Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 2 · Chapter 8 (2 of 3)

Discovery of Jacksons Vanity · Section 2 · Chapter 8 (2 of 3)

p. 281The first is, Shall we then graunt that Gods knowledge is antecedent, and his foreknowledge consequent to his decrees? To this out of that which hath beene formerly delivered may be answered. There is a knowledge goes before Gods will, called scientia simplicis intelligentiae th… knowledge of what may be, or is fitt to be, there is another knowledge called scientia visionis, that is the knowledge of what shall be, and thi… followeth after the will of God; and I know no tolerable divine that did deny it, untill the opinion of scientia media rose up; which the Authors themselves confesse to be a new invent…on; And here as if this opinion were both Law and Gospell unto you, you …ise up in grave and supercilious manner to censure the contrary.

Now as for the terme of foreknowledge; I answere the knowledge of what may be, or is fitt to be, goes before the will of God, and so may be called the foreknowledge of God; but the knowledge that things shall be, though it followeth Gods will, yet may it be called foreknowlege in respect of the event of the things themselves. For the things exist in time, but God did know, that they should be, from all eternitie, like as from all eternitie he did decree the futurition of them. Your second interrogatorie is this, Or shall we say God did inevitably decree the obliquitie of Iewishe blasphemy against his Sonne because he did most certainly foreknowe it? You p. 282never shewed your teeth till now, by this I perceave what you aime at, which hitherto you have beene ashamed to professe in plaine termes, namely, that future contingents which come to passe in the World are not decreed. But what meane you to deny that, in this cunning manner, which you durst not deny openly. For the syllogisme you proposed to answere contained this, in plaine termes in the Minor thus, All things that come to passe are decreed to come to passe: which if you had but in plaine termes denyed, your solution had beene plaine and briefe, whereas you neglecting that course did fetche a great compasse insteed of answering to requite us with another argument whereby to inferre a proposition contradictory to our conclusion.

Secondly though then you might have denyed it, yet now you cannot without contradicting your selfe. For you justified the truth of the premises in that syllogisme, in as much as all the exception you tooke against it was against the form… and not against the matter. For you told us, it was a fallacy, a very simple one. Now every Schollar knowes that where no other exception is taken against a syllogisme, but this, that it is a fallacy, this is as much as to justifie the truth of each proposition contained therein.

Thirdly, I give another reason why you have prejudiced your selfe from denying this. For you have professed that Nothing can come to passe otherwise, then God hath decreed it to come to passe, Iewishe blasphemy against the Sonne of God came to passe contingently and freely, therfore God hath decreed, that that very Iewishe blasphemy against the Sonne of God should come to passe contingently and freely, &c. what followeth hereupon but that therefore God ordeyneth it to come to passe, for to come to passe contingently and freely, is no terminus diminuens of comming to passe. You have nothing at all that I knowe to helpe you at this dead lift, but to fly to the confused manner of expressing that former proposition of yours, whereupon I take advantage, if so be your heart serve you to take hold thereof, whereof I much doubt. For it is true indeed that that proposition was not proposed p. 283categorically thus, Nothing shall come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed, it shall come to passe; whereupon I have taken advantage ag…inst you; but disjunctively thus Nothing can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed it shall or may come to passe. If you will helpe your selfe with this disjunctive you may; but I will be bold to tell you, it is like to prove a shamefull helpe, and such as seemes to be thrust in onelyonly to charme the dangerous issue of it (whereof it seems you had a glimpse) if it were left out. For consider, is it a sober speech to say that God hath decreed that things may come to passe? The possibilitie of thinges is knowne to God before ever his decrees goe forth. He knowes what he is able to bring to passe before he resolves what shall come to passe: And therfore too too absurde it is, to make the possibilitie of any thing the object of Gods decree. Sticke rather to this, and say, that thoughe God did ordaine, the Iewishe blasphemy against his Sonne should come to passe contingently & freely, yet therhence it followes not that he did ordaine it should come to passe: Whereabouts when we knowe your mind è renatâ consilium capiemus, we will thinke of a convenient answere, in the meane time I will proceede. Therefore in the fourthe place why should it seeme so uncouthe that God should decree this very blasphemy, as to be cryed downe at the very hearing of it, especially by Christians who knowe and beleeve the oracles of God, and acknowledge that passage. Act. 4. 27. 28. amongst the rest to be dictated by the Spirit of God wherein the Apostles joyntly professe in theyr meditations unto God in this manner, Doubtlesse against thy holy Sonne Iesus whome thou hast anointed both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israel gathered themselves together, to doe whatsoever thy hand and thy counsaile had determined before to be done. Iudas that betrayed him, the High-Priests that hired Iudas to betray him, the witnesse that testified against him, the people that cryed away with him, were of the people of Israell; The souldiours that scourged him, crowned him with thornes, spate in his face, crucified him, pierced him with a speare & were of the Gentlis, yet all these p. 284together with Horod and Pontius Pilate, are avouched by the Holy Ghost to have gathered themselves together to do what God had determined to bee done; and was there not both Iewish and Gentilish blasphemy against the Sonne of God to be found in all this? and shall wee feare to professe that they did in all this what God had decreed to be done, when the Holy Ghost professeth that they did what God had determined to be done? Could you be ignorant of this passage? and dare you in so apparent termes draw your Reader to contradict it, as some blasphemous assertion, without taking any paines to interpret the place, and so free your selfe from manifest contradiction thereunto, as at first sight is obvious to every Reader, that will but compare this of yours with that of the Acts? Had you ventured upon an interpretation, I would have taken paines to consider it. I have shaken in peeces the rotten interpretation of Bellarmine and Arminius, different each from other. I would have tryed what I could have performed upon yours also. And throughout the Scriptures we may perceive how jealous God is over the maintaining of his providence throughout, even in the most sinfull things that come to passe, and that in such phrases, which when they are used by us, they are cryed downe for blasph…my; but in the meane t…me they consider not, that if they be the phrases of the Holy Ghost, ere th…y are aware they are found to charge the Holy Ghost with blasphemy. And the truth being rightly uttered, is farre enough off even from harshnesse also, as well as from errour, yea from harshnesse unto mens affections, though never so corrupt. As for example, what good soever there is found in such actions, wee acknowledge God to be the author of it, but not of the the malice or evill that cleaves to it; yet that also we say God will have come to pass, but onelyonly by his permission. For, Non aliquid sit nisi volente Deo, Not any thing comes to passe (saith Austin) but God willing Enchirid. cap. 95.it; and he comprehends both good and evill, as appeares by that which followes, vel sinendo vt siat, as in case it be evill, vel ipse faciendo, as in case it be good. But of both these hee pronounceth that not any thing comes to passe but God willing p. 285it. The like may bee manifested to have beene acknowledged by Anselmus, Hugo de Sancto Victore, and Bradwardine, yea and our greatest adversaries. For Bellarmine even in the midst of his heat against us, professeth, that Bonum est esse malum, Deo permittente: It is good that there should bee evill by Gods permission: and if it be good, I pray you why is it not lawfull for GOD to will it, see…ng upon the same ground it was affirmed long agoe by St. Austin that God doth Enchirid. cap. 96.will it. But as for Arminius, never any man was knowne to be smitten with the spirit of giddinesse in opposing this truth more then he; for sometimes he professeth, It was Gods will that Ahab should fill up the measure of his sinnes, and how I pray Exam. praed. Perk. pag. 162. Ibid. pag. 114, 115.could that be, but by adding sinne unto sinne? Againe, hee professeth that it was Gods will that the Iewes should proceed so farre as they did proceed in their ignominious handling of Christ; and every man knowes that they proceeded to a very foule degree of blasphemy and impiety therein. Last of all, it is true that Aquinas and Durandus both oppose this, but herein Aquinas manifestly opposeth Austin, though he names him not. And againe, I desire no better triall of this truth then their oppositions. For if I doe not make it appeare that their arguments are meerly sophisticall, and manifestly unsound, let me be accompted a blasphemer in the maintaining of this Tenet. All which I have already performed, and taken in Valentianus his more copious and frothy exceptions also, but in another language. Lastly, yet were it tolerable if you did onelyonly deny that sinnes of men were decreed by God; but you will have nothing that comes to passe contingently and freely to be decreed by God; contingency you say is decreed, but not the things that fall out contingently: whence it followeth that by your opinion, God did decree no mans faith, no mans repentance, no mans obedience, but onelyonly did decree the contingency of this. This is the mysterious iniquity of your doctrine which you conceale, and make choice rather to give instance in sinne and blasphemy, and to represent the harshnesse of maintaining that to be decreed by God, onelyonly that you may the better insinuate the approbation p. 286of your unlearned Tenets, into vulgar and popular affections. Yet you give me cause to guesse that you would have your reader beleeve more herein, then you beleeve your selfe. You would have your Reader beleeve that God did not decree the Iewish blasphemy against his Sonne, but your beleefe is onelyonly that God did not decree the obliquity of it, and yet forthwith you doubt whether the obliquity may bee distinguished from the act. Againe, you would have your Reader beleeve that God did not decree the Iewish blasphemy against his Sonne, but your beleefe here expressed is onelyonly this, that God did not inevitably decree the Iewish blasphemy, implying that God did decree it, but not mevitably. And not any of our Divines that I know ever said any more, then that God did decree it.

