Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will, Part 2 · Section 7
SECTION VII. Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will consisting in Indifference.
WHAT has been said in the foregoing Section, has a Tendency in some Measure to evince the Absurdity of the Opinion of such as place Liberty in Indifference, or in that Equilibrium whereby the Will is without all antecedent Determination or Bias, and left hitherto free from any prepossessing Inclination to one Side or the other; that the Determination of the Will to either Side may be entirely from it self, and that it may be owing only to it's own Power, and that Sovereignty which it has over it self, that it goes this Way rather than that.‖Dr. Whitby, and some other Arminians, make a Distinction of different Kinds of Freedom; one of God, and perfect Spirits above▪ another of Persons in a State of Trial. The former Dr. Whitby allows to consist with Necessity; the latter he holds to be without Necessity: And this latter he supposes to be requisite to our being the Subjects of Praise or Dispraise, Rewards or Punishments, Precepts and Prohibitions, Promises and Threats, Exhortations and Dehortations, and a Covenant-Treaty. And to this Freedom he supposes Indifference to be requisite. In his Discourse on the five Points, P. 299, 300, he says; It is a Freedom (speaking of a Freedom not only from Co-action, but from Necessity) requisite, as we conceive, to render us capable of Trial or Probation, and to render our Actions worthy of Praise or Dispraise, and our Persons of Rewards or Punishments. And in the next Page, speaking of the same Matter, He says, Excellent to this Purpose, are the Words of Mr. Thorndike: We say not, that Indifference is requisite to all Freedom, but to the Freedom of Man alone in this State of …ravail and Proficience: the Ground of which is God's Tender of a Treaty, and Conditions of Peace and Reconcilement to fallen Man, together with those Precepts and Prohibitions, those Promises and Threats, those Exhortations & Dehortations, it is enforced with.
But in as much as this has been of such long standing, and has been so generally received, and so much insisted on by Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, Iesuits, Socinians, Arminians, and others, it may deserve a more full Consideration. And therefore I shall now proceed to a more particular and thorough Enquiry into this Notion.
Now lest some should suppose that I don't understand those that place Liberty in Indifference, or should charge me with misrepresenting their Opinion, I would signify, that I am sensible, there are some, who when they talk of the Liberty of the Will as consisting in Indifference, express themselves as tho' they would not be understood of the Indifference of the Inclination or Tendency of the Will, but of, I know not what, Indifference of the Soul's Power of Willing; or that the Will, with Respect to it's Power or Ability to chuse, is indifferent, can go either Way indifferently, either to the right Hand or left, either act or forbear to act, one as well as the other. Tho' this seems to be a Refining only of some particular Writers, and newly invented, and which will by no Means consist with the Manner of Expression used by the Defenders of Liberty of Indifference in general. And I wish such Refiners would thoroughly consider, whether they distinctly know their own Meaning, when they make a Distinction between Indifference of the Soul as to it's Power or Abi…ity of Willing or Chusing, and the Soul's Indifference as to the Preference or Choice it self; and whether they don't deceive themselves in imagining that they have any distinct Meaning at all. The Indifference of the Soul as to it's Ability or Power to Will, must be the same Thing as the Indifference of the State of the Power or Faculty of the Will, or the Indifference of the State which the Soul it self, which has that Power or Faculty, hitherto remains in, as to the Exercise of that Power, in the Choice it shall by and by make.
But not to insist any longer on the Abstruseness and Inexplicableness of this Distinction; let what will be supposed concerning the Meaning of them that make Use of it, thus much must at least be intended by Arminians, when they talk of Indifference as essential to Liberty of Will, if they intend any Thing, in any Respect to their Purpose, viz. That it is such an Indifference as leaves the Will not determined already; but free from actual Possession, and vacant of Predetermination, so far, that there may be Room for the Exercise of the Self-determining Power of the Will; and that the Will's Freedom consists in, or depends upon this Vacancy and Opportunity that is left for the Will it self to be the Determiner of the Act that is to be the free Act.
