Common Places, Part 1 · Chapter 14 · Section 2
Of Pleaſure, and wherein it may concur with the cheefeſt good, and wherein it may not.
3 Now the place ſerueth to ſpeake ſomwhat of pleaſure; and that we may not thinke that all kind of pleaſure is ſecluded from the chéefeſt good, or from felicitie. For in verie déed, felicitie, whether we vnderſtand it for naturall or theologicall, is either pleaſure, or elſe is ioined therewith; ſo as they cannot be plucked one from another. Firſt I will ſhew thoſe things, which I hauehave gathered thereof out of Platos doctrine; afterward I will bréeflie comprehend what Ariſtotle hath of the ſame. Plato diuided our ſoule at the leaſt into two parts; to wit, the mind, and the ſenſe: of theſe parts, as the one is high and moſt excellent, and whereby we approch verie néere vntounto God; ſo the other is groſſe, and in a maner brutiſh, and by it we communicate with beaſts. This diſtinction of the mind being put and confirmed, hée attributed vntounto the mind gladnes and ioie; but vntounto the ſenſe, pleaſure. But what the difference is betwéene ioie and gladnes (as me thinks I find by his opinion) I wil declare. He will hauehave it, that gladnes is ſomtimes good and commendable; but ſometimes, if it ſhall paſſe the limits, he affirmeth it to be a vice, and that it is to be deſpiſed. A definition of gladnes.Which will appéere the more plaine, if it be defined: for it is a certeine hautines of the mind, bicauſe of the preſentnes of ſome good thing: but euerie man dooth ſée that gladnes is right, if we be lifted vp by reaſon of ſome preſent good, that is neither leſſe nor more than the thing it ſelfe deſerueth. Wherefore they be fooliſh, which puffe vp themſelues for falſe good things, or be too much eleuated for the obtainment of vile and ſimple goods. But thoſe men are to be deteſted, which reioiſe at wickednes committed, which thorough the corruption of iudgment ſéemes good vntounto their minds. But on the other ſide, gladnes is then praiſed and commended, when the mind is no more merier nor puffed vp, than agréeth with the good that is gotten. And Cicero in his ſecond booke De finibus, as he had learned of the Stoikes, comprehended naughtie gladnes vnderunder theſe words, ſaieng that the ſame is an exalting of the mind, which without reaſon thinks it enioieth a great good.
But I returne to Plato, who alſo aſcribeth ioie vntounto the mind; but yet ſo, Ioie defined.as there can no euill cleaue therevnto, bicauſe he defineth the ſame to be a pleaſantnes, which floweth either from the contemplation of a wiſe man, or elſe from the actions of vertue. This pleaſantnes can ſuffer no euill acceſſe: for thoſe things which be iuſt, right, and as beſt becommeth, cannot pleaſe anie man too much. And he ſo commended ioie, as in his booke De pulchro, when he ſpeaketh of heauenlie & true bleſſed life, he affirmeth that thereby the minds of the faithfull are nouriſhed. And he will hauehave it, that the poets did cunninglie call that kind of meate Ambroſia & Nectar. But the pleaſure, whereby the ſenſes alone (as he thinketh) are repleniſhed, is a ſwéet motion, which tickleth the ſenſes. From which opinion Cicero nothing diſagréeth, who in the ſecond booke De finibus ſaith, that All men think this to be pleaſure, which the ſenſe receiuing is mooued, and is repleniſhed with a certeine pleaſantnes: and after a few words betwéene, hée miſliked not to repeate the ſame. That pleaſant motion, wherewith the ſenſes is made merie, all men call in Gréeke foreign; in Latine Voluptatem; that is pleaſure. By theſe things which I now ſhew, ye muſt obſerue this, that as well Plato, as the Stoikes, and other ancient writers iudged pleaſure to be a motion or action: for afterward we ſhall ſée what truth this may hauehave in it.
Whence pleaſure doth ſpring.Plato thinketh, that this pleaſure of the ſenſes riſeth of the infirmitie of nature: for the ſame if it be ſpent, beginneth to deſire thoſe things wherewith it iudgeth that it may be reſtored and renewed; & while we ſatiſfie the want of nature, the ſenſes are tickled and tempered with pleaſantnes. And contrariwiſe, while nature cannot obteine thoſe things that it hath néed of, both it languiſheth, and thorough want is maruelouſlie gréeued. Wherevpon the ſame authour in Phileto ſaid, that pleaſures are the auoiding of ſorrowes, and thereof concludeth, that the pleaſures of them that be ſicke are greater and more vehement than of them that be in good health: for when they be greatlie tormented with gréefs, they doo excéedingly burne with the deſire of medicins, I meane with the deſire of all pleaſures; therefore when they obteine them, they are delighted aboue meaſure. As we may perceiue in them which are ſicke of moſt ſharpe feuers, and be in a maner conſumed with intollerable thirſt, to whom when the phyſician giueth leaue to ſatiſfie themſelues with cold, or ſome other kind of drinke; it cannot be ſaid what excéeding pleaſure they take. The pleaſures of the ſenſes are mixt.Herevnto in that place he addeth, that theſe groſſer ſort of pleaſures, which belong vntounto the ſenſes, are not ſingle but mixt; for they hauehave alwaies ſome ſorrowe ioined with them: for (as we hauehave ſaid) the néedines of nature bréedeth gréefs. Neither are the pleaſures of this kind brought foorth anie longer, when the naturall want is ſatiſfied: for meate liketh not them that be ſatiſfied and hauehave their fill; neither is drinke welcome to them which hauehave droonke abundantlie. But and if it happen to be otherwiſe, Naturall neceſſitie being ſatiſfied, pleaſure ſeaſeth.as otherwhile we ſée it dooth to them which be droonkards & gluttons, there is another cauſe of the pleaſure than naturall want; namelie an ill diſpoſition, or elſe ſome other thing, which is not now fit time to declare, ſéeing we treat of naturall pleaſures.
