The Doctrine of Original Sin, Theological treatise · Part 4 · Chapter 3

The Doctrine of Original Sin · Theological treatise · Part 4 · Chapter 3

p. 326CHAP. III.

That great Objection against the Imputation of Adam's Sin to his Posterity, considered, That such Imputation is unjust and unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his Posterity are not one and the same. With a brief Reflection subjoined, on what some have supposed, of God's imputing the Guilt of Adam's Sin to his Posterity, but in an infinitely less Degree, than to Adam himself.

THat we may proceed with the greater Clearness in considering the main Objections against supposing the Guilt of Adam's Sin to be imputed to his Posterity, I would premise some Observations with a View to the right Stating of the Doctrine of the Imputation of Adam's first Sin; and then shew the Reasonableness of this Doctrine, in Opposition to the great Clamour raised against it on this Head.

I think, it would go far towards directing us to the more clear and distinct conceiving and right stating of this Affair, if we steadily bear this in Mind; That God, in each Step p. 327of his Proceeding with Adam, in Relation to the Covenant or Constitution established with him, look'd on his Posterity as being One with him. (The Propriety of his looking upon them so, I shall speak to afterwards) And tho' he dealt more immediately with Adam, yet it was as the Head of the whole Body, & the Root of the whole Tree; and in his Proceedings with him, he dealt with all the Branches, as if they had been then existing in their Root.

From which it will follow, that both Guilt, or Exposedness to Punishment, and also Depravity of Heart, came upon Adam's Posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if he & they had all co-existed, like a Tree with many Branches; allowing only for the Difference necessarily resulting from the Place Adam stood in, as Head or Root of the whole, and being first and most immediately dealt with, & most immediately acting & suffering. Otherwise, it is as if, in every Step of Proceeding, every Alteration in the Root had been attended, at the same Instant, with the same Steps and Alterations throughout the whole Tree, in each individual Branch. I think, this will naturally follow on the Supposition of there being a constituted Oneness or Identity of Adam and his Posterity in this Affair.

Therefore I am humbly of Opinion, that if any have supposed the Children of Adam to come into the World with a double Guilt, one the Guilt of Adam's Sin, another the Guilt arising from their having a corrupt Heart, they have not so well conceived of the Matter. The Guilt a Man has upon his Soul at his first Existence, is one and simple; viz. the Guilt of the original Apostacy, the Guilt of the Sin by which the Species first rebelled against God. This, and the Guilt arising from the first Corruption or depraved Disposition of the Heart, are not to be look'd upon as two things, distinctly imputed and charged upon Men in the Sight of God. Indeed the Guilt, that arises from the Corruption of the Heart, as it remains a confirmed Principle, and appears in it's consequent Operations, is a distinct and additional Guilt: but the Guilt arising from p. 328the first existing of a depraved Disposition in Adam's Posterity, I apprehend, is not distinct from their Guilt of Adam's first Sin. For so it was not in Adam himself. The first evil Disposition or Inclination of the Heart of Adam to Sin, was not properly distinct from his first Act of Sin, but was included in it. The external Act he committed was no otherwise his, than as his Heart was in it, or as that Action proceeded from the wicked Inclination of his Heart. Nor was the Guilt he had, double, as for two distinct Sins: One, the Wickedness of his Heart and Will in that Affair; another, the Wickedness of the external Act, caused by his Heart. His Guilt was all truly from the Act of his inward Man; exclusive of which the Motions of his Body were no more than the Motions of any lifeless Instrument. His Sin consisted in Wickedness of Heart, fully sufficient for, and intirely amounting to, all that appeared in the Act he committed.

The depraved Disposition of Adam's Heart is to be considered two Ways. (1.) As the first rising of an evil Inclin…tion in his Heart, exerted in his first Act of Sin, and the Ground of the compleat Transgression. (2.) An evil Disposition of Heart continuing afterwards, as a confirmed Principle, that came by God's forsaking him; which was a Punishment of his first Transgression. This confirmed Corruption, by it's remaining and continued Operation, brought additional Guilt on his Soul.

