A Just Defense of Certain Passages, Part 2 · Argument 4
The fourth Argument.
A Fourth Argument may be taken from the benefitT. G. of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 7. Argum. 4. of Christian liberty, by vertue whereof eueryevery Christian man hath yLibertatis Christianae pars tertia, ut nulla rerum externarum per se indifferentium religione coram Deo teneamur, quin …as nunc usu… …, nunc omittere indifferenter liceat: hujus cognitio si aberit, …lla … js nestris quies, nullus superstitionum futurus est …inis: …o de…um …, ut super … transversam incedere nefas ducatur. Calvin. instit. lib. 3. cap. 19 § 7.a free vse of all Gods good creatures to imploy them vntounto such purposes as by any zIpsa … … dotes satis demonstrant, quorsum & quatenus … …. Ibid. cap. 10 §. 2.naturall power they are inabled vntounto, within the bounds aboue mentioned. But in these ordinarie, ciuill and diuisorie Lots, be they serious or lu…orious, the creatu…e is vsed to no other end or vse, but what it hath a naturall power vntounto, and *Sortibus uti li…et in rebus potestati nostrae subditis. Krakevitz in Ion. c. 1.such as by the mutuall consent and agreement of those that vse it, it may be inabled to effect. For it is in the naturall power of the creature vsed to moue or to be moued diuersly, and vncertainly in regard of those that make vse of it: and it is further in the power of it by their mutuall agreement to determine such matters as are ordinarily wont to be determined thereby. Which therefore *Sors non est mala nisi ex admixta irreligiositate, aut injustitia, aut imprudentia. Cajet. sum. vit.so long as the vse of it is kept otherwise free from superstition and impiety, or from iniustice and dishonestie, ought no more to be exiled from a Christian mans recreations, than any other creature or ordinance whatsoeuer that hath any naturall power to delight and giuegive contentment in that kinde.
Now then with some comfort I proceed to theI. B. Answer. fourth Argument, as Mr. G. calleth it, p. 134.
By vertue of Christian liberty, eueryevery Christian man hath a free vse of all Gods good creatures, to imploy them vntounto such purposes as by any naturall power they are inabled vntounto.
But in lusorious Lots the creature is vsed to no other end or vse, but what it hath a naturall power vntounto, and such as by the mutuall consent and agreement of those that vse it, it may be inabled to effect.
Therefore it is no more to be exiled from a Christian mans recreation, than any other creature that hath any power to delight.
With this Argument Mr. B. dealeth iust as withT. G. Reply. the first. Hee leaueth out (that hee may by that meanes finde matter to worke vponupon) those words in the Proposition, within the bounds aboue-mentioned, that is, so that the same be not either against Piety, or Charitie, (which had beene in the former Argument insisted on;) or more particularly, as by way of further explication I adde after (which Mr. B. also omitteth) so that the same be kept free from superstition and impiety, (in regard of the first Table) and from iniustice and dishonestie (in regard of the second.) So that the maine ground of the Argument is this, that gGen. 1. 28, 29. & 9. 2, 3. Psal. 8. 6, 7.Man being by God made Lord of the inferiour creatures; and that h1 Cor. 3. 21, 22, 23.his right and interest in them being restored againe to each Christian by his interest in Christ, iHebr. 1. 2. Apoc. 21. 7.the heire of all things, k1 Cor. 10. 23, 25, 26.he hath free liberty to vse any of Gods good creatures to such ends and purposes as by nature they are inabled vntounto, the same being within compasse of the bounds beforementioned.
True it is that Caluin from whom I take this Proposition, deliuereth it lIpsae naturales rerum dotes satis demonstrant, quorsum & quatenus frui liceat. Calvin. institut. l. 3. c. 10. §. 2.more indefinitely, and somewhat after that manner as Mr. B. here propoundeth: as the Apostle also doth the like in some places, where he saith; m1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Vbi universales particulae non sunt in infinitū extendendae, quasi liceat surari, scortari, &c. sed ad materiam subjectam restringendae. Chemnit. harmon. Euang. c. 51. Omnis omniū creaturarū usus lege Dei non prohibitus licite & sine peccato haberi potest. Morton. in 1 Cor. 6.All things are lawfull: and, nTit. 1. 15.To the pure all things are pure: and, oRom. 14. 14.I know, and am assured that nothing of it selfe is vncleane, &c. But his meaning (pScriptum potius sequi, quam voluntatem scriptoris, calumnianus est. Cic. pro Caecin. which ought to be regarded) is apparent to be the same with that that I say; and being so conceiued, it is sound and true, and of good vse for direction in the warrantable vse of the Creature. Neither doe I suppose that Mr. B. will be able to giuegive any other good reason, why he may lawfully vse starch for the stifning of his band, or a flint and a steele to strike fire withall, or a spit to roast his meat with, or cord to girt his bed with, or feathers to lie on, or arrowes to shoot with, &c. saue this, that these Creatures hauehave a naturall power thereunto; and God hath vouchsafed vsus the vse of his Creatures for such purposes as by nature they are enabled vntounto, so that the same be conditioned as was before said. But let vsus consider what Mr. B. obiecteth against this.
