A Just Defense of Certain Passages, Part 3 · Argument 1
The first Argument.
WHatsoeuer directly, or of it selfe, orI. B. Dialog. Arg. 1. in a speciall manner tendeth to the aduancing of Gods name is to be vsed religiously nMala. 1. 6, 7., and not to be vsed in sport; as we may not pray or sweare in sport: oExod. 20. 7. Esai. 29. 13. Ierem. 4. 2.But the vse of Lots directly, or of it selfe and in speciall manner tendeth to the aduancing of the name of God in attributing to his speciall Prouidence in the whole and immediate disposing of the Lot, and expecting the euent pProv. 16. 33. Act. 1. 24, 26..
Therefore the vse of Lots is not to be in sports.
I answer: The Assumption is not true if it be vnderstoodT. G. Answer. Of Lots, chap. 7. Sect. 5. vniuersally: it concludeth nothing to the Question if it be taken particularly.
The proofe annexed to it scarce carrieth good sense: the Printer, it may be, is in fault. But if the meaning of the Author be, as I conceiue it, (for I must in part goe by guesse) that the disposition of eueryevery Lot is wholly attributed to, and the euent wholly expected from the speciall and immediate Prouidence of God; I denie it, neither doe the places produced proue it. The fProv. 16. 33.former of them, concerning ordinary Lots, or Lots in generall, was examined and answered sufficiently before.
The gAct. 1. 24, 26.latter is an example of an extraordinary Lot, wherein there was indeed an immediate and speciall prouidence. But hVise Hieron. sup. §. 4. Sic & Greg. in Ezech. homil. 4. Aliud est quod de doctrinae usu atque disciplinae dicimus, aliud quod de miraculo scimus.extraordinary examples make no generall rules. Neither is it a good course of arguing, to reason from the speciall, or a singular, to the generall and vniuersall; much lesse from one extraordinarie act or euent, to all ordinarie courses of the same kinde. Herein is the difference betweene the one and the other, betweene the extraordinarie Lot, wherein there is an immediate hand of God for speciall purpose, and the ordinarie Lot, wherein there is not; that the one could not but fall certainly, were it neuer so oft cast, as in the Lots vsed for the discouery of iIosh. 7. 16, 17, 18.Achan and kIon. 1. 7.Ionas, and in the election of l1 Sam. 10. 20, 21.Saul and mAct. 1. 23, 24, 25, 26.Matthias, and the like: whereas the other cast oft in the same case, as for partition of goods and chatels descending by inheritance vponupon, or bought in common by diuers, would not constantly and certainly fall out still the same.
The Assumption vnderstood generally is true: and I. B. Reply.the places quoted make good the proofe thereof, as shall be made manifest.
This is said; but should be done. But Mr. B.T. G. Reioinder. hauing said, it shall be, presently slincketh away from it: nor doth euer after doe what here he vndertaketh, vnlesse it be by saying that it is manifest to all that will see, that it is so as he saith.
I. B.
First therefore let vsus consider the supposed distinction betweene ordinarie and extraordinarie Lots. Mr. G. speaketh of a distinction, but sheweth not wherein (touching the Lots themselues) it doth consist. Indeed touching themselues (as they be Lots) there is no difference. For in an ordinary, as well as an extraordinary Lot, the things are by man of purpose intentionally disposed vntounto a variable euent, and they are wholly disposed by God vntounto this or vntounto that euent, which the vser of a Lot expecteth. If so, then it followeth, that the vse of all Lots (as they be Lots) whether ordinarie or extraordinarie, directly or of it selfe, and in speciall manner, tendeth to the aduancing of the name of God. How? The vse of Lots attributeth to Gods speciall prouidence in the whole and immediate disposing of the Lot, and in expecting the euent. Doth this scarce carry good sense?
T. G.
Against the proofe of the proofe of Mr. Bs. assumption, from Act. 1. 24, 26. I obiect two things:
1. That it is but one particular example, and therefore cannot proue a generall. To which exception Mr. B. here answereth not a word; and the exception therefore standeth good still; and is enough to infringe the validitie of all proofe drawne here from that place.
2. That it is of an extraordinary Lot: and from extraordinarie actions, much more from some one of them to conclude of all ordinarie, is an vnreasonable kinde of reasoning. And indeed it is as if a man should thus reason; There was a speciall hand of God in Pharaohs aGen. 41. 19, 25.dreame: There is the like therefore in all dreames whatsoeuer. Or, bExod. 3. 2.The Bush was holy that God appeared to Moses in; And therefore eueryevery common Hawthorne is holy. So, The Lot whereby Matthias was elected, was by Gods speciall prouidence immediatly disposed: Therefore the like is in eueryevery Lot.
Now Mr. B. that he might seeme to say somewhat to this at least; Saith that I deliuer a distinction of Lots ordinarie and extraordinarie, but shew not wherein touching the Lots themselues it consisteth. He that readeth cOf Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 1. & chap. 10. sect. 1.my Booke may soone see where I define either, what difference I assigne betweene them: and Mr. B. himselfe in part also hereafter acknowledgeth it.
