Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 2 · Chapter 8 (1 of 3)

Discovery of Jacksons Vanity · Section 2 · Chapter 8 (1 of 3)

p. 241CHAP. VIII.

Of the Infinitie of divine Wisedome. That it is as impossible for ought to fall out without Gods knowledge, as to have existence without his power or essentiall presence.

1. IN the first Section there is nothing that I mislike: we acknowledge God could not be infinite in power, unles he were infinite in Wisedome allso. And that power ungoverned p. 242by Wisedome, would bring forth very enormous effects. But if a duble portion of witt matched with halfe the strength would effecte more then a triple portion of strength with halfe so much witt, surely where the power is equall, & the Wisedome insinitly unequall, there the effects cannot be the like. Yet you have bene bold to affirme in another treatise of yours, not yet extant I confesse, that If a man had the same infinite power that God hath, he might well thinke he coulde dispose thus of thinges as God hath disposed, by the Wisedome which man allready hath.

And you give this reason, for in thinges wee can lay any necessitie upon, wee can tell well enough how to dispose of them to the end which we seeke. As uncouth an assertion as hath passed from the mouth or penne of any man. For we manifestly perceave that the difference of artificiall operations in the World, doth not arise from the difference of mens powers, but merely from the difference of theire skill and Wisedome in severall trades.

2. You doe not well to confounde power with strength; for strength is only power naturall; but there is a civill power goeth beyond that. And there is no question to be made, but Wisedome is to be preferred before the strength of the body, by how much the qualities of the minde are to be preferred before the qualities of the body. But where civill power is supreame that ruleth over the wisest Counsaylers. No question God is as infinite in Wisedome as in power. But I take it to be very absurd to say that Gods wisedome is greater then his power. For is it possible that God by his wisedome can thinke of any course fitt to be done for the setting forth of his glory which his power were not able to effect? and seing you confesse his power to be infinite as well as his wisdome, what should move you to maynteine the one to be greater then the other, I can not devise. Princes have guides to governe them, which yet are not therfore greater thē they, but inferior by farre. But in God, his wisedome and power, though different notions, yet the substance of them is all one and precisely one in God. The same is the proportion betweene p. 243infinite wisedome and power infinite, as betweene sinite wisedome and power finite. But finite wisedome doth not evacuate finite power; therfore neyther doth infinite wisdome evacuate the necessitie of infinite power.

But to salve the matter, you adde that it evacuates the necessitie of power distinct from it. Tis true indeede, in God, though the notions of wisedome and power are distinct, yet the thinges signified are one essence in God. And looke in what manner soever infinite wisedome doth inferre the indistinction of power with it, after the same manner, doth infinite power inferre the indistinction of wisedome with it. For as much as God is essentially wise and powerfull, and therefore infinite in both, & both indistinct in him, whose essence is most simple and admitts no parts. That wisedome is the father and power the Mother of all Gods workes is such an assertion, that I doe not thinke you can finde any to father it, or mother it but your selfe. Will you not give us leave to accommodate it unto the workes of man and pronounce proportionably that his Wisedome is the Father, and his power the Mother of his actions? I take it to be absurd to inquire after a Father and Mother of workes, save in case, the workes themselfes doe admitt these different sexes as being male or female; yet in such a case it hath a Father and Mother only in respect of univocall generations not equivocall.

And as for the proportion to justifie your allegorie, we are content rather to expecte your pleasure to acquainte us with it, then to trouble our witts aboute the deviseing of it. Yet Philo & the Platonicks are a rubbe in your way, who (as you say; for I confesse I am not so well seene in them,) make knowledge the mother of all Gods workes.

To remoove this you acquainte us with your conjecturall dictates. First that tis probable they dreamed of a created knowledge. A most improbable conjecture, that they should conceave, that God brought his works to passe by the knowledg of a creature not by his owne knowledge; Yet that creature by whose created knowledge God is conjectured to have wrought by, in theire opinion, being one of Gods workes, p. 244how coulde that creatures knowledge be possibly accoumpted his mother in creation. Your second conjecture is, that under these termes they covered some transformed notion of the second person in the Trinitie. Such a person more fitt by farre to be the Author of all Gods works in order under God the Father; But equally improbable it is that this second person in Trinitie should be called by them, The Mother of Gods workes. Rather Sapientia in Latine, and foreign in Greeke being the feminine gender; in this grammaticall notion they might accoumpt it foreign the Mother of all thinges created, which yet is more then my learning will encourage me to ascribe unto them. And Christ you deny not to be the wisedome of the Father, but you adde that he is the wisedome personall; but you speake here not of the wisedome personall, but of the wisedome of the Godhead as it is essentially in the whole Trinitie.

Danaeus upon the 32. distinction of Peter Lumbards first booke of sentences, professeth the Sonne to be called the wisedome of the Father, for as much as he maketh the Father knowne unto us. But though you speake of wisedome as it is essentiall, and not personall; yet you may remember, that even the essentiall attributes are severally appropriated unto the Person by divines; and in the course of this appropriation, power is attributed to the Father, Wisedome unto the Sonne, Aquinat. 1. q. 39. art. 8. Durand. 1. dist. 3…. q. 3and goodnesse unto the Holy Ghost. How suitable this is of makeing wisedome the Father of Gods actions, lett every intelligent Reader judge.

Agayne I finde that Gabriell Vasquius proposeth a question, Whether the power of God doth any manner of way differ In 1. q. 25. art. 1. disp. 111.from Gods knowledge and his will? And herein recites the opinion of Durand, mainteyning that Gods wisedome and his will, are but the remote causes of divine actions; and that the power of God is the immediate cause of all. The contrary wherunto he maynteynes, namely that power or execution is needelesly attributed unto God, as distinct from his knowledge and his will; and this he delivers according to the doctrine of Scotus, Bassolis, Ferrariensis, Caietan, and Aquinas. p. 245Neyther of these opinions as I conceave serves your turne in making wisedome the Father, and power the Mother of Gods actions. These flashes of conceyte are farre distante from the conceites of any Schoole divine, that I am acquainted with.

3. Wisedome (you say) as all agree, is the excellency of knowledge from which it differs not, save only in the dignitie or usefullnesse of matters known or in the more perfect manner of knowing them. This promiseth no greate depth, yet it passeth my slender capacitie to comprehend your meaning herein, or to make any good sense therof. You have so long inured your selfe to a phrase of speech and expression beyond the capacitie of your Reader; that I knowe not whether at length you may attaine to such a facultie of speech as may transcende the Authours owne comprehension. Who they are that agree in this, that Wisedome is the excellency of knowledge, I professe I know not.

And I woonder you proceede to discourse of wisedome without distinction; seing it may be taken in some sense by Philosophers, in which it is not taken by Canonicall writers. Agayne in some sense it may be taken by Canonicall writers, in which it is not taken by Philosophers. There is a wisedome to salvation which the Scriptures communicate to the meanest of Gods children, which kinde of Wisedome was nothing knowne to Philosophers. And there is a Metaphysicall wisedome in knowing Ens quà ens, where abouts Philosophers did busie theire braynes, which you shall hardly finde notice taken of throughout the Scriptures. Againe wisedome is sometimes taken for that knowledge, that rest in contemplation; sometimes tis taken for such a knowledge as is not commendable nor right unlesse it be referred to actiō. Solomons Wisedome it seemes comprehended both. For the Wisedome that he prayed for, was the wisedome of government, which respects action; but God gave him other wisedome allso. For this is reckoned up as a parte of his wisedome, that he spake of trees, from the Cedar tree that is in Lebanon, even to the hyssope that springth out of the wall, he speake allso p. 246of beast and of foules and of creepeing thinges, and of fishes. And in this respecte it seemes, that hee excelled the wisedome of all the Children of the East, and all the wisedome of Aegypt. For of Moses it is sayde that hee was learned in all the wisedome of the Aegyptians. Act. 1. 22. And this wisedome I conceave to have bene in sciences contemplative and not practicall. Yet in Scripture phrase as I guesse, it is most generally taken for wisedome practicall, consisting in knowing how to bring aboute intended ends. And thus you seeme to take it, when you professe that it differs not from knowledge save only in the dignitie or usefullnes of matters knowne; which is an harshe manner of expression.

