Common Places, Part 1 · Chapter 14 · Section 6
That vertue is not the cheefeſt good; and wherein the ſame agreeth with it.
24 Among ſome of the philoſophers vertue was taken to be the chéefeſt good, That vertue is not the cheefeſt good.which Ariſtotle refelled on this wiſe; It behooueth that the chéefe good be perfect, But vertue is not perfect, Therefore it muſt not be counted the chéefeſt good. The maior propoſition appéereth: for if it be not a perfect chéefe good, our deſire reſteth not therein, but will deſire moreouer ſome other chéefe good. The minor propoſition; namelie, that vertue is not perfect, is prooued; bicauſe it is an habit, that is, a power not in act: & it may oftentimes be in the ſubiect without the action therof, as a thing that manie waies may be ſtopped; as by ſléepe, & by taking awaie of the occaſion, if matter be wanting, and when afflictions, ſicknes, and miſfortunes doo diſquiet vsus. This opinion, which placeth the chéefeſt good in vertue it ſelfe, is of all other that we hauehave hertofore recited moſt néere vntounto truth, and therefore it hath had great and graue patrones. But how it draweth néere vntounto the truth, hereby we eaſilie gather; that there is none more certeine nor ſurer preparation vntounto felicitie than vertue: for from the habit of vertue procéedeth that action, which is affirmed by Ariſtotle to be verie felicitie: vertue therefore is the néereſt power or facultie vntounto felicitie. Why vertue is not the cheefeſt good.But whie the ſame cannot be the chéefeſt good, & felicitie it ſelfe, it is cauſe inough, that it is referred vntounto a further end. For to what purpoſe doo we procure vntounto our ſelues the habits of vertues, but that we may the more eaſilie and redilie doo well? Wherefore, ſince that vertue is directed vntounto action, action ſhall be better and more to be deſired than it.
I am not ignorant, An obiection of the Stoiks.that they which are woont to hold with the Stoiks, hauehave béene accuſtomed to obiect againſt the Peripatetikes, ſaieng that they, while they appoint vertue to be the chéefeſt good, doo not vnderſtand it, as it is in the power, and lieth without act; but doo take the ſame as it is ioined with hir action: & ſo laugh Ariſtotle to ſcorne, which obiected not againſt them, but an idle vertue, and ſeuered from right action. This anſwer at the firſt ſight ſéemes vntounto ſome to be iuſt, and likelie to be true: but if the thing be more narrowlie conſidered, and that we ſhall more diligentlie looke into the ſame, it is rather a ſhift, than a true diſſoluing of the argument; bicauſe whether they will or no, action, and vertue, from whence it procéedeth, are diſtinguiſhed [one from another:] for they be conteined in ſundrie Predicaments, and are manie times ſeuered one from another. For vertue, when it is an habit, belongeth vntounto qualitie; but the act which it worketh, is comprehended vnderunder the Predicament of action. But how they be ſeuered one from another, I thinke no man that diligentlie conſidereth the matter, is ignorant: for he which is indued with knowledge or wiſedome, dooth neither contemplate alwaies, nor yet is alwaies occupied about thoſe things which he knoweth. Wherevpon it commeth to paſſe, that they which comprehend two for one, and diſtinguiſh them not, doo eaſilie ſwarue from the marke, wherevnto they ſhould hauehave an aime; and in ſtead of an abſolute and perfect doctrine, doo followe that which is confuſed and not plaine. This Ariſtotle perceiuing diſtinguiſhed and ſeuered one of them from another, and when he ſéeth that one of them is referred to the other, he denieth that that which tendeth to another end can be the chéefe: which reaſon of his opinion is ſo euident, as I thinke nothing can be more manifeſt than the ſame. But they which cannot confute the reaſon, doo returne the argument vponupon Ariſtotle himſelfe, who denieth that felicitie is therefore placed in vertue, bicauſe vertue may eaſilie & manie waies be hindered.
