Concerning the Truth of Christian Religion, Chapter 4
The fourth Chapter.
What it is that we can comprehend concerning God.
NOW, albeit that the least things which are in Nature and in our selues, doe sufficiently shewe vsus that there is but one GOD: Yet notwithstanding all Nature is not able to teach vsus what that God is, neither is man, in nature able to comprehend any thing of him: and the reason therof is euident in both twayne. In Man, because the greater can neuer be comprehended by the lesser,Man cannot comprehend God. neither can Man hauehave any thing in vnderstanding, which hath not first bene in his sences, as from whence procéedeth vntounto him the beginning of all naturall knowledge: And he neither seeth nor perceiueth God in himself, but only by his effects. In Nature, because it is a thing wrought by God, and no work or effect how great so euer it be, can perfectly expresse the cause or worker thereof. Man is able to discourse after a sort, of the things that are lesse than himselfe, as of Beastes, Plants, and Stones. And yet if hee will enter into their substaunces; he must néedes stop short, and is constreyued to stay vponupon the histories of them, confessing his knowledge to be but ignoraunce. If he come to himself, to knowe his owne Soule by the power of his Soule: by and by he is at his wits ende: For the maner of his discourse is but to procéede from kynd to kynd, and to passe from one reason to another. But on the contrary part, his mynd seeth not it selfe, but onelyonly turneth into it selfe, leauing not any thing empty without it self whereunto to extend, no more than a Circle doth. And yet notwithstanding, eueryevery thing is equall to it selfe, and measurable by it selfe. What shall we then thinke that Man can doe, if he aduaunce himselfe to the considering of Goddes nature; seeing that the least Creatures that are doe put him to his trumpe? That is the very thing which hath made the ignorant sort to ouershoote themselues so farre, as to counterfect God by a shape like themselues: which thing the very Beastes (sayth Xenophanes) would hauehave done, if they had bin Paynters, as which cannot ordinarily conceiue any greater thing than themselues. Ye see then how Man is of himself too farre vnable to conceiue such a Greatnesse. Againe, if we consider the effects, a man planteth, buyldeth, paynteth, and weaueth a thousande diuers workes: and wee thinke it not straunge that the bruite Beastes conceiue not thereby what Man is, howbeit that there is alwaies some proportion of vnderstanding betwene Creature and Creature; but betwéene the Creature and the Creator there is none at all. Nay, there is yet this more, that a man shall see and feele the workes of another man, and he shall knowe from whence he taketh his stuffe, after what maner he matcheth things together, and what Arte he hath obserued: But shall he for all that, knowe what the Soule or Mynd of that man is? No; nor yet his owne Soule. For his doings come nothing néere to that which he is, no not so néere as the heate which the Sunne sheadeth into vsus from aboue, approcheth néere to the naturall power that is in the Sunne; the which notwithstanding wee durst not take vponupon vsus to describe, if we had neuer felt it otherwise than in a Prison. But if thou couldest hauehave entered into the mynde of that man at the making of his worke,Cicero in his booke of the Nature of the Gods. thou shouldest hauehave seene it farre more beautifull there: and all that euer he could do or thou say, is alwaies farre lesse than his Conceyt; and yet the same Conceyt of his is but as a sparke of the Mynd, whereof the same worke is a part.Plotinus Enn. 6. lib. 8. cap 11 Galen in his 9. booke vponupon the Decrees of Hippocrates. Although it appeare by certeine demonstration, that it is a diuine workmayster that hath procreated vsus: yet can we not by any wit or reason conceyue, neither what his substance is, nor how he made vsus. For we must consider that it is a farre other thing, to shew that a certeyne Prouidence made vsus: than to knowe the substance, eyther of our owne Soule, or of him that made vsus. Now then, if thou being a man, canst not conceiue the mynde of a man by his doings, though thou beare the like mynd about thée thy selfe; and if his doings (of what sorte so euer they be) come farre short of that which he himselfe is: darest thou be so bold as to describe God by his works what he is, and to dispute of his substaunce? And if thou canst not conceiue him by his workes; how wilt thou then conceiue him, seeing thou canst not behold him otherwise? To this purpose we hauehave the common Historie of Simonides, who being asked by Hiero King of Syracuse what God is; demaunded one daies respit to giuegive answere, and afterward two, and then fower, and in the end confessed that the more he thought thereon, the lesse he vnderstood thereof; and yet he was the man which taught very well, that God was the very wisedome it selfe. Xenophon, Plato, Plotin and others say that he is a thing which cannot bee found, nor