Common Places, Part 2 · Chapter 2 · Section 5
Of mans Election, or making of choiſe.
61 Ariſtotle ſaith; Choiſe moſt proper to vertue.that making of choiſe is moſt proper to vertue. For in the definition, which he made of vertue, firſt was placed the generall kind, namelie the habit; then he added the difference, to wit, mediocritie; after that were ioined togither the two properties; namelie, that through vertue we do things of our own accord; and then, that we doo them by making of choiſe. Howbeit, of theſe two properties, making of choiſe is the more proper: neither onlie, if it be compared with that, which is of our owne accord, but alſo if it be compared with the other properties of vertue, which no doubt are manie. For this cauſe are the actions procéeding from vertue commended, bicauſe they come from the making of choiſe. Maners are more iudged by choiſe than by actions.Maners (ſaith Ariſtotle) …re more iudged by making of choiſe, than by actions. True indéed it is, that maners are knowne by actions, as a trée is by the fruit: but yet that iudgement is deceiuable; for hypocrites doo verie oftentimes make a counterfet ſhew, and otherwhile we ſée things doone of a far other purpoſe, than it is méet they ſhould be. The Manicheis abſteined from wiues; alſo from the eating of fleſh: not bicauſe they were giuen to chaſtitie or ſobrietie; but bicauſe of their erronious and blaſphemous opinions. Tyrants doo ſometimes deale curteouſlie with their ſubiects, but to beguile them. And wicked men doo ſometimes abſteine from wickednes, but that is for feare of puniſhments, not for the louelove of iuſtice. Euill men forbeare to ſinne for the feare of puniſhment. Wherefore in iudgements, when the fact is apparant, there is oftentimes inquirie made of the will, mind, and purpoſe of him that dooth it. Neither at anie time is the making of choiſe ſubiect to fortune, as is action. Yea rather, they, which are found in anie crime, are oftentimes accuſtomed to ſaie, that they ment to hauehave doone otherwiſe, and that they purpoſed not in their mind, that ſuch things ſhould happen. And we eaſilie grant, that the actions are more apparant, ſince they are laid open to euerie mans eies; but yet they make not the iudgement either ſurer, or more certeine. Men doo iudge of maners, by that which followeth, namelie by the worke: but the iudgement of chooſing procéedeth from the cauſe, and (as they vſe to ſpeake) from that which went before. And ſometimes it happeneth, that a man dooth no action; ſo as it cannot be iudged by his actions, whether he be good or euill: but immediatlie, ſo ſoone as he ſheweth what choiſe he hath made, although he doo no action, yet men giuegive a iudgement of him, either as touching his naughtineſſe, or his goodneſſe. But how can it be ſaid, that yong children, and alſo bruit beaſts want the making of choiſe, Whether children and brute beaſts, be without choiſe.when as they chooſe one meate before an other; plaie before diſcipline; and ſhunne ſome things more than other things? We muſt anſwer, that making of choiſe is of two ſorts. One is common, whereby one thing is either preferred before an other, or elſe is more eſchewed than an other: and this kind of choiſe neither brute beaſts nor children doo want. The other is the verie proper choiſe, which hath counſell going before, and is directed by the iudgement of reaſon. And this kind of making choiſe can neither bruit beaſts nor children hauehave: for when they purſue one thing before an other, or auoid one thing rather than an other, they are not lead by reaſon; but by ſenſe. Alſo thoſe things, which we doo in haſt, and vponupon the ſudden, are without making of choiſe, not that we want reaſon while we commit thoſe things, but bicauſe we admit no ſpace of time to deliberate on them. Alſo the counſell, and the iudgement, and deliberation of reaſon is hindered by the vehemencie of the perturbation.