How the name of pleaſure is vnderſtood by Ariſtotle.4 Howbeit Ariſtotle put not theſe differences of words; but thoſe delectations which as well belong vntounto the mind or reaſon, as thoſe which be of the ſenſes he called pleaſures, that is, foreign. Yea, and in the ſeuenth booke the eleuenth chapter, he will that foreign, that is, happie, is ſo called of foreign, which is to reioiſe; and he ſpeaketh of pleaſure, which he ioineth with bleſſednes. Certeinlie he ſpeaketh not of this pleaſure, wherewith the ſenſe and groſſer part of the mind is poſſeſſed: for that is only ioined with the felicitie which ſhall be of the mind, which as I hauehave ſaid, of a mingled word, is named pleaſure. And perhaps Ariſtotle would not change the name, bicauſe he thought to ſpeake as moſt men did, although he agréed with Plato as touching the difference of the thing. Wherein Ariſtotle and Plato differ concerning pleaſure.But yet herein they differ one from another, that Ariſtotle thinketh not (as Plato and the old philoſophers did) that pleaſure is a motion or action; but rather an affect cleauing vntounto the motion or operation. Wherefore theſe differ after a ſort, although in the ſubiect they agrée. And if at any time Ariſtotle himſelfe, or any Peripatetike, called pleaſure a motion; that propoſition, which commonlie in the Schooles they call Identica, muſt be aſcribed vntounto them: for as it hath béene ſaid, both the affect, and motion or action; are in ſubiect all one. Wherefore the generall word therof is the Predicament of qualitie, The generall word of pleaſure.and pleaſure belongeth to the third kind thereof, and the ſame is called a paſſion; or paſſible qualitie. It is called in Gréeke foreign; whereby we are ſwéetlie affected with the preſence of ſome good thing agréeing with our nature. And as beautie is a qualitie which riſeth of a iuſt and right temperature of the bodie, of wel-fauourednes, and of a comlie colour; ſo pleaſure ariſeth of a conuenient motion and action. Wherfore thus it ſhall be lawfull to define the ſame.
Pleaſure is an affect, wherwith we are ſwéetlie mooued, The definition of pleaſure.by reaſon of an action which procéedeth from a nature that is of good conſtitution, or elſe from an habit according to nature without impediment. For the actions both of eating, and drinking, and procreating, ſéeing they ariſe of nature, doo alwaies to him that is in health bring pleaſure with them; for they be not hindred by ſicknes, nor weakenes, nor yet by ſaturitie and fulnes. Euen ſo contemplations, and the actions of vertues, ſince they ſpring from an habit of the mind, they be readie and eaſie, and are a preſent good thing, which agréeth with the nature of man; & therefore hauehave pleaſure alwaies ioined with them. Ariſtotle in the tenth booke of Ethiks prooueth, That pleaſure is no motion.that pleaſure is not a motion, bicauſe it is all whole togither, as is a viſion: and pleaſure hath no ſucceſſion, except it be accidentallie. For if it followe actions, which hauehave ſucceſſe, the ſame in like maner is prolonged, as it happeneth in eating and drinking; but if the action be momentanie, as is a viſion, hearing and vnderſtanding, then is all the pleaſure had at once: euen as the whole viſion is at once; if the vertue and power of ſeing be perfect, if the thing that is ſéene be ſet before the eieſight all at once, if the light going betwéene be not obſcured, and a conuenient diſtance come betwéene. A motion is not perfect in his parts, but pleaſure is whole all at once; therefore it is no motion. Motion cannot be at one moment or inſtant, but pleaſure may. The properties of motion be ſwiftnes, and ſlowneſſe; and theſe things are not anſwerable to pleaſure. For while a man reioiſeth, he neither reioiſeth the ſwifter, nor the ſlower; for if pleaſure endure for an houre, it is all whole at once, while the houre laſteth.