You adde another absurd errour hereunto concerning Gods decrees; that forsooth some of them are evitable, some inevitable. Now the meaning of our Divines in saying that God did decree any obliquity, is onelyonly this; God did decree that such an obliquity should come to passe by his permission, directly answering to the prof…ssing of Austin; Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut siat, vel ipse faciendo. Enchirid. cap. 95.It is true, Arminius disputes, and that acutely as hee thinkes, that in some actions the obliquity cannot bee distinguished from the actions themselves. I have dealt with him in this point; I am ready to deale with you also. But it is enough for you to shew your affection to Armenius his Tenets; as for your sufficiency to maintaine them, that you doe dispense very sparingly, as if you affected state in this. Further you tell us, to admit your former cōclusion, that the aeternall foreknows all things because he decreeth them, or that they are absolutely necessary in respect of his decree, (the disjunctive here should be a copulative, for that which followeth is not verified of either of them disjunctively, but copulatively of them both,) were to imprison his infinite wisedome in his selfe-fettered power, to restraine the Aeternall Majestie from using such libertie in his everlasting decrees as some earthly Monarches usurpe in causes temporall or civill. For the Pope never tyes his hand by any grant, which is a fault in him. But in that Holy One the reservation of such libertie is a point of p. 287high perfection. A little before you told us very gravely, that weedes grow apace, and the former errour which you minced, as loath to declare your mind thereon plainly, touching Gods decreeing all things, was soone delivered of a second, to wit, the ground of Gods foreknowing things to come to be the determination of his will. You rather thinke, that God foreknowes things to come, before, and without the determination of his will. Whether this opinion of yours bee a tare or good corne, let the Reader judge. And of what nature not a second is, but seconds are, whereof it seemes you are soone delivered, which now we come to examine. To say that God foreknowes all things, because he decreeth them, is (you say) to imprison his infinite wisedome in his power. Why it is nothing so: for Gods decree is Gods will, not his power: yet how is Gods wisedome imprisoned in his will, more then his power? For as God knoweth more things possible to be done, and fit to be done then he doeth, so hee can doe more then he doeth, and therefore his wisedome is no more imprisoned thereby then his power. But besides this, you take your aime quite amisse. For the foreknowledge of what things God will bring to passe, is no part of wisedome. For, for a man to be privie to his owne purposes, is no part of wisedome, for it is incident even to silly creatures. Againe, to know what I meane to doe, what a senselesse thing it is to say that this is to imprison my knowledge? and as like senselesse a thing it is to say that Gods knowledge or wisedome is imprisoned, by being privie to his owne purposes? Againe, how is Gods power fettered by his will? Seeing the power of every creature is to be ordered by his will without fettering of it? you signifie that his liberty is hereby restrained; wherein? in his everlasting decrees. A most senselesse speech. Is it possible that by making an everlasting decree, Gods libertie of making an everlasting decree shall be restrained? Perhaps you may say, by making it he cannot alter it. I answer, if he should alter it after he hath made it, this decree by way of alteration should not be everlasting: but you suppose the contrary, namely, that Gods decrees are everlasting. Or if God should for a while p. 288suspend his decrees, and not make them with the first, how is it possible they could be everlasting? This savoureth strongly of an affection to maintayne that Gods decrees may be not everlasting with Vorstius, though you are ashamed to professe it, and therfore hand over head you thrust in the denomination of everlasting upon the decrees though quite contrary to your intention. For you would have God still ind…fferent to decree this or that, as the Pope is who by no graunt bindes his hands.

And why so? is it, that upon emergent occasions, God might decree a newe as he thinkes fitt? why but consider, all these emergent occasions were from everlasting knowne to God. So that if God at th…s time were indifferent to decree, he would decree no otherwise then he hath from everlasting. For from everlasting he knewe all that now he doth, and at this present his will is no otherwise then from everlasting it was. For with him is no variablenesse nor shaddow of change.Iam. 1. 17.Jas 1:17

The wildernes of your inventions, I well perceave, is not at an end. I wonder whither the wantonnes of our witts would bring us in the end. Neither are Gods judgements yet at an end in giving men over to illusions to beleive lyes, and that for not embracing his truth with love. And who can looke for better from them who shamefully oppose the g…ace of God. Is it marva…le if God infatuate them?. As for the being of things absolutely necessary by reason of Gods decree, this is your language, not ours, in the last period of your former Section. We say, looke what God hath decreed, that of necessitie must come to passe, but how, not alwayes necessarily, but sometimes contingently. Only the workes of nature doe by the decree of God come to passe necessarily; but as for the actions of men they come to passe by the decree of God contingently and freely. But whether workes of nature, or actions of men, they of necessitie must come to passe, if God hath decreed them, and that after such a manner as God hath decreed them to come to passe, that is, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingen…ly.

p. 2896. As a man or Angell having free power to doe this or that, by producing any thing subject to the freedome of his will, doth therewithall produce contingency without decreeing it, (for in as much as he workes freely the worke must needes be freely wrought, that is contingently,) In like so…t God being free to produce any worke without him, upon the producing of such a worke doth produce contingency without decreeing it. For the work cannot be wrought by God but freely, and consequently it must needs come to passe contingently.

To produce this or that, is the object of Gods decree, because he can choose whether he will produce this or tha…; but to worke contingently is no object of Gods decree …for it is not in Gods power to choose whether he will worke contingently or necessarily. If he doth worke at all ad extra he must needs worke freely that is contingently. For as it is of the perfection of the divine nature to bee necessarily, so it is the perfection of divine nature to worke not necessarily in the producing of ought without him, but freely & contingently. But the divine nature differeth from the nature Angelicall and humane, that he not only worketh freely, but also is able to create creatures herein like himselfe, that can worke freely as namely Angells and men; like as he can and hath produced other creatures that worke in all things necessarily.

