Common Places, Part 1 · Chapter 14 · Section 7
Of the cauſes of Felicitie.
27 Now that we hauehave largelie inough diſputed as touching the nature of felicitie, we will inquire of the cauſe therof. Ariſtotle reckoneth vp fiue cauſes, which may be gathered into two; for either they be inward, or outward. They are reckoned inward, bicauſe diſcipline, cuſtome, and exerciſe doo procéed from vsus. But the outward cauſes are thought to be God and fortune. The difference betweene cuſtome and exerciſe.Betwéene cuſtome and exerciſe this is the difference, that cuſtome is referred vntounto vertues, which are bred by often and continuall actions. But exerciſes and labours are to be applied to a ſure obteining and kéeping of riches, honour, and health; in which things manie (as it hath bin ſaid) hauehave placed felicitie. And firſt as touching diſcipline, it belongeth vntounto them, which hauehave thought that vertues are learned by applieng of doctrines. Wherefore if there be néed of diſcipline, it muſt be learned; if of cuſtome, we muſt not deſiſt from honeſt actions; if it be aſcribed to exerciſe, there muſt of neceſſitie be no labour ſpared; if it be expected of God, he muſt be praied vntounto; but if of fortune, ſince we are able to doo nothing concerning it, all muſt wholie bée committed vntounto the ſame. The Stoiks, and eſpeciallie Epictetus, diſtinguiſh all things which are found either to be in vsus, or not to be within vsus. By thoſe things that are in vsus, they vnderſtand the things which we can rule by our counſell, and obteine by our ſtrength: and thoſe things that are ſaid to be not within vsus, are the ſame that we hauehave not in our power; as nobilitie, health, and riches.
Whether God be the cauſe of felicitie, Ariſtotle in his firſt booke of his Ethiks ſpeaketh verie ambiguouſlie, Whether felicitie be of God.& bringeth a conditionall propoſition, but abſolues not the argument. If anie gift (ſaith he) be of God, felicitie ſhall be giuen of him. And he ſheweth a reaſon of the concluſion, bicauſe the ſame hath the chéefeſt place among all humane things. But to the making vp of the argument, there may be added a double minor propoſition: that the felicitie of the godlie, and ours is all one; But manie things are giuen vntounto men by God, therefore muſt felicitie be expected from him. And that manie things are giuen vntounto men by God, we doubt nothing at all, who doo alſo extoll his prouidence in euerie thing: and ſince from him, as from the chéefe good, and fountaine of goodnes, is deriued whatſoeuer is good, we doo not once imagine, that this doth flowe without his pleaſure, will, and election. The opinion of the Peripatetiks as touching prouidence.But there bée ſome, and thoſe indéed Peripatetiks, which doo déeme far otherwiſe of the prouidence of God: for they thinke that his prouidence, as touching particular things, ſtretcheth not lower than the moone; bicauſe ſo far, all things are done conſtantlie, and in ſingular order. But, as touching the things which are beneath the moone, they make prouidence to be onlie of generall things, not of particular. Wherfore they ſhould take this for the minor propoſitiō; But no gifts are diſtributed by God vntounto men, neither therfore is felicitie giuen. And they ſaie, that gifts are not giuen by God vntounto men, not bicauſe they acknowledge him not to be the firſt efficient cauſe, from whence all good things doo ariſe; but they take the word of giuing or beſtowing from election, will, and frée choiſe. The good things, which we hauehave, and felicitie, they will grant doo depend of God, and of the motion of the heauen, and that they cannot otherwiſe be had; but they thinke that thoſe be not giuen by him, by a certeine diſtribution which he conſidereth of, or which he giueth by a frée diſpoſition. For they thinke that God dealeth neceſſarilie, and by a naturall impulſion.