Yea but saith he so far forth as they are Lots, there is no difference betweene them. No reason there should; for the same generall nature of a Lot is common to both: as the same nature of a dreame is common to all dreames: the same nature of a bush is common to all bushes. Nor did Pharaohs dreame, as it was a dreame, differ from other dreames: nor that holy bush, as it was a bush, differ from any other bush.
But what is the common nature of a Lot? Heare Mr. B. himselfe, and he will tell you truly and fully else-where, that dBalmford. Dialog.it is the variable euent of some sensible thing applied to the determining of some doubtfull matter. But because that will not here serue his turne, he changeth his note now, and maketh this the generall nature of a Lot common to all Lots, (begging withall pitifully that that is in controuersie) that things be by man of purpose intentionally disposed vntounto a variable euent, and wholly disposed by God vntounto this or that euent, which the vser of a Lot expecteth. That which is so far from being the common nature of a Lot, that neither the one branch, nor the other is common to all Lots, much lesse both iointly together. For neither is it true, that in eueryevery Lot things are by man disposed to a variable euent: as where a controuersie is put to be decided by the track and turning of some beast that hath passed before: nor are the things by man disposed in Lot, by God euer wholly and immediatly disposed, as in the proofe of his Assumption is affirmed, and here onelyonly repeated; and much lesse are they euer disposed to such euent, as by the vsers of the Lot is expected, but rather cleane contrary sometime, as in eEster 3. 7, 13.Hamans example. But if it be so in all Lots, saith Mr. B. then mine Assumption is true. That is as much as to say, if you grant me what I affirme in the proofe of mine Assumption, though I barely repeat it onelyonly, and doe not at all proue it; then mine Assumption standeth firme; to wit, that a Lot doth directly or of it selfe and in speciall manner tend to the aduancing of the name of God, in attributing to his speciall prouidence in the whole and immediate disposing of the Lot, and in expecting the euent. Which by the way he demandeth, whether it scarce carry good sense or no: because I said it scarce did, being withall willing to salue the matter by supposing that the Printer might be in fault. But I see now, Mr. B. will take it vponupon himselfe; and I must shew reason for what I said. What others therefore may deeme of it I know not. But I supposed the word, to attribute, to be a verbe transitiue, requiring somewhat therefore to be expressed that should be attributed, as well as some thing or person to which or whom it should be attributed; which in Mr. Bs. words doth not appeare. It were senslesse for any man to say, that hee doth in his words and deeds attribute to God, not expressing ought that he doth therein attribute vntounto him. But let vsus heare Mr. B. further.
I. B.
Is there then no difference betweene an ordinary, and extraordinary Lot? The only difference is the Subiect matter whereabout the Lot is imployed. The subiect matter of an ordinary Lot, is by Gods allowance, a controuersie to be ended. The subiect matter of an extraordinary Lot, is any other matter, whereabout a Lot is imployed by Gods speciall direction: otherwise it is vnlawfull, as be lusorious and diuinatory Lots.
T. G.
I might well fSupervacua enim refutare, nullius artis est. Quintil. instit. l. 5. c. 13.let all this wild discourse passe; since it is nothing at all to the purpose, neither to the iustifying of his Assumption, nor of the proofe of it; yet since he saith it, we will see what he saith. That there is difference betweene an ordinary and extraordinary Lot, in regard of the subiect matter, is most true, but no such difference as Mr. B. here assigneth. gOf Lots, chap. 4. sect. 1. & chap. 10. sect. 1.What it is I shew where I handle the nature of either. But that the subiect matter of an ordinarie Lot is euer some controuersie, is not true, as I hauehave formerly shewed: nor if it were so, did it hinder, but that the Lot vsed in sport might be an ordinarie Lot, since that a controuersie is thereby also oft times ended. And againe, that no controuersie, but some other matter is the subiect matter of an extraordinarie Lot, is also as vntrue: since that a controuersie also may and oft is the subiect matter of it also. Not to adde, that lusorious Lots are without all reason here ranked among extraordinarie Lots, no reason rendred why they should be so termed. So that here is much vnsound matter packt together to no purpose.
I. B.
In regard of which difference onelyonly Mr. Gs. Logick holdeth good as thus. From the vse of a Lot about another matter than ending a Controuersie, and that by Gods speciall direction, it followeth not, that it is lawfull to vse a Lot about any other matter, than ending a Controuersie, as gaming, without Gods speciall direction.
T. G.
In stead of making good his owne Logick, Mr. B. telleth vsus what will hold good in Mr. Gs. Logick. What he meaneth by my Logick, I neither know nor inquire. When I make such an Argument as Mr. B. here frameth, then let him answer it and not before. For this is but to set vp men of straw, and then hauing runne a course or two at them, to ride away in triumph, as if he had done some great matter, and laid Mr. G. or I know not whom in the dust. But meane while Mr. B. forgetteth to shew vsus the validitie of his owne Logick; to wit, how an Argument will follow, from one singular example of an extraordinarie Lot (by himselfe confessed to be such) vsed therein by Gods speciall direction, to the ordinarie vse of Lots in generall.
