A Just Defense of Certain Passages — Thomas Gataker

A Just Defense of Certain Passages · Thomas Gataker

The sixth Argument.

SIxtly and lastly, that the vse of Lots in Game isT. G. of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 9. & 10. Argum. 6. not against Gods word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, may appeare by this Argument. Where the wisdome of God in his word hath not determined the matter, and the manner, or the other circumstances of a thing lawfull in it selfe, there they are left to mans discretion and wisdome. Else should we hang euer in perpetuall suspence, hauing no rule at all to direct vsus by in them. And where they are left thus to mans discretion and wisdome, there is warrant sufficient for any circumstance that man shall make choise of (the Magistrate publikely to inioyne, or priuate persons to practise) that shall eQuum Scriptura generales legitimi vsus tradat regulas, secundum illas nobis limitandus est. Calvin. institut. l. 3. c. 10. §. 1.not be against the generall rules of Gods word concerning the same.

For the better conceiuing of this point, it is to be considered, that for the doing of eueryevery act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word: and a man must know that he hath warrant thence, because fRom. 14. 23.Whatsoeuer is not of faith, is sinne. I say, where naturall reason doth not of it selfe afford sufficient direction; for the word is giuen vsus in morall matters to supply the defects of it caused by our first Parents their fall; g1 Cor. 9. 7, 8. & 11. 13, 14. Ad naturā Apostolus provocat. Tertull. de virg. vel. Nec differt Scriptura quid an ratione consistat. Idem cor. mil.neither doth it abridge vsus of the helpe and *Rom. 2. 14, 15. Ipsa natura legis est instar ignorantibu… legem. Tertull. ad Marc. l. 5.vse of it for direction in such actions, but adde a further and fuller helpe thereunto.

First then for the act it selfe in generall; that is of it selfe good and lawfull, and allowable by Gods Law, for the doing whereof there is either precept or permission in Gods word, and that either direct and expresse, or collected by iust consequence: hDeut. 5. 29, 32, 33. & 12. 32. Quod praecipitur, imperatur: quod imperatur, necesse est fieri. Tertull. ad uxor. l 2. Vbi praeceptum, necessitas est servientis. Ibid.if a precept, it is necessarie and must be done; iDeut. 12. 15, 20, 21, 22.if permission onelyonly, it is indifferent and may be done or not done, as shall seeme good to the party whom it concerneth.

Secondly, for the subiect matter, the manner of it, and other such circumstances, where they are by Gods word determined, there such onelyonly are lawfull as the word of God hath inioyned.

Where they are not determined, there all such are lawfull as the same word kConcessum videtur quod non prohibetur. Accurs. ad Cod. Iust. l. 10. t. 1. l. 4.doth not forbid. In the former that rule holdeth, lMatth. 12. 30. Omnia sunt prohibita, qu… non reperiuatur concessa. Gloss. ad Dig. l. 47. t. 23. l. 3.He that is not with me, is against me: in the latter that other, mLuk. 9. 50. Omnia per legem sunt permissa, quae non inveniuntur prohibita. Gloss. ad D. l. 4. t. 6. l. 28.He that is not against me, is with me. Thus for sacrifice and the place of it, before it was determined, nDeut. 12. 8, 9. Gen. 8. 20. & 12. 7. & 13. 18. & 20. 25. & 26. 25. & 33. 20. Exod. 17. 15. & 24. 4.it was lawfull in any place, because no certaine place was designed: but after it was once determined, oDeut. 12. 5, 6, 11, 13, 14.it was lawfull in no place but that alone, that God had expresly thereunto assigned. So for the Passeouer and other offerings, and the time and season of either, the ordinary sacrifices (I meane the voluntarie or free-will offerings) pLev. 1. 2, 3. & 2. 1. Deut. 12. 5, 6, 26, 27.might be offered at any time, because for them was no time determined: but qExod. 12. 6. Num. 9. 13.the Passeouer might be celebrated onelyonly at one time, because the time of it was determined.

This would the rather be obserued for the readier answering of some friuolous obiections made by some Separatists; What warrant, say they, hauehave you to vse this or that forme of prayer, or to pray vponupon a booke? I answer; It is warrant sufficient that rLuk. 18. 1. 1 Thess. 5. 17. 1 Tim. 2. 1. 8.we are inioyned to vse praier, and sMatth. 6. 9, 12. Act. 8. 22. 1 Ioh. 1. 9.such kinde of praier, confession of sin, and supplication for pardon, &c. no set forme thereof determined; therefore any fit forme warrantable: this forme that we vse, not vnfit otherwise; this forme therefore allowable. And let a man demand of one of them when he praieth, what warrant he hath to vse that forme that he then vseth, he can answer no otherwise; or if in effect otherwise, he shall answer otherwise than well. So for a booke; the meanes of helpe are not determined; and this one among others; this therefore not vnwarrantable. And if one of them should be asked, how he proueth it warrantable to vse a printed booke to reade on in the Church; he shall not be able to make other answer than as before: for neither precept nor practise can be found in the word for the vse of a thing that was not knowne in those times wherein the word of God was written.

But to apply this to the present. First, tEccles. 3. 4. Zech. 3. 10. & 8. 5.Recreation in generall is granted by all to hauehave good warrant from Gods word, as a thing both allowed by permission, and inioyned by precept, if not directly and expresly, yet at least by iust consequence: and therefore I will not stand vponupon the proofe of it.

Secondly, for the matter and manner of it, or the things wherewith we may recreate our selues, uCertum est in divinis literis nullam de ludis aut regulā aut formam praescribi: quamvis in eis multa ludorum genera leguntur. Martyr in Iud. c. 14.there is nothing determined; any meanes therefore of recreation that are not against the generall Rules of *Rom. 13. 13. 1 Cor. 14. 40.comelinesse and decencie, of x1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Rom. 14. 21.conueniencie and expediencie, y1 Cor. 10. 31. Coloss. 3. 17.of religion and pietie, and the like, are by the word of God allowed, and hauehave from thence sufficient warrant. For example; If question be whether Boules or Chesse be lawfull or no: what can there be said in iustification o… them more than this, that recreation in generall is by Gods word allowed; the matter of it in particular not determined: these games not prohibited; therefore lawfull and allowable. Now the very same may be said of Lots and Lotterie. Game in generall is allowed: no particular matter or manner of it prescribed: any therefore lawfull that is not against the generall rules of Gods word: this of Lotterie such; and therefore allowable.

If any shall say, that the particular matter or manner of recreation is determined, zAffirmanti incumbit probatio. Paulus in Dig. lib. 22. tit. 3. leg. 2. Et Vlpian. ibid. leg. 22.he must shew where. Or if any shall say, that this particular by Lots is against the generall rules of Gods word otherwise, he must shew which and how. Otherwise there is no ciuill action almost that shall be iustifiable, as aHebraeis & Asiaticis omnibus ignotum & invsitatum id genus vestitus, decent phrases illae lumbos acc…gendi, Exo. 12. 10. & pedes contegendi, Iud. 3. 24. sed nec Romanis in usu, quod Casaub. notat ad Suet. Iul.going in doublet and hose, bEt haec illis olim, & plaerisque Orientalibus adhuc invsitata.wearing band and cuffs, cIn zona siquidem olim gesta…utur pecumi… ▪ Ma… ▪ 10. 9. Ma…. 6. 8.carrying a mans purse in his pocket, dA…ubitus priscus conviv…tium & … gest. … ▪ 26▪ 20▪ foreign Marc▪ 14. 18. foreign. Luk. 22. 14. foreign ▪ Ioan. 13. 23. foreign.sitting on a stoole at the Table, crossing the water in a Boat when one may goe about by the Bridge, eOlim v…tum. Levit▪ 11. 7▪ Deut. 14. 8. de qu… Plut. symp. l 4. q. 5. à Troskistis nostris renovatum.eating of Porke, fEt hoc olim prohibitum▪ Lev. 7. 26▪ & 17. 10. fed & ab Arianis nostratibus …uper re…catum▪bloudings or ought strangled, and the like, if it shall be deemed enough to make an action vnwarrantable, either because there is no particular precept or precedent for it in Scripture, or because it is questioned or condemned by some without any reason or sufficient cause rendred why it should be questioned and condemned in that sort.

And so I conclude and leaue this sixt and last reason, taken from the common grounds of other ordinary recreations not questioned; which must all with this either stand or fall; the selfe-fame grounds supporting either; that this particular is not prohibited▪ nor is against the generall rules of Gods word otherwise; which as in the former; so in this case must stand good, till the contrary can be proued.

Now to come to M^r. G^s. last Reason, which likeI. B. Answer. an Orator he amplifieth, to leaue a deepe impression behinde. But let it be well considered, as in it selfe, so whether it proue that the vse of Lots in Game is not against Gods word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, as he pretendeth in his introduction, p. 136.

What Rhetoricall amplifications M^r. B. findeth inT. G. Reply. this Argument, those may well wonder, that know what Rhetoricall Amplifications are. But be it Logicall or Rhetoricall, heare, I pray you, not it, but one that M^r. B. hath put into the roome of it.

I. B.

It is this. Where the wisdome of God hath not determined the subiect Matter, the Manner, and other Circumstances of a thing lawfull in it selfe, there all such are lawfull as the word doth not forbid; and as no Circumstance that a man shall make choise of, shall be against the generall Rules of the word concerning the same.

But a Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe, and the Subiect matter, manner, and other Circumstances thereof are not determined by Gods word, nor against the generall rules.

Therefore a Lot in Game is not prohibited, nor is against the generall rules of Gods word otherwise.

T. G.

He that should thus reason, were worthy either aIsta siquidem, Non sani esse hominis non sanus juret Orestes: ut Pers. sat. 3.to be sent to Bedlem, or *Vt curatoris ègens à Praetore da…i. Hor. epist. 11.to be begged in the Court of Wards. bQuem recitas, meus est, … Fidentine, lib…llus: Sed malè dum rocitas, incipit isse …us. Martial.Nor is mine this, nor is this mine, vnlesse I be out of my right wits. How they differ (not to be ouer-tedious) may appeare by my words, where hauing more largely discoursed of and discussed the seuerall parts of it, I thus briefly recollect it: Game in generall is allowed: no particular matter or manner of it prescribed: any therefore lawfull that is not against the generall rules of Gods word: this of Lotterie such; and therefore allowable. Where prefix M^r. B^s. proposition, onelyonly so knit as it may hang a little more handsomely together, turning, and as, into, so as, (which so framed I owne) and you hauehave two entire Syllogismes, and the maine summe of mine Argument.