And in like Manner, Depravity of Heart is to be considered two Ways in Adam's Posterity. The first Existing of a corrupt Disposition in their Hearts is not to be look'd upon as Sin belonging to them, distinct from their Participation of Adam's first Sin: it is as it were the extended Pollution of that Sin, through the whole Tree, by Virtue of the constituted Union of the Branches with the Root; or the Inherence of the Sin of that Head of the Species in the Members, in the Consent and Concurrence of the Hearts of the Members with the Head, in that first Act. (Which may be, without God's being the Author of Sin: about which I have spoken in the former Chapter.) p. 329But the Depravity of Nature, remaining an established Principle in the Heart of a Child of Adam, and as exhibited in After-Operations, is a Consequence and Punishment of the first Apostacy thus participated, and brings new Guilt.—The first Being of an evil Disposition in the Heart of a Child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to approve of the Sin of his first Father, as fully as he himself approved of it when he committed it, or so far as to imply a full and perfect Consent of Heart to it, I think, is not to be look'd upon as a Consequence of the Imputation of that first Sin, any more than the full Consent of Adam's own Heart in the Act of sinning; which was not consequent on the Imputation of his Sin to himself, but rather prior to it in the Order of Nature. Indeed the Derivation of the evil Disposition to the Hearts of Adam's Posterity, or rather the Co-existence of the evil Disposition, implied in Adam's first Rebellion, in the Root & Branches, is a Consequence of the Union, that the wise Author of the World has established between Adam & his Posterity; but not properly a Consequence of the Imputation of his Sin; nay rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first Depravity of Heart, and the Imputation of that Sin, are both the Consequen…es of that established Union; but yet in such Order, that the evil Disposition is first, and the Charge of Guilt consequent; as it was in the Case of Adam himself.**My Meaning, in the whole of what has been here said, may be illustrated thus: Let us suppose, that Adam and all his Posterity had co-existed, and that his Posterity had been, thrô a Law of Nature established by the Creator, united to him, something as the Branches of a Tree are united to the Root, or the Members of the Body to the Head; so as to constitute as it were one complex Person, or one moral Whole: So that by the Law of Union there should have been a Communion and Co-existence in Acts & Affections; all jointly participating, and all concurring, as one Whole, in the Disposition & Action of the Head: as we see in the Body natural, the whole Body is affected as the Head is affected; and the whole Body concurs when the Head acts. Now, in this Case, the Hearts of all the Branches of Mankind, by the Constitution of Nature and Law of Union, would have been affected just as the Heart of Adam, their common Root, was affected. When the Heart of the Root, by a full Disposition committed the first Sin, the Hearts of all the Branches would have concurred; and when the Root, in Consequence of this, became guilty, so would all the Branches; and when the Heart of the Root, as a Punishment of the Sin committed, was forsaken of God, in like Manner would it have faired with all the Branches; and when the Heart of the Root, in Consequence of this, was confirmed in permanent Depravity, the Case would have been the same with all the Branches; and as new Guilt on the Soul of Adam would have been consequent on this, so also would it have been with his moral Branches. And thus all Things, with Relation to evil Disposition, Guilt, Pollution and Depravity, would exist, in the same Order and Dependence, in each Branch, as in the Root. Now, Difference of the Time of Existence don't at all hinder Things succeeding in the same Order, any more than Difference of Place in a Co-existence of Time. Here may be worthy to be observed, as in several Respects to the present Purpose, some Things that are said by Stapferus, an eminent Divine of Zurich in Switzerland, in his Theologia Polemica, published about fourteen Years ago;—in English as follows. Seeing all Adam's Posterity are derived from their first Parent, as their Root, the whole of the human Kind, with it's Root, may be considered as constituting but one Whole, or one Mass; so as not to be properly a Thing distinct from it's Root; the Posterity not differing from it, any otherwise than the Branches from the Tree. From which it easily appears, how that when the Root sin'd, all that which is derived from it, and with it constitutes but one Whole, may be looked upon as also sinning; seeing it is not distinct from the Root, but is one with it.—T…m. I. Chap. III. §. 856, 57. Tis objected, against the Imputation of Adam's Sin, that we never committed the same Sin with Adam, neither in Number nor in Kind. I answer, we should distinguish here between the Physical Act it self, which Adam committed, and the Morality of the Action, and Consent to it. If we have respect only to the external Act, to be sure it must be confess'd, that Adam's Posterity did not put forth their Hands to the forbidden Fruit: In which Sense, that Act of Transgression, and that Fall of Adam cannot be physically one with the Sin of his Posterity. But if we consider the Morality of the Action, and what Consent there is to it, it is altogether to be maintain'd, that his Posterity committed the same Sin, both in Number & in Kind, inasmuch as they are to be look'd upon as consenting to it. For where there is Consent to a Sin, there the same Sin is committed. Seeing therefore that Adam with all his Posterity constitute but one moral Person, and are united in the same Covenant, & are Transgressors of the same Law, they are also to be look'd upon as having, in a moral Estimation, committed the same Transgression of the Law, both in Number and in Kind. Therefore this Reasoning avails nothing against the righteous Imputation of the Sin of Adam to all Mankind, or to the whole moral Person that is consenting to it. And for the Reason mention'd, we may rather argue thus; The Sin of the Posterity, on Account of their Consent, and the moral View in which they are to be taken, is the same with the Sin of Adam, not only in Kind, but in Number; therefore the Sin of Adam is rightfully imputed to his Posterity.—Id. Tom. iv. Cap. 16. §. 60, 61. The Imputation of Adam's first Sin consists in Nothing else than this, that his Posterity are view'd as in the same Place with their Father, and are like him. But seeing, agreable to what we have already proved, God might, according to his own righteous Judgment, which was founded on his most righteous Law, give Adam a Posterity that were like himself; and indeed it could not be otherwise, according to the very Laws of Nature; therefore he might also in righteous Judgment impute Adam's Sin to them: inasmuch as to give Adam a Posterity like himself, and to impute his Sin to them, is one and the same Thing. And therefore if the former be not contrary to the divine Perfections, so neither is the latter.—Our Adversaries contend with us chiefly on this Account, That according to our Doctrine of original Sin, such an Imputation of the first Sin is maintained, whereby God, without any Regard to universal native Corruption, esteems all Adam's Posterity as guilty, and holds them as liable to Condemnation, purely on Account of that sinful Act of their first Parent; so that They, without any Respect had to their own Sin, and so, as innocent in themselves, are destin'd to eternal Punishment.—I have therefore ever been careful to shew, that they do injuriously suppose those things to be separated, in our Doctrine, which are by no Means to be separated. The whole of the Controversy they have with us about this Matter, evidently arises from this, That they suppose the mediate and the immediate Imputation are distinguished one from the other, not only in the Manner of Conception, but in Reality. And so indeed they consider Imputation only as immediate, and abstractly from the mediate; when yet our Divines suppose, that neither ought to be considered separately from the other. Therefore I chose not to use any such Distinction, or to suppose any such Thing, in what I've said on the Subject; but only have endeavoured to explain the Thing it self, and to reconcile it with the divine Attributes. And therefore I have every where conjoined both these Conceptions concerning the Imputation of the first Sin, as inseparable; and judged, that one ought never to be considered without the other.—While I have been writing this Note, I consulted all the Systems of Divinity, which I have by me, that I might see what was the true and genuine Opinion of our chief Divines in this Affair; and I found that they were of the same Mind with Me; namely, That these two Kinds of Imputation are by no Means to be separated, or to be considered abstractly one from the other, but that one does involve the other.—He there particularly cites those two famous reformed Divines, Vitring…, and Lampius.—Tom. iv. Cap. 17. §. 78.

p. 330The first Existence of an evil Disposition of Heart, amounting to a full Consent to Adam's Sin, no more infers God's being the Author of that evil Disposition in the Child, than in the Father. The first Arising or Existing of that evil Disposition in the Heart of Adam, was p. 331by God's Permission; who could have prevented it, if he had pleased, by giving such Influences of his Spirit, as would have been absolutely effectual to hinder it: which, it is plain in Fact, he did with-hold: and whatever Mystery may be supposed in the Affair, yet no Christian will presume to say, it was not in perfect Consistence with God's Holiness and Righteousness, notwithstanding Adam had p. 332been guilty of no Offence before. So Root and Branches being one, according to God's wise Constitution, the Case in Fact is, that by virtue of this Oneness answerable Changes or Effects through all the Branches co-exist with the Changes in the Root: consequently an evil Disposition exists in the Hearts of Adam's Posterity, equivalent to that which was exerted in his own Heart, when he eat the forbidden Fruit. Which God has no Hand in, any otherwise, than in not exerting such an Influence, as might be effectual to prevent it; as appears by what was observed in the former Chapter.

p. 333But now the grand Objection is against the Reasonableness of such a Constitution, by which Adam and his Posterity should be look'd upon as One, and dealt with accordingly, in an Affair of such infinite Consequence; so that if Adam sinned, they must necessarily be made Sinners by his Disobedience, and come into Existence with the same Depravity of Disposition, and be looked upon and treated as th… they were Partakers with Adam in his Act of Sin.—I have not Room here to rehearse all Dr. T—r's vehement Exclamations against the Reasonableness and Justice of this. The Reader may at his Leisure consult his Book, and see them in Places refer'd to in the Margin. **P. 13. 150, 151, 156, 261, 384, 387.—Whatever black Colours and frightful Representations are employ'd on this Occasion, all may be …um'd up in this, That Adam and his Posterity are not one, but intir…ly distinct Agents.—But with Respect to this mighty Out-cry made against the Reasonableness of any such Constitution, by which God is supposed to treat Adam and his Posterity as One, I would make the following Observations.