Wherefore we muſt note, that Ariſtotle in the place aboue mentioned, neither affirmeth nor denieth that felicitie is giuen of God. He affirmeth it not, bicauſe he ſaith, that this worke belongeth to another treatiſe; namelie, to the metaphyſicks, or treatiſe of ſupernaturall things, wherein is treated of the prouidence of God, without which doctrine, this queſtion can not be defined. Neither yet doth he denie felicitie to be giuen of God, leaſt he ſhould fall into an abſurditie. For it ſéemes to be contrarie to reaſon, that the reſt of the gifts ſhould be giuen by God, and felicitie not to be giuen by him. Wherefore he teacheth it vnderunder a condition, namelie, If other things be had from God, felicitie likewiſe doth procéed from him: but he affirmeth nothing at all. But I ſée not how fitlie he putteth ouer this treatiſe to another place; for if this definition doo depend of prouidence, might he not in the meane time hauehave borowed ſo much of his metaphyſicall treatiſe, as ſhould hauehave béene ſufficient for the explaning of his mind? This he did as touching the ſoule, and tooke from his treatiſe of natural things ſo much as ſerued vntounto morall doctrine, and ſaith, that The ſoule as we ſhall ſhortlie ſée, hath diuers parts. So likewiſe might he here hauehave written of this, although he had not here purpoſelie prooued it, but taken it from ſome other treatiſe; that God by his prouidence dooth giuegive manie gifts vntounto men; than the which gifts ſéeing felicitie is far more excellent, it is méet that the ſame alſo ſhould belong vntounto it. Howbeit, diſſembling this, he paſſed it ouer, and ſaith it belonged to an other treatiſe. But I beſéech you, what more conuenient place had there béene, ſéeing in that booke he was to treate of maners and vertues, the vnderſtanding whereof dependeth altogither of the knowledge of felicitie? Now was it time to affirme thereof ſimplie, that he might no leſſe hauehave expected the ſame of God, than other gifts. Now then, when he ſpeaketh on this wiſe, he ſéemeth to ſhunne the hatred of vngodlines, but deſerued no praiſe for a plaine and ſincere confeſſion. If he had ment well and honeſtlie, he ſhould not hauehave vſed theſe ambiguities. But what ſhould he hauehave doone? He could not by philoſophie know any thing of the will of God towards men; for whatſoeuer we knowe thereof, we are all wholie beholding for it vntounto the holie ſcriptures, and eſpeciallie to the goſpell.
28 When Ariſtotle had after a ſort denied, that felicitie commeth from God, in that he would not confeſſe it; this neuertheles he granteth, that it is a thing moſt diuine, that is, moſt perfect, which alſo God inioieth. For he, although not as men be, yet after a certeine maner of his owne, is bleſſed. here Euſtratius added [of his owne] that God dooth giuegive felicitie, but not without the meanes which we hauehave rehearſed, I meane learning, How God dooth giuegive ſome things without a meane and ſome by meanes.cuſtome and exerciſe. And vndoubtedlie, there be certeine things giuen vntounto vsus by God, without anie labour or indeuour of vsus. For when did euer anie man labour that he might be borne wittie, noble, or of a ſound bodie, or of a perfect complexion? Aſſuredlie no man. As for other things, God ſo giueth them, as we ſhould atteine vntounto them by certeine means. Howbeit this muſt be dilligentlie conſidered, that if we will thinke well and godlie of the matter, euen the verie meanes are giuen vntounto vsus by GOD himſelfe: for no man ſhall be mooued to receiue ſound doctrine, nor to take in hand a good cuſtome nor a profitable exerciſe, That felicitie is common vntounto manie.vnleſſe he be ſtirred vp by God. If felicitie hauehave thoſe thrée things, for cauſes and certeine principles, it may ſoone be common vntounto manie; except thoſe which hauehave not their ſenſes perfect, which be féeble, and borne lame, and for that cauſe cannot atteine vntounto felicitie. For there be ſome, which be borne fooles, and of an ill temperature of the bodie; and therefore they which be deafe, dumbe, or which be ouercome with great gréefes & weakenes, cannot learne good arts and litterature, neither are they fit for exerciſes; nor yet to procure vntounto themſelues good manners. And doctrine is not admitted for morall vertues ſake; but bicauſe of the faculties & ſciences which be contemplatiue, in which things for the moſt part felicitie dooth conſiſt. And bicauſe it is ſaid, that felicitie is common vntounto manie; hearers & readers be incouraged to thinke, that if they fall from it, it muſt be imputed to their own default which would not learne and accuſtome themſelues to good actions, and painfull exerciſes.