I. B.

The Proposition he confirmeth:

First, touching a thing lawfull in it selfe, by shewing that Act to be lawfull in it selfe, which in Gods word is either commanded or permitted expresly, or by iust consequence.

T. G.

This is an explication indeed of one terme vsed in it: no confirmation of the Proposition, nor so propounded.

I. B.

Secondly, touching the manner, &c. by prouing the rest of the Proposition, which he endeuoureth to performe,

1. By the authoritie of Caluin.

2. By Luk. 9. 50. 3. By a glosse. 4. By shewing that the circumstance of time for free-will offerings being not determined, they might hauehave beene offered at any time; and Sacrifices: might hauehave beene in any place before a certaine place was determined.

T. G.

M^r. B. here maketh me much more plentifull in proofes than I am: as shall appeare further in his Answer, and mine thereunto.

I. B.

Thirdly, touching the doing of eueryevery Act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, by shewing, that if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, then must warrant be had out of Gods word, because, cRom. 14. …3.Whatsoeuer is not of faith is sin. Which word is giuen vsus in morall matters to supply the defect of it caused by our first Parents their fall. Neither doth the word abridge vsus of the helpe and vse of naturall reason for direction in such actions.

T. G.

This is indeed all alledged for the clearing of my Proposition▪ not for the proofe of any part.

I. B.

The Assumption is thus proued. Recreation in generall is warranted from the word as permitted and inioyned, if not expresly yet by iust consequence. For the matter or manner, or the things wherewith we may recreate our selues, there is nothing determined. Therefore any meanes that are not against the generall Rules of Comelinesse, and decencie, Rom. 13. 13. 1 Cor. 14. 40. of conueniencie and expediency, 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Rom. 14 21. of religion and piety, 1 Cor. 16. 31. Coloss. 3. 17. and the like, are by the word of God allowed.

T. G.

This proofe and the Assumption by M^r. B. before assigned me (to wit, But a Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe, and the subiect matter, manner, and other Circumstances thereof are not determined by Gods word, nor against the generall Rules) hang together, as we say, like dforeign. Plut.harpe and harrow. He would make the world beleeue, that M^r. G. is a strange man, that bringeth that to proue this.

But his Answer ensueth.

I. B.

I might, as did Alexander, loose Gordi…ns knot with one chop, and say, The vse of Lots in Game is forbidden in the word, referring my selfe to what I hauehave and shall write. But for better satisfaction, I will answer more particularly, not doubting but that the Prouerbe may now proue true, viz. eProv. 10. 19.In many words there cannot want iniquitie.

T. G.

Why doth M^r. B. vse so many words then ere he come to the matter? But the Iniquitie he meaneth is on my part: let vsus see it. For here, it seemeth, is the ranke poison, the blasphemy that M^r. B. obserued in my Booke.

I. B.

First, I obserue fearefull shifting, and then vnsound arguing. The former thus appeareth: He supposeth the thing must be lawfull in it selfe, and disputeth onelyonly about the subiect matter, &c.

T. G.

True, I presume Recreation to be lawfull in generall. Dare M^r. B. or any man denie it? And yet I presume it not without proofe neither. But you must remember that M^r. B. here sighteth not with me or mine Argument, but ^f with a man of straw ofg Quomodo apud Romanos contra palum in terram desixum, tanquam contra adversarium cum crate & clava, si… tiro …es dimicabant, ut quasi praesentem adversarium, sic p…lum omni impetu, omni bellandi arte tentarent. Veget. de re mil…t. l. 1. c. 11. & l. 2. c. 23. his owne making. In his Assumption this is presumed of Lotterie: whereas I presume it of recreation, not of it.

I. B.

Againe in the introduction he saith; The vse of Lots in game is not against Gods word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, which may imply this position, That is against the word, which hath not sufficient warrant from it. But in the Proposition of the maine Argument his ground is, Such things are lawfull, which the word dot… not forbid. Foure of his confirmations, and his Assumption are to that effect, or rather defect, and his Conclusion is answerable. Is not this a fearefull shifting course of reasoning?

T. G.

This then, it seemeth, is one point of that fearefull shifting that M^r. B. chargeth me with. Concerning which enough hath already beene said; for this is no new exception. And though the words be not thus generally propounded in my Proposition, as M^r. B. himselfe propoundeth it: Yet there is no contradiction betweene these two: since that gOmnia licent, i. omnis omnium creaturarum & rerum usus lege D…i non prohibitu…, licitè & si…e peccato h…beri p…test. Mor…on in 1 Cor. 6 12. quarumvis creaturarū & rerum usus lege mor…li non prohibitus l…e, …. siue peccato … po…. s…. Ide in 1 Cor. 10. 23.Whatsoeuer is not forbidden in Gods word, is by the same word warranted. What proofes he dreameth of shall hereafter appeare.

I. B.

Touching the Proposition of his maine Argument, I maruell why M^r. G. auouching such subiect matter &c. to be lawfull as are not forbidden, limiteth this Assertion with these words (of a thing lawfull in it selfe.) As if such a thing may warrant our retchlesnesse in and about the subiect matter &c. As if God doth not, according to the old saying, louelove Aduerbs. An Oath is a thing lawfull in it selfe. Are not we therefore to make conscience, that the subiect matter &c. be agreeable to the word of GOD?T. G.

I. B.

Why I insert those words into mine Assertion, may easily appeare to any that will not wilfully shut his eyes: because my dispute is concerning Recreation, a thing granted to be such, and the Question onelyonly about the subiect matter of it. And so far are my words from implying any such matter, as M^r. B. here thence would inferre, that I say in expresse termes, that As well for the doing of eueryevery act, as for the doing of it in this or that manner there must be warrant had out of Gods word hIsta itaque sunt pali vulnera, ut Iuvenal. sat. 6..

But I maruell much more at this ground, Such things are lawfull as the word doth not forbid. I set it downe thus, because the confirmations tend to make this good, and so conclude. All things not prohibited are permitted: and therefore the subiect matter &c. of a thing lawfull in it selfe. I maruell, I say, because M^r. G. confirmeth a thing or act it selfe to be lawfull in it selfe, if it be in the word, either commanded, or permitted expresly, or by iust consequence. Which I acknowledge to be so cleare a truth, that (me thinks) M^r. G. cannot, but in proportion of reason, if he beleeue the word to be iPsal. 19. 7.perfect k2 Tim. 3. 15, 16, 17.vntounto eueryevery good worke, hold all things to be vnlawfull, which are not lawfull one of these two waies; and the rather because he peremptorily affirmeth, p. 95. All particular morall actions, be they neuer so indifferent, to be either conformable or disconformable to Gods word; and, by particular actions he meaneth Actions clothed with circumstances, pag. 94. O that M^r. G. would hold to this doctrine! Then should he thereby prouoke all who make conscience of their waies, and lIohn 3. 21.doe truth (that is, doe good works sincerely) to come to the light, that their deeds might be made manifest, that they are wrought according to God. On the contrary, if he bring not disciples, mIsai. 8. 20.to the Law and Testimonie, by doctrine according to the word; but writh from it, by teaching that to be lawfull, which is not forbidden; as therein this light faileth, so thereby he shall make men carelesse to seeke for their warrant, and wilfull nNum. 15. 39.to seeke after their owne heart and eyes, after which they goe a whoring.

T. G.

Here is a long and sore accusation; which might all well without any one word more be answered, onelyonly by pointing the finger to what formerly was said. But because M^r. B. so much presseth me, I will intreat the Readers patience for a little further discussion of what is here obiected. All I say here is this, that Where the circumstances of Actions in themselues lawfull are not determined in the word, all such are lawfull as are not in the same word forbidden, or as are not against the generall rules of the said word of God otherwise. And is it not strange that this Assertion should to M^r. B. seeme so strange? Or is this any writhing from the rule of Gods word? Yea but I crosse my selfe else-where in it. For I say else-where that such things are lawfull as are in Gods word either commanded or permitted either expresly or by iust consequence. I say so indeed: and what contradiction is there betweene these two? For is not that by iust consequence permitted, that is not prohibited? Yea, (since we are come to these precise termes) that is, neither expresly nor by iust consequence prohibited? For I am sure M^r. B. will not denie that to be prohibited, as well that is by iust consequence prohibited, as that is prohibited in expresse termes. Either M^r. B. then must giuegive vsus some medium between permission and non prohibition, or else these two positions will hauehave very friendly agreement. Yea but M^r. G. himselfe may seeme to assigne some when he saith, that in circumstances determined, there is no permission, though no prohibition be of any other. I answer in a word, that the very stinting of an action to those circumstances is a virtuall prohibition of all other not expressed, albeit no exclusiue particle in the iniunction be adioyned. For example, when God bid Abraham oGen. 22. 2.take Isaak and sacrifice him on an hill that he should shew him: it was as effectuall a prohibition of sacrificing him in any other place but on an hill, and on any other hill but that hill, as if God had said expresly (as he doth of the Iewes sacrificing, pDeut. 12. 13, 14.in the place that I assigne and not elsewhere) vponupon that hill, and vponupon no other: And the reason is apparent; because that commandement could not be fulfilled if any branch of it, whereof the precise place was one, were broken. This is that then that I say, that where the circumstances of actions are stinted, there those onelyonly that are inioyned in speciall are lawfull: where they are not, any are permitted, that are conformable to the generall rules of direction giuen in Gods word. Against which in this whole heape of words M^r. B. bringeth nothing, but an other of mine owne assertions, which no whit crosseth it, his well wishes onelyonly (qSomnia enim sunt haec Democriti optantis, non docentis. Cic. Lucull. which might well hauehave beene spared) set apart.

I. B.

Well, let vsus examine his confirmations.

First M^r. Caluins testimonie in English is this. [When the Scripture deliuereth generall rules of a lawfull vse, the vse is to be limited according to them.] From hence M^r. G. concludeth that a man hath a sufficient warrant for any circumstance he shall make choise of, that is not against those rules. M^r. Caluin speaketh of an Vse, and of an Vse doe we dispute. M^r. G. concludeth a circumstance. M^r. Caluin saith, according. M^r. G. concludeth, not against. Is this sound arguing?T. G.

