D. B. P. And this is all vvhichwhich M. Perkins in his pretended dissent auerreth A poore shift.here, and goeth about to proue in his fiue reasons follovving: the vvhichwhich I vvill omitte, as being all for vsus. And if any man desire to see more to that purpose, let him read the most learned vvorkes of that famous Cardinall, and right Reuerend Archbishop Bellarmine.
speaker A. W. You should, at the least, hauehave propounded his reasons, that all men might hauehave seene whether they make for you, or against you: but you tooke a wiser course for your own credit. Yet giuegive me leaue to shew, that his conclusions are directly against you.
He that hath naturally free will to receiue a good motion inspired by God, hath naturally free will to will that which is good: for to receiue such a motion, is to will that which is good.
But eueryevery man, according to q1. 2. q. 109. art. 6.Thomas, and rConcil. Trident. sess. 6. cap. 5.the Councill of Trent, hath naturally free will, to receiue a good motion inspiried by God: for else he cannot receiue any, or must hauehave some habituall grace to prepare him for the receiuing of it.
Therefore eueryevery man hath naturally free will to will that which is good.
This is your conclusion; to which his are contrarie, viz. EueryEvery man naturally wants free will, to will that which is good. Secondly, Man, by nature, hath no power to will the things of God. Thirdly, Men naturally hauehave no power to will the least good. Fourthly, Man cannot naturally will his owne conuersion. The testimonies alleaged need neither confirmation, nor explication. Bellarmines disputation shall be examined, if it please God to giuegive leisure and opportunitie.
speaker D. B. P. Novv the very point controuersed, concerning free vvill, M. Perkins hath quite omitted, vvhichwhich consisteth in these tvvo points, expressed in the Councell: First, vvhether vve doe freely assent vntounto the said grace, vvhen it is offered vsus, that is, vvhether it lie in our povver to refuse it; And secondly, vvhen vve concurre and vvorke vvith it, vvhether vve could if vve listed refuse to vvorke vvith it. In both vvhichwhich points vve hold the affirmatiue part, and most sectaries of this time the negatiue. Of vvhichwhich our Authour is silent: only by the vvay in his fourth reason, toucheth tvvo texts out of S. Paul, vvhichwhich are commonly alleaged against free vvill.
The fir…. I hauehave (saith he) laboured more abundantly then all they, yet not I, but the grace of God, vvhichwhich is in me, attributing the vvhole vvorke 1. Cor. 15. So doth Ierome reade it.to grace. To vvhichwhich I briefely ansvvere, that they doe corrupt the text, to make it seeme more currant for them: the Greeke hath only He sun emoi, vvhichwhich is, vvith me, not, vvhichwhich is in me, so that the vvord in true construction makes much more for vsus, then against vsus: Saint Paul affirmeth the grace of God, vvhichwhich vvas vvorking vvith him, to hauehave done these things: And so Saint Augustine vvhom they pretend to follovv most in this matter, expoundeth it. Yet not I, but the grace of God vvith De grat. & lib. arb. cap. 15.me; that is, not I alone, but the grace of God with me. And by this, neither the grace of God alone: neither he alone, but the grace of God vvith him: thus Saint Augustine. The like sentence is in the booke of Wisdome. Send that (vvisdome) from thy holy heauen, that it may be vvith me, and Cap. 9.labour vvith me.
speaker A. W. Master Perkins tooke that, as the most principall point, which doth most diminish the glorie of God, the end of all true religion. sSee 12. Art. part. 2. Art. 4. ….Now what opinion is more derogatorie to Gods glorie, than that which giues mans will a power (by nature) to receiue grace ofered, vponupon an inward motion of God, without any inclini…g of the will by him? And this answers your former quesion; denying that it lies in our owne power to refuse gra…e, though we freely assent vntounto it. There is a necessity of in…llibilitie, so that it cannot come to passe, that a man, inclin…d by Gods spirit, should not receiue grace; there is notwthstanding a freedome of will, because the will is not compelled to assent. The second question is like the former and answered in like sort, viz. that we might refuse, in re…ect of the nature of our will, which is not forced to the choise, that in the euent we cannot refuse, because God frames our will ineuitably to make that choise.
