A Just Defense of Certain Passages, Part 2 · Argument 5
The fifth Argument.
A Fifth Argument may be drawne *à concessis.from theT. G. of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 8. Argum. 5. grounds and grants euen of those that oppose in this point; and may be framed on this wise. Any thing indifferent is lawfull matter of recreation: But Lottery is a thing aVidetur sortium usus inter adiaphora constitui. Greg. Tolos. syntagm. lib. 34. c. 5.indifferent: Lottery therefore may be made lawfull matter of disport. The Proposition is confirmed by their definition of recreation, to wit, bFennor of recreat. rules spec. §. 1.Christian recreation is the exercise of some thing indifferent for the necessarie refreshing of body or minde.
The Assumption, namely, that Lottery is a thing in it owne nature indifferent, is thus proued likewise by their definition of things in nature indifferent. cIdem ibid. §. 2. rule 1.Indifferent in nature is that which is left free, so as we are not simply commanded or forbidden to vse it, but as we shall finde it in Christian wisdome beneficiall or hurtfull vntounto vsus. But such is Lotterie, or the vse of Lots; not simply commanded, (for dProv. 18. 18.that of Salomon before alledged is rather a permission than a precept, or not so much a commandement as an aduice and counsell, commending that to vsus as a wise and prudent course, not enioyning or imposing it as a duty necessary to be done, seeing by other courses beside it such controuersies may without sinne be composed as are there mentioned, and that effected oft by other meanes without a Lot, for which a Lot by Salomon is there allowed▪) nor againe any where forbidden or condemned as euill in it selfe: by the former definition therefore consequently indifferent, and so lawfull matter of Christian recreation and delight.
I. B.
Now then to a fifth Argument à concessis, as Mr. G. I. B. Answer.termeth it, p. 135.
Any thing indifferent is lawfull matter of recreation. But Lottery is a thing indifferent. Lotterie therefore may be made lawfull matter of disport.
The Proposition is confirmed by the words of Mr. Fennor. Christian, saith he, recreation is the exercise of some thing indifferent for the necessarie refreshing of bodie or minde.
The Assumption is also proued by Mr. Fennor.
Indifferent in nature is that which is left free, so as we are not simply commanded or forbidden to vse it. But such is Lotterie, saith Mr. G. Not simply commanded. For Prou. 18. 18. is rather a permission than a precept: or, Not so much a commandement, as an aduice commending that as a prudent course. Nor any where forbidden as euill in it selfe.
This is indeed the effect and maine summe ofT. G. Reply. mine Argument, though some inforcements of it be omitted. Let vsus heare Mr. Bs. answer.
I. B.
Mr. Fennors booke, from which these allegations be drawne, and from whence I learned that Lots may not be vsed in sport, doth proue that lusorious Lots are forbidden, and therefore not indifferent. What helpe then hath Mr. G. from Mr. Fennors grants?
T. G.
Much eueryevery way. For aforeign. Isidor. Pel. l. 2. ep. 228. foreign. Greg. Naz. de Spiritu Sancto.no testimonie is stronger than that that the aduerse party giueth against himselfe. If the grounds granted by him that holdeth and laboureth to proue a lusorious Lot vnlawfull, be of sufficient validitie to proue them lawfull and allowable, it is a matter of no small moment. Else why doth Mr. B. himself in his Dialogue reason from Peter Martyrs grants against Peter Martyr?
I. B.
And his owne proofes helpe him as little.
T. G.
I need none, when mine Aduersarie speaketh enough for me.
I. B.
For it is granted, that if Lotterie be either commanded or forbidden, it is not indifferent. To passe by the former: onelyonly obseruing, that Mr. G. doth not absolutely denie it to be commanded, Prouerb. 18. 18.
T. G.
Though he doe not denie absolutely, that it is at all commanded, yet he doth denie, that it is simply and absolutely commanded: For that that we are aduised to doe rather than some other thing, that we are not simply inioyned; which kinde of iniunction bAn indifferent thing in nature, is that which is left free, so as we are not simply commanded or forbidden to vse it, &c. Fennor of Recreat. rules spec. 1.Mr. Fennor seuereth from things indifferent. And that which among many other lawfull courses is commended vntounto vsus, as behouefull and vsefull, is not therefore either simply or absolutely inioyned, yea or at all, where such other may be had.
I. B.
I come to the other. I might here refer the Reader to my Dialogue, and to my Reply, by which it will appeare euidently, that a lusorious Lot is forbidden, and therefore not indifferent.
T. G.
How *foreign. Cic. ad Attic. l. 4. ep. 8.euidently this will there appeare, shall then appeare, when the Reply commeth to be discussed. Meane while Mr. B. here denieth onelyonly the Conclusion of my Syllogisme. For the second branch of the Assumption, to wit, that a Lot is a thing simply forbidden, (which he would seeme to denie, and should denie and disproue if he did ought) he neither here opposeth, nor in his Dialogue or Reply, doth he either defend, much lesse make good, but maintaineth the contrary rather, that in some cases it is allowable, which it were not, if it were simply forbidden, and so absolutely euill. The Argument therefore from Mr. Fennor his Teachers grounds standeth good, if his grounds at least be good.
