Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul, Chapter 37
CHAP. XXXVII. Of the Faculty of Vnderstanding. Its operations outward upon the Object, Inward upon the Will. Of Knowledge, What it is. The naturall Desire and Love of it. Apprehension, Iudgement, Retention requisite unto right Knowledge. Severall kindes of Knowledge. The Originall Knowledge given unto Man in his Creation. The Benefits of Knowledge. Of Ignorance Naturall, Voluntary, Penall. Of Curiosity. Of Opinion; the Causes of it, Disproportion betweene the Object and the Faculty, and an Acute Versatilousnesse of Conceits. The benefit of Modest Hesitancie.
NOw it followes to speak of the parts or principall powers of the Soule, which are the Vnderstanding, and the Will. Concerning the Understanding, the Dignity thereof, though it may partly be perceived in the Latitude and excellent Variety of its Objects, being the whole world of things (for Ens & Intelligibile are reciprocall,Arist. de Anim. lib. 3. & omnia intelligit, saith Aristotle of the understanding) yet principally it proceeds from the Operations of it both Ad extra in respect of the Objects, and ad intra in respect of the Will. The one is a Contemplative, the other a more Practique office, whereby the speculations of the former are accommodated unto any either Morall or Civill Actions. Those which respect the Objects, are either Passive, or Active Operations. Passive I call those first Perceptions and apprehensions of the Soule, whereby it receiveth the simple species of some Object from immediate Impression thereof by the Ministry of the Soule; as when I understand one Object to be a Man, another a Tree, by Administration and Assistance of the Eye, which presents the Species of either.
Another sort of Passive Operations (that is of such as are grounded on Impressions received from Objects) are mixed Operations of Compounding, Dividing, Collecting, Concluding, which wee call Discourse. Of all which to speake according to their Logicall Nature, would be impertinent. Their Excellencie chiefly stands in the End whereunto they move and serve, which is Knowledge; of the which, I shall therefore here speak a few things.
Knowledge is the Assimilation of the UnderstandingAquin. part. 1. q. 14. a. 2. unto the things which it understandeth, by those Intelligible Species which doe Irr…diate it, and put the power of it into Act. For as the beames of the Sunne shining on a glasse, doe there work the Image of the Sunne: so the species and resemblances of things being convayed on the Understanding, doe there work their owne Image. In which respect theAristot. de Anim. lib. 3. cap. 4. & 5. Philosopher saith, That the Intellect becommeth All things by being capable of proper impressions from them: As in a Painters Table, wee call that a face, a hand, a foot, a tree, which is the lively Image and Representation of such things unto the eye.
There is not any Desire more noble, nor more Naturall unto a Man (who hath not like Saul hid himselfe amongst the stuffe, and lost himselfe in the Low and perishing provisions for Lust) than is this Desire of Knowledge. Nature dictating to every Creature to be more intent upon its Specificall than upon its Genericall perfection. And hence it is that though Man be perfectest of all Creatures, yet many doe excell him in sensitive Perfection.Vid. …. lib. 7. i… …. Et Lact…nt. de Opis…. Dei. c. 2. 3. Et C…l. Rhod…g. lib. …. cap. …. Some in exquisitenesse of Sight; others of Hearing; others of Tast, Touch, and Smell; others of Swiftnesse and of Strength; Nature thereby teaching us to imitate her in perfecting, and supplying of our Desires, not to terminate them there, where when wee have made the best Provision wee can, many Beasts will surpasse us: but to direct our Diligence most to the improving of our owne specificall and rationall perfection, to wit, our Understandings. Other Faculties are tyred, and will be apt to nauseate, and surfet on their Objects. But Knowledge as knowledge, doth never either burden or cloy the Minde, no more than a Covetous man is wearied with growing Rich: And therefore the Philosopher telleth us that Knowledge is the *foreign. Arist▪ Physit. l. 7. c. 3. Text …0. foreign Clem. Alex. Str…m lib. 2. foreign. Clem. Alex. prad. lib. 1 c. ….Rest of the Vnderstanding, wherein it taketh delight as a Thing in its naturall Place.
