Concerning the Truth of Christian Religion, Chapter 5
The fifth Chapter.
That in the onelyonly one Essence or Substance of God there are three persons which we call the Trinitie.
LET vsus presume yet a little further, not by rash inquisitiuenes of man, but by the mercifull guyding of God, who hath voutsafed to vtter himselfe vntounto vsus in his Scriptures: and let vsus sée whether reason will helpe vsus to mainteyne and prooue the things which she of her selfe could neuer hauehave found out. For, reason is after a sort in like case towards God, as our eye is towards the Sunne. Neither the Sunne nor any thing vnderunder the Sunne, can well bee seene without the Sunne: likewise neither God nor any thing belonging to God can bee seene without God, how good eyesight or myndsight so euer wee hauehave. But when the Sunne shineth, then our eye seeth the things which it sawe not afore, & iudgeth of them at his ease, notwithstanding that the eye bée but the same it was afore, and hauehave but the same power of sight which it had afore, without receyuing any newe increase thereof. Likewise, when GOD voutsafeth to vtter any doctrine vntounto vsus, the selfsame reason which otherwise could neuer hauehave perceyued it, doth then see it, and discourse it, and allowe of it, without receyuing any newe power abilitie or chaunge in it selfe. We hauehave concluded by reason, that God is a most single essence: And we beléeue by discouery from heauen, that in the same most single essence are thrée persons or Inbeings. Reason of it selfe could neuer hauehave atteyned to the finding thereof: for we cannot distinguish things vnlesse we conceyue them; and yet neuerthelesse, reason will serue vsus to proue it.
First of all,The begetting of the Sonne, or of the second Person we hauehave alreadie acknowledged by Gods effects or doings, that there is in him a working nature or power, (I must be faine to speake in the speech of man seeing that the diuine spéech is vnknowne to vsus) which is the beginner and mouer of al things. And in eueryevery of his workes, wee see a singular cunning; and in the knitting of all, both great and small together, wée see a wonderfull order, as I hauehave discoursed heretofore; and wee see there is neither order nor cunning where there is no vnderstanding. It followeth therefore that the souereine vnderstanding is in God from whom this great order and cunning procéede. Againe, albeit that of the things which are in this world, some vnderstand, and some vnderstand not; yet notwithstanding, all of them are appoynted to some certeyne end and marke, as the Sunne to make the day & to heate; the Moone to lighten the night, and all the Planets and Starres to marke out the Seasons; and so foorth of all other things. N…ne of them stumbleth in his way, none steppeth aside from his end…: and yet notwithstanding, the most part of them could not prescribe it to themselues. For the beginner of all ends is vnderstanding, and in the most of these there is no vnderstanding. Néedes must it bee therefore, that God the maker of them did also appoynt them their ends, and consequently that he had vnderstanding for them. Now, the innumerable multitude of things, and the linking of their ends one to another as they now be, do shewe that al of them hauehave their beginning from one selfsame vnderstanding. Then must it néedes be, that this common author of their being, that is to say, the souereine being, must also be the souereine vnderstanding, séeing he imparteth the effects of vnderstanding to so many things which hauehave it not. Moreouer, the things which hauehave vnderstanding are the disposers and orderers of the other things, and not contrarywise. Man buyldeth, planteth, reareth vp Cattell, and maketh his commoditie of all of them together. Of men themselues, the skilfullest make Lawes, and take vponupon them to rule others. To be short, the things which hauehave no vnderstanding doe naturally serue as instruments to those which hauehave it; and the thing which hath the lesse of it, serueth that which hath the more of it; and no part in nature dealeth to the contrary. And (as wée hauehave proued by all the Philosophers themselues) it is God that created all things that hauehave vnderstanding, as well those which are not tyed to bodies, as those which hauehave bodies; allotting to them their offices and ends, and so consequently he is the very beginner and end of them himself.
