Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 2 · Chapter 8 (3 of 3)

Discovery of Jacksons Vanity · Section 2 · Chapter 8 (3 of 3)

p. 316But in the first place you fall upon it to my judgement very indecently, as when you say: If we shall mould the manner of Gods foreknowglede of things future in our owne conceit or foreknowledge of them, we shall erroneously collect, that seeing we cannot infallibly foreknow future contingents so neither could they be infallibly foreknowne by God, if to him or in respect of his decree they were contingent, and not necessarily predetermined. For first the question only was, whether foreknowledge might be properly attributed unto God in respect of things to come. Now I see no reason but it may, as well as it is attributed unto man; which question is only about the formall denomination of it, not at all as touching the extent of Gods foreknowledge in comparison unto mans foreknowledge, or in respect of the ground of it.

p. 317Secondly, the comparison made by you hath no congruity in the members of it. For the first member is proposed absolutely, the second conditionally; wheras in reason, either both should be proposed absolutely thus. Seing we cannot infallibly foreknowe future contingents, so neither could they be infallibly foreseene by God: which is so absurd an Argument, that any sober man might be ashamed to obtrude upon any adversary.

foreign.

If I would feine, I would feine thinges probable at the least. Or both should runne conditionally, thus: Seeing we cannot infallibly foreknow future contingents, if in respect of our decree they be contingents, and not necessarily determined, so neither can they be infallibly foreknowne by God, if to him, or in respect of his decree they were contingents, and not necessarily predetermined. Yet if the comparison had runne thus, it load bin incongruous inough; For Mans foreknowledge is not usually accoumpted in respect of thinges determinable by his will, Sometime it may be, as I remember Erastus observes that Bellantius Senensis prophecyed of Savanarola his death, but it was after notice was taken of him at Rome, as of an Heretique. So likewise I have read that the fruites of the Gunpowder Treason was prophecyed of in a certeine Liturgy, then of purpose prescribed for the use of Papists, but it was after those English boute-feux were knowne to have been engaged in that conspiracy.

But usually mans foreknowledge of things to come is accompted in respect of thinges naturall, and such as are out of the power of the determination of his owne will. And as for such thinges as are subject to his will, it is an undoubted truth, that he cannot infallibly foreknowe such thinges upon the knowledge of his purpose to produce them; and that for two reasons. First, because his will is mutable from within. Secondly, because his power is resistible from without. But give we you leave to proceede.

p. 318In the next place you tell us, That some push our pronenesse to this errour forward, by another, not distinguishing betweene contingency and uncertainty; who argue thus, That which is in it selfe uncertaine, cannot certainly be knowne. Every future contingent is in it selfe uncertaine, Ergo it is not possible that a future contingent should certainly be knowne. Thus another Hare is started by the way, which hindreth the pursuing of our first game, where we might have experience of your performance in opposing the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents, layd in the determination of his will, whereof God cannot be ignorant. And first you addresse your selfe to the removing of this new rub, by a distinction of a two fold uncertainty, one formally relative, another onelyonly denominative or fundamentall. And, as if these termes needed no explication, you proceed to a resolution thus; That which is relatively uncertaine, cannot be certainly knowne, for so it should be certaine to him, to whom it is uncertaine: But a future contingent, as it is contingent, doth not necessarily or formally include this relative uncertainty, although it usually be in part the foundation or cofounder of it. By relat…ve uncertainty you understand uncertainty in relation to knowledge, in which sense to be uncertaine, is to be such as whereof there cannot be certaine knowledge. In which sense if the proposition proceeded, it were very idle, and indenticall, as if it were expressed thus; That which cennot certainly be known, cannot certainly be knowne: And they undoubtedly are very prone to errour, that suffer themselves to be pushed forwards thereinto by such arguments as these, and thus interpreted. But we were wont to distinguish of Certitudo scientiae, & certitudo rei scitae, or scibilis; and you intimate such a distinction. For the relative uncertainty you speake of is the uncertainty of the knowledge, and the fundamentall uncertainty is the uncertainty of the thing it selfe, and indeed the foundation of the uncertainty of knowledge. Now the argument proceeds manifestly from the one to the other, and the Medius terminus man fests its owne meaning to bee of fundamentall uncertainty, whence it doth infer uncertainty of knowledge, for it proceeds thus: That which is uncertaine in it selfe cannot p. 319be certainly knowne. Now that which is uncertaine in it selfe, is not relatively uncertaine, but rather absolutely. For whereas the most certaine thing that is may be relatively uncertaine, that is uncertaine unto some; yet this shall never be called uncertaine in it selfe.

So then the syllogisme corruptly interpreted by you, and the truth of it obscured by a preposterous distinction, take it in its proper vigour and force, is thus; That which in it selfe hath no foundation of certainty, cannot bee certainly knowne. But every future contingent hath in it selfe no foundation of certaintie: therefore it cannot certainly be knowne. Therefore if you will answer aright, shew what foundation of certainty is found in future contingents, if you please to deny the Minor; or if you please to deny the Major, professe your minde plainly, and say, that That which hath no foundation of certainty in it selfe, may neverthelesse be certainly knowne, which indeed is your course. For you professe plainly, that future contingents cannot bee certainly knowne, of a sinite and imperfect knowledge, but they may be knowne by an infinite knowledge; such as is the knowledge of God.

And thus you might have answered the former syllogisme plainly, without the helpe of your former distinction, in this manner: That which is in it selfe uncertaine, cannot bee certainly knowne. It is true in respect of a finite knowledge, such as is the knowledge of man; but it is not true in respect of knowledge infinite, such as is the knowledge of God. But whereas you put it indifferent to answer by way of distinction, either of knowledge finite and infinite, or of knowledge fallible and infallible; herein you are very wide. For a very absurd issue would be of this latter distinction, after this manner: That which is uncertaine in it selfe, cannot be certainly knowne by knowledge fallible, but it may be certainly knowne by knowledge infallible: which were as much as to says It cannot bee certainly knowne by knowledge that may erre in knowing it, but it may bee certainly knowne by knowledge that cannot erre in knowing it. And yet it will not serve your turne neither; For, though Gods knowledge bee infallible, yet it will not follow that p. 320God knowes this infallibility; because, though he infallibly knowes whatsoever he knowes, yet perhaps this is a thing not knowable at all. for to know that such a thing certainly shall be, which in its owne nature is no more certaine to be than not to be, is not to know, but rather to erre: and so the argument still holds good, 'and no way' answered by you, but boldly outfaced by a meere begging of that which is in question. Yet nothing possible shall be uncertaine unto God, for he knowes it to bee possible, and that most certainly. But with what colour can you inferre, that because it is possible to be, therefore God most certainly knowes that it shall be? For, consider, is it not as well possible not to bee? and may not I by the same liberty of argumentation, which you usurpe unto your selfe, conclude, therefore God most certainely knowes that it shall not bee? In a word, things must bee to come, before they can be knowne to be to come. But seeing future contingents are in their own nature onelyonly possible, and indifferent to be to come, or not to come; I pray consider by what activitie or operation, they have passed from the condition of things possible, to the condition of things future? for if they have not passed into this condition, they are not as yet knowable to be future; and no infallibility of knowledge can make the knowledge extend to the comprehending of such things as are not knowable. Possible they are, and are most certainly knowne of God that they are possible. But as yet future they are not, (unlesse by some alteration they have beene translated from the condition of things meerly possible to the condition of things future, which it stands you upon to shew, if you maintaine it,) therefore as yet they are not knowable to be future.

That which you adde concerning the nature of Gods knowledge, as being without succession, is nothing to the purpose. For though our knowledge be subject to succession, yet this nothing hindreth us from foreknowing things to come, so they be knowable, whether by naturall reason, or by divine revelation. On the other side, though Gods knowledge be not capable of succession, yet things not knowable p. 321he cannot knowe; thinges impossible he cannot know to be possible, and thinges which are only possible, and not future he cannot know to be future. And such a manner of knowledge, is no knowledge indeed, but errour rather.