Another obiection.If this argument (ſaie they) like thée ſo well, neither canſt thou indéed defend the moſt perfect action to be the chéefeſt good; bicauſe the ſame alſo is as manie waies ſubiect to impediments, as thou didſt obiect againſt vertue. For he which ſléepeth dooth not contemplate; neither can he doo the ſame, which is vexed with gréeuous torments; and he cannot endure anie perils, which liueth in quiet & peaceable commonweales. Wherefore thou that ſaieſt that vertue, for theſe cauſes, is not the chéefeſt good; thou ſhalt alſo ſaie, that the moſt perfect action muſt not be accounted for felicitie. A ſhew indéed of truth this hath, which is obiected, but it maketh no matter at all; bicauſe the Peripatetikes will eaſilie grant, that the ſame moſt perfect action, which they ſaie is felicitie, is not continued ſo as it cannot be broken off; but ſo long as it is, they would not grant it to be no felicitie, and much leſſe will they yéeld that the ſame is referred to a better end. Both which things cannot be ſaid of the habit which is vertue. For the ſame, as it is in a man that ſléepeth, or is vexed with moſt painfull gréefes, can neither he called felicitie, nor yet can make him bleſſed in whoſe mind it is: for the habit may remaine, when the action is taken awaie; but an action being let from breaking foorth, neither is it, nor yet remaineth it. And beſides this, an habit, while it yet remaineth hindered, who ſéeth not that it is ſtill referred vntounto action, when as it inclineth the mind and deſire therevnto. Moreouer, that ſhould be accounted our felicitie, which approcheth moſt néere vntounto the diuine felicitie; but God, ſéeing he is not onelie perfect, but euen perfection it ſelfe, hath felicitie in act, not in power; in verie déed, not in habit; therfore our felicitie alſo ſhall be an action: which notwithſtanding is requiſite to be leſſe than the bleſſednes of God, which therefore happeneth; bicauſe his act cannot faile him, but ours is verie oftentimes broken off.
25 After thoſe things, Another obiection, that the action of vertue is onlie in the mind,which we hauehave now ſpoken, muſt their cauill alſo be confuted, which laugh at the argument, brought as touching the impediments, whereby the action of vertue is repreſſed, that it cannot be effectuall. Ye feigne (ſaie they) that the worke of vertues perteineth to the bodie; but it is not ſo: bicauſe the whole action of vertue is in the ſoule, and therein it ſtandeth full and whole: the goods of the bodie, or inſtruments of fortune belong nothing thervnto. And without doubt, a poore man may be liberall, by wiſhing to giuegive vntounto them to whom he thinketh méete to be giuen. Againe, in the middeſt of torments, and in the verie flames themſelues, feare dooth ſhine the more, and becommeth more glorious. According to which opinion Seneca vntounto Lucillus, the ſeuentie epiſtle writeth manie things, and among others ſaith; Vertue hath alſo place in the bed: ouercome thou thy ſicknes with a valiant courage, bicauſe, if others that be preſent, ſhall perceiue thée to be couragious, great, and vpright in torments, they will woonder at the brightnes of thy vertue; and thou, whileſt thou art ſo vexed, ſhalt rightlie inſtruct them, and thorough vertue ſhalt not onelie helpe thy ſelfe verie much, but them alſo. What maner of things theſe be, now will we more narrowlie conſider. They declare, that the action of vertue is whole, full, and perfect in the mind: that we denie. For if we ſhall declare the nature of an habit, the ſame is nothing elſe, than a qualitie brought in by long exerciſe, by the benefite whereof the powers of the mind and bodie are made more readie and fit to occupie themſelues. Neither dooth vertue in the mind alone expreſſe hir action. They which ſaie that vertue dooth beare rule in eating, drinking, fleſhlie deſire, and ſuch like; thoſe alſo will ſaie, that the action of that vertue is expreſſed in the bodie alſo, not in the ſoule onlie. So it may be lawfull to ſaie, as touching fortitude, liberalitie, and manie other vertues; to ſhew that the bodie and goods of fortune were not giuen by God vntounto mankind. Howbeit, theſe men perhaps perſuade themſelues, that the nature of man is fulfilled, and made perfect in the ſoule onelie: which how far it is from the truth, your ſelues without me may perceiue.