I. It signifies Nothing, to exclaim against plain Fact—Such is the Fact, most evident and acknowledged Fact, with respect to the State of all Mankind, without Exception p. 334of one Individual among all the natural Descendents of Adam, as makes it apparent, that God actually deals with Adam and his Posterity as One, in the Affair of his Apostacy, and it's infinitely terrible Consequences. It has been demonstrated, and …hewn to be in Effect plainly acknowledged, that every Individual of Mankind comes into the World in such Circumstances, as that there is no Hope or Possibility of any other than their violating God's holy Law (if they ever live to act at all, as moral Agents) and being thereby justly exposed to eternal Ruin.**Part I. Chap. I. the three first Sections. And it is thus by God's ordering and disposing of Things. And God either thus deals with Mankind, because he looks upon them as one with their first Father, and so treats them as sinful and guilty by his Apostacy; or (which won't mend the Matter) He, without viewing them as at all concerned in that Affair, but as in every Respect perfectly innocent, does nevertheless subject them to this infinitely dreadful Calamity. Adam by his Sin was exposed to the Calamities &Sorrows of this Life, to temporal Death, and eternal Ruin; as is confess'd. And 'tis also in Effect confess'd, that all his Posterity come into the World in such a State, as that the certain Consequence is their being exposed, and justly so, to the Sorrows of this Life, to temporal Death, and eternal Ruin, unless saved by Grace. So that we see, God in Fact deals with them together, or as one. If God orders the Consequences of Adam's Sin, with regard to his Posterity's Welfare, even in those things which are most important, and which do in the highest Degree concern their eternal Interest, to be the same with the Consequences to Adam himself, then he treats Adam and his Posterity as in that Affair one. Hence, however the Matter be attended with Difficulty, Fact obliges us to get over the Difficulty, either by finding out some Solution, or by shutting our Mouths, and acknowledging the Weakness and Scantiness of our Understandings; as we must in innumerable other Cases, where apparent and undeniable p. 335Fact, in God's Works of Creation and Providence, is attended with Events and Circumstances, the Manner and Reason of which are difficult to our Understandings,—But to proceed,

II. We will consider the Difficulties themselves, insisted on in the Objections of our Opposers. They may: be reduced to these two; First, That such a Constitution is injurious to Adam's Posterity. Secondly, That it is altogether improper, as it implies Falshood; viewing and treating those as one, which indeed are not one, but intirely distinct.

FIRST Difficulty, That the appointing Adam to stand, in this great Affair, as the moral Head of his Posterity, and so treating them as one with him, as standing or falling with him, is injurious to them, and tends to their Hurt. To which I answer, It is demonstrably otherwise; that such a Constitution was so far from being injurious and hurtful to Adam's Posterity, or tending to their Calamity, any more than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself personally, that it was, in it self considered, very much of a contrary Tendency, and was attended with a more eligible Probability of an happy Issue, than the latter would have been: and so is a Constitution truly expressing the Goodness of it's Author. For, here the following Things are to be considered.

1. 'Tis reasonable to suppose, that Adam was as likely, on Account of his Capacity and natural Talents, to persevere in Obedience, as his Posterity (taking one with another) if they had all been put on the Trial singly for themselves. And supposing, that there was a constituted Union or Oneness of him and his Posterity, and that he stood as a publick Person, or common Head, all by this Constitution would have been as sure to partake of the Benefit of his Obedience, as of the ill Consequence of his Disobedience, in Case of his Fall.

2. There was a greater Tendency to a happy Issue, in such an Appointment, than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself; especially on two Accounts.

p. 336(1.) That Adam had stronger Motives to Watchfulness, than his Posterity would have had; in that not only his own eternal Welfare lay at Stake, but also that of all his Posterity. (2.) Adam was in a State of compleat Manhood, when his Trial began. It was a Constitution very agreable to the Goodness of God, considering the State of Mankind, which was to be propagated in the Way of Generation, that their first Father should be appointed to stand for all For by Reason of the Manner of their coming into Existence in a State of Infancy, and their coming so gradually to mature State, and so remaining for a great while in a State of Childhood and comparative Imperfection, after they were become moral Agents, they would be less fit to stand for themselves, than their first Father to stand for them.

If any Man, notwithstanding these Things, shall say, That for his own Part, if the Affair had been proposed to him, he should have chosen to have his eternal Interest trusted in his own Hands: 'Tis sufficient to answer, that no Man's vain Opinion of himself, as more fit to be trusted than others, alters the true Nature and Tendency of Things, as they demonstrably are in themselves.—Nor is it a just Objection. That this Constitution has in Event proved for the Hurt of Mankind. For it don't follow, that no Advantage was given for a happy Event, in such an Establishment, because it was not such as to make it utterly impossible there should be any other Event.

3. The Goodness of God in such a Constitution with Adam appears in this; That if there had been no sovereign gracious Establishment at all, but God had proceeded only on the Foot of meer Justice, and had gone no further than this required, he might have demanded of Adam and all his Posterity, that they should perform perfect perpetual Obedience, without ever failing in the least Instance, on Pain of eternal Death; and might have made this Demand without the Promise of any positive Reward for their Obedience. For perfect Obedience is a Debt, that every one owes to his Creator; and therefore p. 337… what his Creator was not obliged to pay him for. None is obliged to pay his Debtor, only for discharging his just Debt.—But such was evidently the Constitution with Adam, that an eternal happy Life was to be the Consequence of his persevering Fidelity, to all such as were included within that Constitution (of which the Tree of Life was a Sign) as well as eternal Death to be the Consequence of his Disobedience.—I come now to consider the

SECOND Difficulty.—It being thus manifest, that this Constitution, by which Adam and his Posterity are dealt with as One, is not unreasonable upon Account of it's being injurious and hurtful to the Interest of Mankind, the only thing remaining in the Objection against such a Constitution, is the Impropriety of it, as implying Falshood, and Contradiction to the true Nature of Things; as hereby they are view'd and treated as one, who are not one, but wholly distinct; and no arbitrary Constitution can ever make that to be true, which in it self considered is not true.