And as for your termes of interposed, and expiring acts, and interminable knowledge; well they may serve to conjure your Reader from understanding you, but they have no force either of illustration, or probation of ought. In the close you acquaint us with a **See Rogers upon the Articles or the Church of England. the 17. Art.new mystery, as if Gods knowledge were like the suspending of a mans judgement, for as much as the act of knowledge in God doth not expire. A vile conceit and ridiculous, were it not concerning the nature of God. For what? because Gods knowledge and judgement doth not expire, but continueth without alteration, shall he therfore be sayd to suspend his judgement? Belike Daniel was cast into the Lyons denne not by judgement, but by suspension of judgement; For the Lawes of the Medes and Persians were unalterable.

So likewise the judgement, and counsaile, and purpose of God, concerning the salvation of his elect, because it continueth without expiration, therfore it is suspended. In the same proportion of pietie you say our ignorance resembles Gods knowledge best, as heretofore you professed, that In respect of immensity and eternity, nothing was so like to God as nothing. But it may be Ioverlash, and upon better consideration, The imperfection of our knowledge or judgement while it is in suspense is rather ignorance, (you say) than Errour. And this imperfection taken away it shall better resemble divine knowledge, than our actuall resolutions and determinations doe. But then, I pray, what is this that shall resemble the divine knowledge? is it our knowledge while it is in suspense? why, but if I am in suspense, how am I sayd to knowe? O, but you will have this imperfection taken away, but then I say, if the suspension be taken away, how shall it be in suspense, which you suppose? Agayne, how can suspension of judgement be taken away, but by resolution this way or that way? but this you deny to be that which resembles divine knowledge.

p. 322The truth is, the sentence is so perplex, that I can divise no issue out of it. Yet I have reason to conceave that your opinion is, that ignorance best resembles the knowledge of God. For the comparison is betweene resolution and the opposite therunto? and you plainly signifie that the opposite to resolutiō doth better resemble Gods knowledge, than resolution. Now what is opposite to resolution but suspension of judgement; and this suspension of judgement you plainly professe is to be called ignorance, rather than errour. Wherfore ignorance consisting in suspension of judgement by your doctrine in this place, doth better resemble the wisedome of God than our actuall resolutions and determinations doe; yet out actuall resolutions and determinations may be sound both in knowledge naturall, and knowledge Theologicall, wheras ignorance or suspension of judgement is no knowledge at all. OnelyOnly wheras you positively affirme, that Without the interposition of some determining or expiring acts there can be no errour, I understand that plainly to be a notorious untruth. For determining or expiring actes are no more required unto errour, than unto truth.

And if a man continue, as many doe, to their lives end in Popery, in Mahumetisme, in Heathenisme, their errours are never a whit the lesse.

It is true indeed that we can understand but one thing at once, and therfore the consideration of one thing must expire before we can passe to the consideration of another. This is the condition of Mans knowledge in generall, not of an erroneous apprehension in speciall.

11. What you discourse of knowledge conjecturall which man may have of things contingent, cannot have of things casuall, I leave it as I find it, I come to the cause why we cannot foreknow future contingents, and this you say is because our essence, and knowledge are but finite; so that things contingent are not so conteined in us, that if we could perfectly know our selfes we might perfectly know them; Thus you are content to dictate at pleasure, without affoording one mite of reason, for the establishing of your proselytes faith in this. As finite as our p. 323knowledge is, we know contingents to be contingents. But to know that a thing meerly contingent which denomination includes only a possibilitie of comming to passe, or not comming to passe, I say to know that such a thing shall come to passe, exceedes the reach of knowledge infinite. For infinite knowledge doth extend no farther than to things knowable. But, for a contingent, which both in his owne nature, and from without doth yet continue indifferent to be or not to be, is not a thing, at all knowable, that it shall come to passe. For it must be a thing future, before it can be knowne to be future. But the contingents, you speake of, are supposed both in their owne nature to be only possible, that is indifferent to be or not be, and as yet determined by no outward agent to be. In which case they still continue under the condition of thinges n…eerly possible. And so farre they are knowable, and no farther. And accordingly so farre they are ind…ed knowne by God, by that knowledge which is commonly called Scientia simplicis intelligentiae. But the knowledge of thigs future is called Scientia visionis. And thinges meerly possible, till some determination doth come unto them from wihout, are not as yet future, and consequently cannot be knowne, to be future, yet notwithstanding you are bold to say, that In the divine essence, all reall effects, all events possible, whether necessary, casuall or contingent, are eminently conteined; The perfect knowledge of his owne essence, necessarily includes the perfect knowledge, not only of all thinges, that have been, are, or shallbee, but of all things that might have beene, or possibly may bee. A most rid…culous amplification? For it is as much, as to say, that God knowes not only all contingent truthes, but all necessary truthes also. As if it were a harder matter to know thinges necessary, than to know things contingent. Whereas it is in the power of the Creature to know things necessary, and perhaps all things that are of necessary truth; but to knowe those things whose existence is only of a contingent nature, that belongs only unto God.

Now what is possible, and what is not, we have a generall rule to know that, as namely, whatsoever implieth no contradiction p. 324is possible, that which doth imply contradiction is impossible. And were it a sober speech for a divine to affirme; that God not only knows all things that have been, are or shallbe, but also he knowes what implies contradiction, & what doth not? you seeme to fumble here at the novel doctrine of the Iesuites concerning Gods foreknowledge of future contingents conditionate; and you doe but fumble at it.

Secondly you say that in the divine essence all reall effects are conteined eminently; Now hertofore you told us, that For all things to be in God, is no more than that he alone can produce them. Ch. 4. num. 2. If this be your meaning in this place, as it seemes, when you say they are in him eminently, for so we say that heate is in the Sunne eminently, for as much as he doth produce heate in bodies capable; Then, I say, we deny not but all reall effects are in God.

But how doth this agree with your tenet, seing herhence it followes that God can produce any act of Mans freewill, any casuall thinge and if he can so doe, what hind…h but that he could from everlasting decree to produce them? Yet not alone as formerly you have interpreted what it is for things to be in God. For it is impossible that God should produce the act of mans will without man. For if without man, then it is not the act of mans will, which is an immanente act of the will.

Thirdly, it is false to say that the perfect knowledge of Gods essence, necessarily includes the perfect knowledge of all thinges that have beene, are, or shall bee. It includes I confesse the knowledge of all necessary truthes, and of all thinges possible; but as for the knowledge of contingent truthes, and of these to come, it includes not that; unlesse under the essence of God, you comprehende the will of God. And so to distinguish as to say that all necessary truthes God knoweth by necessity of nature, but all contingent truthes he knoweth by the determination of his owne will; which indeed is a truth, but flatt opposite to your opinion. But that thinges contingent cannot be knowne to be future, but upon the determination of Gods will, I prove thus. Things p. 325cannot be knowne to be future untill they are future; (for to apprehend or conceive things to be future, when they are not future, is not to know, but to erre,) but contingent things, and onelyonly possible to be or not to be, doe not become future till the determination of Gods will hath made them future. Therefore contingent things cannot be knowne to be future but upon the determination of God will.

The minor I prove thus: Of their owne nature they are not future, but onelyonly possible; and they cannot passe from the condition of things meerly possible, to the condition of things future, without a cause from without. And no cause of this translation can be devised, but the will of God. Which I prove thus. If some other cause, then either without God, or within God; not without God, for these things were future from everlasting; but from everlasting there was no cause at all existent without God; Therefore the cause hereof, if any where to be found, must be found within God. Wee say it is his will; which if you deny, you must shew what else can be the cause: you commonly flee to Gods knowledge, and the infinity thereof, but in vaine, for already they are supposed to bee future before God knoweth them. And indeed it belongs to knowledge to know all things that are to come, not to make them to be to come.

Fourthly, it is possible that Antichrist shall fall in the yeare 1630, it is possible that he should fall the yeare before, it is possible he should fal the yeare after: it was possible he should have fallen ten yeares agoe; it is possible hee should fall ten yeares hence: all these being reall effects possible, must by your doctrine be found eminently in the divine essence, and God knowing his divine essence, must know them all, and not onelyonly that they are possible, but that they shall all come to passe: For in this sense you speake of Gods knowledge of future contingents, namely, of knowing that they shall come to passe, and when they shall come to passe.