But I take your meaninge to be this, that the difference is in the objecte, and that thinges of worth and of use are the speciall object of wisedome. For so a wise man by his wisedome discernes these thinges which are most behoofefull, & advantagious unto him. So then wisedome seemes to be (in your opinion) the knowledge of thinges usefull and behoovefull, that is, the discerning of what is best to be done to the compassing of this or that ende. Yet by your leave if the ende be not good, such a wisard in Solomons phrase, shall be accoumpted no better then a foole. And the Holy Ghoste hath discovered unto us both in the olde Testament, that many Are wise to doe evill, but to doe well have no understanding, Ier. 4. 22. and in the new Testament, that the children of this World are wiser in theyre generation, then the children of light. And the unjust Steward had a commendable measure of wisedome in this kinde. Luc. 16. 8. But take it at the best; why should you call this, the excellency of knowledge? Hath not Aristotle delivered the contrary, and professed that felicity of contemplation is more eminent then the felicity of action? And I know no reason to forsake him in this. Doe not we beleeve that our happinesse in the Kingdome of Heaven shall consist in the vision of God? The knowledge of Gods law is knowledge practicall, and is not this farre inferior to the knowledge of God, and of the mysterie of godlines revealed to us in the Gospell? I confesse the knowledge that we have p. 247of God in this life doth conferre to action, but that is not enough to make it practicall; The knowledge of thinges to be practised and put in execution, that and that alone denominates knowledge practicall. Your laste difference of wisedome from knowledge proposed disjunctively thus, or in the more perfecte manner of knowinge of them, I can hardly make any congruouse sense of.

At first I thought the same difference had bene intended though variously expressed, that the Reader might satisfie himselfe with which expression he pleased; litle thinkeinge that your selfe who take upon you herein to instructe others, were to seeke, whether wisedome differed from knowledge, in the object knowne, or in the manner of knowinge thinges; yet upon seconde thoughts this seemes to be your meaninge. But suppose the truth of both concerning wisedome, namely that it knowes thinges of woorth and usefull, and that it knowes them in a perfecte manner; yet I pray consider, what a mad thing is it to say, that herein it differs from knowledg. Doth the knowledge of thinges usefull differ from knowledge? well you may say it differs from the knowledge of thinges lesse usefull, or not usefull at all, but surely it differs not from knowledge. So likewise the perfecte manner of knowinge thinges, may be sayd to differ from an imperfecte manner of knowinge them, but surely it differs not from the knowinge of them. For we doe not use to say that the species is contradistinct from the genus, but rather one species from another. I professe I am touched with no small regret to consider how much time I am like to wast in correctinge such anomalies, if your booke should be too frequent in them.

But to proceede, Though no man be wise without much knowledge, yet a man may know many thinges and not be wise. In this likewise I finde so much confusion, that a man may very well be to seeke in what sense to justifie it. I have heard of a sage Counsaylor, that knewe not a letter in his owne Mother tongue. Comineus as I remember was no scholar, & yet a very wise Counsaylour. The Turkes are usually accoumpted as p. 248ignorant people as live; yet no doubte the grand Signior hath a wise counsayle. And wisedome of goverment (which now a dayes alone is usually accoumpted wisedome) is many times accompanied with litle learninge.

Achitophell in his time was accoumpted as an Oracle of God, but of his learninge or greate knowledge we reade not. And in my judgement this kinde of wisedome seemes to be rather a naturall gift, then an habite acquired by knowledge. And it seemes to consiste in judginge of moste commodious meanes to compasse endes intended, as in the counsayles of Achitophell unto Absalon, as allso it appeares in Solomons course that he tooke to discerne the true mother of the Child which was in question; and because they may be crossed if they be knowne, therfore to discerne how courses commodious for the compassing of designes may be closely carried undiscovered; as the two hundred men that Absolon tooke with him when he wente to Hebron, are sayde to have accompanied 2 Sam. 15. 11.2 Sam 15:11him in the simplicitie of theire hearts knowinge nothinge; and thus they were engaged in his treason before they were aware. And the same Absolon by his pretence of payinge his vowe at Hebron signified to his Father, prevented jealousie in his Father, and tooke away all suspicion of treason. On the other side, it is a greate pointe of wisedome to discover the reaches of others in theire courses; as Solomon, discerned the trayterous hearte of Adoniah, by the motion which he made to have Abishag the Shunemite givē him to Wife, which Bethsheba perceaved not, and was very willing to gratifie him in the furtherance of his suite.

This was a naturall perspicacy in Solomon; for at this time he was very younge, and had not as yet sought the Lord for that spirite of wisedome in government, as afterwards he did; And whereas you say, A man may know many thinges, and not be very wise; It is a truth, but a very meane truth. For a man may know many things, and yet be a very foole; and that more wayes then one. For firste few and many are termes of respecte; and few thinges are many in respecte of fewer. And though a man knowe never so much as these thinges, that nothing p. 249at all conduce to wisedome; what wise man would expecte that he should be any thinge the wiser thereby? Againe, nothing denominates a man simply wise, but that which makes him a wise man. Now a man may not only knowe many things, but be allso wise in many thinges, and yet not deserve the name of a wise man. He may be a wise painter, a wise graver, wise to worke in handicrafts (which is accoumpted wisedome, both in the phrase of God, and phrase of Aristotle) and yet all this while be farre enough from a wise man. For he only is a wise man that knowes how to governe himselfe and provide for himselfe.

Now many times witt, & that in greate measure, in trades, is founde to be in a fooles keepinge. Nay what will you say; may not a man be wise to doe evill, Ier. 8. 22. wise to satisfie his lust, wise to compasse theire owne wicked endes; but shall he be accoumpted the wiser man for this? Hath not Aristotle delivered, that Incontinens non potest esse prudens, An incontinent man can not be a wise man? Laste of all suppose that a man knowes all that belonges to true wisedome, but will not practise it, like the Athenians, of whome it was sayde, sciunt quae recta sunt sed facere nolunt, shall not such a one be accoumpted one of Solomons fooles in his proverbs? For are not the Morall vertues and recta ratio knitt together indissolubly? But come we to the wisedome of God, Knowledge divine, as it comprehends all thinges, the name of wisedome best befits it, not as restrained to this or that particular. And why should it not be accoumpted wisedome, restrained to what perticular you will, seing he undoubtedly knowes every perticular, in most perfect manner▪ And but erst you professe that wisedome differs from knowledge only in the usefullnes of thinges knowne, or in the more perfect manner of knowing them. The knowledge of God which is of himselfe, is the wisedome of contemplation. His knowledge of other thinges to be produced and ordered by him to the settinge forth of his glory is the wisedome of action.

And the Apostle breakes forth into admiration of the depthe of Gods rich wisedome and knowledge. Piscator p. 250thinks that by wisedome and knowledge one thing is meant. I am not of his opinion. The text seemes to me to make against that construction; For thus it runnes O the depthe of the riches foreign both of the wisedome and knowledg of God. In saying both it plainely intimates that wisedom and knowledge are considered as two, and therfore distinct. I take the meaning to be thus. God by his wisedome discerneth courses most convenient; but by his knowledge he comprehendeth all, whether convenient or inconvenient. And because a man may be so farre wise as to discerne of courses proposed to the compassing of a certeine ende, which is the most convenient; Yet because he is not able to invent all courses, he may faile in wisedome, therfore I conceave it is sayde that God is rich both in wisedome and knowledge; because he doth not only judge what is fittest amongst few or many, but amongst all; For he knowes all even the most inconvenient and disorderly courses; but by his wisedome he judgeth of the conveniency of them, and according to his good pleasure useth them. Your reason followes to shew why the name of wisedome best besitts the knowledg of God, and that is; For though many thinges knowne by him, whilest compared with others more notable, seeme base and contemptible; yet not the meanest, but may be the object of divine contemplation to a Christian, that considers not the mere matter or forme or physicall properties, but the Creators power or skill manifested in it. You undertooke to prove that Gods knowledge of all thinges might moste fittly be called wisedome; to which purpose, you should prove, that God may justly be accoumpted wise in knowinge them; that is, that it might affoorde juste matter of such contemplation unto God, as might justly be called wisedome. But the reason you bringe, medles not at all with the contemplation of God, but with the contemplation of a Christian. For whereas in coherence you should say, it affords matter of wise contemplation unto God; you tell us tis an object of divine contemplation to a Christian.

And whereas you would not affirme that Gods knowledg, as restrayned to this or that perticular, was to be accoumpted p. 251wisedome, but only as it comprehends all thinges; yet your reason makes shew of provinge what you affirmed, of Gods knowledge restrayned to this or that perticular, and not so only but as restrayned to the meanest perticular; though it endes (as I sayde) not in avouching that such perticulars may be an object of divine contemplation unto God, but only in saying that it may be an object of divine contemplation to a Christian. What incongruities and most unscholasticall solecismes of discourse are these?

And all this while you confine Gods knowledge to the perticulars of his owne making. But what thinke you of the particulars of mans or the divills making, in the most wicked, and sinfull courses that have beene, are, or shall be in the World.

Are not these allso knowne unto God, and are these likewise matter of diyine contemplation in respect of the Creators power, or skill manifested therin: We acknowledge the wisedome of God to be excellent in the composition of the meanest worme. Of some likewise we see excellent use as of the bee, & silkeworme; of others we doe not, yet we beleive that his wisedome being infinite, he doth nothing in vaine; he hath use of every thing, though we know it not. And we take notice of a double knowledge the one called scientia visionis, whereby he knowes all things that are, nor such onelyonly but even all such as have beene, or shall be, the other called scientia simplicis intelligentiae, whereby he knowes all thinges possible so farr forth as they are knowable, and betweene these two knowledges, there is a greate deale of difference, though you seeme to confounde them.