It is true that I quote a sentence of M^r. Caluins in the margine, as concurring with me in one clause against which it is quoted. And I might aske why M^r. B. did not take notice of him a little before as well as he here doth. But that I frame any Argument at all out of him, much lesse ground that I deliuer vponupon his or any other mans authoritie, is vntrue. As for the differences betweene him and me herein by M^r. B. here imagined, they are very silly and friuolous. For first of all, doth not the vse of a thing consist in the circumstances of it, as in the manner of vsing, and the like? Or what doth Caluin meane by the limiting of the vse by those generall rules, but the assigning of it such circumstances as those rules giuegive allowance of. aCalvin. institut. l. 3. c. 10. §. 1.Many, saith he, take for granted, which yet I yeeld them not, that th… our liberty is by no qualification to be restrained, but that it is to be left to eueryevery mans conscience, to vsurpe so much of it as to himselfe seemeth lawfull. I confesse indeed that bNec debere nec posse conscientias statis praecisisque legum formulis hîc alligari.mens consciences neither can nor ought to be tied herein to certaine precise formes of lawes: but since that the Scripture deliuereth generall Rules of the lawfull vse of them, according to those is it to be limited of vsus. Where M^r. Caluin saith plainly, that for the vse of cNecessaria praesentis vitae adminicula.the outward necessaries of this life, (whereof recreation is one) there can no speciall precise rules be giuen out of Gods word, but it is sufficient for them that we be directed in the vse of them by such generall directions as the same word doth afford; which is all that I say. Yea he extendeth this dCalvin. ibid. cap. 19. §. 7.afterward to the very matter of our meat, drinke and apparell, where he falleth vponupon the same point againe.

Yea but Caluin saith, according, and M^r. G. not against. M^r. B. is verie curious, that can eQuaeris & in scirpo (soliti quod dicere) nodum. Ennius apud Fest. Qui inimicus est, etiam in scirpo nodū quaerit. Hieron. ad error. Ioan. Hieros.finde a knot in a bulrush. If those generall rules be not violated, are they not obserued? if there be nothing done against them, how are they violated? if nothing then be done against them, they are vndoubtedly obserued. It is all one therefore in effect to bee according to them, and not against them; and M^r. B^s. exception consequently idle.

I. B.

Is the second confirmation from Luk. 9. 50. much better? The words set downe by M^r. G. be these, [Hee that is not against me is with me.] This place (forsooth) is a Rule holding in the Subiect Matter, &c. determined. As these words, [He that is not with me, is against mee, Matth. 12. 30.] is a rule in the subiect-matter, &c. determined. Both a like in conceit. And why may not M^r. G^s. conceit be the same touching things or actions? But let vsus see whether the conceit bee not a be misted phantasie. In the former place Christs words are occasioned by his Disciples their forbidding one who cast out Deuils in Christs Name. Forbid him not, saith Christ, for, He that is not against me is with mee. In the latter place Christ spake those words vponupon occasion of the Pharisies their opposition. So that consider the two sentences with their occasions together, this indeed is the summe. All men are either with or against Christ, for there be no Neutrals. So that those two sentences are like these. He that is not a goat is a sheepe; and he that is not a sheepe is a goat. But M^r. G^s. argument is this: All men who are not against Christ are with him. Therfore circumstances not determined, nor forbidden, are lawfull. Is this sound arguing?

T. G.

And where, I pray you, doth M^r. G. argue on this manner? But M^r. B. fforeign. Plut de Isid & Osirid. Nam quod elim Vitius Crispus, Ego ve…ò ista non dico. Quintil. instit. l. 5. c. 13.frameth me Arguments at his pleasure: And then pleaseth himselfe in finding faults in them; as if their defects concerned me, and not rather himselfe, who either must father them, or I know none else that will. For his exposition of those places, to let passe what exception might well be taken thereunto, because it is not to the purpose. It is vntrue, that I produce them for confirmation of ought that I had before deliuered. I imply onelyonly that the distinction I deliuered (which may be extended also to things or actions, as well as their circumstances; but my dispute now was of these) might in those two Rules or Sentences be not vnfitly conceiued. And the truth is, I had a notion in my head then of somewhat to that purpose, that in a learned gLord of Saint Albans his considerations.Noble-mans writings I had sometime read; which yet because I was not verie certaine of, nor had I the Booke by me then, I forbare then to cite. The speeches are alledged as by him, so by me, not in way of Confirmation, but by way of Illustration and Allusion; as if I should hauehave said, That rule which in another case our Sauiour giueth, holdeth well here. A course not vnusuall, in the writings of the learnedst and most religious. I alledge them but as hRom. 10. 18.the Apostle doth those iPsal. 19. 4.words of the Psalmist; Their sound is gone thorow all the earth, and their words vntounto the worlds ends. Concerning which, I dare not say as Ierome doth ouer-boldly on another occasion, that kAliter in suis locis, aliter in tuis epistolis sonant. Videmus exempla captiva: servi erant tibi ad victoriam, quae suis in voluminibus non dimicant. Hieron. apolog. pro libr. contr. Iovin.the Texts alledged by the Apostle sound one way in their owne places, and another way in his allegations of them: because they are spoken of the lforeign, uti loquitur Basil. Sel.dumbe creatures publishing Gods glorie in the one place, of the Apostles preaching Christs Gospell in the other. They agree well and make good harmonie, since that the Apostle only alledgeth them by way of allusion, for illustration of the matter that there he dealeth in, not by way of illation or inference, for the confirmation of ought there deliuered, or the concluding of ought from thence. The like doe I here. And M^r. B. may as well frame an Argument thus out of the Apostles words, The Psalmist saith, that the heauens preach Gods glory to all the earth: therefore the Apostles hauehave preached to the whole world: as extract such an Argument as he doth here out of my words.

I. B.

The third Confirmation is from a glosse. Here I remember an old saying, [A cursed glosse corrupteth the Text.] Now let vsus see whether M^r. G. hauehave any blessing by this glosse. The words whereof in English bee these, [All things are permitted by Law, which are not found prohibited.] Note that it speaketh of things. Therfore it maketh as well for Actions, as for Circumstances. Is this Diuinitie? But what Law? If the ciuill Law, what is that to the point? Except M^r. G. can proue the Ciuill Law to bee a perfect Rule to vsus; and whatsoeuer it permitteth to be allowed of God. Howsoeuer (I say) this course of fetching proofes from any other Law than Gods Law is fitter for a Papist, who holdeth vnwritten verities (so called) to be a supplement to the Scriptures, thereby to authorize Traditions of men, then for oneDeut. 10. 12. that feareth God to walke in his wayes. Is then this glossing sound arguing?

T. G.

Or rather is all this any more than *Mera vitiligatio, uti Cato olim. Plin. praesat.meere cauilling? To let M^r. B^s. graue notes vponupon this Glosse, and his serious inferences vponupon the allegation of it passe, wherein hee maketh himselfe lforeign; uti Aristoph. & Lucian. Iove Trag.most ridiculous. All this adoe is, because in the margine of my Booke (which a Scholler may make vse of) I alledge out of the Glossers of the Ciuill Law, certaine Rules that in their Law concurre some with the one branch, some with the other of the distinction I there vse. It is but as if one handling some point of Diuinitie about lawfull and vnlawfull silence should say, In some cases that Rule of the Canon Law holdeth▪ nQui tacet consentire videtur. Bonif. in 6. de reg. jur. c. 43.Silence is deemed as consent: in other cases that other Rule, oIs qui tacet, non satetur: sed nec utique negare videtur. Ibid. c. 44.Silence is held no deniall, and yet no consent neither: or determining how far forth the desire goeth for the deed, should say, In this case, that of the Ciuill Law holdeth, pAffectus tantum punitur sicut effectus. Cod. ad leg. Corn. de Sicarijs.The Affection is punished, though it take not effect: in that case it holdeth not, but that other rather, qAffectus non punitur, nisi sequatur effectus. Digest. de Poenis.The affection is not held faulty, if no effect follow. Which (forsooth) in M^r. B^s. conceit must needs therefore be one ground of the truth maintained, or else all is nothing worth. But he wanted better matter, it seemeth, to worke vponupon.

I. B.

Hath the fourth Confirmation more validitie in it than the rest? The former three proofes speake not directly of Circumstances according to the Proposition; (so doth M^r. G. dispute ad idem) here he doth.

T. G.

How should I dispute ad idem, where I dispute not at all? And yet are those ad idem, for that whereunto they are alledged. But M^r. B. now commeth *De semita in viam. Plaut. Cas 3. 5.out of the Margine into the Text againe, wherein himselfe saith I doe dispute to the purpose.

I. B.

Here then I enquire. If the circumstances of Time and Place, be at the pleasure of him that vseth a thing lawfull in it selfe, doth it follow thereupon, that the subiect matter and manner be so too? If God allow any thing to be done, of necessitie there must bee a time and place, when and where it may be done. Euen when and where there is iust occasion of the Act. It is to be obserued, that as here, so in the Proposition it selfe M^r. G. slideth from the subiect matter, and manner, to circumstances onelyonly. Is not this fainting?

T. G.

Or rather is not this fopperie? M^r. G. slideth from the subiect matter and manner to circumstances onelyonly, because he saith in his Proposition, the matter and the manner, or the other circumstances, meaning indeed the subiect matter, as M^r. B. also expoundeth me. For to omit that my words doe not necessarily make them both Circumstances, though I ioyne that word with them; Are not the subiect matter and manner circumstances, that is, things about and without the essence and substance of those things that they hauehave reference vntounto, as well as either Time or Place? If not, our Logicians are much amisse, rMateria in quae subjectum propriè dicitur adjuncta in se recipiens. Materia circa quam propriè Objectum dicitur .i. subjectum adjuncta occupans. Dounam. in Ram. Dial. l. 1. c. 6. Locus est subjectum rei locatae. Ram. Dial. l. 1. c. 10.that referre the Place and the Subiect matter both to one and the same Head. For as for the manner, if it be not a circumstance, I know not what is.

