Common Places, Part 2 · Chapter 9 · Section 12
Of Affects, or affections in generall; out of the Commentaries vponupon Ariſtotles Ethiks.
34 An affect is a certeine power or facultie, What affect is.whereby we either ſéeke or ſhun the obiects laid before vsus. And in liuing creatures, in that they be liuing, and hauehave ſenſe, it dooth inſue knowledge. And ſome affects doo inſue touching; but ſome doo accompanie the cogitation and opinion. Thoſe which followe of touching, foorthwith, What affects doo followe touching.as the ſenſe lighteth into an obiect, either agréeable or vnagréeable, doo either purſue it, or flie from it. For when the ſenſe and the obiect doo agrée the one with the other, then it is pleaſure: but when it happeneth otherwiſe, it is counted gréefe. And while the ſinewes are hurt, there ariſeth a great gréefe; which gréefe vndoubtedlie is not an opinion or a cogitation, as manie hauehave fondlie conceiued: for, beſides the cogitation or opinion, the bodie it ſelfe is ill affected. And it is not in the power of our opinion or imagination, to change ſuch maner of obiects: for thoſe, which doo cauſe gréefe, will alwaies hurt the ſinewes; which ſinewes doo apperteine to the féeling, and will vex the bodie. And on the other ſide, thoſe obiects, which of their owne nature are pleaſant, will alwaies delite; ſo that the bodie be not ill affected with ſome ill qualitie. What affects doo ſpring from the cogitation.But thoſe affects, which doo not inſue in touching, ſpring and ariſe from the cogitation or imagination; although there be no outward obiect preſent. And they be the motions of the hart, whereby we purſue or ſhun obiects; according as the cogitation, either trulie or falſelie ſheweth thoſe things to be either profitable or vnprofitable. Thoſe affects are called *Paſſions.foreign, and therfore they be not cogitations, but are deriued of them. Of theſe affects there be diuers ſorts: for ſome of them be ſimple, and others compounded. Of the ſimple we reckon foure; Gladneſſe,Gladneſſe, Sadneſſe, Sadneſſe. Hope. Feare.Hope, and Feare: for the obiect, which is preſented vntounto vsus, is either good or euill. And the ſame is ſhewed by the cogitation, either as preſent, or by and by to come.
If good be ſhewed to be preſent, there ariſeth gladneſſe, which is a motion of the hart, whereby it openeth & ſpreadeth foorth it ſelfe, ſwéetlie imbracing the preſent good. But if the good be not preſent, but is looked for; hope ariſeth, being a motion of the hart, whereby it inlargeth and prepareth it ſelfe to imbrace that good, when it ſhall come. But the euill, when it is preſentlie ſhewed, the hart dooth ſhun it: for ſadneſſe is a motion of the hart, whereby it draweth it ſelfe togither, that it might auoid the preſent euill. But if the euill that is to come be ſhewed, then we feare. And that affect is a motion of the hart, wherby it draweth it ſelfe togither, leſt it ſhould be oppreſſed by the euill to come. Theſe are the ſimple affects, which are giuen vntounto liuing creatures, that they might not onelie vſe a knowledge for their owne ſafetie; but alſo, that if that knowledge ſhould be but a weake helpe, ſuch kind of ſpurs might be ioined withall, as might ſtir vsus vp to our ſafetie, and call vsus backe from things that are hurtfull vntounto vsus. They be as it were winds, wherby the ſhip is driuen: and they are placed in the third kind of qualitie. And albeit that the firſt and ſecond kind are of very great force, to the gouerning and ruling of liuing creatures; yet are thoſe of more force to rule, and doo worke with a greater vehemence, than the habits or naturall powers doo. Howbeit, there are other affects of this ſort, which are not ſimple, but are compounded of manie things; as is anger, which comprehendeth gréefe and gladnes togither; and ſuch other like there be.