Three things void of choiſe.Wherefore there be reckoned vp thrée things, that want the making of choiſe. Firſt, brute beaſts, bicauſe they are not capable of reaſon. Secondlie, yong children; which although they be indued with reaſon, yet can they not vſe the ſame, bicauſe of their tender age: in the third place are counted ſudden and haſtie motions of the mind: wherein, although men hauehave reaſon enough and alſo yeares, yet doo they want time of deliberation. Wherefore they, which doo anie thing by the force of anie affection, are woont to ſaie, that they did it not of purpoſe, or aduiſedlie. Since that making of choiſe dooth belong vntounto the mind, it is either of the power of knowing, An order whereby the definition of choiſe is found outor the power of appetite. All appetite is diuided into thrée parts. Either it is of the more noble part of the mind, and is ioined with reaſon, and is called the will; or elſe it is of the groſſer part, and then it is diuided into the deſiring power, and into the angrie power. Herevpon Ariſtotle ſaid, that ſome thought choiſe to be the will, others thought it to be anger, others thought it to be deſire: but if it belong vntounto the knowledge, then come they which affirme choiſe to be an opinion, who perhaps were the Stoiks. But firſt Ariſtotle treateth of deſire and anger, That choiſe and deſire are diuerſe.and reaſoneth that their opinion is fond, bicauſe that then we ſhould yéeld, that brute beaſts hauehave choiſe: for they are mooued both with deſire and anger, which he reiecteth, as an abſurd and vnworthie thing. Wherefore it plainelie appéereth, that Ariſtotle did vtterlie remooue deſire from choiſe, bicauſe we may not by anie means ſaie, that deſire is choiſe: which cannot ſo be iudged of, as touching willingneſſe. Indéed willingneſſe differeth from choiſe, but it cannot be ſundered from the ſame; ſéeing euerie choiſe is according to the will. And the argument which he vſed is this; If deſire were choiſe, whatſoeuer thing worketh by deſire, ſhould (no doubt) worke by choiſe; But not euerie thing that worketh by deſire, dooth worke by choiſe. The ouerthrowe of the conſequent appéereth in this, bicauſe an incontinent man worketh by deſire, but not by choiſe; for that he followeth it not. He determined to doo well, but he ſtood not to his determination; therefore he delt not according to the choiſe, which he had conceiued in his mind. Choiſe is an appetite, which is a counſellor; but the incontinent man, while he is carried awaie by deſire, heareth no counſell. And on the other ſide, the continent man giueth no eare to deſire, but followeth his right choiſe. And this reaſon may be applied vntounto anger; for he alſo that dooth anie thing by anger, dooth it not by choiſe: and this we may ſée in angrie men. And héerein it ſhall ſuffice to hauehave ſaid, that an incontinent man is not altogither without choiſe; but yet he followeth not that which he hath in his mind.
He is compared to a man that ſléepeth, to him that is dronken, & to a citie wherein good lawes are not regarded. Héere Ariſtotle reaſoneth; Choiſe is contrarie to deſire; But deſire is not contrarie to deſire; Ergo deſire is not choiſe. This argument is in the ſecond figure. The reaſon is this; Thoſe things that agrée in one third, they alſo agrée in themſelues: Euen ſo thoſe things that doo not oppoſe themſelues againſt one third, doo not agrée togither at once themſelues. But there ariſeth a doubt: Deſire againſt deſire.bicauſe deſire ſéemeth to be againſt deſire. Some man deſireth fame, and to hauehave his name renowmed, and the ſame man is much deſirous of monie; one of theſe deſires is repugnant to an other. Auguſtus deſired ſouereigntie, and yet was deſirous to imitate Silla, in giuing vp of ſouereigntie. Theſe things ſéeme to be repugnant. Pamphilus lōged to be with his louer Glycerie, and yet was deſirous not to offend his father. Theſe things declare, that deſires be contrarie. The anſwer is manie waies to be made. Contraries muſt alwaies be contrarie: but theſe things are not alwaies contrarie, as appéereth in the Sophiſter, which at one time hath both theſe deſires; namelie, the deſire of glorie, and the deſire of monie. Moreouer, it behooueth that contraries hauehave reſpect to one and the ſelfe ſame thing: but the one of theſe deſires reſpecteth fame, the other monie. Thoſe things that reſpect one thing, after a quite contrarie maner, are verie contraries, and cannot be both at once togither. As, to deſire to hauehave fame, and to deſire not to hauehave fame; to be noble, and not to be noble; to be mainteined, and not to be mainteined: theſe be contrarie deſires, and cannot be both at once togither. Ariſtotle was not of the mind, that among deſires there is no contrarietie, but that contrarie deſires cannot be togither at once in one man. But euill deſire is alwaies an enimie to ſound choiſe in one and the ſelfe-ſame man, and at one and the ſelfe-ſame time. Neither is euerie choiſe alwaies an aduerſarie to euerie deſire: for the deſire of theft is not againſt the choiſe, whereby a man determineth to become rich, though it be by vniuſt meanes. And the deſire of ſlaughter is not againſt the choiſe, which a tyrant hath made. But a ſound choiſe (as it hath béene ſaid) is euermore againſt an euill deſire. But what maner of contrarietie is this of deſire & choiſe? No proper contrarietie, but ſuch as is of contrarie winds, or of two enimies. For it behooueth that theſe contrarieties, which be proper contrarieties, be in one and the ſelfe-ſame ſubiect, and that from thence they driue awaie one another; as white and blacke, cold & heat: which thing agréeth not with choiſe and ill deſire, for they be placed in diuers parts of the mind. For choiſe is placed in the mind or reaſon, but deſire in the groſſer part of the ſoule.