And so great is this Delight, that Men have ventured on much Trouble to procure it. *Vid. Valer. Max. l. 8▪ c▪ 7. Th…odoret. Serm. de fide. Clem. Alex Strom. lib. 1. p. 222. 223.As Pythagoras, Plat…, Democritus, travelled into remote Countries to gather Knowledge, as Salomon sent to Ophir for Gold. And as it makes adventurous to undertake Troubles, so it helps men to beare them. A true lover of Knowledge will hardly be over-borne with any Ordinary distresse, if it doe not violate, and restraine that particular appetite. If hee may enjoy the Delights of Learning, hee will be very moderately affected with his other restraints. Archimedes was not sensible of the losse of Syracuse, being wholly intent upon a Mathematicall Demonstration. And Demetrius Cicero de sinibus lib. 5.Phaler…us deceived the Calamity of his Banishment by the sweetnesse of his Studies. A Man is never afflicted to the Quick, but when hee is punish'd in his most Delightfull Affections, of all which the most predominant in Rationall men is this of Knowledge.
And therefore as the first Creature God formed was Light (to shew that all his Works were made in Wisedome, that they might set forth and manifest his Glory) so the first motion of Adam after his Creation was towards Knowledge. By his Exercise of Knowledge hee shewed Gods Image in him, and by the Ambition after more hee l…st it: As no Man sinnes easier than in the Thing which hee best loves. And for this cause wee may observe that Christs frequentest Miracles were shewed in opening the Eyes of the blind, and the Eares of the Deafe and Dumb. His Mercies being perfect, extended themselves on those Faculties which are the chiefe Instruments of Knowledge in Men which they most love.
And this love of Knowledge is seene evidently… homines mente lamentari qu…m la…ari in Amentiâ. Aug. Civ. Dei. l 11. c. 27. in this, that men had rather have sober Calamities, than mad pleasures, and more freely choose cleare Intellectuals with miserie, than disturb'd with mirth. Many Men better content themselves with but a crazie body, for the fruition of their studies, than to purchase a better Health at so great a Price as the losse of Learning.
But the Principall Excellencie of Knowledge is this, That it guideth the Soule to God; and so doth all kinde of Right Knowledge in divers respects. For first, there is scarce any Science properly so called, which hath not its Ar…ana to pose and amaze the Understanding, as well as its more easie Conclusions to satisfie it. Such as are in Philosophie, those Occult Sympathies and Antipathies, of which naturall Reason can render no Account at all: which overcomming the utmost Vigour of humane Disquisition, must needs enforce us to beleeve that there is an Admirable Wisedome that disposeth, and an infinite Knowledge that comprehendeth those secrets which we are not able to fathome.
Againe, since the Knowledge of Things is either of their Beings, or of their Properties and Operations: And Nature abhorreth the Motion of proceeding aforeign, Arist▪ de Generat. Animal. lib. 1. cap▪ 1. foreign. Arist. Physic. lib. 7. cap. 1. Text. 3.In Infinitum: in either of these, necessary it is, that the Minde of man b…id. Iussin. Martyr. qu. ad Grac. qu. 3. Tertull. Apol. cap. 17. 18. De Res…arect. carnis cap. 12. Contra Marcion▪ lib. 1.tracing the footsteps of naturall things, must by the Act of Logicall Resolution at last arise to him who is the fountaine of all Being, the First of all Causes, the Supreame over all Movers, in whom all the rest have their Beings and Motions founded. And this the Lord in the Prophet hath delivered unto us cp. 17. 18. R…sil▪ Hexam. Homi…. 1. Aug. Confess. lib. 10. cap. 6. …. lib. 2. cap. 9. Theophil. Ad Antel. lib. 1. c Hos. 2. 21. 2….. I will heare the Heavens, and the Heavens shall …eare the Earth, and the Earth the Corne and Wine, and they Iezreel. Iezreel cannot subsist without Corne and Wine, shee cries to them to help it. These cannot help without the Earth to produce them, they cry to that to be fruitfull. The Earth can bring forth nothing of it selfe without Influence, benignity, and comfortable showers from the Heavens, it cries to them for ayde. dIer. 14. 22. Iob▪ 38. …. - 37.The Heavens cannot give Raine nor Warmth of themselves, without him who is the Father of Raine, and the Fountaine of Motion. So that here are three notable Things to be observed, The Connexion and Concatenation of All second Causes to one another; The Cooperation of them together for the good of the Church; and the Subordination of them all to God, unto whom at length the more accurate Inquiry into them doth manuduct us. And this Subordination standeth in foure things: 1. All things are Subordinate unto God in aVid. Plutarch. l…b. de … Exod. 3. 14. Isai. 40. 17. Act. 17. 28. Rom. 11. 36. 1 Cor. 8. 6. Col. 1. 16. 17. Heb. 1. ….Being. Hee only hath Being per Essentiam, By Absolute, and Originall Essence; all other things per participationem, by derivation and dependance on him. 2. bNehem. 9. 6. Iob 1…. 10. Psal. 104. 29. Isal. 40. 24.In Conservation. For God doth not make his Creatures as a Carpenter doth his House, which can after stand by it selfe alone: but having our very Being from him, that Being cannot Be or Continue without His supportance, as light in the house dependeth both in Being and in Continuance upon the Sunne. 3. In regard c…at. 10. 29. Prov. 16. 4. Gen. 4…. 28. Act 4. 27. 28.of Gubernation and providence; for All things are by his Wisedome guided unto the Ends of his Glory. And even those Creatures which flie out of the Order of his Precepts, doe fall into the Order of his Providence. Lastly, in Regard of dAct 17. 28. Isai. 26. 12. Iob 10. 8. Psal. 139. 15. 16. 1 Cor. 12. 6. Isai. 10. 5.Operation. For in him wee live and move, hee worketh Our works for us; Second Causes cannot put forth any Causality till he be pleased to concurre with them.
