Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 2 · Chapter 9
CHAP. IX.
Of Divine Immutability.
IN the first place you tell us that some Schoolemen mould immutability in the same conceit with eternity, and that others make that the off-spring of this; but you conceale your Authors. I see no reason for either, but manifest reason I have against the first. For if the conceit of eternity were one and the same with the conceit of immutability, then no man could conceive a thing to bee eternall, but forthwith he must conceive it to be immutable. But this is most untrue. For Aristotle conceived the heavens and elements to be eternall both waies, without beginning, and without end; yet did not conceive them to be immutable, for as much as hee acknowledged them to be all under motion; and the elements also, as touching their parts subject to corruption. Plato though he maintained the world to have had a beginning, yet hee acknowledged it to be eternall one way, that is, without end, yet did not conceive it to be immutable. The first matter was generally held to be eternall both wayes, yet none maintained it to be immutable. And no marvell. For mutation comprehends all kinde of motion, and consequently immutability excludes all possibility of motion, but eternity signifieth only continuance for ever.
Now like as continuance for seven yeares, or an hundred yeares, &c. doth not require that the same thing should bee without all change for seven yeares or an hundred yeares, &c. much lesse doth it include the notion of immutability for such a space of yeares in the conceit thereof: so neither doth continuance for ever include the notion of being without all change for ever in the conceit thereof.
Adam was made immortall, and so had continued if he had not sinned, yet should he not have been free from all change. The Angels are eternall; that is, such as shall continue for ever, and so were made, yet neither are they now, nor were they made immutable. Indeed there are divers kindes of motions, some are in qualitie, called alterations; some in quantitie, called augmentation and diminution; some in place, called locall motion; some in substance, as generation and corruption. Immutability in this last kinde commeth nearest to the conceit of eternity, yet there is a difference. For eternity signifieth onelyonly an everlasting continuance which may be joyned with a possibility of not-continuance, as in Angels, and the soules of men, and our bodies also in the world to come; but immutability cannot bee joyned with such a possibility; therefore the conceit of eternity and the conceit of immutabilitie are much different. And for the same reason immutability cannot be the off-spring of eternity, rather eternity is the off-spring of immutability. I thinke both immediately flow from the manner of his being, which is necessarie. The like judgement may be made of that you avouch in the next place, to wit, That the true explication of the former containes the truth of this. If by the former you meane eternity, as I thinke you doe, (though some while I referred it to your discourse immediately preceding of Gods infinite wisedome, which you chiefly place in foreknowing all things, which is a good reason of the unchangeable nature of his will.) In my judgement immutability rather confirmes eternity, then eternity confirmes immutabilitie: and the knowledge of Gods eternity is the off-spring of the knowledge of his immutability, rather then on the contrary; and that for the reasons before given, to wit, because immutability inferres eternity, eternity doth not inferre immutability.
2. That God is unchangeable I nothing doubt, but in my judgement you doe not well to prove it from the infinitenesse of his essence; First because this consequent carryeth no evidence with it. That nothing can bee added to that which is infinite carryeth some evidence, but that nothing can be diminished from it, doth not. Some have maintayned that God can make an infinite magnitude, and a number infinite as Hurtado di Mendosa disputes. Secondly your argumentation is rather à Posteriori then à Priori. For if by essence infinite you understand infinite in duration, which is as much as eternity, I have already shewed that immutability better inferres eternity then eternity doth inferre immutability. But as for the necessitie of Gods being that doth manifestly and à Priori inferre his eternall being, and that it is impossible he should cease to be. And Bradwardine maintaynes that this attribute of God ens necessarium is the first attribute, as whence all other perfections are manifestly derived. For that a lesse perfect nature should have a necessitie of being, and a more perfect nature should have a contingent being is most absurd and impossible. For so that which is more perfect should have his dependance of being from that which is lesse perfect. Wherefore seeing God is of necessary being, it followeth manifestly that he must be most perfect. Yet I have cause to doubt of your sinceritie in affirming, that To infinite perfection nothing can accrewe. It is well knowne what conceyt Vorstius intertayned hereabouts, as namely that Gods decrees are not everlasting; in which case some new act of will doth accrew to God, which before was not found in him. And I fear you will be found to be of the same opinion. And I pray what meant you in the former chapter and 5. Section to maintayne that it is a point of high perfection for God, to reserve his libertie, and what libertie is this but of decreeing? Yet in the same Section you stile Gods decrees everlasting. But that denomination comes in against the hayre, as if it were only to choak your reader and h…nder him from laying that to your charge which this reservation of libertie, (which you attribute to God, as a point of high perfection) doth manifestly import.
When you say, that From infinite perfection nothing can fall but must fall into God, or into infinite perfection seeing that he is in being infinite, in such a conceyt streyned so high, that it breakes into non-sence and flat contradiction. For if it fall from him, it falls not into him; …f into him, it falls not from him. In like sort in saying that God is indivisibly and totally in every space that can be imagined, you contradict that which formerly you have delivered in the chapter of Gods immensitie. For hence it followeth that God is in vacuo which you in plaine tearmes denyed there.
