Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will, Part 2 · Section 4
SECTION IV. Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the Activity of the Nature of the Soul.
THE Author of the Essay on the Freedom of the Will in God and the Creatures, in Answer to that Objection against his Doctrine of a Self-determining Power in the Will, (P. 68, 69.) That Nothing is, or comes to pass, without a sufficient Reason why it is, and why it is in this Manner rather than another, allows that it is thus in corporeal Things, which are properly and philosophically speaking passive Beings; but denies that it is thus in Spirits, which are Beings of an active Nature, who have the Spring of Action within themselves, and can determine themselves. By which it is plainly supposed, that such an Event as an Act of the Will, may come to pass in a Spirit, without a sufficient Reason why it comes to pass, or why it is after this Manner, rather than another; by Reason of the Activity of the Nature of a Spirit.— But certainly this Author, in this Matter, must be very unwary and inadvertent. For,
1. The Objection or Difficulty proposed by this Author, seems to be forgotten in his Answer or Solution. The very Difficulty, as he himself proposes it, is this; How an Event can come to pass without a sufficient Reason why it is, or why it is in this Manner rather than another? Instead of solving this Difficulty, or answering this Question with Regard to Volition, as he proposes, he forgets himself, and answers another Question quite diverse, and wholly inconsistent with this, viz. What is a sufficient Reason why it is, and why it is in this Manner rather than another? And he assigns the Active Being's own Determination as the Cause, and a Cause sufficient for the Effect; and leaves all the Difficulty unresolved, and the Question unanswered, which yet returns, even, How the Soul's own Determination, which he speaks of, came to exist, and to be what it was without a Cause? The Activity of the Soul may enable it to be the Cause of Effects; but it don't at all enable or …elp it to be the Subject of Effects which have no Cause; which is the Thing this Author supposes concerning Acts of the Will. Activity of Nature will no more enable a Being to produce Effects, and determine the Manner of their Existence, within it self, without a Cause, than out of it self, in some other Being. But if an active Being should, through it's Activity, produce and determine an Effect in some external Object, how absurd would it be to say, that the Effect was produced without a Cause!
2. The Question is not so much, How a Spirit endowed with Activity comes to act, as why it exerts such an Act, and not another; or why it acts with such a particular Determination? If Activity of Nature be the Cause why a Spirit (the Soul of Man for Instance) acts, and don't lie still; yet that alone is not the Cause why it's Action is thus and thus limited, directed and determined. Active Nature is a general Thing; 'tis an Ability or Tendency of Nature to Action, generally taken; which may be a Cause why the Soul acts as Occasion or Reason is given; but this alone can't be a sufficient Cause why the Soul exerts such a particular Act, at such a Time, rather than others. In order to this, there must be something besides a general Tendency to Action; there must also be a particular Tendency to that individual Action.— If it should be asked, why the Soul of Man uses it's Activity in such a Manner as it does; and it should be answered, that the Soul uses it's Activity thus, rather than otherwise, because it has Activity; would such an Answer satisfy a rational Man? Would it not rather be looked upon as a very impertinent one?
3. An active Be…ng can bring no Effects to pass by his Activity, but what are consequent upon his acting: He produces Nothing by his Activity, any other Way than by the Exercise of his Activity, and so Nothing but the Fruits of it's Exercise: He brings Nothing to pass by a dormant Activity. But the Exercise of his Activity is Action; and so his Action, or Exercise of his Activity, must be prior to the Effects of his Activity. If an active Being produces an Effect in another Being, about which his Activity is conversant, the Effect being the Fruit of his Activity, his Activity must be first exercised or exerted, and the Effect of it must follow. So it must be, with equal Reason, if the active Being is his own Object, and his Activity is conversant about Himself, to produce and determine some Effect in hi…lf; still the Exercise of his Activity must go before the Effect, which he brings to pass and determines by it. And therefore his Activity can't be the Cause of the Determination of the first Action, or Exercise of Activity it self, whence the Effects of Activity arise; for that would imply a Contradiction; It would be to say, the first Exercise of Activity is before the first Exercise of Activity, and is the Cause of it.