Agayne, considering that necessitie and contingency are but modi rerum certaine manners of bringing things to passe, & therfore cannot exist without the things themselves wh…ch are sayd to exist and to be brought to passe either necessarily or contingently. Therefore it cannot be sayd that God doth produce the necessitie or contingency of this or that particular, unlesse he produceth the particular it selfe; neither can he be sayd to decree the contingency or necessity of this or that particular, except he decree the thing it selfe. So that for God to decree the necessitie or contingency of this or that particular, is nothing else then to decree that this particular shall necessarily come to passe, or such a particular shall contingently come to passe.

p. 290Neyther is it reasonable to affirme, that God doth decree necessitie or contingency in generall, but not the necessitie of this particular, or the contingency of this particular. For like as generalls cannot exist but in particulars, so neither can generalls be otherwise produced then by producing particulars. So it is impossible that God should decree the producing of generalls otherwise then by producing of particulars. Now there is a contingency taken in another sense, which doth not accompany the existence of any thing but only the essence of it, and denominates it before it doth exist, as when we say raine to morrow is contingent, it is as much as to say it is possible to raine, it is possible not to raine. So touching the actions of men, of any action we may say it is contingent, for as much as it is in the power of man to doe it or no. Now this kind of contingency is not alwayes the object of Gods decree. For in this sense the continuation of the World is a contingent thing; for it may continue or no. So before the World was made, it was possible to be and not to be, and so the making of it contingent, but not by the decree of God. For nothing is such by the decree of God but it might be altered, for Gods decree is a free act. But it was impossible that the World should not be of a contingent nature, like as it is impossible that God should not have power to make the World, or not to make it according to his will. Nay the very workes of men and Angells in this kind of contingency are not the object of Gods decree; for in as much as they are sayd to be possible to be or not to be, this is not from the decree of God but rather from the nature of God, as all necessary truthes are derived therefrom.

Neither is it in the power of God to make that the works of men and Angells should not be possible to be or not to be. But if the possibilitie were the object of Gods decree, it might be otherwise. For Gods decree passeth forely upon every thing where upon it passeth, so that if he decree them to be possible, he might have decreed them not to be possible. Yet you seeme to speake of contingents in no other sense then this, as when you say, God hath decreed that some effects p. 291shall be contingent, although I confesse it is so obscurely delivered that a man can hardly discerne your meaning. But for farther discourse hereof you put us over to the article of creation. So likewise for the contingency of humane actions as decreed by God; your confirmation thereof we must expect, when you come to treat of mans fall. This, thus by fetching compasse expressed by you, I doubt will prove no more then this, that God decreed to make man a free agent; yet you deliver it as if the demonstration hereof did require, and promise some exquisite perfourmance. And I am verily perswaded you have a reach at such a kind of freedome, as to make it good, will surpasse the perfourmance of any Schoole divine that ever was, from the dayes of Anselmus to the dayes wherein we live.

But of the nature of your perfourmances we have had reasonable experience. You may remember what he sayd while he was shearing his hogges, Here is a great deale of cry and a little wooll. In the next place you dictate your parallells Eliam.wherein it seemes you take great pleasure. That Gods wisedome is infinite we nothing doubt; but to make it consist in knowing what he is able to doe, we take to be a very hungry description of it. For is either man or Angell any thing the wiser for knowing what he is able to doe? Gods immensitie consists in filling all places which are but finite, neyth…r is it possible they should be infinite, yet beyond things that are, this immensitie is not extended. And you have already denyed precisely that God is in vacuo. But as for Gods eternity that doth not only coexist with all time, but had existen…e before it actually and that without all beginning. In a word Gods immensitie is not in respect of any quantitas molis, quantitie of extension, but only in respect of quantitas virtutis. And what is this different from his infinite power. And indeed God is not in place after the manner of being contained in any thing, but only after the way of containing and supporting all things. And looke by what quantitie he made all things, by the same quantity he supports all things, and that is the quantitie of his power.

p. 292A very weake amplification it is in my judgement of Gods incircumscriptible presence, (which yet is nothing els but his immensitie) to say it is not circumscribed by the coexistence of his creatures. For coexistence is of no apt nature to circumscribe. For the thing circumscribed coexists with that which circumscribes it, as well as that which circumscribes it, coexists with that which is circumscribed by it.

As for your Mathem…ticall conceyts of center and circumscrence, I have already discovered in their places the vanity of them. To say that eternity is more then commensurable to time, is to graunt that it is commensurable thereunto, which is very absurde. And how is it possible, that should be commensurable to a thing mensurable, which indeed is immensurable as being without beginning and without end. You say it is in all durations; not as contained in them (I hope) if as containing them, this also is untrue. For like as it is not Gods eternity whereby he made the World but by his power, so it is not by his eternity that he maintayneth the duration of it but by his power. What noone tide is we know and acknowledge to be some thing, but as for fluent instants we knowe none. For fluent is as much as succedent▪ and succession is not but in respect of parts, and an instant hath no parts. Yet if we give way to such imaginations, like as sluxus puncti in Longitudinem is not contayned in the line, but is the line; so sluxus instantis is not contayned in a set time, but is the very set time it selfe. Nor is it a part of it as noone-tide is of the day; And a most absurd thing it is to make the duration of the creature in respect of Gods eternitie, to resen…ble the proportion that is betweene the part of time and the whole time, you may say as well the World is contained in Gods immensitie, like as halfe the yard is contayned in the whole yard. Your last position is more sober in all the parts of it then the rest; the proportion of the least beame of light, to the light of the World may be expressed; the proportion of things that are, to the things that God is able to produce cannot, the first is finite, this is infinite. Yet by your leave, there is no greater disproportion betweene Gods wisedome manifested and p. 293manifestable, then betweene his power manifested and manifestable. In a word, God hath so farre manifested his power and wisedome, that wee plainly discerne both of them to bee infinite; and doe you thinke God can so manifest either of them, or both of them, that we may discerne them to be more then infinite? And if his wisedome manifestable doth but so farre exceed his wisedome manifested, as his power man…festable doth exceed that which is already manifested, &c. what meant you to say that Least of all may his infinite wisedome bee comprehended within those effects produced. For if there bee but a pa…ity of proportion, then no disproportion. You proceed to amplifie the wisedome of God above all that can bee gathered by this Vniverse, after your manner.

But I pray consider, was it possible for God to take a more wise and convenient course for the salvation of the world then he hath done? I am sure Austin flatly denyes it, Aug. de Trinit. lib. 13. cap. 10. Ostendamus non alium modum possibilem Deo desuisse cujus potestati cuncta aequaliter subjacent, sed sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientiorem modum alium non suisse, nec esse oportuisse. I am apt enough to conceive, that God could have made and governed the world after another manner then hee hath done, and that after as wise a manner as hee hath done, but I dare not say that hee could doe it after a wiser manner then he hath done. Many other particulars might bee instanced in, that might stagger the course of your amplifications, which yet sometimes are wondrous vulgar, as when you say, God knowes what might have beene and what may be, as perfectly as he knowes the things that are. Which is as much as to say, God knoweth as well what he can do, as what he doth. Now is this strange in a silly man to know what hee doth, or what he can doe? And it were a vaine exception to say that God knowes as well things done by others as by himselfe; seeing not onelyonly their power of doing is from God, but the very doing it selfe is by you acknowledged to be by the concourse of God. As for the manner of Gods concourse, if you conceit it to be upon supposition of Gods foresight of mans endeavour first, you doe not well to propose your errours or p. 294any other Iesuiticall paradoxes for principles and grounds to build upon.