But if it be true of these, saith M^r. B. that they are at the pleasure of him that vseth a thing lawfull in it selfe, doth it follow thereupon that the other are? Yea doubtlesse doth it; what reason can either M^r. B. or any other shew why it should not, where they are left alike free; and the one is no more stinted than the other. But who saith, that time and place are left (either wholly or generally) to the pleasure of him that vseth a thing lawfull in it selfe? This is another of M^r. B^s. spirits or ghosts that he raiseth, to shew his skill in coniuring them downe againe.

Yea but M^r. B. can shew you some difference betweene the one and the other. For, If God allow a thing to be done, there must be time and place when and where it may be done. And must there not be Subiect-matter and manner too? Or must not a man hauehave warrant as well for the one as for the other? Yes, saith M^r. B. for I hope he will not denie that. Well what warrant then? It may be done when, and where there is iust occasion of that act: and what is that, but at any time and in any place where there is iust occasion thereof offered? So that M^r. B. denieth not, but affirmeth the truth of that that I say concerning some Circumstances; onelyonly he denieth therefore that it followeth concerning some other, which he saith are no Circumstances. Which whether they be or no, it is not a pin matter, since that warrant from the word is required for the one as well and as much as for the other.

But I leaue this his friuolous sforeign, 1 Cor. 9. 26. Hodie multi soli adversus aerem pugnis, armis, brach…js exercent se. Drus. proverb. 1. 3. 4.beating the aire: hauing onelyonly obserued, how Mr. B. that was so diligent to hooke in out of the Margine whatsoeuer he thought he might with any the least shew of colour, (though without any iust occasion) be snarling at: yet passeth by all in the Text it selfe that I presse, concerning the infinite perplexities, yea and impossibilitie, which by instances I shew, of making particular actions good, or iustifying of them against those that may question them, that must needs ensue vponupon the deniall hereof. Which I desire by the vnpartiall and iudicious to be well weighed. What I bring not for confirmation, that he saith I doe, and taketh occasion thereby to deale with, and rather than he will let it passe, he will step aside into the Margine to fetch it into the Text: what I bring for confirmation, that he slippeth by, and letteth alone, as if he saw it not, though it lie full in his way, and he need not goe far for it, or as if at least, which I suppose rather, he had no list to see it.

I. B.

Let vsus now proceed to that, which M^r. G. writeth touching both the doing of eueryevery Act, and the doing of it in this and that manner. Neither of which needeth warrant from the word, if naturall reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction. Good Lord! What fearefull shifting from the word is here? But why doth he ioyne the doing it selfe of an Act with the manner thereof? Ile tell you: euen to make a way to his Assumption. For if he sticke close to that which he teacheth in immediate words, to wit, that an act it selfe is lawfull in it selfe, if in the word it be either commanded or permitted expresly or by iust consequence, he foreseeth, that it will be answered to the fore-part of his Assumption, that eueryevery Lot is not lawfull in it selfe. Therefore he would trouble the Readers head with a supposed direction therein of naturall reason, and that sufficient. I say supposed; for he sheweth no direction therein of naturall reason either sufficient or insufficient.

T. G.

M^r. B. here beginneth to blesse himselfe; as if indeed some euill Spirit had appeared. This belike was the blasphemous matter that hee met with in my Booke. But hee must not thinke with such scar-bugs to carry it away. He hath not ^t babes and children onelyonly to deale with. His iudiciousforeign. Xenoph. Hellen. l. 4. foreign. Chrysost. tom. 6. serm. 43. Persona pueris deformis metum facit. Sen. de constant. sap. c. 4. foreign. Sed quae puelli formidant, rident viri. Readers will not be scared with such outcries, from scanning and discussing the things questioned; howsoeuer some simple, or some partiall ones may.

Before he commeth to exagitate the blasphemous Assertion, to cast some dust in his Readers eyes, and breed some preiudice of the aduerse party: uVerum caveat, ne dum aliud studet notare culpae, ipse notetur calumniae. Hieron. adv. error. Ioan. Hieros.hee maketh Mr. G. no better than a Iugler, who foreseeing the weaknesse of some thing in the Assumption or second part of his Argument, laboureth with other by-matter to trouble the Readers head before-hand, that the same may not be discerned. And this was the cause, (as M^r. B. peremptorily telleth you, hauing discouered the mist that I cast before my Readers eyes, and knowing my minde herein much better than I did or doe my selfe) why I ioyned the doing it selfe of an Act with the manner thereof; and why I tell him of a supposed direction of naturall reason. Hee had need of a long clew, that treadeth the maze of this wilde and intricate discourse. But that it may appeare in a word to the Reader, how sincerely M^r. B. herein demeaneth himselfe: What is it in mine Assumption, that I made all this doe about, for feare my Reader should discouer the vnsoundnesse of it? Forsooth that A Lot is lawfull in it selfe. Which Proposition (though none of mine, and yet I denie it not neither) M. B. to oppose telleth vsus (in such language as I thinke no learned man beside himselfe would vse) that EueryEvery Lot is not lawfull in it selfe. But let that position be found in any part of mine Assumption, not as M^r. B. frameth it, but as it is in my Booke, and I will freely confesse the whole accusation, that to this very end I did it whatsoeuer it was that M^r. B. here saith I did; for I vnderstand not well what it is. If no such thing be in it, with what Conscience can M^r. B. say so peremptorily, that I did I know not what to keepe my Reader from discerning that, or the default of that in it, that indeed is not there at all? And thus hauing cleared my selfe from such finister intention, as M^r. B. here chargeth me with, and I not onelyonly had not, but could not hauehave: let vsus proceed now to the point it selfe.

I. B.

But let vsus with feare and trembling consider M^r. Gs. most strange position, to wit, [Neither the doing of any act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if naturall Reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction.] Let vsus consider it, I say, together with his reason. For, saith he, the word is giuen vsus, in morall matters to supplie the defect of naturall reason caused by our first parents their fall. Is it our best way then to seeke sufficient direction in morall matters from naturall reason, before wee consult with God in his word? For the said direction is two times vrged thus. I say, where naturall reason doth not of it selfe afford sufficient direction. And need not a man know, that he hath warrant from Gods word, if in his perswasion he hauehave sufficient direction from naturall reason? Doth the Maxime of Gods Spirit, quoted here by M^r. G. to wit, [What is not of faith is sinne,] intimate, thatRom. 14. 23. whatsoeuer is done by sufficient direction from naturall reason is of faith? Became naturall reason onelyonly defectiue, and not corrupted also by our first ParentsRom. 8. 7. their fall? O God hauehave mercy vponupon vsus! For I see that the wisdome of the flesh is enmitie against thee: for it is not subiect to thy Law, neither indeed can be. But why doe I vex my soule with this fearefull doctrine, seeing M^r. G^s. heart fainteth in the prosecution thereof? For at last he commeth to say: Neither doth the word abridge vsus of the helpe and vse of naturall Reason for direction in such actions. Here is some more authoritie (to wit, Of not abridging vsus of the helpe, &c.) giuen to the word. For it doth imply, that the word might abridge vsus, &c. Therefore our most warrantable way is to be well informed, when and how far the word doth giuegive vsus leaue to vse the direction of naturall reason in morall matters. If this be so, then the former strange doctrine is contradicted, and I need not make any answer to the Scriptures quoted in the Margent.

T. G.

The strange and fearefull Position, as M^r. B. conceiueth it, is this: Neither the doing of any Act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if naturall Reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction. Its this, as I deliuer it my selfe; For the doing of eueryevery act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word.

If the difference betweene these two be demanded; I answer:

First, M^r. Bs. Proposition may seeme to imply, that in any Act whatsoeuer sufficient direction may by naturall Reason be afforded, (which I say not:) in mine onelyonly, that in some kinde and some cases there may. In the former manner (it seemeth) M^r. B. pleased to propound it, to procure the greater preiudice to that that I hold.

Againe, (wherein the most materiall difference consisteth) it is one thing for an action to hauehave warrant from Gods word, (which I denie not but that eueryevery action ought to hauehave) and another thing to hauehave that warrant taken immediatly out of it; as shall afterward appeare. So that neither doth M^r. B. here faithfully relate what I say, nor doe I affirme what he here relareth.

Yet for the point, as M^r. B. here propoundeth it, sauing what he would seeme to imply in it, and burden me and my cause with the enuie of; the Proposition it selfe containeth such an vndeniable truth, as there is no man, I suppose, endued with common sense, but will acknowledge it. For if Naturall Reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there need no further warrant from ought else; since that it were not sufficient yet, if it needed ought else. And it was euen so with Adam in his originall estate. If any truth vndeniable then be fearfull and strange then this position peraduenture may be such; but not else.

But for the point as I propound it; (for with that now I deale not) that for the doing of eueryevery act, and the doing of it thus or thus, if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word. If the question be demanded, why I speake in this manner, I answer, because many things in this kinde are so cleare and euident euen to naturall reason, that there can no doubt be made of them, or that they may vnanswerably and necessarily be thereby concluded; for which therefore a man need not further warrant out of the word; not that the warrant of Gods word is in any wise needlesse; but that a man may thereby be well assured, that it hath warrant in Gods word. For what is the word of God for morall things, but the perfection of true Reason, and a Summe or Body of that Law of Nature at first imprinted in mans soule? So that either it must be held that there are some things in the Law of God not agreeable to Reason; or else it must needs follow, that xGratia non destruit naturam, sed eam perficit. Nam subordinata nō pugnant. Nec est contra naturam, sed supra naturam▪ Etenim Deus est autor omnis boni in natura, five sit secundùm naturam, sive supra naturā. Deus autem sibi ipsi contrarius non est. Proinde nullus fidei articulus est contra rationem. Adeoque quod est Philosophicè verum, etiam verum est Theologicè, & contra: quia verum vero consonat. Alsted. system. Theolog. l. 1. c. ….whatsoeuer is agreeable to the rules and grounds of true Reason, is agreeable likewise to the Law of God: since that true Reason cannot possibly crosse it selfe, nor swerue or disagree in ought from it selfe. To say therefore that for the doing of eueryevery Act, and the doing of it thus or thus, if naturall Reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word: it is all one as to say, In prouing of points in controuersie betweene the Papists and vsus by Authorities, if a man be not very sure that his memorie faile him not, he must hauehave recourse to his Bookes. Which when a man saith, his meaning is not that he may alledge ought that is not in the Bookes whence he alledgeth it, but that if the allegations be so fresh and so firme in his memory, that he is well assured thereof, he need not make further search into his Bookes for it. Or to come neerer home, to say, In morall things, as well for eueryevery thing that a man doth, as for the manner of doing it, if the word of God else-where afford not sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of the Decalogue. Which speech should not argue that any action may be done of vsus, that we hauehave no ground for in Gods Law: but that if we can finde ground for it in any other part of Gods word, we may thereby be sure that it hath vndoubted ground there. To the Reason that I adioyne taken from the end of the word, giuen in morall matters to supply the defect of naturall Reason, &c. M^r. B. answereth nothing at all; but asketh onelyonly, if it be our best way to seeke sufficient direction from naturall Reason, before we consult with God in his word. No. Who saith it? But yet sometimes naturall Reason affordeth grounds more readily without seeking, than the word doth. And it is a certaine truth, that yMr. Hooker of Eccles. Politie, lib. 2. sect. 8.a Reuerend Diuine hath, that In eueryevery action of common life (yea in many of them, say I, whereof no doubt or question is made by any) to finde out some sentence clearely and infallibly setting before our eyes what we ought to doe, seeme we in Scripture neuer so expert, would trouble vsus more than we are aware.