And here I would observe in the first Place, that to make out this Scheme of Liberty, the Indifference must be perfect and abs…lute; there must be a perfect Freedom from all antecedent Preponderation or Inclination. Because if the Will be already inclined, before it exerts it's own sovereign Power on it self, then it's Inclination is not wholly owing to it self: If when two Opposites are proposed to the Soul for it's Choice, the Proposal don't find the Soul wholly in a State of Indifference, then it is not found in a State of Liberty for meer Self-determination. — The least Degree of antecedent Bias must be inconsistent with their Notion of Liberty. For so long as prior Inclination possesses the Will, and is not removed, it binds the Will, so that it is utterly impossible that the Will should act otherwise than agreably to it. Surely the Will can't act or chuse contrary to a remaining prevailing Inclination of the Will. To suppose otherwise, would be the same Thing as to suppose, that the Will is inclined contrary to it's present prevailing Inclination, or contrary to what it is inclined to. That which the Will chuses and prefers, that, all Things considered, it preponderates and inclines to. It is equally impossible for the Will to chuse contrary to it's own remaining and present preponderating Inclination, as 'tis to prefer contrary to it's own present Preference, or chuse contrary to it's own present Choice. The Will therefore, so long as it is under the Influence of an old preponderating Inclination, is not at Liberty for a new free Act, or any Act that shall now be an Act of Self-determination. The Act which is a Self-determin'd free Act, must be an Act which the Will determines in the Possession and Use of such a Liberty, as consists in a Freedom from every Thing, which, if it were there, would make it impossible that the Will, at that Time, should be otherwise th…n that Way to which it tends.
If any one should say, there is no Need that th… Indifference should be perfect; but altho' a former Inclination and Preference still remains, yet, if it … very strong and violent, possibly the Strength of the Will may oppose and overcome it:—
This is grosly absur'd; for the Strength of the Will. … it …e never so great, does not at all enable it to a…t one Way, and not the contrary Way, both at the same Tim… ▪ … gives it no such Sov…reign… and Command, …s to … self to prefer and not to prefer at the same Time, or to chuse contrary to it's own present Choice.
Therefore, if there be the least Degree of antecedent Preponderation of the Will, it must be perfectly abolished, before the Will can be at Liberty to determine it self the contrary Way. And if the Will determines it self the same Way, it was not a free Determination, because the Will is not wholly at Liberty in so doing: It's Determination is not altogether from it self, but it was partly determined before, in it's prior Inclination: And all the Freedom the Will exercises in the Case, is in an Increase of Inclination, which it gives it self, over and above what it had by foregoing Bias; so much is from it self, and so much is from perfect Indifference. For tho' the Will had a previous Tendency that Way, yet as to that additional Degree of Inclination, it had no Tendency. Therefore the previous Tendency is of no Consideration, with Respect to the Act wherein the Will is free. So that it comes to the same Thing which was said at first, that as to the Act of the Will, wherein the Will is free, there must be perfect Indifference, or Equilibrium.
To illustrate this; If we should suppose a sovereign Self-moving Power in a natural Body: But that the Body is in Motion already, by an antecedent Bias; for Instance, Gravitation towards the Center of the Earth; and has one Degree of Motion already, by Vertue of that previous Tendency; but by it's self-moving Power it adds one Degree more to it's Motion, and …oves so much more swiftly towards the Center of the Earth than it would do by it's Gravity only: It is evident, that all that is owing to a self-moving Power in this Case, is the additional Degree of Motion; and that the other Degree of Motion which it had from Gravity, is of no Consideration in the Case, don't help the Effect of the free self-moving Power in the least; the Effect is just the same▪ as if the Body had received from it self one Degree of Motion from a State of perfect Rest. So if we should suppose a self-moving Power given to the Scale of a Ba…ance, which has a Weight of one Degree beyond the opposite Scale; and we ascribe to it an Ability to add to it s…lf another Degree of Force the same Way, by it's self-…oving Power; This is ju…t the same Thing as to as…ribe to it a Power to give it s…lf one Degree of Preponderation from a … E…ilibr…um; and so much Power as the Scale has to give it self an Over-balance from a perfect Equipoise, so much self-moving self-preponderating Power it has, and no more. So that it's free Power this Way is always to be measured from perfect Equilibrium.