How long pleaſure may continue.5 Since we vnderſtand by the definition now brought, that the power muſt be perfect, and the habit firme; and that the action muſt be without impediment, and the obiect principall and excellent: it is gathered how long pleaſure can endure. It ſo long abideth, as the obiect and ablenes, or power of dooing doth remaine whole: for if the obiect fall from the excellencie thereof, or that the facultie be not vehement and earneſtlie bent, delectation dooth not followe. Hereof it commeth, that when in working men be tired, pleaſurs are oftentimes diminiſhed. Which thing alſo happeneth, when anie thing is taken awaie from the excellencie of the obiect. Whie new things ſo greatlie delight.It appéereth alſo, why new things doo ſo greatlie delight; bicauſe the mind, ſo ſoone as anie noble and excellent thing offereth it ſelfe to be beheld, dooth behold the ſame earneſtlie and attentiuelie; which, after it is knowne, the mind rebateth his earneſtnes, and ſo the pleaſure ceaſſeth: but if anie other new thing be put in place of the former obiect, then the vnderſtanding enforceth his ſtudie againe in beholding of the ſame, and the pleaſure returneth, and by this meanes we euer delight our ſelues in new things. Beſides this, it is ſhewed héereby, that the actions which are doone before we attaine to an habit, bréed not pleaſure; bicauſe they be not eaſilie and readilie doone, but with ſome difficultie and labour. Theſe things are opened by that definition.
That pleaſure differeth in kind.Now muſt we ſhew what pleaſure is by hir forms and kinds. Neither is it anie doubt, but that pleaſures are diuided among themſelues in kind, ſéeing actions doo differ. But pleaſure (as we knowe) is the perfection of an action; and the thing which ſhould be doone, being changed, the perfection alſo thereof is changed. For theſe be of thoſe ſort of things, which be compared one with another. Neither is anie man ignorant, that there is one prefection of a cheſt, another of an houſe, another of a plant, and another of a man. Wherefore ſince that actions be diuided one from another, ſo ſhall the pleaſures, whereby they are performed, differ. Furthermore, they ſtriue one againſt another, & one extinguiſheth or letteth another; wherof it commeth that they are diſtinguiſhed. That pleaſure, which ſhall come of muſicke, will take awaie that which ariſeth of ſpéeches: and thoſe, which be the groſſer ſort, doo withſtand and let the delights of the vnderſtanding and reaſon. Again, of actions ſome be euill, ſome good, and ſome betwéene both; whereby it is brought to paſſe, that the pleaſures which followe them hauehave varietie and difference. The which alſo by this meanes commeth to paſſe, bicauſe the deſires of actions are ſundrie: for if the deſires be varied, much more be the pleaſures, which are more ioined with the actions, than be the deſires: for deſires are oftentimes plucked awaie from the worke, whereas pleaſures cannot be ſeparated from their actions. No doubt but ſome pleaſures there be of horſes, ſome of lions, ſome of beares, and therefore alſo there be ſome of men: and not onelie hauehave they them diuerſe from other liuing creatures, but euen men themſelues alſo hauehave them not alike among them. For thoſe pleaſures, which be naughtie, doo pleaſe naughtie men; and thoſe which be honeſt, doo delight good men.
6 Wherefore now (as I thinke) it is ſufficientlie confirmed, The firſt diuiſion of pleaſures.that pleaſures muſt be diſtinguiſhed. Let this then be the firſt diſtinction. Of pleaſures ſome be pure, and ſome vnpure. And this diuiſion is taken from works and actions; ſo as of them ſome be about the obiects more ſeuered from matter, or more ioined with the ſame. Which how true it is, Galen hath verie well declared in his ſecond booke De cauſis ſymptomatum; There are found (ſaith he) gréefes and pleaſures in all the ſenſes: gréefes (as he ſaith) come herevpon, that the ſenſes are remooued from their owne conſtitution and naturall ſtate; but pleaſures come, when they returne to the ſame. And that this may the more plainlie appéere, he thus runneth thorough all the ſenſes. Féeling is remooued from his owne eſtate, if there happen too much heate, or too much cold; or elſe, if it incur thoſe things which doo ſtrike, or gnawe, or breake, &c. hereof doo ariſe gréefes vntounto it. Taſting is gréeued with the ſelfe-ſame things, which it dooth communicate with féeling: but as it is taſte, it is offended with taſts, which be too tart, ſower, ſharpe, and bitter; for by theſe the naturall conſtitution thereof is diſturbed, and the continuance broken off. Smelling is diſturbed by the diſſolution of ouer vehement vapors; for by them the continuance is broken off. Againe, hearing is put from his ſtate, by a voice too high, or too lowe, or too great, or too ſwift, and alſo by euerie violent noiſe. Finallie, the ſight is offended, when it happeneth vponupon moſt bright lights and colours; for theſe things doo ſcatter and diſperſe the vertue therof. With all theſe ſame things the ſenſes are gréeued, bicauſe through them they depart from their owne meaſurable and quiet ſtate. Againe, they are delighted and take pleaſure, when they are reduced to their proper & naturall ſtate. Whereof the ſight hath triall, when it turneth it ſelfe to a browne colour, whereby the power thereof is more gathered and knit togither into one; or elſe when it beholdeth pleaſant colours, as gréene, golden, blue, or ſkie colours. The hearing delighteth in a mild and treatable voice. The ſmelling, when thoſe vapours be diſſolued, which with a certeine ſwéetnes doo ſtrengthen and confirme the inſtruments of ſmelling. VntoUnto taſting are fat and ſwéet reliſhes pleaſant. And though we be ſicke, yet are we for a little while delighted with ſomewhat ſharpe and ſower taſts. Féeling is delighted with qualities which be temperate, ſoft, and ſomewhat warme. Thus are the ſenſes delighted, and doo take pleaſure, when they be reduced to their naturall and proper conſtitution.