3. In the next place you propose a difficultie, and that is this: How Gods will or counsell should be eternally immutable, and yet everlastingly free. And in stead of answer you tell us, You see not what appearance of difficultie can present it selfe, at least to such as beare the two former principles before mentioned levell in their mindes and thoughts. So then two principles will serve the turne to cleare all this, provided that we keepe them levell in our mindes and thoughts: otherwise woe bee to the funambulus if he swerve never so little awry. Now these principles you say are first, That God is absolutely infinite in being, the other, That he is absolutely perfect according to all the branches of being or perfection by us conceivable or more then all these, perfection it selfe. If you will believe me, I assure you, I doe believe all this, and yet I am as farre to seeke for clearing of the former difficultie as ever. If the reason be because I doe not keepe them so levill in my minde and thought as I should, I assure you, I would willingly helpe this also if I knew how. I would doe any thing for a quiet life, and to cleare such a difficultie as this which in my opinion is a wondrous one, if rightly understood. But I much doubt whether every one that proposeth it, rightly understandeth it.
For I have found by experience that many talke of the libertie of Gods will in proportion to our libertie; Now our libertie consisteth in an indifferency of intertayning different acts of will. But we shall fowly erre if we intertaine any such conceyt of the libertie of Gods will. For the act of Gods will being all one with Gods will, and Gods will being his essence, and his essence being one most simple act, it was ever impossible that there should be any thing found in God which now is not, or that any thing should not be found in God which now is. You will say then was it not possible that other things might have bene decreed by God then are? Yes undoubtedly even Iudas might have bene an elect, and Paul a reprobate. Yet other things thus decreed should not have beene decreed by any other act in God then now is in God, for the reason above specified, and that for ought I know so received by Schoole Divines, as denyed by none. And this is a mystery I confesse, wherein we must content our selves with the foreign, & leave to inquire how this may be; for we are uncapable of that. OnelyOnly we can prove that the course of things that now is, in whole and part hath no necessary derivation from God, but meerly contingent, and accordingly proceeded from the free will of God, yet everlastingly determining this course of things that now we see; and having everlastingly determined it, this will of God concerning this course of things, hath everlastingly continued immutable unto this day, and so shall for ever.
As for your principles how they conferre to the clearing of this, I perswade my selfe you are not able to manifest. And what need, I pray, of making a difference betweene these principles which seeme to be all one; and your selfe have coupled them tog…ther, as all one in the former section, and in that argument of yours whereby you proved the immutability of God. Yet these principles must bee helpt with another supposition, that so they may doe the deed; that is, That absolute contingency, or possibilities aequipendent betwixt many effects, may as truly be the object of Gods eternall decree, as necessity in other workes of nature.
Which supposition to raise your readers thoughts to an admiration of the momentous nature thereof, you say, You have often promised, and once for all by Gods assistance shall undoubtedly prove: wheras you might well spare your paines in this, no man being so simple as to question it, were it not that you do intoxicate your readers thoughts in the delivering of it with wilde phrases, in calling the contingency of things possibilities aequipendent. enough to slagger a man at the very noise of such cracking of thornes. Wee maintaine that God decreeth not onelyonly contingency, but things contingent; as namely Cyrus Es. 45. 13.his restoring of the Iewes, and giving them liberty to returne to their owne country: the burning of the Prophets bones 1 King. 13 2. Act 4. 28.by Iosiah upon the Altar; yea and the crucifying of Christ Iesus, the Apostles with one voice directly expressing so much, Act. 4. And such decrees of God though free, continue immutable, and that from everlasting, as indeed being from everlasting. And wee say there is no reason why God should alter what he hath decreed, considering that he knoweth no more now then he did from everlasting.
In that which followeth we agree with you, that immutabilitie is a perfection, & mutability an imperfection; likewise that to worke freely is a perfection, to worke necessarily is an imperfection; and where both immutability and freedome of operation meet, the perfection of that nature is so much the greater. But this I finde not so scholastically expressed, when you say, That if man were as immortall as the heavens are, hee would be more perfect then they can be. This I say wants much of accuratenesse. For the heavens are not immortall. Aristotle conceived them to be incorruptible, but not immortall. For like as in case they were corruptible, yet could they not bee counted mortall, because they have no life to lose; so though they be granted to be incorruptible, yet could they not thereupon be accounted immortall, and that for the same reason, because they have not life, which alone makes a thing capable of the denomination of immortall, and for want of life, the meanest of creatures having life doe in excellency surpasse the heavens.
And if Aristotle had lived in our dayes to bee acquainted with such Astronomicall observations as we are, of so many Comets and blazing Starres in the celestiall Region, not only above the Moone, but even in the firmament it selfe, and that of long continuance, and at length wasted and consumed; it is more then probable that his opinion concerning the incorruptibility of the heavens would have beene changed, considering his apologies and excuses in his bookes De Caelo, that the bodie of the heavens being so farre remote, and little certaine experience (whereupon all natuall reason is grounded) to be had of such things as might discover the nature thereof: therefore his discourse thereof whatsoever to bee taken in the better part, and extraordinary performances thereabouts not to be expected from a naturall Philosopher. And concluding his discourse concerning the incorruptibilitie of the heavens, he professeth that all experience did justifie his opinion in that point, for as much as there was never knowne any alteration there. So then, had he knowne of any alterations there, this might justly have altered the case with Aristotle, and that no alteration was then knowne, was to be attributed to the weake nature of Astronomicall observations in those dayes, whereabouts he was to depend upon the credit of others in their professions, being no Astronomer himselfe. In the next place you tell us, that Though freedome in it selfe be a great perfection, yet to be free to doe evill is a branch of imperfection, which springs from the mutability of the creatures freedome. This deserves well the scanning. Adam in his innocency was free to doe evill was he not? Yet was he made very good, and after the image of God, and no sinne had yet estranged him from the life of God, and therefore his state and condition deserved to be accounted a state of perfection rather then of imperfection. Although I deny not but there be greater perfections then this of Adam.