A poore man (ſay they) may be liberall, while he deſireth to giuegive vntounto them, to whom he thinketh it méet to be giuen. But I would faine learne of theſe Stoiks, whether they that be indued with vertue, and being hindered, doo deſire to worke by it; for what cauſe they deſire this? Doo they it not for bleſſednes ſake? This if they ſhall denie, they will declare themſelues to be vnwiſe in deſiring of thoſe things which they refer not vntounto the chéefeſt good. But if they will grant, that they wiſh thoſe works for felicitie ſake, it ſhall be lawfull to ſaie that felicitie is perfectlie gotten, not in vertue, but in action. I will eaſilie grant, that vertue ſhineth, and is more glorious in the midſt of flames, and in moſt cruell torments; and him that with a valiant courage ſuffereth theſe things, I will extoll with praiſes among good and wiſe men; but yet ſo, as I will denie him, in the meane time, to inioie whole and perfect felicitie. He ſhall verie well by his example inſtruct and teach others, yet ſhall he not perfectlie and all maner of waies be bleſſed. Theſe things be ſo verie true, as euen they, which profeſſe the Stoicall diſcipline, muſt whether they will or no yéeld vntounto this opinion. For Cicero in his fift booke of Tuſculane queſtions, at the beginning ſaith; If vertue be not of ſuch ſtrength, that it can defend it ſelfe, I feare me leaſt we are not ſo much to leane to the hope of a bleſſed life, vponupon confidence of vertue, as it may ſéeme that we hauehave more néed to praie for it. Verelie I my ſelfe, when I conſider thoſe chances, wherein fortune hath excéedinglie exerciſed me, I begin to miſtruſt this opinion, and otherwhiles alſo ſtand in great feare of mans weakenes and frailtie. For I feare leaſt that when nature gaue vntounto vsus weake bodies, and with them ioined vncurable diſeaſes, and intollerable gréefs; it alſo gaue minds agréeable to the gréefs of the bodies, and ſeuerallie intangled with the vexations and troubles therof. But herein I reforme my ſelfe, that I iudge of the ſtrength of vertue according to other mens nicenes, and peraduenture according to mine owne, not according to vertue it ſelfe, &c. How he doubted, and in a manner became of this opinion, he plainelie expreſſed in theſe words: and it maketh no matter, that he ſaith he reformed himſelfe, bicauſe that is vncerteine: and, he addeth this word Peraduenture, which is a token of doubting.
Moreouer, what is ſo certeine, as that Cicero himſelfe in his fourth booke De finibus diſputed againſt Cato, who had before in the third booke extolled the opinion of Zeno and the Stoiks to the heauens? Yea and the Stoiks as in vertue alone they boaſted, that they were bleſſed, That the Stoiks repoſed not themſelues in vertue alone.yet did they not repoſe themſelus in that alone; but called the powers of the bodie, the purenes of the ſenſes, dignities, riches and ſuch like foreign; that is, Things comming naturallie without anie other beginning: which Cicero calleth Things produced, promoted, principall, aduanced aboue other. With the ſenſe of which words if we would vrge the Stoiks, we ſhall ſay, that they attribute more vntounto this kind of things, than the Peripatetiks; as they which doo name thoſe things principall, and aboue others; whereas the Peripatetiks call them indéed good things, but yet of the loweſt degrée, and which are not of much account, being compared with iuſt and honeſt things; and therefore, as the time ſerues, to be contemned, and not much to be deſired. I knowe indéed that the Stoiks doo call theſe things principall and chéefe, while they be compared with their contraries; not when they be compared with vertues: but yet by theſe their new and made words they attribute verie much to this order of things, when they call theſe things, Commodities, things to be preferred, & of chéefe regard; and their contraries foreign: as who ſhould ſaie Diſcommodities, and things reiected. Wherefore, though the Stoiks would contend with the Peripatetiks in talke, yet in reaſon and in the thing it ſelfe they agrée with them. The Stoiks delight in a magnificall kind of ſpeach, and onlie in words bring in an vnſenſiblenes of paſſion, which when they come afterward to the matter, all men féele by experience, that it is quite differing from our ſenſes, and from our tried cuſtoms, and alſo verie far from the ſtrength of our humane nature.