I. B.
But Mr. G. maketh another difference, to wit, an immediate and speciall prouidence in an extraordinary Lot, which is not in an ordinary Lot. He doth so: and therefore in his Logick, he cunningly ioyneth a supposed extraordinarie Euent to a supposed extraordinarie Act, and declineth the proofe of an extraordinarie Act, which rather he should hauehave done, because mine Argument standeth vponupon the vse of Lots.
T. G.
Nay by Mr. Bs. leaue, Mr. G. doth not so. He saith onelyonly that there is great difference betweene an extraordinarie Lot wherein an immediate diuine prouidence is, and an ordinarie one, wherein the same is not. Not presuming that there is necessarily such an immediate diuine prouidence in eueryevery extraordinarie Lot, but that such there was in that extraordinarie Lot by Mr. B. alledged, as also there is euer in all such of that kinde as are done by Gods speciall direction. I spare to speake much of the idle distinction here betweene an extraordinarie Lot, which by Mr. Bs. owne grant this was, and an extraordinarie Act, which he would here imply that it was not, when he requireth proofe of it. If the euent were extraordinarie, it is enough for my purpose, because Mr. Bs. Argument is in expresse termes concerning the euent, wherein somewhat, but I know not what, (for he mentioneth nothing) is said to be attributed vntounto Gods speciall prouidence; which if it be therefore more than ordinarie in such a Lot, there is no reasoning from it to any where it is not so, much lesse to all whatsoeuer in generall. That this Act it selfe, or occasion and manner of vising it, was extraordinarie, though neither I stand bound here to proue it, and the reason is senslesse whereupon Mr. B. here requireth it, yet I hauehave proued euidently hOf Lots, chap. 10. sect. 3.where I entreat particularly of it. But M. B. must remember that here it is his part to proue: it is mine onelyonly to answer, denie, or distinguish; and his to take away mine answers, if he will make his Arguments good.
I. B.
Neither doth he soundly proue an immediate and speciall prouidence, or extraordinary euent to be in an extraordinary, and not in an ordinary Lot.
T. G.
Neither doe I affirme it generally of the former, but of all such of that kinde as are vsed by Gods speciall direction, in which Mr. B. himselfe here acknowledgeth it: and of the latter what I say, I hauehave iOf Lots, chap. 2. sect. 5. & chap. 7. sect. 4.in diuers places proued. Here I speake onelyonly by way of distinction betweene the one and the other, which let Mr. B. if he can disproue▪
I. B.
For as it is a tempting of God to cast … … ry Lot the first time without Gods speciall direction, p. 313. so it is a tempting, yea, a agr…er tempting of God, when be …ath giuegive… his iudgement already by the … of the Lot, to cast the Lot againe without hi… speciall … rection. How then c… Mr. G. so confidently affir…, that an extraordinary Lot could not but fall certainly▪ were it neuer so oft cast?
T. G.
Whether it be a tempting of God or no, vponupon my occasion what▪soeuer to cast a Lot more then on… i… such a businesse as God hath giuen speciall▪ direction … vse it in, is not the Question▪ th…gh I suppose it be more then Mr. B. will be able euer to make good that it is. And whether vponupon so doing, because it were a tempting of him, God …ould refuse to giuegive answer or no, might also be questioned. He was content kIudg. 6. 37, 39, 40.by a Signe to answer Gid… the second time, though he had giuen assurance sufficient before, and as much as he at first required. He answered the sea-man in lIonas 1. …. Of Lots, chap. 10. sect. 5.the Lot that lighted vponupon …, though it were in them a meere tempting of God, by Mr. Bs. owne grant, hauing no speciall direction from God for the doing of it. Nor dare any man say, but that if it had beene by them for their … satisfaction cast oft, as mAri… Montan. in Io…. 1.some thinke it was, it would hauehave lighted vponupon Ionas still. But all that I say is this, that in … … Lot, wherin there i… … … diate hand of God for speciall purpose (good ground supposed for the reiteration of it) the euent were it neuer so oft cast, would be euer the same. For God certainly would neuer giuegive a sentence contrary to himselfe. And of the certaine steedinesse of such a Lot, we see a pregnant proofe in nIosh 7. 16, 17, 18.Achans case, where the Lot soure seuerall times cast, kept on his due course, till it came to seize on that particular person that was aimed at. And the like may be presumed certainly of eueryevery such Lot so reiterated. If God refuse further to answer, there is no such immediate hand of God for speciall end in it: if there be, and he doe answer, hee will bee euer like himselfe, there shall be no, oEst, & non. 2 Cor. 1. 18, 19, 20.tis, and tis not, with him.