Common Places, Part 1 · Chapter 14 · Section 1
TOuching the name of Felicitie, all men in a maner agrée; which is manifeſt by the Latins, Gréekes, and Hebrues: for none of them doo contend about the name; but about the thing it ſelfe, and eſpeciallie wherein the ſubiect or matter is to be placed, they are at great diſſention, For the vulgar ſort differ from the wiſe men; yea & if thou wilt ſomewhat narrowlie conſider the matter, all the common ſort agrée not with themſelues; and wiſe men doo not a little differ from wiſe men. The matter or ſubiect of felicitie. The definition of felicitie.From this felicitie did Ariſtotle exclude all creatures void of reaſon, and this he did by vertue of the definition of felicitie; which he affirmed to be the chéefe action of mans mind, ariſing of the moſt excellent vertue. If this be ſo, then brute creatures ſhall not be partakers thereof, ſéeing they be not capable of ſuch an action. Indéed it would not be denied, but that they hauehave in their owne nature or kind ſom good, proper to themſelues, which to them is principall and chéefe; but yet we muſt not thinke that the ſame is bleſſednes, ſéeing it is of ſuch a nature, as it cannot be without reaſon.
But before we come to the thing it ſelfe, I thinke it ſhall be good to knowe how this definition of Ariſtotle dooth either agrée or diſagrée with the holie ſcriptures. How Ariſtotles definition agreeth with the holie ſcriptures. Pſal. 118. and 127. 1. Pſal. 111, 1. and 127, 1. Pſal. 1, 2. Pſal. 32, 1. Iohn. 2.And firſt, where he appointed mans worke in act to be felicitie, he decréed no otherwiſe than doo the holie ſcriptures, where it is ſaid; Bleſſed are thoſe which walke in the lawe of the Lord. Bleſſed is the man that feareth the Lord, and which dooth meditate in the lawe of the Lord daie and night. All theſe be moſt godlie acts and exerciſes for this life. But it is obiected; Bleſſed are they whoſe iniquities are forgiuen, and whoſe ſinnes be couered. Bleſſed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth no ſinne: which things belong not to the worke of men, but flowe from the méere liberalitie of God. Héerevnto we ſaie, that Ariſtotle vnderſtood not, nor beléeued this iuſtification through Chriſt, which the holie ſcriptures hauehave reuealed vntounto vsus; neither doo we in the meane time ſpeake of this felicitie: but we ſpeake onelie of that which followeth this firſt bleſſednes, and ſtandeth in the right dooing while we liue héere; and in the other world, in the contemplation and fruition of the ſight of Gods maieſtie. And yet neuertheleſſe, if we will alſo regard the bleſſednes of iuſtification, and laie that before our eies, whereby it is applied vntounto vsus; then commeth the worke of faith. For we be iuſtified by beléeuing, although we are not iuſtified by the merit of that action, nor yet for the dignitie thereof are receiued into grace: but of this felicitie we doo not now treate.
And that which we doo ſpeake of, although it be the worke of man; yet doth it not breake out from his ſtrength, but is produced by the power of the ſpirit of God, and from the heauenlie maieſtie. In the world to come this felicitie ſhall be perfect, which ſhall neuer be interrupted, but ſhall be one, and a continuall act. Whereas this bleſſednes of Ariſtotle, as his definition ſheweth, may manie times betwéene whiles breake off. He would that this action, whereby a man is bleſſed, ſhould flowe from a moſt excellent vertue. The ſame alſo doo we thinke, who ſhew that the actions of faithfull men are not right and acceptable vntounto God, vnleſſe they be the branches of faith, hope, and charitie, the which we eſtéeme for the chéefeſt vertues. We agrée with him alſo as touching the continuance; for we require a perſeuerance while we liue héere, and in the world to come we beléeue to hauehave euerlaſting bleſſednes. Onlie in this, there is a diſagréement betwéene Ariſtotle and vsus, that he requireth the good things of the world, but we affirme that they are not of neceſſitie héere in this world vntounto a Chriſtian to make him bleſſed.