The places or organs of the affects.35 Now it remaineth, that we ſée what be the organs or places of theſe affects. Plato did place anger in the hart; deſire and gladneſſe in the liuer. But Ariſtotle was of another mind, who placed as well anger as gréefe, gladneſſe, and ſuch like, in the hart: albeit that Ariſtotle placed alſo the naturall affects; to wit, thoſe which belong to the vegetatiue or growing power, in the organs, which be proper vntounto that facultie: and ſuch are hunger, thirſt, and the ſtirring vp vntounto procreation. Neither would he denie, but that the liuer is the chéefe among theſe inward parts; bicauſe therein is the principall ſtorehouſe of the bloud; and that humor is both nouriſhment, and alſo is the proper matter of the ſéed. But ſetting aſide theſe naturall affects, which are not ioined vntounto knowledge; let vsus deale with thoſe, which are ioined either to the apprehenſion of the ſenſes, or elſe vntounto the cogitation. That the hart is the ſeate of the affects.And ſince, according to the opinion of Ariſtotle, we place them in the hart; let vsus prooue this opinion of ours by arguments. Certeinlie, this muſt be doone, whereſoeuer they are to be placed, either in the braine, or in the hart, or in the liuer. They ſhall not be placed in the braine, ſince there the actions and powers, which be repugnant to theſe affects; namelie, iudgement, and reaſon, hauehave their abiding. But one and the ſelfe-ſame power bringeth not foorth at one verie time, actions which be repugnant. And that the actions of the affects, and thoſe of iudgement and reaſon be one repugnant to another; euen Medea hir ſelfe in Ouid teſtified, who ſaid;
Video meliora, probóque; deteriora ſequor:
The better I allow, and vew;
But yet the woorst I doo inſew.
And by this verie reaſon it appéereth, that theſe affects are not (as the Stoiks thought) cogitations or opinions; ſince theſe actions conſiſt in the braine. And therfore it remaineth, that if they be not in the braine, they muſt be placed either in the hart, or in the liuer. And verelie they cannot be aſcribed vntounto the liuer; bicauſe thoſe affects, which belong therevnto, cannot be gouerned by iudgment and reaſon, as hunger, thirſt, and moouing vntounto procreation may be. No doubt but iudgement or reaſon may ouer-rule the power that mooueth; to wit, that it ſhall not eate nor drinke, nor procreate children: but it cannot let, that it ſhould diſcloſe it ſelfe, that it ſhould prouoke, diſquiet, and ſtir vp. But thoſe affects, which followe perceiuing or knowledge, may be ſtaied by reaſon and iudgement: and ſo they be not of the ſelfe-ſame nature that thoſe be, which are placed in the liuer. Wherefore, they ſhall not belong vntounto that part of the bodie, but vntounto the hart. And with this opinion, which wée thinke is Ariſtotles, the holie ſcriptures doo agrée, which ſaie; Deut. 6, 5. Mark. 12, 30Thou ſhalt louelove the Lord thy God, with all thy hart, with all thy ſoule, and with all thy ſtrength, and thou ſhalt feare to offend him.
36 But we muſt note, How the naturall affects do belong to the hart.that hunger and thirſt are ſometime vnderſtood for the defect it ſelfe, when we be quite emptie; and in this reſpect they cannot be gouerned by iudgment and reaſon, nor yet hauehave their originall from thence: but that gréefe, which dooth followe, belongeth to the hart; ſince the firſt emptineſſe is in the organs, which doo belong vntounto the vegetatiue power. And as touching the affects alſo, which followe the ſenſe of féeling, there muſt be two things conſidered; to wit, the diſſolutions of the whole, the rending in péeces, and burnings: which things are doone in the fleſh and ſinewes. But the gréefes, which followe them, be motions of the hart. Neither muſt we paſſe ouer this, that the hart hath two other motions, beſide affects; namelie, the pulſes. But we are not now at this preſent to ſpeake of them, and therefore I come againe to the affects: which, ſince we hauehave called them motions of the heart, That the affects are no violent motions.we muſt not thinke them to be violent: bicauſe they hauehave their originall from nature it ſelfe, for they ariſe from the powers of the heart. But yet muſt we vnderſtand, that ſuch is the courſe of nature, that thoſe things which be ouer vehement, doo hurt; yea they marre and corrupt. As for example: if the light be too great, it deſtroieth the eies; ouer-much heat, or ouer-much cold doo deſtroie liuing creatures: but whatſoeuer is moderate; dooth profit and preſerue. Which ſelfe ſame thing muſt be iudged of the affects. Vehement gréefe, feare or gladneſſe be hurtfull; but when there is vſed a meane, they bring verie manie helpes and commodities. Now hauehave we ſpoken enough of the formall cauſe: for we hauehave prooued, that they be motions of the heart, which doo followe the knowledge of the ſenſes; or elſe followe cogitation or opinion, which neuertheleſſe are naturall and not violent. And we hauehave alſo ſhewed what we muſt determine as concerning the matter or ſubiect.