Againe, set we the fall of Antichrist at an hundred different points of time, whereof let us suppose one to bee true, and the other false; yet all in their owne nature alike possible: p. 326why should the fall of Antichrist in the true point of time bee included in Gods essence more then the other, all being alike possible; and that very instante wherein the fall of Antichrist shall be, it being as possible that it should not be, and that possibility also being included in the essence of God, as well as any other? Perhaps you will say that this being a truth is included in the essence of God, and not the others, being untruths. But then I demand how this became to be a truth, that Antichrist should fall at such a time, rather then at another, it being as possible to fall out at any other time as at this, and as possible not to fall out at this time as at any other, and all these possibilities equally included in the essence of God I say againe, how came this to be a truth, answer mee, not of its owne nature, for the contrary hereunto is supposed on both sides, namely, that of his owne nature it was onelyonly possible: therefore you must assigne some cause from without; and because you like not to acknowledg the determination of Gods will to be the cause hereof, you must alledge some other cause. I see you usually flye to the infinitie of Gods knowledge, but in vaine; for Gods knowledge is to know truths, and not to make them.

Lastly, by this doctrine of yours it will follow that God knew the world would be made, before ever God determined to make…, to wit, by vertue of his infinite knowledge. Now what a faire way this openeth unto Atheisme, let the wise and learned Reader judge indifferently. Heretofore I confesse you seemed to maintaine the existence of all things from everlasting in eternity; which if it were true, then this might minister an apparent ground of Gods knowledge of all things, be they never so contingent, for as much as they are supposed to exist before him. But here you have assigned nothing for the ground hereof hitherunto, but onelyonly the infinity of Gods knowledge. But in the next sentence I thinke you cast about for this also. As Balaam did many wayes to serve his turne in the course of his divinations; and all is fish that comes to your net; so it may serve your turne to oppose in this question, the determination of Gods will. Well, thus p. 327it is: For as Gods essence is present in every place as it were an ubiquitarie center, (for indeed if a body were infinite, everywhere might be imagined a center: and you doe much affect to compare the nature of God to impossibilities, and sometimes preferre him so farre, as to compare him to just nothing,) so is his eternity or infinite duration coexistent to every part of succession, and yet withall is round about. Hee it is that drives things future upon us, being from eternity as well beyond as on this side of them. Wee have beene acquainted with these absurd paradoxes of yors heretofore, so that now wee cease to admire them. But first we do deny the comparative coherence So, which hath force of an argument by way of comparison: but it hath no force here, because there is no proportion betwixt the things compared. Gods presence is in every place, no marvell; for all places doe ex…st together. And so if all times did exist together, God eternity should coexist with all times: But it is impossible that all times should exist together, because time consists in succession of parts: But as one time and the things therein shall exist after another, so God shall coexist with them. So then Gods presence is in every place, and Gods eternity coexists with every time, and that indivisibly: but with a great difference: for God all at once coexists with everie place, but not all at once doth he coexist with every time, but successively; for as much as time doth not otherwise exist then successively. Nay the comparison is flat against you. For like as God not onelyonly coexisteth at this present with everie place that is existent, but shall coexist with a world tenne times as big, whensoever by the will of God such a world shall have existence, but for the present coexisteth onelyonly with the places that are: In like sort God for the present coexisteth only with time present, and with al things in time present, but shall by vertue of eternity coexist also with all times to come, and all things therein tenne times longer then the world shall last, if so be that by the will of God the world should last ten times longer then it shall: but for the present he doth coexist onelyonly with the time present, and the things contained therein.

p. 328Yet this a…seth not from any divisible succession in God, in whom as there is no shaddow of change, so there can be no succession; but only from the divisible succession of thinges without God, both time and motion, & things subject thereunto, with all which God doth and still shall coexist in theire courses of succession, without succession in himselfe; Like unto a Pole fixed in a river that coexisteth with severall parts of water succeeding one another it selfe being unmoveable. Now that God doth not coexist at once by vertue of his eternity with all parts of time and the things therin, I demonstrate thus. If God at this time present did coexist with all parts of time, then all parts of time should at this present coexist with God, both time past and time to come; And by the same reason, before ever the World was, you might say that the whole course of time did coexist with God, And if coexist, then surely it did exist; and so time had an eternall existence as well as Gods eternity it selfe. It is true some have conceited that eternity doth ambire tempus, but only in this sence, that as it was before it, so it is after it; If they had sayd so it shall be after it, it were tolerable. For we beleive the World shall have an end. But I never yet heard or read of any but your selfe that made eternity to be round about it, so to make way for your circular duration: For in this sence time shall not only have two ends but two sides also, or rather neither end nor side as if it were rounde as a tennis ball.

In the prosecution of the same w…ld phrase, you tell us that God, by vertue of his eternity, is as well beyond all thing…s to come, as on this side of them. Belike as the Heavens are on either side of the earth, so eternity is on either side of time. And indeed if the parts of time were coexistent as the parts of heaven and earth are, it were to the purpose; but the succession of time in the parts therof marres the play and discovers the wildnesse of this fiction. That which we call beyond in space of place applied to time is rather longe before then longe after; & the reason is, because to be beyond, doth suppose existence either being as in place, or having bene as in time. But as for things that are to come herafter, they p. 329neither have existence at this present, nor ever had. But let it be applied as you will, so you speake plainely, that so we may encounter men and not shadowes. Say that God is after all things to come; I say this is false, and thus I prove it. To be after another is to suppose the existence of that other thing precedent. But things to come have not yet had …hiero existence, therfore God cannot be sayd to be after them. It is true to say that God shall be after all things to come in this World, for as much as after they are come and gone, Gods existence shall continue.

It is true as you say, Though God should create other creatures without the circumference of this World, they should be all within his presence. In like sorte though the World should last ten times longer then God hath appointed it, yet should God by vertue of his eternitie coexist with it: Herein the comparison holds with good congruity. But like as Gods presence is not with a greater circumference till such a circumference doth actually exist; in like sorte Gods duration doth not coexist with any duration to come, untill it existeth. And in each case it is true that he gaines not any new existence, but only takes a denomination of coexistence with them; But not untill they doe exist; for till they exist they cannot be sayd to have any existence with him, which before they had not. And this your selfe make the ground of denomination of Gods coexistence with them. We doe not only acknowledge that things when they come to passe, doe fall within the Spheare of Gods actuall knowledge, but also before they come to passe, we say, they are knowne to God, and the precise time when every thing shall come to passe. I have already shewed the absurdity of that conceit of yours of environing succession. Now I say it is directly false to say that Gods knowledge is coexistent to every successive act. And the reason is not farre off but at hand. For if God or his knowledge were coexistent to every successive act thē every successive act were also coexistent to Gods knowledge and to God himselfe; and if coexistent, then existent; and so both time past and time to come and all things in them should at this present be existent. p. 330And but erst your selfe professed that God takes the denomination of coexistence with his creatures upon their existence in him, which before they had not: which is manifestly contradictious to those wilde assertions which you have so often scattered, namely, that God is coexistent with every successive act, and with all times.

Likewise in the next sentence you acknowledge that the creature gets coexistence with eternity anew; therefore it had not alwaies coexistence with it, nor it with the creature: Gods knowledge is still the same, and therefore not so much as in this respect is there any motion or change in God; and consequently no succession, though the things that are known may succeed in their coexistence to one another, and consequently in their coexistence with God.

The Scripture without distinction professeth that God both is, and was, and is to come: which yet is not to signifie any priority or posteriority in him in respect of any things succeeding in him, but onelyonly in respect of things succeeding without him. For as much as the things that are past did coexist with God at the time of their being, and things long before them also were not before God. In like sort things to come, whensoever they come shall finde God coexistent with them, and whensoever they vanish, shall leave Gods existence still continuing the same behinde them. It is true, Gods knowledge may bee said to containe our knowledge, in as much as he knowes all that we know, and much more: but it is absurd to say that his knowledge resembles ours; for there is no likenesse betweene them.