ought to be sought. To bee short, all the Philosophers crye in one voyce with Dauid, *Pesuit tenebras latibulum suum, Defec… in A…rijs tuis Domine.Lord, thou hast made darknesse thy Couert, Lord I am wearied euen in thyne outter Courtes. Yet notwithstanding, whereas men are not able to atteyne to Gods substaunce; they hauehave gone about to betoken it by the excellentest names that they could deuise, as we hauehave séene in the last Chapter. They considered yt forasmuch as all things hauehave their beeing from him, he himselfe was the souereine Béeing; and that to be so, it behoued him to bee euer, and therefore they called him the Euerlasting. And that to hauehave béeing without life; is nothing: and that he which giueth life to all, must needes bee all life: and therefore they call him the liuing God. And againe, that life without vnderstanding is dead, and vnderstanding without power is vnperfect; and that he which giueth both of them to all, must néedes hauehave thē in himselfe for all: and therefore they call him Mynd and Myght, attributing vntounto him the perfect knowledge and infinite power of all things. Finally, forasmuch as to Bée, to Liue, to Understand, and to be mightie, the higher that they be, are so much the lesse to be estéemed, if good also abound not on all partes: because men on the other side receiue so many good turnes at his hand, they call him Good, excéeding good, and the goodnesse it selfe; assuring themselues that no other name doth so peculiarly fit him as that. Yet notwithstanding neither that, nor any thing els that we can imagine more, can come néere him by infinite distance. Let vsus attribute vntounto him the highest degrée of all perfections that can be, (as in very déede he must néedes hauehave them at the highest pitch, seeing that there is not any that hath measured them vntounto him:) yet doe we attribute vntounto him but imperfection. For if any of them be finite, then is he not infinite, as we ought to conceiue him to be: and infinite it cannot be, because the one of them should by the infinitenesse thereof shut vp the other within bounds.foreign. Therefore it behoueth vsus to conceiue a most single singlenesse, which neuerthelesse in one perfection comprehendeth al perfectiōs, as the roote of them; which séemeth a thing contrarie to mans vnderstanding: that is to wit, that his Prouidence is no more Prouidence than Iustice, nor his Iustice more Iustice than merciemercy, nor his knowledge more knowledge then life, nor his life more life than single béeing: To be short, that his being is such a being as is wholly aud alonly all, I meane altogether déede,Mercurius Trismegistus in his Poemander. cap. 2. & 6. altogether forme, altogether perfection and so foorth. And that is the thing which God himselfe teacheth vsus, in that being asked his name by Moyses, hee answered him, I am that I am: Ehjch asher ehjeh.which name the Iewes had in such reuerence, that the very Priestes themselues (as they say) named it not but at the great Feastes. And yet in the iudgement of Plotine, that name is not sufficient for him.Plotiri. Ennead. 7. lib. 7. cap. 38. Also we call him the good, and yet is that too little for him; for Good is the good of goodnes, as heate is the heate of hotnes. But God is the goodnes it selfe; and whatsoeuer is good, is of him. Yet notwithstanding, the very word Goodnes is not sufficient; for goodnes hath his being in some substance. But in God there cannot any thing be conceiued, which is not substantially, yea and more than substantially substance. Againe, when we say, he seeth, he knoweth, he vnderstandeth; these things hauehave relation to tyme; and hee that made time is without the reache of time. Also when wee say, hee is héere, or hee is there, it is all one; for hee that made all places is not conteined in any place. And therefore Tiismegistus saith very well,Mercurius in his Poemāder. Prouer. 30. v. 4. That he is better and mightier then any name can expresse. And Salamon cryeth out with admiration, what is his name? As who would say, man is not able to vtter or conceiue any word yt doth properly fit him, neither in Nownes nor in Uerbes nor in complet spéech, because man is an essence subiect to time, place and accidents, which cannot passe beyond it selfe. Now then, what is the vttermost poynt that all our sine conceites can reache vntounto?foreign sayth Porph. foreign sayth Porph. foreign. in praepositionibus. Dennis in his booke of the names of God. Uerily the most in effect that we can knowe concerning his being, is that we can vnderstand nothing at al thereof. Insomuch that whatsoeuer we say thereof affirmatiuely, whether we terme it Scothnesse or Wisdome, or Kingdome, or Unitie, or Godhead, or any thing els which we meane thereby, it can not fit him. Finally, we can no more name him than comprehend him, how high so euer we thincke we mount vp. And therfore we must with Trismegistus call vponupon him in silence; and say vntounto him with Dauid, Lord, the best prayse that I can giuegive vntounto thée is silence.
