Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will, Part 2 · Section 9
SECTION IX. Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding.
IT is manifest, that the Acts of the Will are none of them contingent in such a Sense as to be without all Necessity, or so as not to be necessary with a Necessity of Consequence and Connection; because every Act of the Will is some Way connected with the Understanding, and is as the greatest apparent Good is, in the Manner which has already been explained; namely, that the Soul always wills or chuses that which, in the present View of the Mind, considered in the whole of that View, and all that belongs to it, appears most agreable. Because, as was observed before, No…hing is more evident than that, when Men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what appears most agreable to them; and to say otherwise, would be as much as to affirm, that Men don't chuse what appears to suit them best, or what seems most pleasing to them; or that they don't chuse what they prefer. Which brings the Matter to a Contradiction.
As 'tis very evident in it self, that the Acts of the Will have some Connection with the Dictates or Views of the Understanding, so this is allowed by some of the chief of the Arminian Writers: Particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Samuel Clark.— Dr. Turnbull, tho' a great Enemy to the Doctrine of Necessity, allows the same Thing. In his Christian Philosophy (P. 196.) He with much Approbation cites another Philosopher, as of the same Mind, in these Words: No Man (says an excellent Philosopher) sets himself about any Thing, but upon some View or other, which serves him for a Reason for wh…t he does; and whatsoever Faculties he employs, the Understanding, with such Light as it has, well or ill informed, constantly leads; and by that Light, true or false, all her operative Powers are directed. The Will it self, how absolute and incontroulable soever it may be thought, never fails in it's Obedience to the Dictates of the Understanding. Temples have their sacred Images; and we see what Influence they have always had over a great Part of Mankind; But in Truth, the Ideas and Images in Men's Minds are the invisible Powers that constantly govern them; and to these they all pay universally a ready Submission.
But whether this be in a just Consistence with Themselves, and their own Notions of Liberty, I desire may now be impartially considered.
Dr. Whitby plainly supposes, that the Acts and Determinations of the Will always follow the Understanding's Apprehension or View of the greatest Good to be obtain'd, or Evil to be avoided; or in other Words, that the Determinations of the Will constantly and infallibly follow these two Things in the Understanding: 1. The Degree of Good to be obtained, and Evil to be avoided, proposed to the Understanding, and apprehended, viewed, and taken Notice of by it. 2. The Degree of the Understanding's View, Notice or Apprehension of that Good or Evil; which is increased by Attention and Consideration. That this is an Opinion he is exceeding peremptory in (as he is in every Opinion which he maintains in his Controversy with the Calvinists) with Disdain of the contrary Opinion, as absurd and self-contradictory, will appear by the following Words of his, in his Discourse on the five Points.*Edit. 2d P. 211, 212, 21….
Now, 'tis certain, that what naturally makes the Understanding to perceive, is Evidence proposed, and apprehended, considered or adverted to: for Nothing else can be requisite to make us come to the Knowledge of the Truth.—Again, what makes the Will chuse, is something approved by the Understanding; and consequently appearing to the Soul as Good. And whatsoever it refuseth, is something represented by the Understanding, and so appearing to the Will, as Evil. Whence all that God requires of us is, and can be only this; to refuse the Evil, and chuse the Good. Wherefore, to say that Evidence proposed, apprehended and considered, is not sufficient to make the Understanding approve; or that the greatest Good proposed, the greatest Evil threatned, when equally believ'd and reflected on, is not sufficient to engage the Will to chuse the Good and refuse the Evil, is in Effect to say, that which alone doth move the Will to chuse or to refuse, is not sufficient to engage it so to do; which being contradictory to it self, must of Necessity be false. Be it then so, that we naturally have an Aversation to the Truths proposed to us in the Gospel; that only can make us indisposed to attend to them, but cannot hinder our Conviction, when we do apprehend them, and attend to them.— Be it, that there is in us also a Renitency to …he Good we are to chuse; that only can indispose us to believe it is, and to approve it as our chiefest Good. Be it, that we are prone to the Evil that we should decline; that only can render it the more difficult for us to believe it is the worst of Evils. But yet, what we do really believe to be our chiefest Good, will still be chosen; and what we apprehend to be the worst of Evils, will, whilst we do continue under that Conviction, be refused by us. It therefore can be only requisite, in order to these Ends, that the good Spirit should so illuminate our Understandings, that we attending to, and considering what lies before us, should apprehend, and be convinced of our Duty; and that the Blessings of the Gospel should be so propounded to us, as that we may discern them to be our chiefest Good; and the Miseries it threateneth, so as we may be convinced they are the worst of Evils; that we may chuse the one, and refuse the other.