Then once againe, so farre foorth as we can describe this vnderstanding by the outward effects thereof, it must néedes be in God a most excellent abilitie (if it may bee so named) by direction whereof he executeth most wisely the actiue or inworking vertue power and nature which we marke in all things in this world, howbeit, so as the chiefe working of them doth abide and rest still in him. I hauehave proued heretofore that God is infinite: which being so; nothing can be imagined in him, which is not infinite likewise: for otherwise he should bee as well finite as infinite both together. And infinite he were not, if he could vnderstand or knowe that to day which he vnderstood not afore. Néedes then must it be, that he from al eternitie vnderstandeth and knoweth the things which hauehave bin, which are, and which shall be; the whole, and the parts; the generalles, the specialles, and the particulars; the originalles, the procéedings, and the aftercommings; the doings, sayings, and thoughts of men; and so foorth, …o as this vnderstanding in God is euerlastingly infinite.
Againe, vnderstanding is an inworking which abideth and remayneth in the partie which hath it, and passeth not into any outward thing. For, when we vnderstand the course of the Sunne, we become the more skilful therof in our selues; but as for the Sunne, he is nothing altered thereby. Also I hauehave told you alreadie, that God is most single, and that there is not any thing in him which is not his very essence or being. Whervpon it followeth, that God not onelyonly hath vnderstanding, but also that his vnderstanding is his very essence [that is to say, he is the very vnderstanding it self.] Now then, let vsus see what it is that this vnderstanding begetteth. I hauehave told you that God is a mere doing, and that whatsoeuer he doth, he doth it from euerlasting; and that on the other side being most single, there is nothing in him which is not a dooer. Wherevpon it followeth that this vnderstāding is euerlastingly occupyed in doing. And wherein then is it occupyed? What is the thing that it worketh vppon? Surely it can méete with nothing but it selfe. God then conceyued and vnderstood himselfe; and it must néedes be that he vnderstood himselfe, seeing that the chiefest wisedome is to knowe ones selfe, whereof he could not fayle. Therefore it was of necessitie, that this vnderstanding of God, should yéeld a reflexion backe againe to it self, as a face doth in a Lookingglasse, and as our mynd doth when it setteth it self to the considering of it owne proper nature; and that it should conceyue and beget in it selfe a perfect image of it owne selfe, which image is the same thing which in the Trinitie we call the Sonne, the Word, or the Spéech; namely, the liuely and perfect image and wisedome of the Father. Now, this vnderstanding is actually euerlasting, [that is to say, euerlasting in …éede] and euerlastingly actuall, [that is to say, euerlastingly doing,] and therefore wee say that the second person which it begetteth is also euerlasting: and God in his vnderstanding had not conceyued any thing that is lesse than himself; for it is equal with him. And whereas wee comprehend not our selues; that commeth of the darknesse and lumpishnesse of our flesh, which maketh vsus vnlike our selues. We say then that the Sonne is equall to the Father, and the image of the Father. But yet moreouer, the being of the Father and his vnderstanding are both one: & his being or essence (being vnderstoode of it selfe) is none other thing than the being of the Sonne, who is bred and begotten by the Fathers vnderstanding or mynding of himself. Wherevpon we conclude againe, that the essence of the Father is the essence of the Sonne, [that is to say, that looke whatsoeuer the Father is, the Sonne is the same;] so as they differ not but by way of relation: and consequently that they be Coeternall, Coequall, and Coessentiall, [that is to say, of one selfessame euerlasting continuance, of one selfesame state condition and degree, and of one selfesame substance or being;] which is the thing that we be taught in the Church. This second person for diuers respects is betokened, by diuers names. He is ordinarily called the Sonne, because he is a Conception of the vnderstanding which is in God, and a perfect resemblance of him. And here wée hauehave to consider, that according to the diuersities of natures; the maner of bréedings or begettings doe varie also. For eueryevery life (if I may so speake) begetteth or bréedeth a Sonne, issue or ofspring in it selfe afore it send it out; and the excellenter that the life is, the more inward to it is that which procéedeth or is bred thereof. Herevpon some hauehave supposed the Fire to be a liuing wight, because it bréedeth or begetteth another fire like it selfe. But howsoeuer the case stand, like as the Elements are naturally the bacest things in degrée, so hath Fire the bacest maner of bréeding or begetting; as which is not able to doe it but out of it self, and by the applying of some outward matter to him. The Plant conceyueth moysture in it selfe, which springeth foorth into bud, from bud into flower, and from flower into fruite; which fruite being ripe falleth to ye ground, and there bringeth foorth another Plant. Now, this second Plant liued in the first Plant ere it liued in it selfe; and all liuing wights doe liue, moue and feele in their Dammes bellies, afore they come foorth; which is yet a more inward maner of bréeding and begetting than the other. The sensitiue life conceyueth an imagination which hoordeth vp it selfe in the memorie: but as it procéedeth from the Sences and sensible things; so doth it depart out of it self. The reasonable life hath his conceptions and bréedings yet more inward