But it is to be vnderſtood, that thoſe alſo may take pleaſure, though they hauehave not bin firſt offended or remooued from their naturall ſtate. For if there happen to come a pleaſant colour, or delightfull ſound, the ſight and hearing is delighted, though it hauehave not bin firſt remooued from the conſtitution thereof. Galen procéedeth in thoſe things which he ſaid, and ſheweth, that there is a degrée of greater or leſſe purenes in theſe actions of the ſenſes, and in pleaſures; and declareth that the ſame ſtandeth in the meanes that the ſenſes vſe. The ſight worketh by light; hearing, by the aire; ſmelling, by ſauour; theſe things be pure, and hauehave little of the groſſer and thicker kind of matter. Thoſe things, wherin féeling is occupied, hold the loweſt place; thoſe be groſſe and terreſtriall things. From thence we come to taſting; that alſo is exerciſed about waterie humors, which bée ſomewhat thicke. Smelling is eleuated vntounto vapours, far more pure than water. VntoUnto hearing is the aire, and that a pure aire more néere. Laſtlie, we come vntounto the light, which among thoſe things that be perceiued, is moſt fine, and hath a great deale of purenes. Howbeit, we are not there to reſt, but after theſe things we come to imagination, cogitation, memorie, and vnderſtanding, which are occupied about the ſimilitudes and images of things far more pure. Wherefore by theſe things appeareth, that firſt diſtinction of pleaſures, that one is purer, and another groſſer, and out of Galen wée hauehave expounded the ground of the diuiſion.
7 After this diuiſion there followeth another, that ſome pleaſures are bodilie, The ſecond diuiſion of pleaſures.others not bodilie. Of the bodilie, thus we affirme in generall, that neither they be good, nor yet bad; as alſo are not the actions about meate, drinke, and carnall pleaſure. But as touching the kinds and parts, we muſt ſaie, that if they excéed meaſure, they be euill; but if they conteine themſelues within iuſt and due limits, they are indifferent, ſince that men may vſe them both rightlie, that is, according to vertue, and alſo vntounto good and laudable ends. They doo alſo abuſe them ſometimes, namelie, vponupon an ill determination & corruptlie, as Catiline, when he tempered himſelfe from delights and pleaſures, to the intent he might deſtroie his countrie: but yet, if they ſhall be weied in their owne nature, they be rather good, according to ciuill goodnes, than euill. The third diſtinction of pleaſurs.We come now to a third diſtinction of pleaſures. There be ſome, wherein there is exceſſe; but there be others, wherein it cannot be, as it alſo hapneth in actions. For who did euer rightlie or iuſtlie more than is requiſite? And ſo in contemplations of the truth, be it of things naturall, or mathematicall, or diuine; no man can reioice, or take pleaſure of them more than is requiſite; neither can he in like manner, as touching things rightlie done, and of the works of iuſtice. But in being angrie, in ambitious deſire of promotion, in giuing, in hearing, we may excéed meaſure, no leſſe than in eating, drinking, and procreation.
Finallie, the fourth diſtinction is, The fourth diſtinction of pleaſures.that of pleaſures, ſome be ſingle, and by themſelues; bicauſe they hauehave no ſorrowes mingled with them, nor yet be ſwéet, in reſpect they fill and reſtore nature, being waſted and conſumed. Neither be they at one time pleaſant, and at another time vnpleaſant, but are euer in their owne nature to be wiſhed and deſired: and theſe pleaſures are chéefelie thoſe, which are perceiued in the mind; but others be mixed, namelie with ſorowes, and for that cauſe are pleaſant, bicauſe they refreſh and renew nature decaieng, and therefore are not to be deſired alwaies and at all times.
8 Theſe things being thus determined, What pleaſures muſt be auoided and why.let vsus go in hand with the pleaſures which be vnpure, bodilie, and which hauehave exceſſe, and which be mixed; and let this be the firſt propoſition of them: If they excéed meaſure, they muſt be altogither auoided; for ſuch doo either ariſe of a corrupt nature (for ſome men are euen by a proprietie of nature, fierce, wild, and cruell; and others be beaſtlie, and altogither intemperate) or elſe theſe euill actions and pleaſures doo come from a vitious habit, brought in by a naughtie cuſtome, as we ſée it in drunkards, gluttons, and laſciuious men: wherefore from ſuch ſhamefull and wicked cauſes, nothing can happen which (as we hauehave ſaid) muſt not be auoided. Furthermore, ſince that pleaſures of this kind, as it hath bin alreadie ſaid, hauehave bin inuented to be as it were medicins vntounto vsus, when we ſuffer them to excéed meaſure; How greatlie the groſſer pleaſurs hurt vsus.ſo far is it off that they be medicins, as they are euen hurtfull vntounto vsus, and that in all kind of good things, and eſpeciallie thoſe things which come of fortune. For how manie riotous men be there, which hauing ſpent their great and ample patrimonies, are conſtreined miſerablie to liue in want? I ſpeake nothing of the goods of the bodie, ſéeing gluttonie and fleſhlie pleaſure killeth far more than the ſword, or anie ordinarie ſicknes, or defect of nature. Yea, and Galen in his ſecond booke De ſemine wrote, that Pleaſure is ſomtime by it ſelfe the cauſe of diſſoluing the force and ſtrength which giueth life. And there hauehave béene manie, which hauehave yéelded vp the ghoſt thorough too much pleaſure. But & if that all abuſe of things muſt be auoided, ſuch kind of immoderate pleaſures as theſe muſt be vtterlie ſhunned, ſéeing by this meanes they cure not the bodie, but doo excéedinglie deſtroie it. I let paſſe the goods of the mind, ſince nothing dooth more harme vntounto wiſdome, nor anie thing more weaken the right iudgement of dooing things, than theſe immoderate pleaſures.
