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Discovery of Jacksons Vanity · William Twisse

Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 2 · Chapter 13

CHAP. XIII.

In what sense, or how Gods infinite will is said to bee the rule of goodnesse.

THe question was never before (that I know) proposed in this manner, viz. of Gods infinite wil, but only of Gods will. The Heathens painted Iustice as an assistant of Iupiter. Anaxarchus to comfort Alexander, cast downe with conscience of his foule fact, inmurthering his deare friend Clitus, deviseth an interpretation of this pageant, sutable and serviceable to the consolation of Alexander; and that was this, Iupiters actions must alwaies be esteemed just. So saith the great Monarchs who are Gods on earth, their actions must bee accounted just. Anaxarchus is censured by Arrian, and justly, for his grosse flattery in the application of this unto Kings on earth, who, it is well knowne, may degenerate into tyrants. But I hope you will not dislike this interpretation as applied unto God: you will not make question, I trow, whether God be righteous in all his waies, and holy in all his workes, much lesse deny it, although he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his sonne, allowed Samson to sacrifice himselfe, the Israelites to rob the Egyptians; though he send an evill spirit betweene Abimelech and the men of Shechem; though hee put a lying spirit in the mouthes of all Ahabs Prophets, to seduce the King, and to perswade him to goe up against Ramoth Gilead, that he may fall there; though he sends to Pharaoh a commandement to let Israel goe, yet tels Moses hee will harden Pharaohs heart that he shall not let Israel goe; though that worke of the rending of the ten Tribes from the two, comprehending the defection of people from their lawfull King, he by open protestation takes unto himselfe as his own work; like as touching the defiling of Davids concubines, he telleth David to his face, that he would doe this openly, saying, I will take thy wives from thee, and give them to thy neighbour, and he shall lye with them in the sight of the Sunne.

2. Your comparison of Gods power with his goodnesse, I doe not much mislike; onelyonly your comparing of him with Monarchs in goodnesse, is not so fit; for alas what prerogative have they of goodnesse above other men? They are to bee borne withall, though they are not so good as others, because they are exposed to greater temptations then others, and the greater is the temptation, the lesse is the sinne. No great commendation to exceed Sardanapalus, or Heliogabalus in goodnesse; yet wee know there is a great deale of difference betweene the goodnesse of God, and the goodnesse of man in the course thereof: for mans goodnesse in the exercise thereof, is subordinate to a law, and they are bound to exercise it towards all: Gods goodnesse is of no such condition, nothing could binde him to the making of the world, or to the making of any creature at all. They being made, hee exerciseth his goodnes towards whom he will: for though in the course of his naturall providence he causeth his Sun to shine, and his raine to fall both upon the just and unjust; yet as touching the dispensation of his chiefest blessings, his spirituall blessings in heavenly things, he hath mercy on whom he will, yea and whom he will he hardeneth also. And though ordinarily all Rom. 9. 18are partakers of his temporall blessings, yet sometimes he puts a great difference even in the communication of them also. Am. 9. 7. I have withheld the raine from you, when there were yet three weekes to the harvest, and caused it to raine upon one Citie, and caused it not to raine upon another Citie; one piece was rained upon, and the piece whereon it rained not, withered. Some dye in their mothers wombe, some hanging at their mothers breasts, some after a long time are consumed with a lingring death: Rom. 9. 13 In 1. disp. 85. & 8…. In opusc. de instit. commut. sect. 2. num 36.neither is Gods love in Scripture phrase enlarged towards any save towards his elect. Thus Iacob was loved, but Esau hated.

Againe, what justice doe you devise in God towards his creature? Both Vasquez and Suarez concurre in this, that the justice of God towards man doth alwaies presuppose his will, and God may binde himselfe as he pleaseth by promise. But Gods will (you say) is not the rule of goodnesse, because the designes thereof are backt with infinite power. Your theame was to prove, that Gods will is not the rule of goodnesse, when you come to prove it, you prove nothing lesse, but onelyonly that the cause why Gods will is not the rule of goodnesse, is not, for that his designes are backt with infinite power. This is not to disprove Gods will to be the rule of goodnesse, but rather to confirme it, for, in saying that this or that is not the cause why Gods will is the rule of goodnesse, you doe imply, that you maintaine, that his will is the rule of goodnesse, though not for this cause. Perhaps you may say, They which maintaine Gods will to be the rule of Gods goodnesse, doe maintaine it upon no other ground then this, to wit, Because his designes are backt with infinite power.