than all the rest. For it hath his reflexion backe to it selfe; and wée commonly terme the doings or actions thereof by the name of Conceptions or Conceyts, after which maner the lear…ed sort doe call their bookes their Children. But yet there is this more in this matter; namely, that in men this conceyuing procéedeth of imagination, which is an outward thing vntounto it, because nothing can enter into the vnderstanding of man but by the Sences; and moreouer, for that the thing which is mynded or vnderstood, and ye mynd or vnderstanding it selfe, are not both one in vsus. But forasmuch as onelyonly God is altogeter life, and his life is altogether vnderstanding, which is the highest degrée of life; he hath his maner of conceyuing and begetting most inward of all.Why the second Person is called the Son, the Worde, Speech, Wisedome. &c. For, he conceyueth in himself and of himself, and his conceyuing is a begetting, and this begetting abideth still in himselfe, because his vnderstanding can neuer any where méete with any thing but that which he himselfe is. And that is the second person whom wee call the Sonne, and vntounto whom that name doth so much the more properly agrée, because his resembling of him is more perfect, and his begetting or Sonneship (if I may so terme it) is more inward, than all the bréedings and begettings which we commonly see, or than any other that we can imagine. Also we cal him Logos, which some translate Word or Speech, and othersome Reason. Eyther of those significa…ious is ordinary to the word Logos, and agréeable to that which is ntended to be signified thereby, so farre foorth as diuine things can be expressed by the spéech of man.Looke in the 12. Chapter of Mercurius trimegistus Poemander. When we call him Spéech or Word, it is according to the doctrine of the Philosophers, who hauehave marked that there is in man a dubble Spéech; the one in the mynd, which they call the inward Spéech, which wee conceyue afore we vtter it; and the other the sounding image thereof, which is vttered by our mouth and is termed the Spéech of the Uoyce; eyther of both the which we perceyue at eueryevery word that wee intend to pronounce: which thing those folke might yet much better obserue, which had neuer learned any Language, because they should not cease to hauehave those inward Conceyts in themselues [though they could not speake] For the witte or vnderstanding doth by and by conceyue an inwarde Spéech vppon the thing which is offered vntounto it,Rapid… quadam Corusca…ione perfundit animum. that is to say, it sheadeth through the mynd with a certeyne swift glistering. and begetteth or bréedeth that conceyt in our mynde as it were by a suddein flash of Lightning, and afterward our mynd vttereth it more at leysure by the voyce, the which voyce (notwithstanding) is vnable to represent or expresse ye inward Spéech perfectly: insomuch that wee see many men hauehave a great number of goodly conceyts in their mynds, which they be not able to expresse; and that in expressing them eyther by worde or by writing, they mislike their owne doings, because they bee farre inferiour to the things which they had conceyued in their mynds. Now, the spéech of the mynd is very Reason it self:Vox pr…f…rt, Animus ratiocinatur, Mentis … is to say… the voyce vttereth, the mynd reasoneth or deba…eth, and so Reason is the very word or … Mynd. and looke what the spéech of the mynd reasoneth and debateth, that doth the voyce vtter, and eyther of them is the image of the next that went afore. For looke what proportion is betwéene the voyce or Spéech of the mouth, and the Spéech of the mynd; the like proportion is betwéene the Spéech of the mynd, and the Spéech of the vnderstāding. The voyce hath néede of ayre, and is diuided into parts, and requireth …eysure: The Mynd in déede is vndiuidable, but yet hath it néed of tyme to passe frō one cōclusion or reason to another. But as for ye vnderstāding, it accomplisheth his action or working in lesse than a moment, and with one onelyonly act doth so fill the Reason and mynd, that it is constreyned to make many acts of one. And this diuersitie may eueryevery man marke in himself, notwithstanding that all these acts seeme to be done together like Thunder and Lightning. Now then, the said Conception or Conceyt which Gods vnderstanding hath conceyued euerlastingly in himselfe, wee call Speech or Word; which is the perfect image of his vnderstanding, and Gods vnderstanding, is God himself. Also wee call it Reason, because Reason is as ye would say the Daughter, Spéech or worde of the vnderstanding, and we say that by the same Spéech or word, God made al things. For, as the Craftsman maketh his worke by the patterne which he had erst conceyued in his mynde, which patterne is his inward word: so God made the World and all that is therein, by that sayd Spéech of his as by his inward skill or arte. For he being but one, conceyueth all things by conceyuing himselfe. To be short, we call him also the Wisedome of the Father, yea, and euen meerely and simply wisedome. For, Wisedome (euen in man) is nothing els but a hauiour procéeding of diuers Conceyts or inward spéeches, whereby our mynde is perfected in the knowledge of high things. Now, God is the heyghth of all heyghthes, and by the conceyuing of himself he knoweth himself. But yet we must take this withall, that the thing which is a hauiour in vsus, is essence in him, [that is to say, that he is the very things themselues which wee obtey…e to hauehave by meanes,] and that he himselfe is the ground of his owne wisedome, whereas the true wisedome of men, hath not any other ground than God. Now then, can there bee any greater wisedome in God, than to knowe himselfe? And is not that knowledge bred of vnderstanding?