Againe, since wee finde that all other Creatures have, answerable to the Instincts and Appetitions which Nature hath Grafted in them, proportionable Objects of equall Latitude in goodnesse to the Faculties which are carried unto them; It must needs be reasonable that that be not wanting to the Excellentest of Creatures, which all the rest doe enjoy. Since then the supreame Appetite of the Reasonable Soule is Knowledge, and amongst all the Creatures there never was yet any found able to fill and satisfie this Desire; But that still there is both roome for more Knowledge and Inquirie after it: And besides, all the Knowledge of them is accompanied with Vnquietnesse, and labour (as the Beast first stirres the mudd in the water with his feet before hee drink it with his Mouth) from hence it infallibly followeth that from these lesser Objects, the Soule be carried at the last to God, The Adequate and *Vid. Aug. Confess. lib. 1. cap. 1. & lib. 4. cap. 10. 1… ▪ & lib. 13. cap. … De Trin. lib. 8. cap. 3. Dr. F…ild of the Church. lib. 1. cap. 1. Hooker. Ecclesiasticall Pol. l. 1. sect. 11.Vltimate End and Object of all our Desires, as Noahs Dove was carried back to the Ark, when shee found no place for the sole of her foot to rest on.
Againe, when wee see things which have no knowledge, work so regularly towards an End, as if they knew all the way they were to goe, wee must needs conclude they are guided by a Mighty wisedome, and Knowledge without them, as when an Arrow flyeth directly to the Mark, I am sure it was the Hand of a skilfull Archer that directed it.
VntoUnto the Perfection of Knowledge, after due and proper Representation of Objects in themselves, or in their Causes, Effects, Principles, unto the Minde; There are in the Subject three things requisite.
First, Clearenesse of Apprehension, to receiveRepresentatio reru…. Iudicium de Rebus Represental …. Aquin 22…. qu. 173. Art. 21. the right and distinct Notion of the Things represented, as the clearenesse of a Glasse serveth for the Admission of a more exact Image of the face that looks upon it, whereas if it be soil'd or dimm'd, it rendreth either none, or an imperfect shape.
Secondly, Solidity of Iudgement to try and weigh the particulars, which wee apprehend. That out of them wee may sever for our use the pretious from the vile; for Knowledge lies in Things as Gold in a Mine, or as Corne in the Straw; when by diligent inquiry after it, wee have digged it up, and thresh'd it out, wee must then bring it to the fire, and fanne, to give it us purified from drosse and levity. And this in Speculation answereth unto the generall vertue of practicall prudence in Morality, whereby wee weigh the severall Mediums unto the true Ends of life, and accordingly select and prosecute the Best.
