Common Places, Part 2 · Chapter 9 · Section 13 – Section 15
Of ſome of the Affects ſeuerallie.
In Iudg. 8, verſe. 1. Looke before part. 2. chap. 2. and alſo vponupon 1. Sam. 18, 8. and 1. Cor. 3, verſe. 3.43 But now we thinke it good to ſpeake ſomwhat of the affects ſeuerallie. Affects, as it is manifeſt, doo belong vntounto the generall word of qualitie, and are conteined in that kind, which commonlie is called paſſion, and paſſible qualitie. But among theſe, there be two of a groſſer ſort, and verie common; I meane delectation and gréefe. They chéeflie hauehave their place in the ſinewes, which be diſperſed in a maner ouer all the bodie: vntounto which ſinewes, when things, either agréeable to nature, or elſe repugnant therevnto be applied, then we be either delited, or elſe doo ſorrowe. Moreouer, there be other affects, which followe knowledge it ſelfe: whereby, as the nature of them is, ſo the hart dooth change his motion, according as good or euill ſhall be laid hold vponupon in the knowledge; and that, either preſent or imminent. For when we féele that good is preſent, the hart is pleaſantlie delited, and ſwéetlie affected therewith: and this affect is called gladneſſe. But if ſo be we perceiue that the good is not preſent indéed, yet not far off, but readie; and that within a while we ſhall obteine it, then are we ſtirred vp with hope to purſue the ſame: and the hart in like maner is pleaſantlie mooued. But when we perceiue that euill is preſent, the hart ſtarteth backe with a gréeued motion: for it ſhrinketh, it abhorreth, and it is vexed. And this affection is commonlie called as well ſorrowe as gréefe of mind. In Gréek it is foreign; ſo called, as the Stoiks thinke of foreign, that is, A looſing. For euen as the bodie of him that is ſicke, is looſed through ſickneſſe; ſo likewiſe the mind ſéemeth, after a ſort to be conſumed with ſadneſſe.
There remaineth another knowledge of euill, the which indéed is not preſent, but ſuch as is now néere at hand: that dooth the hart eſchew, & euidentlie enough ſtarteth from it by his motion: and ſuch an affect is called feare. According to theſe principall affects, we will now intreat of thoſe, which hauehave their originall from ſadneſſe or gréefe. And thoſe are likewiſe reckoned to be foure; that is to wit, merciemercy, Foure affects which ariſe of greefe.indignation, enuie, and emulation; of the which Ariſtotle did ſingularlie well write manie things in his booke of Rhetoriks. But before I deale particularlie with theſe, Whether affects be among the number of good or of euil things.we muſt demand one thing; to wit, whether affects are to be reckoned in the account of good or of euill things? The Stoiks accounted them in the number of euill, and condemned them generallie: being led by this reaſon; that by them the mind, the iudgement, and ſound counſell is greatlie troubled. For they ſo hale and drawe the mind and reaſon to and fro, as it cannot peaceablie behold things naturall and diuine; neither yet determine of dooing things orderlie and rightlie. And further, bicauſe with the heauie loade of them, they driue men verie often to commit diſhoneſt and vniuſt things: yea, and when they be ſomewhat more vehement, they hurt the bodie it ſelfe. Theſe in a manner were the reaſons of the Stoiks.
The Peripatetiks teach far otherwiſe; The Peripatetiks.namelie, that it is not true, which the Stoiks declare, except when affections be not chaſtiſed by reaſon, but are ſuffered to hauehave their immoderate ſcope. Bicauſe thoſe affections, if they be compriſed within certeine bounds, are both good & profitable: as being the matter of vertues, and which by nature were giuen, as the whetſtone of them. For fortitude is greatlie furthered by the meanes of wrath: and compaſſion dooth attend vponupon the vertue of clemencie. And in the ſame ſort it may be ſaid as touching the moſt part of them. But among theſe philoſophers, What the holie ſcriptures determine of affects.ſo diſagréeing in themſelues; ſentence muſt be giuen according to the iudgement of the holie ſcriptures. They declare, that man, in reſpect both of the bodie, and of the ſoule, was created by God: and they adde; that All things, Gen., 131.whatſoeuer GOD made, were good. Therefore, ſéeing he himſelfe planted the affects in man (I meane not wicked nor corrupt, as now we hauehave them, but perfect and ſound, and which ſhould obeie and ſerue reaſon) they of neceſſitie be good. Furthermore, the lawe of God dooth in euerie place commend merciemercy vntounto vsus: it preacheth repentance, which cannot be without ſorowe & gréefe of mind. Dauid alſo wrote, and Paule repeated it; Pſal. 4, 5. Epheſ. 4, 26.Be ye angrie, and ſin not. Yea & the matter hath ſtretched ſo far foorth, that affects are attributed euen to God himſelfe; namelie, wrath, merciemercy, ſorrowe, That which is ſinne in his owne nature is neuer attributed vntounto God.repentance, and ſuch like: which although they be not properlie ſpoken of him, yet this we muſt obſerue, that in man, whatſoeuer by it ſelfe is vice and ſinne in his owne nature, is neuer by the holie ſcriptures attributed vntounto God.