You saw it was not for you to deale with Master Perkins reasons, as they were set downe by him, for then it would hauehave been looked for that yo… should hauehave answered directly to all the places of Scrip…ure hee brings against the strength of fr…will by nature. Therefore you shift off the matter, and outof nine texts alleaged in this question, you chuse onelyonly th…e. Against which you thinke you are able to say somewh…. And what is it you say? That Master Perkins attributes he whole to grace; vtterly vntrue. For hee saith plainly, t1. Cor. 15. 10.…at there is a supernaturall cooperation of mans will, with Gods s…rit, by grace, enabling him to will his conuersion. And addes fterwards, Not I, that is, I by any thing in me; but Gods grace …e enabling my will to doe that good, I do. uHieron. contra …ouin. lib. 2.If that translation …rrupt the text, Hierome corrupted it, not we: and to say…e truth, it is all one to vsus, whether you reade in me, or wh…me, so you acknowledge the strength, whereby the Apole workes, to be of God, and not of nature. But for the prase, the grace of God, in the Scripture, signifies either the louelove and fauour of God, which is wholy without a man, or some gift of his, which is a qualitie in the soule. Now it is a great deale more likely, that the Apostle speakes of some gift of God within him, whereby hee is made able to labour, than of the fauour of God without him, wherby his labour is blessed. We subscribe to *August. de grat. &. lib. arb. cap. 15.S. Austin, That in all our good workes we have a part; or rather, that the worke it selfe is wholieours, though both the grace, whereby we are enabled to do it, and the inclination whereby we are brought to doe i…, proceede from the spirit of God.
speaker D. B. P. The second text is. It is God that woreth in vsus, both to vvill and to accomplish. We graunt that it is God, bu…ot he alone without vsus, for in Phil. 2. 13.the next words before, Saint Paul, saith Worke your saluation vvith feare and trembling. So that God worketh pincipally by stirring vsus vp by his grace, and also helping forward our wil, to accomplish the worke; but Not onelyonly helping forward, but also inclining. Of this if occasion be offered in the poynt of Iustification.so sweetly and con…ormablie to our naure, that his working taketh not away, but helpeth forward our will toconcurre with him. Againe, the whole may be attributed vntounto God, considering that the habits of grace infused, be from him as sole efficient cause of them, our actions indued also with grace, being onelyonly disposi…ons and no efficient cause of those habits: but this is an high point of …choole Diuinitie, very true, but not easily to be conceiued of the vnlea…ed.
speaker A. W. We also grant, as I hauehave said, that it is God with vsus: herein wee differ, that you ascribe no more to God in our first conuersion, but a stirring of vsus vp, and helpng forward of our will, leauing the euent to our choise, an… so vncertaine: we affirme, that God doth so work, that he …clines the will, so that the euent shall in fallibly ensue ther…on. The whole may not be attributed to God, though the habits of grace infused be from him, as a sole efficient case of them. For the question is not how we come by these…abits, but whether the actions done, when we hauehave the hbits, be ours or no, speaking of good workes after iustifi…tion. If the question be of our first conuersion, we say •, t… act of beleeuing is ours; but the grace, by which we are eabled to beleeue, is giuen by God; and made effectual; … made to produce this effect of beleeuing, by God also.
speaker D. B. P. One other obiection may be collected ou… of …. Perkins third reason, against free will, which is touched, as he saith, by the holy Ghost, in these You neede not hauehave troubled your selfe vvith collecting obiections, there are fiue plainely s…t dovvne. Ad Ephes. 2. 2. He is so like a dead man, that he is dead indeede spiritually.words. VVhen vve vvere dead in sinnes. If a man by sinne become like a dead man, he cannot concurre with God, in his rising from sinne.