But had it beene so, you might have fallen directly upon the overthrowing of such a foundation, without carrying it in such a manner as if you would beare the world in hand, that your selfe in some sort hold Gods will to bee the rule of goodnesse, whereas you mean nothing lesse; and therefore in carying your discourse after this manner, you betray a faint heart in maintaining the maine. Secondly, I say it is incredible that any should maintaine Gods will to bee the rule of goodnesse, for this cause, because his designes are backt with infinite power, as much as to say, because God can doe what hee will. This reason carieth no colour of truth with it; for there is no reason why amongst men, they that can doe what they will in comparison to other men, should therefore bee honester men then other. But because God hath infinite lawfull power, that extends to every thing that implies no contradiction, hence it followeth, that whatsoever God doth is good; and whatsoever God can doe, if it were done by him, it should justly be done, otherwise hee should have power to be unjust; which power (in this case) should either be in vain, because it is not possible that ever it should be actuated, or if actuated, God should be unjust. Holinesse (you say) doth so rule his power and moderate his will, that the one cannot enjoyne, or the other exact any thing, not most consonant to the eternall or abstract patterns of equitie. You take great liberty of discourse throughout. What I pray, according to our understandings is the subject of Gods holinesse? is it not his will? And how can his holinesse worke upon his will? Doth the heat of fire worke upon the fire? or the cold of water worke upon the water? Againe, here wee have power and will distinguished, and the act of injoyning attributed to the one, and exacting to the other. Both are acts of command: now I pray consider, doth Gods power command? I had thought imperium had beene the proper prerogative of the will, yet both these, by your discourse, are in subjection to the eternall patterns of equity; and equity before you confounded with justice. Now I know no such justice in God, different from his wisedome. And herein I am of the same minde with Aquinas, Quest. 23. De voluntate Dei, Art. 6. where hee disputeth this question, Utrum justitia in rebus creatis ex simplici divina voluntate dependeat. And there hee professeth, that Primum ex quo pendet ratio omnis justitiae est sapientia divini intellectus qua res constituit in debita proportione, & ad se invicem, & ad suam causam. Now let any man name any thing that God can doe, and then let him answer me whether God bee not as well able by the infinitie of his wisedome to doe it wisely, as by the infinity of his power to doe it at all. And marke what in the same place (where he seems most to favour your present Tenet) Aquinas professeth, Quamvis in nobis sit aliud intellectus, & voluntas secundum rem & pro hoc nec idem, est voluntas & rectitudo voluntatis: Deo tamen est idem secundum rein intellectus, & voluntas, & propter hoc est idem rectitudo voluntatis, & ipsa voluntas. Although in us the understanding is one thing, and the will really another thing, whence it is that our will, and the rectitude of our will is not the same, yet seeing that in God, the understanding and the will are really the same, hence it is, that in God his will, and the rectitude of his will are all one. But be it that his will is consonant to the eternall or abstract paternes of equitie, I pray, what more eternall and abstract paterne of equity then this, that it is lawfull for God to make the world, if he will, and not to make it if he will; yea, and to doe what he will, and leave undone what he will. I hope the will of God revealed, doth as sufficiently warrant all our actions, if things are therefore good because God wils them, as in case because they are good therefore God willeth them. Now the former of these is true, without all question, in most things; for whether the world had beene made sooner or later, bigger or lesser, more Angels or lesse, more spheres or lesse, whether they had moved this way they doe, or the contrary way; whether they should have continued longer or shorter time then they shall, all had been received as the good course of Gods providence equally as now it is. But here you passe to a point of a farre different nature; for it is one thing to enquire whether Gods will be the rule of goodnesse in this sense, whether whatsoever God brings to passe in the world, is therefore good because God hath done it, and a farre different thing to demand, whether Gods will be the rule of goodnesse in this sense, that whatsoever God commands us in his word (for so I understand you when you speake of Gods revealed will) it is therefore good because God commandeth it. And I give a manifest reason of this difference, for before the revelation of Gods word, and without that, all men naturally are able to discerne between good and evill, they knew impiety, idolatry, profane swearing, perjury, irreligiousnesse, contempt of government, murder, uncleannesse, gluttony, drunkennesse, theft, oppression, extortion, lying, to be evill, and the contrary to these to be good, by the light of nature, and suggestion of conscience, there being a law of good and evill written in the hearts of all, their conscience bearing witnesse, and their thoughts accusing, or excusing, Rom. 2. 14. 15. And therefore it is false to say, that wee know this or that to be good, because Gods will revealed commends it to be such For undoubtedly, in most points of morality, wee know this to be good, and that to bee evill, without the revealed will of God, and by the very light of nature. Neither doth it follow, that because God willeth nothing but that which is just and good, therefore justice and goodnesse are the objects of his will; first, because wee have heard out of Aquinas, that Gods wisedome is his justice: secondly, it is absurd to say, that justice, goodnesse, or wisedome are the objects of his will. Againe, if the goodnesse of Gods will consists in willing that which is good and just, to wit, in things that are to be done by man, then the rectitude of Gods will shall accrue to him from without, and shall not bee essentiall unto him, like as the rectitude of mans will, which is disproved by Aquinas in the place before alledged. Whereas you say, unlesse this or that had beene good, God had not willed it, this may admit such an interpretation as nothing serves your turne; for the wisedome of God may represent this or that to bee good, that is, such as is sit to be done in the way of congruity, so that if it be done it shall be done congruously, yet not to bee good, so as it ought to be done in the way of necessity. Nay, marke what Bradwardine professeth, suppose the wisedome of God shall represent this to be more congruous to be done then that, yet is not God hereby bound to preferre the doing of that before this. Ratio praeponderans est, qua dictat quod melius esset facere hoc quam illud, vel quod melius est, hoc facere Bradward. lib. 1. cap. 22.quam dimittere, & talis ratio non movet, nec concludit voluntati divinae, nec eam determinat ad agendum. Posset enim Deus facere meliora quam facit & multa bona quae non facit. And concludes Homini tutum est semper ut conformet voluntatem suam rationi praeponderanti. Deus autem non potest sequi per omnia rationem praeponderantem, nisi faceret omnia possibilia, & horum quod libet infinitum, quod contradictionem includit. Sufficit igitur sibi in talibus pro ratione, voluntas, vel saltem ratio congruens & concomitans praelaxata. Yet the will of God is alwaies reasonable: but marke what is the ground of this denomination, according to Aquinas, in 1. Quest. 19. Art. 5. Ad. 1. Voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid, sit Deo causa volendi sed in quantum vult unum esse propter aliud. Yet you would make the world beleeve that you fetch your divinitie from the fountaine, they that thinke otherwise never taste it but in trenches, yet where have you hitherto discovered the fountaine from whence you take it?