Now séeing we cannot knowe what God is, but by not knowing it, it standeth vsus on hand to knowe what he is not, which is no small helpe for vsus to know him after a sort. Wherein we must followe a cleane contrarie rule.foreign. Tibi silentium laus. What God is not. For as we hauehave said, that of all the things that are spoken and affirmed of Gods essence or substance, none fitteth him, being taken strictly: so whatsoeuer is spoken therof negatiuely, shalbe found true, being taken after the same maner: Insomuch that that man may bee sayd to bee most skilfull in that behalfe, which knoweth most Negatiues or Remotions (as they terme them.) To make this poynt yet clearer, nature hath taught vsus by the diuers mouings which we sée héere beneath, that there is a GOD which is the first mouer of the whole world. And by the same reason, we say that he himselfe is vnmouable,Vnmouable. that is to say, remoueth not at all. For we see that the nature of him which maueth, insomuch as he moueth, is to be and to be setled in rest. Euen our Soule (as in respect of the body) is vnmouable, notwithstanding that it cause and procure all the mouings of the body: and the mo things that a man intendeth to moue, the more it behoueth him to hauehave his mind settled. Forasmuch as God is euermore dooing, he is euer at rest, and he hath not his resting in another but in hym selfe, or rather is his owne rest himself. And therefore the auncient Philosophers called him foreign,1. Phisik. 3. foreign. that is to say, the vnmouable and stedfast, to put a difference betwéene him and the heauen, the Planets, and the Starres, which are subiect to mouing, and whom the ignorance of folke hath called Gods. Herevppon we say also that he is vnchangeable: for the change of a thing in it self, as a kind of mouing which tēdeth out of it self.foreign. Out of the verses of Parmenides reported by Simplicius. Vnchaungeable. As for exā ple, He that desireth or coueteth, desireth or coueteth ye thing which hehath not. But God is one, & al togither; neither is it possible for him to receiue being from any other: for nothing is changed but by some other thing, which in some respect is more mightier thā it, as Wood is changed by Fyre. But al things hauehave their power & force frō God alone. Therfore by this terme Vnchaungeable, we deny him to be lyke the immortall soules, which admit such passions as we perceiue, or also to the very bodilesse Spirites, whome we call Angels, & the Philosophers call Gods; who be not vnchangeable, sauing so farre foorth as they rest in ye beholding of him which cānot be changed. And it maketh nothing against the matter, that we sée so diuers changes in all things. For it is one thing to change ones selfe, & another thing to will yt there should be a chaunge; like as it is one thing to moue ones selfe, & another thing to will yt there be a mouing. The Sunne maketh many diuers changes in the things which we see héere beneath, he maketh things gréene, hee maketh things yellow, he rypeneth things, he withereth things & so forth, and yet notwithstanding he changeth no whit of his heate; and had he also a mynd (as some suppose him to hauehave,) he might also wil al these chaunges without changing himself. So also may God, and much better. He without altering his own being, willeth & maketh al the changes in the beings of things: & yet it is as certeine yt he is vnchangeable, & that if he were not so ye whole chaungeable nature should perish; as it is certaine that if he were not vnmoueable, all mouing should vtterly ceasse. Now out of these two negatiues we drawe a third, namely yt he hath neither beginning nor end, which thing we call Euerlastingnes. Euerlasting.For the beginning and ending of all things, procéedeth of mouing and chaunge: and therefore he that is not subiect to thē, can hauehave neither beginning nor end. Moreouer, Time is but a measure of mouing, wherin there is both a forenesse & an afternesse. He therefore which is not subiect to mouing, is not subiect to time, and he which is not subiect to time, hath not his being by continuance of succession from one mouing to another. And so Gods being is altogether at once, which is the peculiar propertie of euerlastingnes. And whereas we say, he hath bin, and he shall be; it is as much to say as there was neuer any tyme when he was not, neither shall it euer come to passe that he shall ceasse to be.