But whereas you touch by the way that things to come to us are onelyonly to come, thereby you imply one of your well known paradoxes, that things to come are not onelyonly to come unto God; the meaning is, that they are not onelyonly to come to him, but present to him also. It is enough for you to dictate mysteries. By the same proportion of truth, things past, which are onelyonly past to us, are not so onelyonly to him, but unto him they are not onelyonly past, but present also; this is good hobgoblin stuffe, whether you count it Philosophy or Divinity. p. 331In the next place you tell us that For us to apprehend a thing past as contingent, is not impossible. About the coherence I will not question you; you take libertie to discourse at pleasure. In the very next page you say that it is in our power to make a thing necessary to morrow, which is truly contingent this day. As I take it, it proceeds in congruity to that Maxime, Quicquid est quando est necesse est esse. And therefore if once I doe that which is in my power to doe, when I once have done it, it is necessary, whereas before it was contingent. … on the contrary you will have it not impossible to apprehend a thing as contingent after it is done and past, whereas this was wont to bee held impossible to God himselfe to make undone that which was already done. In a word it is held flat contradiction. For to be contingent is to be indifferent to be or not to be. But that which is, neither is nor possibly can be indifferent to be or not to be. Yet herehence it followeth not, that it came to passe necessarily there is no colour for any such inference. For what? doth nothing come to passe but necessarily? but whether it comes to passe necessarily or contingently, being once come to passe the contingencie of it is at an end, and past irrecoverably. For it is no longer indifferent to be or not to be. And your caution is very idle that you put in, lest upon the passing of a contingent thing we should conceive it to come to passe necessarily. Yet notwithstanding that which comes to passe contingently in respect of the manner of existence, may of necessity come to passe upon supposition of Gods decree, as the calling of the Iewes, the destruction of Antichrist which we looke for. So the restoring of the Iewes out of the captivity of Babylon, the burning of the Prophets bones upon the Altar by Iosiah, the killing of Sennacherib by his owne children, the taking of Zedechiah and carrying him into Babylon, yet so as he could never see it, for his eyes should be pulled out first.

Againe, though they come to passe contingently, yet why should you deny, or would not have us conceive that they fal out certainly? though uncertainly to man, yet undoubtedly whatsoever comes to passe, comes to passe most certainly unto p. 332God: yet no doubt but the production of it was contingent, yea and sometimes casuall in respect of second causes. The event is not necessary in respect of the manner of producing it. But being produced, now it must needs be produced, and it is impossible it should be otherwise.

Neither doth our knowledge of any thing change the nature of it. Neither is our knowledge necessary (though you say so) of things past or present but merely contingent in the generation therof also; Though as of all other contingents, so of our knowledge also, it is true that when once it is, it is imimpossible it should not be, or not have bene at all. In a word upon the existence therof, the indifferency therof, to be or not be, is utterly vanished. But herhence to inferre the like, not of Gods foreknowledge only but of his decrees also, is a very wilde inference. Yet we willingly grant that Gods knowledge of things doth no way alier the nature of them, or of the manner of their ex…stence. No nor his decree neither. For though he decreed to make the World, yet the World we say came to passe never a whit the lesle contingently. And though God hath decreed the fall of Antichrist, and that Babylon shall be burnt with fire: yet these shall come to passe never a whit the lesse contingently. For God decrees not onelyonly res ipsas, but modus rerum, to witt that some things shall come to passe necessarily, and somethings contingently. And so the effectuall will of God in Aquinas his judgement is the rate of all contingency. But yet notwithstanding even from the foreknowledge of God there riseth a necessitie of consequence as thus: If God foreknowes such a thing shall come to passe, then it is necessary it shall come to passe, though perhaps he knowes it shall come to passe not necessarily but contingently. How much more doth such a necessitie arise from the decree of God as thus. If God hath decreed the World should have an end, it is necessary the World should have an end, yet not necessarily but contingently. For as God did worke freely in making the World, so shall he worke as freely in setting an end unto it. So farre are we from saying that Gods decrees take away contingency p. 333from any thing, as that rather we averre that it doth maintayne it.

And you shewe either a great deale of ignorance in not understanding aright your adversaries tenets which you impugne, or that which is a great deale worse in dissembling and corrupting it. But I beare with you, it may be you fashion it in such a kinde as may best give way to some conceytes of yours, and very fewe arguments. Yet by your leave the more infallible any knowledge is, either of God, Angell or man, the more fitt it shall be to found a necessitie of consequence thereupon thus; It is infallibly foreknowne, ergo it is necessary that it should be. Here followeth another extravagant of yours, for insteede of opposing that opinion which maintaynes the ground of Gods foreknowledge of future contingents to be the determination of his will, you leave that and oppose the derivaiton of Gods infallibilitie from the absolute necessitie of the event. An opinion that I never knewe any man patronize; but it seemes you would draw their opinion unto this, who maintayne that God foreknowes all things by seeing the determination of his owne will concerning the futurition of them. Now, I pray you, of those that take this course who ever sayd that the events decreed by God were of absolute necessitie? Yourselfe I have observed to professe, that upon Gods decree touching the futurition of a contingent thing, as namely, the apprehensiō of a Traytour, the successe of the meanes tending thereunto is absolutely necessary as in this very chapter in the end of the first Section. But never was I acquainted with any of our divines that sayd so much. We professe that the producing of contingents is absolutely contingent, only this contingent production they holde to be necessary upon supposition of the will of God. And Durand wondereth that any should conceive things to fall out necessarily in respect of the will of God, whereas on the contrary he conceaves it to be a cleare thing, that not only contingent thinges but even necessary th…nges also (as we call them) doe come to passe, all contingently in respect of the will of God.

p. 334They that ground Gods foreknowledge of future contingents upon things without God, doe usually ground it not upon any absolute necessity of the events themselves, as upon the causes producing them, which though they worke contingently and not necessarily, yet this they th…nke nothing hindreth the infallibility of God knowledge, because hee is able to comprehend all failings possible, and to discerne in what case they take place, and in what not; which in effect is to rest upon the condition of Gods knowledge in it selfe, as you here doe: and because it is infinite therehence to conclude that it is infallible. An invention of late yeares, and brought in by the Iesuits, together with their doctrine concerning scientia media.

For whereas before there was onelyonly a double knowledge found in God, the one antecedent to his will which they called scientia simplicis intelligentiae, whereby hee understood his owne essence, and therewithall all necessary truths, and all things possible; the other subsequent to the will of God, which they called scientia visionis, and hereby he knoweth all things past, present, and to come, all which they acknowledge to be dependant upon the will of God; the Iesuits have of late yeares devised a middle knowledge betweene th…se two, and it consists in know…ng not things necessary, nor th…ngs contingent, that have beene, are, or shall be, but in knowing what would be in such or such a case; as for example, what a man in such a case, thus or thus moved and induced unto good or evill, would doe or not doe

And the ground hereof they make the infinitie of Gods knowledge, as I remember Vasquius expresly professeth so much, and so (as well they may) make this infinitie of Gods knowledge the ground of knowing all future contingents. For although Suarez takes upon him to confute Palatius, who as he hath maintained that God knowes future contingents De absol. scientia fut. conting. l. 1 c. 5.by reason of the efficacy of his knowledge, yet judge I pray, whether himselfe differ from him when he come to prove his owne opinion, which is this: In Deo sola essentia ejus est sufficiens ratio cujuscunque cognitionis possibilis, cum in virtute & efficacitate p. 335Ibid. c. 8.intelligendi sit simpliciter infinita. In God his essence alone is a sufficient cause of all knowledge possible, considering that virtue and efficacy of knowing it is simply infinite. So Vasquez; Deus, quae sua est infinitas, efficacitate sui intellectus omnia intelligibilia intellectu suo penetrat: and againe, Quia divinus intellectus infinitae virtutis est, quicquid intelligibile est necessario debet amplecti & intelligere. Nam si aliquid ab ipso infinito intellectu non posset intelligi, à quo alio posset? And indeed were future contingents intellig…ble, there were no further question to be made, but that his knowledge were sufficient to comprehend them. But it is apparent that no such contingent is knowable as a thing to come, more th…n as a thing not to come in its owne nature, and consequently God can no more know that it is to come, then that it is not to come; unlesse that which in its owne nature is onelyonly possible be determined this way or that way, and consequently made future or not future.