I need say no more to prove, that, if Indifference be essential to Liberty, it must be perfect Indifference; and that so far as the Will is destitute of this, so far it is destitute of that Freedom by which it is it's own Master, and in a Capacity of being it's own Determiner, without being at all passive, or subject to the Power and Sway of something else, in it's Motions and Determinations.
Having observed these Things, let us now try whether this Notion of the Liberty of Will consisting in Indifference and Equilibrium, and the Will's Self-determination in such a State, be not absurd and inconsistent.
And here I would lay down this as an Axiom of undoubted Truth; That every free Act is done in a State of Freedom, and not only after such a State. If an Act of the Will be an Act wherein the Soul is free, it must be exerted in a State of Freedom, and in the Time of Freedom. It will not suffice, that the Act immediately follows a State of Liberty; but Liberty must yet continue, and co-exist with the Act; the Soul remaining in Possession of Liberty. Because that is the Notion of a free Act of the Soul, even an Act wherein the Soul uses or exercises Liberty. But if the Soul is not, in the very Time of the Act, in the Possession of Liberty, it can't at that Time be in the Use of it.
Now the Question is, whether ever the Soul of Man puts forth any Act of Will, while it yet remains in a State of Liberty, in that Notion of a State of Liberty, viz. as implying a State of Indifference; or whether the Soul ever exerts an Act of Choice or Preference, while at that very Time the Will is in a perfect Equilibrium, not inclining one Way more than another. The very putting of the Question is sufficient to shew the Absurdity of the affirmative Answer: For how ridiculous would it be for any Body to insist, that the Soul chuses one Thing before another, when at the very same Instant it is perfectly indifferent with Respect to each! This is the same Thing as to say, the Soul prefers one Thing to another, at the very same Time that it has no Preference.— Choice and Preference can no more be in a State of Indifference, than Motion can be in a State of Rest, or than the Preponderation of the Scale of a Balance can be in a State of Equilibrium, Motion may be the next Moment a…te… Re…; but can't co-exist with it, in any, even the least Part of it. So Choice may be immediately after a State of Indifference, but has no Co-existence wi…h it: Even the very Beginning of it is not in a State of Indifference. And therefore if this be Liberty, no Act of the Will, in any Degree, is ever performed in a State of Liberty, or in the Time of Liberty. Volition and Liberty are so far from agreeing together, and being essential one to another, that they are contrary one to another, and one excludes and destroys the other, as much as Motion and Rest, Light and Darkness, or Life & Death. So that the Will acts not at all, does not so much as begin to act in the Time of such Liberty: Freedom is perfectly at an End, and has ceased to be, at the first Moment of Action; and therefore Liberty can't reach the Action, to affect, or qualify it, or give it a Denomination, or any Part of it, any more than if it had ceased to be twenty Years before the Action began. The Moment that Liberty ceases to be, it ceases to be a Qualification of any Thing. If Light and Darkness succeed one another instantaneously, Light qualifies Nothing after it is gone out, to make any thing lightsome or bright, any more at the first Moment of perfect Darkness, than Months or Years after. Life denominates Nothing vital at the first Moment of perfect Death. So Freedom, if it consists in, or implies Indifference, can denominate Nothing free, at the first Moment of Preference or Preponderation. Therefore 'tis manifest, that no Liberty which the Soul is possessed of, or ever uses, in any of it's Acts of Volition, consis…s in Indifference; and that the Opinion of such as suppose, that Indifference belongs to the very Essence of Liberty, is to the highest Degree absurd and contradictory.
If any one should imagine, that this Manner of arguing ing is Nothing but Trick and Delusion; and to evade the Reasoning, should say, that the Thing wherein the Will exercises it's Liberty, is not in the Act of Choice or Preponderation it self, but in determining it self to a certain Choice o… Preference; That the Act of the Will wherein it is free, and uses it's own Sovereignty, consists in it's causing or determining the Change or Transition from a State of Indifference to a certain Preference, or determining to give a certain Turn to the Balance, which has hitherto been even; and that this Act the Will exe…ts in a State of Liberty, or while the Will yet remains in Equilibrium, and perfect Master of it self:— I say, if any One chuses to express his Notion of Liberty after this, or some such Manner, let us see if he can make out his Matters any better than before.