Let vsus come to the third person.The proceeding of the holy Ghost, or third person. We hauehave acknowledged heretofore, that in the most single essence of God, there is a workfull power, abilitie, or nature, matched with an vnderstanding, according whereuto the sayde vertue or power executeth his actions. Now, in the selfesame essence, should there not also be a Will besides the sayd vnderstanding? If wee consider all the things in the world, we shall finde in them a kynd of Will, tending to the seuerall welfare of eueryevery of them: & the more vnderstanding they hauehave, the more wil also hauehave they; becasue that the more their welfare is knowne vntounto them, the more also is it desired; & the more it is desired, the more also is their will vniforme, and the lesse parted. I omit the sencelesse things, as Plants, Herbes, and Stones, which hauehave certeine naturall inclinations, sufficiently marked by the fear…hing out of their natures. But yet it cannot bee denyed, but that the Beastes hauehave a sensitiue appetite to followe the thing which their Sence taketh hold of to be good for them. Men also doe runne with all their harts after the thing which they suppose to bee good for them, whether it bee honor, riches or pleasure. And the more they knowe it or thinke themselues to knowe it, the more doe they yéeld their will vntounto it: and the more they hold and possesse therof, the more is their hart settled therevpon. Only their vnderstanding being bewitched by vanitie, is deceytfully driuen to choose the euill for the good; by meanes wherof, the will which ought to be discréete and full of wit and vnderstanding, is forced of necessitie to degenerate into fleshly and beastly lust. The Angelles likewise (as say the Philosophers) hauehave also a will, and much more simply one & more liuely than ours. And as by their vnderstanding they know the very good it self, that is to wit God; so hauehave they their will euer settled on him alone, without turning it aside to any of all the great multitude of obiects wheron we be wont to set our mynds. Now, shall not he himself hauehave a will, who hath giuen will to al liuing things and imprinted it in them? And he that hath imparted so many benefites to all things, to some mo and to some lesse; hath not he (say I) bestowed those benefites vppon them willingly? And he with the beholding of whom ye blesseddest Spirits do féede their willes, hath not he the pleasure of contenting himself throughly with him selfe, seeing he knoweth himselfe perfectly? And what els is this pleasure, than will fulfilled, yea euen filled to the full with the true Good which sufficeth to himselfe, which is the onelyonly peculiar thing whereon the very will resteth in déede? Againe, the nature of will is to applye all abilities to their actions. To no purpose hauehave wée hearing, if wee lift not to heare; to no purpose hauehave we sight, if wee list not to see; to no purpose hauehave wee abilitie to doe things, if wee li…t not to doe them. And this appeareth dayly in all our doings, which neuer come to effect, till they be quickened and put foorth by the will. But we see that God hath applyed his power to the doing of many things, yea of things infinite and infinitely diuers. Therefore it followeth that he listed to doe them, and that he listed to make one thing to one ende and another to another, and one of them for another, and finally all for himselfe, and so consequently that he hath a will. And this will (so farre as we be able to discerne it by the effects) is a certeyn abilitie wherby he applyeth his workfull power, when, where, and how he thinketh good; guyding and performing it according to his owne mynd, howbeit that the chiefe act thereof is performed within it selfe. Neuerthelesse, this is spoken alwaies after the manner of men. For if we hauehave much a doe to discerne the difference betwéene the abilities of Will and Understanding in our owne Soules, by reason of the linking of them together: much more reason is it that in this essence of God which is most single, and infinitely more one than ours, we should déeme all these things to be but one in him, notwithstanding that they differ in certeyne respects. God vnderstandeth, but I hauehave told you, that to be and to vnderstand is all one in him. Also God willeth or listeth; but too will and too vnderstand are likewise both one in him: and so all three come into one essence [that is, bee all one thing.] The reason hereof is