The efficient cauſe of the affects.Now it remaineth, that we ſpeake of the efficient cauſe. As for this, it is the obiect, whereby the ſenſe or cogitation is mooued; namelie, that good thing or euill thing, which offereth it ſelfe, either preſent or to come. And moreouer, the efficient cauſe is a power of the heart, which foorthwith mooueth the ſame to purſue or to ſhun that which is offered. Howbeit, betwéene the obiect and power ſtirred vp of the hart, there commeth betwéene a middle knowledge: for the power of the heart is not ſtirred vp by the obiect, vnleſſe it be through knowledge. For immediatlie, ſo ſoone as the obiects are apprehended, either by the ſenſe, or by the knowledge; the ſpirits faculties, which doo attend vponupon the knowledge, doo ſtrike the hart it ſelfe, and the power of the hart is awakened, whereby it is mooued either to flie from, Why the affects are in ſome more feeble, and in other more vehement.or to purſue. But yet it muſt be noted, that according to the diuers temperature of the bodie, ſo is this motion of the heart, either ſlowlie or ſpéedilie ſtirred vp; and by reaſon of the affects, doo become more vehement in ſome, and in other ſome more féeble. Hot and drie humors doo eaſilie and vehementlie ſtirre vp; but thoſe which be cold and moiſt, be ſomewhat ſlower: from which the affects muſt of neceſſitie procéed ſomewhat ſlacklie. And further, the humors are mooued, according to the nature or condition of th'affects. In gréefe or feare is raiſed melancholie; in gladneſſe, bloud; and in anger, yellowe choler. Ouer this, the motions be either of the propertie of drawing togither, or of ſpreading abroad. When the obiect, which is offered, ſhalbe good; the heart ſpreadeth it ſelfe abroad to receiue it: but if the obiect ſhalbe euill, then the humors withdrawe themſelues to the inward parts. And hence procéedeth paleneſſe of the face; and from hence ariſe bluſhings, according as the bloud either retireth vntounto the inward parts, or elſe powreth out it ſelfe into the outward parts. And thus much ſhall ſuffice as touching the cauſe.
37 Now remaineth, Whether affects be opinions.that we conſider of two things. Firſt, that theſe affects be not either cogitations, or opinions; as the Stoiks thought them to be. Secondlie, that they muſt not be all condemned as vitious and euill. Firſt it may euidentlie be prooued in thoſe affects that be called naturall, as are hunger and thirſt: which affects inuade vsus without anie cogitation. Alſo, who will call it a cogitation or opinion, when we be afflicted with a diſſolution of the whole, with a breaking of the ſinewes, or burning by flame or fire? They may as well perſuade vsus, as touching the naturall affections of parents towards their children, which are not onlie vehement in men, but in brute beaſts alſo. Howbeit, ſince the matter is plaine; I thinke it néedles to ſtand much therevpon. Now, as concerning the ſecond; I will not denie, Whether all affects be euill.but ſome affects hauehave their faults ioined with them. But I will ſhew, that manie of them are good; and that thoſe, which are euill, are euill through mans fault, not in their owne nature. And firſt may we ſpeake of the error of iudgement, for we doo not alwaies iudge aright of the obiects which are before vsus. That which is euill, is otherwhile taken for that which is good; and that which is good, is eſtéemed to be euill. But the affects, as we hauehave declared, doo accompanie the iudgements of the mind; and ſo the fault paſſeth from the iudgement vntounto the affect. Acts. 5, 51.The apoſtles iudged the contumelies, which they ſuffred for the name of Chriſt, to be honourable vntounto them, and therfore departed with ioie and gladneſſe from the Councell.
But contrariwiſe, when Dauid was driuen out of his kingdome by his ſonne, he ſorrowed; bicauſe he ſawe, that his caſting foorth would be an offenſe vntounto men, which knew what God promiſed vntounto Dauid by the prophets. He ſawe moreouer, that theſe things did happen through his owne fault: and ſith that theſe were euils, he could not chooſe but ſorrowe. Either of theſe both Dauid as the apoſtles iudged rightlie of the things obiected, albeit in diuers maners they iudged of the things that happened. Vaine men doo eſtéeme flatteries to be good things indéed, and therefore are delighted with them. Others iudge more rightlie of them; for they perceiue them to be but mockeries, and for that cauſe doo diſlike of them. Thoſe that are good men, doo reioiſe in méere vertues; for they iudge rightlie of them. Againe, thou ſhalt ſée others, which doo hate them; bicauſe they be infected with a corrupt iudgement: ſo as the naughtineſſe and goodnes of the affects, procéedeth of the true or falſe iudgement, concerning the things which are obiected. Howbeit, it is not requiſite to ſaie, that all the affects are euill; bicauſe manie men being ſeduced by error, doo light vponupon thoſe ill motions of the mind: for they which erre not, are not hurt by the affects of error.