Here let it be observed, how plainly and peremptorily it is asserted, that the greatest Good proposed, and the greatest Evil threatned, when equally believed and reflect…d on, is sufficient to engage the Will to chuse the Good, and refuse the Evil, and is that alone which doth move the Will to chuse or to refuse; and that it is contr…dictory to it self, to suppose otherwise; and therefore must of Necessity be false; and then what we do really believe to be our chiefest Good will still be chosen, and what we apprehend to be the worst of Evils, will, whilst we continue under that Conviction, be refused by us. Nothing could have been said more to the Purpose, fully to signify and declare, that the Determinations of the Will must evermore follow the Illumination, Conviction and Notice of the Understanding, with Regard to the greatest Good and Evil proposed, reckoning both the Degree of Good and Evil understood, and the Degree of Understanding, Notice and Conviction of that proposed Good and Evil; and that it is thus necessarily, and can be otherwise in no Instance: because it is asserted, that it implies a Contradiction, to suppose it ever to be otherwise.
I am sensible, the Doctor's Aim in these Assertions is against the Calvinists; to shew, in Opposition to them, that there is no Need of any physical Operation of the Spirit of God on the Will, to change and determine that to a good Choice, but that God's Operation and Assistance is only moral, suggesting Ideas to the Understanding; which he supposes to be enough, if those Ideas are attended to, infallibly to obtain the End. But whatever his Design was, Nothing can more directly and fully prove, that every Determination of the Will, in chusing and refusing, is necessary; directly contrary to his own Notion of the Liberty of the Will. For if the Determination of the Will, evermore, in this Manner, follows the Light, Conviction and View of the Understanding, concerning the greatest Good and Evil, and this be that alone which moves the Will, and it be a Contradiction to suppose otherwise; then it is necessarily so, the Will necessarily follows this Light or View of the Understanding, not only in some of it's Acts, but in every Act of chusing and refusing. So that the Will don't determine it self in any one of it's own Acts; but all it's Acts, every Act of Choice and Refusal, depends on, and is necessarily connected with some antecedent Cause; which Cause is not the Will it self, nor any Act of it's own, nor any Thing pertaining to that Faculty, but something belonging to another Faculty, whose Acts go before the Will, in all it's Acts, and govern and determine them every one.
Here, if it should be replied, that altho' it be true, that according to the Doctor, the final Determination of the Will always depends upon, and is infallibly connected with the Understanding's Conviction, and Notice of the greatest Good; yet the Acts of the Will are not necessary; because that Conviction and Notice of the Understanding is first dependent on a preceeding Act of the Will, in determining to attend to, and take Notice of the Evidence exhibited; by which Means the Mind obtains that Degree of Conviction which is sufficient and effectual to determine the consequent and ultimate Choice of the Will; and that the Will with Regard to that preceeding Act, whereby it determines whether to attend or no, is not necessary; and that in this, the Liberty of the Will consists, that when God holds forth sufficient objective Light, the Will is at Liberty whether to command the Attention of the Mind to it.
Nothing can be more weak and inconsiderate than such a Reply as this. For that preceeding Act of the Will, in determining to attend and consider, still is an Act of the Will (it is so to be sure, if the Liberty of the Will consists in it, as is supposed) and if it be an Act of the Will, it is an Act of Choice or Refusal. And therefore, if what the Doctor asserts be true, it is determined by some antecedent Light in the Understanding concerning the greatest apparent Good or Evil. For he asserts, it is that Light which alone doth move the Will to chuse or refuse. And therefore the Will must be moved by that in chusing to attend to the objective Light offered, in order to another consequent Act of Choice: so that this Act is no less necessary than the other. And if we suppose another Act of the Will, still preceeding both these mention'd, to determine both, still that also must be an Act of the Will, & an Act of Choice; and so must, by the same Principles, be infallibly determin'd by some certain Degree of Light in the Understanding concerning the greatest Good. And let us suppose as many Acts of the Will, one preceeding another, as we please, yet they are every one of them necessarily determined by a certain Degree of Light in the Understanding, concerning the greatest and most eligible Good in that Case; and so, not one of them free according to Dr. Whitby's Notion of Freedom. And if it be said, the Reason why Men don't attend to Light held forth, is because of ill Habits contracted by evil Acts committed before, whereby their Minds are indisposed to attend to, and consider of the Truth held forth to them by God, the Difficulty is not at all avoided: still the Question returns, What determined the Will in those preceeding evil Acts? It must, by Dr. Whitby's Principles, still be the View of the Understanding concerning the greatest Good and Evil. If this View of the Understanding be that alone which doth move the Will to chuse or refuse, as the Doctor asserts, th…n every Act of Choice or Refusal, from a Man's first Existence, is moved and determined by this View; and this View of the Understanding exciting and governing the Act, must be before the Act: And therefore the Will is necessarily determined, in every one of it's Acts, from a Man's first Existence, by a Cause beside the Will, & a Cause that don't proceed from, or depend on any Act of the Will at all. Which at once utterly abolishes the Doctor's whole Scheme of Liberty of Will; and he, at one Stroke, has cut the Sinews of all his Arguments from the Goodness, Righteousness, Faithfulness and Sinc…rity of God, in his Commands, Promises, Threatnings, Calls, Invitations, Expostulations; which … makes … of, under the Heads of Reprobation, Election, Univer… Redemption, sufficient and effectual Grace, and the Freedom of the Will of Man; and has enervated and made vain all those Exclamations against the Doctrine of the Calvinists, as charging God with manifest Unrighteousness, Unfaithfulness, Hypocrisy, Fallaciousness, and Cruelty; which he has over, and over, and over again, numberless Times in his Book.