4. That the Soul, tho' an active Substance, can't diversify it's own Acts, but by first acting; or be a determining Cause of different Acts, or any different Effects, sometimes of one Kind, and sometimes of another, any other Way than in Consequence of it's own diverse Acts, is manifest by this; That if so, then the same Cause, the same causal Power, Force or Influence, without Variation in any Respect, would produce different Effects at different Times. For the same Substance of the Soul before it acts, and the same active Nature of the Soul before it is exerted (i. e. before in the Order of Nature) would be the Cause of different Effects, viz. different Volitions at different Times. But the Substance of the Soul before it acts, and it's active Nature before it is exerted, are the same without Variation. For 'tis some Act that makes the first Variation in the Cause, as to any causal Exertion, Force or Influence. But if it be so, that the Soul has no different Causality, or diverse causal Force or Influence, in producing these diverse Effects; then 'tis evident, that the Soul has no Influence, no Hand in the diversity of the Effect; and that the Difference of the Effect can't be owing to any Thing in the Soul; or which is the same Thing, the Soul don't determine the Diversity of the Effect; which is contrary to the Supposition. — 'Tis true, the Substance of the Soul before it acts, and before there is any Difference in that Respect, may be in a different State and Circumstances: But those whom I oppose, will not allow the different Circumstances of the Soul to be the determining Causes of the Acts of the Will. … bein… contrary to th…n Notion of Self-determ…natio… …nd Self-motion.
5. Let us suppose, as these Divines do, that there are no Acts of the Soul, strictly speaking, but free Volitions; Then it will follow, that the Soul is an active Being in Nothing further than it is a voluntary or elective Being; and whenever it produces Effects actively, it produces Effects voluntarily and electively. But to produce Effects thus, is the same Thing as to produce Effects in Consequence of, and according to it's own Choice. And if so, then surely the Soul don't by it's Activity produce all it's own Acts of Will or Choice themselves: For this, by the Supposition, is to produce all it's free Acts of Choice voluntarily and electively, or in Consequence of it's own free Acts of Choice, which brings the Matter directly to the fore-mentioned Contradiction, of a free Act of Choice before the first free Act of Choice.— According to these Gentlemen's own Notion of Action, if there arises in the Mind a Volition without a free Act of the Will or Choice to determine and produce it, the Mind is not the active voluntary Cause of that Volition; because it don't arise from, nor is regulated by Choice or Design. And therefore it can't be, that the Mind should be the active, voluntary, determining Cause of the first and leading Volition that relates to the Affair. — The Mind's being a designing Cause, only enables it to produce Effects in Consequence of it's Design; it will not enable it to be the designing Cause of all it's own Designs. The Mind's being an elective Cause, will only enable it to produce Effects in Consequence of it's Elections, and according to them; but can't enable it to be the elective Cause of all it's own Elections; because that supposes an Election before the first Election. So the Mind's being an active Cause enables it to produce Effects in Consequence of it's own Acts, but can't enable it to be the determining Cause of all it's own Acts; for that is still in the same Manner a Contradiction; as it supposes a determining Act conversant about the first Act, and prior to it, having a causal Influence on it's Existence, and Manner of Existence.
I can conceive of Nothing else that can be meant by the Soul's having Power to cause and determine it's own Volitions, as a Being to whom God has given a Power of Action, but this; that God has given Power to the Soul, sometimes at least, to excite Volitions at it's Pleasure, or according as it chuses. And this certainly supposes, in all such Cases, a Choice preceeding all Volitions which are thus caused▪ even the very first of them. Which runs into the fore-mentioned great Absurdity.
Therefore the Activity of the Nature of the Soul affords no Relief from the Difficulties which the Notion of a Self-determining Power in the Will is attended with, nor will it help, in the least, it's Absurdities and Inconsistences.