This objection Suarez foreseeth and proposeth: Sicut divina Lib. de scien fut. conting.potentia non potest facere id quod de se non est factibile, ita nec scientia divina scire potest id quod ex se scibile non est, neque certum judicium ferre de eo quod in se omnino incertum est: Nam neque scientia potest ferri extra objectum suum, neque potest suo modo non commensurari illi in certitudine, & infallibilitate, quia requirit adaequationem. And to this purpose he alledgeth Thomas, saying; Scientiam non posse esse necessariam, nisi objectum sub aliqua ratione qua attingitur, necessitatem habeat. Et hoc modo dici potest requiri ex parte objecti certitudinem objectivam, id est, talem modum veritatis, quae apta sit, ut certum & infallibile judicium feratur, quod sane habet omnis veritas hoc ipso quod determinata est. In which latter words he gives in briefe a better and fairer answer, then in the whole distinction following, if he be able to make good what he saith. For indeed every truth determinate is a sufficient object of knowledge.

But I would know of him or you, how comes it to bee true that such a contingent shall exist, whereas in his owne nature it is onelyonly possible to exist, and indifferent as well not to exist as to exist. As for example, how is it true that to morrow p. 336it shall rayne, rather then that to morrowe it shall not rayne, seeing in it selfe it is no more inclinable to the one then to the other. If the one were true and the other false, then there were no question, but God should knowe the one to be true and the other to be false. But seeing there is no reason given by Suarez, why the one should be true rather then the other; there is no reason why one should be knowne of God to be true more then the other. And therefore Suarez layeth for a ground that future contingents have from all eternitie a determinate truth, but shewes not how they come to have their truthe; nor how thinges merely possible in themselvs come to be future, which as it is apparēt, could not possibly be without a cause. But had he gone about this worke, which indeede was most necessary, the truth would soone have appeared in his colours. For it will soone be found that nothing could be the cause hereof but the will of God. Which was the opinion as he professeth both of Ricardus, and of Scotus, and in effect of Cajetan and of many of the Thomist; and that Alexander of Hales favoureth it.

Neither could he be ignorant that Alvarez maintaynes it to have bene the opin…on of Aquinas also. To the same opinion Durand not only inclines as Vasqu us writes in 1. disp. 65. cap. 1. but to it only adheres as the same Vasquius notes in the sa…e disputation, cap. 2. Durands words are playne; Not only Gods prescience of a thing to come is joyned with his will to have t… come, in 1. dist. 35. q 3. num. 25. Deum prescire, A fore, coexigit. Deum velle, A fore. But also that his prescience is built hereupon ibidem dist. 39. q. 1. num. 10. in these words. Repraesentatur res fore vel non fore per essentiam divinam, non ut est solum essentia virtualiter rem omnem continens, sed ut est volens rem possibilem sore, & quia libere vult rem fore. And Vasquius himselfe not only acknowledgeth that from the decree of Gods will may sufficiently be gathered the certeintie of knowledge which God hath of future contingents, in 1. disp. 65. cap. 4. but also proposing the same objection that Suarez doth above mentioned, answeareth it not as Suarez doth by saying, Things contingent have a determinate p. 337truth, as touching their being for the the time to come, whereof we nothing doubt, but shewes whence they have it, which point Suarez declined wholy tanquam praecipitium as a breaknecke to his owne opinion.

But Vasquius deales more plainly, and professeth that future things of merely possible become future by vertue of the decree of God. Observandum est (sayth he) futurum ita esse objectum scientiae Dei infallibilis eo ipso quod re ipsa futurum In 1. dist. 65. cap. 4. num. 22.est, ut tamen nostro modo intelligendi supponat decretum Dei, tan quam causam ante quam nihil intelligitur vere esse futurum. And agayne, Quia nulla res ex se futura est, sed ex voluntate & omnipotentia Dei, ideo antequam intelligantur futura, supponitur Dei voluntas ut causa illius non quidem durationis ordine sed rationis, & num. 23. Sicut creatura nondum possibilis est, donec Deus intelligatur esse, qui est primum omnium ens, sic etiam creatura nondum est futura donec decretum voluntatis esse intelligatur, ex quo ut ex causa futura est. Thus Vusquius mainteyning the infinity of Gods knowledge to be the ground of his knowledge of future contingents, as well as you doe, yet doth not make use of this his opinion to oppose the forgoing of the determination of Gods will as you doe. Yet what have you conferred to the overthrowe of that opinion which you impugne, that deserves to be named the same day with the least part of the meanest of those that have mainteyned it. You only shewe your teethe, and proceede confidently in dictating what pleaseth you without any evidence of reason to confirme what you so boldly propos…. I long to come to an end of this.

In the next place you give some reason for your assertion. As when you say, We are able by Gods permission to lay a necessitie upon contingents and so to foreknowe them, yet our knowledge still is but finite. Hence you seeme willing to inferre that therefore God seeing his knowledge is infinite is able to know future contingents without laying any necessitie upon them, by the determination of his will. I am very glad to heare you reason, because it is so rare with you herein like to Hector Naevianus, Qui Philosophari volebat sed paucis.

Henry the seventh of England was wont to say he desired p. 338to look his dangers in the face: so I desire to know what my opposite hath to say against the truth I defend. I have beene so long exercised in these points, and encountred such champions, that I have no cause to feare your colours, nor powder and shot neither: wherefore in the first place I answer, that the difference betweene knowledge finite and infinite doth not require that infinite knowledge should extend so farre as to know things unknowable, for that were to extend beyond his object. But rather herein they differ, of things knowable, finite knowledge takes notice onelyonly of some; infinite knowledge comprehends all. Now things contingent till they are determined to come to passe, or not to come to passe, are not knowable that they shall come to passe, nor are knowable that they shall not come to passe; and consequently cannot be knowne that they shall come to passe, or knowne that they shall not come to passe.

For if the understanding of man doth apprehend a thing as future which is not future, herein he cannot be said to know but to erre rather. Now that which in its owne nature is onelyonly possible, cannot passe from this condition into the condition of a thing future, without some cause. Now you have shewed no cause of this alteration, nor you list not to inquire into it, it is too hot for your fingers. For by inquirie it would be found that no cause hereof can be assigned, but onelyonly the will of God.

Secondly, I deny that God by determining things contingent, and in their nature meerly possible, making them future, doth lay any necessity upon them, but rather decreeth a contingent manner of production unto them, answerable unto their natures. For as hee decreeth that necessary things shall come to passe necessarily, so hee decreeth that contingent things shall come to passe contingently.

Thirdly, as touching your antecedent, I desire to know what things contingent those are, whereupon we can lay any necessity, whereby to foretell them, for it passeth my imagination to divine. This may well goe for your owne. I have been acquainted with many disputants in this argument, I never p. 339met with any argument of any kinne to this. Certainly there is some exquisite curiosity in it. For you suppose men may doubt of this, and therefore you undertake to prove it: but when? In your treatise of the divine providence, that I heare is newly printed, we shall heare of it belike ere long, in case you doe not forget what you promised: and the reason why I may doubt hereof is this; In the end of the fifth Section of this Chapter you told us that you were anon to intimate, that the reservation of such liberty unto God himselse, (as never to passe any decree whereby to binde his owne hands) is a point of high perfection. Now this anon of yours is yet to come, for hitherto since we parted from that section wee have received no intimation hereof. But be it, that you will bee as good as your word, what is that which you undertake to demonstrate? That some events which are to day truly contingent, may by our industrie become to morrow truly necessary. But this needs no demonstration. For whatsoever I doe, by doing it, I make that necessarie, which before was contingent. For every Sophister knowes out of Aristotle, and out of common sense also, that Omne quod est quando est necesse est esse. But this is nothing to your purpose. For you speake of such a necessity laid upon contingents, as whereby we might foreknow them. But by doing things I cannot fo…know them; for knowledge of things upon the doing of them, is rather after-knowledge then fore knowledge.