I. B.
But to speake a little more (generally) of things not indifferent, because forbidden; I say, That is forbidden as well which is forbidden by iust consequence, as that which is expresly forbidden: As that is permitted as well which is permitted by iust consequence, as that which is expresly permitted. Mr. G. affirmeth the latter, p. 137. and will not (I dare say) denie the former. Againe, The word of God is so perfect, that whatsoeuer it neither commandeth, nor permitteth expresly or by iust consequence, that is verily forbidden. For all things, especially such as hauehave relation to God, ought to hauehave some warrant from the word. If Mr. G. put me to proue this, I dare vndertake to proue it demonstratiuely. But I presume he will not. For in the last mentioned page, he describeth that to be indifferent, which is (at least) permitted by the word. If a thing be not so much as permitted, it cannot be lawfull, and therefore not indifferent. Here I wish he would remember what he writeth, pag. 95. speaking of this word [Indifferent] as it is opposed to good or euill, and she wing how some say that to be indifferent, which is neither good nor euill, he determineth the point thus. Neuerthelesse most true it is, That no particular morall action, or, No action of the reasonable Creature proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessitie be either conformable to the Rules of Gods holy word, or disconformable thereunto. So that I wonder why Mr. G. should say here, Lotterie in game is not any where forbidden as euill of it selfe? That is good of it selfe which is either commanded or permitted, p. 137. Therefore that is euill of it selfe that is forbidden.
T. G.
Mr. B. hauing no more to say to the substance of mine Argument, falleth to quarrell againe with some termes vsed in it. aforeign. Plato Phileb. foreign. Idem de leg. l. 6. foreign. Idem Gorgia.A good thing, they say, may doe well twise or thrise. But bforeign. Pindar. Nem. 7.such friuolous exceptions so frequently inculcated, and so tediously prosecuted, cannot but tire the patientest Reader that is.
He maruelleth much (falling into his wonted veine of vaine wonderment againe) why I should here say, that Lotterie in game is not simply forbidden as euill of it selfe. I might well aske where I say it: not that I might not well so say, but because I no where here say it. But as I said at first, if Mr. B. might hauehave the framing of my Arguments, they should iudiciously be framed. The Minor should not be part of the Conclusion, as he speaketh elsewhere; but the whole Conclusion or the effect of it should be part of the Minor, or at least of the proofe of it. I say therefore in mine Assumption, or rather in the proofe of one part of it, not that Lotterie in game is this or that; (it belongeth to my Conclusion to tell what it is) but that Lotterie in generall is not simply forbidden ac euill of it selfe. And my reason (which I rendred of the like before) why I speake so, is; because a thing though not euill simply of it selfe, yet may be sometime forbidden in regard of some abuse necessarily then annexed thereunto, or some other euill necessarily ensuing thereupon; and may therefore though not simply and absolutely, yet in that respect and in such case be forbidden. That is good of it selfe, that is commanded or permitted; and yet by circumstances or manner of doing may be marred. And that is euill of it selfe that is simply forbidden, so as by no manner of doing, it can be made good. But that is not euill of it selfe, that cEsai. 1. 11, 14. Dans legem mea dixerat, quae vestra nunc dicit. Hieron. in Ezek. 5. Quia secundum libidmem suam, non sec. religionem celebrando, sua j…m, non Dei fecerant. Tertull. ad Marc. l. 2.being of it selfe good is by euill handling of it marred. A man might well wonder that any meane Christian, much more a graue Minister should wonder to heare some things said to be forbidden as euill of or in themselues; or not be able to distinguish betweene things simply euill of themselues, and things euill in regard of some consequence onelyonly. I might here make vse of that Schoole distinction, some things dProhibita quia mala, mala quia prohibita. Angel. de Clav. sum. verb. Alea, & alij.prohibited because simply euill, some things euill onelyonly because prohibited. But of these things more than enough, vnlesse they were more to our purpose than they are.
I. B.
It grieueth my soule to see what a wide doore to lusorious Lotterie this doctrine will make. For now Lot-mongers will chop Logick, and say, What if a lusorious Lot be forbidden by iust consequence, yet they are not forbidden as euill in themselues, and therefore they are indifferent.
T. G.
And it grieueth my soule to see Mr. B. to trifle so seriously or so sadly rather, and *foreign. Cum larvis & umbris ….to fight thus with fearefull shadowes and fancies of his owne framing. Where reach I any on this wise to argue? Or what difference enfueth from ought I say betweene that which is forbidden expresly, and that which by iust consequence is forbidden? That which is forbidden simply *foreign. Greg. Naz. de Spiritu Sancto.by iust consequence, is simply euill; that which respectiuely, is so euill onelyonly, and not otherwise. But what if no Gamester, but some honest and good Christian being reproued by Mr. B. for holding two pawnes in his hands, and bidding his Aduersarie chuse to determine who shall lead, alledging all Lot-games by iust consequence to be condemned in Gods word; should tell him, that though Lot-games may in some case or in some kinde by iust consequence be forbidden, yet they are not forbidden simply or as euill in themselues, and that they are therefore of themselues indifferent. I know not well, how Mr. B. will be able to answer him. For to say that whatsoeuer is by iust consequence out of Gods word in any sort forbidden is simply and of it selfe euill, were senslesse. Since that nothing can be in any sort euill, otherwise than as it is forbidden.