4. By usefull knowledge as I take it, you meane the knowledge of usefull things. Of this you say there are two offices, The one steadfastly to propose a right ende: The other to make, and prosecute a right, choyse of meanes for effecting it. By this it appeares that you speake onelyonly of that kind of wisedome which is referred to action, and whereby agents are accommodated ad…res gerendas. From the consideration of humane wisedomes imperfection, you take a course the better to set p. 252forth the perfection of wisedome divine. Humane wisedome (you say) is oftimes blinde in both, and usually lame in the latter.

I will endeavour to give some illustration of this. The end, we ayme at, is our good. For Finis., & bonum convertuntur. Ethic. 1. 1. This good is eyther naturall, or supernaturall, both in respect of power to discerne it, as allso in respect of power to compasse it. The naturall good which every one aimes at, is the preservation of his esse, or naturall being, and the acquiring of his bene esse, or well being naturall. In both these are found errors enough. For though nothing is a more naturall object of mans desires then the preservation of his being, yet sometimes they are found most unnaturally to affect theyr destruction; sometimes through passion, (and that in divers kinds) in wonderfull manner blinding reason, not onelyonly to avoyde shame or rather the suffering of shame, or to avoyde a worse kind of death, but sometimes out of miserablenes, rather then they will part with a litle, they are wilfully set to part with all.

foreign

foreign

Achitophell whose wisedome was as an oracle of God, went soberly this way, when he saw his counsayle refused: For he went home & set his house in order and hanged himselfe; it seemes his unsanctified wisedome urged him hereunto. For as it is written of Cesar that he alone came sobrius ad perdendam Rempublicam so Achitophell accessi… sobrius ad perdendum seipsum.

As for the acquiring of well being, this is an end that all affect, but according to theyr severall dispositions. For the good which they affect being bonum conveniens agreing to theyr affections, so it comes to passe, that as men are of different affections, so they propose unto themselfes different endes. The luxurious person setts his witts on worke for compassing the satisfaction of his lust; the covetous person he affecteth to grow rich; the ambitious person to grow p. 253greate, the vertuous person to be good according to natures direction. And thus foreign Ehit. 3. 5.foreign. Looke how every man is qualified, such is the end he aymes at, but still naturall. But in compassing, there is a great deale of difference; for some are wise to doe evill as appeares in Absolons carriage of himselfe aspiring to the Kingdome; as allso in Achitophells counsayles, which if Absolom had followed, it hath gone full ill with David. Nay generally they are found, even naturall men, to be wiser in theyr courses though wicked (witnesse the un…st …teward) then the children of God are in theyres, though honest, and Christian. The children of this world (sayth our Saviour) are wiser in theyr generation, then the children of light. Nay morall Philosophers, in theyr instructions unto vertuous courses, have advised theyr Disciples to set before their eyes the picture of vice, and to perswade them to take but the like course in prosecuting vertue, that the wicked doe in prosecuting vice.

Vt jugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones,

Vt teipsum serves non expergisceris?

A manifest argument of the great corruption of man, whose witt serveth him so well in evill things, so ill in good things. Tho improvement whereof is in no small degree allso imputable unto Satan, who is most forward to impregnate the fancies of men with suggestions unto evill. We have known heavy headed, and dull persons brought up at schoole amongst us, when afterwards they have taken other courses, & given themselfes to Ruffianisme, they have beene acounted amongst the witts of the time. But as for the discerning of true good, that power transcends the region of nature. God must first regenerate us, and translate us into a supernaturall state, before we can discerne the thinges of God, or these thinges that belong unto our owne peace, which when God hath graunted us, then our end is no longer the preservation of our temporall being, but the salvation of our soules in the p. 254world to come, and to this purpose to cleave unto God by faith and love usque ad contemptum nostri, even to the contempt of our selfes, as touching this temporall life of ours. And to attaine to this end, we neede no consultatious with flesh, and blood; God in his word hath chalked out unto us a direct way unto this end, and therfore it is sayd to be a lanterne unto our feete and a light unto our pathes. But whatsoever the end be, you tell us that if it bee much affected, the lesse choyse of meanes is left, the more eagerly we apply our selfes unto their use, and strive as it were to straine out successe, by close embracing them. And for this reason ignorance, or want of reason to forecast variety of meanes, for bringing about our much desired ends, is the mother of selfe will, and impatience. For what is selfe will, if a man should define it, but a stiffe adherence to some one, or few particular means, neyther onelyonly, nor cheifly necessary to the maine point. It seemes you are in a streight, and therfore fetch about for matter, though aliene, and here we have mett with a good phrase, of straininge out successe by close embracing the meanes. Yet even in these unnecessary straines, your discourse is but loose in my judgement. For whether we discerne many meanes, or few meanes, all is one as touching the close pursuing of that which we much affect; For if many, we will make choice of the fittest in our judgement, and as close embrace them as others doe, that doe not discerne so greate variety.

And as for successe, that is not in our power to be strayned out, as you speake, by close embracing the meanes, Man is a resistible agent, and easily crossed in his courses; and the ends we ayme at, in reference to our best meanes, are but of a conjecturall nature, and so of uncertayne issue; Neyther doe I seè any reason to the contrary, but that a man may be as selfe willed in the midst of variety of meanes discerned by him, as of few meanes, and if he be cr…st in them all, much more impatient. For surely the greater variety of meanes is represented, the more the way is open to take hold of that which is neyther onelyonly, nor cheifly necessary, like as where many wayes offer themselfes, a travailer is in most danger to mistake the most direct way. Selfe will I confesse is excercised in adherence p. 255to meanes unfitt; as may be seene in the rude Irish, that will not be brought off from theyr rude courses, they will tye their ploughes or harrowes to theyr horse tayles, say what the English will to persuade them to another course. But it is as well seene in following different endes. Many will not be takē off from theyr uncleane conversation, from their riotous and intemperate courses, they count it pleasure, (as S. Peeter speakes) to live deliciously; these fruites of selfe-will are not in adhering to meanes so much, as in adhering to evill ends. But 2. Pet. 2.2 Pet 2you proceede, and tell us in the next place, that Witts conscious of theyr owne weakenes for conqueing what they eagerly desire, presently call in power, wrath or violence as partiall, or mercenary seconds to assist them. Whereas he that out of fertility of invention can furnish himselfe beforehand with store of likely meanes for accomplishing his purpose, cannot much esteeme the losse or miscarriage of some one or two. These may seeme prety contemplations, and as pretily expressed.

But I had little thought that selfe will, and impatience joyned with want of witt, had allso beene joyned with consciousnes of selfe weakenes. For the sluggard though but a foole as Solomon sayth, is as wise in his owne conceit as seven men that can give a reason. And certainly selfe will, and selfe Pro. 26. 16Prov 26:16conceyts are companions inseparable. And therfore such commonly make little question of accomplishing, or as you call it, of conquering theyr desires, by theyr owne courses. And yet if they faile hereof, tis nothing strange, since the best meanes are but likely as your self stile them.

I can as hardly beleeve that fertility of invention is of power to keepe men from impatience. In my opinion patience as all other morall vertues, depends rather upon judgement then invention, though formally it is a quality of the will as all morall vertues are, and not any habitt of the understanding. But suppose he miscarry in all, then a mans patience must needes bidd farewell to invention to support it, and it is high time to relye upon judgement. Yet I trust patience which must have her perfect worke, (Iam. ….) may have course in this case allso; though it be an hard matter you say to keepe p. 256from fowle play, if the game whereat a man shootes be fayre, and good, and most of his stringes allready be broken. It is good they say to have two stringes to a mans bowe. A vertuous man hath more then two, you suppose as much, for you suppose many to be broken yet not all. And surely vertue is not vertue if it keepe not from foule play.

The Stoickes mainteyned that a vertuous man might descend into Phalaris bull, without the interrup…ion of his happines. We Christians are taught, and disciplined to rejoyce even in tribulation, and marke well our bow stringes, because tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope, and hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed in our hearts by the Holy Ghost that is given unto us. foreign …m. 5. 4.sayth S. Paule, I am able to endure all thinges by the Phil. 4. 12.Phil 4:12power of Christ that enables me, and herupon he exhorts Timothy to be partaker of the affliction of the Gospell, to witt by the 2. Tim. 1. 82 Tim 1:8power of God. The power of Christ, and the power of God are two such stringes to our blowe of patience, as can never be broke. We know his grace to be sufficient for us, and when his power is made perfect in our weakenes, we shall 2. Cor. 12.2 Cor 12have cause to rejoyce in our infirmities. For when we are weake, then are we strong. In a mans owne strength no man shall be strong. But blessed art thou o people, who art the saved of 1. Sam. 2. 91 Sam 2:9the Lord, who is the sheild of thy strength, and the sword of our glory. Deu. 33. 29Deut 33:29He can make us to be as a Gyants sword, and he is a wall of fire round about Ierusalem. All that sight against it, theyr fleshe Zach. 9. 13Zech 9:13shall consume away, though they stand on theyr feete, and theyr eyes Zach. 2. 5.Zech 2:5shall consume in theyr holes, and theyr tongues shall consume in their mouthes. But to returne. The contingency of the issue is Zach. 14. 12.Zech 14:12within the horizon of our fore sight.