Ansvvere. Sure it is, that he cannot, before God by his grace hath quickned, and as it were reuiued him, to which grace of God, man giueth his free consent. How can that be, if he were then dead? Marry, you must remember what hath been said before: that albeit man in sinne be dead in the way of grace, yet he liueth naturally, and hath free will in naturall and ciuill actions: which will of his being by grace fortified, and as it were lifted vp vntounto a higher degree of perfection, can then concurre and worke with grace to faith, and all good workes necessarie to life euerlasting. As (for example,) a crab-tree …ocke hath no ability of it selfe to bring forth apples, and therefore may be tearmed dead in that kind of good fruit. Yet let a sian…e of apples be ga…ted into it, and it wil be are apples: euen so albeit our sower corrupt naure of it selfe be vnable to fructifie to life euerlasting, yet hauing re…iued into it the heauenlie graft of Gods grace, it is inabled to produce he sweete fruit of good workes: to which alludeth Saint Iames. Rece…e the ingrafted vvord, Cap. 1.vvhichwhich can saue our soules: againe what more d…d then the earth? and yet it being tilled and sowed, doth bring forth, a… beare goodly corne: now the word and grace of God is compared by …ur Sauiour himselfe vntounto seede, and our harts vntounto the earth that recei…ed it: what meruaile Matth. 13.then if we otherwise dead, yet reuiued by this liuelyeed, do yeeld plentie of pleasing fruit?
speaker A. W. The question is not, whether God can ma…e a man able to doe good workes, or no (for of that no mandoubts:) but Ephes. 2. 2.what a man can doe by nature, to his owne co…ersion. Master Perkins saith, he is spiritually dead, and there…re can do nothing. You answere, that he can doe something, when God hath quickened him. But what can hee do… to the quickening of himselfe? giuegive his free consent, you say. Then it must needes follow, that he hath power by na…e to will his owne conuersion: for as yet hee hath receiued no grace, but onelyonly hath had a good motion made to him, or inspired into him by God: of which by his owne free wil… he takes a liking, and so attaines to iustifying grace.
speaker D. B. P. Hauing hitherto explicated the state of the question, and solued such He propounds none for you, and therefore misapplies none.obiections as may be gathered out of Master Perkins against it, before I come to his solution of our arguments, I will set downe some principall places, both out of the Scriptures, and auncient Fathers, in defence of our Doctrine, because he proposeth but few for vsus, and misapplieth them too. page missing
God hath appointed to bring them, to chuse and like of saluation … Christ.
speaker D. B. P. VntoUnto these … of the old Testament, (one vnderunder the law of Nature, and the …er vnderunder Moyses law) let vsus couple two more out of the new Testament,
The first may be those kind words of our Sauiour vntounto the Iewes. Jerusalem, Matth. 23.Jerusalem, &c. how often vvould I hauehave gathered together thy children as the hen doth her chick…s vnderunder her vvings, and thou vvouldest not: Which doth plainely demonstrate that there was no want, either of Gods helpe inwardly, or of Christs perswasion outwardly, for their conuersion: and that the whole fault lay in their owne refusing, and withstanding Gods grace, as these words of Christ doe plainely witnes, and thou vvouldest not.
The last testimony is in the Reuelat, where it is said in the person of God. I stand at the doore and knocke, if any man shall heare my voice and Cap. 3.open the gates, I vvill enter in to him, and vvill suppe vvith him, and he vvith me. Marke well the words: God by his grace, knocks at the dore of our harts, he doth not breake it open, or in any sort force it, but attendeth, that by our assenting to his call, we open him the gates, and then, lo he with his heauenly gifts will enter in: otherwise he leaues vsus. What can be more euident in confirmation of the freedome of mans will, in working with Gods grace?
speaker A. W. hMatth. 23. 37We acknowledge that the fault is wholy in eueryevery man, that is not saued: but wee denie, that therefore he hath power, by nature, to chuse life when it is offered: he failes indeede in doing of that which hee might doe, and ought to doe, for his owne furtherance, to this choise; as the Iewes did, in refusing to heare, to meditate, to yeeld to the miracles wrought by our Sauiour Christ, and to beleeue the doctrine; which they could in no reasonable sort gainsay. It was iPerk. of Gods free grace. p. 23 Lombard. 1. senten. dist. 45voluntas signi, not beneplaciti: God offered them the outward meanes of his word, not the inward meanes of his spirit, for their conuersion, which kAct. 16. 14.Lydia had.
lReuel. 3. 20.To breake open the doore, were to vse compulsion; to mPerk. of Gods free grace. p. 79knock, is to vse the outward meanes of conuerting a man; or if you will, to inspire a good purpose: vponupon which if any man open, out of doubt Christ will enter. But this doth no: prooue, that a man vponupon this motion, can yeeld by the strength of his owne free will, which is the point in question.