From felicitie he in like manner exempted children; bicauſe they, in reſpect of their age, Children excluded from felicitie by Ariſtotle.which in them is verie yoong and tender, cannot execute that action to all intents and purpoſes. But the reaſon which he maketh, why they cannot be bleſſed, let vsus examine it as it is produced by Ariſtotle; There is néed (ſaith he) vntounto felicitie, both vertue, and a perfect life. Touching life, there is no controuerſie; bicauſe as one ſwalowe maketh not the ſpring time, ſo one day maketh not a man happie. Wherefore, if one ſhould become happie, it is requiſite that his age be lengthened, and his time produced. There is alſo required a perfect vertue; for vnleſſe it ſhall take déepe roote, it will ſoone ſlip awaie, as hauing ſmall faſtening. Bréefelie, Ariſtotle will that a happie man ſhould be in ſuch a ſtate, as he cannot eaſilie be remooued therefrom; whervnto all men ſée, that a full age and perfect vertue is requiſite. This opinion pleaſed the Pelagians, which placed righteouſnes, and the kingdome of heauen in the power of men. Alſo it pleaſed the ſchoolmen; for as the Pelagians denied grace, & ſaid that nature dooth ſuffice: ſo theſe men likewiſe affirming grace in bare name, hauehave in verie déed quite taken it awaie, as they which hauehave made the ſame common and open to all men, as though it were in euerie man, either to receiue it, or to put it from him. And when they be aſked who dooth giuegive grace to them, which accept it, in ſuch ſort as they both deſire it, and receiue it, when it is offered to them; they flie vntounto frée will: and of all theſe is Pighius the ſtanderd-bearer.
Wherefore, if either thou aſke of Ariſtotle, or of them; Since felicitie is thus common, as ye ſay, how coms it to paſſe, that ſo few obteine the ſame? Bicauſe few (ſaie they) will learne, few will labour, few will accuſtome themſelues to honeſt and good exerciſes. But we will here note a generall and a certeine propoſition; To euerie nature or kind there is a purpoſed end, the which all that be comprehended in it may atteine. And ſurelie, that which Ariſtotle anſwered, as touching them that hauehave not their perfect ſenſes, be lame, and féeble, why they cannot be partakers of felicitie; namelie, bicauſe of their naturall defect; that propoſition may be vnderſtood, when the powers ſhall be perfect: ſo doo we anſwer, that men cannot now by themſelues be perfect, bicauſe nature was corrupted euen from the beginning, and that we hauehave not the powers as well of the mind, as of the bodie perfect. So that now, when we heare theſe things, let vsus thinke that we heare Ariſtotle, not Paule, or Chriſt. Here hauehave we thrée things that are ſpoken of felicitie; It is a diuine thing, Three things ſpoken of felicitie.it may be obtained by the thrée principall things, which he hauehave alreadie rehearſed, and it is common in a maner to all men.
29 There remaineth fortune, which Ariſtotle remooueth from the cauſes of felicitie; bicauſe it is thought vnwoorthie that it ſhould be admitted to open ſo excellent a gift vntounto men. But before I ſhew the reaſon brought by Ariſtotle, A plaine declaratiō what fortune is.I will indeuour to declare what fortune is. As it is written in the ſecond booke of naturall philoſophie; It is an accidentall cauſe, and then it commeth in place, when anie thing is ioined to anie man, which is author of the effect following; vntounto the producing of which effect, that which is ioined therevnto, worketh nothing, but onlie giueth ſometimes an occaſion; and the effect may well come to paſſe without it. This is made plaine by a ſimilitude; If a man, by reaſon of an ague, become temperate, we will ſaie that this fell out by fortune: for temperance commeth of the will as of hir own proper cauſe, which will bridleth the affection of luſt. The ague might hauehave bin the occaſion whereby this came to paſſe, but the cauſe it could not be. And bicauſe theſe things, to wit, the will of temperate gouernement, and the ague, méete by fortune in one and the ſame man; therefore doth temperance ſpring by fortune from the ague. But it appeareth plainelie inough, that the feauer is not by it ſelfe the cauſe of the temperance; otherwiſe, all that be gréeued with a feauer, would become temperate. According to this maner of ſpeaking muſt the ſentence of Paule be examined and vnderſtood; 1. Cor. 8, 1.Knowledge puffeth vp. Pride, which immediatelie preferreth our owne things aboue other mens, procéedeth from the will; héereby we become vaine and puffed vp. And bicauſe knowledge giueth an occaſion vntounto ſome that this is done, therefore knowledge is ſaid to puffe vp, but yet by fortune; bicauſe in one ſelfe man, are ioined together by chance theſe two things, to wit, the deſire of paſſing and excelling others, and alſo ſome knowledge of things. And as theſe things be ioined together at all aduentures; ſo doth vaine puffing vp procéed by fortune from knowledge. Alſo it hapneth, that when vntounto that effect, which we deſire by it ſelfe, and by our owne aduiſe, another effect by chance is ioined therewith; then the ſame commeth of fortune, not purpoſelie, whereas we in verie déed ſought for another thing. As otherwhile it hapneth vntounto them that be diggers, that they in labouring doo finde treaſure, when as they onlie intended the trimming of their vines and trées: this I ſaie happeneth by fortune, when as the digger ſought for another matter: neither is the digging the proper and true cauſe of finding out the treaſure; for if a man ſhould affirme this, he muſt of neceſſitie auouch, that all diggers doo finde treaſures. Adde moreouer, that all the effects of fortune doo verie ſeldome come to paſſe, and that contrariwiſe than falleth out in the true and proper cauſes, which verie ſeldome are hindred from bringing foorth their effects. Which things being ſo, it appeareth, and that manifeſtlie, that fortune is repugnant to reaſon and counſell. That fortune is not the cauſe of felicitie.Wherefore it is not méete to attribute vntounto it, that it bringeth foorth felicitie. And ſo Ariſtotle concludeth, that ſéeing felicitie is better deriued from the cauſes before mentioned, than from fortune, it is méete that wée ſhould determine it ſo to be; bicauſe it ought to be in the beſt maner that it can.