As for horizons of contrivances, let such as fancy them make themselfes merry with them. All this while the matter of your discourse being of Gods infinite wisedome, and to that purpose preluding of the imperfect wisedom of man, I have wondred what you meant to enter upon the consideration of patience; unlesse it were to prepare your reader therby with a more willing entertaynment of your discourse.

p. 257But now I perceive you desire to gratify God with a commendation of his patience, which that it might seeme the more congruous, you pretend that the infinitenes of his wisedome carries him herunto. And this patience consists in bearing with sinners which as you say, every minute of theyr lifes violently thwart, and crosse some particular meanes, ordeyned for his glory and theyr good. Gods patience in forbearing us, and our sinnes in provoking him are greate enough in theyr proper colours, they neede no inconsiderate amplification to bombast them, by saying that every minute of life we violently crosse them. For surely eyther you must suppose man, every minute of his life, to be waking, or els you delivered this as it were slumbering.

But to touch upon something more materiall, I pray remember, that you treate of the wisedome of God, as exercised in intending a right end, and prosecuting a right choyse of meanes for the effecting of it. Now would you be so good as to consider, what is the end that God aymes at in this, and particularly whether it be all one, in bearing thus with all, and that of an ambiguous nature, thus, that in case they doe at length repent, and turne unto God, he may magnify his mercy in theyr salvation; if still they stand out, and dye in impenitency he may magnify himselfe in theyr just condemnation? And withall I pray consider, whether this be the course of any wisedom finite or infinite, in God, or man to intend ends after this ambiguous manner. I mention no other end of Gods patience, and long suffering, because I know no other end agreable to your opinion. That which followeth tendes rather to the commendation of the goodnes of Gods will, then the wisedome of his understanding, & therfore so much the more heterogeneall, and extravagant; as when you say out of the Apostle that He is light and in him is no darknes; and that He distingvisheth the fruites of light from fruits of darknes before they are, even before he gave them possibility of being. An amplification partly idle, partly unsound. For God must eyther distinguish them before they are, or not at all; For there is no change in his understanding; unsound, in saying p. 258God gives them possibility of being. The being of things is from the gift of God, but not the possibility of being. But you proceede in the same stringe. As impossible it is for his will to decline from that which he disernes truly good, as for his infinite essence to shrinke in being. God indeede cannot shrinke, for he is indivisible, and you well know what thereupon you have wrought for the amplification of his power in the former chapter. But I would you had told us what is that truly good discerned by God, from which you say his will cannot decline. I cannot be satisfied with your concealments in this particular. What I pray is more truly good then the setting forth of Gods glory eyther in his patience, and long suffering, or in ought else whatsoever? And is it impossible thinke you for Gods will to decline this? If so then it were impossible that God should decline the making of the World.

Is not this a faite way to Atheisme? Many thinges (you say) may and every thing that is evill doth fall out against Gods will, but nothing without his knowledge, or besides his expectation. In Scripture phrase we find that many thinges fall out not onelyonly besides, but contrary to Gods expectation as Esa. 5. where God complayneth of the house of Israel, that while he looked for grapes they brought forth wilde grapes. And Arminius urgeth this as if it were spoken in a proper speeche.

By the proposition in this place it must be sayde, that God expects sowre grapes, as well as sweete, for otherwise they shoulde fall out besides his expectation which you here deny. So then God did expect that Shimei should rayle on David, that Absolon should defloure his Fathers Concubines, that Iudas should betray his Master, that David should defile his neighbours wife, and cause hir husband to be slayne by the sword of children of Ammon, and that the Iewes should crucify the Holy Sonne of God. Say allso if you will that God did with patience, and long suffering expect all this. As for the knowledge of God there is no question about that, all confessing that all thinges are knowne to God not onelyonly at theyr falling out, but long before, as David professeth of his p. 259thoughts that they were knowne to God a farre-off or long before. Psal. 139. 2. But to say that any thinge falls out against the will of God, I had thought it had beene generally receaved for a notorious untruthe. Aquinas I am sure is flatt against you, where he sayth, Deus neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult permittere mala fieri, & hoc est bonum. God neyther willeth that evills shall be, nor willeth that evills shall not be, but he will permitt evills to be, & this is good. Part. 1. q. 19. art. 9. Arminius himselfe professeth …e minimum quidem fieri praeter Dei voluntatem, nempe vel volentem Exam. Praedest. Perk. p. 114.ut fiat, vel volentem non prohibere, sed permittere ut fiat.

You professe that all evill falls out against Gods will, Arminius professeth that nothing falls out besides the will of God, at least willing not to prohibite it, but to permitt it. And no merveyle, for the Apostle hath given us to understand that nothing can resist the will of God. It is true all evill falleth Rom. 9.Rom 9out against Gods commandement, which usually is called allso the will of God but improperly. For every one knowes that he is well able to sinne, to transgresse, and consequently to resist this will of God.

Further you tell us, that That which in its owne nature (as being made such by his unalterable decree) is absolutely contingent, is not casuall inrespect of his providence or eternall wisedome. You are at lengh come to the wisedome of God from whence you digressed, but you seeme to bring it in by the eares. For Casuall thinges are suchas fall out praeter intentionem, besides intention which is an action of the will not of the understanding where wisedome is stated. And how can those thinges be sayde to fall out, not besides Gods intention, which fall out against his intention, namely against his will, as already you have professed of many thinges; that they doe fall out against Gods will, though not without his knowledge. I would you had given instance in those absolute contingents which (as you say) are made so by Gods unalterable decree. But because you have neglected it, I will doe it for you. Rayne to morrow is a thing contingent, in this sense, it shall rayne, or not rayne. For me to walke abroad or ride foorth to p. 260morrow is a thing contingent, that is I shall walke or not walke, ride foerth or not ride. And accordingly in other of your traditionary writings I have reade a discourse of yours touching a certeyne disjunctive decree of God. But I pray be entreated to consider, whether such a contingent before specified, or such a disjunctive proposition be a fitt object of Gods decree. Gods decrees I suppose you will say are all voluntary, and free, he could have eyther not decreed at all what he hath decreed, or decreed theyr contraries. Therefore thinges of theire owne nature impossible to be otherwise, are no fitt object of Gods decrees. Now a disjunctive proposition as above mentioned, is such as it is impossible it should be otherwise. For this disjunctive (it shall raine, or not rayne; my walking shall be, or not be) is of necessary truth, and therfore no more decreable by God to be, then the Godhead it selfe is decreable by him to be.

Agayne may I not be bold to say, that it is too absurde to talke of his unalterable decree, if it proceede by way of distinction, to imply that some of Gods decrees are alterable. All his decrees are more unalterable then the laves of Medes, and Persians; they are compared to brazen mounteynes Zach. 6. But here followeth a mistery in the next place, and a great mystery: In that he fully comprehendeth the number of all meanes possible, and can mixe the severall possibilities of theyr miscarriage in what degree or proposition he list, he may, & ofttimes doth infallibly forecast the full accomplishment of his proposed ends, by multiplicity of meanes in themselfes not inevitable but contingent. Adde hereunto all that followes in this Section. The absurdities that you mixe in this mysterious sentence of yours I desire, and will endeavour to discover. Here we have three thinges to be considered.

First certeyne ends proposed by God to be accomplished. Secondly meanes appointed for the accomplishinge of these ends. Thirdly Gods forecast of the accomplishment of these ends. Touching the first I desire some instance of those ends you speake of. One instance you give in the sequence of his action, and it is the apprehension of a Traytor p. 261which you suppose to be ordeyned by God. Yet is this as absolute a contingent as ought else. And contingents are no otherwise ordeyned by God, then to be contingents. For you have already signified that it is by Gods unalterable decree; So then God hath decreed them to be contingents. Therfore this action allso to witt the apprehension of a Traytor, God hath ordeyned to be of a contingent nature.