very euident: namely, that willing or listing of is no more an action that passeth into the outward thing, than Understanding is; but abideth still in the Willer. For by our listing of a thing, we may perceiue some alteration in our selues; but ye thing it self that is listed or willed feeleth nothing thereof. Now, I hauehave proued heretofore, that whatsoeuer is or resteth in God, is his very being; and moreouer, God willeth not any thing but as in respect that he vnderstandeth it; for the knowne good is the ground of his will, and he vnderstandeth not but by his essence, [that is to say, for that he is the very vnderstanding it selfe.] It followeth then, that in God, his Will is his very essence as well as his vnderstanding; insomuch that he is both Power, Understanding, and Will all in one.
But let vsus see now what procéedeth of GOD by his Will. I hauehave sayd afore, that God is mere Action, and moreouer, that he is most single: therfore he is still doing from all eternitie, and so likewise is whatsoeuer els we consider in his essence. Now, there we hauehave found an Understanding, by the Inworking whereof he knoweth himself; and also a Will, whereby he cannot but will himself, seeing he knoweth himselfe. And this Understanding, by a certeine Reflexion of it selfe vponupon it selfe, hath begotten vsus a second person, whom we call the Sonne and the Wisedome of the father. This will then which worketh euerlastingly, hauing likewise none other thing to worke vppon but it selfe, doth also by his working strike backe vponupon himselfe, and delight it selfe in the infinite good which it knoweth there, and so sheadeth out it selfe wholly to the louing thereof; and by this action it bringeth vsus foorth a third person (if I may so terme it) whom we call Gods Spirit and the holy Ghost, that is to wit, the mutuall kindnesse and louingnesse of the Father and of the Sonne; of the Father the vnderstander, towards the Sonne conceyued and begotten by his vnderstanding: and of the Sonne backe againe towards the Father, acknowledging all that he hath and all that he is to be of the Father. And this sayd Will is the essence of God himselfe, and consequently eternally actiue, and actiuely eternall. For, in the euerlasting all things are euerlasting; and in a mere act, all things are act; and of such can nothing procéede which shall not be like them. Néedes therefore must this Spirit, this Louingnesse, or this goodwill, bee also actually euerlasting. Moreouer, the will extendeth as farre as the vnderstanding: for (as I hauehave sayd afore) will and vnderstanding are both one in God; and vnderstanding doth perfectly comprehend the thing that is vnderstood, namely the thing that is beloued, that is to wit God himselfe. The will then doth by his action (which is louelove & liking) extend it selfe as farre as God himselfe; and so the third Person is equall to the second and the first. And yet doth this third Person procéede of the will, and the will is Gods essence, & of that essence can nothing procéede which is not his essence. Therefore he is not onelyonly coeternall and coequall, but also coessentiall. Againe, wee see that in vsus, there goeth alwaies some act of the vnderstanding afore the act of our will; for ye cause why we will things, is that we think wee vnderstand them; and wee desire them for the good which wee perceyue in them; & the louelove of a thing cannot be in the louer thereof, but vppon his knowing of the thing loued; neither is will any thing els than appetite, bred of vnderstanding. The third Person therefore procéedeth from the first, not only by the will, but also by the vnderstanding, and by the knowledge which the vnderstanding bréedeth. And because it procéedeth of two, and not by way of resemblance, but by act of Will; we terme him Proceeding and not Begotten; which is in effect the reason of all that is taught vsus in the Church concerning that matter. Notwithstanding, whereas wee say that the action of Understanding goeth afore the action of Will; our meaning is not to imagine any going afore or comming after in these persons; but onelyonly to lay foorth this procéeding by the order of Nature, which wee could not hauehave done so well by the trueth of the matter: as if wee should say, that the Sonne is considered afore the holy Ghost, in like maner as ye knowing of a thing goeth afore the desire of it, because that if they could hauehave had any beginning, the Sonne had bin formost in that case.