One reaſon, whereby Ariſtotle prooueth fortune to be no cauſe of felicitie is this; The chéefeſt good ought not to be referred vntounto a vile and abiect cauſe; Felicitie is the chéefeſt good, & fortune is but vile among the cauſes; Wherefore bleſſednes ought not to be reduced vntounto fortune, being a cauſe leſſe woorthie than others. And hereof dependeth the force of this argument: for although a noble cauſe doo otherwhile bring foorth a vile effect (as we knowe that the ſunne dooth not onelie bréed a man, but alſo frogs, fleas, and flies) yet excellent effects cannot procéed but of noble cauſes. Here we ſée, that by euident and moſt manifeſt words Ariſtotle excludeth fortune, as he that would not number the ſame among the cauſes of felicitie, and taketh propoſitions as well out of his booke of naturall philoſophie, as alſo out of his metaphyſicks: the verie which certeinlie he might hauehave doone, in affirming God to be the cauſe of mans bleſſednes. So that he excludeth from this number both God and fortune: GOD, as ouer-woorthie and too high; but fortune, as an vnwoorthie and a more vile cauſe. For it is a moſt inconſtant thing, and hath no ſubſtantiall ground-worke: which neuertheles is ſo excluded, as it can doo nothing about the nature and ſubſtance of felicitie; and yet vndoubtedlie it can doo ſomewhat about thoſe good things which helpe vntounto felicitie, & be the inſtruments therof. But if it be of power, concerning riches, and honours, and ſuch like, which (as it hath béene ſaid) doo not a little further vntounto felicitie; why doo they denie them to be the cauſe thereof? We grant indéed, that theſe things doo accompliſh, and doo ſeruice vntounto felicitie, and doo ſuch ſeruice, as it may not be without them; but we denie that it dooth properlie cauſe the ſame. For it ſo fareth not, that as the lacke of theſe things may hinder bleſſednes; ſo if they be preſent, they can performe and bring the ſame to paſſe. For thou ſhalt ſée manie men that be noble, rich, ſtrong, and in honours, who neuertheles being wicked, thou wilt not call happie. Which aſſuredlie ſhould not come to paſſe, if theſe things were by themſelues cauſes of happines. But if theſe kinds of good things be taken awaie from honeſt and wiſe men, they ſuffer them not to be happie, although (as it hath béene ſaid) thoſe things themſelues are not the cauſes of bleſſednes. But if thou demand, whether the good things of the bodie doo alſo come from fortune? I may eaſilie denie it; bicauſe fortune is affirmed to be one of thoſe cauſes, which rarelie and ſeldome comes in action: for ſcarſelie within a hundred yéere it happeneth, that a digger of vine trées, or a ploughman chanceth vponupon a treaſure. But it is verie often giuen vntounto men euen frō their birth, to hauehave a good conſtitution of their bodie, & hauehave giuen them ſound members, and ſufficient ſtrength to accompliſh their actions.