26 And I doo not thinke, that I ſhould lightlie paſſe ouer thoſe things, which I cited a little before, out of the fift booke of Tuſculane queſtions; If (ſaith Cicero) vertue had not helpe inough in it ſelfe, that then we muſt make our praiers for the ſame. What is this we heare? As though if vertue were ſufficient in it ſelfe, is there nothing then to be wiſhed for, or to be deſired of God; as if we had all things conſiſting in our own ſelues? Shall Tullie on this wiſe, in making more of vertue than is requiſit, take awaie godlines, which is the chéefe vertue of all others, by aboliſhing the inuocatiō of God? Trulie euen thus did the Stoiks thinke. That the Stoiks opinion is far from religion.For Seneca writeth, that Iupiter can doo no more than a good man. Wherefore the Stoiks vſed no leſſe magnificall kind of ſpeach, than their doctrine was altogither differing from religion. Which I doo not therefore ſaie, as though I endeuoured to pronounce Ariſtotles opinion to be godlie and religious; but to giuegive warning, that the Stoiks are not ſo to be eſtéemed, That the Stoiks are more to be borne withall, than the Epicures.as though in praiſing of their vertues, they drew verie néere (as ſome thinke) vntounto the chriſtian doctrine. Yet will I beare more in this behalfe with the Stoikes, than with the Epicures; bicauſe they ſpeake in a maner alwaies that which is agréeable to their owne opinion, whereas the Epicures manie times affirme things not agréeable to their owne rules. Bicauſe Epicurus accounteth gréefe for the chéefeſt euill, he alſo placeth pleaſure of the bodie, or voidnes of ſorrowe to be the chéefeſt good. If he be tormented, or deſcend into Phalaris bull, and tell me how ſwéete this is, as he boaſteth that His wiſe man will ſaie, without doubt he ſhall ſpeake moſt inconſtantlie, and ſuch things as no maner of waie accord in themſelues.
Let theſe words ſo glorious and woorthie of memorie be left vntounto the Stoiks, which ſo boaſt of their vertues, as they thinke that a wiſe man indued with them, ſhall neuer bée without happines. Neither can they perſuade their mind, that ſéeing felicitie dooth euermore accompanie vertues, it will then forſake them, and that it will ſtaie vponupon the threſhold, wherein they enter into the priſon; as though it may not be lawfull for it to enter into a ſorrowfull place, nor (as ſaid Theophraſtus) to aſcend vponupon the rocke or whéele of torment. Theophraſtus, no doubt, was far wiſer than Epicurus. For he which ſawe, that by the Peripatetiks doctrine, was required vntounto ciuill felicitie, whereof we now intreate, both the goods of the bodie, and the goods externall; the verie ſame man vnderſtood, how vnpoſſible it was, that euen the wiſeſt man ſhould be bleſſed in torments & miſerie. But Epicurus, who was delighted with ſuch a chéefe good, as we hauehave now declared, will ſpeake things neither méete nor agréeable to his purpoſe, while he ſpeaketh ſo magnificallie, and vſeth ſuch glorious ſentences. But yet this is no maruell; for he contemned Logike, which is the right meanes of diſputing: but of this thing we hauehave ſpoken enough.