As the perfection of God is above the perfection of any, of all creatures. The perfection of Angells is above the perfection of man. The perfection of men in the state of glory above the perfection of man in the state of innocency. Yet I see no cause why Adams state in creation should be counted a state of imperfection, rather then of perfection. And for ought I see, freedom unto evill is no more favouring of imperfection then freedome unto good, considering that they both make but one morall freedome. For to be morally free to doe good quoad exercitium is to be free to choose whether a man will doe good or no, and quoad specificationem, is to be free to choose whether he will doe good or evill. So to be morally free to evill quoad exercitium is to be free to choose whether he will doe evill or no; quoad specificationem is to be free to choose whether he will doe evill or good. This discourse of mine hath proceeded according to your owne phrase, that speaks of freedom unto evill, but to speak in mine owne phrase, I should not hastily speake of any freedome of the will of man to evill. You may say as well that the will of man in th… use of the eye is free to behold either colours or sounds which he will, or in the use of the eare is free to judge of sounds or colours as he will. There is a Common sence within, I confesse, whereby the will is able to judge of these, but by the eye or eare she cannot.
The reason is, no facultie extends beyond his object. Within the compasse of his owne object it may be extended to any kind or particular, but it reacheth not beyond his object; Now the object of the eye is onelyonly colour, and the object of the eare is onelyonly sound. And a man may looke upon what colours he will of many, that are presented unto him, so by the eare take notice of any sounds that are, but neither the eye can behold that which is not coloured, nor the eare appr…hēd ought that is not of the nature of sound. In like so… the will within the compasse of her owne object, may settle upon what she will, but beyond her object she cannot extend.
Now the object of the will is good not evill, and therefore she is of free choyce to settle upon what good she will, but not upon evill. But here some may say how then can any evill be committed? I answere two wayes: First by errour of judgment. For it is the nature of the will to follow the judgement of the understanding, therefore it is called a reasonable appetite. Secondly, by preferring a lesse good before a greater, as in making choice of doing something because it is profitable, or pleasureable, or some way or other advantageous for the present, notwithstanding that it is dishonest, and such as will bring a farre greater dammage unto us for the time to come. Or thus; because we make choice of something as before mentioned notwithstanding a superiour authority hath forbidden it; both because an evill inclination maks us preferre things presently pleasing and profitable, and withall prowd that we cannot endure to be in subjection to lawfull authority, such as undoubtedlie is the authority of God.
Hence it comes to passe, that we are sayd also to be free to good or evill, which we may call a morall liberty in distinction from the former, which is liberty naturall, and consisteth in being indifferent to doe ought that lyes in our power to be done, provided that it may seeme convenient to be done. As for that morall liberty, it scarce ever was to bee found in the world. For it consisteth in an indifferent inclination neither vicious nor virtuous. Now where was ever such a disposition to be found? Not in man before his fall. For hee was created good and holy, and inclined onelyonly to delight in that which was truly good and pleasing in the sight of God. Some will say, then how could he sinne? I answer, his sinne was the actuating of his naturall indifferency to the doing of any naturall thing. As to eate an Apple, or not eate it, or to eate this or that, a thing meerelie indifferent, had not God forbidded it, and in this case restrayned his libertie: which prohibition of Gods, he hearkening too much to the tentations of Satan, by the ministery of Eve, who before had tasted of the forbidden fruit, without any dammage discernable, and upon her commendation of it inconsiderately transgressed. Since the fall of Adam a vitious inclination hath possessed all, which even in the regenerate continueth in part, though a supernaturall vertuous or religious inclination hath possessed them, whereby it comes to passe that both carnall things are pleasing to them as they are flesh, and the will of God is pleasing unto them according to the spirit.
Still the naturall liberty continueth in all, to doe any naturall thing, whether commanded or forbidden of God. For even in the regenerate there is a power to doe any naturall thing, though God hath forbidden it, and too great a propension to the doing of it, (and that because God hath forbidden it) in respect of the flesh. And in the unregenerate a power also to doe any naturall thing which God hath commanded, and an affectation to doe it also because God hath commanded it; but in the way of hypocrisie to further their owne carnall ends and courses, yet have they no religious inclination to honour God. How freedome to evill is said by you to spring from the mutability of the creatures freedome, I doe not yet understand.
First, what meane you by the creatures freedome▪ Do you meane it of his freedome to good, or freedome to evill, or such freedome as is neither to good nor evill? I thinke your meaning is of the creatures freedom to good.
Secondly, what meane you by the change of this freedome of the creature? If you speake of the creatures freedome unto good, how is it changed? or into what is it changed? here is nothing to answer, but by saying, that his freedome unto good is changed into a freedome unto evill. Which if it bee your meaning, it was verie absurd to say, that his freedome to evill did spring from his change into freedome unto evill. For thus the selfe same thing shall bee both before and after it selfe. Yet you say not, I confesse, that this freedome to evill springs from the mutation of the creatures freedome, but from the mutability; that is, from the possibility of change. But that is as absurd. For change cannot be said to spring from a possibility of change, but rather from the agent that changeth. Why did you not say plainly, it sprang from the will of man disobeying his Creator? I see a reason of this. First because freedome to evill doth rather goe before disobedience then follow after it. Why but then if this state of imperfection came not from the creatures delinquency, whence came it? The truth is, not freedome to doe evill, but bondage unto sinn proceeded from the prevarication of the creature against God his Maker. And this is a state of great imperfection indeed, or rather of great misery, as whereby all mankinde are borne children of wrath, and such as deserve to be made the generation of Gods curse. And are you pleased to mince it thus, calling it onelyonly a freedome to doe evill, whereas if yet we are onelyonly free to doe evill, it must needs follow that wee are free also not to doe it; yea and free also to doe good, which freedom is now adaies found in none but those whom the Sonne hath freed, according to that of our Saviour, If the Sonne hath made you free, then are you free indeed.Ioh. ….