As touching names, we call him most cōmonly the holy Ghost. Holy, because there is nothing in God which is not pure and holy; Why the holy Ghost is called LoueLove. &c.whereby he is discerned from al other Spirits: and Ghost or Spirit, because we commonly call those things Spirits, the beginning of whose mouing is vnknowne to vsus;foreign. as the Wyndes, whose beginning is vnknowne vntounto vsus: the breathing of the Heartstrings, which procéedeth from an inward beginning that is hidden from vsus; and such other things: and to be short, because that in all things which hauehave life, the inwarde force procéedeth from some kynde of will by a certeyne Spirit. Now, as for louelove, it is nothing els but a certeyne couert forewardnesse or foorthgoing of the will towards the thing that is loued; insomuch that the very benefite which we receyue by his louelove, is a secrete and insensible through breathing, which worketh in vsus, & yet we cannot well perceyue from whence it commeth. Againe, wee call him also LoueLove and Charitie, because all the actions of will are in louelove and wellyking as in their roote, in like maner as all the doings of Gods Understanding, mée…e altogether in his wisedome. For, whereas wee desire the thing which we want, or be glad of the thing which wee hauehave; the cause thereof is that we louelove it or like well of it. Likewise also, whereas we feare a thing, or lothe it; that commeth of a hatred, which can hauehave no place in God, whose will nothing is able to withstand. Therefore as we hauehave God of God (that is to wit, the Sonne of the Father) by the euerlasting inworking of his Understanding; so also hauehave wee God of God againe (that is to wit, the holy Ghost or louelove of them both) by the ioyntworking of the Understanding and Will together. Wherevpon we conclude thrée distinct persons or Inbeings in one essence; not to exclude the singlenesse thereof which it behoueth vsus to hold still; but to expresse the diuersitie thereof after a sort, which ought not to bee vnknowne; namely the power of the Father, the wisedome of the Sonne, & the goodnesse of their louelove; for whom, by whom, and in whom,Of whom, by whom, and in whom. it hath pleased the sayd onelyonly one vnspeakable essence to create and to louelove all things.
But there is yet more, namely, that as there are thrée Inbeings or PersonsThree Persons and no mo. in this essence; so also there can bee no mo but thrée: which thing may be made euident by the same reason. Whoso denyeth that there is Understanding and Will in God as wee hauehave seene afore, must also denye that he hath made any thing, or that he doth any thing: for all the things which wee see here belowe, are marked both with the one and with the other. Likewise, he that confesseth that all things are in him, (according to their preaching vntounto vsus) must néedes also confesse the Sonne and the holy Ghost, to bee the wisedome and the louelove; for they bee but actions of those two, which cannot be without their action; neither can action bee euerlastingly any where els than in God himself. Now, as we can not imagine God without his actions; so can wee not consider any other than those to abyde in him, nor consequently any other Underbeings that procéede from thence; wherevpon we say also, that a fourth person cannot be admitted. As for example, we say he is the Creator, and we say true; and in so saying wee finde also a relation to the Creatures. But this power of Creating procéedeth from the power which is in the Father, and is not an action that abideth still within him, but passeth directly into the thing created, which in respect of the Creator, is as nothing in comparison of infinitenesse, whereof it cannot hauehave the preheminence. Also we say he is a Sauiour: and that is all one with the other. For his being a Sauiour, is by his Sonne, as we shall see hereafter; and moreouer, it is an action that passeth into the thing saued, and abydeth not in God alone. Therefore it maketh not to the stablishing of a fourth person or inbeing; for then it ought to be Coessentiall. To be short, all Gods operations doe eyther procéede from within him, and abyde still in the worker and in their first ground; or els they procéed from without, and passe into the outward effect. That worke or action which procéedeth from within, can bee of none other essence than the thiug from whence it commeth: for in GOD there is nothing but essence, and in that esseuce can nothing abyde but the essence it selfe. That which procéedeth from without, is alwaies of a sundrie essence, as are the Creatures and workes of God, which come nothing nere the essence of the Creator. The thing which doth the worke without, is Gods power, howbeit accompanyed with his vnderstanding and will. And the thing that doth the work within, is his vnderstanding and will and nothing els, as wee may discerne in our selues, who are but a very slender image thereof. And like as in beholding a paynted Table, or in reading the verses of a Poet, we imagine not therefore that there was a peculiar and immediate abilitie of paynting or versifying in the mynd or souereyne part of their Soule; but we referre those skilles and al other like, vntounto Wit and Will: euen so and much more according to reason, of all the workes and doings which we see done by Gods power, we cannot gather any other persons or