Another argument is gathered from the obiects, the which being contraries, Whether choiſe be both of that which is pleaſant and vnpleaſant.doo cauſe that the powers themſelues are not the verie ſame. Deſire is caried vntounto thoſe things which be pleaſant, and which be vnpleaſant; namelie, to obteine the one ſort, and to auoid the other. But choiſe hath not reſpect vntounto theſe things, but regardeth onelie that which is ſhamefull and honeſt, profitable and hurtfull. Howbeit, here there is a doubt; bicauſe the choiſe ſéemeth to be of things pleaſant, and of things gréeuous. Before yong men there is ſet vertue and pleaſure, and they are ſaid to be ſet as it were in the point of two waies; that when they ſhall be come vntounto the yéeres of mans ſtate, they may bend either to the right hand, or to the left. Wherevpon they are at their choiſe, to chooſe whether waie they will. Thus hauehave Pythagoras ſcholers and the Poets deſcribed the matter. And to Paris there was a choiſe giuen; Pallas offered him learning and good arts; Iuno offered him ciuill honors, & a happie gouernement of the common-weale; finallie, Venus offered him the groſſer ſort of pleaſures: wherefore the choiſe was in Paris, and he rather choſe that which was pleaſant. Yea, and our ſauior Chriſt ſetteth before vsus a broad and a narrowe waie, a wide and a ſtrait gate: ſo as it ſéemeth, that the choiſe is both of that which is gréeuous, and that which is pleaſant. We anſwer: If by choiſe, thou vnderſtand the action of the mind, whereby one thing is preferred before another; we cannot denie, but that choiſe is both of that which is pleaſant, and that which is gréeuous, ſéeing we preferre pleaſantneſſe before gréefe. But deliberation concerneth not properlie pleaſant and groſſe delights: for to thoſe we are not borne. Wherefore thoſe which preferre ſuch pleaſures before ſeuere honeſtie, or ſometimes before a gréeuous ſenſe, are not ſaid to chooſe, but rather to be led and violentlie caried by the deſire. Yet is it not to be denied, but that it may ſometimes be, that the honeſt and profitable things, which we chooſe, may be pleaſant: howbeit, that happeneth at all aduentures, (or as the common ſort ſpeake) accidentallie. Wherfore choiſe is exerciſed about that which is good, and about that which is euill: for this by our choiſe we ſéeke, euen to obteine good things, and to auoid euill. Whether there can be a chooſing of euil.But if a man demand, whether there can be a chooſing of euill? We will anſwer, that this cannot be, bicauſe we neuer make choiſe of that which is euill: for it behooueth, that that which is choſen, either be good, or at the leaſt wiſe hauehave in it ſelfe a ſhew and reſemblance of goodneſſe. But thou wilt ſaie; Are not the leſſe euils oftentimes choſen before the greater? I grant they are: but Ariſtotle in his Rhetoriks ſaith, that the leſſe euill in that caſe, hath a conſideration of good. That wrath is not choiſe.Finallie, Ariſtotle ſaid, that anger pertaineth much leſſe to choiſe; bicauſe thoſe things ſéeme not to be doone deliberatelie, which be doone in anger.That the will is not the choiſe, but theſe two doo differ.