3 You proceed to free your tenet from exceptions; but alas, you propose but one exception, and that a poore one, Seeing no thing can be without Gods will, what can be good before God wills it? And your answer is by concession, That goodnesse actually existent in the creature, cannot be without some precedent act of Gods will, as much as to say, this exception is nothing to the purpose: and so you undertake to free your Tenet onelyonly from such exceptions as are nothing to the purpose. Now as touching goodnesse actually existent in God himselfe, doth that depend meerly upon the will of God, or at all upon the will of God? The manifestation of it, or the exercise of it depends meerly upon the will of God, for as much as this is performed onelyonly by outward workes, and God might have chosen whether hee would have made the world, or any part of it, yea, or no. But as for Gods goodnesse, we that tast of divinity but in trenches, acknowledge, that the being thereof is as necessary as the being of God himselfe, and depends not at all upon the liberty of Gods will: There is, you say, a goodnesse objective precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of Gods will. What I pray? Is it any such as bindes God to the willing of any outward thing? take heed what you say, lest you fall into Atheisme by making God a necessary agent, or that he was bound in the way of justice to make the world: whence it followeth, that the world was everlasting. Yet this goodnesse which you make the object of Gods will, savoureth of ditch water rather then of spring water; for it is brought by you, as that which sheweth Gods will, what is to be done. But every novice knowes, it belongs not to goodnesse to give direction, but to wisedome rather: and therefore Aquinas, as I shewed before, makes that whereupon depends the reason of all justice to be the wisedome of Gods understanding. And I grant willingly, that the direction of wisedome in God precedeth the operation of his will in order of nature, according to that of Aug. alledged by Bradw. out of his answer to the 7. question of Orosius. In Deo praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest, ergo prius est rationabiliter sapere, qaam rationabiliter velle. Yet neither the wisedome of God shall determine his will, unlesse it doth so direct, as to shew that this or that ought to be done▪ For if it doth onelyonly direct by shewing what is fit to be done, and of many courses which Gods wisedome can devise sit to be taken, if it be left indifferent to Gods will to choose or refuse what hee list, it is apparent, that though before God choose, it was fit to be done, like as many other courses were also, yet no necessity why God should preferre this before an other: sure I am you have proved no such thing hitherunto, neither out of the fountaine, nor out of the trenches. Intellectus divinus (saith one) singulos modos operandorum possibiles circa creaturas considerat, & omnes voluntati proponit ut libere quem voluerit exequi eligat, Henrie. quodlib. 8. Quest. 1. Aquinas professeth, that whatsoever God is able to doe, that also hee can wisely doe, in 1. Quest. 25. Art. 5. in Corp. Divina sapientia totum posse potentia comprehendit. And again professeth, that the order of things in the government of this world, doth not adequate the wisedome of God; as much as to say, hee could have brought forth a world, and the dispensation of his providence in as wise a manner as hee hath shewed in this: his words are these, Ordo divinae sapientiae rebus inditus in quo ratio Aquin. de voluntate Dei. q. 25. …. 5.justitiae consistit: non adaequat divinam sapientiam. sic, ut divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc ordinem. And he proves it thus, Tota ratio ordinis quem sapiens rebus à se factis imponit à fine sumitur. Quando igitur sinis est proportionatus rebus propter finem factis sapientia facientis limitatur ad aliquem determinatum ordinem. Sed divina bonitas est sinis improportionabiliter excedens res creatas: unde divina sapientia non determinatur ad aliquem ordinem rerum, ita ut non possit alius cursus rerum ess…uere. Scotus in like 1. Dist. 44. …. unica.sort, Nulla lex est recta nisi quatenus à voluntate divina acceptante statuta. And he gives this instance of his assertion, Omnis peccator finalis, damnabitur: quis autem dubitat Deum de potentia absoluta potuisse peccatorem non damnare, sed annihilare? See also what Iohn Gerson saith to the same purpose, Deus non ideo vult res ad extra fieri, quia bonae sunt, quemadmodum movetur humana voluntas, ex objectione boni veri, vel apparentis: Est è contra potius, quod ideo res ad extra bonae sunt, quia Deus vult eas tales esse; adeo quod si vellet eas vel non esse vel aliter esse, id quoque jam bonum esset, propterea benè enuntiavit magnus Ambrosius post Basilium quod voluntas divina naturae primaria lex est. Yet of these you may say that they are but trenches. Although your selfe hath hitherto brought nothing for your assertion, either out of fountaine or trench, save onelyonly out of your owne braine, which may be the fountaine of your invention, and yet inferiour to these trenches. But come we to the fountaine, God is said to worke all things according to the counsell of Eph. 1. 11. Eccles. pol. lib. 1.his owne will. Mr. Hooker passeth his censure upon those Divines that referre all the reason of justice to the will of God. Calvin belike is one of those divines whom hee in his reprehension reacheth at; who in his Institutions hath these words, Adeo summa est justitiae regula Dei voluntas, ut quicquid vult, eo ipso quod vult, justum habendum. Yet Calvin saith not, that in this respect it is just; but onelyonly that in this respect it ought to be received as just. But Mr. Hooker, though he acknowledgeth that there is a law of divine actions, yet he professeth that this law is to be resolved into the will of God, which is somewhat more then Calvin professeth, and as much as Perkins Perk. de praedest. mod. & ord. cric. 2.professeth, when he saith, Nothing is just to God before it be willed by him, hee speakes in respect of things to be done by him, and not of that justice which is called by the Schoolmen, Justitia condecentiae, which dictateth what may conveniently be done. For certainly, if a thing might not conveniently be done, God would never have done it: but he speaks of justitia obligationis, justice that bindes to the doing of it; and maintains, that nothing bindes God to the doing of it, but onelyonly his owne will and determination. And in this sense have I elsewhere justified Mr. Perkins against Arminius. But as for Calvins saying, when hee professeth, that whatsoever God willeth must bee received of us as just, is a most temperate speech. And to what purpose should we trouble our selves to look any further, and to enquire after the reason of it. Whereas we are given to understand, that of the wisedome and knowledge of God there is such a depth as is unsoundable, O the depth of the riches of the wisedome and knowledge of God; how unsearchable Rom. 11. 33are his judgements, and his waies past finding out? But upon the matter, we may easily perceive how little difference there is betweene Mr. Hooker and others, when hee professeth, that though this counsell of Gods will, according whereunto he worketh all things, doth signifie a law of divine actions, yet withall, such a law as is resolved into the will of God. Againe consider, how is it called the counsell of Gods will? not of Gods will giving counsell, for that belongs to the understanding; but of Gods will accepting the counsell proposed; and if many wise courses are proposed (as why should wee conceive that Gods infinite wisedome is limited to the devising of one course) then the will doth freely accept one rather then another. And thus Suarez interpreteth it when ho saith, Non ita operatur Dei voluntas secundum consilium ejus, Suarez. relect. de lib. volunt. divin. disp. 1.ut omnino à consilio determinetur, sed potius (si ita loqui liceat) ut ipsa determinat consilium. In like sort Didacus Alvarez, though of a sect much opposite to the Iesuites, yet concurreth with Suarez in this exposition, Hic ut notavit Glossa, prius ponitur Alvar. de auxil lib. 2. disp. 17.consilium, quod pertinet ad intellectum, deinde additur voluntatis suae, Ubi significat quod intellectus divinus, seuscientia ejus, ut determinatur à voluntata est causa rerum. You that pretend to fetch your divinity from the fountaine, have not brought so much for proofe of your assertion as this place cometh unto; it is enough for you to dictate and say, There is a goodnesse objective, precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of his will. And yet I willingly confesse, it is so farre good, as that Gods wisedome doth represent it as a thing that decently and conveniently may be done; but that of necessity it must be done, and that thus divine wisedome represents it, your selfe is so fat…e from proving this, that you doe not so much as take notice of this distinction. You proceed, and tell us positively, that Unto some things considered as possible, this goodnesse objective is so essentially annexed, that if it be his will to give them actuall being, they must of necessity be actually good, nor can he that can do all things, will their contraries. Never, I thinke, was so vulgar an assertion so much honoured, as to be brought in with such state and pompe. As if any Scholler did make question, whether Ens & bonum convertuntur; or any sober man doubted, whether the works of God must needs be good. Whereas this is utterly beside the question: which is onelyonly this, Whether because God willeth any thing, therefore the doing of it bee just; or rather because it is just therefore God doth it. So that the question is not, Whether any entity produced by God bee good; but rather, Whether the producing of it be therefore good, because God willeth it.

Yet your instance is more extravagant then your assertion, as when you adde, God might, had it pleased him, have taken life and existence from all mankinde, when he preserved Noah and his family. But to reserve them men, and no reasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent. So God did reserve divers beasts at that time also; but to reserve them beasts, and not unreasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent; as much as to say, to reserve reasonable creatures, no reasonable creatures, and to reserve unreasonable creatures no unreasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent. For certainly God cannot make contradictories to be true: as for the same creature to be both reasonable and unreasonable. And call you this the objective goodnesse of a thing possible? or is this your definition of goodnesse, to imply no contradiction. Then let evill be goodnesse, and injustice goodnesse, and darknesse light, Belial an honest man. For certainly not one of these apart doth imply any contradiction. Your exposition of this is as bad as any of the rest. When we say things implying contradiction cannot have any being, wee understand it of things containing divers notions, which notions are contradictory one to another: not that they are contradictory to the nature and essentiall goodnesse of God, as you expound it. For that which is continuall, to consist of points indivisible, we hold to be contradictions: so did Aristotle: as also that a body existent should be infinite; or that motion properly so called should be in an instant. But neither Aristotle, nor any of his Peripatetickes, that I know, did ever maintaine, that the contradiction here spoken of, consisted in this, that the thing stood in contradiction to the nature or essentiall goodnesse of God; more then in contradiction to the nature and essence of an Angell, or to the nature and essence of a man.

I doe not finde any reason why the making of the world should be esteemed more consonant to the nature of God, then the not making of it. And whatsoever God willeth, if he willeth it freely, he might forbeare the willing of it, and that without sinne. I know nothing that God willeth necessarily but himselfe; and it is improper enough to say, that Gods nature is consonant to it selfe. But in what sense a sphere of heaven, or a tree, or any vile creature shall bee said to bee consonant to the nature of God, I am content to be ignorant. I know no purity or holinesse without the will of God, as that must be which is the object of it. In a word, is it created purity and holinesse which is the object of the will of God you speake of, or increated? Increated it cannot be; for the object of that will of God, whereof we speake, is such as God willeth to have existence: but God doth not will increated holinesse to have existence; for that were to will himselfe to have existence, seeing increated holinesse must needs bee God himselfe. But to say that God doth will himselfe to have existence, were to imply, that God as yet hath no existence. If created purity and holinesse be the object of Gods will, you speake of, then God cannot but will some created thing to be, therefore he must necessarily create the world.

A little before you told us, that God could not will ought contradictory to his owne nature and essentiall goodnesse, as in this particular; he cannot will a man to be a man, and yet unreasonable. So then if he will have a man to be, hee must have him to be a reasonable creature: in like sort, if hee will have a beast to be, hee must have him to bee an unreasonable creature.