The meaning wherof is no more then this, it may come to passe, it may not come to passe. It shall be, or it shall not be, and accordingly in other treatises of yours you have discoursed of a disjunctive decree of God, so called from the disjunctive object therof, as to say, God hath decreed that such a Traytor eyther shall be apprehended, or shall not be apprehended. Now there is no neede of any meanes to procure the accomplishment of such an ende thus determined. For any man is able to avouch that a Traytor shall be apprehended, or no, and nothing at all to fayle in the truth herof; much lesse neede is there of such variety of meanes, and those mixed with such possibility of miscarriage, as you treate of, to bring to passe such a decree, such an intention of this. But let the end passe as you have shaped it; this being of a contingent nature, and yet absolutely intended by God; for you neyther expresse, nor intimate the signification of any condition, it will hence follow, that any thing of the like nature may be absolutely ordeyned by God notwithstanding the contingency therof. That is, be it never so contingent and free, as the apprehension of a Traytor is a free act of man (for you doe not suppose him to be apprehended by doggs or catts but by men rather) yet notwithstanding God is able absolutely to ordeyne that such a thing shall come to passe. Therefore God is as well able to ordeyne that at such a time a man shall beleive, shall repent, yea or doe any thinge though never so free, notwithstanding the contingent nature thereof. Now I can no where find (though I have perused throughly divers of your treatises) that you like of this. Yet here ere you are aware (as it seemes) you are fallen upon it, and take upon you to acquaint us with mysterious conceits of yours, concerning p. 262the meanes whereby God doth inevitably accomplish such ends, you may as well say that God can bring to passe inevitably that man shall beleive and repent though I have founde you elsewhere to abhorre this. To the consideration of which meanes we are now to proceede. Concerning these meanes you give us to understand, 1. that they are many possible, 2. that God comprehendes the number of them all. 3. That he can mixe the severall possibilities of theyr miscarriage, in what degree, or proportion he list. 4. That in themselfes these meanes are not inevitable, but contingent. I nothing doubt, but the same ende God can bring to passe by divers meanes, and that all these meanes are knowne to God but what you meane by mixing theyr severall possibilities of miscariage in what degree he list. I understand not. One kind of meanes is possible to miscarry, so is another, so is every one, for so you acknowledge them all to be in themselves not inevitable, but contingent; the meaning wherof I conceave to be this, they doe not inevitably, but contingently accomplishe the end proposed, this I take to be the meaning though incongruously delivered. But how can God be sayd to mixe these possibilities, unlesse you meane hereby Gods comprehending of them all, which is a truth. For God comprehends them all in his mind, but without mixing of them. But you seeme to project a farther meaning, by the last wordes as when you say in what degree, and proportion he list. I take the meaning obscurely delivered to be this; God knowes every degree of theyr possibility to miscarriage, or rather God makes the possibility eyther of each his miscarriage, or of all theyr miscarriage in what degree he list; yet it seemes you acknowledge no degree of possibility of the miscarriage of them all. For you maynteyne it as a thing necessary, that all shall not miscarry in the wordes immediately following. Have you not such a conceite as his? God hath ordeyned the apprehension of a Traytor, eyther by this meanes or by that meanes, or by a third meanes or by a fourth? if it be I would you had spoken out, and told us your minde plainly, yet we may take also that into our consideration in the end. But by the way I see no p. 263groundes of these degrees of possibility which you fancy. For all of the meanes being as you confesse contingent, and evitable as you speake, I see no reason, but every one should be equally possible to miscarry. If you had talked of degrees of probability of miscarriage, I should not have excepted against it, but I seeme to have just reason to except against the degrees of possibility.

Let us come to the third, & that is Gods inevitable forecast of the full accomplishment of his proposed ends by this multiplicity of meanes. Now this as it is plaine enough, so it seemes as manifestly to be untrue. For that God should foreknow the issue of thinges by the meanes which have onelyonly a contingent operation, is generally disclayned by School-divines the Iesuites themselves, and Frarius by name in his Opuscula; as that which would inferre an uncertayne, and not infallible knowledge in God. For as much as nothing can lay a better grounde of certainty, then the nature of it can affoord.

Secondly eyther you suppose that all this multiplicity of meanes you speake of, shall be used or no. If all be not used, then God doth not forecast the full accomplishment of his proposed end by this multiplicity of meanes possible, you speake of, but onelyonly by some of them, namely so many as were used. And indeed it is very strange, that all meanes possible to be used should be used to the accomplishment of every proposed end, or indeede of any proposed end. But if all be used, and all faile save the last, upon what ground can you say that the end proposed must necessarily be accomplished by this last, which is as possible to miscarry as the former; for you have not signified that God alwayes useth this course, as to use the courses first that are most possible to miscarry, and such as are least possible in the last place; nay your selfe professe all the meanes to be alike possible, and probable. To this you seeme to answere in the sentence following, that it comes to passe by the rules of eternall wisedome. Namely that if an hundred meanes be appointed for the apprehension of a Traytor, and ninety and nine doe amisse, the hundreth, and last by the rules of eternall wisedome must of necessitie take. But where p. 264these rules of eternall wisedome are to be founde, that you doe not tell us, and therefore we take liberty to discourse against it thus; was it not possible for God to have used this meanes in the first, or second, or third, or middle place, or in the place last save one which he useth in the last? you have not manifested the least likelihood to deny this. Now if used in the first place, or in the last place save one it might have miscarryed, why not in this, seing the nature of it is not altered but continueth the same still, working onelyonly contingently unto the producing of the end proposed, and not necessarily? Agayne all other meanes fayling this takes effect (you say) by the rules of eternall wisedome. Now I demaunde if none other had beene appointed but this, why could not this alone being used have taken effect by rules of eternall wisedome as well, as now it doth, that is why could not God ordeyn that by this meanes onelyonly used, the effect intended should be brought to passe, as well as by this meanes used after, the use of many other, seeing still the effect coms to passe by his meanes alone and not by any other: For if God can ordeyne that after other meanes have fayled, this meanes alone shall bring about the end intended by God, why could he not as well ordeyne that this meanes alone should doe it, without using of any other meanes before it.

Last of all, what needes Gods forecast runne out to these meanes for a grounde of its certeynty, when God himselfe cannot be ignorant of his owne determinations? and therfore having ordeyned such an end, as suppose the apprehension of such a Traytour, upon this grounde he may be most certeyne that such a Traytor shall be apprehended. By the way I will take leave to observe some positions that have dropped from your pen in this Section. 1. That God can ordeyne such a thing to come to passe, which is of a contingent nature, as for example the apprehension of a Traytor. 2. That upon such an ordination of God successe to the meanes used hereunto is absolutely necessary, you adde and immutably also, committing a great indecorum therein, immutability being a congruous attribute onelyonly to the ordination of God, and not to the successe of thinges. p. 2653. That meanes of contingent operation onelyonly shall necessarily take effect. 4. This necessity of taking effect is not absolute but gotten merely by casuall miscarriage of the possibilities of the former meanes, so you expresse it, whereas indeede the possibilities miscarry not; for the meanes are in theyr nature possible, yea and probable too, to produce the end intended as your selfe professe. 5. Though this necessity in the effectuall working of the meanes be not absolute, yet the successe of them is absolutely necessary. I say no more but this, the Theses that Picus Mirandula proposed at Rome were many of them paradoxicall enough but I doe not find that any of these had place amongst them.

5. There is a fallacy (you say) though the simplest one that ever was sett to catch any wise man, wherein many excellent witts of these latter ages with some of the former have beene pittifully entangled, you that have discerned the simplicity thereof in all probabilitie, are not like to be entangled therein, for then you were not any wiser then they; yet it seemes all these excellent witts are but woodcokes in comparison to your selfe; well let us consider it. The more, wherein it were not possible for any besides themselfes to catch them, they thus (you say) frame and sett. Whatsoever God hath decreed must of necessity come to passe; But God hath decreed every thing that is, therfore every thing that is, comes to passe of necessity. All thinges are necessary at least in respect of Gods decree, The extract or Corollary wherof in briefe is this. It is impossible for ought that is not, to be, for ought that hath beene, not to have beene, for ought that is not, to be, impossible for ought to be hereafter that shall not bee. I promise you, you have engaged your selfe very farr not onelyonly to looke to it that your selfe be not founde to be entangled herein, but for the performance of a very easy, and cleare solution of this which you terme a fallacy, least your selfe be not found as wise as they which were entangled herein. Yet I am not ignorant of such a tricke of witt, as first to cry downe an argument by disgracing it, and powring contempt upon it, & thereupon presuming that any answere shall serve the turne, when the Reader is before hand awed with such a censure as to forfete p. 266the reputation of a scholar, and to be Metamorphosed into a woodcocke, if he doe not applaude it, and perswade himselfe to see a cleere solution of the former argument, which is proclaymed base, and sufficient to discreditt all that favour it. Yet some witt is required to catch a woodcocke. But this is so simple a fallacy as the like was never set to catch a wise Man. Now a man would have thought your selfe had beene one of those excellents witts that had beene taken in this snare, if it be a snare; seing you come but freshly frō professing that God decreeth such a contingent, as the apprehension of a Traytour. In which case, it is absolutely necessary that it shall come to passe. Now why may not God as well decree every contingent thinge, for ought the contingency can hinder it. For what is more contingent then the apprehension of a Traytour, yet this you say God may ordeine, and in this case it is absolutely necessary that it shall come to passe. But let us consider what you have to say to it. I hope you will remember your owne interpretation of it, namely that it must necessarily come to passe in respect of Gods decree, and so by your owne profession not onelyonly a contingent thinge, but a free action, may be sayd to come to passe necessarily, to witt in respect of Gods decree, as for example, the apprehension of a Traytor which is as free an action as any, you might have beene pleased to have framed the proposition thus, whatsoever God hath decreed to come to passe, must necessarily come to passe. For you cannot be ignorant that God doth as well decree that some thinges shall not come passe, as that other thinges shall come to passe. As for example Ezek. 20. 31. O house of Israel as I live sayth the Lord God I will not answere you when I am asked 32. Neyther shall that be done that cometh into your minde: for yee say we will be as the heathen and serve wood, and stone, and Esay. 37. 33. Thus sayth the Lord concerning the comming of Assur. He shall not enter into this citty, nor shoote an arrowe there, nor come before it with sheild, nor cast a mounte against it. Now we are ready to attend the discovery of this fallacy, this simple fallacy.