Ill affects are repugnant to right reaſon38 An other euill there is in the affects, which in verie déed procéedeth not of error; but for that there be ſome, which are aduerſaries vntounto right reaſon: ſuch is the deſire of other mens goods, of murther, of adulterie, and ſuch like. Theſe affects muſt of good right be condemned; but yet for theſe ſakes muſt not ſentence be giuen generallie; ſith there be other affects, which are agréeable to right reaſon and ſound iudgement; namelie, louelove towards vertue, and hatred and anger againſt ſinnes. Good and laudable affects.Which affects, being agréeable to reaſon, are not onelie honeſt and laudable, but alſo verie profitable: for they are giuen as certeine ſpurs to godlie life. For it is not ſufficient to knowe thoſe things that are good, but we muſt be earneſtlie ſtirred vp vntounto them. For the affects be as it were ſinewes, by whoſe ſtretching foorth, or ſhrinking in, we are the earneſtlier, or the lightlier ſtirred vp. Who ſéeth not, that this is moſt true, that anger is as it were a whetſtone vntounto fortitude? We ſhould be verie dull euen vntounto honeſt actions, if we had not theſe prouocations: we ſhould be euen as a ſhip in the ſea deſtitute of wind. Wherefore, the nature it ſelfe of affects is not euill, ſince manie of them be verie profitable and honeſt. Vndoubtedlie, God gaue the organs of theſe affects, and he appointed humors to attend on them, and knowledges to accompanie them: ſo as it can not be denied, but that they are the works of God; and eſpeciallie ſince he in his lawe requireth ſuch affects. For he willeth vsus to louelove and to feare God, to louelove our neighbours, and ſeruants to feare their maſters: and full of ſuch precepts are the holie ſcriptures.
foreign or the impaſſibilitie of the Stoiks muſt be auoided.That ſame impaſſibilitie then of affects, which the Stoiks would hauehave (albeit that Baſil, Nazianzen, and certeine other of the fathers, otherwhile ſéeme greatlie to commend) muſt vtterlie be refuſed. Chriſt wept, was ſad vntounto death, was mooued with merciemercy: ſo then he was not without affects. And therefore affects are not repugnant euen to the perfection of our humane nature. True it is, there happen euils manie times, through the fault of our corrupt nature: but we muſt indeuor our ſelues to correct our vitious affects, and to confirme and reſtore thoſe that be good and agréeable to reaſon. And this we read, that the holie and godlie heroicall men did, both in the old, and in the new teſtament. Theſe fathers did not followe their affections, as guided by them; but vſed them vntounto thoſe vertues and noble acts, which God commanded. And it is apparant in the holie ſcriptures, that thoſe heroicall men were ſtirred vp of God, with certein more vehement affections, than other men are. But it may be doubted of, Whence it coms that there is a diſſenting of the affects from reaſon.from whence the excéeding corruptions of affects, or elſe ſo great a diſagréement from reaſon in ſome of them (ſuch as is the gréedie deſire of other mens goods, of murther, rape, & adulterie, which can not anie maner of waie be allowed) had their originall. VntoUnto which queſtion an anſwer may eaſilie be made out of the holie ſcriptures; bicauſe that By one man, that is by Adams fall, ſinne entered into the world. But the philoſophers, which vnderſtand not this, doo flie vntounto temperatures of the bodie; and vntounto aſpects and motions of the ſtarres: howbeit, as the thing it ſelfe declareth, they can not by thoſe cauſes yéeld a perfect reaſon.