Thirdly, Fidelity of Retention; for hee is notMus… ita que dicta Io…is & M…cmosynes filia. C…l. Rhod. l. 11. c. 10. likely to grow Rich, who puts up his Treasure as the Prophet speaks, into a *Hag. …. ….bag with holes. For as Nature hath given to the Bodies of men for the furtherance of corporeall strength, and nutriment, a Retentive power to clasp and hold fast that which preserveth it, untill a through concoction be wrought; so proportionably is the Faculty of Memory given to Reason, as a meanes to consolidate and enrich it. And fluxes, as in the Body, so in the Minde too, are ever Arguments and Authors of Weaknesse. Whence it comes to passe that in matter of Learning many of us are faine to be Day-labourers, and to live from hand to mouth, being not able to lay up any thing. And therefore in the choice of fit persons to breed up unto Learning, wee should take a like course as wise Architects doe in choice of fit timber for Building. They choose first the straitest and that which hath fewest knots, and flawes in it; which in the mind answereth unto clearenesse, and evennesse of Apprehension. For a cleare minde, like strait and smooth timber, will work easiest. Next, they take the heart and strongest substance, and cut out the sap: because that is best able to beare the weight that shall be laid upon it: And this answers unto Maturity and firmnesse of Judgement. Lastly, they doe not take Sally, or Willow, or Birch, and such other Materialls as are quickly apt to putrifie and weare away, but such Timber as is lasting and Retentive of its Nature, as Oake and Elme, which may make the Superstruction of the nature of the Foundation, strong and lasting: and this answereth to that excellent Faculty of the Minde, a Rationall memory: from which one particular (I think more than any other) doe arise those vast differences of felicity and infelicity in the mindes of men addicted to the search of Knowledge. Strange was the unhappinesse of Calvisius Sabinus Se…. Ep. 27. Vid. etiam Coel. Rhod. l. 11. c. 10.in Seneca, who being at vast charges in matter of learning, was not yet able to retaine fast the Names of Achilles, or, Vlysses: But, as his ParasiteVt Grammatico… haberet An… lectas. was wont deridingly to advise him, wanted a Grammaticall Attendant to gather up the fragments which his Memory let fall. And Curio Cicero in B…uto & in Orator….the Orator in Tully, was wont when hee had proposed three things in an Oration, to forget some one or other of them, or to add a fourth;Pl… l. 7. cap. 24. yea Messala Corvinus forgat his owne name, as Pliny telleth us. And as wonderfull on the other side hath beene the felicity of some others. aM▪ Senec. Controvers. lib. 1 …n Prolog.Seneca the father could repeat two thousand words together in their Order. bPlin. l. 7. c. 24. Qui…il. lib. 11. cap. 2. Val. Max. lib. 8. cap. 7. sect. 15.Cyrus and Themistocles could call all their Souldiers by their Names, (by which one Art of Curtesie cAlex. ab Alex. lib 6. cap. 18.Otho aspired unto the Empire) dAli. Sp…rtian. in ….Adrian could read a Book which hee never saw before, and after recite it by memory; and of the Emperour eAmmian. Marcell. lib ….Iulian it is said, that hee had drunk Totum memoriae dolium, the whole vessell of memory. To say nothing of fPlin. Supr…. Suidas in Apoll. Voss. Instit. Orat. 16 c 6. sect. 2.Simonides, and Apollonius Tyanlus, who in their old age, the one at 80, the other at a 100 yeeresg De quibus mentio apud Plin…um & M. Senecam & Quintil. ut supra. old, were very famous for the exquisitenesse of their memories; nor of Cyneas, Charmidas, Portius Latro, and divers others, who have beene admired for this happy Quality. Now unto this Felicity doth conduce, a Methodicall and orderly Disposition of minde, to digest and lay up things in their proper places. It was easier for Cyrus to remember men in an Army than in a Throng. And hence hath proceeded the Art of Memory invented as Pliny tells us by Simonides, and perfected by Me…rodorus Sceptius, consisting in the committing of severall Heads of matter unto distinct places, whereof Quintilian discourseth in his Oratory Institutions.
