Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will, Part 4 · Section 4
SECTION IV. It is agreable to common Sense, and the natural Notions of Mankind, to suppose moral Necessity to be consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment.
WHETHER the Reasons that have been given, why it appears difficult to some Persons to reconcile with common Sense the praising or blaming, rewarding or punishing those Things which are morally necessary, are thought satisfactory, or not; yet it most evidently appears by the following Things, that if this Matter be rightly understood, setting aside all Delusion arising from the Impropriety and Ambiguity of Terms▪ this is not at all inconsistent with the natural Apprehensions of Mankind, and that Sense of Things which is found every where in the common People, who are furthest from having their▪ Thoughts perverted from their natural Channel, by metaphysical and philosophical Subtilties; but on the contrary, altogether agreable to, and the very Voice and Dictate of this natural and vulgar Sense.
I. This will appear if we consider what the vulgar Notion of Blame-worthiness is. The Idea which the common People through all Ages and Nations have of Faultiness, I suppose to be plainly this; A Person's being or doing wrong, with his own Will and Pleasure; containing these two Things; 1. His doing wrong, when he does as he pleases. 2. His Pleasure's being wrong. Or in other Words, perhaps more intelligibly expressing their Notion; A Person's having his Heart wrong, and doing wrong from his Heart. And this is the Sum total of the Matter.
The common People don't ascend up in their Reflections and Abstractions, to the metaphysical Sources, Relations and Dependences of Things, in order to form their Notion of Faultiness or Blame-worthiness. They don't wait till they have decided by their Refinings, what first determines the Will; whether it be determined by something extrinsic, or intrinsic; whether Volition determines Volition, or whether the Understanding determines the Will; whether there be any such Thing as Metaphysicians mean by Contingence (if they have any Meaning;) whether there be a Sort of a strange unaccountable Sovereignty in the Will, in the Exercise of which, by it's own sovereign Acts, it brings to pass all it's own sovereign Acts. They don't take any Part of their Notion of Fault or Blame from the Resolution of any such Questions. If this were the Case, there are Multitudes, yea the far greater Part of Mankind, nine Hundred and ninety-nine out of a Thousand would live and die without having any such Notion as that of Fault ever entring into their Heads, or without so much as once having any Conception that any Body was to be either blamed or commended for any Thing. To be sure, it would be a long Time before Men came to have such Notions. Whereas 'tis manifest, they are some of the first Notions that appear in Children; who discover as soon as they can think, or speak, or act at all as rational Creatures, a Sense of Desert. And certainly, in forming their Notion of it, they make no use of Metaphysicks. All the Ground they go upon consists in these two Things; Experience, and a natural Sensation of a certain Fitness or Agreableness which there is in uniting such moral Evil as is above described, viz. a being or doing wrong with the Will, and Resentment in others, and Pain inflicted on the Person in whom this moral Evil is. Which natural Sense is what we call by the Name of Conscience.
'Tis true, the common People and Children, in their Notion of a faulty Act or Deed of any Person, do suppose that it is the Person's own Act and Deed. But this is all that belongs to what they understand by a Thing's being a Person's own Deed or Action; even that it is something done by him of Choice. That some Exercise or Motion should begin of it self, don't belong to their Notion of an Action, or Doing. If so, it would belong to their Notion of it, that it is something which is the Cause of it's own Beginning: And that is as much as to say, that it is before it begins to be. Nor is their Notion of an Action some Motion or Exercise that begins accidentally, without any Cause or Reason; for that is contrary to one of the prime Dictates of common Sense, namely, that every Thing that begins to be, has some Cause or Reason why it is.