But what purity and holinesse, or what consonancy to Gods purity and holinesse is to be found in all this, as namely in willing a man to be a reasonable creature, a beast to be a creature unreasonable, seeing now you affirme, that Gods will cannot pitch but upon that which is pure and holy? If I bee not deceived, you are now passing to another point, and doe beginne to apply the termes of your assertion to Gods will of commanding; which makes me remember what the Welsh Tayler said to his boy, in making a garment while the owner stood by: for he cried out, Potherion, potherion, which afterwards by inquiry was found to signifie, Wide stitches, wide stitches. At length you come to the fountaine whence you fetch your Divinity, whilst others tast it but in trenches. And you tell us out of the booke of Wisedome, that For as much as God Wisd. 12. 15.is righteous, he ordereth all things righteously, thinking it not agreeable to his power to condemne him that hath not deserved to be punished. God is righteous in keeping his word; I hope you will not deny it: neither Philo the Iew, nor the author of the booke of Wisedome, doth informe us of any other righteousnesse in God. Sure I am, that both Suarez and Vasquez, other manner of Schollers then Philo ever was, acknowledge no justice in God, in respect of his creatures, but upon supposition of his will. Now God hath promised, that every soule that sinneth, it shall dye, and not that the sonnes Ezek. …teeth shall be set on edge for the sinnes of the father. And yet I appeale to your owne judgement, whether thus to carrie himselfe be to doe that which is agreeable to his power, or rather that which is agreeable to his righteousnesse. God, you say, loveth truth & sincere dealing, because he himselfe is true & just. Yet when the devill testified of the Apostles saying, These are the servants of the most high God, which shew unto us the waies of everlasting life, though it were a truth which they uttered, yet the comming of it out of such a ones mouth, I thinke was as little liked by God himselfe, as by his Apostle. Amongst the actions of heathen men, truth was found, as well as other vertuous conversation; yet of their best actions Austin was bold to professe, that they were no better then splendida peccata. Aug. cont. Iulian. Pelag. l. 4. c. …And he gives this rule for the discerning of true goodnesse, Noveris non ossiciis, sed sinibus discernendas esse virtutes. And as one blemish of their best actions was this, that they were not performed in reference to his glory; so another very suitable hereunto I take to be this, that they were not performed in obedience to his will. For the horrible sinne of the Iewes in offering their sonnes and daughters unto Moloch, is amplified thus in holy Scripture, Things that never entred into Ier. 7. 38.my heart to command them. And why should God regard that which is not performed in obedience to his will? Many things may be done, and are done by strangers living in farre Countries, agreeable to the lawes of this Kingdome; but wee ken them no thankes for this, because they do it not in obedience to the lawes in this kingdome. There is no likenesse between the goodnesse of God, and the morall goodnesse of the creature. For looke what goodnesse is in God, the same is in him necessarily; it is not so in man.

As for justice, I have often shewed the consent of Suarez and Vasquez, and that opposed by none that I know, that justice in God in respect of the creature, doth alwayes presuppose the will of God. Then as touching the truth of God, it is well knowne that God is a spirit, and hath no tongue to bee the interpeter of his minde, as he hath given unto man; onelyonly he hath taken up the hearts and tongues of his Prophets and Apostles, to deliver his oracles unto his people. And though God is not bound to reveale himselfe unto any; yet if it be his pleasure to reveale himselfe, he is not capable of any such inducement, to deliver an untruth, as man is: man may advantage himselfe by untruth, when by other meanes hee cannot: it is not so with God, who needs not untruth. thereby to advantage himselfe. But whereas you say that Gods veracity is coeternall to his essence, in my judgement it is a very wilde phrase. For veracity hath no place where speech is not; and seeing that God speakes not but by his Ministers, it followeth that before the world was, he never spake at all; and seeing he could have forborne the making of the world, hee might have never spoken at all; so farre off from truth is it, that veracity, which supposeth speech, is coeternall to his essence. For if speech be not coeternall to his essence, how can truth of speech, or truth in speech be coeternall to his essence? Yet veracity taken fundamentally as a disposition in God to deliver truth whensoever he is pleased to cause speech, or to speake by his Ministers, so it is all one with the nature of God, and no marvell if in this sense it bee coeternall to his essence. Intemperancy, and consequently the opposite vertue of temperance and chastity is found onelyonly in bodies, not in spirits; and as it is no commendation to the nature of an Angell to bee chaste, so neither is it to the nature of God.

You say, God could not give a law for the authorizing of promiscuous or preposterous lust. Yet it is manifest, that promiscuous lust in bruit beasts, in all sorts, hath its course, without any transgression, and it being a course of nature in them, it cannot bee denied to bee a worke of God. And Suarez, though hee takes upon him to maintaine a tenet like unto Suarez de legib. l. 2. cap. 15.yours, namely, that God cannot dispense as touching his morall law; yet he professeth that God may make it lawfull for one man to have many wives. And I pray you, why may hee not as well make it lawfull for one woman to have many husbands, and what then I pray you will this want of promiscuous and preposterous lust? It may be plurality of husbands to one wife, may bring a greater inconvenience in the course of nature, as touching the corrupting of conceptions, and hindring the course of generation, then plurality of wives; but how in morality it should be more intolerable then the other, I know not. And withall we reade of Massalina, that notwithstanding all her luxurious courses this way, yet not onelyonly brought forth children, but also those like unto her husband also; and being demanded how that came to passe, made this answer, Non nisi pl…na nave vectorem fero. For the brother and sister to know one another carnally, we count it incest; yet unlesse Adams sonnes had maried with their sisters, it was impossible there should have beene any propagation of mankinde. And in like sort Abraham is supposed to have beene the Vncle of Sarah; and doe you thinke that holy Patriaroh would have continued in so sinfull a course after his calling, had it beene such that God could not any way have made it lawfull?