But let us proceed with you. It was, I doubt not, the will and pleasure of God to make his creatures mutable before they be immutably happy. But hence it followeth not, that this mutability was necessarily prerequired. For how can that be said to bee necessarily, which depended meerely upon the free will and pleasure of God, without specification of so much as a congruous end intended by God, upon supposition whereof, this mutability of the creature might be said to be necessarily prerequired before their happinesse? Now what kinne this is to the immutability of God, or to the reconciling thereof to his freedome, let the Reader judge. As also of the sobriety of that which followeth; God in that he is absolutely perfect is essentially immutable, essentially free and immutably happy, because infinitely good. Then followes the order of immutability and freedome; that the ground of this, this the perfection of that. Yet many creatures are free without any such growne as immutability, and where the one is wanting, the other cannot be the perfection thereof. And if we speake of immutabilitie in respect of second causes, is it not in the power of God to make the heavens, the Sunne, Moone and Starres immutabl… which notwithstanding should not be any free agents. And undoubtedly, the immutability of Gods will rather supposeth the freedome thereof, then is presupposed by it. But these are matters of no great moment, that which followeth is of more, though you doe but touche, and away, like the dogge at the River Nilus, who feares the Crocodile, and it may be herein you feare some bug-beare also. Freedome it selfe (you say) were no absolute perfection unlesse it were immutably wedded unto goodnesse. Gods freedom then, you will have wedded unto goodnesse. In what sence is this delivered? I am of opinion that whatsoever God doth, it is impossible it should be otherwise then good. For it is impossible that God should transgresse; As who hath no superior to give lawes to him, but rather his will gives lawes to all, yet in giving lawes to others he gives none to himselfe.
And if his will were a law unto himselfe, it were impossible he should transgresse it in doing ought. For as much as whatsoever he doth, he doth according to the counsayle of his owne will. But you I doubt have some other sence which Aephe. 1. 11I will labour to start out if I can. You signify his freedome must be wedded to goodnes. When a man is wedded to his wife, he is restrayned from all others, and must keep himselfe only unto her.
So belike amongst diverse things whereunto Gods power doth extend, his freedome must not extend to all, but be confined to that which is good. As if there were some rules of good and evill prescribed unto God, and he were confined to the one, and restrayned from the other. This is Arminius his language, upon which occasion, I have bene bold to encounter their … in two digressions, who maintayne that there is a justice tha… doth oblige the will of God. If you would deale plainly in setting downe your opinion, and Scholastically, in taking paynes to dispute for it, and not in some sory manner to begge the question, I should be ready with the help of God to enter into the lists in this point with you also.
And at this time, had you named any thing that God cannot doe in the way of justice, which otherwise he hath power to doe, I would have taken the paines, not to consider it only, but to confute it. For I hold that tenent not farre from blasphemy. And I doe well observe that in expressing this your opinion, you doe not signify that Gods freedome must be wedded to his goodnesse, but that freedome must be wedded to goodnesse. And indeed the freedome of men and Angells is to be limited by the lawes of God, who is their Creator, and may and doth give lawes unto them. But as for any law of obedience that God is bound unto, I know none, no not to his owne goodnesse as being neither bound to manifest it nor to communicate it: but by necessity of nature he loves it, that is, himselfe, and by necessity of nature whatsoever he doth, he must doe for himselfe, and for the setting foorth of his owne glory, as he shall thinke good, and not to any other end.
He that is the supreame efficient, must necessarily be the supreame end of all things. So from him and by him, and for Rom. 11. 36.him are all thinges. Much lesse is he bound to the rules of any goodnesse or justice without him. But it may be of this we shall heare more from you hereafter.
In the next place you returne to shew, how immutability and freedome may stand together; and in stead of proving it you tell us, that we may easily conceive it, provided that they be rightly joyned or sorted. And hereupon you take occasion to discourse somewhat at large of the ill sorting of them, and that in such a kind as none would ever prove so mad as to sort them so; (yet that serves for matter of your discourse,) but as touching the right sorting of them, I doubt we shall never heare of in such a manner as you promise, to wit, that our conceits shall easily comprehend it, no more then wee have heard of that reservation of libertie which you promised to intimate as a point of very high perfection in God.
Well, the ill sorting of them seemes to bee the conceiving of God to be freely immutable, and that you say implieth contradiction, if not unto the nature of immutability, yet unto the nature of absolute perfection, or to our true conceit of infinite being. I know no congruity of this discourse of yours. For freedome is onelyonly in resp…ct of operation, not in respect of being. For freedome supposeth being according to the kinde and nature of the thing which is said to bee free. It were a very absurd thing to discourse that man is not freely a man, or that he were not freely reasonable. And no lesse absurd is it to tell us that God is not freely immutable. You might as well tell us that God is not freely God. And yet if we list to walke along with you in the like vanity of discourse, we might maintaine that God is freely immutable, freely of absolute perfection, freely of infinite perfection, if you take freedome in opposition to coaction. For God is not immutable by coaction, nor of absolute perfection by coaction, nor of infinite being by coaction. And to be that which a man is freely, is better then to be that which he is by coaction.