Neither is the choiſe, ſaith Ariſtotle, our will, although it hauehave an affinitie thervnto. In which words he propoundeth two things; the one, that will hath an affinitie with choiſe: for both of them are placed in the chiefeſt part of the mind. And moreouer, the common people ſaie, that they will thoſe things which they chooſe. And yet neuertheleſſe, how néere ſo euer they be, they differ one from another: for the will is more at libertie, and ſtretcheth further than choiſe and election dooth. For will extendeth vntounto manie things, wherevnto the choiſe doth not atteine: as vntounto the end, vntounto things vnpoſſible, and to thoſe things which by vsus cannot be performed. By common ſenſe it is manifeſt, That the choiſe is not of things vnpoſſible.that choiſe perteineth not to things vnpoſſible: for he ſhuld be counted a mad man, that would chooſe ſuch things, as can by no means be compaſſed. That the will extendeth to ſuch things, it appéereth, bicauſe that thou maiſt find manie men, which would not die: which in nature is vnpoſſible. Alſo there be, which would be monarchs of all the world, and beare rule ouer all men: which alſo is a thing vnpoſſible. Moreouer, the will is the end, but the choiſe is rather of thoſe things which belong vntounto the end, and therefore they differ. Bicauſe the end, eſpeciallie the chiefeſt end is of that nature, that foorthwith, ſo ſoone as it is ſet before vsus, it cannot be refuſed. Therefore ſince it is not in our power to ſlippe from the ſame, it belongeth not to the choiſe: for that concerneth thoſe things which are in our power. But yet we muſt vnderſtand, that there is a choiſe of ſuch ends as conſiſt betwéene two extremes: for manie times is ſet before a yong man the choiſe of good learning, or of chiualrie, or of eccleſiaſticall function, or of the adminiſtration of the common-weale. Firſt, they chooſe to themſelues one of theſe things which liketh them beſt; then alſo they chooſe the means, whereby they may excell them. But we anſwer, that choiſe in thoſe ends hath no place, as they be ends, but as they be certeine means vntounto felicitie. For an end, ſo farre foorth as it is an end, is (as Ariſtotle ſaith) no choiſe.
That choiſe is not opinion.Finallie, to prooue that choiſe is not opinion, which was ſet downe in the fourth place, the reaſon is drawne from the obiects. Opinion is of all things; But choiſe is not of all things; Therfore choiſe is not opinion. The argument is in the ſecond figure, taken from the nature of relatiues: for the power is referred vntounto his obiect. Now let vsus ſée what is opinion; A definition of opinion.It is an aſſent of the mind, whereby we take vponupon vsus to mainteine the one part of a thing that is gaineſaid: yet we auow it not without all feare, but ſomewhat doubting, leaſt perhaps the other part of the contradiction ſhould be found true. And herein opinion differeth from knowledge: for knowledge is a moſt ſure and vnmooueable aſſent. Therefore let no man go about to perſuade one that hath knowledge, or is a profeſſor of the Mathematicall ſciences, that a thing is otherwiſe than he knoweth it to be: for it is vnpoſſible to perſuade him therevnto. But chéeflie doo Orators indeuour to roote opinions out of the minds of men, when they ſée that iudges, or hearers doo otherwiſe iudge, than they themſelues would would hauehave them. Ariſtotle prooueth, That opinion concerneth all things.that opinion is of all maner of things; bicauſe men hold opinion euen of things eternall. For men hauehave opinion of manie things concerning God, concerning angels, concerning heauen, and ſuch like things, which of the philoſophers are holden for eternall. Alſo men hauehave an opinion of thoſe things, which cannot be; to wit, that there be Chimeras, Centaures, and ſuch like monſters: and that the diametre is equall to the ſide lines of the quadrangle, which cannot poſſiblie be. Alſo things neceſſarie be otherwhile ſubiect vntounto opinion: for it may be, that what one hath perceiued by knowledge, another beléeueth by opinion. But when it is ſaid, that opinion is as touching all things, this muſt not be vnderſtood as concerning ſimple motions, or ſingle words; but as touching propoſitions, which conſiſt of manie motions or words, & doo ſhew, that either a thing is, or is not. Neither yet is there opinion of all theſe things: for there be certeine things, which euen of themſelues are knowne either to the ſenſe, or to the mind. As, that fire is hot, we certeinlie knowe by experiment of the ſenſe, we hauehave not an opinion thereof; and that the whole is greater than the part thereof; or that we pronounce of euerie thing, either that it is, or is not (which things be called principles) we are not led by opinion, ſith of themſelues they are knowne to our vnderſtanding. Opinion therefore is of all things; that is to wit, of all propoſitions, which of themſelues are not knowne vntounto vsus. Opinion diſtinguiſhed from faith.Alſo opinion is diſtinguiſhed from diuine faith: for faith ſignifieth a firme aſſent giuen vntounto the word of God, by the perſuaſion of the holie Ghoſt; ſo that it neither ſtaggereth nor wauereth as dooth opinion. The Minor propoſition of the argument aforeſaid is thus prooued; Bicauſe choiſe is onelie of thoſe things, which may be doone of vsus, wherefore it is not of all things, as opinion is.