You proceed and tell us, That to legitimate violence, or entitle oppression unto the inheritance bequeathed to conscionable and upright dealing, is without the prerogative of Omnipotencie; and in stead of giving a reason of your opinion, you expresse it in … double phrase, as if you would make up in figures, what is wanting in argument; and say, It cannot be ratisied by any Parliament of the Trinity; and indeed I read in Virgil of a Parliament sometimes called in heaven by Iupiter: but I doubt you are of Ovids fault, who as Seneca writes knew not when it was well. But you overdoe onelyonly in words, and underdoe in argument: and as if you had not phrasified enough, you further tell us, that The practice or countenancing of these and the like, are evill not in us onelyonly, to whom they are forbidden, but so evill in themselves, that the Almighty could not but forbid and condemn them, as profest enemies to his most sacred Majestie. Thus to phrasifie with you, is to fetch Divinity from the fountaine, and not from the trenches; though you bring neither evidence of Scripture, nor evidence of reason to justifie it. That which you doe bring such as it is, is rather from reason then from Scripture. And if it be so manifest in reason, as you seeme to signifie, the lesse need I should thinke there was of forbiddng it: yet you say God could not but forbid it. And where I pray must he forbid it, and by what law? Is it by the law revealed in his word, or by the law of nature? As for the law revealed in his word, that was communicated onelyonly to the Iewes; and why God was necessitated to forbid it to one small nation, and not to another, I can devise no reason. The law of nature I confesse is generall, forbidding such things as are knowne to be evill by the light of nature; but doth it teach that God cannot legitimate any such actions? Iephte thought otherwise, as appeares by the message hee sent to the King of Ammon, Wilt thou not possesse that which Chemish thy god giveth Iudg. 11. 24thee to possesse? So whomsoever the Lord our. God shall drive out from before us, them will we possesse. And it is observable, that whereas in other particulars you have derived the absolute unlawfulnesse of such actions, from the incongruitie of them to the nature of God; as namely, because he is true, therefore he hateth falshood; because pure, therefore he hateth lust, (wheras to touch one thing more by the way that was omitted, it is well knowne that God is as pure from lawfull lust, as from lust unlawfull) here in this place you make no mention at all of any condition in God, whereunto the practice of violence should bee incongruous, but in place of reason, which you bring not so much as in shew, you make us amends with variety of phrases. Yet what more violent act, then for the father to cut the throat of his most innocent childe? and you well know, God sent Abraham that holy Patriarch in such an Gen. 22. Heb. 11.errand as this. Samsons faith is commended by S. Paul; his first rising against the Philistins, was as the subject rising against their Princes, as the men of Iudah signified unto him, saying, Knowest thou not that the Philistins are rulers over us? and thereupon Iudg. 15. 11.they were content to deliver him into their hands, to manifest themselves to be no confederates with him in this insurrection. Afterwards we reade how he died flaming with desire of revenge upon the Philistins, and that for his two eyes; Iudg. 16.and to the end he might be revenged on them, was content to be his owne assassinate; and all this in an holy manner performed, commending himselfe by solemne prayer unto God. For he called unto the Lord, and said, O Lord God remember V. 2….me, I pray thee, and strengthen me I pray thee onelyonly this once; O God, that I may bee at once revenged of the Philistins for my two eyes; and thereupon taking hold of the two pillars of the house, he bowed himselfe, and said, Let me die with the Philistins; V. 30.and the house fell upon the Lords, and upon all the people that were within: so the dead which he slew at his death, were more then they which he slew in his life. What a strange zeale possessed Phinees, when he ran his javelin thorow Zimri and Cosbi, Numb. 25. 8.thus perishing in their incestuous act, and thus hee as it were sending their soules to hel, as well as their bodies to the grave. Yet God approves of it, and seales hereupon unto him the covenant V. 12, 13.of the Priesthood. The children of Israel expell the Canaanites, and destroy them without all mercy, having nothing to justifie them in these violent courses, but onelyonly the commandement of God. The Israelites are said to have robbed Exod. 3. 21, 22.the Egyptians, in borrowing that which they never meant to restore, and the Lord animates them hereunto, and foretels unto Moses that he would cause them to march out of the land laden with the riches of Egypt; and a great part of this was afterwards consecrated to the service of the Tabernacle.

4. In the next place you tell us after your manner positively, that the infinite goodnesse of Gods Majestie cannot wrest his most holy will from strict observance of such rules of righteousnesse as he sets us to follow; and this dogmaticall assertion of yours is ushered in with a great deale of state, by a comparison forsooth of the contrary disposition of great men, for whom, to set paternes of the morality which they require in others, is reputed a kinde of pedantisme or mechanicall servitude; and why mechanicall? forsooth because it is like the setting of us copies, or songs, or teaching us some honest trade. Yet I can hardly beleeve but that Sardanapalus or Heliogabalus both did thinke it better becomming the Majesty of a Prince to give examples of honest conversation, then to play the Scrivener or the Shomaker. Instruction in morality, or in liberall Arts, may in some things have resemblance to mechanicall instructions; but is any man so sottish as thereupon to conceive such morall and liberall instruction to be mechanicall? An Ape may bee like unto a man, Simia quam similis turpissima bestia nobis, yet no foole conceives him to be a man. Neither doe I see any cause to wonder, that they who are willing to give lawes to others, are loath to have any lawes given to curbe them. Well, though the garments of morality be too strait for great ones, yet they are not too strait for God; he can bee content to put them on, to weare them, and they become him so well, that the infinite greatnesse of his Majestie cannot wrest his most holy will from strict observance of such rules of righteousnesse as he sets us to follow. As I remember in Cyri paedia there is conceived such a good lesson becomming Princes, namely, themselves to observe those lawes which they make for their people. This law you have such a transcendent conceit of, and of the goodnesse of it, that you thinke fit to establsh it in the Common-wealth of the Trinity. God (say you) cannot wrest his will. Consider, I pray, whether this be a sober speech. The corruptest man that lives, the devill himselfe cannot wrest his will. First because the will cannot be wrested: lawes may be wrested by violent interpretations; mens goods may bee wrested from them by violent courses, but I never read nor heard that any mans will may be wrested. For it is a received rule, that, Voluntas non potest cogi. Secondly, because a man cannot wrest anything that he undertakes to wrest, but by his will. Now in what congruitie can the will of any be said to wrest it selfe? But take we your meaning, that God doth strictly observe the rules of righteousnesse, which he sets us to follow. Now the rules he setteth us to follow, ate partly such as are conteined in the first table, and partly such as are conteined in the second. In the first wee are commanded to love him, to feare him, to put our trust in him. Are these the rules that God himselfe doth so strictly observe? doth he feare himselfe? doth he put his trust or confidence in himselfe? In the second we are commanded to worship him according to his word; hath God a care to worship himselfe according to his word? God sometimes doth sweare by himselfe, and I hold it impossible that God should doe any thing in vaine, much more that he should take his owne name in vaine.

But as for the sanctifying of the Sabbath, whereunto wee are bound, I cannot well conceive, how that day, and the sanctification thereof should be observed by God; unlesse you are of the Iewes opinion, who thinke that God spends some part of the day in reading their Talmud, and some part in lamenting Ierusalem, and the desolation thereof; and the other part of the day he spends in playing with Leviathan; and you desire to translate these celestiall devotions to the Sabbath. We are bid to honour our father and mother, God hath none to honour. Wee are forbid to kil any man, yet God did bid Abraham to sacrifice his sonne, and allowed Phinees in slaying Zimri and Cosbi, and exposed his owne innocent Sonne to be crucified, and gives us power over inferiour creatures, as Lords of life and death. God made Adam after his owne image and likenesse; Adams integrity was the image of his holinesse; but when man by his fall lost this his holinesse, take heed you avouch not, that hereby he lost the image of God.

Our holinesse consisteth in seeking the glory of God; and no creature can be so zealous of Gods glory as God is of his owne. But how to expresse our zeale of Gods glory better, then by obedience unto his will, I willingly professe I know not. As likewise what you meane by those ever living examples of goodnesse, which, as you say, God expresseth in his works; vnlesse it bee in making his sunne to shine, and his raine to fall both upon good and bad. For unto this is the last precept which Matt. 5. 45you mentioned, referred by our Saviour. And yet I doubt not (nor you neither) that God hath contrary waies and courses, as namely, in making us to discerne betweene the righteous and the wicked, betweene him that serveth God, and him that serveth Mal. 3. 18.him not; and that in respect of demonstration of merciemercy to the one, and execution of judgement on the other: Behold, my servant shall eate, and ye shall be hungry; behold, my servants Esa. 65. 13.shall drinke, and yee shall be thirstie: behold, my servants shall rejoyce, and ye shall be ashamed: Behold, my servants shall sing for joy of heart; but yee shall cry for sorrow of heart, and house for vexation of spirit. Yea, and in making one piece rained upon sometimes, and not another: yet I nothing doubt, but you Amos 4. 7.will acknowledge God to bee as holy in these waies as in any other; yea, in causing two Beares to come out of the wood, 2 Kings 2. 24upon Elisha his cursing in the name of the Lord, and teare fourty two children. Yea, in revenging Achans sacriledge, Ios. 7.not onelyonly with his owne death, but with his childrens also; and in destroying suckling children, and children in the wombe, both in the generall deluge, and in the conflagration of Sodome: and when for the sinne of Saul, hee caused seven of his sonnes to bee delivered into the hands of the Gibeonites, 2 Sam. 21. 8. 9.to bee put to death: for, God is righteous in all his waies, and holy in all his workes. And the equity of Gods courses, Psal, 145. 17.though sometimès discernable by man, as in the case you put out of Ezechiel 18. 25. yet not alwaies so, but that wee are driven sometimes to cry out with the Apostles, Oh the Rom. 11. 33.depth of the riches of the wisedome and knowledge of God, how unsearchable are his judgements, and his waies past finding out?