7. The incomprehensible wisedome of God doth appeare more you say, in the harmony or mixture of necessity and contingency. And this you say is most conspicuous in moderating the free thoughts of men or Angels, and ordering them to the certaine accomplishment of his glory. In the fou…th Section you told us that the parts of wisedome were two; the one in intending the right end, the other in ordering right meanes. So then the prescription of right meanes is a part of wisedome, but why it should affect the mixture of necessity with contingency in accomplishing the end intended I see no reason. Nay rather I finde that wisedome alwaies affecteth the most certaine meanes that can bee had for the compassing of the end intended. As for example, all manuall Arts doe expresse their wisedome by meanes used by them which are altogether of necessary operation. In the art of physicke also the meanes used by physitians as all sorts of medicines doe all worke by necessity of nature. In the Art of Oratory, the end is wholly conjecturall, and the meanes they use being arguments of persuasion, there no necessity at all hath place. No where doe I finde that any wisedome affecteth the mixture of necessitie with contingency, as you speake. Come we to the consideration of the wisedome of God. How is Gods wisdome seene in the contexture of a mans body, and every part thereof? Who knoweth the breeding of young bones? saith Solomon. I am fearfully and wonderfully made, saith David. Galen in consideration of the body of man anatomized, was driven to acknowledge the Divine providence. Now what mixture of necessity with contingency did God affect in this? The fashioning of the body in the wombe being meerly an operation of nature, not of any free agent. Yet even this necessary operation of nature is contingent I confesse unto God; for as much as he could either suspend the course of nature, or after it, or set an end unto it. So on the contrary the most free actions of men doe of necessity come to passe in their kinde and after their manner, as well as workes of nature in their p. 295kinde and after their manner. For to abstaine from the breaking of Christs bones was a free action of the Souldiers; so was Iosiahs action in burning the Priests bones upon the Altar; so was Cyrus his action in restoring the Iewes unto their country; so was the crucifying of Christ Iesus, and other foule actions committed against him by Iewes and Gentiles, yet were all these decreed and determined by God, as the Scriptures plainly testifie; and therefore as your selfe acknowledge, of necessity they come to passe. Yet how God doth moderate the thoughts of men and Angels, you are not over hasty to communicate unto us. Solomon speakes plainly when he saith, The hearts of the Kings are in the hands of God, and he turneth them, &c. and both the preparations of the heart, and Prov. 21. 1 Prov. 16. 1 Prov. 29. 26.Prov 21:1Prov 16:1Prov 29:26answer of the tongue are from the Lord: and that many seeke the face of the Ruler, but every mans judgement commeth of the Lord. But in what sense you say God moderates mens thoughts, and ordaines them for the accomplishment of his glory, you doe not love to discover: and I doubt all this will desinere in piscem in the end, and come to nothing. But although the meanes which man may use may be successively infinite, yet the ends (you say) which God doth forecast in their creation shall by any course which they take be inevitablely brought to passe; what these ends are which God did forecast in their creation, you come very soberly to expresse, or rather leave to the Reader to collect out of these wordes, the award of every thought is determined by Gods eternall decree, that is to bring you to playne termes either Salvation or Damnation. These then are the wayes wherby they shall accomplish Gods glory in the end, what course soever they take; And herein consists the infinite wisedome of God.

Now let us examine the sobriety of all this. First you told us of courses infinite, by which notwithstanding all theyre varieties and inconstancies, Gods ends should be accomplished. Now all these courses in reference unto the issue of damnation or salvation whereby Gods glory shall be …llostrated, (wherof you speake as of the end that shall be accomplished.) I say al these courses in reference hereunto are but two: good, p. 296and bad answerablely to Hercules his bivium, and Pythagoras his Y; according to that of Esay. Say yee surely it shall be well with the just, for they shall eate the fruite of theyre workes; woe be to the wicked, it shall be evill with him, for the reward of his handes shall be given him. Esa. 3. 10. 11.

Secondly, if this be all the fruite of Gods wisdome, wherin doth this exceede the wisedome of every Magistrate; who ordeynes rewards for the good and punishment, for the wicked? Agayne what need is there of moderatinge mens thoughts unto this end; whereas though he never moderates any mans thoughts, yet his wisedome shall appeare never a white the lesse in setting forth his glory in punishing the one and rewarding the other.

Consider yet farther what I pray you, was the end of Iudas, which God did forecast in his creation? No doubt the setting forth of his owne glory, but I desire to know whether he did intend to set it forth in Iudas his salvation, or damnation. So likewise I desire to know what end God did forecast of Paul the Apostle in his creation? his glory I doubt not, but whether in his salvation or damnation. It seemes by the genius of your Tenet, that God did neither intend the salvation of the one, nor the damnation of the other in their creation; but indifferently intended each of them should be saved or damned accordingly as they departed this life, either in impenitency or in repentance. Now if God did not intend the salvation of Paul, nor the condemnation of Iudas at the time of their creation. I pray when did he begin to intend it? Say what you will, it followeth that these intentions of God were not eternall, and consequently neither the decrees of God are eternall; yet commonly you professe of Gods decrees that they are eternall and everlasting. Yet here I confesse you may play fast and loose, and say they are eternall so farre forth as they are without end, but they are not eternall so farre forth as to bee without beginning. But what meane you so directly to contradict the word of God, as you doe if this be your opinion? For the Apostle professeth that mans election was made before the foundation of the world: yea p. 297and touching the wicked, King Solomon professeth, that Pro. 16. 4.Prov 16:4God made him against the day of evill.

As for the similitude, you use to represent unto us the wisdome of God by comparing of him unto a bird catcher, though you father it upon Austine, yet in this case it is nothing worth. For though it be more then humane after many birds formerly caught to catch them all againe; yet for God it is nothing, who is everywhere, and in whom every thing hath that being, that life, that motion which they enjoy. The hayres of our head we know are numbred; and therefore nothing strange that our thoughts should bee, considering that our thoughts shall come into judgement, but our haires shall not. And if wee shall give an account of every idle word, as Mat. 12. 26Matt 12:26our Saviour hath professed unto us, why not as well of every idle thought? Hee shall make the counsels of the heart manifest, 1 Cor. 4. 5. but that the award of every thought is defined by God, I cannot tell how to beleeve: my reason is, because evill thoughts are not fit to be rewarded; and as for the evill thoughts of Gods children, shall not they bee pardoned as well as their evill words and outward actions are, to wit, upon their repentance? For if wee acknowledge our sinnes, God is faithfull and just to forgive us our sinnes, 1 Ioh. 1. 9. And Peter signified as much to Simon Magus conceiving evill thoughts also, when he said unto him, Repent of this thy wickednesse, and pray unto God, that if it bee possible the thought of thine heart might be forgiven thee, Act. 8. 22.

8. Free it was for you to have done something the last yeare, which you did not, and every minute thereof, in case every minute thereof you were waking. For that a man hath free will in his sleepe I never heard. But how thereby the whole frame of your cogitations or actions might have beene altered, is a mystery unto mee. Yet I doubt not but the whole frame of your cogitations and actions this yeare might have beene altered. For actions free and contingent could not justly bee accounted free and contingent, were they not accompanied with a possibility of being otherwise. And God you acknowledge to be the cause of this alteration, and of every thought and p. 298deed thus altered. So then if there had beene another course of your thoughts and actions, God had beene the cause of it, and of every thought and deed. What thinke you of that course which hath beene of your thoughts and actions; is God the true and princ…pall cause of this also, and of every thought and deed of yours this yeare? I see no reason to the conttary, but it stands you upon to justifie this also, as well as the former; and as of your selfe, so as concerning the actions of all o…her both men and Angels: and if for one yeare, why not for every yeare from the beginning unto this day? And so I see no colour of reason why you should not as freely acknowledge that all things are decreed by God; for if God hath decreed all the thoughts and actions of men, it will bee no hard matter to grant that God hath decreed all things that in their times and seasons doe successively come to passe. And if God be the true and principall cause of them, did hee not decree that he would be the true and principall cause of them? that is, that he would in due time indeed and principally produce them, not withstanding all the evill that doth accompany them? For I doe not thinke that you take upon you so much perfection as to avouch that amongst all your thoughts and actions for a yeare together, there was no evill thought, no evill action among them. For if you stand upon it that God cannot be the true and principall cause of any evill thought or action, we must not yeeld unto you that God was the true and principall cause of all the thoughts and actions that were conceived in you, or derived from you that yeare or yeares wherein you were hatching this booke of yours, which I take to be a fardell of erroneous conceits both in Philosophy and Divinity.