inbeings in him, than those which procéede immediatly of his Understanding and Will; and alonly those and none other can be Coessentiall in him. Now, Understanding and Will in GOD, are essence; and his essence is merely one and most single. And moreouer, the Word or Spéech conceyueth not another Spéech, but turneth wholly vntounto the Father; neither doth the Spirit conceyue another louelove than the louelove of those two; but resteth and reposeth it selfe altogether in them. So then, there can but one onelyonly word or spéech procéede by the vnderstanding, nor but only one LoueLove procéede by the Will; neither can any other procéede of that Word and that LoueLove. And so there remayne vntounto vsus the onelyonly thrée persons of the Father, the Sonne, and the holy Ghost; by the which two, the Father gouerneth and loueth all things, because he himself alone is all things.
Now, as we hauehave read in nature that there is but one God, as a thing which we finde written euen in the least creatures:Traces of the Trinitie in the World and in Man. so may we now perceyue the euident footsteps of the chrée inbeings or persons in one e…sence, as a marke of the worker that made them, in some more and in some lesse, according to their dignitie; which yet notwithstanding are such, as we could not well perceine them, vntill the doctrine thereof was reuealed vntounto vsus, no more than we can vnderstand the letters of Cyphering, which wee can neither reade nor decypher, vnlesse we hauehave some knowledge of ye matter which they import, from other folkes hands, or by coniecture, or by some other way. Wee finde an Unitie in all things, yea euen in those which hauehave but only being. For all things are inasmuch as they be one: and whensoeuer they ceasse to bee that one, they consequently ceasse also to be. Againe, we see in them a forme or shape, and that is the marke of that witfull action (that is to say, of the euerlasting Word or Conceyt whereby God made them) which hath bred vsus the essentiall forme or shape, and all other maner of formes and shapes. Also we see an inclination or disposition, in some more apparant than in othersome; in some to mount aloft, as in fire; in some to sincke downe towards the Center, as in a Stone; and in all, to hold themselues vnited in their matter & forme. This is the marke of the workfull Will, wherein God hath voutsafed to stoope vntounto them; and of the vnion which procéedeth therof, wherein he loueth, vpholdeth, & preserueth all things. But euen in some of the things of this bacest sort, there appeareth not onelyonly a trace, but almost an image thereof. For, the Sunne breedeth or begetteth his owne beames, which the Poets doe call the very sonne of the Sunne: and from them two proceedeth the light, which imparteth it selfe to all things here beneath; and yet is not the one of them afore the other; for neither is the Sunne afore his beames, nor the Sunne or his beames afore the light, otherwise than in consideration of order and relation, that is to wit, as in respect that the beames are begotten and the light is proceeding; which is an apparant image of the Coeternitie. Likewise in Waters, we hauehave the head of them in the earth, & the Spring boyling out of it,The welhead, the Spring, & the streame. & the streame which is made of them both and sheadeth it self out farre of from thence. It is but one selfesame continuall and vnseparable essence, which hath neither forenesse nor afternesse, saue only in order and not in tyme, that is to say, according to our considering of it, hauing respect to causes, and not according to trueth. For, the Welhead is not a head, but in respect of the Spring; nor the Spring a Spring, but in respect of the Welhead; nor the Streame a Streame, but in respect of them both; and so all three be but one Water, and cannot almost be considered one without another, howbeit that the one is not the other. It is an expresse mark of the originall relations and perso…s Coessentiall in the only one essence of God. The like is to bee sayd of Fire, which ingendreth fire, and hath in it both heate and brightnesse vnseparable. Also there are other examples to bee found of such as list to seeke them out. In Hearbes and Plants there is a roote, which yeeldeth a slippe, stocke or ympe, and the same ympe groweth afterward into a Tree. It cannot well be named or deemed to be a roote, but that therewith it hath also ingendred an ympe or stocke; for in that respect is it called a roote, and so is the one as soone as the other. Also there is a sappe which passeth from the one to the other, ioyning, knitting, and vniting them together by one common life, without the which life, neither the roote should bee a roote, nor the slip a slip, and so in effect they bee altogether, the one as soone as the other. Moreouer, among all liuing wights, eueryevery of them ingendreth after his owne kind and forme; of whom one is an ingendrer and another is ingendred; among men, a father and a sonne; and by and by through knowledge, there procéedeth a naturall louelove and affection from the one to the other, which knitteth and linketh them together. All these are traces, footsteps, and images, (howbeit with the grossest) of that high misterie; and also I hauehave told you afore, that no effect doth fully resemble his cause, and much lesse that cause which in all respects is most infinite.