speaker D. B. P. To these expresse places taken out of Gods word, let vsus ioyne the testimony of those most auncient Fathers, against whose workes the Protestants can take no exception. The fi… shall be that excellent learned Martyr Iustinus in his Apologie, who vntounto the Emperour Aatonine speaketh thus. Vnlesse man by free vvill could she from soule dishonest deeds, and follovv those that be faire and good; he vvere vvithout fault, as not being cause of such things as vvere done But vve Christians teach that mankind by free choise, and free vvill, doth both doe vvell, and sinne.
To him we will ioyne that h…ly Bishop and valiant Martyr Jreneus, who of free will writeth thus, not only in vvorkes, but in faith also, our Lib. 4. cap. 72.Lord reserued liberty, and freedome of vvill vntounto man: saying, be it done vntounto thee, according to thy faith.
speaker A. W. I will adde to that worthie company, Saint Cyprian: who vponupon those words of our Sauiour, vvill you also depart, discourseth thus. Our Lord did Ioan 6. Lib. 1. Epist. 3.not bitterly in…igh against them, vvhichwhich forsooke him, but rather vsed these gentle speeches to his Apostles, vvill you also goe your vvay: and vvhy so? Marry obseruing and keeping (as this holy Father declareth) that decree by vvhichwhich man left vntounto his liberty, and put vntounto his free choise, *Appetite, des…es, or at the most, procure; not might deserue.might deserue vntounto himselfe, either damnation, or saluation. These three most auncient, and most skilfull in Christian Religion, and so zealous of Christian truth, that they spent their blood in confirmation of it, may suffice to certifie any indifferent reader; what was the iudgement of the auncient and most pure Church, concerning this article of free wl specially when the learnedst of our Aduersaries, confesse all An…quitie, (excepting only S. Augustine) to hauehave beleeued and taught free will. Heare the words This is but a popish slaunder to charge him vvith lying. Cent. 2. c. 4. col. 59. They vvere not led to this point by the Apostles, if the… sp…ke of spirituall actions. S…ny answere in the Epistle ded…atoru.of one, for all. Mathias Illyricus in his large, long lying historie, hauing rehearsed touching free will, the testimonies of Iustine Ireneus and others, saith. In like manner …lement, Patriarch of Alexandria, doth eueryevery vvhere teach free vvill, that it may appeare (say these Lutherans) not only the Doctors of that age to hauehave been in such darknes, but also that it did much encrease in the ages follovving. See the wilfull blindnes of heresie. Illyricus confessing the best learned in the purest times of the Church, to hauehave taught free will: yet had rather beleeue them to hauehave bin blindly led, by the Apostles and then best Schollers, who were their Masters: then to espy and amend his owne e…ror. These principall pillers of Christs Church were in darknes belike as Protestants must needes say: and that proud Persian and most wicked heretike Manes (of vvhom the Manichees are named) vvho first denied free vvill, began to broach the true light of the nevv Gospell.
nIustin Apol. 2. ad Anto… num.Iustin speakes of naturall actions, not of spirituall: for these were vtterly vnknowne to the Emperour being a heathen. He speakes also, perhaps, against the imputation of fatall necessitie, wherewith the Christians were charged in those times.
oIrenae. lib. 4. cap. 70.Irenaeus giues a man that freedome, which is contrarie to constraint: God (saith he) made man free, from the beginning, &c. pNon Coactum à deo.not constrained by God.
qCyprian lib. 1. epist. 3.Cyprian speakes of vsing, or not vsing the outward meanes; such, as following Christ to heare the word of him, whereof rIoh. 6. 66.the Euangelist there entreates. Now that this is in mans power, and that it is a meanes to procure saluation, or damnation, who denies? But Cyprian doth not say, that it is in a mans power by nature, to consent to Gods motion for his conuersion.