This Objection, however specious, is really founded on a false Hypothesis, and wrong Notion of what we call Sameness or Oneness, among created Things; and the seeming Force of the Objection arises from Ignorance or Inconsideration of the Degree, in which created Identity or Oneness with past Existence, in general, depends on the sovereign Constitution and Law of the supreme Author and Disposer of the Universe.

Some Things, being most simply considered, are intirely distinct, and very diverse; which yet are so united by the established Law of the Creator, in some Respects and with Regard to some Purposes and Effects, that by Virtue of that Establishment it is with them as if they were One. Thus a Tree, grown great, and an hundred Years old, is One Plant with the little Sprout, that first came out of the Ground, from whence it grew, and has been continued in constant Succession; thô it's now so exceeding diverse, many Thousand Times bigger, and of a very different Form, p. 338and perhaps not one Atom the very same: Yet God, according to an established Law of Nature, has in a constant Succession communicated to it many of the same Qualities, and most important Properties, as if it were One. It has been his Pleasure, to constitute an Union in these Respects, and for these Purposes, naturally leading us to look upon all as One.—So the Body of Man at forty Years of Age, is one with the Infant-Body which first came into the World, from whence it grew; tho' now constituted of different Substance, and the greater Part of the Substance probably changed Scores (if not hundreds) of Times: and tho' it be now in so many Respects exceeding diverse, yet God, according to the Course of Nature, which he has been pleased to establish, has caused, that in a certain Method it should communicate with that infantile Body, in the same Life, the same Senses, the same Features, and many the same Qualities, and in Union with the same Soul; and so, with regard to these Purposes, 'tis dealt with by him as one Body. Again, the Body and Soul of a Man are one, in a very different Manner, & for different Purposes. Considered in themselves, they are exceeding different Beings, of a Nature as diverse as can be conceived; and yet, by a very peculiar divine Constitution or Law of Nature, which God has been pleased to establish, they are strongly united, and become One, in most important Respects; a wonderful mutual Communication is established; so that both become different Parts of the same Man. But the Union and mutual Communication they have, has Existence, and is intirely regulated and limited, according to the sovereign Pleasure of God, and the Constitution he has been pleased to establish.

And if we come even to the personal Identity of created intelligent Beings, thô this be not allowed to consist wholly in that which Mr. Locke places it in, i. e. Same Consciousness; yet I think it can't be denied, that this is one thing essential to it. But 'tis evident, that the Communication or Continuance of the same Consciousness and Memory to any Subject, thro' successive Parts of Duration, p. 339depends wholly on a divine Establishment. There would be no Necessity, that the Remembrance and Idea's of what is past should continue to exist, but by an arbitrary Constitution of the Creator.—If any should here insist, that there is no Need of having Recourse to any such Constitution, in order to account for the Continuance of the same Consciousness; and should say, that the very Nature of the Soul is such as will sufficiently account for it; and that the Soul will retain the Idea's & Consciousness it once had, according to the Course of Nature:—Then let it be remember'd, Who it is, gives the Soul this Nature; and let that be remember'd, which Dr. T. says of the Course of Nature, before observed; denying, that the Course of Nature is a proper active Cause, which will work and go on by itself without God, if he lets and permits it; saying, that the Course of Nature, separate from the Agency of God, is no Cause, or Nothing; and affirming, that it's absolutely impossible, the Course of Nature should continue it self, or go on to operate by itself, any more than produce itself; **P. 410.and, that God, the Original of all Being, is the ONLY CAUSE of all natural Effects. ††P. 416.—Here is worthy also to be observed, what Dr. Turnbull says of the Laws of Nature, in Words which he cites from Sir Isaac Newton. ‖‖Mor. Phil. P. 7.It is the Will of the Mind that is the first Cause, that gives Subsistence & Efficacy to all those Laws, who is the efficient Cause that produces the Phenomena, which appear in Analogy, Harmony and Agreement, according to these Laws. And he says, The same Principles must take Place in Things pertaining to moral, as well as natural Philosophy.‡‡Ibid P. 9▪

From these Things it will clearly follow, that Identity of Consciousness depends wholly on a Law of Nature; and so, on the sovereign Will and Agency of GOD; and therefore, that Personal Identity, and so the Derivation of the Pollution and Guilt of past Sins in the same Person, depends on an arbitrary divine Constitution: and this, even p. 340though we should allow the same Consciousness not to be the only Thing which constitutes Oneness of Person, but should, besides that, suppose Samen…ss of Substance requisite. For, if same Consciousness be one Thing necessary to Personal Identity, and this depends on God's sovereign Constitution, it will still follow, that personal Identity depends on God's sovereign Constitution.

And with respect to the Identity of created Substance it self, in the different Moments of its Duration, I think, we shall greatly mistake, if we imagine it to be like that absolute, independent Identity of the FIRST BEING, whereby He is the same Yesterday, to Day, and for ever. Nay, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated, that even this Oneness of created Substance, existing at different Times, is a …eerly dependentIdentity; dependent on the Pleasure and sovereign Constitution of Him who worketh all in all. This will follow from what is generally allowed, and is certainly true, That God not only created all Things, and gave them Being at first, but continually preserves them, and upholds them in Being.—This being a Matter of considerable Importance, it may be worthy here to be considered with a little Attention.—Let us inquire therefore, in the first Place, Whether it ben't evident, that God does continually, by his immediate Power, uphold every created Substance in Being; and then let us see the Consequence.