The common People, in their Notion of a faulty or praise-worthy Deed or Work done by any one, do suppose that the Man does it in the Exercise of Liberty. But then their Notion of Liberty is only a Person's having Opportunity of doing as he pleases. They have no Notion of Liberty consisting in the Will's first acting, and so causing it's own Acts; and determining, and so causing it's own Determinations; or chusing, and so causing it's own Choice. Such a Notion of Liberty is what none have, but those that have darken'd their own Minds with confused metaphysical Speculation, and abstruse and ambiguous Terms. If a Man is not restrain'd from acting as his Will determines, or constrain'd to act otherwise; then he has Liberty, according to common Notions of Liberty, without taking into the Idea that grand Contradiction of all the Determinations of a Man's free Will being the Effects of the Determinations of his free Will.—Nor have Men commonly any Notion of Freedom consisting in Indifference. For if so, then it would be agreable to their Notion, that the greater Indifference Men act with, the more Freedom they act with; whereas the Reverse is true. He that in acting, proceeds with the fullest Inclination, does what He does with the greatest Freedom, according to common Sense. And so far is it from being agreable to common Sense, that such Liberty as consists in Indifference is requisite to Praise or Blame, that on the contrary, the Dictate of every Man's natural Sense thro' the World is, that the further he is from being indifferent in his acting Good or Evil, and the more he does either with full and strong Inclination, the more is he esteemed or abhorred, commended or condemned.
II. If it were inconsistent with the common Sense of Mankind, that Men should be either to be blamed or commended in any Volitions they have or fail of, in Case of moral Necessity or Impossibility; then it would surely also be agreable to the same Sense and Reason of Mankind, that the nearer the Case approaches to such a moral Necessity or Impossibility, either through a strong antecedent moral Propensity on the one Hand, *'Tis here argued, on Supposition that not all Propensity implies moral Necessity, but only some very high Degrees; which none will deny.or a great antecedent Opposition and Difficulty on the other, the nearer does it approach to a being neither blameable nor commendable; so that Acts exerted with such preceeding Propensity would be worthy of proportionably less Praise; and when omitted, the Act being attended with such Difficulty, the Omission would be worthy of the less Blame. It is so, as was observed before, with natural Necessity and Impossibility, Propensity and Difficulty: As 'tis a plain Dictate of the Sense of all Mankind, that natural Necessity and Impossibility takes away all Blame and Praise; and therefore, that the nearer the Approach is to these through previous Propensity or Difficulty, so Praise and Blame are proportionably diminished. And if it were as much a Dictate of common Sense, that moral Necessity of doing, or Impossibility of avoiding, takes away all Praise and Blame, as that natural Necessity or Impossibility does this; then, by a perfect Parity of Reason, it would be as much the Dictate of common Sense, that an Approach to moral Necessity of doing, or Impossibility of avoiding, diminishes Praise and Blame, as that an Approach to natural Necessity and Impossibility does so. 'Tis equally the Voice of common Sense, that Persons are excusable in Part, in neglecting Things difficult against their Wills, as that they are excusable wholly in neglecting Things impossible against their Wills. And if it made no Difference, whether the Impossibility were natural and against the Will, or moral, lying in the Will, with regard to Excusableness; so neither would it make any Difference, whether the Difficulty, or Approach to Necessity be natural against the Will, or moral, lying in the Propensity of the Will.
But 'tis apparent, that the Reverse of these Things is true. If there be an Approach to a moral Necessity in a Man's Exertion of good Acts of Will, they being the Exercise of a strong Propensity to Good, and a very powerful Love to Vertue; 'tis so far from being the Dictate of common Sense, that He is less vertuous, and the less to be esteem'd, loved and praised; that 'tis agreable to the natural Notions of all Mankind that he is so much the better Man, worthy of greater Respect, and higher Commendation. And the stronger the Inclination is, and the nearer it approaches to Necessity in that Respect, or to Impossibility of neglecting the vertuous Act, or of doing a vicious one; still the more vertuous, and worthy of higher Commendation. And on the other Hand, if a Man exerts evil Acts of Mind; as for Instance, Acts of Pride or Malice, from a rooted and strong Habit or Principle of Haughtiness and Maliciousness, and a violent Propensity of Heart to such Acts; according to the natural Sense of all Men, he is so far from being the less hateful and blameable on that Account, that he is so much the more worthy to be detested and condemned by all that observe Him.