39 Now let vsus ſée, How the affects may be gouerned.how thoſe affects may be ruled and corrected. The firſt waie is ciuill; to wit, through morall vertues. For thoſe doo reduce them to a mediocritie; and thoſe would ſuffice; if we ſhould onelie hauehave reſpect vntounto the preſent life. But in truth, before God they are not ſufficient; neither dooth this ciuill iuſtice ſuffice before his tribunall ſeate. And therefore another rule is yet neceſſarie; namelie, the rule of the diuine ſcriptures, the which doo profit nothing at all, vnleſſe they be apprehended by faith. This rule bringeth two maner of commodities with it. The firſt is, that that which is wanting vntounto true righteouſnes (conſidering the morall ſtate wherein we be) is not imputed to vsus, and that the whole fulfilling is aſcribed to vsus out of Chriſt his fulneſſe. Beſides this, there is giuen vntounto vsus greater ſtrength to withſtand luſts. And finallie by faith, the verie actions of vertues, & good affects, are altogither referred to God: which without faith cannot be doone. And therefore, in men, which are eſtranged from Chriſt, thoſe moderate affects, how gorgious ſoeuer they were, are ſinnes; not that they be ſo in their owne nature, but they ſo become through our naturall corruption. For we be euen as fuſtie veſſels, the which doo corrupt the wine, though it be good that is powred into vsus. And therefore, ſith God is the author of all creatures, and that he made nothing but is good, and made no bare ſubſtances, and ſuch as are furniſhed with no kind of helps, but gaue vntounto euerie one a proneſſe and inclination vntounto thoſe things which be holſome and profitable: it followeth, that not onelie natures and ſubſtances be good; but alſo the affects, which are by God ingraffed in them. Albeit, that in thoſe which be wicked men, they drawe vntounto them theſe two euils, which otherwiſe of themſelues are good. Firſt, by reaſon of originall ſinne, nature is ſo corrupted and weakened, that good affects are not of ſuch efficacie as they ought to be. Secondlie, they are not directed vntounto God, as it behooueth that they ſhould be; but rather to the imbracing of pleaſures and earthlie delectations.
Foure degrees of men.Wherby we may perceiue, there are foure degrées of men. The firſt are the baſeſt, who be neither indued with morall vertues, nor yet with godlineſſe: in theſe we may perceiue all things to be fraught with perturbations and diſorder. Secondlie, there be others as yet aliens from godlineſſe; howbeit, ciuill men, who by a certeine kind of habit, hauehave after a ſort reuoked their affections to a mediocritie. The third ſort are beléeuers in Chriſt; who notwithſtanding they are not without ſin, no more than are other mortall men, yet is not their ſinne imputed vntounto them. In the fourth & laſt place muſt thoſe be put, which either were made by God at the beginning, or elſe are looſed from hence, and be now with Chriſt. They indéed hauehave no corrupt affections, neither on the ſecond, nor yet on the third cauſe; but they hauehave them altogither good, abſolute, and perfect. Howbeit, in nature there be not anie affects ſo corrupt, and ſo vicious, but in them may be ſéene ſomwhat that is good. In all affects there is ſom good thing.For in all of them there dooth appéere ſome part of the inſtitution of God. For that ſame firſt beginning, or (as I may ſo ſaie) the facultie & ſtrength of theſe qualities had his originall from God; but the confuſedneſſe either of imperfection, or of deformedneſſe, which commeth by reaſon of ſinne, hath corrupted the ſame. Neither doo thoſe euill affects hurt alone the groſſer parts of the ſoule, Ill affects hurt the will and reaſon.but they alſo hurt the will and reaſon. For ſo did God faſten and bind togither thoſe powers of the mind, as they might ſerue one another; namelie, that the affects ſhould obeie reaſon, and that reaſon ſhould rule and gouerne the affects, and temper the motions of the hart. Howbeit, it fareth otherwiſe; and ſo great a féebleneſſe there is of the will, as being compared with the affects, it may ſéeme to be euen a fearefull child, ſitting vponupon a verie fierce horſſe. Wherefore, the morall philoſophers hauehave prefixed to themſelues this end; namelie, to qualifie the affections by vertues, and to ſtrengthen reaſon being weake.