That God does, by his immediate Power, uphold every created Substance in Being, will be manifest, if we consider, that their present Existen…e is a dependent Existence, and therefore is an Effect, and must have some Cause: and the Cause must be one of these two; either the antecedent Existence of the same Substance, or else the Power of the Creator. But it can't be the antecedent Existence of the same Substance. For Instance, the Existence of the Body of the Moon at this present Moment, can't be the Effect of it's Existence at the last foregoing Moment. For not only was what existed the last Moment, no active Cause, but wholly a passive Thing; But this also is to be considered, p. 341that no Cause can produce Effects in a Time and Place in which it self is not. 'Tis plain, Nothing can exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not existing. But the Moon's past Existence was neither where not when its present Existence is.—In point of Time; what is past, intirely ceases, when present Existence begins; otherwise it would not be past. The past Moment is ceased and gone, when the present Moment takes Place,; and does no more co-exist with it, than does any other Moment that had ceased twenty Years ago. Nor could the past Existence of the Particles of this moving Body produce Effects in any other Place, than where it then was. But its Existence at the present Moment, in every Point of it, is in a different Place, from where its Existence was at the last preceeding Moment. From these Things, I suppose, it will certainly follow, that the present Existence, either of this, or any other created Substance, cannot be an Effect of its past Existence. The Existences (so to speak) of an Effect, or Thing dependent, in different Parts of Space or Duration, thô ever so near one to another, don't at all co-exist one with the other; and therefore are as truly different Effects, as if those Parts of Space and Duration were ever so far asunder: And the prior Existence can no more be the proper Cause of the new Existence, in the next Moment, or next Part of Space, than if it had been in an Age before, or at a Thousand Miles Distance, without any Existence to fill up the intermediate Time or Space. Therefore the Existence of created Substances, in each successive Moment, must be the Effect of the immediate Agency, Will, and Power of GOD.

If any shall say, This Reasoning is not good, & shall insist upon it, that there is no Need of any immediate divine Power, to produce the present Existence of created Substances, but that their present Existence is the Effect or Consequence of past Existence, according to the Nature of Things; that the established Course of Nature is suffient to continue Existence, where Existence is once given;—I allow it: But then it should be remembered, what Nature p. 342is, in created Things; and what the established Course of Nature is; That, as has been observed already, it is Nothing, separate from the Agency of God; and that, as Dr. T. says, GOD, the Original of all Being, is the ONLY Cause of all natural Effects.—A Father, according to the Course of Nature, begets a Child; an Oak, according to the Course of Nature, produces an Acorn, or a Bud; so according to the Course of Nature, the former Exist…nce of the Trunk of the Tree is followed by it's new or present Existence. In the one Case, and the other, the new Effect is consequent on the former, only by the established Laws, and settled Course of Nature; which is allowed to be Nothing but the continued immediate Efficiency of GOD, according to a Constitution that he has been pleased to establish. Therefore, as our Author greatly urges, that the Child and the Acorn, which come into Existence according to a Constitution that he has been pleased to establish. Therefore, as our Author greatly urges, that the Child and the Acorn, which come into Existence according to the Course of Nature, in Consequence of the prior Existence and State of the Parent and the Oak, are truly immediately created or made by God; so must the Existence of each created Person and Thing, at each Moment of it, be from the immediate continued Creation of God. It will certainly follow from these Things, that God's preserving created Things in Being is perfectly equivalent to a continued Creation, or to his creating those Things out of Nothing at each Moment of their Existence. If the continued Existence of created Things be wholly dependent on God's Preservation, then those Things would drop into Nothing, upon the ceasing of the present Moment, without a new Exertion of the divine Power to cause them to exist in the following Moment. If there be any who own, that God preserves Things in Being, and yet hold that they would continue in Being without any further Help from him, after they once have Existence; I think, it is hard to know what they mean. To what Purpose can it be, to talk of God's preserving Things in Being, when there is no Need of his preserving them? Or to talk of their being dependent on God for continued Existence, when they would of p. 343themselves continue to exist, without his Help; nay, though he should wholly withdraw his sustaining Power and Influence?

It will follow from what has been observed, that God's upholding created Substance, or causing it's Existence in each successive Moment, is altogether equivalent to an immediate Production out of Nothing, at each Moment. Because it's Existence at this Moment is not meerly in Part from God, but wholly from him; and not in any Part, or Degree, from it's antecedent Existence. For the suppo…ing, that it's antecedent Existence concurs with God in Efficiency, to produce some Part of the Effect, is attended with all the very same Absurdities, which have been shown to attend the Supposition of it's producing it wholly. Therefore the antecedent Existence is Nothing, as to any proper Influence or Assistance in the Affair: And consequently God produces the Effect as much from Nothing, as if there had been Nothing before. So that this Effect differs not at all from the first Creation, but only Circumstantially; as in first Creation there had been no such Act and Effect of God's Power before: whereas, his giving Existence afterwards, follows preceeding Acts and Effects of the same Kind, in an established Order.