To reflect vponupon our former instance concerning the Decalogue, who doubteth but that all a mans actions ought to be grounded vponupon it, since that they are all lawfull or vnlawfull so far forth as they are either consonant vntounto or dissonant from that that is therein contained. Yet how many actions are there, the lawfulnesse whereof may be demonstrated much more readily from some other, either proofes of Scripture, or grounds in Nature, than from any Branch of it? Yea in resolution of doubts, how oft doe the Reade Mr. Perkins his Cases of Conscience, his Treatise of Callings, &c.best and religiousest Diuines resolue Cases of Conscience concerning Ciuill actions, by grounds of Reason, without allegation of any Scripture?

Yea but, saith M^r. B. need not a man know that he hath warrant from Gods word, if in his perswasion hee hauehave sufficient direction from naturall Reason? How doth this follow from ought that I say? If it doe not, as it doth not, I might well returne it to M^r. B. and request him to returne an answer to it himselfe. But I answer: If he be sure he hath, he may thereby know it, and need not therefore in that regard to seeke further for it, saue for the further strengthning of his faith, if some doubt should arise of it. If he be falsly perswaded of it, the case is all one, concerning direct warrant from the word. For be he falsly perswaded of sufficient direction either from naturall Reason, or the written word, aConscientia siquidem … non excusat.hee hath iust cause to looke further, though he be not aware of it.

But doth that Maxime, What is not of faith is …, intimate, that whatsoeuer is done by sufficient direction from naturall Reason is of Faith? Here is a new quare, that I am not bound to answer. Nor doe I, as M^r. B. would intimate, deduce any such thing from thence. Yet I say, that whatsoeuer is so done … of faith: because whatsoeuer is so done, as before was shewed, hath sufficient warrant from the word.

Yea but naturall Reason is not defectiue onelyonly, but corrupted also. What then? Is it so vtterly defaced that there is nothing left of it, that a man can hauehave any certainty at all of? bforeign. Epic…et. Arian. dissert. l. 2. c. 20. Oculos bi nobis effodiunt. Si Protagorae credimꝰ, nihil in natura rerum est nisi dubium. Si Nausiphani, hoc unum certum est nihil esse certi. Non facilè dix erim, utrum magis irascar illis, qui nos nihil scire voluerunt; an illis qui ne hoc quidem nobis reliquerunt, nihil scire, Sen. epist. 88.No Sect of Philosophers was euer held more absurd, than those that held that men had no certaine knowledge of any thing. For morall grounds it seemeth M^r. B. holdeth the same with them: at least without holding so, that that he holdeth here cannot be vpheld. For if naturall reason be so corrupted by the fall of our first Parents, that nothing can certainly be from thence concluded concerning the lawfulnesse or vnlawfulnesse of ought, then it is certaine that there is no certaine knowledge of ought in that kinde; and nothing is certaine therein, but that all things are vtterly and vniuersally vncertaine. That cHooker eccles. polit. lib. 2. sect. 8.reuerend Diuine before mentioned, hath not amisse obserued, what infinite perplexities, doubts, and scrupulosities will arise in mens mindes, and what stops and rubs will be cast into the course of mens liues, with the weaker and simpler sort especially, concerning their ordinarie and ciuill affaires, if this light be suppressed, and men should euer be constrained, though it burnt neuer so clearely, yet not to proceed by it in ought, till they had solemne accesse still vntounto the written word, and fetched light from some particular sentence in it, for the further confirmation of them therein. But I adde further; since that the most of mens particular actions, which they must hauehave ground for being infinite, are not expresly and precisely in the written word specified, and must therefore hauehave their warrant by consequences deducted from it, in which deduction, sometime dSo Mat. 22. 32. Galat. 3. 15, 17. 1 Cor. 9. 9, 10. Rom. 4. 3, 4. & 3. 10, 19, 20. Hebr. 8. 13.a naturall principle is ioyned with a testimonie of Scripture for the concluding of the thing questioned, and though eSo Gal. 3. 11, 12. Heb. 1. 4, 7, 8, 13, 14.two places of Scripture be produced for it, which being in a Syllogisticall forme ioyned together, may truly and infallibly conclude the point questioned, yet it is fVise Keckerman. praecogn. Logic. tract. 1. & in system. Logic. lib. 2. & 3. passim.naturall Reason that must iudge of the force and strength of the Argument; take we all certainty of iudicature from naturall Reason in such cases, and we shall hauehave no certainty left of the lawfulnesse of ought, that is not in expresse termes comprised in Scripture. I might well adde, that by this M^r. B^s. manner of reasoning, an vtter vncertainty might be concluded euen of all things contained in Scripture; at least to those that doe not exactly vnderstand the Originals: For if this Inference be sound, Naturall Reason is in part defectiue and corrupted: and therefore it cannot certainly informe vsus of ought: This must also of necessitie be allowed for a good Consequence; All Translations of Scripture are in part defectiue and corrupt: therefore nothing can certainly be learned out of them. Yea, EueryEvery mans skill in the Originals is in part defectiue and corrupt; and therefore no man can certainly gather ought thence. Let M^r. B. therefore, who professeth to hauehave his soule so much vexed with the fearefull doctrine that I here deliuer, take heed lest by that that he here maintaineth, he vex the soule and perplex the conscience of many a scrupulous Christian, and ensnarle them thereby in such inextricable difficulties, as he shall neuer be able with all the skill he hath to vnwinde them out of againe.

But he findeth me at last fainting and contradicting my selfe: and therefore all is now almost well againe. And wherein? Forsooth, because I affirme that the word doth not abridge vsus of the helpe and vse of naturall Reason for direction in such Actions. And how doth this contradict (for I thought it had confirmed) that which before I had deliuered? M^r. B. will make it cleare vntounto you.

For first when I affirme that the word doth not abridge vsus, I doe imply that it might abridge vsus, of such helpe. Is not this thinke you a strange Inference? As if when we say against gAct. 17. 18.the Stoicks, that hAffectus gratia moderatur, non aufert. Stultique erant Stoici, qui in eo toti erant, ut affectus omnes perimerent. Pet. Martyr in 2. Sam. 13. Facessat ergò inhumana illa philosophia, quae obtinere non potest, nisi hominem sensibus omnibus sp…liatum in stipitem redegerit. Calvin. instit. l. 3. c. 10. Quis foreign illā ubi nullus animū tangit affectus, stuporem immanem, qui nullo prorsus erigatur & excitetur, nullo flectatur atque inclinetur affectu, non omnibus vi…ijs judicet esse pejorem? Aug. de civil. l. 14. c. 9.Grace doth not strip men of humane affections; nor make them stocks and stones; we doe thereby imply, that Grace might strip them of it, and make meere blocks of them: As much to say, as that it might worke against it selfe, and the word worke against that end for which it was giuen. But this is too too senslesse.

Secondly, therefore our most warrantable way must then be to be well informed, when and how far the word giueth vsus leaue to vse it. How followeth this vponupon ought that I say, vnlesse this be a good consequence, Gods word doth not abridge vsus; Therefore it is the best way to be well informed, when and how far it doth. But to omit, that to say, that It is the warrantablest course to be well informed when and how far forth Gods word in matters concerning the Law of Nature, (for the iRom. 2. 14, 15.Morall Law is no other) giueth vsus liberty to make vse of true reason: Is as much as to say, that it is the warrantablest way to be well informed how far forth Gods word warranteth vsus to vse Logick in scanning of morall matters, or how farre forth it giueth vsus leaue to be reasonable creatures. Let M^r. B. hauehave what he would: what followeth hereupon? Why? If that be so then is my strange doctrine thereby contradicted. Which way, thinke we? Marke the Consequence; (though the Antecedent also follow not vponupon ought that I say:) It is the best way for vsus to know how the word giueth liberty to vse this direction. Therefore there is no vse of it for direction at all in this kinde. Nay rather, therefore there is some vse euen in this kinde of it; or else to what end is it to labour to be informed, when and how far forth, of that that is not at all. Whether doth this contradict now M. B. or me? Iudge, Reader.

But that which best is, M^r. B. hereby taketh occasion to ouer-slip whatsoeuer my margine here affordeth for the confirmation of mine opinion in this Point. How fitly, you shall see, if you obserue how it followeth. M^r. G. saith, The word abbridgeth vsus not of direction hereby: therefore it may abbridge: and therefore it is best to be informed how it abridgeth: and therefore M^r. G^s. doctrine is contradicted: and therefore I need answer none of his Arguments. Here are strange Ergoes. But where one hath no list to doe a thing, a small matter will serue to with-hold him. M^r. B. that was a little before so▪ curious in this Argument to pull in by head and eares eueryevery marginall note, though containing no matter of proofe, and drawne out of the Ciuill Code; is easily induced here to let passe the marginall quotations, where they containe matter of confirmation, though extracted out of holy writ. But yet by his leaue, thou shalt hauehave them; and iudge when thou hast them, whether M^r. B. had need to hauehave answered them or no.

First then, for the Point it selfe that I here hold; it is neither new nor strange. It is all one, saith kTertull. de coron. milit.Tertullian, whether a point be proued by Scripture or by Reason: thereby implying that what was allowable by the one, was warrantable also by the other.