Neither if you did maintaine that God is the true and principall cause of every free action, would wee object that then you make Gods will to depend on ours; for there is no colour for any such objection; there is colour for the contrary, as namely, if he be the principall cause, then his will doth not depend on mine, but rather mine on his: and consequently our liberty seemes to be infringed by making God the principall p. 299cause of all our actions. Yet you take no notice of this objection, (much lesse take paynes to answere it) but goe on desperately (in shewe and that against your owne tenet) to maintayne, that our will is necessarily subject unto his. But whether you meane in producing thoughts & actions, (which alone is to the purpose) or in some other sense and respect you betray not.

Yet by the way what meane you to say that our will is contingently free; seeing this is as much as to say, it is possible that the will of man should not be free. But you give a reason and it is worthy our consideration if perhaps therby, we may perceyve to what issue of tolerable sense your present discourse may be brought. And the reason is this: For unto every cogitation possible to man or Angell he hath everlastingly decreed a proportionate end: to every antecedent possible, a correspondent consequent, which needes no other cause or meanes to produce it but only the reducing of possibility (granted by his decree) into act. For what way soever (of many equally possible) mans will doth encline, Gods decree is a like necessary cause of all the good or evill that befalls him for it. I looked for an elucidation of a former assertion or two of yours, namely, that God is the true and principall cause of every action, and deede that hath passed from you this yeere, like as he had beene the cause (as you say) of every thought and action that might have passed from you, if the frame of your thoughts and actions had beene altered.

The other assertion was that our will is necessarily subject unto Gods will, which also is delivered in reference to the former assertion. I say I looked for an elucidation of these by this following sentence wherin you pretend to give a reason of the former. But this performes nothing lesse. If you had done something the last yeere which you did not as you might, then the whole frame of your thoughts and actions this yeare had beene altered, and God had beene the cause of this alteration and of every thought and action therin. And the reason is this, For unto every cogitation possible God hath decreed, a determinate end. But I pray you consider, p. 300are the thoughts and actions of men this yeare the proportioned end of somethinge that you did the last yeare? Or are they correspondent consequents to our antecedent actions the last yeare? Many man the last yeare was an opposite unto goodnes, he is reformed this yeare and become a proselyte. Is grace the proportionate end of the state of sinne? The last yeare many a man was a formall professour; this yeare it may be he is turned Papist, or Turke, is this a correspondent consequent to that antecedent? Yet many continue formall professours still, wi…hout any such alteration; some have changed theyr formalitie into realitie. It may be some man the last yeare hath satisfied anothers silthy lust, and this yeare is advanced by it.

Call you this a correspondent consequent destined by God? Some have prospered by impoysoning of others and proceeded in their sinfull courses so much the more, without controll. In a word by the last Clause it appeares that by proportionate end, & correspondent consequents, you meane only the good and evill, that doe befall men according to their former workes, according to that God will rewarde every man according to his workes. But by your leave this hath no proportion to prove that God is the Authour of every thought and action of man this yeare, which you made to be consequent to some thing done the last yeare; and God to be the true and principall cause of every one of those thoughts, and actions. For what? Are mens thoughts and actions this yeare, the rewardes and punishments of the same mens actions the other yeare? What a ridiculous conceyte in this? Well; still we holde you engaged to maintayne, that, which you have plainely avouched, namely that God is the true and principall cause of every action, and thought of man for a yeare together, yea and of every thought and action of yours for the yeare past; which you have delivered without any explication. I have manifested the incongruity of your whole discourse, in generall. In particular consider further: you say that mans will is necessarily subject unto God; this we understood in respect of operation in proportion to what you delivered in the p. 301sentence before going; but you understand it in respecte of rewardes or punishments succeeding, proportionably unto former actions whether good, or bad. But by your leave it is not mans will, but his person rather that herin is necessarily subject unto God. For no wise man useth to say that mans will is rewarded or punished, but his person rather. Agayne, suppose God decreeth not the actions of men, but the rewards of them, yet you have not explicated how in this case Gods will depends not upon the will of man, the true explication whereof that I know is only this; that the execution of his will may depend upon mans will to witt in rewarding, or punishing, but not the will of God himselfe: Yet if good or evill actions of men be foreseene by God before he hath decreed either to reward or punish; neither have you offered to cleare Gods will in this case from dependance upon the will of man, neither are you able to performe it. Agayne it is false to say that God hath decreed a proportionate end to every cogitation possible. For many cogitations are possible which shall never be; And it is absurde to say God hath decreed an end to that which shall never bee. Agayne by this proportionate end and correspondent consequent, you understand rewardes, or punishments; But it is false to say that God hath ordayned to every cogitation a reward or punishment. For to the evill thoughts and words, and deeds of Gods children he hath ordayned neither reward nor punishment to befall them, but his purpose is to pardon them.

Agayne punishments for the sinnes of men are many times inflicted by the sinnes of men; So Sennacherib that blasphemer of the God of Israel, was slayne by the sword of his owne children; Davids adultery was punished by the fil…hy actions of his owne Sonne Absolon deflouring his fathers Concubines.

If these were proportionate ends to former sinnes, and correspondent consequents, and everlastingly decreed by God, what hindereth but that in your opinion, actions notoriously sinnefull may be sayd to be decreed by God? You say the producing of these consequents and proportionate ends, needsno p. 302other cause or meanes but only the reducing of possibilitie (granted by his decree) into acte: Which is plaine gibrish; you instance in nothing for illustration sake, not as if your discourse were so plaine that it needed it not, but rather it is so unsound, that you might well feare it: And darkenesse is fittest for them that hate the light: I will give instance for you; Absalons deflouring his fathers Concubines was a disproportionate end, and correspondent consequent to Davids defiling his neighbours wife; for God punished David hereby; and Arminius acknowledgeth that this fact of Absolon Inserviit castigand… Exam. praedest. Perk. p. 162.Davidi: Now this fact of Absolon by your doctrine in this place, needed no other cause or meanes to produce it, but onelyonly the reducing of possibilitie (granted by Gods decree) into act. Now what possibility doe you meane? the possibility of Davids defiling Bethsheba? It is manifestly untrue: first in generall, that to produce a reward, and punishment, no cause is required but the producing of the fact, which is to bee rewarded or punished, Consequents naturall follow I confesse upon antecedents naturall, but it is not so with consequents morall, such as are rewards and punishments. And in particular the case is cleare, that something else was required to Absolons defiling Davids Concubines, then Davids defil…ng of Bethsheba. For both the counsell of Achitophel, and Absolons corruption in yeelding thereto, and the p…nishing hand of God herein, were found in this; and none of all these was found in Davids sinne.

Or doe you meane this of the possibility of Absolons sinning as he did? so that to the punishing of David no other thing was required but Absolons reducing his power of defiling his father Concubines into act. Now this I confesse is a truth, but such a truth as might make any wise man ashamed to accommodate himselfe to the grave profession of it, though he did not affect any singularity of conceit therein▪ For tis as much as to say, that to defile Davids Concubines no other thing was required then to defile them; for this is to reduce possibility granted (as you say) by Gods decree into act, and that is enough. But by your leave, it is not enough to salve your p. 303credit, to say that a possibility hereof was granted by Gods decree. For you have plainly professed that God hath decreed not a possibility of a proportionate end, or correspondent consequent to every cogitation, but a proportionate end, and correspondent consequent. And therefore if the defiling of Davids concubines by Absolon, was a proportionate end, or correspondent consequent to Davids former cogitations and actions, then by your doctrine this deiling of Davids concubines by Absolon his sonne, was everlastingly decreed by God, and not the possibility of it. And how absurd a thing it is to say, that God decreed the possibility of any thing, whereas all contingent things are possible in their owne nature without the decree of God, as the whole world was possible, and that not by the decree of God? But it seemes you have reference to the possibility, not of the punishment, but of the time, for which correspondent punishment is decreed, as appeares by that which followes: as when you say, Did we that which we doe not, but might doe, many things would immediately follow, which now doe not: which though it be granted you, yet herehence it would not follow, that No other cause should be required to the producing of them, then our producing of the antecedent. But by this you justifie that upon Davids adultery, Absolon his defiling Davids concubines; and upon Sennacheribs blasphemy against the God of Israel; Ad…amelech and Sharezar his sonnes slaying him with the sword in the Temple of Nisroch his god, did inevitably follow. For these things did befall them, and those things which doe befall you and us doe come to passe, as you professe in the next place, though not as absolutely decreed by God, and in the first place, yet because he decreed them as the inevitable consequents of some things which hee knew he would doe. By all which it cannot be avoided but that Absolon defiling his fathes concubines in speciall, and all the sinnes of man whereby God doth punish former sinnes in generall, are by this your opinion decreed by God as inevitable consequents of some things which God kn…w would be done.