Now, in the next Place, let us see how the Consequence of these Things is to my present Purpose. If the Existence of created Substance, in each successive Moment, be wholly the Effect of God's immediate Power, in that Moment, without any Dependence on prior Existence, as much as the first Creation out of Nothing, then what exists at this Moment, by this Power, is a new Effect; and simply & absolutely considered, not the same with any past Existence, tho' it be like it, and follows it according to a certain established Method. **When I suppose, that an Effect which is produced, every Moment, by a new Action or Exertion of Power, must be a new Effect in each Moment, and not absolutely and numerically the same with that which existed in pr…ceeding Moments, the Thing that I intend, may be illustrated by this Example. The lucid Colour of Brightness of the Moon, as we look stedfastly upon it, seems to be a permanent Thing, as though it were perfectly the same Brightness continued. But indeed it is an Effect produced every Moment. It ceases, and is renewed, in each successive Point of Time; and so becomes altogether a new Effect at each Instant; and no one Thing that belongs to it, is numerically the same that existed in the preceeding Moment. The Rays of the Sun, impressed on that Body, and reflected from it, which cause the Effect, are none of them the same: The Impression, made in each Moment on our Sensory, is by the Stroke of new Rays: And the Sensation, excited by the Stroke, is a new Effect, an Effect of a new Impulse. Therefore the Brightness or lucid Whiteness of this Body is no more numerically the same Thing with that which existed in the preceeding Moment, than the Sound of the Wind that blows now, is individually the same with that which pass'd a little before. And if it be thus with the Brightness or Colour of the Moon, so it must be with it's Solidity, and every thing else belonging to it's Substance, if all be, each Moment, as much the immediate Effect of a new Exertion or Application of Power. The Matter may perhaps be in some Respects still more clearly illustrated by this.—The Images of Things in a Glass, as we keep our Eye upon them, seem to remain precisely the same, with a continuing perfect Identity. But it is known to be otherwise. Philosophers well know, that these Images are constantly renewed, by the Impression and Reflexion of new Rays of Light; so that the Image impress'd by the former Rays is constantly vanishing, and a new Image impress'd by new Rays every Moment, both on the Glass and on the Eye. The Image constantly renewed, by new successive rays, is no more numerically the same, than if it were by some Artist put on a-new with a Pencil, and the Colours constantly vanishing as fast as put on. And the new Images being put on immediately or instantly, don't make 'em the same, any more than if it were done with the Intermission of an Hour or a Day. The Image that exists this Moment, is not at all derived from the Image which existed the last preceeding Moment: as may be seen, because, if the Succession of new Rays be intercepted, by something interposed between the Object and the Glass, the Image immediately ceases; the past Existence of the Image has no Influence to uphold it, so much as for one Moment. Which shews, that the Image is altogether new-made every Moment; and strictly speaking, is in no Part numerically the same with that which existed the Moment preceeding. And truly so the Matter must be with the Bodies themselves, as well as their Images: They also cannot be the same, with an absolute Identity, but must be wholly renewed every Moment, if the Case be as has been proved, that their present existence is not, strictly speaking, at all the Effect of their past existence; but is wholly, every Instant, the Effect of a new Agency, or Exertion of the Power, of the Cause or thier Existence. If so, the Existence caused is every Instant a new Effect, whether the Cause be Light, or immediate divine Power, or whatever it be.And there is no Identity or p. 344Oneness in the Case, but what depends on the arbitrary Constitution of the Creator; who by his wise sovereign Establishment so unites these successive new Effects, that he treats them as One, by communicating to them like Properties, Relations, & Circumstances; and so, leads us to regard and treat them as one. When I call this an arbitrary Constitution, I mean, that it is a Constitution which p. 345depends on Nothing but the divine Will; which divine Will depends on Nothing but the divine Wisdom. In this Sense, the whole Course of Nature, with all that belongs to it, all it's Laws and Methods, and Constancy and Regularity, Continuance and Proceeding, is an arbitrary Constitution. In this Sense, the Continuance of the very Being of the World and all it's Parts, as well as the Manner of continued Being, depends entirely on an arbitrary Constitution: for it don't at all necessarily follow, that because there was Sound, or Light, or Colour, or Re…istance, or Gravity, or Thought, or Consciousness, or any other dependent Thing the last Moment, that therefore there shall be the like at the next.—All dependent Existence whatsoever is in a constant Flux, ever passing p. 346and returning; renewed every Moment, as the Colours of Bodies are every Moment renewed by the Light that shines upon them; and all is constantly proceeding from GOD, as Light from the Sun. In Him we live, and move, and have our Being.

Thus it appears, if we consider Matters strictly, there is no such Thing as any Identity or Oneness in created Objects, existing at different Times, but what depends on GOD's sovereign Constitution. And so it appears, that the Objection we are upon, made against a supposed divine Constitution, whereby Adam and his Posterity are view'd and treated as One, in the Manner and for the Purposes supposed, as if it were not consistent with Truth, because no Constitution can make those to be one, which are not one; I say, it appears that this Objection is built on a false Hypothesis: For it appears, that a divine Constitution is the Thing which makes Truth, in Affairs of this Nature. The Objection supposes, there is a Oneness in created Beings, whence Qualities and Relations are derived down from past Existence, distinct from, and prior to any Oneness that can be supposed to be founded on divineConstitution. Which is demonstrably false; and sufficiently appears so from things conceded by the Adversaries themselves: And therefore the Objection wholly falls to the Ground.

There are various Kinds of Identity & Oneness, found among created Things, by which they become one in different Manners, Respects and Degrees, and to various Purposes; several of which Differences have been observed; and every Kind is ordered, regulated and limited, in every Respect, by divine Constitution. Some Things, existing in different Times & Places, are treated by their Creator as One in one Respect, and others in another; some are united for this Communication, and others for that; but all according to the sovereign Pleasure of the Fountain of all Being and Operation.

It appears, particularly, from what has been said, that all Oneness, by Virtue whereof Pollution and Guilt from p. 347past Wickedness are derived, depends intirely on a divine Establishment. 'Tis this, and this only, that must account for Guilt and an evil Taint on any individual Soul, in Consequence of a Crime committed twenty or forty Years ago, remaining still, and even to the End of the World and forever. 'Tis this, that must account for the Continu…nce of any such Thing, any where, as Consciousness of Acts that are past; and for the Continuance of all Habits, either good or bad: and on this depends every Thing that can belong to personal Identity. And all Communications, Derivations, or Continuation of Qualities, Properties, or Relations, natural or moral, from what is past, as if the Subject were one, depends on no other Foundation.

And I am persuaded, no solid Reason can be given, why God, who constitutes all other created Union or Oneness, according to his Pleasure, and for what Purposes, Communications, and Effects, he pleases, may not establish a Constitution whereby the natural Posterity of Adam, proceeding from him, much as the Buds and Branches from the Stock or Root of a Tree, should be treated as One with him, for the Derivation, either of Righteousness, and Communion in Rewards, or of the Loss of Righteousness, and consequent Corruption and Guilt.**I appeal to such as are not wont to content themselves with judging by a superficial Appearance and View of Things, but are habituated to examine things strictly and closely, that they may judge righteous Judgement, Whether on Supposition that all Mankind had co-existed, in the Manner mention'd before, any good Reason can be given, why their Creator might not, If he had pleased, have established such an Union between Adam and the rest of Mankind, as was in that Case supposed. Particularly, if it had been the Case, that Adam's Posterity had actually, according to a Law of Nature, some how grown out of him, & yet remain'd contiguous and literally united to him, as the Branches to a Tree, or the Members of the Body to the Head; and had all, before the Fall, existed together at the same Time, thô in different Places, as the Head and Members are in different Places: In this Case, who can determine, that the Author of Nature might not, if it had pleased him, have established such an Union between the Root and Branches of this complex Being, as that all should constitute one moral Whole; so that by the Law of Union, there should be a Communication in each moral Alteration, and that the Heart of every Branch should at the same Moment participate with the Heart of the Root, be conformed to it and concurring with it in all its Affections and Acts, and so jointly partaking in its State, as a Part of the same Thing? Why might not God, if he had pleased, have fix'd such a Kind of Union as this, an Union of the various Parts of such a moral While, as well as many other Unions, which he has actually fix'd, according to his sovereign Pleasure? And if he might, by his sovereign Constitution, have established such as Union of the various Branches of Mankind, when existing. In different Places, I don't see why he might not also do the same, though they exist in different Times. I know not why Succession, or Diversity of Time, should make any such con…itued Union more unreasonable, than Diversity of Place. The only Reason, why Diversity of Time can seem to make it unreasonable, is, that Difference of Time shews, there is no absolute Identity of the Things existing in those different Times: But it shews this, I think, not at all more than the Difference of the Place of Existence.