First you tell us of an extract or Corollary hereof thus; p. 267It is impossible for ought that is not to be, &c. Is this the way you take to discover the simplicity of this fallacy? this savoureth strongly of your fallacious dealing; in as much as by callecting consequences you labour to discredit the syllogisme, this surely is not to answere it. Besides not one of your consequences are sounde, there is no ingenuity in the collection of them. For the conclusion of the former syllogisme being this therefore, every thing that is comes to passe of necessity, your selfe have acknowledged this necessity to proceede in respect of Gods decree. And therefore what necessitie of thinges soever you doe inferr herence, you must accordingly understand it in respect of Gods decree not otherwise. Now this necessity is but necessity secundum quid not simpliciter as the learned call it, and such as may stand with contingency, and possibility to the contrary. Like as the apprehension of a Traytor is a thinge possible not to be and in its owne nature meerely contingent, but upon supposition that God hath ordeyned that such a Traytor shall be apprehended by certeyne meanes, you professe that the successe of those meanes is absolutely necessary, which is as much as to say that the apprehension of that Traytour upon Gods ordeyning it, is absolutely necessary; which is more then the divines whom you impugne as overlashing doe use to say, or can in any sobriety of speech be justified. For if it must necessarily come to passe onelyonly upon supposition of Gods decree, then not absolutely but upon supposition.

But consider we your extracts apart; the first is this. It is impossible for ought that is, not to be; Now this proposition cannot at all be deduced out of the former syllogisme, or out of any part thereof. It depends manifestly upon another proposition which is not at all mentioned in the former syllogisme and the proposition is this, whatsoever God hath decreed that it shall not be, it is impossible, that should be or come to passe. Now let every sober Reader judge, with what ingenuity you call this first proposition of yours an extract of the former syllogisme, or of the conclusion thereof; whereas it is nothing necessary that he who affirmes, that All thinges which p. 268God hath decreed shall necessarily come to passe, must allso affirme the other, namely that whatsoever God hath not decreed, it is impossible that it should come to passe, wherhēce alone is derived the first abstract you speake of. Nay rather if we consider the analogy of propositions aright, we shall find that these propositions are onelyonly proportionall; Whatsoever God hath decreed to come to passe, the same shall necessarily come to passe; Whatsoever God hath decreed that it shall not come to passe, it is impossible that it should come to passe. These are suitable indeede, and accordingly we professe that it is impossible that any thinge which is not, because God hath decreed that it shall not be, I say it is impossible that it should be. So likewise as touching the second extract we say that every thing which hath beene, so farre forth as God hath decreed the being thereof, it is impossible not to have beene.

Your third extract is of the same nature with the first, and so admitts the same answere. Well I still attend the discovery of the fallacy; It may be we shall meete with it in that which followeth, and that is this, But if it bee (as I suppose) very consonant to infinite wisedome, altogether consonant to infinite goodnes and to decree contingency as well as necessity a conclusion quite contradictory to that late inferred, will be the onelyonly lawfull issue of the former Maxime or Major proposition matched with a Minor proposition of our owne choosing, &c. Is this to discover the fallacy of the former syllogisme? Or are you to seeke in the solution of a fallacy? If it be not concluded in moode and figure, you might have signified so much; but indeede no exception can that way be taken against it. If any terme had beene aequivocall, the answere had beene by distinction. But no colour of any such just exception; so that every way the forme is unquestionable. And therefore no exception is here to be taken but against the truth of one of the premises.

And I verily beleive there is one of the premises that disliketh you, though you are ashamed plainly, and directly to manifest so much. For so the answere had beene fayre, and facile by denyinge it, if not the Major because thereof you p. 269make use in your owne syllogisme, wherewith you doe as it were requite this, yet at least the Minor which was this, But God hath decreed every thinge that is. For I verely beleeve this is such a dish of lettice as fitts not your lipps. This you say you might have done, but now the liberty hereof is taken from you, and that by your selfe. For although the Pope never bindes his owne handes, yet you have bound your tongue, and sealed up your owne lippes from taking any such exception as this. For you call the syllogisme a fallacy, and that a simple one. Now fallacies are such formes of argumentation, as offend onelyonly in forme of argumentation, which kind of exception is to justify the matter of it, and the truth of the premises, especially whereas you doe not professe that it offendes both in forme, and matter, nor shew any forwardnes to deny either of the propositions. Well we gave you a syllogisme to answere, in steede of answering it, you thinke to make us amends with another syllogisme. I have read that when one presented Augustus with verses looking for a reward, Augustus in steede of a reward gave him verses of his owne making. The Poet hereupon very liberally bestowed a reward upon Augustus. We expected at your handes not another syllogisme, but the answearinge of our owne. But though you fayle to answeare ours, I will not fayle to doe my best in accommodating an answere unto yours. You undertake to inferr the contradictory to our conclusion, which is to outface your opposites, and to cry a syllogisme downe without answearing it.

Yet let us see how well you performe that you undertake. Your syllogisme is this. Whatsoever God hath decreed must of necessity come to passe, but God hath decreed contingency as well as necessity, therefore of necessity there must be contingency. And for the better strengthning of your discourse or argumentation, you make a motion that an additionall to the Maior which is this, Nothinge can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed it shall or may come to passe. Now the judge, or Chancelour in Logicall Courts to whome such a motion should be made, would cry out shame upon it. For that proposition p. 270is an universall affirmative, and you desire that an universall negative should be added to it to make up an entire Maior proposition, which were like a sixt finger upon an hand. And indeed in that case it were neither Categoricall nor Hypotheticall. For though two propositions with a copulative have place in some Hypotheticall syllogismes, yet it is alwayes by way of negation thus, Non & dies est, & nox: sed dies est, ergo non nox, Againe upon a second consideration, the motion would be rejected as being altogether without witt. For as much as the conclusion intended is well enough inferred without it, and this additionall conferres no strength to improve the inference. I appeale to every schollars judgment in this.

Thirdly the proposition it selfe as touching the latter clause of the disjunctive, hath as little witt as the motion made for the admittance of it. As where it is sayd that God hath decreed that thinges may come to passe, you might as well say that God hath decreed that the World may come to passe. For the possibility of the event of thinges is not from Gods decree, but rather from Gods omnipotency. For because he is able to produce every thinge that implyes no contradiction, therfore they are denominated possible.

Lastly this proposition which you crave to be admitted is like a Troian horse, it will doe you more harme then good, as ere we part from this section shall be made manifest. Yet what neede you desire more, your conclusion is granted you, namely that of necessity there must be contingency, supposing Gods decree. For Gods decrees are onelyonly of doing, or suffering some thinges, as it is free for God whether he will doe them, or suffer them, yea or no. And therefore though God had not at all decreed contingency, yet decreing any thinge, of necessity there must be contingency, though he had decreed nothing else, but such thinges as we count most necessary, in the course of nature. But we graunt also that God did decree contingency, and decrees necessity in respect of second causes; as for example God did decree to make fire of such a nature as to heate or burne necessarily, the Sunne of such a p. 271nature as to enlighten the aire necessarily, heavy thinges to move downewards, and light thinges upwardes, and all this necessarily. Necessarily I say in respect of second causes, though this necessity was mere contingency, in respect of the will of God. For he could have chosen whether there should have beene any fire, or world at all, yea and can hinder the fire from burninge if it please him, as he did hinder it from taking hold of the three noble children in the furnace of Babylon. And as God hath decreed many thinges to come to passe necessarily, so hath he decreed many thinges to come to passe contingently, as in course of nature many thinges there are that come to passe contingently by the will of God, and especially the actions of men and Angells.