speaker D. B. P. It cannot reasonably be denied, that, in the point of free will, some of the ancient writers, before Austin, *Sixtus Senens lib. 5. in praefat. Tolle…us in Ioh. 6. & Rom. 9. Maldonatus in Ioh. 6. Peter. in Rom. 9. Num. 33.spake liker Philosophers, than Diuines; and gaue both occasion to Pelagius of his error, though they fauoured it not, and also aduantage for the confirming of it; as the place of the sCentur. 2. cap. 4. col. 59.Centuries alleaged by you plainly prooues. Other of them also spake not so plaine, as it was to be wished they had done: so that tAug. de nat. & grat. cap. 61. & seq. 2. Inst. c. 2. q. 4. It becomes not a diuine to vvrite so skornefully. Not to hauehave spoken so plainly and vvarily. De spirit. & li…. 34. De gra. Chri. 14. Ad Simpl. q. 2. Tract. …2. in Ioh. Ep. …7.Austin hath much adoe to defend them against Pelagius, and in the entrance to his defence is faine to lay this foundation, that he holds himselfe free for yeelding to any writings of men whatsoeuer.
Here I vvould make an end of citing Authorities, vvere it not that Caluin saith, that albeit all other auncient vvriters be against him, yet S. Augustine as he vaunteth, is clearely for him in this point, but the poore man is fouly deceiued, asvvell in this, as in most other matters. I vvill briefly proue, and that out of those works which S. Augustine wrote after the Pelagian heresie was a foote; for in his others, Caluin acknowledgeth him to hauehave taught free vvill. Of our freedome in consenting to Gods grace, he thus defineth, to consent to Gods calling, or not to consent, lyeth in a mans ovvne vvill. Againe: VVho doth not see eueryevery man to come, or not to come, by free vvill? but this free vvill may be alone, if he doe not come, but it cannot be but holpen, if he doe come. In another place, that vve vvill (doe vvell) God vvill hauehave it to be his and ours; his, in calling vsus; ours, in follovving him. Yea more: To Christ vvorking in him, a man doth cooperate, that is, vvorketh vvith him, both his ovvne iustification, and life euerlasting: will you heare him speake yet more formally for vsus? We hauehave dealt vvith your brethren and ours, as much as vve could: that they vvould hold out and continue in the sound Catholike faith; the vvhichwhich neither denieth free vvill, to euill or good life, nor doth attribute so much to it, that it is vvorth any thing vvithout grace. So according to this most worthy Fathers iudgement, the sound Catholike faith doth not deny free will, as the old Manichees and our new Gospellers do; nor esteeme it without grace able to doe any thing toward saluation, as the Pelagians did. And to conclude, heare S. Augustines answere vntounto them, vvho say, that he, when he commendeth grace, denyeth free will. Much lesse Lib. 4. con. …ul. c. 8.vvould I say that, vvhichwhich thou lyinglie dost affirme me to say, free vvill to be denied, if grace be commended, or grace to be denied, if free vvill be commended.
speaker A. W. Caluin doth not without cause affirme, that Austin is for him; not onelyonly in his writings after the Pelagian heresie, but in those before it also; though in the former he uAug. Ret. act. lib. 1. cap. 9.speak not so warily, as in the latter; yet his iudgement was all one.