Now let us examine this a little further. You speake indifferently p. 304of good and evill that doth befall men; And these indifferently you prosesse to be ordayned by God upon the foresight of some thing in man; So then like as the damnation of any man is ordayned by God not absolutely, and in the first place but upon the foresight of some evill thing in the person damned; so the salvation of any man is not decreed absolutely by God, and in the first place, but upon the fore sight of some good in the person, saved or to be saved, which good must be eyther faith or good workes or both; or which is worst of all some thing which is lesse evill (as suppose naturall humilitie) in the state of nature. Yet you will not seeme to be an abetter of their opinion, that maintayne election to be upon the foresight of faith or workes.

Yet let me have one bout with you more in the point of reprobation also. God foreseeing some evill in man (say you) doth purpose to condemne him: Now because like as no evill can exist without Gods permission; so God could not fo…see evill but upon presupposall of his purpose to permit it, it followeth that the decree to permit sinne, is before the decree of God to damne for sinne, therefore permission of sinne is in Gods intention before damnation, and consequently it must be after it, in execution, as much as to say; God doth first damne men for sinne, and afterwards permit them to sinne. Hereupon you will refl…ct upon us with an interrogatorie saying; Will you maintayne that God did first decree to damne men for sinne, and secondly to permit them to sinne? I answere; If I did maintayne this, I should looke to be confuted by reason, and not to be cried downe without reason, or contrarie to all reason. Nay I had rather maintayne an harsh opinion according unto reason, then a plausible opinion in contradiction unto manifest reason.

Secondly, I answere by negation; For I doe not mayntayne either of these to be subordinate unto other in Gods intention, but rather coordinate; because neither of these thinges decreed is the end of the other, but both joyntly make up an integrall meanes tending to the manifestation of Gods glorie in the way of justice, according to that of Aquinas, who professeth p. 305that reprobation includeth the will of God of permitting sinne, and of inferring damnation for sinne. Now let us proceed to that which followes. It is absurde to say we have a possibilitie to doe what we doe not; but rather you should say we have an abilitie to doe what we doe not. For possibilitie is of a passive signification, not active: And abilitie to obey God, I confesse we had in Adam, and in Adam we have lost it. That which you call the absolute necessitie of Gods decres, is not in respect of Gods act in …. For his decrees are most free, but in respect of the event ensuing upon supposition of Gods decree. So then thinges freely decreed upon this supposition must necessarily come to passe. Both that which should and that which doth befall us floweth alike (you say) from the absolute necessitie of Gods decree. Now because your present discourse is not of Gods power, but of his wisedome that you might not seeme beside the text, you tell us in the close, that herein is seene Gods incomprehensible wisedome, that nothing falls out without the circumference of it; whereas that all things fall out as God hath decreed, it is rather the fruit of his power then his wisedome. And if you referre it to Gods knowledge, yet it is no parte of God, wisdome. For what wisedome is it to know what he hath decreed, or what he meaneth to bring to passe, whereas any man though simple may know what himselfe meaneth to doe? But to know what is fitt to be done for the setting forth of his owne glorie, and to directe all things most conventently hereunto, herin consists the wisedome of God. You content not your selfe with ascribing, a Circumference unto Gods wisedome, within which all things fall out, but you call it actuall, also as if there were two sortes of circumferences, the one potentiall, the other actuall.

9. It seemes you doe not please your selfe so well in this Argument of Gods infinite wisedome, as in the former; neither is it your happines to light upon such quaint straines of invention, and expression here, as in the poinct of Gods immensitie, and eternitie: It may be the matter will not afforde it; For if it did, why should not you that seeke after it, be acquainted With p. 306it as soone as another? Therefore, I guesse, it is that you break forth into such a profession: the Christian writers are more able and apt both to conceive right, and to speake more consequently to what they rightly conceive concerning other branches of divine absolute infinitenesse, then concerning his infinite knowledge. And because you are bold by a confident supposition to put this out of question, (whereas yet I know no reason, save that you finde no place in this argument for such Chimaericall fictions as you vented in other points, especially in the point of Gods immensitie and eternitie) you take upon you to give certaine reasons hereof. Now because to my understanding Gods immensitie and …ternity are farre more obscure to treat of then Gods wisedome, I am very willing to weigh well the weight of these your reasons. They are in number two. The first is this: All creatures are participant of Gods other attributes besides his wisedome and knowledge; but of his knowledge and wisedome men and Angels are of all his creatures the onelyonly participants: and those rules are alwaies the most cleare and certaine, and most easily gathered, which are gathered from an uniform idenditie of particulars in variety of subjects: Those universall rules are hardly gathered, or are lesse certaine, which can be experienced onelyonly in some one or sewer subjects. In this argument there is little or nothing sound. For (as touching the maine) though creatures inferiour unto man doe not worke by wisedome and knowledge of their owne, yet the wisedome of God appeares no lesse in their workes then in the workes of man, even to the admiration of man himselfe.

What art, what industry is found in the little Bee in the gathering of his waxe, in the fashioning of his combes, in the gathering of honey of divers sorts, every one following and plying his proper and peculiar flowre, and afterwards tempering it, the liquid stuffe brought in their bottles, with the grosser stuffe brought upon their thighes, and bringing it to that perfection which wee see and use both for dainty food, and wholesome physicke: then their government under one King as the Ancients conceived, but indeed under one Queen rather, as later writers even of these dayes have elegantly observed, p. 307and the exquisite manner of a common wealth among them. Is not the wisedome of God observable in this? And as it was said of such as suddenly became Prophets, But who is 1 Sam. 10. 12.1 Sam 10:12their father? so may we aske concerning these, Who is their father, or who their Schoolemaster that instructed them, and bred them up in this occupation? I say the wisedome of God doth appeare more in these then in the actions of men. For wee know by what meanes men usually attaine to wisedome, as namely, by instruction and by observation, but no such thing to be found in Bees; therefore this wonderfull worke being a worke of nature, must necessarily be ascribed to the God of nature. But suppose the wisedome of God were to be observed no where but in the actions of men, is not the world of men sufficient to afford particulars sufficient for induction thereupon to conclude generall rules?

The wisedome of Arts and liberall professions are growne now adayes to great perfection, and all these what are they but the searching out, and by searching the discoverie of the wisedome of God, even in those creatures which are not participants of the wisedome and knowledge of God?

The science of Astronomy, how hath it displayed unto the world the wisedome of God in the various motions of the heavens? and still they are searching, as having not yet attained to the full discovery thereof. So likewise the naturall Philosopher in search…ng out the nature of the whole world; what is this but an inquirie after the wisedome of God in the whole and parts of this Vniverse? and albeit still there is enough to be discovered, yet that which is discovered, is it not sufficient to draw us to adore the wisdome of God, and that so much the more, because that though God hath set the Eccles. 3.Eccl 3world in mans heart, yet can hee not finde out the workes that hee hath wrought from the beginning to the end?