To be freely immutable in your sense, is not a branch of imperfection, but rather of impossibility. For it is neither possible to the Creator, nor possible to the creature. But imperfections imply a possibility, rather then include any impossibility. But suppose there were any such freedome in God, yet it followeth not, that it should put all those perfections which are contained in his nature upon the hazard. For how improbable were it, that God by his will should choose to be imperfect rather then perfect? Possible indeed it were upon this supposition, but yet in respect of his wisedome and goodnesse, …t were as good as impossible hee should will any such thing, though he were free to will it. But God by necessitie of nature is immutable, and impossible it is he should be otherwise; & in this nature of his the will of God delghteth. And accord…ngly we may judg of the nature of these your extravagant suppositions: yet by your leave, mutability is not alwaies charged with possibility of doing amisse, but onelyonly in creatures reasonable, yet is mutability found as well in creatures unreasonable, yea and without sense and life also, as in creatures reasonable. But to proceed: as it is impossible God should be freely immutable, so is it impossible he should be mutably free.
But why you should account it the period of perfection I know no reason, more then to be immutably wise, immutably powerfull, immutably good. Neither doe I like your inference herehence, namely that therefore God is unchangeable in freedome, as in power, wisedome, or goodnesse; like as because God is immutably wise, and powerfull, and good, it is no good consequence to say therefore he is as unchangeable in wisedome, power, and goodnesse, as he is in freedome. The consequents, that is, the propositions themselves I approve, but I cannot approve your deduction of the one from the other. Now because God is immutably free, therefore hee was, and is, and shall be eternally free, to exercise his power, and to communicate his goodnesse. All this we grant, and by all which you seeme to goe a birding, and if your tackling hold, you are like to catch something ere long; and if I mistake not, the next sentence discovereth the mystery you hawked after so long: Free it is (you say) for him from everlasting to everlasting omnipoten…ly to decree as well a mutability in the actions of some things created, as a necessity or immutability in the course or operation of nature inanimate. In which words by that time I come to the end of transcribing of them, I finde more then at first blush I dreamed of. For that which you hunt after as now I perceive, is a soryconceit, and such as being granted you, will yeeld your cause as much support as a bulrush; what need you thus travell to be delivered of such a principle as no man thinkes worth the asking. OnelyOnly you carrie it in such a phrase of obscurity, as if you desired your reader to conceive it to be some great mystery, whereas if …t were plainly delivered, and that in a sober sense, it is no more then this, God hath decreed that some things shall worke contingently and freely, as namely, men and Angels; like as hee hath decreed that other things, to wit, naturall agents, shall worke necessarily.
And can you tell who is ignorant of this? or can you shew that ever any was found to call this into question amongst Christians? All Naturalists acknowledge this difference betweene naturall agents and voluntary agents; and no Christian denieth but all this proceeds from Gods inward decree, and outward operation accord…ng to this decree. But what if you have a further ayme then this, and the obscurity of your expression in this particular serves onelyonly to amuse your reader in that which is of no worth, that so in the meane time his intention may oversl…p the observation of foule things broached by you in a few words? For consider I pray, would you have your reader swallow sucha goageon as this, that God is at this time free to decree this? Why doe you not say as well that God is at this time free to decree the salvation or dammation of any man? For why should not one decree of God be temporary as well as another? and how contradictious is this to your owne often profession of Gods everlasting decrees, and also to your present doctrine of Gods immutabilitie? For if he be now free to decree this or that, then may some decree of God begin to be, which before was not, and consequently there shall bee a change in God. For as much as some act shall be found in God which before was not. And if Gods decrees be everlasting, and yet to this day he continueth free to reverse these decrees, then is God free to change. Perhaps you will say, Gods liberty is eternall, (for otherwise I know not to what purpose you discourse here of Gods eternall liberty.) I answer, God is still and ever shall be free, but in respect of what? In respect of those things that are possible and indifferent to be done by him or no. But that Gods eternal decrees should be at this time indifferent to bee made by him or no, is a thing utterly impossible. God alone cannot doe this, as Philosophers were wont to say, to make that which is done to be undone, it being a thing implying manifest contradiction.
Againe, the libertie of God is not like unto the liberty of his creatures, whether Angels or men, which yet notwithstanding you very confidently confound, manifesting no sense of so uncouth an assertion. Liberty in the creature is unto different acts of will, as either to will this, or to will that; but no such libertie is to be found in God. It was and is impossible there should bee any other act in God then there is, because God is a simple act, and that act is his very essence, and as his essence cannot, nor could not bee otherwise then it is, so neither could any other act of will be in him then there is. Gods liberty is only to different objects, not to different acts, though you passe over this without any distinction.
Againe, in the sentence going before you told us, God was free to exercise his power, and to communicate his goodnesse; which is most true: but when in the next place you tell us he is free to decree, this is nothing answerable to the former. For to decree is no exerc…se of his power, nor communication of his goodnesse. For if it were, then seeing his decrees have beene free from everlasting, from everlasting there should be an exercise of his power, and communication of his goodnesse. Which is as much as to say that the world was everlasting.