In what parts of the mind be the affects.40 But which be the parts of the mind, that being inſtructed by vehement affects, doo diſturbe reaſon, and make it féeble; Plato declared, who in the chéefe place appointed *The part that ruleth.foreign, and in the inferiour place, *The luſting part.foreign, and *The wrath full part.foreign. So that in theſe latter parts of the mind are placed the affects. And theſe powers of the mind, as it was ſaid before, he iudged to be in the head, in the liuer, and in the hart. But Ariſtotle, for the generall word, tooke foreign, which he diuided into thrée parts; to wit, foreign, that is, Gréedie deſire, Affectation, or Couetouſneſſe: foreign, that is, Anger, or Vehemencie of the mind: & foreign, that is, Will. Which parts, bicauſe they are apparant of themſelues, there is no néed to expound them anie further. Yet this neuertheleſſe will I adde, that according to right order, the inferiour appetites ought to be mooued, gouerned, and ruled by that ſame ſuperiour, which is foreign; to wit, Will: euen as the vppermoſt ſphere doth guide the lower, as Ariſtotle writeth in his 3. booke De anima. And thus doubtleſſe the caſe ſtandeth: the inferiour powers, when they be ſtirred vp, and compell vsus to the dooing of anie thing, are gouerned by the cogitation; and the cogitation by reaſon.
Yea, and euerie man hath experience in himſelfe, that when anie naturall reaſon is applied, the diſturbed affections are ſet in quiet: euen as the winds are feined to be ſuppreſſed by Aeolus. Wherefore, in man, the affects are obedient vntounto the will it ſelfe; whereas in brute beaſts, action immediatelie followeth vponupon the motion of the affects. But our affections do perpetuallie expect the commandement of the will, vnleſſe that ſome impediment doo oppoſe it ſelfe: as in children, and in mad men we ſée it falleth out. Here perhaps thou wilt ſaie; Doo we not ſée, Whether the affects be mooued againſt the will.that in thoſe, which are incontinent, the affects are mooued euen againſt the will? We anſwer, that indéed they rebell againſt the will; but that, as touching the motion and actions, they bring nothing to paſſe, vnleſſe that the will doo command them. Indéed the affections doo reſiſt the will, and trouble it, and finallie ouercome it, and lead it awaie to their owne opinion; which will, when it ſhall hauehave giuen hir aſſent, and ſhall hauehave ouerruled the matter, actions doo followe, not as it decréed at the beginning, but as it commandeth when it is ouercome.
41 But ſome thinke, Whether the powers of deſire & of anger be all one.that the power of deſiring, and of being angrie, is all one; bicauſe contraries belong all vntounto one facultie: but things agréeable vntounto nature, and things hurtfull to the ſame, are contrarie; and therefore they be both obiects of one part of the mind. As white and blacke, are obiects of the ſight; a right and crooked line, are obiects of one and the ſame ſcience; namelie, of the ſcience Mathematicall; and a whole and a ſicke man, are obiects of phyſicke. Herevnto we anſwer, that the obiects of the angrie and of the deſiring power, are not ſo to be diſtinguiſhed, by that which is agréeable, and that which is hurtfull, but that either of theſe parts hath reſpect vntounto good and euill; howbeit, not after the like maner. The power, which deſireth, hath reſpect vntounto good and to euill abſolutelie; that is to wit, that it may atteine the one, and auoid another. Neuertheleſſe, otherwhile impediments and things that doo corrupt it, doo fall out betwéene: ſo that it is a difficult thing to obteine this, or to auoid that. And there dooth the power of anger ſhew it ſelfe, for the ouercomming of theſe difficulties; it wreſtleth, and it earneſtlie reſiſteth the impediments, to the intent we may either apprehend the good, or auoid the euill, according as we doo deſire. So then the obiect of the angrie power is good and euill, according as the thing difficult and hard offereth it ſelfe. Hope is chéefelie an affection of the angrie power: for it is carried vntounto that which is good, but yet a good that is abſent, to the obteining wherof muſt be deuoured the impediment of expectation; yea, the power and the difficultie of the impediments muſt be ouercome.