Secondly, for the proofe of it, we hauehave it both from the practise and the doctrine of the Apostle Paul. First for his practise; lIdem de virg. veland.The Apostle, saith Tertullian, appealeth vntounto Nature. m1 Cor. 11. 13, 14.Doth not Nature, saith he, teach you? speaking of some comely and vncomely habits: as *foreign. Chrysost. in 1 Cor. hom. 26.by Nature both the comelinesse, and consequently the warrantablenesse of the one being iustified; and the vncomelinesse, and consequently also the vnwarrantablenesse of the other by the same also sufficiently detected. And againe, pleading to the Corinthians for the maintenance of the Ministerie, n1 Cor. 9. 7, 8.he vseth reasons drawne from the light of naturall reason in the first place; which yet it seemeth M^r. B. would controll him for, if any other should now doe.

Againe, Nature it selfe, saith oTertull. adv. Marc. l. b. 5.Tertullian, is in stead of the Law to those that are ignorant of it. pRom. 2. 14, 15.When the Gentiles, saith the Apostle, which hauehave not the Law, yet doe by Nature the things contained in the Law, they hauing not the Law are a Law to themselues. Which shew the effect of the Law written in their hearts, their Consciences also bearing witnesse, and their cogitations qforeign alternati…. Vet. Inter sese. Quomodo Virg. Illi inter sese multa vi brachia tollunt. P. scat.interchangeably excusing and accusing. And surely, if the Law of Nature written in mans duplicate page duplicate page heart be the very same so far forth as it is yet vndefaced, with the Law of God reuealed in the word: Then whatsoeuer by iust consequence of Reason may be deduced from the grounds yet in Nature remaining of the one, may be certainly knowne to be agreeable also vntounto the other.

And thus we hauehave at length got out of this intricate Labyrinth which M^r. B. hath drawne or rather withdrawne vsus into. If the Point were so perilous, as he here pretendeth, and it vexed his soule in such manner as he here professeth, it had beene a charitable worke, I deeme, both to me and himselfe, to hauehave let me seene it before this, especially so instantly requiring the same, and so to hauehave freed his soule sooner from this grieuous vexation. But for the Point it selfe; rAdor… Scripturae plenitudinem. Tertull. adv. Hermogē.I adore, with Tertullian, the plenitude of Gods word, as much as M^r. B. or any other man doth. I acknowledge it with Chrysostome, and Augustine, to be sforeign. Chrysost. in 2 Cor. hom. 13.a most perfect and absolute Rule, tIn his quae apertè posita sunt in Scriptura inveniuntur illa omnia, quae cō tinent fidem moresque vivendi. Aug. de doctr. Christ. l. 2. c. 9.containing in it all things necessarie vntounto faith and good life. I should grieue at the heart to hauehave vttered the least tittle that should tend to the derogation either of it, or ought in it. If uReprehe…ures enim non audio; sequor magistros. Hieron. apolog. prolib. in Iovin.I may be shewed that I hauehave so done in ought, I will readily recant it. Concerning this Point in particular, (besides those that viewed the whole worke, & aduertised me what they wished to hauehave altered, which was not much, nor materiall) I had conference with xM^r. W. Bradshaw.one not vnknowne to M^r. B. whom I hauehave before named in this Booke, as iudicious and as precise in his iudgement as the most; who not only concurred with me in it, making no doubt at all of it; but withall told how he was oft troubled to satisfie some in their Cases propounded vntounto him, though he gaue them neuer so good reason for his resolution, because they would not therewith be satisfied, vnlesse he could produce some place of Scripture for eueryevery particular. But let the wise and learned iudge: and if I may from them be informed that I hauehave herein erred, I will say as he did, yErrare possum, Haereticus esse nolo.Erre I may, but an Heretike I will not be; I will not be obstinate in mine error; I will retract it: which I may well, without the least preiudice to the maine matter in Question, which it nothing concerneth, and will stand therefore well enough without it. But *Ad pensum redeamus. Cic. de Orat. l. 3.returne we to our taske.

I. B.

So then I proceed to the Assumption of the maine Argument. In the former part whereof it is to be denied (as was said before) that eueryevery Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe. For as a Diuinatorie by him, Cap. 11. so a lusorious Lot by me and others is denied to be a thing lawfull in it selfe.

T. G.

To passe by the strange manner of speech, that EueryEvery Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe: which I suppose none but M^r. B. will vse. That a Lot is a thing of it selfe indifferent, and consequently lawfull in it selfe, was before shewed. But I hauehave nothing here to say to it: for in mine Assumption there is no mention of it. M^r. B. must answer, if he will, for his owne Argument.

I. B.

More clearely to answer the other part. It is to be obserued, that in this large Argument, it cannot be gathered what M^r. G. meaneth by Subiect Matter. So the mind of the Reader may be troubled with words, which Acts 15. 24.ought not to be. But by that which he writeth, p. 230. I vnderstand, hee meaneth the matter whereabout the Lottery is imployed. If so, I affirme that the subiect matter of a Lot is determined by God, namely, A controuersie to be ended thereby: and therefore I also affirme, lusorious businesse (to vse M^r. G^s. owne word, p. 130.) to be a subiect matter of a Lot, no lesse against the generall Rules of the Word, than was the finding out of Ionas in M^r. G^s. iudgement, p. 278. If then a lusorious Lot be not a thing lawfull in it selfe, and if Lusorious busines be a subiect matter of a Lot, that is against the generall Rules, then how can the manner and other circumstances, though neither determined, nor forbidden, be sufficient warrant for the vse of a lusorious Lot.

T. G.

Not to say, how fitly the place of Scripture in the Margine is here applied. For the simple Reader, if a man should stand to explaine eueryevery Schoole terme, that, in such discourses and disputes as this, we are inforced oft to vse, it would be a very tedious taske both to Writer and Reader. Nor doth M^r. B. himselfe obserue that Rule that he would tie others to: For doth he not oft speake of maior, minor, proposition, assumption, mood and figure; Sub, prae, prima, &c. neuer informing his Reader what thereby is meant. But is it possible that so learned a man as M^r. B. should not vnderstand what so familiar and ordinary a Logicall terme as the Subiect Matter is, meaneth? But it is yet more strange that M^r. B. should not vnderstand what himselfe saith. For this Assumption he speaketh of, is not mine but his owne: nor doe I here speake any one word of the Subiect Matter of Lottery: it is himselfe onelyonly that doth it. Which Subiect Matter whether it be, as he saith, determined to be such as he here saith, shall in his due place appeare. No more for the present, but that this Assumption I owne not, and therefore need take no care for it, whether it fall or stand, so far forth as it commeth here in question.

I. B.

Let vsus try the force of the Assumptions confirmation. It is true, that Recreation in generall, indefinitely vnderstood, is warranted by Gods Word. But I beleeue M^r. G. will not affirme all recreations taken vp by men to be so warranted. Yes, (saith M^r. G.) we may recreate our selues with anything, that is not against the generall rules; because touching things wherewith we may recreate, there is nothing determined.

T. G.

That which indeed was mine Assumption, M^r. B. hath now at length by good hap light vponupon. But knowing not well how to bring it otherwise in, he maketh it the Confirmation of mine Assumption, that is the confirmation of it selfe. Or rather, according to M^r. B^s. analysis and resolution of mine Argument, (which was not yet so hard to be brought into forme) the confirmation not of mine, but of his owne Assumption: and so the Argument should thus stand;

Recreation in generall is warranted, and … particular manner of it prescribed, &c. Therefore a Let is a thing lawfull in it selfe, and the subiect matter and manner &c. are not determined by Gods word, nor against the generall Rules.

You need not maruell why M^r. B. de…ieth not this Consequence▪ albeit it be most senslesse. For if he should, he knoweth not any that would vndertake to defend it, but turne it home to him the true fether indeed of it.

But as he dealeth with me for mine Arguments; so he doth the like with his owne inferences. He doth not beleeue, he saith, that I will defend all recreations taken vp by men to be warrantable. And yet as controlling himselfe herein, he saith, Yes. What is that but as much as, he doth? Now how proueth hee this grosse Calumnie? Thus forsooth. M^r. G. saith, we may recreate our selues with any thing that is not against the generall Rules. And doth he that saith so, defend that All recreations taken vp by men are allowable? This is *foreign. Plato de rep. l. 8. & Euseb. adv. Hierocl. Vel caeco appareat. Liv▪ hist. l. 31.so palpable, that a man though starke blinde, yet might feele it with fingers.

I. B.

Of this …uasion, [Not against] I need not speake at this instant.

T. G.

No: we hauehave had more then enough of it already too oft.

I. B.

But touching things not determined, so much incule… ted. I aske whether things must be determined particularly, or by name, or else, if not so forbidden, they are lawfull. If so, why doth M^r. G. (speaking of diuers particulars) as of a Key and a Booke, of a paire of sheeres, and a sieue, and such like, so earnestly aske, Are they any where found reuealed in the Word of God? Where he is of another mind then here, arguing thus: Not found there commanded or permitted; therefore vnlawfull. If it be said, not so found there, to find out a thiefe. I then say, Neither are Lots so found there for recreation.

T. G.

What I meane by determined, may easily appeare by the instances giuen of aExod. 12. 6.the Passeouer tied to a certaine time, and the bDeut. 12. 8, 9.sacrifices restrained to some one certaine place; to wit, stinted to some one or more particular matter, manner, time, place, &c. as on the other side, by not determined, such as are left free without such speciall restraint, as the free-will offerings, vowes, &c.

For the Obiection here brought, we had it once before; and there it was answered. Neither doth M^r. B. cite my words there vsed sincerely, but as he is wont: And the place it selfe, had he not clipt the tongue of it, would without further helpe hauehave afforded him an answer: to wit, that such Lots diuinatorie must hauehave some speciall institution, because that is required of them, which by no naturall power that either is in them, or man can adde to them, they are able to effect. Let M^r. B. prooue as much by the sporting Lot; and there an end.

I. B.

But if by not determined, he meant, Things wherewith we may recreate, are not determined in the Word, either expresly, or by iust consequence, then, whosoeuer saith so, if he be wise, will adde [so far as I doe remember and know.] For who can remember all the sentences of holy Scriptures, and know all iust Consequences, that may be made from them? If he thus adde, then his Negation is of no validity; but he himselfe is too bold in denying, vponupon presumption, that another remembreth and knoweth no more than he.