Your next sentence is as wilde as the former, or rather more, not to speake of the coherence of them. For it seemes you have no more care of that, then as if you were dictating proverbs. That the course of mans life, or the finall doome awarded to every man (though that must be awarded to all according to the diversity of their courses) should be immutable, because they are foreset by an immutable omnipotent decree hath no more colour of truth, then to say the omnipotent creator must needes be blacke, because he made the crowes and Ebony black, &c. And this comparison you enlarge with multiplicity of instances, as the course of your stile is to exuberate in matters of no moment. You might as well have sayed that there is no colour of truth, why God that made a crowe should be a crowe, or that made the swanne should be a swanne. And indeed there is no colour of truth in this. For indeed a painter makes a fayre picture, but it no way followeth herehence that he should be a fayre picture, or so much as fayre.
And though a pewterer makes a chamber-pot, yet no colour of truth, that he should be therefore a chamber pott, or that because a Chimny-sweeper makes a clean chimny, therfore himselfe should be a cleane chimny. Never was any knowne to be so absurde, as to devise any such inferences. Like as I think never any before your selfe was knowne to affirme, that there was as litle colour of truth in collecting, that things decreed by God should be immutable, because his decree is immutable. For I pray, what proportion doe you find in these? the efficient cause that is aequivocall, is not of the same nature with the effect produced, therefore the thing decreed is not immutable, by reason of the immutability of the decree whereby it is decreed.
Let every Reader judge whether there be so much likenesse betweene these, as betweene a foxe and a Fearne-bush. Yet you give no reason but the bare proportion it selfe to beare it out. Now the former inference which you denye, is drawne from the cause to the effect, the later inference which you denye is drawne from the effect to the cause. Yet these inferences you make proportionable. If you would make them suitable, after some such manner as this, it should proceed. God makes crowes black; herhence it followeth not that God himselfe is black, so God decreed to damne Iuda… herehence it followeth no…, and what I pray? I am ashamed t… follow the proportion of your inference least so I should utter that which in modestie is not fit, or thus. God makes Iudas his damnation immutable; herhence it followeth not that God is immutable, or to helpe you with a proportioned case fitter for your turne. God makes Iudas his damnation mutable, herehence it followeth not that God or his decree is mutable.
This I say better serves your turne, but this is not the inference whereupon you passe your denyall, but rather quite cam as we say; Gods decree is immutable; herhence it followeth not that Iudas his damnation, though foreset by God is immutable. Yet as for that inference proposed, which I sayd was more fitter for your turne, who ever sayd that God decreed Iudas his damnation to be mutable, or the damnation of reprobates to be mutable? Who ever sayd that God decreed the salvation of Peter or Paul, or of any one of Gods elect to be mutable?
And indeed, it were very absurd to say so: For the mutability of a thing supposeth the being of a thing. Now hath God ordained that the salvation of Gods elect, after they have obtayned it, or the damnation of the reprobates after they suffer it, shall be mutable? Hath he not rather ordained the contrary both as touch…ng his elect, that they shall ever be with the Lord, Thess. 4. Marc. 9. 44.and as touching the reprobate that their Worme shall never dye, and their fire never be extinguished? Yet I confesse either is simply mutable, in respect that God hath power to alter it. But this kind of mutability is not the object of Gods decree. For God doth not decreec to take unto himselfe power to doe this or that. Yet it is true, that by vertue of Gods decree some things come to passe contingently, and some things necessarily. But this is onelyonly in respect of the agency of second causes, some of them being made by God, agents naturall working necessarily, some agents rationall and free, working contingently and freely: Not in respect of Gods owne agency, for whatsoever God doth work outwardly, that must needs come to passe contingently or freely: for it is not in the power of God to worke necessarily; it is the perfection of God unalterable, to be necessarily, to worke freely. Now the doome of any man is the work of God, and so is the condemnation both of men and Angels, and not the worke of second causes: and therefore the contingent being thereof is not the object of Gods decree. God doth not decree, that to fall out contingently, much lesse doth he decree that after it is, it shall be mutable: speake your minde plainly, and tell us whether the damnation of Iudas, or of the Angels that fell, or of any reprobate that is departed this life is mutable. I presume you dare not affirme this: and what is the reason? not because God wants power to alter, but because his will is that it shall not be otherwise, and his will can neither bee changed from within, nor resisted from without, because it is omnipotent. In this case therefore this consequence is good: God hath decreed the damnation of Iudas, and his decree is immutable, and omnipotent, therefore the damnation of Iudas is immutable, to wit, supposing the foresaid decree of God.
Now consider wee the damnation of wicked men not yet departed this life; hath God decreed it, or no? if no, then his decrees are not everlasting, the contrary whereunto you have hitherto professed in words, though I feare your meaning is otherwise.
Againe, if God hath not yet decreed it, then hereafter he shall decree it, (for he must first will their damnation before he damnes them) and consequently there shall be a change in God, and something found in him which before was not, contrary to that which you have delivered in this Chapter, sect. 2. in these words, VntoUnto infinite perfection what can accrew? If then God hath decreed it, and this decree or will of God cannot be changed, for you confesse it is immutable, nor can be resisted, for you confesse it is omnipotent; will it not necessarily follow herehence, that the damnation of such wicked men yet surviving is immutable? This I speake in your phrase, but in mine owne phrase I say onelyonly that herehence it necessarily followeth, that all such shall bee damned, which necessity is meerly upon supposition of Gods decree: and therefore not necessity simply so called, but onelyonly secundum quid, and upon supposition,
So likewise concerning the salvation of Gods Elect, who are yet surviving, if God hath decreed it, seeing his will is both unchangeable, and unresistible, their salvation must needs bee immutable, to speake in your phrase, but to speake in mine owne phrase, it necessarily followeth herehence that they shall be saved.