Of Knowledge there are severall sorts, according to severall considerations, with respect to the Ends of it. Some is Speculative for the improving of the Minde, as Physicall, Metaphysicall, and Mathematicall Knowledge. Others Practicall for fashioning, and guiding of the manners and conditions of Men, as Ethicall, Politicall, Historicall, Military Knowledge. Some mixt of both, as Theologicall Knowledge, consisting in the speculation of Divine Verities, and in the direction of Divine Duties. Some Iustrumentall, being only subservient unto others, as Grammaticall, Rhetoricall, Dialecticall learning. In regard of Order, some Superiour, others Subalternate, as Musick to Arithmetick, Opticks to Geometry. In regard of their Originall, some Ingrafted, as the supreame Principles of Verity, and implanted notions of Morality, which is called the Law of Nature, and written in the Heart of all men, Rom. 2. 14. 15. Other Acquired, and by search and industry laboured out of those Principles, and the others which are taught us. Other Revealed and Divinely manifested to the Faith of Men, whereof the supreame Principles are these two. 1. That God in his Authority is infallible, who neither can be deceived, nor can deceive. 2. That the things delivered in Holy Scriptures, are the Dictates, and Truths, which that infallible Authority hath delivered unto the Church to be beleeved, and therefore that every supernaturall Truth there plainely set downe in termini…, is an unquestionable Principle; and every thing by evident consequence and deduction from thence derived, is therefore an undoubted Conclusion in Theologicall and Divine Knowledge. In regard of the manner of Acquiring, some is Experimentall, A Knowledge of Particulars; and some Habituall, a generall knowledge growing out of the reason of Particulars. And those Acquired either by Invention from a mans Industry, or by A…scultation and Attendance unto those that teach us. In regard of Objects, some supre…me, as the Knowledge of Principles and Prime Verities, which have their light in themselves, and are knowne by evidence of their owne Tearmes. Others derived and deduced by argumentation from those Principles, which is the Knowledge of Conclusions. In regard of Perfection, Intuitive Knowledge, as that of Angels whereby they know things by the View; and Discursive, as that of Men, whereby wee know things by Ratiocination. In regard of Order and Method, Syntheticall, when wee proceed in Knowledge by a way of Composition from the Causes to the Effects; and Analyticall, when wee rise up from Effects unto their Causes, in a Way of Resolution.
With this noble Endowment of Knowledge,De ist… Materi. … sufi…is d…sputant Schol…tici ad l. 2. dist. 23. & ad part 1. Tho qu. 94. & Perer. in Gen. 2 19 20. l. 5. disput. 1. de Amplitud. & Excellent. Scicut. Adami. was the Humane Nature greatly adorned in its first Creation: So farre forth as the Necessity of a happy and honourable life, of the Worship and Communion with God, of the Dominion and Government over the Creatures, of the Acquaintance with himselfe, and of the Instruction of his Posterity, did require Knowledge in him. For wee may not think that God, who made Man in a perfect stature of Body, did give him but an Infant stature of Minde. God made all things exceeding Good, and Perfect; and therefore the perfection naturally belonging unto the Soule of Man, was doubtlesse given unto it, in its first Creation. Hee made Man right and straight; and the Rectitude of the Minde is in Knowledge and light; and therefore the Apostle telleth us, that Our Renovation in Knowledge is after the Image of him that Created us, Coloss. 3. 10. Without Knowledge hee could not have given fit Names, and suteable to the Natures of all the Creatures which for that purpose were brought unto him. Hee could not have awed and governed so various, and so strong Creatures, to preserve Peace, Order, and Beauty amongst them. Hee could not have given such an account of the substance and Originall of Eve. Of the End of her Creation to to be the Mother of all living men as hee did. Experimentall Knowledge hee had not but by the Exercise of his Originall light upon particular Objects, as they should occurre. Knowledge of future Events hee had not, it being not Naturall, nor Investigable by imbred light, but Propheticall, and therefore not seene till Revealed. Secret Knowledge of the Thoughts of Men, or of the Counsells of God hee could not have, because secret things belong unto the Lord. But so much light of Divine Knowledge as should fit him to have Communion with God, and to serve him, and obtaine a blessed life; so much of Morall Knowledge as should fit him to converse in Love as a Neighbour, in Wisedome as a Father, with other men; so much of Naturall Knowledge as should dispose him for the Admiring of Gods Glory, and for the Governing of other Creatures over which hee had received Dominion; so much wee may not without notable injurie to the perfection of Gods Workmanship, and to the Beauty and rectitude of our first Parent, deny to have beene conferred upon our Nature in him. The Benefits of which singular Ornament of Knowledge, are exceeding Great. Hereby wee recover…. a largenesse of Heart, for which Salomon is commended, 1 Reg. 4. 29: Able to dispatch many Businesses, to digest and order Multitudes of Motions, to have mindes seasoned with generous and noble resolutions; for that disposition is by the Philosopher called foreign, Greatnesse of Minde. Hereby weeV…d. Aqu. 22 …. qu. 188. Art. 6. i… C. are brought to a Just Contempt of sordid and wormie Affections. It is Darknesse which makes Men grope, and pore, and looke onelyonly on the things before them, as the Apostle intimates, 2 Pet. 1. 9. Illightned mindes see a greater lustre in Knowledge than in the fine Gold, Pro. 3. 14. 15. The Excellencie of Evangelicall Knowledge made Saint Paul esteeme every thing in the World besides as D…ng, Phil. 3. 8. As the light of the Sunne swallows up all the petty light of the Starres: so the more noble and spacious the Knowledge of Mens mindes is, the more doth it dictate unto them the Contempt of those various and vulgar Delights which bewitch the fancies of ignorant Men. It disposeth Men for mutuall Communion, and helpfull Societie: for without Knowledge every Man is ferae Naturae, like Birds of prey, that flie alwayes alone. Neither is it possible for a man to be sociable, or a member of any publick Body, any further than hee hath a proportion and measure of Knowledge: Since Humane Society standeth in the communicating of mutuall notions unto one another. Two men that are Deafe, and Dumb, and Blinde, destitute of all the Faculties of gaining or deriving Knowledge, may be together, but they cannot be said to have society one with another. To conclude, hereby we are brought neerer unto God, to admire him for his Wisedome, and Power; to Adore him for his Greatnesse, and Majestie; to Desire him, and work towards the fruition of him, for his light and Glory; because in the Vision of Him consisteth the Beatitude of Man.