5 I confesse, that if to dictate like a positive Theologue be to instruct us, you have thus farre instructed us, That those paternes of holinesse or perfection, which we are bound to imitate in him, are not to be taken from his bare commandement, or revelation of his will, but from the objects of his will revealed, or from the eternall practises which he hath exhibited, as so many expresse and manifest proofes that his will is alwayes holy and just. The paterns of holinesse which wee are bound to imitate, are not to be taken (you say) from Gods bare commandement: I finde what you say, but I had rather finde what you prove. When our Saviour exhorteth us to be holy as God is holy, and perfect as God is perfect, he speaketh it with a particular reference to a particular course in Gods providence, taking thereby not an obligation to imitate him, but onelyonly an inducement to bee so much the more forward in doing that which God commands us in loving our enemies. And unlesse wee have a commandement from God for the rule of our obedience, it is nothing safe to imitate God. For what? shall Magistrates spare malefactors, because God spareth them a long time? Or because God causeth the children to be put to death sometime for the sinne of the father, shall we do so too? Or because God makes his sunne to shine as well upon one as upon another, shall we therefore put no difference betweene such as are of the houshold of faith, and others? Wee may not imitate Elisha in cursing little children that mocked him; nor the zeale of Phinees in killing Zimri and Cosbi in their lust; much lesse must wee alwaies imitate God, who hath greater power over mens lives then Elisha, or Phinees had. Yet why you should call the workes of God in the course of his providence eternall practises, I know no reason, or coulour of reason. It may be that in stead of eternall, it should be externall practises. God no doubt is holy in all his waies and workes, but herehence it followeth not, that wee must imitate him in all his courses, but rather wee must have an eye to his commandements. And what, I pray are those perfections whereof our generall duties are the imperfect representations? Our generall duties are such as these, We must not deale unjustly with any; we must deale justly with all, or wee must be holy; Holinesse becomes thine Psal. 93. 5….house for ever: and in the Priests forehead was wont to bee written, Holinesse unto the Lord. Now, are these the perfections, Ex. 28. 35.wherein God, as you say, is holy and just? Then tis as if you should say, God is eminently and apparantly holy in the perfection which is called his holinesse. God is eminently and apparantly just, in that perfection which is called his justice. Of all his morall commandements, not one there is, you say, whose sincere practise doth not in part make us truely like him: and we are bound to be conformable to his will revealed, that we may bee conformable to his nature, without conformity whereunto, wee cannot participate of his happinesse, for happinesse is the immediate consequent of his nature. You proceede to cut out work for your Readers, as many as are willing to Try the spirits, and not hand over head to receive all for gold that glisters. That the practise of Gods commandements maketh us like him, is a plausible speech. And it is true in the generall: for as God is wise and holy, so our obedience to his commandements, is that which mades us wise and holy. And as God doth nothing but that which very well becomes him; so in obeying the will of God, wee shall doe nothing but that which very well becomes us. But as for particular duties, there is little or no correspondency betweene the carriage of superiours and inferiours. Wee have a God to worship by reverence and feare, and by praying unto him; these are moralities no way incident unto God.

Wee have parents both naturall and spirituall, and masters and magistrates whom we must honour; God hath none such to honour. Wee by our authoritie may not take away the life of any, be he never so great an offendor; God may take away the life of any, bee hee never so innocent, without any blemish to his holines. Matrimoniall chastitie is a vertue commendable in a Christian; but this vertue is of so base a condition, that the divine nature is not capable of it, as who hath no lusts at all to order; like as on the contrary, the very Devills themselves, being Spirits, are no way obnoxious to unchristitie. The like may bee said of temperance, and intemperancie in the use or abuse of Gods creatures through gluttony and drunkennes. Tis theft for us to take any mans goods from him against his will; it is not so with God, who can send any man as naked out of the world, as hee brought him into the world, without any prejudice to the repuration of his justice. And seeing he is not capable of any manner of concupiscence, either of the eye or of the flesh, (for hee is a Spirit, Ioh. 4. 24.and not a body or flesh) nor in the way of pride of life: the contrary conditions cannot be in the way of any commendable vertues attributed unto God. In a word, all the goodnesse that is in God, is essentiall unto him; our goodnesse, whatsoever we be, is but accidentall unto us: and therefore, 1 Pet. 1. 16 Matt. 5. 48when we are exhorted to be holy as he is holy, and perfect as God is perfect, it tends onelyonly to this, even to set before us certaine actions of God, as patternes and precedents to imitate him therein; and that onelyonly so far forth as they are suitable and congruous inducements to the performing of Gods commandements, not to affect any conformity of nature with the deitie. For what conformity can there be betweene the nature of a creature, and the nature of his Creator? But Saint Peter telleth us, we are made pertakers foreign. 2 Pet. 1. 4.I have observed some to have rendred this passage thus, We are made partakers of a godly nature; and the godlinesse of our nature undoubtedly consists in obeying the will of God; according to that of the Apostle, This is the will of God, even your sanctification. And what godlinesse can be greater, 1 Thes. 4. 6then for a man to obey the will of his Creator; and that is the will of Gods commandement, though it may fall out to be contrary to Gods purpose. For wee are bound to pray for the life of our parents and princes, though it maybe, God will not have either the one or the other to live. And God commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, he arose early about this businesse, though it appeared afterwards, that Gods purpose was, Isaac should not be sacrificed. But let it be that we are partakers of the divine nature: in this sense I nothing doubt but that it proceedeth in respect of the holy Spirit, wherewith God hath endued us, and which he hath given us Rom. 5. 5 Rom. 8. 11 1 Ioh. 4. 13to dwell in us; and whereby God the Father, and God the Sonne are said to dwell in us. But let us proceed inwashing away this painting, which makes errour appeare with a face of truth. We are bound by the law of God, to forgive our enemies, and to pray for them even to the last, as our Saviour did, and Steven did. But is God bound to forgive his enemies, and that alwaies, as we are? we know he may, and doth sometimes forbeare long (according to the pleasure of his will) but, If once he whet his glittering sword, and his hand take Deut. 32. 41hold of judgement, he will execute vengeance on his enemies, and make his arrows drunke with bloud. Againe, Magistrates must not suffer a witch to live, being once discovered: God knows Exod. 22. 18them when man doth not, yet suffers them to live as long as he thinkes good, and sometimes very long. Wee are bound to have mercy on all according to our power; God hath mercy Rom. 9. 18on whom he will, and hardeneth whom he will. Lastly, wee may not suffer any man to sinne, if it lie in our power to hinder it. But God suffereth all manner of all abominations to be committed before his eies, and in all these hee carrieth himselfe without blemish to his holinesse. Nos cer…è (saith Austine) Aug. cont. Iulian. Pelag. lib 5. cap. 4si cos in quos nobis potestas est, ante oculos nostros perpetrare scelera permittemus, rei tum ipsis erimus: Quam verò innumerabilia ille permittit sieri ante oculos suos, quae utique si voluisset, nullaratione permitteret; & tamen justus, & bonus est, & quod praebendo patientiam dat locum paenitentiae nolens aliquem perire. That wee are bound to conforme to Gods revealed will, the Scripture teacheth us; Secret things belong to the Lord our God, but the Deut. 29. 29things revealed are for us and our children to doe them. But that therefore we must be conformable to his will, that wee may be conformable to his nature the Scripture teacheth not: and therefore give us leave to take this superfoetation of yours to be but a revelation of flesh and bloud. In the book of Iudges Iudg. 13. 17wee read that Manoah enquired after the name of the Angell Iunius & Pis at. in Iudic. 13 Iudg. 13. 18 1 King. 8. 12.that appeared unto him; whom good Divines, upon pregnant circumstances, doe collect to have beene the Lord: but he answereth, Why askest thou after my name which is secret? God verily dwelleth in the darke cloud: and though sometimes againe it is said, that he dwelleth in the light, yet forth with it 1 Tim. 6. 16is added, that this is such a light that no man can approach unto. As groundlesse is your following dictate, that, without conformitie to his nature, we cannot participate of his holinesse, it being the imodiate consequent of his nature. And what, I pray, will you make gods of us? or shall our glorification in the kingdome of heaven be a deification? as it must be if it be a participation of the divine happinesse. But this is an usuall libertie of discourse which you take to your selfe. I hope you will not say, that formall glory which God hath provided for us, shall be a glory increated, though in the way of an efficient cause it shall proceede from the increated glory of God, but created rather.