p. 348As I said before, All Oneness in created Things, whence Qualities and Relations are derived, depends on a divine Constitution that is arbitrary, in every other Respect, excepting that it is regulated by divine Wisdom. The Wisdom, which is exercised in these Constitutions, appears in these two Things. First, In a beautiful Analogy and Harmony with other Laws or Constitutions, especially relating to the same Subject: and Secondly, in the good Ends obtain'd, or useful Consequences of such a Constitution. If therefore there be any Objection still lying against this Constitution with Adam and his Posterity, it must be, that it is not sufficiently wise in these Respects. But what extreme Arrogance would it be in us, to take upon us to act as Judges of the Beauty and Wisdom of the Laws and established Constitutions of the supreme Lord and Creator of the Universe?—And not only so, but if this Constitution, p. 349in particular, be well considered, it's Wisdom, in the two forementioned Respects, may easily be made evident. There is an apparent manifold Analogy to other Constitutions and Laws, established and maintained through the whole System of vital Nature in this lower World; all Parts of which, in all Successions, are derived from the first of the Kind, as from their Root, or Fountain; each deriving from thence all Properties and Qualities, that are proper to the Nature & Capacity of the Kind, or Species: No Derivative having any one Perfection (unless it be what is merely circumstantial) but what was in it's Primitive. And that Adam's Posterity should be without that original Righteousness, which Adam had lost, is also analogous to other Laws and Establishments, relating to the Nature of Mankind; according to which, Adam's Posterity have no one Perfection of Nature, in any Kind, superiour to what was in him, when the human Race began to be propagated from him.

And as such a Constitution was fit and wise in other Respects, so it was in this that follows. Seeing the divine Constitution concerning the Manner of Mankind's coming into Existence in their Propagation, was such as did so nat…rally unite them, & made 'em in so many Respects One, naturally leading them to a close Union in Society, and manifold Intercourse, and mutual Dependence, Things were wisely so established, that all should naturally be in one and the same moral State; and not in such exceeding different States, as that some should be perfectly innocent and holy, but others corrupt and wicked; some needing a Saviour, but others needing none; some in a confirmed State of perfect Happiness, but others in a State of publick Condemnation to perfect and eternal Misery; some justly exposed to great Calamities in this World, but others by their Innocence raised above all Suffering. Such a vast Diversity of State would by no Means have agreed with the natural & necessary Constitution & unavoidable Situation and Circumstances of the World of Mankind; all made of one Blood, to dwell on all the Face of the p. 350Earth, to be united and blended in Society, and to partake together in the natural and common Goods and Evils of this lower World▪

Dr. T. urges, **P. 13.that Sorrow and Shame are only for personal Sin: and it has often been urged, that Repentance can be for no other Sin. To which I would say, that the Use of Words is very arbitrary: But that Men's Hearts should be deeply affected with Grief and Humiliation before God, for the Pollution and Guilt which they bring into the World with them, I think, is not in the least unreasonable. Nor is it a Thing strange and unheard of, that Men should be ashamed of Things done by others, whom they are nearly concerned in. I am sure, it is not unscriptural; especially when they are justly looked upon in the Sight of God, who sees the Disposition of their Hearts, as fully consenting and concurring.

From what has been observed it may appear, there is no sure Ground to conclude, that it must be an absurd and impossible Thing, for the Race of Mankind truly to partake of the Sin of the first Apostacy, so as that this, in Reality & Propriety, shall become their Sin; by Virtue of a real Union between the Root and Branches of the World of Mankind (truly and properly availing to such a Consequence) established by the Author of the whole System of the Universe; to whose Establishments is owing all Propriety and Reality of Union, in any Part of that System; and by Virtue of the full Consent of the Hearts of Adam's Posterity to that first Apostacy. And therefore the Sin of the Apostacy is not their's, meerly because God imputes it to them; but it is truly and properly their's, and on that Ground, God imputes it to them.

By Reason of the established Union between Adam and his Posterity, theCase is far otherwise between him & them, than it is between distinct Parts or Individuals of Adam's Race; betwixt whom is no such constituted Union: As, between Children & other Ancestors. Concerning whom is p. 351apparently to be understood that Place, Ezek. xviii. 1,—20.**Which Dr. T. alledges P. 286, 287. Where God reproves the Jews for the Use they made of that Proverb, The Fathers have eaten sowre Grapes, and the Children's Teeth are set on Edge; and tells them, that hereafter they shall no more have Occasion to use this Proverb; and that if a Son sees the Wickedness of his Father, and sincerely disapproves it and avoids it, and he himself is righteous, he shall not die for the Iniquity of his Father; that all Souls, both the Soul of the Father and the Son, are his; and that therefore the Son shall not bear the Iniquity of his Father, nor the Father bear the Iniquity of the Son; but the Soul that sinneth, it shall die; that the Righteousness of the Righteous shall be upon him, and the Wickedness of the Wicked shall be upon him. The Thing denied, is Communion in the Guilt and Punishment of the Sins of others, that are distinct Parts of Adam's Race; and expresly, in that Case, where there is no Consent and Concurrence, but a sincere Disapprobation of the Wickedness of Ancestors. It is declared, that Children who are adult and come to act for themselves, who are righteous, and don't approve of, but sincerely condemn the Wickedness of their Fathers, shall not be punished for their disapproved and avoided Iniquities. The Occasion of what is here said, as well as the Design and plain Sense, shews, that Nothing is here intended in the least Degree inconsistent with what has been supposed concerning Adam's Posterity's sinning and falling in his Apostacy.—The Occasion is, the People's murmuring at God's Methods under the Mosaic Dispensation; agreable to that in Levit. xxvi.29. And they that are left of you, shall pine away in their Iniquity in their Enemies Land, and also in the Iniquities of their Fathers shall they pine away with them. And other parallel Places, respecting external Judgments, which were the Punishments most plainly threaten'd, and chiefly insisted on, under that Dispensation (which was, as it were, an external p. 352and carnal Covenant) and particularly the People's suffering such terrible Judgments at that Day, even in Ezekiel's Time, for the Sins of Manasseh; according to what God says by Jeremiah (Jer. xv. 4.) and agre…ble to what is said in that Confession, Lam. v. 9. Our Fathers have sin'd and are not, and we have borne their Iniquities.