This Knowledge is corrupted foure manner of wayes. First, By the Contempt of it in Ignorance. Secondly, By the Luxuriousnesse and Wantonnesse of it in Curiosity. Thirdly, By the Defect and uncertainty of it in Opinion. Fourthly, By Contradiction and Opposition unto it in Error.
There is a three-fold Ignorance wherewith the Minds of men may be blinded and defaced. The one is a Naturall Ignorance, which of DivineDeum … …nemo potest nisi Deo d…ceute. vid. Ir…n l. 4. c. 14. Hilar. de Trin. lib. 1. & 5. In tantum v debimus in quantum … crimu…. Aug. Ep. 6. V…i ad profunditatem … perventum est, … Platonicorum caligavit … ▪ Cypr. de Sp. Sanct. Aug. de Pr…dest. cap. 8. & de Doctr. Christian. l. 2 c. 6. Things, so farre forth as those things are Spirituall, is in all men by Nature; for the Naturall Man neither Receiveth with Acceptation, nor with Demonstration discerneth the things of the Spirit of God; And the Reason the Apostle gives, because they are spiritually discerned. For as the Eye is fitted to discerne light by the Innate property of light and Cognation which it hath thereunto, without which the Eye could no more perceive Objects of light than it can of sounds: so the Minde cannot otherwise receive spirituall Objects, than as it hath a similitude to those Objects in a spirituall disposition it selfe; whence that Expression of St. Iohn, Wee shall be like unto him, for wee shall see him as hee is. Spirituall Things doe exceed the weaknesse of Reason, because they are above it, and so cannot be discerned; And they doe oppose the corruption of Reason, because they are against it, and so cannot be Received.
There is likewise in many Men much NaturallVid. Hieron. adve…s. …ov … l. 2. Ignorance, even in Morall and Natural things. For as in the Fall of Man our Spirituals were lost, so were our Naturals weakned too, as wee finde in the Great Dulnesse of many men in matters of learning, in so much that someCoel. R…d l. 11. cap 10. have not beene able to learne the Names of the first Letters or Elements.
Againe, there is a Voluntary Ignorance (of which wee have before spoken) whereby Men doe wilfully close their Eyes against Knowledge, and refuse it; and of this there may be a double ground, The one Guile, in Knowledge that pertaineth to the Conscience, when a man chooseth rather not to know his duty, than by the Knowledge of it, to have his Conscience disquieted with Exprobrations of contemning it. The other out of Sluggishnesse and Apprehensions of Difficulty in the Obtaining of Knowledge. When of two Evils, Undergoing of labour, or forfeiting of Learning, a man esteemeth this the lesser.
Thirdly, there is a *Math. 13. 13. Act. 28. 26▪ 27. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Thess. 2▪ 10▪ 11▪ N… … g…rent … de▪ …ctorum. …. Apol. cap. 21. contr. Marc. lib. 3. cap. 6. Cyprian. lib. 1. …p. 3. Percussi sunt Caeci…ate ut n…c … Delicta n…c plangant Indignan…is Dei major …aecira. …. de lapsis. Vid. Aug. qu. 14. Ex Math. & … contra Iulion. lib▪ 5.Poenall Ignorance of which I shall not speake, because it differeth not from the Voluntary Ignorance of Spirituall things, save onelyonly in the relation that it hath to the Justice of God thereby provoked, who sometimes leaveth such men to their Blindnesse, that the thing which with respect to their owne choyce of it, is a pleasure, with respect unto Gods Justice, may be a plague, and punishment unto them. Thus the Intellectual Faculty is corrupted in many men by Ignorance.