Dr. Samuel Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, †Edit. 6. P. 93.to evade the Argument to prove the Necessity of Volition, from it's necessary Connection with the last Dictate of the Understanding, supposes the latter not to be diverse from the Act of the Will it self. But if it be so, it will not alter the Case as to the Evidence of the Necessity of the Act of the Will. If the Dictate of the Understanding be the very same with the Determination of the Will or Choice, as Dr. Clark supposes, then this Determination is no Fruit or Effect of Choice: And if so, no Liberty of Choice has any Hand in it: As to Volition or Choice, it is necessary; That is, Choice can't prevent it. If the last Dictate of the Understanding be the same with the Determination of Volition it self, then the Existence of that Determination must be necessary as to Volition; in as much as Volition can have no Opportunity to determine whether it shall exist or no, it having Existence already before Volition has Opportunity to determine any Thing. It is it self the very Ri…e and Existence of Volition. But a Thing, after it exists, has no Opportunity to determine as to it's own Existence; it is too late for that.
If Liberty consists in that which Arminians suppose, viz. in the Will's determining it's own Acts, having …ree Opportunity, and being without all Necessity; This is the same as to say, that Liberty consists in the Soul's having Power and Opportunity to have what Determinations of the Will it pleases or chuses. And if the Determinations of the Will, and the last Dictates of the Understanding be the same Thing, then Liberty consists in the Mind's having Power to have what Dictates of the Understanding it pleases, having Opportunity to chuse it's own Dictates of Understanding. But this is absurd; for it is to make the Determination of Choice prior to the Dictate of Understanding, and the Ground of it; which can't consist … the Dictate of Understanding's being the Determination … Choice … ▪
Here is no Way to do in this Case … to the old Absurdity, of one … another, and the Cause of it; and another before … determining that; and so on in infinitum. If the last … of the Understanding be the Determination of the Will it self, and the Soul be free with Regard to that Dictate, in the Arminian Notion of Freedom; th…n the Soul, before that Dictate of it's Understanding ex…sts, voluntarily and according to it's own Choice determines, in every Case, what that Dictate of the Understanding shall be; otherwise that Dictate, as to the Will, is necessary; and the Acts determined by it, must also be necessary. So that here is a Determination of the Mind prior to that Dictate of the Understanding, an Act of Choice going before it, chusing and determining what that Dictate of the Understanding shall be: and this preceeding Act of Choice, being a free Act of Will, must also be the same with another last Dictate of the Understanding: And if the Mind also be free in that Dictate of Understanding, that must be determined still by another; and so on forever.
Besides, if the Dictate of the Understanding, and Determination of the Will be the same, this confounds the Understanding and Will, and makes them the same. Whether they be the same or no, I will not now dispute; but only would observe, that if it be so, and the Arminian Notion of Liberty consists in a Self-determining Power in the Understanding, free of all Necessity; being independent, undetermined by any Thing prior to it's own Acts and Determinations; and the more the Understanding is thus independent, and sovereign over it's own Determinations, the more free. By th…s therefore the Freedom of the Soul, as a moral Agent, must consist in the Independence of the Understanding on any Evidence or Appearance of Things, or any Thing whatsoever that stands forth to the View of the Mind, prior to the Understanding's Determination. And what a Sort of Liberty is this! consisting in an Ability, Freedom and Easiness of judging, either according to Evidence, or against it; having a sovereign Command over it self at all Times, to judge, either agreably or disagreably to what is plainly exhibite… to it's own View. Certainly, 'tis no Liberty that renders Persons the proper Subjects of perswasive Reasoning, Argument▪ Expo…ulations, and such like moral Means …nd Induceme… ▪ The Use of which with Mankind, is a … Arminians, to defend their Notion of … Necessity. For according to this, the more … they are under the Government … subject to the Power of Evidence and … more independent on their Influence, in their ….
And whether the Understanding and Will are the same or no, as Dr. Clark seems to suppose, yet in order to maintain the Arminian Notion of Liberty without Necessity, the free Will is not determined by the Understanding, nor necessarily connected w…t… the Understanding; and the further from such Connection, the greater the Freedom. And when the Liberty is full and compleat, the Determinations of the Will have no Connection at all with the Dictates of the Understanding. And if so, in … are all Applications to the Understanding, in order to induce to any free vertuous Act; and so in vain are all Instructions, Counsels, Invitations, Expostulations, and all Arguments & Perswasives whatsoever: For these are but Applications to the Understanding, and a clear and lively Exhibit…on of the Objects of Choi…e to the Mind's View. But if, after all, the Will must be self-determined, and independent on the Understanding, to what Purpose are Things thus represented to the Understanding, in order to determine the Choice?