And therefore though heretofore I thought of no other meaning of these words of yours then this, yet now by pondering better upon it I conceive you have a farther reach, and that of a mysterious nature: for as much as you are loath to utter it, and give an instance of that which you deliver. Yet why should you be loath to utter that which you presume no intelligent Christian will deny? This makes me looke back againe upon your words, to try whether I can start the mysterie. And hereupon I discover other mysteries, though not the maine; as when you say, We are able (after this necessity layd upon them by our selves) infallibly to foreknow and foretell. Now this speech is mysterious and imperfect: for you doe not tell p. 340us what we may foreknowe and foretell whether it be the things themselves whereupon we have layd the necessitie spoken of, or rather some thinges els; but neither of these thinges doe you acquaint us with here. For if you had I should make no question, but if we might foreknowe them, whatsoever they be, we might without any more adoe foretell them, if we were not tonguetied.

Now no necessitie can we lay upon any thing but by doing it, and such a thing cannot be sayd hereupon to beforeknowne, therfore undoubtedly your meaning is, that by doing something before contingent, and therby laying a necessitie upon, it we may foreknowe another thing. Now this may prove nothing to your present purpose; and yourselfe in this argumentation quite besides the cushion. For Gods foreknowledge which you impugne is the foreknowledge of a thing contingent, by willing it.

But this foreknowledge of man, shall be the foreknowledge of one thing by willing and doing of another; now these are no more suitable then the hares head and the goose gibletts. And to proceede a litle further in my conjectures, because your concealments put me to it, I say your concealment is most unseasonable. For as much as you conceale that whereupon your argument depends, like unto a Physitian that giving a Medicine to his patient, he should tell him there is one necessary ingredient more belonging to it, and he must suspend the taking of it, untill he goeth to the East-Indies to ferche it. In which case his patient may have his greene cap on his head before he returne.

Suppose faith and repentance be those contingent things upon which I may lay a necessitie by beleiving and repenting; will you say hereupon I may foretell my salvation? If this be it, this againe is nothing to the purpose in a second respect. For the assurance of my salvation is not so much built upon my faith and repentance, as upon my perseverance in faithe and repentance unto the end. And I cannot hereupon foreknowe or foretell my salvation untill I am dead, which is not to foreknowe it, much lesse to foretell it.

p. 341Agayne my assurance of salvation depends not so much upon my faithe and repentance, and perseverance in both, as upon the revelation that God hath made, that as many as finally believe and repent shall be saved; and also that if once I believe and repent truly I shall continue therein to the end; which I have cause to doubt whether you believe. Agayne doe you thinke indeede, that it is by Gods permission only that men doe believe and repent? and doe you thinke good to deny that God doth effectually worke them unto faith and repentance? You must needes take this course. For if God be indeede the Authour of faith & repentance, thē he did decree to give men faith & repentance, & so contingents should be decreed by God, and God should foreknowe them by seeing the purpose of his owne will to bestowe them.

Thus I have ventured to boult out the mysteries which you conceale. If I have missed of the marke, I will aime at it no more and give it over with a mysterium quaere, as Schoolemen sometimes when they have hunted themselves out of breathe they have ended their discourse with a Responsionem quaere. Yet we have not finished this Section. The very next sentence is a Crevecoeur unto me, I can make no sense of it: Succession is a scroule (as we imagine it) containing severall columnes of contingency or indifferent possibilities, of which only so many or so much of any as in revolution of time take inke and are unfolded become visible to men and Angells. Alas, what disaster hath befallen me, that I should divert from other studies wherein I fought the Lords battayles against forren enemies, and encountred with errours plainly sett forthe nothing involved with affected phrases, or streynes of expression in farre fetcht Metaphors, but strengthned with such armes as witt could afford without Rhetoricall painting, their manner of fight well knowne unto me, and in confuting whereof I profited myselfe and gained increase of knowledge and of abilitie in mainteining the truthe of God. And now to be cast upon such discourses the opening of the meaning, whereof in one sentence sometimes costs me more paines then the answering of their best argument, and all this without any p. 342profit redounding unto my selfe, my time wasted, my knowledge no whit bettered: well, jacta est alea, we must proceed, and since our hand is put to this plo…gh, though oftentimes I looke backe, and come to a parle about not intermission only but interruption also, yet I must not breake off. Succession is as much as time, and this you compare to a scroule containing possibilities. Out upon the shallownesse of my wits, that can comprehend no analogie in this comparison. For though all changeable things are said to bee in time, yet nothing like unto writing which is in a scroule, as in the subject of it. For time is rather an antecedent to things durable, then things durable an antecedent to time. But to say that time contains possibilities, is a wilder speech then the former. For before ever any time was, possibilities were as many as now, and more also. For the world was possible, and every part of it, and every thing that since hath beene, or shall be, even before the world was, was possible like as the world was. Aga…ne, the duration of possibilties hath no succession; for if it had, then time should have beene before the world was.

By unfolding of these possibilities, I thinke you intend the bringing of them into act, and this is to take ink, as you phrasifie it. Now I had thought the scroule had contained onelyonly those things that are written in it, and so the things brought forth in it, and not those things that are not written, and so accordingly neither time is to be accounted to containe possibilities. Yet all things that are brought forth, surely are not visible to men, howsoever they are to Angels. So that when the painting with a great deale of intention of spirit and consideration, is washed off, the face of the sentence is but this. In time many things before possible are brought forth into act: what is mine understanding the better for this, or my readers either?

Then you returne to your former mad paradoxes, and tell us againe, (to inure us to your bugbeares, that hereafter wee might be the lesse affrighted with them,) that the Almightie lookes on all things as well from that end of time which is to come, as from that which is past; and that his infinite and eternall wisedome p. 343doth not only encompasse all things that come to pass, as the circumference doth the center, but penetrates the whole scroule of succession from end to end, more clearely then the Sunnes brightnesse doth the perspicuous ayre. To this I answer, that it is indifferent unto man in the course of his knowledge, to take notice of things that have beene either from the beginning of the world to Noahs flood, or from Noahs flood to the beginning of the world. So likewise it is indifferent unto us to take notice of things done from this day upwards to the beginning of the world, or from the beginning of the world to this day.

As for things to come they are unknowne unto us. But if they were knowne unto us, as by revelation they may, it were as easie for us to take notice of them successively from the end of the world, rising upwards unto this day, or proceeding from this day unto the end of the world. As for notice of them all at once, it is impossible to be taken by us, our nature disposeth us to understand things onelyonly successively one after another. Now it is without question that all things are knowne to God that have beene from the beginning of the world unto this day, and that shall bee from this day to the end of the world. And therefore if God were to take notice of them, and that in a successive manner as we doe, it were indifferent for him to take into consideration first the things that have been the first yeare of this world, then those things that came to passe the next yeare, and so forwards unto this present yeare, and so successively to take notice of what shall be the next yeare, and so onwards unto the end of the world. Or otherwise he might begin to take notice of those things that shall come to passe the last yeare of the world, then what shall come to passe the yeare before it, and so upwards unto this yeare, and thence proceed to consider what hath beene the last yeare, and so upwards unto the first yeare of the world.

But albeit this kind of successive consideration be incident unto man, yet it is not so with God. He hath from everlasting knowne what from the beginning of the world unto the p. 344end should come to passe, and that not successively but all at once. For his whole knowledge and every part of it is everlasting. And therefore it is absurd to say that God knowes things from the beginning of the world unto the end, unlesse in this sence, God knowes all things, which things come to passe from the beginning of the World unto the end, thereby denoting the succession of things in the World, not in the knowledge of God. But much more absurd is it to say that God knowes all things from the end of the World to the beginning of it: because this speech can admitt no tolerable congruity of explication, like the former, namely by applying it, not to any succession in the knowledge of God, but to the succession of things in the World. For albeit that we may well say that things doe succeed in course from the beginning of the World to the end; yet it were absurd to say that things doe succeed in course from the end of the World to the beginning. You may as well say, A mans life hath continued not only from the beginning to the end, but also from the end unto the beginning, which is as much as to turn a mans heeles upwards, and place them where the head should be.