In others it is abused by Curiosity, which mayClem. Alex. …. lib. 1. sta…im ab … …. lib. 5. cap. 28. Vid. quaedam contra … scicutiae … apud Ter…ull. de Anim l. cap. 1. contr. Marcion. lib. …. cap. 1. Aug. Ep. 29 & 56. & 78. & 157. …. lib. 11. cap. 12▪ de Gen. ad li…. lib. 2. cap. 9. & lib. 10. cap. 23. …. well be called the Pride, and the Wantonnesse of Knowledge, because it looketh after high things that are above us, and after hidden things that are denied us. And I may well put these two together, Pride and Luxurie of Learning. For I beleeve wee shall seldome finde the Pride of Knowledge more praedominant than there where it ariseth out of the curious and conjectural enquiries of Wit, and not out of scientificall and demonstrative Grounds. And I finde the Apostle joyning them together, when hee telleth us of some, who intruded themselves into Things which they had not seene, and were Vainely puff'd up by a fleshly Minde. And hee himselfe complaineth of Others, who were Proud, and languished about needlesse Questions; as it is ever a signe of a sick and ill-affected stomack to quarrell with usuall and wholsome meat, and to long for and linger after Delicacies which wee cannot reach too. When Manna will not goe downe without Quailes, you may be sure the Stomack is cloyed, and wants Physick to Purge it. I will not hereIn my Sermon of the Peace of the Church. pag. 24.—26. add more of this point, having lately touched it on a fitter Occasion.
A third Corruption of this Faculty in regard of Knowledge, is in the Fluctuation, wavering, and uncertainty of Assents, when the Understanding is left floating, and as it were in Aequilibrio, that it cannot tell which way to encline, or what Resolutions to grow unto; and this is that which in Opposition to Science, is called Opinion: For Science is ever cum certitudine, with Evidence and Unquestionable Consequence of Conclusions from necessary Principles: but Opinion is cum Formidine Oppositi, Aqui…. 22 …. qu. …. Ar…. 4. C.with a feare least the contrary of what wee assent unto should be true: And so it importeth a Tender, Doubtfull, and Infirme Conclusion.
The Causes of Opinion, I conceive to be principally two: The first is a Disproportion betweene the Understanding and the Object, when the Object is either too bright and excellent, or too dark and base: the one dazles the Power, the other Affects it not. Things too Divine and Abstracted, are to the Understanding Tanquam lumen ad Vespertilionem, as light unto a Batt; which rather astonish than informe; and things too Material and Immerst, are like a Mist unto the Eyes, which rather hinder, than affect it. And therefore, though whatsoever hath Truth in it, be the Object of the Understanding; yet the Coexistence of the Soule with the Body, in this present Estate, restraines and Limits the Latitude of the Object, and requires in it, not onelyonly the bare Nature and Truth, but such a Qualification thereof, as may make it fit for representation and Impression by the conveyance of the Sense. So that as in the True perception of the Eye (especially of those Vespertiliones, to which Aristotle hath compared the Understanding in this estate of subsistence with the Body) there is required a mixture of Contraries in the Ayre; it must not bee too light, lest it weaken and too much disgregate or spread the sense; nor yet too dark, lest it contract and lock it up: But there must bee a kinde of middle Temper; cleerenesse of the Medium for conveyance, and yet some degrees of Darknesse for qualification of the Object. Even so also the Objects of mans Vnderstanding must participate of the two contr…ries, Abstraction and Materiality. Abstraction first, in proportion to the … of the Vnderstanding, which is Spirituall. And Materiality too, in respect of the Sense, on which the Vnderstanding depends in this estate, as on the Medium of Conveyance, and that is Corporall. So that where ever there is Difficulty and Vncertainty of Operation in the Vnderstanding, there is a double defect and disproportion: first in the Power, whose Operations are restrained and limited for the most, by the Body: and then in the Object, which hath not a sufficient mixture of those two qualities, which should proportion it to the Power. This is plaine by a familiar similitude; an Aged man is not able to read a small Print, without the Assistance of Spectacles to make the Letters by a refraction seeme greater. Where first wee may descry an Imperfection in the Organ; for if his Eyes were as cleare and well-dispos'd as a young mans, hee would be able by his Naturall Power, without Art, to receive the Species of small Letters. And next, there is an Imperfection and deficiencie in the Letters; for if they had the same Magnitude and fitnesse in themselves, which they seeme to have by Refraction through the Glasse, the weaknesse of his power might haply have sufficient strength to receive them without those Helps. So that alwayes the Uncertainty of Opinion is grounded on the Insufficiencie of the Vnderstanding to receive an Object, and on the Disproportion of the Object to the Nature of the Vnderstanding.