T. G.

Here M^r. B. thinketh he hath got me on the hip. And either he will condemne me of great presumption and want of much wisdome, or else ouerthrow the maine strength of mine Argument. That concerning recreation therefore there are no speciall rules prescribed in Scripture, whereby it is stinted to this or that particular matter, and is therefore (as from Caluin before was well and truly affirmed) to be directed by the generals; it that which I affirme, and Peter Martyr with me; as by my Margine (which M^r. B. had no list, it seemeth, to take notice of) may appeare.

Yea but no man without presumption, saith M^r. B. may so affirme, vnlesse he put in this exception, so far as I know or I remember▪ Besides that Peter Martyr then was too presumptuous in this very particular: Our Diuines that deale with the Papists are very^b Per Scripturam sanctū convinci non potest Petrum suisse Romanum Episcopum, aut unquam Romae suisse. Mars…l. Pasav. defens. pac. part. 2. c. 16. far ouer-seene; with whom these assertions are so frequent and vsuall, aQuinque spuria illa Sacramenta cū omnibus suis ritibus & ceremonijs, sine verbo Dei addita. Confess. Scotic. Verbo Dei destitui. Calvin. instit. l. 4. c. 19. §. 3.That … … … Sacrament, there is no Scripture for it; That Pen…nce, or Orders, or extreame Vnction, is a Sacrament, cannot out of Gods word be proued▪ … … Peter was euer at Rome, or was Bishop there, or that he had a superioritie of power and authoritie aboue the rest of the Apostles; or that the Pope succeedeth him either in his seate or in such right, cannot be made good out of Gods word. And againe, cNo place of Scripture can be shewed, where Christ or his Apostles hath bound vsus to it. White way to Church, digress. 33. Non est Dei verbo praescriptura. Calvin. inst…t. lib. 3. c. 4. §. 8. Non habet Scripturae testimonium. Ex Scriptura probari non potest. Chem…it. exam. Conc. Trid. part. 2.for a man to repaire to the Sacrament vnshriuen; to eat flesh in Lent, &c. are not against any word of God. Yea this is a generall plea with them against most of the Popish superstitions, dThe most and greatest points of their religion, euen well nigh all wherein they dissent from vsus, hauehave no foundation in the Scriptures. White ibid. sect. 5. nur…. 8.that there is no ground for them in Gods word. Whereas if they had consulted with M^r. B. before-hand, they should hauehave beene better aduised, and hauehave added alwaies this exception; So far as I know or remember: and so giuen their Aduersaries iust cause to hauehave laught at them for their labour▪ Where obserue we withall, what aduantage M^r. B. here giueth to the Aduersarie, when he shall be pressed with ought in this kinde. For tell we one of them, that for a man to refuse Shrift is not against ought in Gods word: After aduice had with M^r. B. hee may soone shape you an answer, that you are very presumptuous so to say: for can you, or any man else, remember all the sentences in Scripture, or know all iust consequences that may be made from them? Which if it be a sound and sufficient answer, surely for many points of Popery, as some of their new Sacraments, &c. we must lay our hands vponupon our mouthes, and let them alone with them, for ought that I see. As if the Scripture were so vaste and diffused a peece of worke, that a man could not, without he had such an infinite memorie and an vniuersall vnderstanding, tell what were of some particular subiects deliuered in each part of it. Yea what a miserable perplexitie doth M^r. B. by this meanes plung Christian meny Consciences into, the more scrupulous sort especially, when for particular ciuill actions of ordinarie vse, their scrupulous hearts causlesly mouing doubt of them, hauing searched to and fro in Gods Booke, though they can finde nothing at all that may controll them in the vse of them, yet they shall still be perplexed, because M^r. B. hath here informed them, that there may yet be somewhat in Gods word against them, neither can they, doe they what they can, hauehave any assurance of the contrary, vnlesse they had such memories and vnderstandings as M^r. B. here speaketh of? I cannot here passe by a passage of M^r. Caluins concerning such scruples; eCalvin. instit. l. 3. c. 19. §. 7.These and the like, saith he, se…me friuolous trifles: but there is more in them than men are commonly aware of. For when mens Consciences are once in this manner ens… red, they enter into a long and an intricase Labyr…th, from whence it is no easie mut…er to get out againe. fSi dubitare …eperit, an lino uti liceat, nec de cannabe … securus erit, … & de stupis incidet dubitatio.If a man shall begin to doubt, whether he may vse flax, or linne… made thereof, in his sheets, shirts, handkerchefs, towels, table-napkins, &c. he will not long ofter hauehave the like scruple of hempe; and after that of towe too. And he will begin to thinke whether he may not dine and sup without any Table-cloth or napkins▪ at all▪ and so consequently whether he may vse them or no, when he may well enough be without. Yea gDenique coveniet, ut super transversam, quod dicitur, festucam incedere nefas ducat.at length, saith he, you shall hauehave a man come to that passe, that he will thinke it a sinne (… … say) to stride ouer a straw. Such height of superstition men grow vntounto▪ when way is giuen to such frin…lous scruples, which yet M^r. B. here ministreth much matter vntounto. For suppose we one of these scrupulous Christians, yea or any other, should repaire to M^r. B. and moue this as a doubt to him, whether it be lawfull for him to weare band and cuffs either of cambricke or holland, and M^r. B. hauing affirmed that it is, he should demand of him, what warrant out of Gods word he could furnish him with for it. Answer him this way, that Apparell in generall is inioyned, and for the matter of it there is no speciall direction of restraint giuen in the word, and therefore liberty left for any that is not against the generall Rules in the word, of decencie, modestie, frugalitie, &c. resoluing him of such as doubt or question may be moued of: and it is not vnlikely but you may giuegive him good satisfaction therein. Whereas goe M^r. B^s. way and tell him, that though apparell it selfe be allowed, yet whether the matter of it be determined or no, neither he nor any man can say, vnlesse he had all the Bible, and whatsoeuer is contained in it, or may be deduced from it, in his head: I suppose you will be so far from giuing him any good satisfaction, that you will leaue him more perplexed than you found him at first. I propound somewhat of this kinde in pursuit of mine Argument, which M^r. B. misdoubting he might run a ground there, slily saileth by, and not so much as once taketh notice of. Either he medleth with the Conclusion, and passeth by the premises: Or hee frameth me such matter of confirmation as hee pleaseth, and letteth passe that that I propound. I demand then, rubbing vp M^r. B^s. memorie a little, as before in my Booke, what other proofe can be brought for the iustifying of Bowles or Chesse-play, than such as is here propounded, which it behoued him to hauehave answered if he knew any better, considering that the instance was of much more moment for the clearing and confirming of this branch of mine Assumption, than many things that it hath pleased him to be pidling withall.

For the thing it selfe: First, it is well knowne, that for many Heads, or Common places, what is found in the word may soone be laid all together, as for games, for markets, for mariage-feasts, for Lots, and the like: by consideration whereof a man may oft be informed what is in Gods word either for or against them. Secondly, such things as require a speciall Institution, (and of this kinde must a Lot be, if it be a diuine Oracle, and an immediate iudgement and sentence of God, as M^r. B. pretendeth that it is) the matter is much more obuious. Speciall Institutions in the word are as starres of the chiefe magnitude, so eminent and conspicuous, that they cannot easily lie hid, nor need ouer-much search, and a man may boldly say therefore of such and such things, that there is no speciall institution of them in the word. Thirdly, for morall matters, wee may draw to a neerer scantling than the bodie of the whole Bible; hExod. 20. Deut. 5.the Summe of all is comprised in the Decalogue, and whatsoeuer a man is sure to be against none of those iExod 34. 28. Deut. 10. 4.ten Words, or to come yet to a narrower compasse, against neither kDeut. 6. 5. Levit. 19. 18. Luk. 10. 27, 28.Piety, nor Charitie, the Summe of the lExod. 24. 12. & 31. 18.two Tables, hee may surely know not to be against mMatth. 22. 37, 38, 39, 40. Mark. 10. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34.any part of Gods word, and consequently to hauehave nothing in Gods word against it, though hee hauehave not such a vaste capacitie of vnderstanding or memory, as M^r. B. here requireth. But consider the whilst what an nforeign.vtter vncertaintie and irresolution in this kinde M^r. B. driueth vsus hereunto: For by his grounds a man may not safely say, that There is nothing against wearing of an Hat in Gods word; vnlesse he know all consequences that may be deduced from this Sentence of Scripture, oGen. 1. 1.In the beginning God made Heauen and Earth. For if he must needs know so much of all, that may safely say so of ought, then of that in particular, that being one of those all.

I. B.

At last let vsus religiously consider the generall Rules so oft spoken of, and we shall finde, that M^r. G. should hauehave done well not to hauehave pleased Libertines by pleading Not against, but to hauehave giuen the word due honour by saying with M^r. Caluin. [The vse of things is to be limited according to the generall rules.] For these rules require Decency, Expediency, and Piety, and therefore they are not obeyed by the vse of things not vndecent, not inexpedient, and not impious. For it is to be noted, that in 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Paul saith not, All things are lawfull, but some things are inexpedient; but in both places thus; All things are lawfull, but all are not expedient.

T. G.

Of this distinction we heard before, and answer thereunto was there giuen. Yet lest I seeme to passe by so graue and serious obseruations with silence,

First, if those rules require more than not vndecent, not inexpedient, &c. then whatsoeuer is not more than so, is against those rules, and is no more by M^r. G. allowed than by M^r. B. himselfe, for ought that M^r. G. here saith: which M^r. B. also might soone see, if he knew what he would hauehave. And therefore his, It is to be noted, might very well hauehave been spared, for any hurt it doth M^r. G^s. cause, if that be all that it proue.