2 The opinions of the philoſophers concerning felicitie, may thus be diſtinguiſhed; Sundrie opinions of the philoſophers as touching felicitie.ſo as we may ſaie, that ſome of them were notable, hauing famous patrons; but others vile and obſcure, bicauſe they came from men of no account, and be not confirmed by ſtrong and euident reaſons. And of this kind are found health, riches, and ſuch like, whoſe defenders were no notable men. To the other kind belongeth pleaſure, honeſtie, vertue, to liue agréeable with the firſt gifts of nature, knowledge, &c. Simple ends and conioined ends.Theſe indéed are the ends, which are accounted without mixture. And there be ſome that hauehave other things ioined with them: for ſome men vntounto vertue doo ioine pleaſure; others vntounto honeſtie ioine a fréedome from ſorrowe; otherſome with vertue doo ioine the accompliſhment of a perfect life. Auguſtine againſt Iulianus Scyllaeus blameth that good, which is compounded with pleaſure; for in that honeſtie is placed therein, it repreſenteth a ſhew of man, the pleaſure which is mingled, is a brutiſh thing. But he that will more fullie vnderſtand of this matter, let him reade Cicero as well in his ſecond booke De finibus, as in his Tuſculans queſt: and thou maiſt alſo ſée, that ſometimes ſome of them diſagrée with themſelues; and that which they firſt iudged to be the chéefeſt good, ſtraightwaie they refuſe it: for they which being whole, made ſmall reckoning of health, afterward being deſtitute thereof, placed it in the chéefeſt good, which alſo hapneth to them that be preſſed with pouertie: for ſuch, not onlie make great account of riches, but aboue all things ſéeke for the ſame. And theſe, whom we hauehave ſpoken of, doo appoint ſome thing ſhat ſhould be euident and manifeſt. For theſe things; namelie, pleaſure, riches, and honors be ſo plaine and euident, that they are apparant, euen to the ſenſes. Yea and Epicurus ſaid, that he therefore thought pleaſure to be the chéefeſt good, bicauſe it was the moſt knowen, and moſt euident good thing. And he ſaid, that pleaſure was no leſſe knowne to be the chéefeſt good, than ſnowe to be white, or fire hot. Varro ſheweth, that the number of opinions concerning this matter, was verie great, as Auguſtine declareth in his booke De ciuitate Dei: for he ſaith, that there might be reckoned two hundred foureſcore and eight opinions touching felicitie.
Let vsus then ſéeke the cauſe why there aroſe ſo manie and ſo variable opinions thereof: which therefore we ſaie came to paſſe, bicauſe men did not deliberate of this matter with the better part of their mind, but rather counſelled with their owne affections, which as they be diuers, and doo diuerſlie ſtir vp the affections, they inclined mens minds vntounto ſo manifold and ſundrie ends. A man may ſée yoong men, which diuers waies being hot in louelove, thinke themſelues bleſſed; others make their bellie their God; ſome hauehave giuen themſelues like bondſlaues to the ſéeking of honor. There be ſome ſuch alſo, which thinke that nothing is to be preferred aboue riches: and the libertie of the Cynicke philoſophers verie well pleaſed Diogenes and his like. But if that reaſon it ſelfe had bin conſulted withall in this matter, aboue the ſenſes and affections, without doubt we ſhould not hauehave had ſo manie and ſo contrarie opinions.
Now ſince there be, or may be ſo manie in number, to reckon all, much leſſe to examine them, ſhould be ouer-great labour. Wherefore, that we take not a ſuperfluous matter in hand, we will in this treatiſe chooſe thoſe things which might eaſilie deceiue vsus, ſéeing a great likelihood of truth is diſcerned in them; Euſtratius.which Euſtratius ſhewed by a verie learned ſimilitude; A ſimilitude.If one (ſaith he) ſée a ſtock-doue, he will ſoone thinke he ſéeth a pigion, which will not happen vntounto him when he ſéeth an eagle, ſéeing the ſame is far vnlike vntounto a pigion. So we may iudge, that there be ſome opinions of bleſſednes, ſo far from the truth, as verie few or none can be deceiued by them: and againe, others in a maner ſo néere ioined vntounto the truth, as it is not in all men to diſcerne or knowe them one from another: wherefore thoſe that be of this ſort, ought not to be paſſed ouer, but to diligentlie be examined.