There is to way to help this, but by maintaining that Gods decrees are not absolute but conditionall; but it seemes you dare not venture upon this assertion in plaine termes, though the face of your tenet bespeakes such a course: And in another Treatise of yours you talked of a certaine disjunctive decree of God. It were a commendable thing in you to deliver your selfe plainly of your meaning; for otherwise you will be guilty of something else besides a corrupt judgement. And indeed if you would deale plainly, and maintaine that God hath decreed salvation or damnation to none absolutely, but to all conditionally, and withall by sound arguments confirme it, there should be no further question; we would willingly subscribe that no mans salvation should come to passe immutably, as you speake, or necessarily, as we speake; no not so much as in respect of Gods decree; if so be God hath decreed salvation to no man absolutely, but conditionally; and that in such sort as that he may bee either saved or damned as he will. But then withall you must maintaine that God hath decreed to give no man faith and repentance more then another; but left it indifferently to their free wills whether they will beleeve and repent or no.
For albeit God hath ordained salvation to befall men upon ther finall perseverance in faith and repentance; yet if God hath withall decreed to give some men faith and repentance, and finall perseverance therein, and deny all this unto others; herehence it will follow that God in effect hath ordained some men absolutely unto salvation, and not other; and it will necessarily follow herehence, that as many as to whom God hath decreed to give faith and repentance, and perseveran…e, they shall be saved; and as necessarily, that all others shall not be saved to whom God hath decreed the deniall of the like grace, unlesse you will say that though God doth not give any such grace, yet they may beleeve and repent if they will, and therein persevere unto the end: I see no reason to the contrary, but this must be upon your opinion, as before hath beene specified, albeit you are not very forward in plaine termes to expresse as much. And in this place you scatter somthing that seemes to me directly contrary hereunto.
For consider, though Gods decree concerning the doome of every man be immutable, yet you deny that hethence it followes, their doome shall be immutable. Now this of a conditionall decree is evidently untrue, as I presume will appeare of it selfe. For if God hath no other decree concerning Peters doome then this; If thou beleevest, thou shalt be saved, if not, thou shalt be damned; the case is cleare that this doome is immutable, not salvation absolutely nor damnation absolutely, but either salvation or damnation disjunctively as elsewhere I have found you to discourse of a disjunctive decree of God. Therefore seeing you speake of such a doome which you deny to be immutable, it followeth that you cannot understand it of a disjunctive doome, as salvation, or damnation; but you must needs understand it of a single doome by it self…, as the salvation of Peter by it selfe, or the damnation of Iudas by it selfe.
And withall you doe acknowledge this doome to be forset by the decree of God, which is as much as to acknowledge that it is decreed by God. Now I say if it be decreed by God, seeing his decrees cannot be changed, no… his omnipotent will resisted, it must necessarily follow that every one so destinated to salvation shall be saved, every one so destinated to damnation shall be damned. The best helpe you have against this, and whereupon this discourse of yours doth most runne, is, that the object of Gods decree is contingency, or mutability, (for so you are pleased to confound things that differ.) But you are nothing wary to keepe your selfe from contradicting your selfe. For when you say that God decreeth contingency, you doe withall deny that God doth decre… the thing contingent; as you have expresly professed in your treatise upon Ier. 26. Did not Hezechiah feare before the Lord, &c. And withall to make your meaning the more plaine, you have professed that albeit God doth not decree necessity, but withall decrecing the things that come to passe necessarily; yet in decreeing contingency, you deny that he decreeth withall the things contingent.
But in this place you have plainly signified that the doome it selfe of every man is foreset by the immutable decree of God, and not onelyonly the contingency of it; And no mervayle, For albeit as touching the actions of men, ther may be some colour for the exempting of them from being the objects of Gods decrees, yet the doomes of men being the actions of God himselfe, there is no colour at all for the exempting of them from being the object of Gods decrees. And therefore this distinction of Gods decreeing contingency, or mutability, but not the things contingent themselves, will nothing avayle you in this place. For you plainly professe that the doome of every one is forset by the decree of God: and it is impossible it should be otherwise. For God could not execute it, unlesse he did will it. He cannot execute the salvation of Peter, unles he did first will it, nor the damnation of Iudas except he did first will it, and his will was everlasting, otherwise there should be a change in God.
And seeing his will can neither change, nor be resisted, therefore it necessarily followeth, that whose salvation he did from everlasting will or decree, they must be saved, and whose damnation he did from everlasting will or decree, they must be damned. And thus much as touching the doome of every man foreset by Gods decree. You adde unto this, The course of every mans life, and affirme, that it also is foreset by Gods decree; And this course of every mans life you understand in respect of good and evill morall, as appeares by this, that you proportion mens doomes unto the courses of their lives: which can beare no other interpretation then in respect of mens good and evill actions.