Moreover, 'tis manifest that it is no Part of the Notion which Mankind commonly have of a blameable or praise-worthy Act of the Will, that it is an Act which is not determined by an antecedent Bias or Motive, but by the sovereign Power of the Will it self; because if so, the greater Hand such Causes have in determining any Acts of the Will, so much the less vertuous or vicious would they be accounted; and the less Hand, the more vertuous or vicious. Whereas the Reverse is true: Men don't think a good Act to be the less praise-worthy, for the Agent's being much determined in it by a good Inclination or a good Motive; but the more. And if good Inclination or Motive has but little Influence in determining the Agent, they don't think his Act so much the more vertuous, but the less. And so concerning evil Acts, which are determined by evil Motives or Inclinations.
Yea, if it be supposed that good or evil Dispositions are implanted in the Hearts of Men by Nature it self (which, it is certain, is vulgarly supposed in innumerable Cases) yet it is not commonly supposed that Men are worthy of no Praise or Dispraise for such Dispositions; altho' what is natural is undoubtedly necessary, Nature being prior to all Acts of the Will whatsoever. Thus for Instance, if a Man appears to be of a very haughty or malicious Disposition, and is supposed to be so by his natural Temper, 'tis no vulgar Notion, no Dictate of the common Sense and Apprehension of Men, that such Dispositions are no Vices or moral Evils, or that such Persons are not worthy of Disesteem, Odium and Dishonour; or that the proud or malicious Acts which flow from such natural Dispositions, are worthy of no Resentment. Yea, such vile natural Dispositions, and the Strength of 'em, will commonly be mention'd rather as an Aggravation of the wicked Acts that come from such a Fountain, than an Extenuation of 'em. It's being natural for Men to act thus, is often observed by Men in the Height of their Indignation: They will say, 'Tis his very Nature: He is of a vile natural Temper; 'tis as natural to Him to act so, as it is to breathe; He can't help serving the Devil, &c. But it is not thus with Regard to hurtful mischievous Things that any are the Subjects or Occasions of by natural Necessity, against their Inclinations. In such a Case, the Necessity, by the common Voice of Mankind, will be spoken of as a full Excuse.—Thus 'tis very plain, that common Sense makes a vast Difference between these two Kinds of Necessity, as to the Judgment it makes of their Influence on the moral Quality and Desert of Men's Actions.
And these Dictates of Men's Minds are so natural and necessary, that it may be very much doubted whether the Arminians themselves have ever got rid of 'em; yea, their greatest Doctors, that have gone furthest in Defence of their metaphysical Notions of Liberty, and have brought their Arguments to their greatest Strength, and as they suppose to a Demonstration, against the Consistence of Vertue and Vice with any Necessity: 'Tis to be question'd, whether there is so much as one of them, but that if He suffered very much from the injurious Acts of a Man under the Power of an invincible Haughtiness and Malignancy of Temper, would not, from the foremention'd natural Sense of Mind, resent it far otherwise, than if as great Sufferings came upon Him from the Wind that blows, and Fire that burns by natural Necessity; and otherwise than he would, if he suffered as much from the Conduct of a Man perfectly delirious; yea, tho' he first brought his Distraction upon Him some Way by his own Fault.