What is asserted is, that the Will, while it yet remains in perfect Equilibrium, without Preference, determines to change it self from that State, and excite in it self a certain Choice or Preference. Now let us see whether this don't come to the same Absurdity we had before. If it be so, that the Will, while it yet remains perfectly Indifferent, determines to put it self out of that State, and give it self a certain Preponderation; Then I would enquire, whether the Soul don't determine this of Choice; or whether the Will's coming to a Determination to do so, be not the same Thing as the Soul's coming to a Choice to do so. If the Soul don't determine this of Choice, or in the Exercise of Choice, then it don't determine it voluntarily. And if the Soul don't determine it voluntarily, or of it's own Will, then in what Sense does it's Will determine it? And if the Will don't determine it, then how is the Liberty of the Will exercised in the Determination? What Sort of Liberty is exercised by the Soul in those Determinations, wherein there is no exercise of Choice, which are not voluntary, and wherein the Will is not concerned?— But if it be allowed, that this Determination is an Act of Choice, and it be insisted on, that the Soul, while it yet remains in a State of perfect Indifference, chuses to put it self out of that State, and to turn it sel… one Way; then the Soul is already come to a Choice, and chuses that Way. And so we have the very same Absurdity which we had before. Here is the Soul in a State of Choice, and in a State of Equilibrium, both at the same Time: the Soul already chusing one Way, while it remains in a State of perfect Indifference, and has no Choice of one Way more than the other.— And indeed this Manner of talking, tho' it may a little hide the Absurdity, in the Obscurity of Expression, is more nonsensical, and increases the Inconsistence. To say, the free Act of the Will, or the Act which the Will exerts in a State of Freedom and Indifference, does not imply Preference in it, but is what the Will does in Order to causing or producing a Preference, is as much as to say, the Soul chuses (for to Will and to Chuse are the same Thing) without Choice, and prefers without Preference, in order to cause or produce the Beginning of a Preference, or the first Choice. And that is, that the first Choice is exerted without Choice, in order to produce it self.
If any, to evade these Things, should own, that a State of Liberty, and a State of Indifference are not the same, and that the former may be without the latter; But should say, that Indifference is still essential to the Freedom of an Act of Will, in some Sort, namely, as 'tis necessary to go immediately before it; It being essential to the Freedom of an Act of Will that it should directly and immediately arise out of a State of Indifference: still this will not help the Cause of Arminian Liberty, or make it consistent with it self. For if the Act springs immediately out of a State of Indifference, then it do's not arise from antecedent Choice or Preference. But if the Act arises directly out of a State of Indifference, without any intervening Choice to chuse and determine it, then the Act not being determined by Choice, is not determined by the Will; the Mind exercises no free Choice in the Affair, and free Choice and free Will have no Hand in the Determination of the Act. Which is entirely inconsistent with their Notion of the Freedom of Volition.
If any should suppose, that these Difficulties and Absurdities may be avoided, by saying, that the Liberty of the Mind consists in a Power to suspend the Act of the Will, and so to keep it in a State of Indifference, 'till there has been Opportunity for Consideration; and so shall say, that however Indifference is not essential to Liberty in such a Manner, that the Mind must make it's Choice in a State of Indifference, which is an Inconsistency, or that the Act of Will must spring immediately out of Indifference; yet Indifference may be essential to the Liberty of Acts of the Will in this Respect; viz. That Liberty consists in a Power of the Mind to forbear or suspend the Act of Volition, and keep the Mind in a State of Indifference for the present, 'till there has been Opportunity for proper Deliberation: I say, if any one imagines that this helps the Matter, it is a great Mistake: It reconciles no Inconsistency, and relieves no Difficulty which the Affair is attended with. — For here the following Things must be observed,
1. That this suspending of Volition, if there be properly any such Thing, is it self an Act of Volition. If the Mind determines to suspend it's Act, it determines it voluntarily; it chuses, on some Consideration, to suspend it. And this Choice or Determination, is an Act of the Will: And indeed it is supposed to be so in the very Hypothesis; for 'tis supposed, that the Liberty of the Will consists in it's Power to do thus, and that it's doing it is the very Thing wherein the Will exercises it's Liberty. But how can the Will exercise Liberty in it, if it ben't an Act of the Will? The Liberty of the Will is not exercised in any Thing but what the Will does.