I. B.
So generall and eager is the pursuit after Libertie in this licentious age, that a godly and charitable Christian, much more being a Minister, ought to take great heed, that he occasion not any, much lesse too too many, q1 Pet. 2. 16.to make liberty a cloake of naughtinesse.
T. G.
Such a godly, charitable, christian Minister as Mr. B. deciphereth here, was Mr. Caluin, and one, I doubt not, wary of straining Christian liberty beyond its due extent: and yet speaketh he no otherwise than Mr. G. here doth, or rather not so cautelously as Mr. G. doth; as the Margine sheweth, where his owne words are alledged.
I. B.
But Mr. G. speaketh of Christian liberty, not of licentiousnesse. Then let vsus consider what he saith. For both the premises of this Argument are flatly to be denied.
T. G.
When Mr. B. saith, both the premises, his meaning is, not of mine Argument, but of this Argument, that is, of his owne, for the one of them, to wit the Proposition, at least, as appeareth by the reason of his deniall ann exed.
I. B.
For sundry good creatures hauehave a naturall power to impoison. But Christian liberty giueth vsus not free vse thereof to impoison at pleasure.
T. G.
Nor doe I say, or Mr. Caluin meane that it doth. It giueth liberty to vse such creatures for impoisoning, where that vse is free from such taint as was formerly mentioned; as for the impoisoning, and (by impoisoning) destroying of vermine, &c. But how doth this instance touch my Proposition at all? As Mr. B. propoundeth it peraduenture it may. As I conceiue it my selfe, I am sure, it doth not. Neither is my Proposition therefore denied, but an other of Mr. Bs. owne put in the roome of it, nor any exception at all here taken to it. Let vsus proceed to see what to the Assumption he saith.
I. B.
Neither is it true that any creature hath a naturall power to be a Lot, no more than a stone hath a naturall power to be caried vpward. For as a stone is caried vpward by a power that is without it: so all creatures are moued and applied to be Lots by a power without them.
T. G.
Albeit this be nothing to that that I say, for I say not, that the creature hath a naturall power to be a Lot, but that the creature in such a Lot is vsed to no other end or vse, but what it hath a naturall power vntounto. Yet is it most vndoubtedly and vndeniably true, that the creature that is vsed in a Lot hath a naturall power to be made matter of a Lot; as a stone hath a naturall power to be driuen vpward: else could not either of them by any Art or humane power be effected with either, nor without some supernaturall worke. So that to the Assumption also rightly vnderstood here is nothing at all said.
I. B.
God keepe me from teaching that Christian libertie warranteth the vnlawfull vse of any Creature, whatsoeuer naturall power it hath to that vse.
T. G.
Nor is any such thing here taught, either by me, or Mr. Caluin either, if his words be rightly vnderstood.
I. B.
If any Creature hauehave any power to be a Lot, yet that power is not to be vsed vntounto Lotterie, but in cases (whereof gaming is none) wherein God alloweth such vse thereof.
T. G.
This is but a deniall of the Conclusion; and a plaine begging of the point in Question: which is this, whether a Lot in game be (how, but by Gods word?) allowable.
I. B.
To the inforcing of the Conclusion by a supposed confirmation of the Assumption, I say, it is a begging of the Question. For though a Dog hauing a naturall power to hunt, be not exiled from recreation: yet ought a Lotcreature to be, for reasons giuen, and to be giuen, or rather defended hereafter.
T. G.
What reason hath beene already giuen, we hauehave seene; what will be, we shall further then see, when it is. But meane while I would gladly vnderstand from Mr. B. (since he hath pleased to propound this instance) what reason he can giuegive why a man may lawfully vse an Hound or Spaniel to hunt with, other than before of the like was rendred. As for the supposed confirmation of the Assumption, what he vnderstandeth thereby, I know not, vnlesse he meane the illustration of the Conclusion: which, by his instance, it seemeth, hee doth. For to that that is brought indeed for the proofe of it, here is not a word. So that, neither is my Proposition touched, nor either the Assumption it selfe, or the proofe of it dealt with: the Conclusion onelyonly is denied; and the illustration of it propounded as a confirmation of the Assumption, which it hath nothing to doe with.