As for Gods incompassing of time as the circumference doth the center (wherunto you may adde the circular duration formerly spoken of) and the penetrating of the whole scroll of succession from end to end, wherein you so much please your selfe as in rare notions, I take them to be no better then sicke mens dreames: we have nauseated enough upon them, you needed not to have repeated them, yet you will have these conceyts of yours to be receyved for precious truths, as Mountebanks commend their oyles and balmes, and not so only, but to be as cleere as the Sunne also. It is well that paper blusheth not. Every man seeth how the brightnes of the Sunne doth pierce the ayre, doth every man acknowledge God to incompasse time by his eternitie? Sure I am Durand censures this conceit as absurd. Yet I deny not but that others might doate upon it as well as your selfe, taking it upon trust without examination.

p. 345And the corruptnes of mans mind may appeare in this very vanity, that he pleaseth himselfe many times in such notions as he understands not. Againe, doth every man that cleerly sees how the same peirceth the ayre, as cleerly see how Gods eternitie doth penetrate all time both all that is past and that which is to come, in such sort as indivisibly (for eternitie is indivisible) to coexist with it? For hitherto tends the reach of your me…ning. A most absurd conceyte. For therhence it would follow that all parts of time past, and all parts of time to come doe coexist together at this present; For if eternity doth now coexist with them, then at this present they must needs coexist with it, and consequently they must exist at this present, (otherwise how could they coexist) whence it followeth that both time past should be present, and also time to come, As absurd and voyd of all reason is that speeche of yours, whē you say that Gods finger hath drawne columus of possibilities. God knowes things possible, I confesse, but his finger hath not drawne these possibilities, no more thē he hath drawne himselfe and his owne omnipotent nature. For nothing is required to the denomination of the possibilitie of any thing, but this, that God is armed with allmightie power, whereby he is able to bring it to passe. Now amongst possible things some are brought forth immediately by God, some by second causes, whether by God or by second causes, they are all knowne to God, and who doubts now adayes of this? yet this is the whole contents of your last sentence, which you have commended unto us so embroydered with art, and with the needle worke of quilting eloquence, as if you travayled in childbirth to be delivered of words and phrases, which many times vent untruthes, commonly deliver but vulgar sence, and sometimes end in no sence. Yet when a man or oxe or asse brings forth any thing that is possible; you say it is like the embroyderer who fills the drawers obscure patterne with conspicuous branches of silke, gold, or silver, which yet notwithstanding is fulfilled in bringing forth that which is accoumpted the eigth deadly sinne among the Irishe; were ever quaint terms and silken similitudes worse bestowed? p. 346by the way forgetting that the Embroiderer himselfe is a second cause in bringing forth things possible into act, as well as a boy doth in playing at Top and scourge. And you may as well compare the Embroiderer to a boy playing at Top and scourge, as a boy playing at top and scourge to an Embroiderer. Turpe est difficiles habere nugas: If any man prove an ounce the wiser for this, he may soone prove as wise as Pauls steeple. I remember in the beginning you called this discourse of yours a paradise of contemplation, and I confesse I finde many flowres of Rhetoricke growing therein, and especially pre…ty similitudes, but by applying them they are utterly cast away, for commonly they serve either for the illustration of untruths, or very vulgar truths. And great pitty but they should finde a place among the toyes in London.

12. In the last place for a congruous explication of Austines and Gregories meaning, in passages before mentioned, you commend unto us certaine observations as necessary extracts of what hath hitherto beene delivered. This necessity I presume was no impeachment to the liberty of your will in broaching them, for my part I see no necessity at all of them, nor of this whole discourse of yours. In like sort as little necessary it was that my braines should be surbeaten so often in hunting after the involved sense of many sentences, thorow the thickets of wilde phrases and figures, and affected obscure expressions.

As touching the perfection of Gods knowledge uncapable of addition, therein we argue with you. Your next position is worthy of consideration; As Gods knowledge doth not make things to be, so neither doth the immutable or absolute certainty of his knowledge make things so knowne by him to be immutable, or absolutely necessarie either in themselves, or in respect of his eternall knowledge. To this I answer, first to the first member of your sentence, that great Divines from Austines daies to these daies have maintained that the knowledge of God is the cause of things. And the reason they give is th…s; because the knowledge of God is scientia artificis, the knowledge of a craftsmaster. Now the case is cleare, that craftsmasters by their p. 347knowledge doe worke and cause things. Yet I am content to helpe you with a distinction, if you will be pleased to accept of it. That the knowledge of God which is the knowledge of an artificer, is the scientia simplicis intelligentiae, whereby hee knowes all things possible, and how to order all things most conveniently to their ends. But the knowledge you speak of here proceeds of scientia visionis, wherby God ever knew what should come to passe: and this knowledge indeed is not the cause of things. But as for the later member of this your sentence, it might have been… so carried as to give your selfe satisfaction (if I be not deceived) and us also: as thus, So the certainty of Gods knowledge doth not make things certaine; or if you would adde the word necessarie we could have bo… with it, though it marreth the proport…on; which precisely is this, As knowledge doth not make things to be, so certaine knowledge doth not make things certainly to be. But you leaving out the word certainly, take away all evidence of proportion. Belike you would acknowledge that certaine knowledge doth make things certainly to be. But I doe not like the proposition, and the genius of your argument drawn from proportion, if it hath any force any way, hath force against it.

Now if I doe not acknowledge that certaine knowledge makes things certainly to bee, much lesse would I acknowledge that it makes things necessarily to be. There is so manifest reason against it, considering that all those things that fall our contingently, are as certainly knowne to God, as those things that come to passe certainly. Yet you (as …imorous men never thinke themselves sure enough,) are not content with this, but clogge your inference with other needlesse circumstances, as in saying, absolutely necessary, and that not in respect of themselves, but of Gods knowledge also: whereas without these the comparison was incongruous enough. And these circumstances I say are needlesse, because I would grant what you desire without these. But by your addition of these I perceive your meaning: for hereby you imply that it is necessary that things knowne by God shall come to passe: for though knowledge p. 348doth not make them to be, much lesse to be necessary, yet upon supposition of Gods knowledge, it followeth necessarily by way of argument, that such things as God foreknows shall come to passe. This is of an undoubted truth, which kind of necessitie is not any necessitie of being in the things themselves, but only of externall denomination upon supposition of Gods foreknowledge. And you doe in vaine seeme to strive against this; For can you deny this argument? God foreknowes that Antichrist shall be destroyed; therefore it is necessary that Antichrist shall be destroyed according to the time foreseene by God, neither will it herhence followe, that therefore it is absolutely necessary that Antichrist should be destroyed, as you very weakly suppose. For necessitie upon suppositiō onelyonly, commonly called necessitie of consequence was never yet taken for absolute necessitie by any that I knowe. I medle not with the terme immutable, because it is nothinge congruous in the application. For applyed to Gods knowledge, it signifieth that knowledge which havinge being cannot be altered, but applyed in this sense to the event that commeth to passe is untrue. For no event, especially contingent, after it comes to passe is immutable. If applyed to the manner of comming to passe, yet it is not congruous. For God knowing that it shall come to passe in a mutable manner (that is in a contingent manner, for if that be not your meaning, I know not what is) the immutability of Gods knowledge doth rather confirme the contingency of the event, then diminish it.

Yet you suppose some would inferre the contrary: but I assure you I am none of them, and that for the reason before mentioned. Yet still it holds good, that if God foreseeth such a thing shall come to passe; It followeth of necessity that the same thing shall come to passe, albeit not necessarily but contingently; when you say, Gods knowledge of things mutable (that is of the futurition of contingents; give me leave to construe you so, that I may fayrely understand you) is absolutely necessary, all Schoolemen I thinke that ever write are directly against you. And for good reason; for like as it was not at p. 349all necessary that such a course of contingent things should be in the world as now is, so neither was it necessary, much lesse absolutely necessary, that God should know this course; for if he had ordeyned another course of things (as it was very possible) then he had also knowne another course. But your meaning though incommodiously expressed I conceyve to be this: VponUpon supposition that thing should come to passe, it was necessary that God should know those things. For it is impossible that he should be ignorant of any thing that is to come: And this is a truth. But you have marred it by adding the word, absolutely. For to be necessary in the sense before mentioned, is to be necessary upon supposition only and not absolutely. Thus you see I would fayne have healed the incongruity of your position, but it will not be healed.