…w at the first I wondred what you meant to bring so unequall heyfers to plow under the same yoke, considering that the courses of mens lifes in this sense are the actions or workes of men; but the doomes of men according to their courses of life, are the actions or workes of God, much more have I cause to wonder to reade you professing them all indifferently to be foreset by the decree of God. For as for the good, yea the most gracious actions of men, according to your opinion, they are not foreset by the decree of God. For your profession is (and that as of some singular subtilty and invention) that God decreeth contingency, but not the things contingent; whence it followeth, that as touching the most gracious actions of men, even faith and repentance (they being onelyonly contingent things) that God decreeth them not, but only the contingency of them. How much lesse fit is it for you (according to the tenour of your opinion) to joyne all the courses of mens lives, even the evill courses as well as good with the doomes proportionall, and to consider them as fore-set by an immutable and omnipotent decree of God, as here you doe▪ Yet I see how some one in your behalfe might plead for you, namely, that this is delivered by you onelyonly by way of …upposition, not positively affirmed; but I see no likelihood that you would plead thus for your selfe, but rather give your self to the emasculating of Gods decree by some frivolous distinctions. For you acknowledge Gods concourse to every action.
And in the preface you make shew not so much of excepting against the doctrine of Gods decreeing all things, as against the manner of decreeing them. And when you speake of the worst courses of mens lives, as of Iewish blasphemy against the Sonne of God, and amplifie the hainousnesse of their opinion, that maintaine it to have been decreed by God, you rather except against the manner of decreeing it, to wit, ineritably, and that as touching the obliquity of it onelyonly, then simply against the decreeing of it. Yo…r words a…e these, ch. 1. sect. 15. Shall we say God did inevitably decree the obliquity of Iewish blasphemy? Which cautions whereunto they tend I know not, unlesse to make some declination from ma…fest contradiction to the words of the Holy Ghost, Act. 4. 28. delivered with one mouth by the Apostles in their meditation unto God, saying, Uerily against thy holy Sonne Jesus both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles and people of Israel, are gathered together to doe what thy hand and thy counsell had determined before to be done. And indeed it is nothing but ignorance, or wilfulnes in some, and trafty perverting the state of the truth in others, that makes those things seeme harsh, which yet notwithstanding their harshnes, are manifestly commended to us in the word of God. For what harshnes I pray is in this: God determined that all the evill that was done to Christ should be done by his permission? And none give better evidence unto this truth ere they are aware, then they that with might and mayne oppose it, as Arminius, who professeth that the Iewes proceeded so farre in their ignominious handling of Christ, as God would have them, and this he delivers without all temperament.
And Bellarmine prof…sseth, that it is good that evill should be by Gods permission. And yet herein we say no more then Austin professed 1200. yeares agoe, saying, Non aliquid sit nisi quod omnipotens fieri velit, velsinendo ut siat, vel ipse faciendo. Enchirid. cap. 95.And your selfe in this place joyne the doome of every man with the course of every mans life in good or evill, and suppose them to beforeset by the immutable and omnipotent decree of God. Wherefore it is not for your positive dictates and wild resemblances without all proportion that we doe beleeve God to be eternally and immutably free; yet wee doe beleeve he is so, not to decree a new, (for Gods decrees are eternall, not temporary) but to doe any thing that is possible to be done, and to bring forth some creatures, agents naturall to worke necessarily, others, agents rationall to worke contingently and freely. As for the resemblance of Gods freedome and immutability, your talke of it is like your other discourses; For what resemblance doe you find of Gods freedome in the mutability of the elements, in the generation and corruption of mixt bodyes? The best resemblance of Gods …reedome is in the freedome of creatures rationall, which are to be found as well in the superior, as in this inferior World. And why should any mutability be a resemblance of Gods freedome, who is immutabile throughout? And as for the resemblance of his immutability in the Heavens, to make that good you had need devise a quintessence first, and deny all those apparances of comets, breeding and wasting in the Heavens, even in the firmament, the acknowledgement whereof is now commonly receaved by frequent observations.
Sure I am the Prophet plainly professeth of the heavēs, that they all wax old as doth a garment, and as a vesture God shall change them, and they shall be changed, but God is the same, and his yeares fayle not. You may doe well to deny the Heavens motion also, & so you may the better free them from all change, for as I take it, all motion is mutation, though all mutation be not motion. That God is both immutable, and irresistible our opinions manifest, so doe not yours, but dangerously prejudice them both. But I knowe no reason why his irresistiblenes should flow from his immutability. For if his immutability be conceaved as free from al possibility of change from within, there is no coherence at all betweene this and his irresistiblenes, which is in respect of agents from without. The essence of spirits is immutable from within, and so were the Heavens, if a simple essence, or quintessence as some call it; but hence it followeth not that any of these are irresistible from without. But if immutability be spoken of in respect of freedome from all change as from without, in as much as no outward thing is able to worke any change in the nature of God, then it is onelyonly immutability passive, but irresistibility in God is in respect of his power active, able to bow and breake all things without resistance, so that in this sense also there is no coherence betweene these two attributes, as if one could be sayd to flow from an other.
To the preventing of wise contrivances is required not onelyonly wisedome to discover them, and meanes to prevent them, but also power for the execution of this prevention. And that Gods contrivances are not prevented, it is a worke of his power, as well as of his wisedome.
As for the rule of Gods decree, I know no goodnes of God to be the rule thereof, but that goodnes wherby he is inclyned to the setting forth of his owne glory, for He hath made all thinges for himselfe. Prov. 1. 16. 4. And seeing All thinges are from him and by him. Rom. 11. ver. last. There is great reason why all things should be for him also, even referred to his glory as to the end. What other goodnes you dreame of, as the rule of Gods decrees, I know not, neither doe the Scriptures teach any other, but it is generally your course to dictate much, and to prove wonderous litle; Whether your ability that way be the more in store and reserved for some speciall subject to shew it selfe therein, I know not.