Ariſtotle hath another argument drawne from the parts. Theſe two whole things, choiſe and opinion, hauehave not the ſame parts, whereinto they might be diuided; Ergo they are not all one. For the parts of choiſe are euill and good; but the parts of opinion are falſe and true opinion. And yet this argument may ſéeme to be weake; for we commonlie ſaie, that there be manie euill opinions; Ill opinions.as if a man thinke that our ſoules are mortall, or that God dooth not by his prouidence care for mens actions. Whoſoeuer thinke theſe things, are ſaid to hauehave ill opinions, Firſt we anſwer hervnto, that ill is here vnderſtood as it belongeth to maners: & therfore Ariſtotle ſaith, that opinion is neither euill nor good, bicauſe it is not reckoned among maners. But the common ſort doo call opinions, euill; bicauſe that which is falſe, is euill; euen as that which is true, is good. For thoſe things, which are commonlie called tranſcendent, are ſo ioined one with another, that true, is good; and falſe, is euill. Alſo theſe opinions may ſometimes be called good or euill in a morall ſenſe; bicauſe thorough thoſe falſe or true opinions, men are ſtirred vp either to good or vntounto euill maners. That no kind of opinion is all one with choiſe.The next argument is taken from the effects, to prooue that it cannot be particularlie ſaid, that anie kind of opinion is all one with choiſe. Here we hauehave to deale with the particular part, bicauſe it hath béen alreadie declared in the whole, that opinion & choiſe doo differ. Wherefore, leaſt anie man might ſaie; They differ generallie, and yet it may be, that ſome opinion is a particular choiſe; Ariſtotle prooueth, that this cannot be: bicauſe (ſaith he) this is the effect of choiſe, that through a iuſt cauſe we ſhall become men denominated of that qualitie; to wit, iuſt men. But this happeneth not in opinion; and therefore they are by no meanes all one. Thoſe things, which be here ſpoken, are moſt euident in an incontinent man: for he, bicauſe he maketh an ill choiſe, is ſaid to be an euill man, whereas in other matters he may hold an opinion right inough. For as touching vertues, he iudgeth rightlie; and thinketh, that it is good to temper him ſelfe from vnchaſtitie and droonkenneſſe, & yet dooth not chooſe this: he is not called a good man. But yet none can denie, but that euen by conceiuing an opinion, we are become indued with ſome certeine kind of qualitie, ſince opinion it ſelfe is a qualitie, and euen of opinions doo ariſe ſome affects of the mind. But Ariſtotle is to be vnderſtood as touching that qualitie, whereby we conceiue an opinion, and doo make our choiſe: for in chooſing of chaſt things, we become chaſt; by chooſing of ſtrong things, we become ſtrong; by chooſing of iuſt things, we become iuſt. But it is not likewiſe true in generall, as touching opinion: for in conceiuing an opinion of eternall things, we are not made eternall; nor yet in conceiuing an opinion of anie thing touching iuſtice, are we made iuſt. Howbeit this is true, that by true opinions we become more apt vntounto vertues; and through falſe opinions, more prone vntounto vices. But opinion it ſelfe dooth ſtraitwaie of it ſelfe, ſo ſoone as it is preſent, communicate vntounto vsus ſuch formes or denominations; but yet it behooueth that there be a choiſe had therein. Moreouer, choiſe is occupied in purſuing or flieng, but ſo is not opinion: for when anie thing is offered vntounto vsus, we begin to conceiue an opinion what it is, what com…oditie may be gotten thereby, and how it muſt be vſed. But we doo not ſo much conceiue in our opinion, whether the thing ſhould be ſhunned or followed: for that rather apperteineth to choiſe. Yea rather, betwéene theſe things there ſéemeth, that there ſhould be a certeine order ſet: for firſt (as I ſaid) we conceiue in opinion what it is, what profit it bringeth, and how it will ſerue our turne. Which things being cōceiued in opinion, then we procéed either to purſue, or to eſchew the matter.