30 Another argument is alleged, which is much ſtronger, and that is taken from the definition of bleſſednes. And the ſenſe is; bicauſe felicitie is an action, and that no ſmal action of the mind, it ought not to be expected of fortune: for the nature of minds and of vertues is otherwiſe, than it is of fortune. But he ſaith not abſolutelie, that bleſſednes is an action of the mind; but he added, that it is a certeine kind of action, that is to wit, a moſt abſolute and moſt perfect action; bicauſe it procéedeth from a moſt excellent vertue. Hereof dependeth the force of the argument, that neither the mind of man, nor vertue doo anie action by fortune. He againe confirmeth felicitie not to be of fortune; bicauſe he ſaid at the beginning, that the end of ciuill facultie is the chéefeſt good; but no man doubteth, but that the ſame facultie worketh not by chance, or by fortune. And he prooueth, that therefore the chéefe end of man belongeth vntounto that facultie, bicauſe therein ciuill vertue dooth verie much labour, to the end it may make good citizens. Wherefore, if it vſe diligence, it cannot be ſaid to deale by fortune. For counſell, induſtrie, and diligence are altogither repugnant vntounto fortune: for the ciuill art endeuoureth to make good citizens, and to be of excellent conditions, & ſingular qualities; firſt by making of good lawes, afterward by giuing of honours and rewards to the kéepers and faithfull obſeruers of them; and on the other ſide, by puniſhing, and kéeping vnderunder thoſe which doo tranſgreſſe them.
Let vsus now bréefelie examine theſe things by the holie ſcriptures, How theſe things agree with the holie ſcriptures.how much they agrée with them, or how much they diſſent from them. Ariſtotle ſpeaketh doubtfullie of God, whether he be the authour of felicitie or no. But we conſtantlie affirme that he is; I will (ſaith God vntounto Abraham) be thine exceeding great reward. Gen. 15, 1.And leaſt we ſhould ſuſpect that this is naturallie true, but not at the will and election of God himſelfe, there followeth there the making of a couenant, wherby he choſe to himſelfe a certeine people; and he couenanted that he would be the God of thoſe that beléeue. And Moſes, who verie well vnderſtood, that felicitie conſiſteth herein, that God might be vnderſtood and ſéene, deſired this of God, when he ſaid; Shew me thy face, Exo. 33, 13.which alſo he obteined. And Dauid ſang; Pſal. 15, 12.Pleaſures are at thy right hand for euermore. And Chriſt our ſauiour, who is our God; Mat. 11, 28.Come (ſaith he) vntounto me all that labour and are heauie loden, and I will refreſh you. And he ſaid ſpeaking of his ſhéepe; They heare my voice, Ioh. 10, 28.& I giuegive them eternall life. Let this be a full perſuaſion to euerie one of vsus, that our felicitie is to be expected and deſired of God himſelfe. As for the exerciſes, cuſtomes, and doctrines which Ariſtotle mentioneth, in our opinion alſo muſt not be contemned; naie rather they are commanded vsus in euerie place of the ſcriptures: yet not ſo, that they ſhould be the cauſes of our felicitie. Rom. 3, 24.For we be fréelie iuſtified, not of works; and eternall life is granted fréelie vntounto vsus.
But there be certeine means, whereby God dooth lead vsus vntounto him, and to the felicitie which we deſire: and theſe means we hauehave from God himſelfe. Wherefore it was vponupon good cauſe ſaid by Paule; Phil. 2. 13.It is God which giueth vntounto vsus both to will and to performe. But as for fortune much leſſe than Ariſtotle did, doo we commit bleſſednes therevnto; as we that thinke, that all our dooings are gouerned by the counſell and will of God, ſo as without his will, not ſo much as one heare can fall from our head. Luke. 21, 18.And we thinke this of all other to be moſt falſe, which is commonlie ſaid of the Ethniks, that Euerie wiſe man frameth to himſelfe his owne fortune. Ariſtotle denieth that children can be happie, but we on the other ſide affirme them to be happie, ſéeing Chriſt ſaid; Suffer them to come vntounto me, Mar. 10, 14.& he imbraced them with great fauour, & with ſingular clemencie. We know indéed, that they as yet cannot be workers of excellent actions, but yet by Chriſt both originall ſin is forgiuen them, and a waie vntounto eternall life is opened to them. Neither doo we grant vntounto him, that they can not be called happie, which are afflicted with great miſchances; ſince it may be, that they which are trulie bleſſed, doo ſuffer gréeuous things for the name of Chriſt: neither doo thoſe hard and horrible things, which they indure, ouerthrowe that bleſſednes, which we men may hauehave while wée liue héere.
¶ Of felicitie and bleſſednes, looke more Part. 2. Cap. 16. Art. 26.