And all created glory, I hope, bee it never so great, is no part of Gods happinesse, which is, you say, an immediate consequent unto his nature; wherin notwithstanding I doubt much, you speake as Peter sometimes did, when he spake he knew not what; as namely, in distinguishing Gods happines from his nature, as an immediate consequent thereof. You doubt of Lactantius his consequence, as neither certaine, nor authentique; as if it might be authentique, though not certaine in your opinion. Yet you embrace the same consequence applied to another matter that serves your turne, and you swallow it with great facility, it never stickes by the way like a Burre in your throat, as if consequences were but ceremonies, and you the master of them. But you put a difference; Lactantius his inference is sometimes doubtfull, you say; but out of all question, yours (if we may take your word) is not. But you take too great liberty to your selfe, to put things at your pleasure out of question. We should have a mad Church and a mad world, if you had power to put out of question what you list. But let us consider your inference, God doth bid us unfainedly blesse our persecuoors, therefore he doth unfainedly tender his blessings to such as persecute him in his members. This then belike is that conformity to Gods nature which we must aspire unto. But by your leave I finde no conformity herein. Matt. 5. 44For first, wee are bid to blesse our persecutors, not to tender our blessings unto them upon condition they will admit them; but you doe not say, God doth blesse his persecutors; you onelyonly say, hee doth tender his blessings unto them. Againe, God biddeth us blesse them that persecute us: you doe not say, that God doth blesse, or tender his blessings to them that persecute him, but to them that persecute others, to wit, his members. Thirdly, and chiefly, God bids us to blesse all our persecutors.; for hee exhorts us to be mercifull unto all, as you confesse in the next words; but you dare not say, that God doth blesse, or tender his blessings unto all; but here you lispe, and speake indefinitely, saying, God doth tender his blessings to them that persecute him in his members; and that, Hee she weth kindnesse to them that are most unkinde. Indeed, he doth so to some, but not unto all, but unto whom he will: for so himselfe professeth unto Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have Exod. 33. 19.compassion. And I pray consider, what blessing hath God tendred Rom. 5. 15unto the Angels since their fall? So that albeit Gods charitie towards some infinitely exceeds the charity of man, yet mans duety is to be charitable towards all; Gods duety is not to be charitable to any, but hee loves whom hee will, and hates whom he will, and that before they are borne, as he loved Iacob and hated Esau. Gods fidelity must needs be greater then mans, as being backt with power to performe that he promiseth, the creature is not: nay, all the power and readinesse that the creature hath to performe fidelity towards God, proceeds meerely from the grace of God.

But to compare the chastitie of Virgins with Gods purity, is most absurd; neither is there any correspondency in the parts of this comparison, and of the comparison following, as betwixt the drosse and corpulency on the one side, and the sublimated spirits of the same body on the other side: for both the drosse and spirits you speake of are corporeall: no such proportions betweene the chastitie of Virgins, and the purity of God. The children of God, though in a married estate, yet are they Virgins in the sight of God.

As for Virginity corporall, it hath beene found in Heathens, and is wondrous base metall to be compared to the spirituall purity of God, in spight of all preferment you give to the one above the other. That rule, Doe unto every man as we would be done unto, must be rightly applied, otherwise it will be farre from equity. For it becomes not a Magistrate to spare a malefactor, because if himselfe were in the like case of danger and desert, he would be glad to be spared. We must doe that unto others, which in the way of justice, or equity, or charity, we would have done unto our selves.

As for that, Him that honoureth me, I will honour, it is meerly 1 Sam. 2. 3…dependent upon the will of God. For all confesse, that God can annihilate the holiest creature that is, secluding his ordinance to the contrary, and in this case should be nothing guiltie of iniquitie.

At length you come to the point, and demand, Whether God doth intend thus well to all? but because the nearer you come to the light, by a true stating of the question, the more your deviations from the truth are like to be discovered, therefore you forthwith obscure it. For whereas the conformity you spake of before, requires, that as we are bid to be mercifull unto all, so should God be mercifull unto all likewise. And so the question, to come to an issue, should be this, Whether God intends thus well to all, or no? You decline this; and wheras the proper place of Gods libertie and cariage of himselfe according to the meere good pleasure of his will, is not in designing destruction or salvation unto whom he will, (for the case is cleare, that God doth not determine, that destruction or salvation shall befall any, but according unto congruous dispositions preceding, at least in persons of ripe yeares,) but onelyonly in the dispensation of his grace and mercy, shewing it towards whom he will, and denying it to whom he will; you againe decline this state of the question, and propose it onelyonly of Gods wishing well to all, or destruction unto some.

Nor doe you content your selfe with this, but as fearing left this state of the question be not safe enough to keepe your shinnes whole, you propose it in a most wilde manner, Whether God doth intend thus well to all, or destruction to some, as it is a meanes of blisse to those whom he loves. You have courage enough to dictate positively, but you manifest a very faint hart when you come to be put to the proofe. What meant you to complicate so many questions into one? By your tenet God may intend thus well to all as you have spoken, to wit, in intending his blessings, albeit he did will destruction unto some, to wit, for the contempt or refusall of his grace offered. And a great deale of difference there is betweene these two questions, Whether God intends destruction unto any; and Whether hee intends a mans destruction after this or that manner; as namely, Whether he intends it as a meanes of blisse to those whom he loves; and yet on this latter onelyonly you insist. And indeed you might well despaire of getting any credit upon the former points: the case is so cleare, that God in the dispensation of his grace doth not cary himselfe indifferently towards all, but hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. As also that in his sentences of condemnation or salvation he carrieth himselfe in due reference unto their former disobedience or obedience, and so accordingly did from everlasting purpose to carry himselfe.