Notwithstanding, in mans Soule, (when I say Soule, I meane there the highest power thereof) the image and likenesse of the Trinitie is yet much more lyuely and more expresse. For first there is in it a Nature & abilitie of working, and as it were a mere act, whereby it liueth and giueth lyfe, and is it selfe in continuall working. The Latins call it Mens [that is to say Mynd] & we call it also the reasonable Soule, the which wee may liken to the Father. This Mynd bréedeth an vnderstanding or Wit, by the which we vnderstand and discerne, not onelyonly other things, but also our selues; and againe by vnderstanding we come to will, through the which we louelove other things, and most of them for our owne sakes. These thrée powers are very distinct in vsus: for wee worke not alwayes by Wit, not alwayes by Will, and yet our mynd worketh continually. Moreouer, oftentymes wee will the thing which wee vnderstand not, and wee vnderstand the thing which wee will not. And therefore to will and to vnderstand are not both one. Neuerthelesse this Working, Understanding and Willing, are not thrée lyues or thrée Soules in vsus, but one lyfe and Soule, and that so streitly vnited in once essence, that euen in the selfsame instant that our mind doth a thing, it also vnderstaudeth the reason why it willeth it or willeth it not, in which worke both our inworking power and also our wit and our will doe concurre all together. Yet notwithstanding, this image is farre from the thing it selfe. For these thrée powers are seuerall in the essence of our Soule; and howe néerly so euer they be vnited together, yet is not the one the other; But in God who is most singly one, Being is Understanding, and vnderstanding is will, as I hauehave said afore. And againe, by Gods vnderstanding and by his will there procéede from hym two Inbeings, by reasons whereof hee myndeth and loueth himselfe, and in himselfe all things. As for our Soule there can no such thing procéede from it by the wit or the will, because although they be both in it, yet they take their grounds from without themselues, insomuch that it can neither vnderstand nor louelove, vnlesse the abilities thereof be set aworking by some outward thing. And which more is, the more it vnderstandeth it selfe, the more doth it streine it selfe to vnderstand and knowe another than it selfe: and the more it loueth it selfe through true knowledge of it selfe, the more dooth it séeke contentment by louing another, which other it cannot louelove but by hating it selfe; that is to wit, it streyneth it selfe too behold and louelove God, and to knowe and louelove it selfe but only for his sake, to whome alonly it belongeth to vnderstand all things in himselfe, and to louelove all things of himselfe. But now it is high time hencefoorth to sée what antiquitie will say to vsus concerning this matter, the which it wilbe better for vsus to reserue to the next Chapter following. And as touching the questions that may bee made by the curious sort vppon this poynt, we answere them at one word; Let them tell vsus how they themselues are bred and begotten, and then let them aske vsus of the begetting of the Sonne of God: Let them tell vsus the nature of the spirit that beateth in their Pulses; and thē let them bee inquisitiue at our hands for the procéeding of the holy Ghost. And if they must be fayne to kéepe silence in so comon matters, which they dayly sée and féele in themselues; let them giuegive vsus leaue to be ignorant in many things, which are such (as sayth Empedocles) as no eye hath séene, nor eare heard, nor wit of man can conceyue.