The Physitian, what d…vine wisedome doth he finde in the contexture of the body of man? Was not Galen hereupon driven to acknowledge a divine providence? Then in searching after the nature of Herbes and other simples, and considering the power and virtuous operation of them, both of p. 308each apart, and of severals together in composition fitting for the cure of every malady and disease of the body of man: what report can they make unto us of the wisedome of God even in those things which are not participants of the wisedome and knowledge of God? But come wee to Arts manuall, of mans invention, and wherein indeed wee are more apt to derogate from God, then to give him the glory of them; yet both from the wisedome of man wee may the better ascend to the contemplation of the wisedome of God, and also the wisedome of man is from God, who as we are taught instructeth all, as well the meane husbandman, Esay 28. 26. as the most curious artificer, Exod. 31. In the Turkish History I read of a present sent to the Grand Signiour Achmat that Turkish Emperour; all the particulars (save three Birds of Paradise of rare and precious plumes, wonderfull goodly to behold, and valued at 800. pound sterling,) were handicrafts worke, as namely, two vessels of Cristall, wonderfull rich and beautifull: foure other vessels made of fishes bones, whereas the art seemed miraculous in the graving: forty peeces of cloth of golde of diverse colours; five peeces of silke; five of Damaske; five of silke watered and five plaine; A staffe of an Elephants tooth graven with admirable industrye; A Parret set in a cage of Cristall so artificially done as no man could discerne the entrie; And many faire and rich table clothes of Holland cloth most parte poudred with flowers to the life, and wrought in their lively colours. The which (it is sayd) the Sultan did accepte with admiration. The Authour addes in the close: All these thinges shew sufficiently that the Estates from the beginning, or soone after have raysed handy workes as well as trafique and navigation to the highest point of perfection. This calls to my remembrance the rich presents, which the same Estates presented the Lady Elisabeth in her entertainement at the Hage, in her way out of England, unto the Palatinate being most of curious handicraft. First a Carcanet enriched with 36. Diamonds all of facet stones. 2. Two great hanging pearles weighing 35. Carals, and one grayne. 3. A chaine of pearles of 52. peeces, p. 309orientall water. 4. A golde needle enriched with a great Diamand, in forme of a table, having 4. Diamants round about, wherof the three out hanging were facet stones. All this layd in a little trunke of cloth of golde, betwixt a perfumed cushion. 5. A great looking glasse inclosed in a silver quilted brimme enriched with faire inlaid workes. 6. Ten peeces of Tapestry of Francis Spierick, whereof two pieces were to be sent after unto her highnes. 7. Six pieces moreover of Tapistry for a Cabinet of the same Master, whereof two were to be sent after to her highnes. 8. Diverse sorts of linnen Damas workes pacted up in cases, rated numero. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. according to the workes layd in every case. 9. Workes of Spanish waxe made according to the fashion of the East-Indies, whereof were diverse particulars. 1. A cover of a bed standing on 4. pillars not playne but round. 2. A Cupboorde. 3. A Table. 4. Two great trunkes, 5. A middle trunke. 6. Five little trunkes. 7. Two casket standishes. 8. Foure and twenty middle dishes. 9. Nine and twentie little dishes. 10. Twelve fruit dishes. 11. Six Saucers. But come we from the wisedome of Manuall artes, to wisedom morall and politicall. David was wise as an Angell of God. 2. Sam. 14. 17. Yet he feared the wisedome of Achitophell, whose counsell was accounted as an Oracle of God in those dayes. 2. Sam. 16. 23. And David prayed unto God to turne his counsell into foolishnes, and the Lord heard him, and shewed his wonderfull wisedome in making that counsell of Achitophell, (which had soone dispatched David if it had binne followed) seeme foolishnes in the judgement of Absolon, by the meanes of Hushai sent only to crosse Achitophel. Yet Solomon was wiser then they both, and it was God that gave him a large hearte, like unto the sand of the Sea shore; So that his wisedome excelled all the wisedome of the children of the East, and all the wisedome of Aegypt. Wise heades there were, many it seemes in those dayes both in Aegypt, and in the East, yet Salomon was wiser then they all; And the Queene of the South came from the uttermost part of the earth to heare the wisedome of King Salomon. Since there have binne p. 310men famous in this kinde, that have boasted.

Consilijs nostris laus est attonsa Laconum.

Tiberius his governments had it binne matched with as much honestie as wisedome it had binne admirable. It was wonte to be sayd that the French got more upon us by parle then by the sword: Yet Henrie the IV, of France was wonte to say, he feared but two men in the World, and that was for their wits; the one was (as he called him) the fox of the mountaynes; the other was the lacke an apes of the Iles. Yet some say the Spaniards herein outreach the French, and the Italian the Spaniards. And that of all the Italians the Florentines have beene most cunning; and of all the Florentines the house de Medices. And indeed Laurentius de Medices was accounted the chiefest ballancer of States in his time, if Newes from Parnassus speake true. But the world of men (as you complaine) are not sufficient to give presidents of wisedome fit to raise us to the contemplation of the infinite wisedome of God. Yet if you were acquainted with all the wisedome of the world, you might finde matter enough of admiration thereat, and of adoration of the wisedome of God, that goeth infinitely beyond it.

But whereas you say that all creatures are participants of Gods other attributes, in as much as they have some being, some power, some duration, some quantity; and therefore the knowledge of them conferres something to the knowledge of those attributes of God. Neither the antecedent is true, nor the consequēt sound. For what doth the quantity of a gnat confer to the knowledg of Gods immensity? or what doth the duration of creatures that live but a day or a yeare conferre to the knowledge of Gods eternity? or the b…ting of a flea, to the discerning of the power of God? Againe, the antecedent is st…ke false. No creature that hath quantity is partaker of Gods immensity. For the quantity of a creature is quantitas …lis▪ quantity of extension; but Gods quantity is quantitas virtutis, quantity of spirituall and immateriall perfection, and it is impossible p. 311that one should be a part of the other: nay Gods immensity hath no parts, so neither hath his eternity, nor his almighty power, and therefore no creature can partake of any of these. It is true, God produceth the being, and maintaineth the duration of all things, but it is not by his essence he produceth their being, nor by his eternity he maintaineth their duration, but all is done by the power and counsell of his will.