But consider we the third point, the onelyonly field wherein you have an edge to shew your strength. And first I demand, Who ever said that God did intend the destruction of any as it is a meanes of blisse to them whom he loves? Wee usually professe that God intends to damne no men but for their sins, and that to this end, even to the manifestation of his glory in the way of justice towards them; but withall we say, that God doth intend also, by the consideration of this their destruction, to illustrate his grace so much the more towards the vessels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory. For when they shall consider not onelyonly their owne salvation, but also the damnation of others, and that God might have made them also vessels of wrath as well as others; how can it be but that their joy should be the greater upon this? and if it be so, God must needs have intended it. And this not onelyonly our Divines Rom. 9. 23 Alvar. de auxil. disp. III.have observed out of the Apostle Saint Paul, but even Pontifician Divines also, as Didacus Alvarez, and Alphonsus Mendosa. Mendos. disp. 1.Now let us consider the force of your arietation against this. If so he did, say you, we might be exempt from that negative precept, of not doing evill that good might ensue. We deny this consequence, and as for your reason, it seemes to be this, We may and must imitate our heavenly Father; and therefore seeing he doth evill that good may come thereof, so may wee doe too. To this I answer, 1. First, that the consequence is nothing true. For God intending the destruction of any, doth not therein doe any evill, no nor intend any evill. For God doth intend onelyonly the destruction of impenitent sinners. But to intend the destruction of impenitent sinners, I hope you will not dare to say that this is evill. Thus may every one see how wide you rove from the marke in your inconsequent consequences. 2. Secondly I answer, it is not lawfull for us to imitate God in all things, as before I have shewed, and gave instance in divers particulars. Now I will adde one more. If we repent, God not onelyonly spares us, but forgives us; If wee acknowledge our sinnes, he is faithfull and just to forgive us our sins. 1 Ioh. 1. ….But Magistrates, when a malefactor is arraigned and convicted, and condemned of some capitall crime, though he doth repent, yet may not they spare him. That wherein our Saviour exhorts us to imitate our heavenly Father, and to be perfect as he is perfect, is in a particular case, namely, in loving not Matth. 5. last.onelyonly our friends, but our enemies. For so God not onelyonly loveth his children and his friends, but his enemies also, as appeares in the pardoning of their sins, and changing of their hearts, as many as belong to his election. And it is false to say, that this is the onelyonly reason why wee must love our enemies, and not our friends onelyonly: for the commandement of God is another reason, and a more chiefe reason; and we may not take inducements from Gods actions to encourage us in the doing of any thing, unlesse in such cases, as when the actions whereabouts we set our selves, are agreeable to the law of God. God determined the crucifying of Christ, but neither Act. 4. 28.Iudas, nor the high Priests, nor Pilate, nor the people of Israel were the more free from sinne for this, while they determined to bring him to his crosse. God turnes not onelyonly 2 Cor. 11. 19.the evils of some to the good of others, but a mans owne sins also to his owne good, according to that of Austin, Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum, manifestumque cadere peccatum.De Civit. Dei l. 14. c. 13.

6. I wonder what glory of God doth appeare in the punishment of the reprobate: not the glory of his mercy certainly; nor say I the glory of his justice. For vindicative justice, whereof this is spoken, hath onelyonly place in reference unto sinners. It is absurd to say, that Gods dealings throughout are to be imitated by us; and you have no ground for this but the saying of our Saviour, Matth. 5. 48. which is applyed to a speciall case. And will it follow, that because wee must imitate Gods actions in a speciall case, therefore we must imitate his dealings generally? To intend evill to some, before they have committed sinne, admits a double interpretation; either this, to intend that evill shall befall some; in which sense it is manifest, that God doth intend the evill of punishment to befall none before they have sinned. Or thus, the very intention of evill unto some is not untill sinne bee committed; in which sense it is notoriously untrue. For sinne is not committed but in time; but Gods intentions are everlasting. Of intending the destruction of any as meanes of others good, I have already spoken that which is sufficient. Why should your tautologies draw me to the like absurdity? The last clause is new, and therefore we will consider it. If God did absolutely ordaine some to eternall inevitable misery, for the advancement of his owne glory; we should not sinne, but rather imitate the perfection of our heavenly Father, in robbing Iudas to pay Paul, &c. Ridetur chorda qui semper oberrat eadem. This argument was in the close of the former section proposed, and the inconsequence thereof discovered. The consequence is this, God did ordaine to punish some, therefore we may rob them; God did ordaine this to the advancement of his glory; therefore we may rob, to pay our debts, No proportion is to bee found in any part of this comparison. For if God take away the life of any man, will it follow that therefore we may doe soe also? It is well known …od may doe such a thing without all respect to sinne; but it is not in our lawfull power to doe so, though with respect unto their sinne. And what a senslesse collection is this, that because God may doe this or that to advance his glory, therefore we may doe the like thing for our profit and advantage? We say, God intends to punish no reprobate, but for his sinne; yet I hope you will not say, it is in any private mans power to robbe or take any mans goods from him, by reason of his sinne.

Wee are beholden to you for your counsell in the next place, when you teach us to guesse at the perfection of Gods Iustice towards the wicked, and of his bounty towards the godly, by the commendable shadow or imitation of it in earthly gods. A proper course to search out the goodnesse and justice of God, in the courses of heathen men. Yet it is a rule of State, Better a mischiefe then an inconvenience. And by warres is procured peace, but is it without intention of harme to any? Can warres bee managed without harme? even as well as the Fryar could bee satisfied with a goose livor, and a pigges head, albeit nothing for him were dead. And in making Sodom and Gomorrah Iude 7.examples of his judgements, did he not intend our good? and was this without intention of harme to any? And though they of ripe years amongst them had committed abomination, Ezech. 16. 50.and God tooke them away as hee thought good; yet what I pray became of infants, some in their mothers wombe, some hanging at their mothers breasts? And will you challenge God for injustice in this, because we doe not finde the like course in the commendable shadow or imitation of Gods justice in earthly gods, as you are pleased to phrasifie it? In distribution of rewards upon the obedient, and execution of punishment upon the disobedient, God failes not, as he will manifest at the day of judgement. And as he executes, so he intends to execute, and no otherwise. But God hath a peculiar power, no shadow whereof appeareth in man or Angell; and that is, of giving grace, of giving repentance: and this he distributes to whom Rom. 9. 18he will, and denies to whom he will. You are content to leape over this; and no marvell; for the grossenesse of your opinion would bee too clearly manifested to the world, if you should deale on this. Yet God, you say, drawes men to repentance by gracious promises of inestimable reward. And where I pray are these herbes of grace known to grow, is it any where but in Gods word? And was Gods word afforded to all in the daies of the Old Testament? or is it so in the daies of the New? And where he doth afford his word, is this all the mercy he shewes, namely, to perswade men to repent? or is this to give them repentance? And doth not Gods word manifestly Act. 5▪ 31. Act. 11. 18 2 Tim. 2.teach, that repentance is the gift of God? Againe, doe we maintaine that God damnes any but impenitent sinners? Tis true, we say, if all the world should beleeve and repent, all the world should be saved, notwitstanding all their sinnes, and not Cain onelyonly. What more severe punishment then damnation? and what precedent loving instructions or good encouragements to doe well, were afforded by God to all those infants, who perish in that sinne which they drew from the loynes of their parents? And will you challenge God of unnaturalnesse for this? or will you deny that any infants perish in originall sinne, as Pelagius did? And what loving instructions doth God minister to those Heathen, who doe not so much as know God, nor ever were acquainted with his word 1 Thess. 4. 6.and Gospell?