Agayne you tell us, that It is most true which S. Gregory sayth that things future doe not come upon God, as they doe upon us, that things present doe not passe from him or by him, as they doe from us. That which you take to be most true, I take to be most false, in the sense wherin you deliver it. For like as they passe from us by ceasing to coexist with us, so they passe also from God as ceasing to coexist with him. And as they come upon us by beginning anew to coexist with us, so they come upon God also, as beginning anew to coexist with him. The conforming of space of time, with space of place, doth abuse your understanding, and cast you into errour ere you are aware, though you will not be perswaded of it. In space of place it is true things both comming towards us yet doe not come towards God; and passing by us and from us, yet doe not passe by God or from God.

The reason whereof is, because God doth coexist with all places, and filleth all but man doth not. And no marveile. For all places doe actually exist, and God existing too, they are truly sayd to coexist together.

But as for all the parts of time they doe not exist together, and therefore consequently cannot bee said to coexist with God, neither God at once to coexist with them. But as they p. 350doe exist by succession one after another, so is God said to coexist with them, not by reason of any succession in God, but onelyonly in the creature, and as wee lose our coexistence with creatures that cease to be, so doth God. For coexistence is an externall denomination attributed unto God from the existence of the creatures. In which sence he is said to be He that was, and is, and is to come; to wit, in respect of his coexistence which was with things that are past, and which is with things that are present, and which shall bee with things that are to come, to w…t, when they are come.

But besides this succession in man of coexistence with other creatures, there is also a succession in man which is not in God. For he groweth or diminisheth in the quantity of his body, he is changed and altered to and fro in the qualities both of body and soule. In body sometimes hot, sometimes cold, sometime faire, sometimes foule. In soule he hath for a while a growth in knowledge, afterward hee … and decayeth in knowledge. As for the duration of his essence, that is without succession, as the Angels are. And to continue the same as God doth, is not to gaine ought, but to keep that which he hath. God is alwayes; so are Angels since the time they have beene. The manner of Gods duration is indivisible; such also is reputed the duration of Angels; whom Schoolemen acknowledge, not to be measured by time, but by Aevum as touching their substance; onelyonly as touching their thoughts, whereof there may be a succession, they have invented a discreet time to be the measure thereof. God loseth no existence by antiquity: man neither loseth nor gets existence by continuance. For how should the continuation of existence be the losing of it? and how can hee get that which he hath already? Accidents are gotten and lost, I confesse, nothing so in God. Thus your fancies cast about to gaine some confirmation of your former erroneous conceit, of Gods coexistence with all parts of time; but nothing serves your turne. If by continuance alone we did gaine any thing, which before we had not, God himselfe should gaine something which before he had not. For without doubt hee hath p. 351continuance. Times passing (you say) exonerate themselves into the Ocean of his infinite duration without inlarging it; Times comming incessantlie flowe from it without diminution of it. No doubt you please your selfe in these expressions: To me they are worse then Empedocles his Androprora were to Aristotle. There is no canting like unto this. The waters that run into the Sea, are a part of the Sea; thence they came, and thither they returne, as Salomon telleth us. And therefore no marvell Eccles. 1…Eccl 1if the Sea neither is diminished by their egresse, nor by their regresse enlarged. No creatures duration is a part of Gods duration, as the rivers are part of the sea. And how doth our duration flow from Gods, but as an efficient cause, and that equivocall, that is wholly different? but water doth not come from the Sea, as from an efficient, much lesse equivocall, but as a part from the whole. Neither indeed doth our duration proceed from Gods duration, but from his will. For our duration is our existence continued, and this from the will of God. For he worketh all things according to the Eph. 1. 12.Eph 1:12counsell of his will.

Thus we can devise how our duration comes from God, though farre different from the flowing of the water from the Sea: but how our durations doe exonerate themselves into God, or into his duration, it surpasseth the sphere of my imagination to devise. I doe not thinke Paracelsus was ever able to interprete this. Yet some say he heard the devill reade a lecture through a grate in the Vniversity of Toledo. Yet you have not done traversing your ground. Times future (you say) are said to come upon us, or to meet us, because our duration or existence cannot reach to future things whilest they are future. Your figure Catachresis when will it be at an end? when we talke of reaching, we suppose the thing to have existence whereat we reach, but time future as yet exists not. Yet you thinke God doth reach it by coexistence with it. Yet I marke of late you forbeare th…s phrase. Is it not because it doth manifestly discover the errour of your conceit? For to coexist with things future, doth imply that things future coexist, and consequently exist, and so they are present, and not future. The very Angells p. 352are not of so long standing to day as they shall be to morrow. This I confesse is something, but I would gladlie know what inference you make herehence.

Angells have had a beginning; God hath not: if God had a beginning, as Angells have had, every day he should be of longer duration then he was the former, yet without any change, and consequently without succession. But will you inferre herehence, therfore God hath coexistence with things future? A consequence of no coulour of probability; and the consequent in it selfe implying manifest contradiction as before I have shewed. Till future things exist, we have no coexistence with them; nor God neither. For if God did coexist with them, they should coexist with God, & consequently exist, and so cease to be future, and forthwith become present. Yet you labour to prove the contrary; and so you may, and sweate too, and be never a whit the nearer to that you seeke for. God is every way before time, (you say) that is, not onelyonly before it, as we accompt (he is before that which is to come and so are we also, but he was before all Worlds) but after it and behind it also. For that which we accompt after or behind time, you call before it; that so with the better grace you may attribute it unto God. But we like plaine fellowes, love to speake plainlie, and to call a spade a spade. And in the like language we deny that God is after time to come, and prove it thus. To be in duration after any thing is to be while that other thing is past, or at least, the first ex…stence of it; but God in this sence cannot be sayd to be after time to come, because time to come is neither yet past nor yet existent. Yet at length when divinations will not serve your turne, you thinke to have gotten a text of Scripture for it. Gods duration you say is Yesterday, to day to morrowe and the same for ever. It is well you did not quote Scripture, least so your penne might have bene censured as Corruptor stilus for putting into the text to morrowe, and that in small letters suitable with the former. Perhaps you may say, why may he not be as well sayd to be to morrowe, as to be Yesterday. I grant the proportion of truth in both; but where doe you find it, p. 353to be sayd of God that He is yesterday. Take heed of adulter sensus which may be as bad as Corruptor stilus. Not in the Hebrewes where it is onelyonly sayd that Christ is the same yesterday, and to day and for ever. Not that he is Yesterday, nor that he is To morrow; but rather to the contrary thus, He was, he is, and he is to come: But still the same in opposition to alteration, more wayes then you have expressed; nor to alteration onelyonly, but to all possibilitie of alteration. For he is of necessary being. Tis false to say, that In his duration all thinges are. It beeing neither true formally as it is manifest (for time is no part of eternity) nor eminently. For it is nor Gods eternity that produceth things, or maintayneth the duration of things, but the will of God armed with power and wisedom to doe every thing. At first sight, I thought to have made no exception, against the last sentence; but upon second thoughts two members of the three seeme to be as faultie as any. For things future have no being at all in esse reali, as touching reall being, they are in esse cognito and esse volito, knowne by God and decreed to come to passe in due time. So likewise things past have no being at all, only they are knowne of, and were decreed by God, to be in such a time as now is past. And how can they be sayd to be in God? Not formally as is manifest; nor eminently, for he cannot produce things past. For that were to make them not to be past. Yet you end in a truth, that Thinges present cannot subsist without him. I would you had both begun, and continued so. Yet this you corrupt with a needlsse amplification, That presence cannot subsist without him, which being but a relation requires no distinct operation, to susteyne it, distinct from that which susteyneth the foundation.

In the end of the fifth Section you promised to intimate a certaine point of high perfection in God consisting in the reservation of his libertie; but since that time we never heard of it more.