And as for that additionall of yours which you craved to be admitted, Nothing can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed, it shall come to passe, we are so farr from disliking it, that we cannot beleive that you doe beleive it, and therefore you have taken a course to confound it, as in due time shall appeare. We willingly professe that all thinges beside God, are created entities, and such as whose being must necessarily depend or God, or have no being at all. And not onelyonly doe we subject res ipsas to the will and decree of God, but allso modos rerum. And these modi rerum are necessity, and contingency.

Nothing (we say) comes to passe, but what God hath decreed shall come to passe. Againe nothing comes to passe after any manner whatsoever, but that God hath decreed, it to come to passe after that manner; whether it come to passe necessarily, God hath decreed it shall come to passe necessarily; or whether contingently, God hath decreed it shall come to passe contingently. In a word that which you deliver faultringly we say plainly Nothing comes to passe otherwise, then God hath decreed it shall come to passe. So then I say we graunt your conclusion. But how doth it appeare that this conclusion of yours contradicteth our former conclusion which was this, therefore Every thinge comes to passe of necessity. You will say, if every thinge comes to passe of necessity, then nothinge p. 272comes to passe contingently. I confesse this consequence is plausible, but to whome? to none but ignorants. Of which number you are not. For your very conclusion it selfe in the very outward face of it utterly contradicteth this consequence. For is not your conclusion this, therfore of necessity there must be contingency, which manifestly justifieth that necessity and contingency may stand together, and are nothing oppositie. And how, I pray, is this necessity, but in respect of the decree of God? And did our conclusion proceede in any other sense? Your selfe have acknowledge that it doth not, though therein somewhat faultring allso, as it is your usuall course, in taking notice of any truth that makes against your tenents. For are not these your wordes in interpreting our conclusion, All thinges are necessary in respect of Gods decree? OnelyOnly you adde at least in this respect as if you would faine drawe it to another meaninge. Now our meaning is plaine. All thinges come not to passe necessarily, nor all things contingently, but some thinges come to passe necessarily as works of nature, some thinges contingently as the actions of men. But by your owne receaved Maxime Nothing can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed they shall come to passe, therefore God hath decreed that some thinges shall come to passe necessarily, some thinges contingently. But by your owne receaved principle, whatsoever God hath decreed to come to passe, that must of necessity come to passe, therefore of necessity it must come to passe that some thinges shall come to passe necessarily, some thinges contingently. Now give me leave to represent your owne ill carriage, to your owne eyes. The Maior proposition in our syllogisme, and the Maior proposition in your syllogisme are all one as your selfe acknowledge in these wordes, Let the Maior proposition stand as it did before. Now if they be all one why doe you not propose them after one manner? doe you practise to gull your Reader presuming this legier du maine of yours shall not be discovered?

The Maior proposition in both is all one I confesse as touching each part, both the midle tearme, and the greater extreame. But when the greater extreame comes to be repeated p. 273in the conclusion, it is repeated in a farre different manner in our conclusion then in yours. For in the Maior proposition of each syllogisme it runnes thus, must of necessity come to passe, but in our conclusion it is corrupted thus, must come to passe necessarily. But in your conclusion it is mended thus, of necessitie there must bee contingency; which is as much as to say, of necessitie it must come to passe. I say in ours it is corrupted; for whereas in these words must of necessitie come to passe, the word necessity is indifferently to be referred to that which goes before, or that which comes after; and indeed ought to be referred to that which goes before; in the conclusion it is put in the last place, so that it cannot bee referred but to the words come to passe. And it is mended in yours, for in the conclusion it is put in the first place of the greater extreame, and so takes away all danger of referring it to the last words, come to passe. As for example, had our conclusion beene shaped like yours as touching the majus extremum which is the same in both, the harshnes of it had beene qualified, thus, ergo all things of necessity must come to passe, which hath a faire, and facile construction thus; though some things come to passe necessarily, and some things contingently, yet all things as being decreed by God, must of necessity come to passe, both those things that come to passe necessarily, and those things that come to passe contingently. In like sort had your conclusion beene shaped by you as ours is, as touching the greater extreame, as indeed it ought, the greater extreame being all one in both, then your conclusion would have seemed as harsh as ours thus, ergo Contingency must come to passe of necessity or thus some effects shall bee contingent of necessitie, for so runnes the Minor, God hath decreed contingency, or that some effects shall be contingent as well as some are necessary. And as for the consequences which hence you make they are nothinge contradictory to those extracts you made from our conclusion. For all those impossibilities deduced from our conclusion, were onelyonly secundum quid and upon supposition of Gods decree, which kind of impossibilitie is alwaies joyned with a simple and absolute possibilitie to the contrary, p. 274secluding Gods decree. For even those things which God decreeth to come to passe contingently as the actions of men, must necessarily by the vertue of Gods decree come to passe, in such a manner as joyned with a possibilitie of not comming to passe, otherwise it were impossible they should come to passe contingently. About which truth, namely that God decreeth some things to come to passe contingently, why doe you faulter in this fowle manner? If you like it not, why doe you not in plaine termes contest against it, if you doe approve of it, why doe you not plainly professe it, but carry your selfe in the clouds of generalitie and ambiguity? As first, when you say, God hath decreed contingency, here a man might bee apt to conceave, that you doe beleeve that God hath decreed that some things shall come to passe contingently. Especially if he understand that God decreeth not only necessity, but allso that some thinges shall necessarily come to passe, which may seeme to urge you in like sort to mainteyne that God decreeth contingency, so he should also decree that some things shall come to passe contingently.

Most of all considering what here you seeme to approve of in your additionall, namely that Nothing can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed. Now the case is cleere that many things come to passe contingently, therfore it followeth that God allso hath decreed, that even those things shall come to passe contingently; But I have had experience of your opinion to the contrary in another treatise of yours, wherein though you confesse that God hath decreed the necessity of things, & the things themselfes that necessarily come to passe, and graunt that it cannot bee otherwise, yet on the other side though you graunt that God decreeth contingency, yet you deny that God decreeth the thinges themselfes that doe contingently come to passe. A most prodigious opinion, as if God did bring to passe the contingency of a thing (which is but modus rei, and containes no realitie different from the thing it selfe) yet doth not bring to passe the thing it selfe; for if he did he must decree it allso. And as directly opposite to the word of God, plainly testifying a multitude of contingent p. 275thinges to have beene decreed by God. The like ambiguitie you content your selfe withall, when you say that God hath decreed that some effects shall be contingent, or as otherwise you expresse it, that some contingent effects shall bee, which seemes manifestly to imply as well the being or existence of them to bee decreed by God as the contingent manner of their being.