2. This determining to suspend acting is not only an Act of the Will, but 'tis supposed to be the only free Act of the Will; because it is said, that this is the Thing wherein the Liberty of the Will consists.—Now if this be so, then this is all the Act of Will that we have to consider in this Controversy, about the Liberty of Will, and in our Enquiries, wherein the Liberty of Man consists. And now the forementioned Difficulties remain: the former Question returns upon us; viz. Wherein consists the Freedom of the Will in those Acts wherein it is free? And if this Act of determining a Suspension be the only Act in which the Will is free, then wherein consists the Will's Freedom with Respect to this Act of Suspension? And how is Indifference essential to this Act? The Answer must be, according to what is supposed in the …vasion under Consideration, That the Liberty of the Will in this Act of Suspension, consists in a Power to suspend even this Act, 'till there has been Opportunity for thorough Deliberation. But this will be to plunge directly into the grossest Nonsense: for 'tis the Act of Suspension it self that we are speaking of; and there is no Room for a Space of Deliberation and Suspension, in order to determine whether we will suspend or no. For that supposes, that even Suspension it self may be defer'd: Which is absurd; for the very deferring the Determination of Suspension, to consider whether we will suspend or no, will be actually suspending. For during the Space of Suspension, to consider whether to suspend, the Act is ipso facto suspended. There is no Medium between suspending to act, and immediately acting; and therefore no Possibility of avoiding either the one or the other one Moment; and so no Room for Deliberation before we do either of them.
And besides, this is attended with ridiculous Absurdity another Way: For now it is come to that, that Liberty consists wholly in the Mind's having Power to suspend it's Determination whether to suspend or no; that there may be Time for Consideration, whether it be best to suspend. And if Liberty consists in this only, then this is the Liberty under Consideration: We have to enquire now, how Liberty with Respect to this Act of suspending a Determination of Suspension, consists in Indifference, or how Indifference is essential to it. The Answer, according to the Hypothesis we are upon, must be, that it consists in a Power of suspending even this last mentioned Act, to have Time to consider whether to suspend that. And then the same Difficulties and Enquiries return over again with Respect to that; and so on forever. Which, if it would shew any Thing, would shew only that there is no such Thing as a free Act. It drives the Exercise of Freedom back in infinitum; and that is to drive it out of the World.
And besides all this, there is a Delusion, and a latent gross Contradiction in the Affair another Way; in as much as in explaining how, or in what Respect the Will is free with Regard to a particular Act of Volition, 'tis said, that it's Liberty consists in a Power to determine to suspend that Act, which places Liberty not in that Act of Volition which the Enquiry is about, but altogether in another antecedent Act. Which contradicts the Thing supposed in both the Question and Answer. The Question is, wherein consists the Mind's Liberty in any particular Act of Volition? And the Answer, in pretending to shew wherein lies the Mind's Liberty in that Act, in Effect says, it don't lie in that Act at all, but in another, viz. a Volition to suspend that Act. And therefore the Answer is both contradictory, and altogether impertinent and beside the Purpose. For it don't shew wherein the Liberty of the Will consists in the Act in Question; Instead of that, it supposes it don't consist in that Act at all, but in another distinct from it, even a Volition to suspend that Act, and take Time to consider of it. And no Account is pretended to be given wherein the Mind is free with Respect to that Act, wherein this Answer supposes the Liberty of the Mind indeed consists, viz. the Act of Suspension, or of determining the Suspension.
On the whole, 'tis exceeding manifest, that the Liberty of the Mind does not consist in Indifference, and that Indifference is not essential or necessary to it, or at all belonging to it, as the Arminians suppose; that Opinion being full of Nothing but Absurdity and Self-Contradiction.