Some seem to disdain the Distinction that we make between natural and moral Necessity, as tho' it were altogether impertinent in this Controversy: That which is necessary (say they) is necessary; it is that which must be, and can't be preventent And that which is impossible, is impossible, and can't be done: and therefore none can be to blame for not doing it. And such Comparisons are made use of, as the commanding of a Man to walk who has lost his Legs, and condemning and punishing Him for not obeying; Inviting and calling upon a Man, who is shut up in a strong Prison, to come forth, &c. But in these Things Arminians are very unreasonable. Let common Sense determine whether there be not a great Difference between those two Cases; the one, that of a Man who has offended his Prince, and is cast into Prison; and after he has lain there a while, the King comes to him, calls him to come forth to Him; and tells him that if he will do so, and will fall down before Him, and humbly beg his Pardon, he shall be forgiven, and set at Liberty, and also be greatly enrich'd, and advanced to Honour: The Prisoner heartily repents of the Folly and Wickedness of his Offence against his Prince, is thoroughly disposed to abase Himself, and accept of the King's Offer; but is confined by strong Walls, with Gates of Brass, and Barrs of Iron. The other Case is, that of a Man who is of a very unreasonable Spirit, of a haughty, ungrateful, wilful Disposition; and moreover, has been brought up in traiterious Principles; and has his Heart possessed with an extream and inveterate Enmity to his lawful Sovereign; and for his Rebellion is cast into Prison, and lies long there, loaden with heavy Chains, and in miserable Circumstances. At length the compassionate Prince comes to the Prison, orders his Chains to be knocked off, and his Prison-Doors to be set wide open; calls to him, and tells Him, if He will come forth to him, and fall down before him, acknowledge that he has treated him unworthily, and ask his Forgiveness; He shall be forgiven, set at Liberty, and set in a Place of great Dignity and Profit in his Court. But He is so stout and stomachful, and full of haughty Malignity, that He can't be willing to accept the Offer: his rooted strong Pride and Malice have perfect Power over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his Heart: The Opposition of his Heart has the Mastery over Him, having an Influence on his Mind far superiour to the King's Grace and Condescension, and to all his kind Offers & Promises. Now, is it agreable to common Sense, to assert and stand to it, that there is no Difference between these two Cases, as to any Worthiness of Blame in the Prisoners; because, forsooth, there is a Necessity in both, and the required Act in each Case is impossible? 'Tis true, a Man's evil Dispositions may be as strong and immovable as the Bars of a Castle. But who can't see, that when a Man, in the latter Case, is said to be unable to obey the Command, the Expression is used improperly, and not in the Sense it has originally and in common Speech? And that it may properly be said to be in the Rebel's Power to come out of Prison, seeing he can easily do it if he pleases; tho' by Reason of his vile Temper of Heart which is fix'd and rooted, 'tis impossible that it should please Him?
Upon the whole, I presume there is no Person of good Understanding, who impartially considers the Things which have been observed, but will allow that 'tis not evident from the Dictates of the common Sense, or natural Notions of Mankind, that moral Necessity is inconsistent with Praise and Blame. And therefore, if the Arminians would prove any such Inconsistency, it must be by some philosophical and metaphysical Arguments, and not common Sense.
There is a grand Illusion in the pretended Demonstration of Arminians from common Sense. The main Strength of all these Demonstrations, lies in that Prejudice that arises thro' the insensible Change of the Use and Meaning of such Terms as Liberty, able, unable, necessary, impossible, unavoidable, invincible, Action, &c. from their original and vulgar Sense, to a metaphysical Sense entirely diverse; and the strong Connection of the Ideas of Blamelesness &c. with some of these Terms, by an Habit contracted and establish'd, while these Terms were used in their first Meaning. This Prejudice and Delusion is the Foundation of all those Positions they lay down as Maxims, by which most of the Scriptures, which they alledge in this Controversy, are interpreted, and on which all their pompous Demonstrations from Scripture and Reason depend. From this secret Delusion and Prejudice they have almost all their Advantages: 'Tis the Strength of their Bulwarks, and the Edge of their Weapons. And this is the main Ground of all the Right they have to treat their Neighbours in so assuming a Manner, and to insult others, perhaps as wise and good as themselves, as weak Bigots, Men that dwell in the dark Caves of Superstition, perversly set, obstinately shutting their Eyes against the Noon-day Light, Enemies to common Sense, maintaining the first-born of Absurdities, &c. &c. But perhaps an impartial Consideration of the Things which have been observed in the preceeding Parts of this Enquiry, may enable the Lovers of Truth better to judge, whose Doctrine is indeed absurd, abstruse, self-contradictory, and inconsistent with common Sense, and many Ways repugnant to the universal Dictates of the Reason of Mankind.
Corol. From Things which have been observed, it will follow, that it is agreable to common Sense to suppose, that the glorified Saints have not their Freedom at all diminish'd, in any Respect; and that God Himself has the highest possible Freedom, according to the true and proper Meaning of the Term; and that He is in the highest possible respect an Agent, and active in the Exercise of his infinite Holiness; tho' He acts therein in the highest Degree necessarily: and his Actions of this Kind are in the highest, most absolutely perfect Manner vertuous and praise-worthy; and are so, for that very Reason, because they are most perfectly necessary.