*Aug. de spirit. & lit. cap. 34.Austin saith no more, but that assenting, or dissenting, when God calles, is an action of mans will. That the difference betwixt man and man, why one beleeues, and another doth not, proceedes from the diuers worke of Gods spirit, not from the choise of the parties, he speakes most plainly in the same place. *Ipsum velle credere deus operatur in homine.God workes in a man the very willing to beleeue: and yet more; nay, If any man will draw vsus to the searching of that depth, yCur illi ita suadeatur, vt persuadeatur, illi autem non.why this man is so perswaded, that hee yeelds, he is not, there are onelyonly two things, which I thinke good to answere. zRom. 11. 33. & 9. 14.O the depth of the riches! And is there iniquitie with God? Let him, whom this answere mislikes, seeke for some that are more learned, but let him take heede that he finde not some that are more presumptuous. Imagine then what Austin thinkes of you Papists, who confidently affirme, that the reason of this difference proceedes from the good vse of free will in the beleeuer: not that you are more learned, but that you are more presumptuous. aAug de gra. Christ. cap. 14.If you had added the words that follow immediatly in Austin, you should hauehave needed no further answere. Free will, if a man come to Christ, cannot be but holpen, bEt sic adiutum, &c.and so holpen, that not onelyonly he must know what is to be done, but doe that he knowes: and therefore when God teaches, not by the letter of the law, but by the spirit of grace, he teaches so, that a man doth not onelyonly see by knowledge that which he hath learned, but also desire it by willing, and performe it by doing. And by this diuine manner of teaching, euen the will and worke it selfe, not onelyonly the naturall possibilitie of willing and working is holpen. cSi enim sol… posse nostrum, &c.For if onelyonly our power were helpt by this grace, the Lord would thus speake: EueryEvery one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, can come to me. But he said not so; but eueryevery one which hath heard of my Father, and learned, doth come to me. To hauehave power to come, Pelagius dVenire posse in natura ponit.ascribes to nature; or, as of late he hath begun to speake, to grace, what grace soeuer he meane; by which (as he saith) our possibilitie is helped: but to come, is in will and worke. It followes not, that he which can come, eEtiam veniat, nisi id voluerit, atque fecerit.comes, vnlesse he will, and doe so; but eueryevery one that hath learned of the Father, not onelyonly can come, but comes. I hauehave set downe these words of Austin at large, as well that it may appeare with what conscience this man cites the Fathers, as that S. Austins iudgement of this point may be fully knowne to all men.
There is great reason that wee should expound fAug. ad Simplicia. q. 2. lib. 1such short sentences as this, by such large discourses as the former: but if we knew not that, this place makes nothing against vsus: for we hauehave graunted already, that to will is our worke, but wee say further, that Gods calling, as his teaching, in gAug. de grat. Chri. cap. 14.that other place of Austin, works in vsus, not only to be able to will, but to will indeede.
I hAug. in Ioh. tract. 72.say of this as of the former, that it is not contrarie to our doctrine: for we acknowledge, that in our iustification, and saluation after election, we worke with God; but not, as I hauehave often answered, by any naturall power of our free will, nor by any choyse of our owne, to which we are not inclined and brought by Gods spirit.
We say with iAug. Epist. 47 Lib. 4. contra …ulian. cap. 8.S. Austin, both in words and meaning, that true religion neither denies free will, either to a good or bad life, nor giues so much to it, that it should be of any force without grace; and we adde, that therefore your religion is false, because it affirmes, that the will of man can, by nature, assent to a good motion inspired. So to commend free will is indeede to deny grace; but to holde them both, as I hauehave proued Austin did out of these very places which you alleage for your opinion, and as we doe, going not an haires breadth from him in this question, is to glorifie Gods merciemercy, and confesse our owne weaknes; which is the end of his louelove to vsus, in the whole worke of our saluation.
III. Obiections of Papists.
speaker W. P. Obiect. I. First they alleadge that man by nature may doe that which is good, and therefore will that which is good: for none can doe that which hee neither willeth nor thinketh to doe, but first wee must will and then doe. Now (say they) men can doe good by nature, as giuegive almes, speake the trueth, doe iustice, and practise other duties of ciuill vertue: and therefore will that which is good. I answer, that a naturall man may doe good workes for the substance of the outwarde worke: but not in regarde of the goodnesse of the manner: these are two diuers things. A man without supernaturall grace may giuegive almes, doe iustice, speake the truth, &c. which bee good things considered in themselues as God hath commaunded them; but he cannot doe them well. To thinke good things and to doe good things are naturall workes: but to thinke good things in a good manner, and to doe them well, so as God may accept the action done, are workes of grace. And therefore the good thing done by a naturall man is a sinne, in respect of the doer: because it failes both for his right beginning, which is a pure heart, good conscience, and faith vnfained; as also for his end, which is the glory of God.
speaker D. B. P. Novv in fevv vvords I vvill passe ouer the obiections vvhichwhich he frameth The …esse you meddle v… them, the … it vvill be for … c…ed…s.in our names. But misapplieth them.
First Obiection. That man can doe good by nature, as giuegive almes, do Iustice, speake the truth, &c. And therefore vvill them vvithout the helpe of grace. This argument we vse to proue liberty of wil in ciuil and morall matters, euen in the corrupted state of man, and it doth demonstrate it: and M. Perkins in his third conclusion doth *He graunts no more there, then he doth here.graunt it. An …his answere here is farre from the purpose, for albeit (saith he) touching the substance of the worke it be good, yet it faileth both in the beginning, because it proceeds not from a pure hart, and a faith vnfeined: and also in the end w…ich is not the glory of God.