But in what order thoſe faculties ſhalbe placed among themſelues, it héereby appéereth; in that the force of the angrie power beginneth at the power of deſire, and endeth alſo at the ſame. For when anie man hath an iniurie doone vntounto him, he is ſad: but the affect of ſadneſſe perteineth to the facultie of deſire. Againſt this euill (whereby the offended partie is made ſad, to the intent it may be auoided) dooth anger interpoſe it ſelfe; which, by reuenge, coueteth to repulſe that euill. But reuenge (as we all knowe) is a hard matter; which when it is performed, then ſuccéedeth gladneſſe, which belongeth to the power of deſire, and there we ceaſe to be angrie. Wherefore the power of anger is a defender, and alſo a ſtriuer againſt, and dooth reſiſt the deſiring part. For the angrie part flieth from labours and gréefes, but the part deſiring ouercommeth them, endureth them, and entereth into them, whether it will or no: and when the one of them enforceth hir action, the other contrariwiſe dooth ſlacken it. They which luſt verie inordinatelie after women, are not angrie with them: and they which be angrie with them, are leſſe inflamed with the deſire of them. Wherfore the obiect of the angrie part, offendeth the deſiring part; bicauſe (as we ſaid right now) it flieth from labours and difficulties, wherevnto the angrie part offreth it ſelfe, & maketh it ſelfe readie to get the victorie. And it is a manifeſt thing, that of thoſe two powers of the mind, the angrie part commeth the néerer vntounto reaſon; for it is a helper of the ſame, to execute wholeſome counſels: but the deſiring part commeth néerer to the ſenſe. And to deale by examples, in a matter which yet I thinke is plaine enough. Boldneſſe and feare, being parts of this mind, be affects: for boldneſſe dooth affect a good thing, which is difficult. But feare flieth an euill thing, which is hard to be auoided: for we feare not the euils, which vrge vsus not, and may eaſilie be auoided. And thus much of the affects in generall; whereof not onlie the morall philoſopher diſputeth, but alſo the naturall philoſopher, and the Phyſician, and Rhetorician.
42 Now to ſet aſide naturall philoſophers and Phyſicians, How Rhetoricians diſpoſe themſelues in the moouing of mens affections.I will ſpeake ſomwhat of Rhetoricians. They doubtleſſe (as Ariſtotle teſtifieth in his ſecond booke of Rhetoriks) doo firſt indeuour by arguments, to make men beléeue, that thoſe things be true, which they affirme. And then doo they conſider of the minds and affections of the iudges, and of thoſe which heare them: for that carrieth a great weight vntounto the cauſe. For they which fauour him that is guiltie, doo beléeue, that either he ſinned not, or elſe that he made a verie ſmall fault. But on the other ſide, if they ſhall hate him, they thinke with them ſelues, that either he is no innocent at all, or elſe that he is moſt guiltie of all. Theſe affections, vnleſſe that an Orator can change, qualifie, or turne vntounto the contrarie; he ſhall labour in vaine. Wherefore Ariſtotle teacheth, that thrée things there muſt be conſidered. Firſt, who they be that are prone to be affected, either this way or that. Secondlie, towards whom they are woont to be ſo affected. And finallie, for what cauſes their affections are mooued, either one waie or an other; to the intent that theſe things being knowne, they may eaſilie make them ſerue their purpoſe. But there be ſome, which thinke, Whether it be lawfull for Orators to iudge mens affections.that this is not iuſt, or to be permitted; that in pleading of cauſes, affections ſhould be mooued, ſince that the minds of the iudges, in diſcerning, ought to be at quiet: which cannot come to paſſe if the affects be troubled by an artificiall ſpéech of Orators.
Howbeit, they which ſpeake this, ſéeme to me, that they diſtinguiſh not the nature of affects, by the vſe of them; bicauſe in verie déed, the nature of affections is good, albeit that the vſe of them be otherwhile good, and otherwhile euill. Alſo ſwords being made of iron, which is a good creature of God, doo ſerue ſometime to a iuſt vſe; and ſometime to an vniuſt. And wherein (I beſéech you ſhall the Orator offend; if, when in a good and iuſt cauſe, he ſhall ſée the iudge ill affected towards the partie accuſed, he doo temper him with the art of eloquence, and doo drawe him vntounto a contrarie mind, yea and ſtirre vp the motions of his hart to decrée grauelie and iuſtlie? Héere vndoubtedlie there ſhalbe no offenſe committed; but humane affections ſhalbe directed vntounto the ends preſcribed vntounto them. For otherwhile the auditorie, and alſo the iudges become cold; as vntounto whom it ſhall not ſuffice to hauehave ſhewed what is to be doone, vnleſſe they be drawne therevnto, by ſtirring them vp with a verie vehement affect. But thoſe Orators are to be reprehended, and reſtrained, which to this end direct eloquence for the moouing of affections; that the minds of the iudges may be diſquieted, and that they may not ſée what is iuſt. But yet, for theſe mens ill demeanor, muſt not that profitable cunning be baniſhed from the affaires of men. For ſo ought the holie ſcriptures to be blamed, wherin the ſpirit of God, not onelie warneth what things are to be doone, and what to be auoided; but alſo ſtirreth vp the affections, that we may be the more compelled to obedience. And this will I hauehave to ſuffice as touching this matter.