We come to your second reason; Why wee cannot conceive and speake so right concerning Gods knowledge, as concerning other attributes, and that is, say you, because we want fit termes to expresse it. But how doe you prove that we have more fit termes to expresse Gods other attributes then this? you doe not once goe about to prove this; the instance you give is in the praescience of God, concerning which Gregory makes a question how it can bee attributed unto God; seeing nothing but future things are said to be foreknowne, and unto God nothing is future, but all things present. And for the same reason Austine (you say) would have Gods knowledge of things to come to be termed rather science then praescience, seeing all things are present unto God. Now if this change of termes will serve the turne to avoid incongruity concerning the right apprehension of Gods knowledge, what cause is there to complaine of the unfitnesse of termes, when as with so little adoe the unfitnesse we speake of, may be corrected? It is like enough upon such conceits as these, some have entertained an opinion that all things are actually existent in eternity, not onelyonly things present, but things past also still are, and things future already are existent in eternity: and you your selfe also have already manifested your approbation of this Tenet in the Chapter of eternity: The more I wonder to reade you except against this doctrine of Gregories and Austines, as neither cleare, nor accurate enough: And here first you tell us that we may not say, nor did Saint Austine, or Saint Gregory thinke that God doth not, or cannot know a distinction between times past, present, or to come. Neither indeed doe I see any colour why any man should entertaine a conceit of any such meaning of Austine or Gregory; p. 312neither doe they denie that God knowes all these thinges and consequently the differences of them, one from another; Only Gregorie makes a doubte how the knowledge of future thinges in God should be called prescience. And Austine (as you say) had rather call it Science. But then you demande how it is sayd by Gregorie that nothing to him is future, nothing past. Your selfe have heretofore layd downe that which may answere this; as when you sayd all thinges are coexistent in eternitie, but not in time: And therefore God may know thinges to be so differenced in respect of such a course of eternitie. In a word, that God knowes the thinges that are past, present and to come, so called in respect of man who is measured with time, but not so called in respect of God who is measured with eternitie. But though they are alltogether presēt unto God, yet it followes not herhence that they are all one (as you inferre) much lesse that they are so in respect of Gods eternall knowledge, as if Gods knowledge did make them one, which in themselves and in their owne natures are not. As God himselfe, so his knowledg is before all worlds, as worlds doe exist in time. But you may remember what you have formerly maintayned, that both all worlds which have an existence successively in time, and time it selfe is actually existent in eternitie, and so not only present in respect of Gods knowledge of them which ever was, but also in respect of their owne existence (as you have accoumpted it) in eternitie, which Aquinas makes the ground of Gods knowledge of them. Then you dispute, and prove that foreknowledge is to be attributed unto God; because he forknowes them before they are, which is as much as to say, while they are yet to com. To this I answeare out of your owne doctrine thus; Allbeit Gods knowledge be before them, yet if the same also be to come, and that as much after them as before them, what reason, why it should be called foreknowledge, rather then together knowledge, or after knowledge.

But what knowledge soever we attribute to God, it can no more be sayd to be past, than to come according to your doctrine pag. 77. your wordes are these. Whatsoever can be p. 313more properly sayd or conceived to be past than to be yet to come, or to be in every moment of time designable, can have no propertie of eternitie. And in very truth Gods knowledge is not altered, but one and the same knowledge it is which God hath of things without him, before they were, when they are, and after they were. In the things themselves an alteration is found, but not in Gods knowledge of them: And therefore the knowing of all things that are, were, and are to come is commonly called Scientia visionis, in distinction from Scientia simplicis Intelligentiae, wherby God knowes all necessary truthes, and all things possible.

Your conclusion is, that God foreknowes, and Man foreknowes but with a difference, such as, you say, is oftentimes not well expressed by Teachers, nor duely considered by Readers; the identitie of the word wherby we expresse both Gods foreknowledge, and mans foreknowledge making us apt to confound the different meaning of them. Which confusion of things arising from communion of the same terme, you say is a fertile nursery of many errours in this Argument. And is it not, I pray, as well in other Arguments as in this? But I beare with you, for if you had professed so much, you had utterly broken the necke of your second Argument. Yet we are like to be beholding to you in good time. For the displanting of these errours. For you promise to endeavour this, and therin to imitate Heralds, who give the same Coate to diverse parties, but alwayes which a difference.

Thùs we have gained a flourish of allusion unto the pracctise of Heralds, and with this Kickeshewes we must be merry till more substantiall provision commeth. As for my opinion, I acknowledge no ex…stence of thinges in eternitie, nor coexistence with eternitie untill the time of their actuall production commeth. And so accordingly theyr coexistence with eternitie first was to come, then is, afterwards is past, and ceaseth to be; and so accordinglie foreknowledge, coknowledge, and after-knowledge of the same thinges may be attributed to God, all which are externall denominatives attributed unto the knowledge of God, from the various condition p. 314of things knowne by him, who lookes not out of himselfe for the knowing of any thing. For how could he, before any thing was? yet then he knew all things that were to come, as well as now he doth, yet without any change: For with him is no variablenesse, nor shadow of change.Iam. 1.Jas 1

10. Here you enter upon the explication of the difference betweene mans knowledge and Gods. Our knowledge (say you) of things to come is many wayes imperfect (and foreknowledge onelyonly) because the duration neither of our knowledge, nor of our selves as yet can reach unto that point of time wherein things so knowne get first existence. No soundnesse of truth in all this.

For first our foreknowledge of things to come, is not foreknowledge onelyonly, save so long as the things themselves are to come; but when they come, wee know them never a whit the lesse, and after they are gone and past. As the Eclipse of the Sunne and Moone is knowne by us before it comes, when it comes, and after it is past. It is true, before they come, the knowledge of things is onelyonly foreknowledge, and not in man onelyonly, but God also. When they doe coexist with God, then Gods knowledge is no longer foreknowledge, but till they doe coexist with God, his knowledge of them is foreknowledge of them, as well as ours. For it is before them, and onelyonly before them; for it is neither with them, nor after them. Not with them, for then they should coexist with God, and that from all eternity, which is most untrue. For if they did coexist with God, then they did exist, and that from all eternity, which is most untrue. Much lesse is it after them. For if so, then their coexistence with God were past, but we suppose it to be to come. And impossible it is that the same things should at once bee both past, and also to come. And as for the duration of our knowledge, whereas you say it doth not reach to the things that are to come; I say neither doth the duration of Gods knowledge reach thither. For if the duration of Gods knowledge did reach unto things to come, then Gods knowledge should in this present coexist with things to come, which is untrue. For if Gods knowledge did coexist with things to come, at this present, then p. 315things to come at this present should co…exist with the knowledge of God, and consequently they should exist, that is, they should be present, and not to come. It is no way required to knowledge to coexist with things knowne. In like sort neither doth Gods duration at this present reach unto things to come any more thē ours. For if God did at this present coexist with things to come, then at this present things to come should coexist with God; for coexistence includes existence on both sides. But things to come doe not at this present coexist with God, for if they did coexist, then they should exist, and consequently they should be said to be present, and not to come. And in a word, to maintaine that God coexists with all things to come, is to maintaine by just consequence, that the world did exist from all eternity. It is true, God shall coexist with things to come, because his yeares cannot faile, they endure for ever: but our yeares and dayes are as swift as a post, in comparison. But this makes no difference in the point of foreknowledge. But with such like wilde conceits of yours as touching Gods eternity, we are now reasonably well acquainted, they doe so much the lesse move us, or trouble us. We have continuance of being for a time, God hath continuance of being for ever. God hath the continuance of his being from none, wee have the continuance of our being from God. But as God by continuing doth not get continuance of being, so neither doe we. OnelyOnly we have it so, as that God coulds…t an end to it every day and houre; but it is impossible any end should bee set to the continuance of Gods being, because he is of necessary being. But this is it that deceiveth you; wee get many things by continuance, as growth and strength of body, encrease of knowledge, and grace, and this maketh you affirme that we get continuance. Whereas indeed we get not continuance, but wee get something else by continuing. Yet wee may continue the same that we were; sure I am we shall so continue in the world to come.

Sometimes againe we lose by continuance both health and strength, and memory, and so grow towards our graves; and p. 316this is Alteration, so that we are still in motion. But God getts nothing by continuance, for there is no motion, no change in God. And where motion and change is not, there time is not, but either Aevum or Eternitie. It is true, contingent thinges are not foreknowne by us; and herein is a great difference betweene Gods foreknowledge and ours. But this is a materiall difference only, but now we dispute of the forme of foreknowledge, wherof hitherto you have shewed no sound difference. No question but God precisely knowes future contingents, we doe not; And it is as true, that this is just nothing to the present purpose. Yet now you are fallen upon it, we must give due regard to your cariage in this. Of the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents questions, have beene ventilated amongst Schoole-divines for many hundred yeeres continuance.

The most flourishing opinion at this day, and wherein the Sects in other points very opposite of Scotists and Thomists doe agree, is, that God foreknowes them by seeing the determination of his owne will, touching their coming to passe; this you invade both elswhere and here; how well and scholastically you have carryed your self herein hertofore we have considered; now what else you have to vēt against this tenent, we are ready to entertaine as it shall deserve.