Againe,Mere Act. being euerlasting he is not subiect to any passiue possibilitie; that is to say, looke whatsoeuer he is, he is the same actually and in very déede, and he cannot become any other thing than he is alreadie. For, were there any passiue possibilitie in him as from himselfe, then should there be a chaunge in him; and if it were from elswhere, then should there be a mouing from possibilitie to déede, or to dooing; & he is not subiect to any of them both.Erom Possibilitie into deed. Furthermore, Euerlastingnesse cannot be in way of possibilitie, but only actually and in very déede. For eueryevery maner of déede being simply taken is afore the possibilitie thereof, as the cause is afore his effect, forasmuch as the possibilitie is (as ye would say) quickened by the déede. As for example, from a graine to an Herbe,A grayne may become an herbe, and a kernell a tree: which they be not so long as they continue a grayne and a kernell. Vnmateriall. and from a kernell to a Trée by the power of the Sunne. But as for Euerlastingnesse, it can abyde neither forenesse nor afternesse; and therefore looke whatsoeuer it can bee, it is the same all at once, and actually or in very déede, and euer. Whervpō it followeth also immediately, that God is neither matter nor materiall: for the propertie of matter is to be merely passiue; that is to say, capable of diuers formes or shapes, and such as may in possibilitie receiue, being it selfe altogether naked and such as the Philosophers describe it to bee. By these conclusions we come to another, which is, that GodGod is single and vncompounded. is not compounded. For whatsoeuer is so, we say is of later tyme than the things whereof it is compounded. But God is euerlasting, and vntounto him nothing can be new. Againe, Compounding is a knitting of many things into one; & ere those things could bee vnited in very déede, it behoued thē to be first in possibilitie; that is to say, to bée capable thereof. Now, as for God, he is not a thing in possibilitie (which is an vnperfect beeing) but altogether actually and in very déede.
Moreouer, wee say that God made all things, and knoweth all things. Now, if he had in him the nature of any of them, the same would trouble the natures of the rest, as wee see that the tongue of a sicke man that is sicke of an Agewe, is vnable to iudge of the tast of things, because it is furred by a cholerick humor; and the eye which hath any matter therein, can see nothing. It followeth then that too make and too knowe all things, God must néedes bee very single, and not holding any thing at al in him. And the more single hee is, the more is hee capable of the innumerable multitudes of things; like as the eye is then most capable of all colours and the eare of all voyces; when [in themselues] the one is least troubled with noyzes and the other with colours. Wherevpon it followeth that seeing he is not compounded, he cannot be a bodie:Bodylesse. Numenius foreign. for all bodies are conteyned within boundes, and hauehave partes, which thing most people hauehave knowne well enough as Numenius the Pythagorian reporteth.Place is to be considered, eyther as a thing created, or as a conteyner of a thing placed. This way God is nowhere: the other way he is eueryevery where. So is he both eueryevery where, and no where. No where by limitation or poynting downe of place, & eueryevery where by filling all places. And not being a bodie, he cannot be in place, neither wholly nor partly. By reason whereof, wee may say in strict spéech, that he is no where, that is to say, that no part of him is limited within any place to be poynted at. Notwithstanding, like as he made all things by the power of his béeing; so doth the same power enter into all things, fill all things and conteyne all things. And forasmuch as the same is vndiuidable, it is whole in all, and whole in eueryevery part: and so likewise is he himselfe; that is to say, he is euerywhere, whole throughout, in whom all things hauehave their béeing, howbeit that hee is not determinatly or definitely in any thing. Wee hauehave an image hereof in our owne mynd, which yet notwithstanding is but a vayne shadowe. For, in as much as all the things which we conceiue are lesse than we; they be in the mynd without intermingling of the mynd with them, and the mynd after a certeyne fashion toucheth them all, although it bée not comprehended in any of them. Now, if all these things be in our mynd, because they be entered into it by our sences: how much more shall all essences be in God and he in all of them, seeing that all of them procéede from him, and that his onelyonly conceyuing of them hath brought them foorth? Now then, let vsus not imagine any intermingling in this behalfe. The light of the Sunne continueth entierly throughout; it cannot bee deuided intoo partes, nor shet vp in any place, nor seuered from the welspring thereof: it sheadeth it selfe into all places, it filleth all places, and it is present with all things which we see, (I speake after the maner of the Diuines) in essence, in power, and in presence. The Ayre is lightened with the presence thereof, and darkened with the absence, and wee perceyue both twayne of them; and yet for al that, it intermingleth