Ansvvere. It faileth neither in the one nor other: for that almes may issue out of a true naturall compassion, which is a sufficient good fountaine to make a worke morally good: faith and grace do purge the hart, and are necessarie onelyonly for good and meritorious workes: Againe being done to relieue the poore mans necessity, God his Creator & Master, is thereby glorified. And so albeit the man thought not of God in particular: yet God being the finall end of all good, any good action of it selfe, is directed tovvards him, vvhen the man putteth no other contrarie end thereunto.
speaker A. W. Master Perkins, as any man may see, grants a freedome of will in morall actions, but denies those actions to be good, in regard of the goodnes of the manner: and afterward, A man may giuegive almes, &c. which are good things, considered as they are commanded of God: but hee cannot doe them wel, that is, so as God may accept of the action done. If you will replie vponupon M. Perkins, you must proue, that such workes of a naturall man will be accepted of God; but that you cannot do. kProsper. de vocat. gentium. lib 2. cap 3 Sine cul…u veri Dei etiam quod virtus vi detur esse, peccatum est. Aug in senten. Prosper. cap. 106. Omnis infidelium vita, peccatum est.For the person must be accepted before the worke; lHebr. 11. 6.and without faith he cannot be accepted, nor hauehave faith being a naturall man. The summe of the answere is, if it be not done as the law requires, it is not a good worke: if it be, it is meritorious, and so must be accepted of God.
speaker W. P. Obiect. II. God hath commaunded all men to beleeue and repent: therefore they hauehave naturall free will, by vertue whereof (beeing helped by the spirit of God) they can beleeue and repent. Ans. This reason is not good: for by such commaundements God shewes not what men are able to doe; but what they should doe, and what they cannot doe. Againe, the reason is not well framed, it ought rather to bee thus; because God giues men commaundement to repent and beleeue, therefore they hauehave power to repent and beleeue, either by nature or by grace, and then we hold with them. For when God in the Gospel commandeth men to repent and to beleeue, at the same time by his grace he inableth them both to will or desire to beleeue and repent, as also actually to repent and beleeue.
speaker D. B. P. 2. Obiect. God hath commaunded all to beleeue and repent, therefore they hauehave naturall free will, by vertue whereof being helped by the spirit of God, they can beleeue. The force of the argument consisteth in this, that God being a good Lord, will not commaund any man to doe that, which he is no way able to doe.
Ans. M. Perkins ansvvereth in effect (for his vvords be obscure) that To him that vvill not vnderstand them.God commaundeth that, vvhichwhich we be not able to performe, but that which we should doe: Then I hope he vvill admitte that he vvill enable vsus by his grace to doe it, or else hovv should vve doe it? God surely doth not bind vsus by commandement to any impossible thing, he is no tyrant, but telleth vsus, that his yoke is sweet, and his burthen easie. And S. John vvitnesseth, that his commaundements are not heauy. He vvas farre off Matth. 11. Ioh. 5.from thinking that God vvould tye any man by lavv, to doe that which he was altogether vnable to performe. This in the end M. Perkins himselfe approueth.
speaker A. W. Master Perkins denies the consequence of the enthymem, viz. That therefore men hauehave free will to beleeue and repent, because God commands them to beleeue and repent; you to helpe the matter, giuegive a reason of the consequence, God being a good Lord, will not command any man to do that, which he is no way able to do: therefore since God commands men to beleeue and repent, they hauehave free will to beleeue and repent. Here the consequence is worse than before; for who sees not that there may be other meanes of beleeuing & repenting? namely, inclining the wil by grace. The antecedent also is false: for God being a good Lord, may inioyne his seruant that, which he made him able to performe, mBernard. d… grat. & lib. arb. fol. 263. Corruit de posse non peccare, in non posse non peccare.though by his owne fault he be now vnable.
speaker W. P. Obiect. III. If man hauehave no free will to sinne, or not to sinne, then no man is to be punished for his sinnes: because he finneth by a necessitie not to bee auoided. Answere, The reason is not good: for though man cannot but sinne, yet is the fault in himselfe, and therefore he is to be punished; as a bankrupt is not therefore freed from his debtes, because he is not able to pay them: but the bils against him stand in force, because the debt comes through his owne default.
speaker D. B. P. 3 Obiect. If man hauehave no free will to sinne, or not to sin, then no man is to be punished for his sinnes, because he sinneth by a necessity, not to be auoided.