Yet I say, in another discourse of yours you fly of from this acknowledgement, but withall deliver your selfe with as much confusion and perturbation, as any adversary could expect in an opposite maintaining erroneous points, and crying downe the truth of God. Thus have I taken paines to answere your syllogisme, but as for the discovery of the fallacy of ours wee have hitherto found nothing tending thereunto: What is to come wee are to expect. Yet hereupon as if you had performed some great service, very gravely and magisterially you tell us, that As ill weeds grow apace, so the late mentioned errour once conceaved, was quickly delivered of a second which derived the infallible certainty of Gods foreknowing things future, from an infallible necessitie (as they conceaved it) layd upon them, (before they had being) by his immutable decree. But every wise decree presupposeth wisedome, and wisedome essentially includeth knowledge. It seemes you thinke you have sufficiently discharged your selfe of that you undertooke, namely the discovery of the fallacy of our syllogisme, you proceede to the censure of another errour, and that both obscurely and unsoundly expressed. It is about the ground of Gods fore-knowing things to come. Now the opinion you taxe for an errour, is the opinion of those that maintaine that God foreknowes all things to come, by seing the determination of his owne will to the producing of every action. This you expresse after your manner thus, God foreknowes them from an infallible necessitie layd upon them by his immutable decree. I doe not thinke you can produce any Author of this opinion, that expresseth his opinion in this manner. Besides, it is notoriously untrue. For the Authors of this opinion maintayne, that God by his decree, laieth contingency upon some things, as well as p. 276necessitie upon others. And that as he will have the fire to burne, the Sunne to enlightē necessarily, so he will have, Angells and men produce their actions contingently and freely. Nay which is more, even they that openly professe, that God doth determine the will of man unto every actiō as touching the substance of the action; doe withall maintayne that God determines the will of man and Angells to worke contingently and freely in all their actions, and consequently neither doth hee decree any other wise to determine them, which doctrine maintaynes that Gods will and decree doth lay upon all reasonable creatures a contingent manner of operation rather then any necessity. Yet upon supposition of Gods decree, they maintayne that of necessitie such thinges as God hath decreed shall come to passe, and that after that manner as God hath decreed it to come to passe, that is, either necessarily as all the operations of naturall agents, or contingently and freely, as all the actions of reasonable creatures. But this opinion you dislike, and upon what reason? Vndoubtedly it seemes they had need bee weighty ones, considering that this question hath beene abundantly canvassed, by the most learned and subtilest among Schoole-divines. And indeed it is one of the first points whereabout I have beene acquainted with Schoole divinity: Scotus proposeth this questiō, to witt; Now God doth foreknowe future contingents; for thus they in their wisedome thought fitt to propose it, to witt, of future contingents in speciall not as you doe, of future thinges in generall. And he proposeth two opinions hereabouts which he impugneth. The first, is the opinion of Bonaventura, who maintayned that God did foreknowe future contingents, by the Ideaes of them in the mind of God. The second is the opinion of Aquinas, who made the ground of Gods foreknowing of future contingents, to bee Their reall existence in eternitie. Both these Scotus impugneth with such excellent arguments to my judgement at that time, and withall so cleare, that as I remember this brought me first in love with Schoole divinity. The third opinion is his owne, which there he maintayneth, & that is this, which you invade, p. 277namely, That God knowes all future contingents by knowing his owne will and purpose to produce them. And as touching your objection that God foreknowes the sinnes of men as well as theyr good actions, which yet undoubtedly he did not decree to produce, his answeare is, that this also is foreknown by God in as much as he knowes the determination of his will to produce every sinfull act as touching the substance of it, and to permitt the obliquitie of it. The opinion of Calvin maintayning no other ground of Gods foreknowledge of future contingents but this, & that out of Valla is apt to bee exposed to scorne now adayes, not onelyonly amongst Papists but amongst English Protestants also. But as for Scotus who is knowne to maintayne the same opinion, he is reputed to be of sufficiency to beare the brunt of any adversary that in point of Metaphysicall, and Schoole divinity shall encounter him. Yet consider a little farther. The Thomists and Dominicans who stand much upon the tearmes of defence for the credite and reputation of theyr great Master Aquinas, they are apt enough to meete with Scotus his arguments opposing his opinion in laying the ground of Gods foreknowledge upon the reall existence of all thinges in eternity. But marke how Didacus Alvarer a great Schoole-man carryeth himselfe in this. Aquinas sayth he did never deny Scotus his way of Gods foreknowing future contingents, to witt, by knowing the determination of his owne will. But besides this he devised another, and that was by the reall existence of all future things in eternity. Agayne, in maintaining the opinion of Aquinas concerning the actuall existence of all future thinges in eternity, he first presupposeth the determination of Gods will for the producing of them, and thereupon makes future contingents to have theyr reall existence, & not otherwise. So that for this opinion which you doe very magisterially censure, as an ill weed hath not onelyonly poore Calvin for the patron of it, and Valla alleaged by him; but Scotus also the Father of the Realls, yea and Didacus Alvarer a Thomist, a sect of Schoole-divines commonly opposite to the Scotists, yet herein professedly concurring with Scotus himselfe, p. 278and avouching allso Aquinas himselfe to bee of the same opinion. You had neede therefore looke well to your tackling in opposing such who I tell you never were reputed Babies, but tall fellowes.

But yet I confesse they were but men and may have their matches. But leave your censures, and trust to your sword and dint of arguments, & doe not thinke that words or phrasos or figures (much lesse imperious censures) will carry it.

And heere it would bee required, not onelyonly to argue your owne Tenet, but to make answere to theyr Arguments. But you Eagle like and as if they were but flyes keepe your state, and will not fly at such inferiour gaine. Wherein your proselyte shall be little beholding to you, whē being possessed with your opinion, hee shall find himselfe left to himselfe to sinke or swimme without any helpe from you to answere theyr arguments, that have maintayned the contrary; They had neede bee of Chrisippus temper, who was wont to pray his Master to give him principles and let him alone to maintayne them; Yet it may bee I am deceaved and it was not Chrisippus but Carneades. Yet with one argument you are content to helpe your reader here. Belike it is some cleare demonstration, such as it is, this it is. Every wise decree presupposeth wisedome, and wisedome includeth knowledge, and what of this? Nay if any man desires to fare better in the endoctrinating himselfe in this point, he must goe to the Cookes, you have no better entertainment for him. A very short dispatche (in a controversie of great moment) and a quicke; Never was Schooleman so simple as to doubt, whether wisedome includeth knowledge or a wise decree presupposeth wisedome; yet never any one of them was found to discerne any such inference as you imply herhence, as if herhence it did so evidently followe that Gods foreknowing of future thinges doth not depend upon the determination of his will. For you take no paines to cleere this inference. But let us examine this a little. When we say the foreknowledg of future contingents depends upon the determination of Gods will, the meaning is, therefore God foreknowes them because he purposeth to produce p. 279them, so farre as they are good, or to permitt them in case they are evill. Now you in opposition to this, tell us, that Gods knowledge goeth before his decree, and because you doe not specify what knowledge, we have reason to expound it of the knowledge spoken of, that is of the knowledge of future contingents. In like sort because you specifie not of what decree you speake, we have reason to understand it of the decree before spoken of, whereupon those divines, whome you impugne, doe ground the foreknowledge of things to come. So then your meaning must be this in opposition to the Tenet which you censure for an errour or weed in opinion. Whereas some thinke that Gods foreknowledge of things to come is grounded upon Gods decree, as if God ergo did foreknow them, because he purposeth to produce them. You are of a contrary opinion, namely, that Gods foreknowledge doth goe before his decree, that is, first God foreknowes thinges to come, and then secondly he purposeth to produce them. For if you meant it of another decree, then that which was spoken of, what an absurd thing is it for you not to specifie it, especially seing you propose this by way of contradiction to the former opinion? which unlesse it proceedes of the same things is no contradiction. For if I say God doth first decree to produce things, and hereupon he knowes them; and you shall as it were by way of opposition say; No this is not so; but God doth first foresee the actions of men, and thereupon decree to save or damne them, here is no contradiction at all, but an unlearned and foolishe shewe of opposition, without any substance of contradiction. Wherfore if you speake to the purpose in this, and that by way of opposition, your meaning must be this; God doth not first decree them and afterwards foreknowe them, but rather he first foreknowes them and then decreeth them; which is as much as to say, that God foreknowing that they will be, doth hereupon decree that they shall be. So that Gods decree of things future contingent proceedeth in this manner, Seing they will be, they shall be. But to consider your reason more closely, Every wise decree (you say) presupposeth wisedome. Now this being delivered in opposition to our opinion which p. 280maintayne that the foreknowledge of future contingents followeth Gods decree; and you saying plainly that wisedome rather goeth before Gods decree then followeth after it, (which indeed is a truth, for God worketh all things according to the counsaile of his will) this discourse of yours (I say) doth imply that this foreknowledge of future contingents, which we make consequent to Gods decree is by us accoumpted the wisedome of God. For otherwise heere againe were no contradiction, though you make shew of contradicting us; as whereas we say foreknowledge of future things is subsequent to Gods decree, you as it were contradicting us reply, Nay rather Gods wisedome goeth before his decree, otherwise it were no wise decree. So that herein you doe manifestly suppose that we by Gods foreknowledge of future things did understand the wisedome of God. It seemes you conceave it to be so, but as for us we take it to be so foule an absurdity that we desire, though you please your own lipps with such lettice, yet untill you have better ground for it you will not charge it upon us. For even for a man to foreknowe what he meaneth to doe is no part of wisedome. For the ve…yest foole that is may knowe and be privy to what he meaneth to doe. Every man is privy to his owne thoughts and purposes. No man knoweth the things of man but the Spirit of Man. 1. Cor. 2. 8. So then the spirit of man is well enough acquainted with the purposes of man. But the wisedome that directeth the will of God is that which the learned call Scientia simplicis intelligenti…, whereby God knowes what is most fitt to be done for the compassing of his proposed ends, which your selfe confesse to be the part of wisdome in the beginning of the former Section. Where also you made not the least mention of any such part of wisedome as to foreknowe what one meaneth to doe. Now Gods decree of producing future things in theyr season is a decree of the, meanes tending to the end which God h… intended, namely the setting forth of his glory. For God makes all things for himselfe. And this wisedome includeth knowledge, it is Prov. 16. 4Prov 16:4true the knowledge of all meanes whereby his glory may be p. 281set forth, and God makes choyce of what he thinkes fitt, and all this knowledge is not the knowledge of what shall be, but onelyonly the knowledge of what may be, or is fi…t to be, which all the learned acknowledge to be scientia simplicis intelligentiae. and they make it distinct from scientia visionis which is the knowledge of what shall be. And these knowledges all acknowledge to be so farre different as that the one to witt scientia simplicis intelligentiae is precedent to Gods decree, the other to witt scientia visionis is subsequent which two knowledges in God, how judiciously and learnedly in the course of your magisteriall censure you are pleased to confound let the Reader judge. But to proceede, hereupon you betake your selfe …o interrogatories.