In what is said here, there is a special Respect to the introducing the Gospel-Dispensation; as is greatly confirmed by comparing this Place with Jer. xxxi. 29, 30, 31. Under which Dispensation, the Righteousness of God's Dealings with Mankind would be more fully manifested, in the clear Revelation then to be made of the Method of the Judgment of God, by which the final State of wicked Men is determined; which is not according to the Behaviour of their particular Ancestors; but every one is dealt with according to the Sin of his own wicked Heart, or sinful Nature and Practice. The Affair of Derivation of the natural Corruption of Mankind in general, and of their Consent to, and Participation of, the primitive and common Apostacy, is not in the least intermeddled with, or touch'd, by any thing meant or aimed at in the true Scope and Design of this Place in Ezekiel.

On the Whole, if any don't like the Philosophy, or the Metaphysicks (as some perhaps may chuse to call it) made use of in the foregoing Reasonings; yet I cannot doubt, but that a proper Consideration of what is apparent and undeniable in Fact, with respect to the Dependence of the State and Course of Things in this Universe on the sovereign Constitutions of the supreme Author and Lord of all, who gives none Account of any of his Matters, and whose Ways are past finding out, will be sufficient, with Persons of common Modesty & Sobriety, to stop their Mouths, from making peremptory Decisions against the Justice of God, respecting what is so plainly and fully taught in his holy Word, concerning the Derivation of a Depravity and Guilt from Adam to his Posterity; a Thing so abundantly confirm'd by what is found in the Experience of all Mankind in all Ages.

p. 353This is enough, one would think, forever to silence such bold Expressions as these—If this be just,—if the Scriptures teach such Doctrine,&c. then the Scriptures are of no Use—Understanding is no Understanding▪—and, What a GOD must be be, that can thus curse innocent Creatures!—Is this thy GOD, O Christian!—&c. &c.

It may not be improper here to add something (by Way of Supplement to this Chapter, in which we have had Occasion to say so much about the Imputation of Adam's Sin) concerning the Opinions of two Divines, of no inconsiderable Note among the Dissenters in England, relating to a partial Imputation of Adam's first Sin.

One of them supposes, that this Sin, thô truly imputed to INFANTS, so that thereby they are exposed to a proper Punishment, yet is not imputed to them in such a Degree, as that upon this Account they should be liable to eternal Punishment, as Adam himself was, but only to temporal Death, or Annibilation; Adam himself, the immediate Actor, being made infinitely more guilty by it, than his Posterity.—On which I would observe; That to suppose, God imputes not all the Guilt of Adam's Sin, but only some little Part of it, this relieves Nothing but one's Imagination. To think of poor little Infants bearing such Torments for Adam's Sin, as they sometimes do in this World, and these Torments ending in Death andAnnihilation, may fit easier on the Imagination, than to conceive of their suffering eternal Misery for it. But it does not at all relieve one's Reason. There is no Rule of Reason, that can be supposed to lie against imputing a Sin in the Whole of it, which was committed by one, to another who did not personally commit it, but what will also lie against its being so imputed and punished in Part. For all the Reasons (if there are any) lie against the Imputation; not the Quantity or Degree of what is imputed. If there be any Rule of Reason, that is strong and good, lying against a proper Derivation or Communication of Guilt, from one that acted, to another that did not act; then it lies against all that is of … Nature. The Force of the p. 354Reasons brought against imputing Adam's Sin to his Posterity (if there be any Force in them) lies in this, That Adam and his Posterity are not One. But this lies as properly against charging a Part of the Guilt, as the Whole. For Adam's Posterity, by not being the same with him, had no more Hand in a Little of what was done, than in the Whole. They were as absolutely free from being concerned in that Act partly, as they were wholly. And there is no Reason can be brought, why one Man's Sin can't be justly reckon'd to another's Account, who was not then in Being, in the Whole of it; but what will as properly lie against it's being reckon'd to him in any Part, so as that he should be subject to any Condemnation or Punishment on that Account.—If those Reasons are good, all the Difference there can be, is this; That to bring a great Punishment on Infants for Adam's Sin, is a great Act of Injustice, and to bring a comparatively small Punishment▪ … a smaller Act of Injustice; but not, that this is not as truly and demonstrably an Act of Injustice, as the other.

To illustrate this by an Instance something parallel. 'Tis used as an Argument why I may not exact from one of my Neighbours, what was due to me from another, that he and my Debtor are not the same; and that their Concerns, Interests & Properties are intirely distinct. Now if this Argument be good, it lies as truly against my demanding from him a Part of the Debt, as the Whole. Indeed it is a greater Act of Injustice, for me to take from him the Whole of it, than a Part; but not more truly and certainly an Act of Injustice.

The other Divine thinks, there is truly an Imputation of Adam's Sin, so that Infants can't be look'd upon as innocent Creatures; yet seems to think it not agreable to the Perfec…ions of God, to make the State of Infants in another World worse than a State of Non-existence. But this to me appears plainly a giving up that grand Point of the Imputation of Adam's Sin, both in Whole and in Part. For it supposes it to … not right, for God to bring any Evil on a Child … …dam, which is innocent p. 355as to personal Sin, without paying for it, or balancing it with Good; so that still the State of the Child shall be as good, as could be demanded in Justice, in Case of meer Innocence. Which plainly supposes, that the Child is not exposed to any proper Punishment at all, or is not at all in Debt to divine Justice, on the Account of Adam's Sin. For if the Child were truly in Debt, then surely Justice might take something from him, without paying for it, or without giving that which makes it's State as good, as meer Innocence could in Justice require.**P. 359, &c. If he owes the suffering of some Punishment, then there is no Need that Justice should requite the Infant for suffering that Punishment; or make up for it, by conferring some Good, that shall countervail it, and in Effect remove and disannul it; so that, on the Whole, Good and Evil shall be at an even Balance, yea, so that the Scale of Good shall preponderate. If it is unjust in a Judge, to order any Quantity of Money to be taken from another, without paying him again, & fully making it up to him, it must be because he had justly forfeited none at all.

It seems to me pretty manifest, that none can, in good Consistence with themselves, own a real Imputation of the Guilt of Adam's first Sin to his Posterity, without owning that they are justly view'd and treated as Sinners, truly guilty, and Children of Wrath, on that Account; nor unless they allow a just Imputation of the Whole of the Evil of that Transgression; at least, all that pertains to the Essence of that Act, as a full and compleat Violation of the Covenant, which God had established; even as much as if each one of Mankind had the like Covenant established with him singly, and had by the like direct & full Act of Rebellion, violated it for himself.