not it self with the Ayre, ne leaueth any whit of it selfe into it. And shall wee presume to thinke lesse of the light which is not to bee conceyued but in vnderstanding; considering that wee see the like with our eyes? Or shall wee thinke it straunge that GOD should bee both eueryevery where and nowhere, considering how wee see that from a bodie there isseweth such a bodilesse thing, as without touching any of them, lighteneth them all? And if a light shine in all things that shine; shall not the souereine essence bee in all things that are? And seeing that things could not hauehave bin made vnlesse Gods power (which is his very essence) had bin present with all things & with eueryevery of them; shall any thing let him from being present with all things still? Now, like as the light of the Sunne hath diuers effects through the disposition of mens eyes, and of the shéerenesse of things, and the diuersities of the substances whereon it lighteth: so is Gods presence diuers too diuers things, and yet is it without any diuersitie in it selfe. He is (sayth S. Austin S. Austin vponupon the Psalmes.) in himself, as the beginning and the end: to the World, as the Author and gouernor thereof: to his Church, as a father in his House: to our Soules, as a Bridegroome in his Chamber: to the Rightuous, as a Helper and defender: to the Reprobates, as a trembling and terror. No man fleeth from him but to him, from his rigor to his goodnesse, and so foorth. For what place shall he meete with (sayth he) where he shall not finde they presence? The selfesame presence which was present at the making of all things,1. Phisic. 2. &c. foreign. is present with eueryevery thing to preserue them all: and yet is it neuerthelesse absent from all things and from eueryevery thing, as it was at the tyme that there were no things at all; because none of them conteyneth it or any part of it, but it conteyneth all things.
But we must passe yet one step further. God (say we) is present euerywhere. Then is he infinite,Infinite. and yet is he not conteyned in any place, for he is not a bodie. It followeth therefore that he is not infinite in bodie,Infinite, not by stretching or streyning out, but by sheading in. but in Spirit; nor in quantitie, but in goodnes and power, and better if better may be sayd. Wherfore, let vsus not imagine him to bee a huge or massie lumpe, as the ignorant sorte doe. The massinesse of things is that (as wee see) which maketh them vnable to doe things. Contrariwise, the more spirituall a thing is, the more actiue it is. He then which is the action of al powers, must néedes bee a Spirit of infinite power, and yet notwithstanding exempted from all quantitie, (which properly is but a weakenesse or want of power) yea, and yet in such sort infinite, as all the infinitenesse thereof bee comprehended within bounds as to himselfe, that is to say, so as he finish or bound himselfe, because he neither is nor hath any thing without himself. Thus hauehave we by reason (and we may also hauehave it by the Deuilles in the forealledged Oracles, and likewise by all the Philosophers) that GOD is vnmoouable, vnchaungeable, beginninglesse, endlesse, single, bodylesse, and infinite; all which are termes whereby wee declare, not what he is, but onelyonly what he is not; not to make vsus to conceyue him, but to kéepe vsus from deceyuing our selues by our owne vayne conceytes. And of all these Negatiues we conceyue but one affirmatiue, as we did at the first; namely, that God is his owne being, as he himself faith vntounto Moyses; insomuch that he is of himselfe, and all things are of him, and he cannot be aught els than he is; insomuch also that it is all one with him to be great and mightie, as méerely and simply to bée; which is as much to say as that we must (as much as wee can) conceyue him to be good without qualitie, great without quantitie, euerlasting without tyme, euerywhere present without place, and so foorth. And to conclude this Chapter, whereas wee cannot comprehend God in his very being, wee will indeuer to come néere to the knowledge of him thrée waies by considering his effects; howbeit in such sort as that we must thinke infinitely of him, aboue and beyond the things which seeme greatest vntounto vsus in the perfections which we perceyue to be in all things; as, goodnesse, trueth, wisedome, Iustice, life, vnitie, and such like; and yet conceyuing him (if we can) to be but one only perfection comprehēding all perfections in one, and yet eueryevery of them infinitely aboue the highest degrée of perfection that we can imagine. And finally as in respect of the imperfections which are in all things, (as chaungeablenesse, weakenesse, materialnesse, and such like,) by conceyuing them to be more infinitely farre of from his nature, than wee can set them of in our vnderstanding. But when wee hauehave or shall hauehave taken neuer so much paynes in that behalfe, yet the vttermost that wee shall hauehave learned, is but only not to be ignorant of our owne want of knowledge. And therefore, to the intent we lose not our selues in seeking him, the surest way for vsus is to p…ssesse him by louing seruing and woorshipping him; the which thing hee of his louelove towards vsus graunt vsus to doe.
Amen.