The reaſon which I hauehave brought, that by theſe groſſe and immoderate pleaſures, all the kinds of good things belonging to man be deſtroied, is written by Cicero in his booke called Hortenſius, which booke is loſt; yet will I reherſe his words as they be recited of Auguſtine in his fourth booke againſt Iulian the 14. chapter; Cicero his words as touching the euils which riſe of pleaſures.But are thoſe pleaſures of the bodie to be deſired, which trulie and grauelie are of Plato called the allurements and baits of euils? For what deſtroieng (ſaith he) of helth, what deforming of the colour and the bodie, what foule loſſe, what diſhonour is there, that is not called and brought foorth by pleaſure? Euerie motion whereof, the greater it is, the more is it enimie vntounto philoſophie. For the pleaſures of the bodie cannot agrée with anie great cogitation of the mind. For who is he, that when he vſeth the greateſt pleaſure he can, is able to applie his mind to make an account, or to thinke of anie manner of thing? But who is ſo vnſatiable a perſon, that day and night, without anie intermiſſion of time, will hauehave his ſenſes ſo to be mooued, as they be mooued in the chéefeſt pleaſures? What man indued with a good mind, had not rather that no pleaſurs at all ſhuld be giuen vsus of nature? Thus much ſaid he. VnderUnder which ſentence of his are cōprehended the hurts, which are woont to be brought in through theſe pleaſures of the bodie, which excéed meaſure. But thou wilt ſaie, that If this reaſon were of force, Whether the pleaſures that ariſe of contemplation or iuſt actions do hurt.it will condemne pleaſures which ſpring of contemplation, and alſo that which ariſeth of iuſt actions; bicauſe both the bodie is hurt by too much ſtudie and contemplation: and that Socrates and alſo Ariſtides periſhed for their honeſtie ſake. I anſwere, that this was accidentally; bicauſe Socrates lighted among euill men. Againe, that the powers of the head, which doo ſerue vntounto cogitation, are ſomtimes ouermuch conſumed. But ſome wittie fellowe will replie, that this alſo is accidentall, as touching the pleaſures of the bodie; which in verie déed doo ariſe of thoſe actions, which deſtroie the bodie, and our good things, which the verie pleaſures by themſelues would not doo. Howbeit to this we anſwere, that it coms not alwaies to paſſe, that a man periſheth for righteouſnes; nor yet that contemplation dooth alwaies harme. But theſe groſſer and mixt pleaſures, ſo oft as they excéed the meane, it cannot be but they doo hurt: and ſo the hurt is not to be accounted of both alike.
9 But this of ſome is counted a hard matter, Whether the pleaſures which muſt be ſhunned be verie pleaſures.that theſe pleaſures muſt be ſhunned, ſéeing pleaſure by it ſelfe is good, & to be deſired. Wherfore to auoid this, they are wont to ſay, that They are not pleaſures indéed, but onlie ſéeme ſo to be; and although they ſéeme ſo, yet that of wiſe men they ought not to be accounted pleaſures. Euen as thoſe things are not ſaid to be white, which ſo appeare vntounto bleare eies; neither ſwéet or bitter, which thoſe that are ſicke doo ſo affirme. But me thinks it ſhould not ſo be anſwered; bicauſe both Plato and Ariſtotle doo call them pleaſures, wherevpon the definition before alledged dooth trulie agrée vntounto them. Therefore would I rather ſaie to the argument, that pleaſure indéed is of his owne nature good, and to be deſired, but not to be taken of all things: euen as we deſire to ſatiſfie hunger, yet not by euerie kind of meate. Iuſt men alſo would become rich, but yet not by euerie kind of gaine; we alſo deſire health, but yet not by euerie kind of medicine; and ſo we would hauehave pleaſures, but yet not thoſe which ariſe of actions that be diſhoneſt and filthie, and which doo hurt the bodie, and all the good things which we hauehave. Whie theſe kind of-pleaſures which hurt and are to be ſhunned are deſired of manie.But ſéeing this kind of pleaſures is both hurtfull, and to be ſhunned, how happeneth it that it is deſired of ſo manie? Bicauſe pleaſure in his owne nature hath ſome certeine diuine thing in it, and is deſired of all men. Howbeit it coms to paſſe, that ſéeing nature in manie is not yet full perfect and confirmed, as in children, or elſe when men be indued with naughtie and lewd habits of mind, as be drunkards and fleſhlie perſons, they be deceiued, and ſéeke for pleaſures where they ought not. Wherefore I maruell at Epicurus, which taketh his argument from children, whoſe nature is not yet become full perfect, neither are they indued with any vertue, & therfore may eaſilie be deceiued. Againe, it muſt be conſidered, that men doo perpetuallie labour, and are wearied with ſundrie exerciſes; and therefore to be recreated and refreſhed, they turne themſelues to diuers pleaſures; and when they cannot hauehave honeſt, pure, and ſimple pleaſures, they will be ſatiſfied with thoſe groſſer and hurtfull pleaſures. And men hauehave a compounded nature, not ſimplie one and vnmixed; and thereof it coms, that they imbrace ſundrie kinds of pleaſures. Somtimes they take thoſe which belong vntounto the mind, and ſometime thoſe which be of the bodie; ſince that they conſiſt as well of the mind as of the bodie. Yea, and the bodie it ſelfe, bicauſe it hath manie humors, and is indued with manie ſenſes, therefore are we ſomtimes mooued to theſe pleaſures, and ſometimes to thoſe, according as the humors ſtir them vp, or as the ſundrie obiects doo fall into the ſenſes. But God, ſince he is one and moſt pure, he enioieth one and the ſelfe-ſame pure and eternall pleaſure.