Ariſtotle declareth, that men, as touching the chéefeſt good things, bent their opinions vntounto thoſe kinds of life, which they had determined to followe, which indéed are reckoned to be thrée; namelie, delightfull, ciuill, and contemplatiue. But if thou ſhalt demand the cauſes why one will incline to this kind of life, another to that, Why men doo ſeeke diuers kinds of life.manie cauſes may be ſhewed: for manie in the execution of their affaires, and ordering of their actions, doo followe the conſtitution of their bodie, wherein, if they be giuen to ſurfeting, to drunkennes, to the fleſh, to excellent and good arts, to reuenging of iniuries, then they ſpeciallie thinke themſelues happie, when they hauehave obteined thoſe things, wherevnto they are mooued by a certeine naturall prouocation. Others are greatlie deſirous to atteine this or that thing, being brought therevnto by education; and it doth not ſeldome happen, that they become like vntounto thoſe men, with whom they be conuerſant, and be ioined in frendſhip. Againe, vntounto others, and thoſe without doubt not a few, nor alwaies euill men, it is argument and cauſe inough for them to proſecute anie thing; bicauſe they regard their authoritie, which gouerne either the common wealth, or church, or ſchooles, or warfare. For looke what princes, graue and wiſe men, whoſe authoritie is verie great, doo chooſe vntounto themſelues as an end and thing moſt to be deſired, that doth a great part of men take in hand and wiſh, according to that woorthie ſentence of Plato, and of other wiſe men; Such as the kings and princes be, Such princes, ſuch people.ſuch are their people. When England had king Edward who was a godlie prince, and giuen to good learning, Godlie king Edward the ſixt.all the youth indeuoured to imitate his labours. Cauſes indéed theſe be, but yet no iuſt cauſes. We ought not to be mooued by authors, nor by examples, nor yet by the force of bodilie conſtitution, but by the ſuggeſtion of reaſon, and of the mind, and by the weight of the things themſelues. But to follow Ariſtotles ſimilitude, héerein the common people are like vntounto bond-ſlaues, and brute beaſts. For this ſéemes to be the maner of ſhéepe, that if the ramme, or that ſhéepe which goeth formoſt in the flocke, depart vntounto anie ſide, they doo all followe: alſo bondſlaues without anie iudgement or anie choiſe doo followe their maiſters. I would ſpeake ſomwhat of Sardanapalus, Sardanapalus.ſauing that thoſe things which Iuſtine hath of him, are common vntounto all men: onlie that I will ſhew, which they ſaie he had alwaies in his mouth; Eate, drinke, and plaie. But Horace in his epiſtles reprooueth thoſe ſpéeches; Thou haſt plaid enough, thou haſt drunk enough, and thou haſt eaten enough, it is time for thée to be gone.
In the fift booke of Tuſculans queſtions Cicero ſaith, that Sardanapalus willed to be written vponupon his toombe;
Haec habeo, quae edi, quaeque exaturata libido
Hauſit, at illa iacent multa & praeclara relicta;
that is,
Theſe things I onelie hauehave that I did eate,
Delighting most to cram my panch with meate:
Whereas thoſe things that were of better kind,
As I them found, I left them all behind.
Cicero addeth that Ariſtotle ſaid; What elſe wouldeſt thou write vponupon the toombe of an oxe, not of a king? But what complaine we onelie of Sardanapalus, Tyberius.as though that Tyberius prince of the Romans were not ſo greatlie giuen to theſe delights and wantonnes, as he erected to himſelf euen an office of pleaſures. For euen as vntounto kings and magiſtrates, there are ſome which be maiſters of requeſts, ſecretaries, and maiſters of the horſes; ſo would he hauehave a maiſter of the pleaſures. Heliogabalus.Alſo Heliogabalus, whom I cannot tell whether I ſhould call an emperour, or a monſter, appointed rewards to them which could deuiſe ſtrange kind of ſauces, that he might the more prouoke his appetite to eating and drinking. And not onelie did the Roman monarchs ſinne in this point, but alſo the great king of the Perſians; Xerxes.euen Xerxes, who appointed great rewards to the inuentors of new pleaſures.