Againe, though this might suffice to keepe M^r. B^s. exception from fastning on ought that I say: Yet let vsus see of what weight his annotation here is. The Apostle saith not, Some things are inexpedient, but, all things are not expedient. Why? what difference is there in the Apostles meaning here betweene these two? Heare we the exposition of aTh. Morton. è Coll. Christi Cantabrig.as acute and iudicious a writer as the most of those that these times of ours hauehave afforded vsus, though one that liued in much obscuritie; bIn 1 Cor. 6. 12.on the former place of the Apostle he thus paraphraseth his words, If we Christians ought to be so carefull in cherishing and improuing piety, cVt vel à licito rerum usu pietati officiente abstinendum putemus.that we deeme our selues restrained euen from the lawfull vse of things that hurt or hinder piety, how much ought we to abstaine from things of their owne nature and eueryevery way vnlawfull. dIn 1 Cor. 10. 23.On the other place yet more plainly: But all things are not expedient: ei. at quarundam rerum usus interdū incommodus & noxius est.that is, but the vse of some things is sometimes incommodious and harmfull to a Christian man, in that that concerneth the defence and iner ease of his faith and piety, and the furtherance of his eternall safety. For it is not to be expected from earthly things, of which the Apostle principally here speaketh, such as are meat and drinke, that they should directly further our saluation: it is enough if they be not an impediment thereunto. And againe afterward: fQuod non aedificat. i. quod fratris fidei, pietati, & saluti impedimento est.That doth not edifie; that is, is an hinderance to our brothers faith, piety, and safety. As for decencie and indecencie; piety and impiety, in actions capable of either, M^r. B. may as soone gforeign. Insec…bilia secare.diuide the point of a Spanish neeale, as assigne any medium betweene the one and the other. Meane while M^r. B. hath set a new snare here to intangle and snarle scrupulous Consciences in. For though no indecency can be discouered in some kinde of attire, yet if they hEt Magis audiendū quàm auscultandum censeo: Vti de Ariolis Pacuv. Chryse. apud Cic. de divin. l. 1. de Pharmacopolis Cato in Coelium apud Gell. noct. Attic. l. 1. c. 15.heare M^r. B. they shall hang, vponupon this new conceit of his, still in suspence, whether it may be auowed to be decent or no. I might adde, that with much difficultie and no little adoe they must hauehave it proued to them by some sentence of Scripture, (which I would faine heare M^r. B. performe) for no reason will serue else, that it is so.

I. B.

Let vsus consider these rules yet somewhat more neerely to the point. Touching the first: The words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 14. 40. be these. [Let all things be done honestly, and by order.] In which is no intimation that all things are in themselues lawfull to be done, which are done honestly and by order: but a charge, that all things, be they in themselues neuer so lawfull, be done honestly and by order. Those drinke offerings to Bacchus, commonly called Healths, per antiphrasin, are solemnized sometimes with standing, sometimes with kneeling, alwaies with putting off hats, and some speech more or lesse: are they acceptable to God, because they are thus orderly carried? If not, then be Lots and the vsers of them in gaming neuer so orderly disposed, yet are they not therefore iustified.

T. G.

M^r. B^s. taske is to instance if he meane to doe ought, against what generall Rule of Gods word a lusorious Lot is; for that is the issue that we now are at. But in stead thereof M^r. B. telleth vsus that that no man denies, that if it be in it selfe vnlawfull, it is not the more iustifiable, because it is not against this first rule of order. And what is this to the purpose? I iforeign. Plut. foreign. vel quod Rufino Hieron. Manū posceris, & pedem porrigis. Vel Academico Domino si serviret, facturum quod se Epictetus profitetur, foreign. Arian. dissert. l. 2. c. 20.aske for a pickaxe, and M^r. B. reacheth me a spade. This is mine Argument, Game in generall being allowed, and no particular matter or manner of it prescribed, any is lawfull that is not against the generall rules of Gods word: But Lottery is such, to wit, not against any generall Rule of Gods word: therefore Lottery is lawfull. That it is of it selfe lawfull is the Conclusion; that it is not against any generall rule of Gods word is the Assumption. M^r. B. denieth the Conclusion; saith it is vnlawfull; and that it cannot be made lawfull, though it be not against some one such Rule. What manner of answering call we this, wherein nothing is denied or answered to, but that that indeed ought neuer to be denied?

I. B.

Touching the second Rule. It is true, That all things must be expedient, that is, edifie, 1 Cor. 10. 23. Therefore they sinne who stumble or offend a brother, that is, occasion him to fall or be made weake, Rom. 14 13, 21. But lusorious Lots occasion thousands to fall into sinne, and to be weake in goodnesse. Therefore they doe not edifie, and therefore are not expedient.

T. G.

Here M^r. B. speaketh somewhat to the purpose indeed, if his Answer could be made good. For he saith, that a lusorious Lot is against this second Rule. But how proueth he it? Because lusorious Lots occasion thousands to fall into sinne, and grow weake in goodnesse. What doth eueryevery Lot vsed in game doe so? Make that good and take all. Let M^r. B. proue, that eueryevery Lot vsed in game, as for example sake, eueryevery shuffling of arrowes, or choise of pawnes hid in the hand to decide leading, or eueryevery game that children play at, euen and odde, heads and points, &c. doth occasion thousands, or some one at least or other to fall into sinne, or grow weake in goodnesse, and I will yeeld all lusorious Lots to be vnlawfull. If he cannot, he must no more condemne all lusorious Lots, because where they are abused they produce such effects, then all vse of boules for disport in generall, because bouling abused doth altogether as much.

I. B.

Concerning the third Rule, Let all things be done to Gods glory, 1 Cor. 10. 31. Is this to Gods glory, to vse his Name in any other case, than wherein God is well pleased his Name should be vsed, and then to take that Name in vaine? Is tempting of God any glory to God? But playing with a Lot is to vse Gods name in another case, than wherein God is well pleased his Name should be vsed; and then also to take that Name in vaine: and it is a grieuous tempting of God, as shall be proued. Therefore playing with a Lot is not to Gods glory, and by consequence not agreeable to religion and piety.

T. G.

This is, to vse M^r. B^s. terme, the kill-cow indeed. But all that here a sporting Lot is charged with, is yet to be proued. It shall be, M^r. B. saith. In good time; but till then kNihil dicitur fuisse factum, quamdiu aliquid agendū superest. Reg. Iur.nothing is done. Nor is it true that M^r. B. saith in the next words, vnlesse what shall be done, be done already.

I. B.

Though it be sufficiently proued that lusorious Lots are directly against two of the generall Rules; and not warranted by the third: So that M^r. G. hath not bettered his cause by appealing to them.

T. G.

How sufficiently M. B. hath proued this, whatsoeuer he will doe; I hauehave shewed: lforeign. Aristoph. thesmoph…r.Nor is my cause yet any thing hereby impeached, vntill more be brought against it, than as yet is.

I. B.

Yet it is to be obserued, that all the Rules require Things and Actions to be according to them. But M^r. G. by onelyonly speaking of them, would iustifie circumstances, and meanes of playing with Lots, if (forsooth) they be not against them.

T. G.

Of that friuolous exception, and distinction of according to them, and not against them, enough already hath beene said.

For the rest here obiected, that by onelyonly speaking of them, I would iustifie circumstances and meanes of playing with Lots, if they be not against them, albeit neither I, nor any man else, I beleeue, besides M^r. B. himselfe, vnderstandeth well what it meaneth: yet to cleare my selfe from such aspersion, as it may seeme to cast on me; I will briefly relate the summe of mine Argument reduced into due forme. Thus then it standeth:

Any meanes or manner of recreation that is not against the generall Rules of Gods word, these and the like, is allowable. Lottery is such a meanes of recreation as is not against any of the generall rules of Gods word, these or the like. Lottery therefore is a meanes of recreation allowable.

The Proposition I thus proued:

Where a thing is allowed, and the meanes, manner, and other circumstances are not in particular determined; there is any meanes or manner of it allowed that is not against those generals. But such is recreation: for it is allowed in generall, nor are the meanes, and manner, and other circumstances of it determined in particular. Any meanes or manner of it therefore is allowed that is not against the generall rules of Gods word.

In explication of the first Proposition, I relate those Rules: For confirmation of the Assumption, … require to be nominated, against what generall rule Lottery vsed in game doth offend. Now let M^r. B. shew which way herein I offend.

I. B.

Thus hauing euidently shewed the Reasons inducing (not drawing) M^r. G. to allow lusorious Lots, to be …oth fearefull; as these euasiue speeches, [Not euill in themselues] [Not prohibited] [Not determined] and [Not against the generall Rules] doe import; and otherwise vnsound; I will (with Gods helpe I hope) reply vponupon M^r. G^s. answers to mine Arguments against playing with Lots contained in my Dialogue.

T. G.

How well M^r. B. hath quit himselfe in this his opposition, there will no doubt, I see, be made, if he may be his owne Iudge. But if his mDextra sinistram meliorem & gladio scutum habere dicebantur, qui sua melius defenderent, quàm aliena impugnarent.left hand steed him no better than his right, nor his shield doe him more pleasure than his sword hath, I doubt much whether his Reader will receiue from him any good satisfaction, howsoeuer he may therein please and sooth vp himselfe. As there is seldome nAutor laudat opus. Ovid. de Pont. l. 3. el. 9. Quidni? Scruta quidem ut vendat s…rutarius laudat. Lucill. apud Gell. l. 3. c. 13. Sed & suum cuique pulchrum. Cic. Tusc. l. 5. foreign. Aristot. ethic. l. 9. c. 7.any workman but liketh well of his owne worke.

THE THIRD PART. M^r. BALMFORDS Arguments against Games consisting in or depending vponupon Chance, taken out of his Dialogue. Together with M^r. GATAKERS Answer to them in his Booke of the Nature and Vse of LOTS. As also M^r. B^s. Reply in defence of them: and M^r. G^s. Reioinder thereunto.

A Just Defense of Certain Passages, Part 2 · Argument 6

p. 110The sixth Argument.

p. 163THE THIRD PART. Mr. BALMFORDS Arguments against Games consisting in or depending vponupon Chance, taken out of his Dialogue. Together with Mr. GATAKERS Answer to them in his Booke of the Nature and Vse of LOTS. As also Mr. Bs. Reply in defence of them: and Mr. Gs. Reioinder thereunto.

The sixth Argument.

THE THIRD PART. M^r. BALMFORDS Arguments against Games consisting in or depending vponupon Chance, taken out of his Dialogue. Together with M^r. GATAKERS Answer to them in his Booke of the Nature and Vse of LOTS. As also M^r. B^s. Reply in defence of them: and M^r. G^s. Reioinder thereunto.