Who be moſt inclined to the pleaſures of the bodieBut to thoſe pleaſures of the bodie, they that be yoong, and melancholike men are moſt inclined. In them, while their ſtature is increaſed, the humors are diſturbed, and nature is wearied and haled; and therefore doo they flie vntounto pleaſures, as vntounto a certeine medicine and recreation. Likewiſe dooth the melancholike humor diſquiet and vexe melancholike perſons, and ſuffereth them not to reſt; ſo as they being wearie, returne to pleaſures, whereby they ſomewhat reſtore and exhilerate themſelues. Wherevpon it appéereth, that nature, yea God himſelfe, Why theſe pleaſures were giuen by God vntounto men.did not vnprofitablie giuegive vntounto mankind theſe pleaſures, that the immoderate vſe of them might be auoided. For by them we lead the more commodious life, and we take more willinglie in hand the neceſſarie labours of life, and the preſeruation of mankind, and are the more readilie healed of our dailie infirmities. Moreouer, yoong men, by certeine honeſt and moderate pleaſures, are ſtirred vp vntounto honeſt duties, and excellent vertues; and by gréefes they are terrified from ſinnes and wickednes. Auguſtine.And Auguſtine addeth, that theſe baſe pleaſures are certeine ſteps of good, and as it were a little ſhadowe of the nature of felicitie, and of the chéefe good, whereby we may be ſtirred vp to an earneſt deſire thereof: wherefore they be of force to awaken vsus, wherein neuertheles we are not to ſtaie, but muſt rather riſe vp vntounto better things. And that we ſhould not dwell in theſe things, God is ſo good, that he with theſe kinds of pleaſures hath mingled manie bitter things.
What pleaſures are not to be auoided, and why.As touching thoſe pure, vnmixt, and no bodilie pleaſures, and which hauehave no exceſſe, let this be the propoſition. They ought not to be refuſed, but ſince they are of the better ſort, they drawe not a little néere vntounto the nature of the chéefeſt good: for they be deſired; not for themſelues, but for another thing. I ſaid that they drawe néere to the nature of the chéefeſt good; bicauſe in verie déed, the chéefeſt good is not in pleaſure, no not of this kind: for that conſiſteth in the moſt perfect action, and vntounto it is pleaſure ioined, as a perpetuall companion: wherefore it cannot be plucked from the chéefeſt good, ſo as it ſhould not be comprehended in the nature thereof. We verelie grant, that the ſame is wiſhed for of all men, ſince there is none, but deſireth both to liue, and to liue well. And as to liue, is to worke; ſo to liue well, is to be occupied in a verie good action: wherevnto when excellent pleaſure is ioined, all men wiſh for the ſame, when they wiſh for that whereof it is a perpetuall companion. But an excellent action it cannot be, vnleſſe it be conuerſant about the moſt noble obiect; whereof as of a fountaine our perfection dependeth. Which that it may euidentlie be perceiued, we muſt vnderſtand, that we are made perfect by a moſt excellent obiect, as by the efficient cauſe, whereby our mind and will is carried, or is allured vntounto it. Againe, we are made perfect through pleaſure, which is an affect and qualitie, that is inſtilled into our mind. Whether pleaſure for life, or life for pleaſure is to bee wiſhed.But it is called into doubt by ſome, whether pleaſure muſt be wiſhed for the life ſake, or life for pleaſure ſake. And to omit thoſe things which may be ſaid on the other part, that which to mée ſéemeth good, I thus ſet downe; Pleaſure is deſired for the life ſake, not the life for pleaſures ſake; bicauſe pleaſure hereof ariſeth, that the action agréeth with nature, and this we both féele and knowe. Wherefore that aboue all is to be wiſhed, to the intent that the action may be counted moſt perfect. Neither is anie man ignorant, that perfection is inſtituted for that thing ſake, which dooth make it perfect, eſpeciallie when in his owne nature it hath no ſtabilitie. And all men ſée, that meate it ſelfe is better than the ſauce thereof.