Of Shamefaſtnes.
44 Shamefaſtnes, which is a meane thing, is commended; In the commentaries vponupon Ariſtotles Ethiks.yet is it no vertue, bicauſe men doo naturallie run thereinto, and ſometime againſt their wils: for it is a ſorrowe or feare for ſome euill that hangeth ouer our head, or into which we ſhall fall. But thou wilt ſaie, that affects are neither praiſed or diſpraiſed, ſince they be naturall; how then can ſhamefaſtneſſe be commended, and the extremities thereof condemned? I anſwer, that a méere affect is neither praiſed nor diſpraiſed, but the meaſure therof is. It is praiſed, when it is in a meane; it is diſpraiſed, if it be extreame. Here likewiſe in ſhamefaſtneſſe there is found an exceſſe: and he which ſo excéedeth, is ſaid to be foreign, that is, Aſtonied, or abaſhed, who is aſhamed at euerie thing. And on the other ſide, he is impudent, who although he be not altogither aſhamed, yet he lacketh ſhamefaſtneſſe more than becommeth him.
Of Temperance.
45 Betwéene pleaſures and gréefes, temperance is the meane; and intemperance the exceſſe. The defect hath no name. But bicauſe pleaſure is of two kinds; ſome be of the mind, and thoſe be commended of all men; as when a man reioiſeth in the contemplation of God, and of nature: or delighteth in the remembrance of his well dooing, either elſe taketh pleaſure in the helping and benefiting of others to his power. But the other kind of pleaſure is more groſſe, and is perceiued of the ſenſes, not of the reaſon: and thoſe are called corporall pleaſures. Wherevpon Ariſtotle ſaith, that this vertue is not conuerſant about the former vertues: for thoſe things being moſt pure, hauehave no néed of moderation. It remaineth therefore, that temperance is placed in this latter kind. And yet hath it not place about all corporall things; but in thoſe onelie, which belong vntounto the ſenſe of touching. But with touching thou muſt alſo vnderſtand taſting: for thoſe two ſenſes (as it is written in the booke De anima) are verie néere one to another. Wherefore, temperance ſhall be a mediocritie in pleaſures of meate and drinke, and fleſhlie deſire. But wherefore dooth it not alſo moderate the pleaſures, which come by the ſight and by the hearing? Bicauſe the deſire of thoſe pleaſures is not ſo great and vehement, as it is of theſe: neither are thoſe ſo hurtfull as theſe be. For by theſe, if they be immoderate, men doo in a maner degenerate into brute beaſts; but ſo doo they not through ſounds, ſmels, or colours.
But admit that in this kind of pleaſures alſo, which belong vntounto the other ſenſes, meaſure be excéeded; and that there is néed of ſome vertue, that kind of exceſſe is neuer accounted or called intemperance: but they, which ſo ſinne, are accuſed of a certeine other ſinne, not of intemperance. Wherefore, ſéeing that the vertue of temperance hath place, as well in pleaſures, as in diſpleaſures; whether of theſe affections is the more frequented matter thereof? Ariſtotle ſaith, that thoſe be pleaſures: for in the ſuppreſſing of them, we hauehave greater labour; and vntounto the exceſſe of pleaſure we ſéeme to be driuen by nature. Neither is it ſo hard a matter to reſiſt diſpleaſure, as it is to temper a mans ſelfe from pleaſure. Vertue in verie déed is chéeflie conuerſant about thoſe things that be difficult. Furthermore, the gréefe of the mind, which belongeth to this vertue, ariſeth of the defect or abſence of pleaſure. But it is far more eaſie, to abide the deſire of a pleaſure that is abſent, than not to enioie a pleaſure that is preſent. The defect or want in this matter had no name. A reaſon is brought; bicauſe there be not manie, naie rather, there be verie few, which doo altogither ſhun pleaſures. Thoſe things, which doo ſeldome happen, or be in a maner neuer ſéene, doo eaſilie want a name. But yet, ſaith Ariſtotle, they be foreign, that is, Aſtonied. Neuertheleſſe, we muſt thinke that they are properlie ſo called: for that word dooth alſo ſignifie them, which being oppreſſed with the force of ſickneſſe, hauehave no ſenſe. And it may be, that ſome men, by reaſon of a ſickneſſe, or ſome diſſolution of the ſinewes, féele no taſte of pleaſure and fleſhlie luſt.