The next Cause of Opinion and Vncertainty in Assents, may be Acutenesse and Subtilty of wit, when Men out of Ability, like *Null…m unquam in d…sputationibus re… de…endit quam non probarit, null…m oppugnavi… quam non everterit. Cic. de Oratore. lib 2. Non min…ibus viribu… contra Iustitiam dicitur disser uisse, quam pridie pro Iustitia dixe…at▪ Qui…til. de …. lib: 12. cap. 1. Plin. lib. 7. cap. 30.Carneades, to discourse probably on either side, and poizing their Judgements betweene an equall weight of Arguments, are forc'd to suspend their Assents, and so either to continue unresolved and equally inclineable unto either part, or else, if to avoyd Neutrality, they make choise of some thing to averre (and that is properly Opinion) yet it is rather an Inclination, than an Assertion, as being accompanied with feare, floating and Inconstancie.
And this indeed, although it be in it selfe a defect of Learning; yet considering the Estate of man, and strict conditions of perfecting the Vnderstanding by continuall Inquiry (man being …ound in this also to recover that measure of his …irst fulnesse, which is attainable in this Corrup…ed Estate, by sweat of braine, by labour and degrees, Paulatim extundere artes) I say in these considerations, Irresolution in Iudgement (so it be not Vniversall in all conclusions; for that argues moreVid. qu… adve. su… … disputat Aristocles apud E…seb. de p…aepar. Evang. l 14. c 18. weaknesse, than choise of conceit; nor Particular in things of Faith and Salvation, which is not Modesty but Infidelity) is both Commendable, and Vsefull. Commendable, because it prevent… all temper of heresie (whose nature is to †Ad quam cu… que sunt di… …, qu…st …empestate de lapsi ad …. …nquam ad Saxum ad haerescunt. Ci…. Acad▪ q. l. 4. Pli…. …. …. …p. 22.be peremptory.) And both argues Learning and Modesty in the softnes of Iudgement, which will not suffer it selfe to be captivated, either to its owne conceits, or unto such unforcible reasons, in the which it is able to descry weaknesse. And this is▪ that which Pliny commends in his friend Titus Ariston, whose hesitancy and slownesse of resolution in matter of Learning proceeded not from any emptines or unfurniture; but ex diversitate Rationū qua… acrimagno que Iudicio ab origine Caus… que primis repetit, discernit, expendit: out of a learned cautelousn…sse of judgment, which made him so long su spend his Assent, till he had weighed the severall repugnancies of reasons, and by that means found out some truth whereon to settle his conceit. For (as the same Pliny elsewhere out of Thucydides observes) It is rawnes & deficiency of learning that makes bold and peremptory: foreign DemursLib. 4. ep. 7. and fearfulnes of Resolution, are commonly the companions of more able wits. And for the use of Doubtings▪ First, they lessen, the number of heresies, which are (as I said) alwaies obstinate. And next it gives occasion of further enquiry after the Truth, to those who shall find themselves best qualified for that service. But Heresie comming under the shape of Science, with shewes of Certainty, Evidence, & Resolution (especially if the inducements be quick and subtle) doth rather settle the Vnderstanding, and possesse it with false Assents, than yeeld occasion of deeper search, unlesse it meet with a more piercing Iudgement, which can through confidence descry weaknesse. For questionlesse the Errours of Great men generally honoured for their Learning, when they are once wrapped up in the boldnes of Assertions, do either by possessing the judgement with prejudice of the Author, make it also subscribe to the error; or if a more impartiall eye see insufficiency in the ground, the Authority of the man frights and deterres from the opposing of his conceipt. Whereas when mens assents are proposed with a modest confession of distrust and uncertainty: the Vnderstanding is incited both to enquire after the reasons of Diffidence▪ as also to find out means for a more setled Confirmation and cleering of the Truth.