What the holie ſcriptures teach hereof. Pſal. 49, 6.26 Let vsus now ſée what the holie ſcriptures ſaie herevnto: trulie they make no mention of vertues, when they ſhew the felicitie of man. In the pſalme, wherin is rehearſed the opinion of the common ſort, which thought him to be happie that hath abundance, and who is repleniſhed with infinite ſtore of the goods of this world; we are otherwiſe perſuaded by the voice of God. Pſal. 32, 12.For it is added; Bleſſed is the people whoſe God is the Lord. Here an act is ſhewed, not a power; Pſal. 112, 1.Bleſſed is the man that feareth the Lord; Pſal. 119, 1.bleſſed is the man that walketh in the lawe of the Lord. Further, that euen the good habits of the mind may be ſomtime idle and vnprofitable, hereby it is euident; That good habits may be vnprofitable. 2. Cor. 6, 1. 1. Tim. 4, 14that Paule warneth vsus to take héed, that we receiue not the grace of God in vaine. And Paule aduiſeth Timothie, To ſtir vp the gifts of God, which were in him, by laieng on of hands by authoritie of the elderſhip. Séeing then the gifts of the ſpirit, which are more excellent than morall vertues, are referred vntounto action, that others may be holpen and inſtructed, (otherwiſe we ſhould not become the better for them) this muſt be iudged much truer, and more certeine as touching humane vertues. Where it is ſaid of Ariſtotle, that Calamities and miſeries doo let, that men cannot be counted happie; if this ſhould be conſidered by it ſelfe, Whether calamities doo hinder men from happines.as it is ſaid without anie diſtinction, it agréeth not with the holie ſcriptures. For they which ſuffer for Chriſt, are in great penurie, and are troubled with gréeuous puniſhments; yet doo they enioie that bleſſednes, which in this life is poſſible to be atteined vntounto: Pſal. 32, 1.bicauſe their ſinnes are not imputed vntounto them, and their ſoule and bodie are then excéedinglie renewed toward the attainment of eternall life. Howbeit, ſéeing the felicitie of this life is not yet full, but begun; therefore we will grant it, that the ſaints, which be ſo afflicted, are not in perfect and abſolute bleſſednes; ſéeing they looke ſhortlie to hauehave the ſame, wherein they ſhall féele none of theſe miſeries. For the oracles of God ſaie; Eſaie. 25, 8. Apoc. 21, 4.God ſhall wipe awaie all teares from the eies of his ſaints, neither ſhall there be mourning nor lamentation anie more: for theſe former things are parted awaie. Wherfore we ſaie with Ariſtotle, that betwéene perfect and full felicitie, and miſeries and calamities there is no agréement, which neuertheles diſagréeth not with that felicitie, which we hauehave here begun.
And Paule ſawe the diſpleaſures of this life to be ſo repugnant vntounto perfect bleſſednes, and that they could not abide togither, as he ſaid vntounto the Corinthians; If the dead riſe not againe, 1. Cor. 15, ver. 13, & 19we are more vnhappie than all men. And if that Chriſt pronounced them bleſſed, which mourne, and which ſuffer perſecution for his name; Matth. 5, 4. verſ. 4, & 10.that muſt not ſo be vnderſtood, as though we ſhould be bleſſed, bicauſe we wéepe, and ſigh, and ſuffer perſecution; but bicauſe we wait for better things hereafter, and are ſaued by hope. Neither doo I denie, but that in the middeſt of the troubles of the fleſh, God will giuegive maruellous comforts to them that be his: which I perſuade my ſelfe paſſeth all the delights of ciuill happines. Yet commeth it not to paſſe thereby, that perfect felicitie is ioined with theſe calamities. After this maner did Paule comfort the ſoldiers of Chriſt; Rom. 8, 18.The things (ſaith he) which we ſuffer in this life, are not equall and of like value with thoſe things, which at length ſhall be reuealed in vsus, when we reigne together with Chriſt. But Ariſtotle was conſtreined to iudge as he ſaid, bicauſe he was ignorant of the bleſſednes to come, and ſawe that the ciuill happines, which he treated of, was obſcured and diminiſhed by aduerſities and afflictions. And vntounto him were vnknowne thoſe heauenlie comforts, which God, aboue the power of nature, bringeth to the confeſſors of the truth, euen in the verie torments. Wherefore, if as touching this matter, the Stoiks ſéeme ſomewhat to diſagrée from vsus, this they did vnaduiſedlie; ſéeing they alſo knew nothing of the life to come, neither had they euer triall of the conſolations of God in the midſt of miſeries and death.