He answereth, that the reason is not good; for, though man cannot but sinne, yet is the fault in himselfe, and therefore is to be punished. Against which, I say that this answere supposeth that which is false, to wit, that a man in sinne, cannot choose but sinne: for by the helpe of 1. Per. 3.God, who desireth all sinners conuersion, and thereunto affordeth grace sufficient; a sinner in a moment, may call for grace and repent him: and so choose whether he will sin or no, and consequently hath free vvill to sin or not to sin: And that example of a bankerupt is not to purpose, for he cannot when he will, satisfie his creditours, who content not themselues Not to your purpose, but to his very fit.vvith his repentance, vvithout repay of their money, as God doth.
speaker A. W. Here againe Master Perkins denies the consequence; that therefore a man is not to be punished for sinning, because he hath no free will to sinne, or not to sinne. The reason of his denial is that, which I answered in the second obiection: he may iustly be punished, though he hauehave not free will not to sinne, because it is by his owne fault that he hath it not. You replie, that the answere supposeth that which is false. The answere doth not suppose it, but, as I hauehave shewed, plainly denies the consequence. How your conceit, that eueryevery man hath helpe of God, so that he may repent and beleeue when he will, can stand with Austins iudgement before set downe, let eueryevery man, that hath reason, consider. The example of the bankerupt is fully to the purpose; for which Master Perkins brings it, to shew, that a man is not alwaies therfore to be borne with, for not doing that which hee is inioyned, because hee cannot doe it: for when it is through his owne fault that hee cannot, why should hee escape?
Now concerning the force of this argument, heare S. Augustines opinion De duab. animab. contra Manich.in these wordes. Neither are we here to search obscure bookes to learne, that no man is worthy of dispraise or punishment, which doth not that, vvhichwhich he cannot doe: for (saith he) doe not shepheards vponupon the dovvnes, From the doing vvhereof he is for…bly restrained.sing these things? doe not Poets vponupon the stages, act them? Doe not the vnlearned in their assemblies, and the learned in their libraries acknovvledge them? Doe not maisters in the schooles, and Prelats in the pulpits, and finally all mankind throughout the vvhole vvorld, confesse and teach this? to wit, that no man is to be punished, because he did that, which he could not choose but doe. Should he not then (according to S. Augustines VVho shall iustisie the matter of originall sin, if no man may be punished for that vvhichwhich he could not auoide?censure) be hissed out of all honest company of men, that denieth this so manifest a truth; confessed by all Mankind? How grosse is this heresie, that so hoodeth a man, and hardneth him, that be he learned, yet he blusheth not to deny roundly, that which is so euident in reason, that euen naturall sense, doth teach it vntounto shepheards? God of his infinite merciemercy, deliuer vsus from this straunge light of the new Gospell.
speaker A. W. Saint Austin disputing in that booke nSee my ansvvere about the Manichees in the Epistle dedicatorie.against the Manichees, who hold that there were two soules in eueryevery creature, of two diuers substances; the one good, the other bad, by which they are forced to doe good or euill, as either of them could ouercome other; refutes them by this reason, among other, that if men doe well or ill, by constraint, they were neither to be praised, nor dispraised for it. That he is thus to be vnderstood, not onelyonly the course of his disputation shewes, but also the definition that he brings of will: Will (saith oDe duabus animabus contra Manic. cap. 10.Austin) is a motion of the minde (pNullo cogente. no man constraining it) to qAd aliquid vel non amittendum, vel adipiscendum.the not losing, or to the getting of something. I shewed before that we admit no such necessitie of sinning, but onelyonly affirme, that whatsoeuer a naturall man doth, it is sinfull: so that wee grant him libertie from constraint, for the doing, or not doing this or that action; but denie, that any action he doth is free from sinne, and therefore he sins necessarily in all he doth.