10 But how thoſe things, How Ariſtotles opinion agreeth with the ſcriptures.which Ariſtotle bringeth, doo agrée with the holie ſcriptures, we may eaſilie perceiue. Firſt he ſaith, that this opinion, as touching the groſſer ſort of pleaſures, is the opinion of manie, and that of the vulgar ſort of men. Which alſo Chriſt taught, affirming that the waie of perdition is large, Matt. 7, 13.and manie doo go that waie. He addeth moreouer, that they which iudge this, are foreign, that is, moſt burdenſome. And in Eſaie we knowe, that it was ſaid to wicked Ahaz; Eſaie. 7, 13.Is it a ſmall matter vntounto you to be greeuous vntounto men? Ariſtotle calleth them bond-ſlaues. And the Lord ſaid; Iohn. 8, 34,He that dooth ſinne, is the ſeruant of ſinne. Alſo Peter ſaid; Euerie man is his ſeruant, 2. Pet. 2, 19.of whom he is ouercome. Ariſtotle ſaith, that they chooſe a beaſtlie life. And we hauehave it in the Pſalmes; Man, when he ſhould be in honour, Pſal. 48, 12.is compared vntounto the brute beaſts, and is made like vntounto them. Alſo Ieremie; Ierem. 5, 8.Euerie man neigheth at his neighbours wife. And againe in the pſalme; Be ye not like horſſe and mule, Pſal. 32, 10.in whom there is no vnderſtanding. They which ſo thinke (ſaith the philoſopher) doo defend themſelues by the authoritie of princes, which liue after the maner of Sardanapalus. Neither dooth this diſagrée with the holie ſcriptures, wherein we read, that ſuch in a maner were the people, as were the kings whom they had. Oſea. 4, 9.And in Oſea we reade; Such people, ſuch prieſt. In the Prouerbs, the 29. chapter; When the wicked ſhall beare rule, tranſgreſſion ſhall be multiplied. And in the Goſpels as touching Herod, Matt. 2, 3.when the wiſe men came to Ieruſalem, we find that not onlie hée himſelfe was troubled, but alſo the whole citie with him. Laſtlie, it is concluded, that in theſe groſſer ſort of pleaſures cannot be repoſed the chéefeſt good. Which alſo the Apoſtle confirmeth to the Corinthians; 1. Cor. 6, 13.Meate for the bellie, and the bellie for meate, God ſhall deſtroie both the one and the other. And Chriſt himſelfe ſpeaking of the pleaſure of procreation; Matt. 22, 30.In the regeneration they neither marrie wiues, nor are married, but they ſhall be like vntounto the angels.
11 Ariſtotle diſputing yet further of pleaſure ſaith, That pleaſure is not ſtrange from felicitie.that the ſame muſt not be counted ſtrange from felicitie, and ſo prooueth it, bicauſe it is of thoſe kind of good things, which belong vntounto the mind, vnleſſe we will ſaie, that ſtones, ſtocks, & mettalles reioice and be glad. Let vsus firſt declare his generall ſentence; That is pleaſant to euerie man, wherevnto he is ſaid to be, and therof is named deſirous. Héereby Ariſtotle meant, that pleaſure ſéemeth to be of thoſe kind of things, which hauehave relation one to another. And it is no maruell, for thoſe things which be ſwéet, muſt of neceſſitie be ſwéet to ſome bodie. But what he is, to whome pleaſure is referred, is declared by affection, while he ſaith; A horſſe, a ſhew, iuſt things, and vertues doo delight thoſe men, which hauehave bin deſirous of horſſes, ſhewes, a iuſt thing, and of vertues. The maner of all Syllogiſmes is, that firſt ſhould be brought foorth the cauſe in generall, and then it is woont to be applied vntounto that thing wherof it is ſpoken. So in this matter, the generall cauſe is ſet foorth for which anie thing is pleaſant and ſwéet vntounto anie man; namelie, for bicauſe he loueth it. This generall cauſe is héere reſtreined vntounto him that is happie, bicauſe he is a louer of honeſt and good actions, wherevpon of neceſſitie it followeth, that he is verie much delighted with them.
For the confirmation of that generall cauſe, he vſeth diuers and manifold examples; and firſt, he alledgeth the pleaſure that men hauehave in riding of horſſes, wherewith, how fondlie and earneſtlie ſome men are otherwhile delighted, the yong man Strepſiades in Ariſtophanes doth teſtifie. He bringeth foorth them alſo, which are deſirous to behold ſhewes, vntounto whome we may adde thoſe, which giuegive their mind to philoſophie, wine, and monie: all which men (we ſée) are wonderfullie delighted, when at anie time they enioie their deſires. By theſe examples the fourme of the argument, which the Logicians call Induction, being the maior propoſition, which comprehendeth the generall cauſe, is plainelie confirmed and ſhewed, which is ſtraitwaie applied to the matter in hand, whereas he ſaith, that The like reaſon is to be had of thoſe cauſes that are of a iuſt thing, and of good actions, and are referred to good and happie men, to wit, that thoſe things be loued of them, and that they reioice not a little in them. Whereof it plainelie commeth, that bleſſed and good men, if they either ſée or heare anie to liue well and honeſtlie, they take great pleaſure therein: but without doubt much more, while they themſelues exerciſe themſelues in iuſt, good, and honeſt actions. By theſe things we now vnderſtand, that the life of happie men is not ſeuered from pleaſure; and we ſée, that they did not vtterlie ſtraie from the right waie, which ioined themſelues vntounto this felicitie.
12 But the queſtion is, Whether all pleaſures hauehave felowſhip with felicitie.whether all pleaſures hauehave fellowſhip with felicitie, and if that all hauehave not, as it ſhould ſéeme we muſt affirme, then, what pleaſure ſhall we ioine therewith? To this we anſwere by diſtinction. Some things are pleaſant in their owne nature, and by themſelues; but ſome hauehave it not of their owne propertie to delight, but taketh delight by a certeine corruption or viciouſnes of him that is caught therewith. Wiſedome, vertues, honeſt actions, remembrance of good déeds, prudent gouernment of things, finding out of profitable counſels, doctrine, contemplation, and ſuch like, are delightfull euen of their owne goodnes, which if otherwhiles they be not liked of ſome, that hapneth through their owne vnſkilfulnes and rudenes. But on the other ſide, immoderate wine, gorgeous ſights, ſurfetings and luſts, are not in their owne nature pleaſant and ſwéete, but doo onelie delight them which of themſelues bée caught by ſuch things. It is the common ſort, which hunt after things not pleaſant in their owne nature, which things are diuers and in ſundrie ſort, & thoſe repugnant one to another. No man doubteth, but that there is a great number of pleaſures of the common ſort; for there be manie minds, and euerie one hath his owne delight, which certeinlie is then not lawfull, when it paſſeth his bounds, and when it deteineth men too much therein, or doth ſtir vp and diſquiet their minds. Theſe, and other pleaſures of the ſenſes, if they hold themſelues within their bounds and limits, and doo not paſſe them, are both naturall, and by right cannot be condemned.
And what contrarietie there is of pleaſures betwéene the vulgar ſort, The contrarietie of pleaſures betweene the vulgar ſort.Euſtratius thus ſheweth; One is delighted with ſalt meate, another with ſwéet, one with drinke ſomewhat bitter, another with ſower, which taſts be one contrarie to another, and cannot be had togither in one and the ſame thing. But here a man may ſaie, that this alſo may be ſéene among the pleaſures which ye call naturall; ſome are delighted in the mathematicall ſciences, others in the knowledge of naturall things, ſome in logicke, others onlie in prudent actions.
Wherefore ſince there is a varietie as well here as there, this difference of contrarietie after that manner interpreted, ſéemes not to put a diſtinction betwéene pleaſures, ſéeing it is found alike on both parts. Vnleſſe thou wilt ſaie, there is a great varietie & multitude of vulgar pleaſures, which are contraries; as ſwéet and ſower, harſh and mild are one repugnant to another; which contrarietie is not in the honeſt pleaſures that we hauehave now recited. For the mathematicall ſciences are not againſt the knowledge of naturall things; nor logicke againſt prudence. But the difference is more trulie declared, if we marke the repugnancie in the appetite of one & the ſelfe-ſame man: for euen he that delighted in a thing, ſtraightwaie hateth the ſame; and he that deſired meate, dooth by and by loath it. Whervpon Terence ſaid; In louelove are all theſe faults, iniuries, ſuſpicions of enimitie, truce, war, and peace againe. Here we ſée a contrarietie of things among themſelues, and againſt the mind. But thoſe things are pleaſant indéed, wherewith the louers of honeſtie are delighted: for they which giuegive credit to reaſon, and not to the ſenſes, take counſell of the better iudge. Thou ſhalt moreouer perceiue thoſe to be conſtant, and of one mind; and that the right things which once liked them, will neuer miſlike them: neither doo they ſuffer the true opinion to be wroong from them. Againe, they ſaie all one thing with men of their owne profeſſion: for ſo manie as be louers of honeſtie, allow the ſelfe-ſame vertues, and the ſame actions.
How theſe things concurre with the holie ſcriptures. Phili. 4, 4.13 Finallie, this hauehave we learned out of the holie ſcriptures to concurre with Ariſtotle, that Paule exhorted the godlie, as being happie men, to true and perfect gladnes, when he wrote; Reioiſe in the Lord alwaies, and againe I ſaie reioiſe. Alſo in the 21. chapter of the Prouerbs; The iuſt man delighteth to doo iudgement. verſe, 15.And Dauid dooth manie times ſtir vp the iuſt and godlie to gladnes, and reioiſing. And ſo true is this opinion, that euen thoſe good actions, which by the ſenſe of nature, and iudgement of the common ſort ſéeme to be repelled, doo delight happie men. And therefore we read that the Apoſtles went awaie merie and reioiſing from the ſight of the councell, bicauſe they were counted woorthie of rebukes for the name of Chriſt. Acts. 5, 41.And we knowe, that not onlie manie chriſtians ſuffered death with a ioifull mind for the teſtimonie of their faith, but that manie Ethniks alſo, with great ioie and chéerefulnes, gaue their life for the libertie of their countrie.