Touching our Present Impositions of Loyalty and Obedience, Chapter 5
CHAP. V. The Solution of an Objection, That Majestas imperij and Salus populi may not be rendered inconsistent with one another.
FOr the impugning the Doctrine of indefinite Subjection there are several things I know alledged, which might swell my Book more then is needful. Some instances (as of David and the Macchabees) are brought out of the Old Testament; and many things in reference to Religion have been said in the late times. But forasmuch as we have so much Scripture against Resistance as there is in the New, and so many precepts there, of Patience, of Suffering, of Faith, of the Cross: I shall commend these Texts ensuing, Mat. 5.39. Luk. 6.29. Ro. 12.17. Mat. 5.10, 11, 12. 2 Cor. 4.17. Ja. 5.10, Heb. 10.32, 33, 34. Heb. 11.35, 36, 37. Mat. 16.24. Mark 8.34, 35. Heb. 3.1, 2, 3. Phil. 2.6.8. 1 Pet. 2.18, 19, 20, 21, to the Consciences of every sober Christian, as in the sight of God, and content my self with that of Grotius for this place. Illa questio gravior, an quantum Davidi, an quantum Machabaeis licuit, liceat & Christianis, quorum Magister crucem subire toties jubens, exactiorem patientiam videtur requirere. Certe ubi Superiores ob religionem mortem inteutant Christianis, Christus fugam concedit, ultra fugam nihil.
And unto this Dr. Hammond in his papers between him and Mr. Marshal gives his suffrage. But there is an Objection of an higher moment, wherein I see not that they come off so easily; An objection of another Topick then from Example, which indeed enters the very Nature and End of Government it self, and cannot be waved with faithfulness to this cause. It is this. If there be such a Power attributed to Princes, then may they not only oppress any of their particular Subjects according to their unbrideled Wills, but they may take such courses as are destructive to the whole, and if we may not then take Arms against them, there shall be more care had for the Means, that is the Governours, then for the End (unto which they are Ministers,) the common good and safety of the people.
I must acknowledg, I am encouraged to venture on this Objection by the learned Primate Ʋsher in his Book of the Power of Princes, or else I should be startled, when I find those two great Champions for the same Power, Barclay and Grotius at a stand here. Barclaius ait amitti Regnum si Rex verè hostili animo in totius populi exitium feratur. Quod concedo, consistere enim simul non possunt voluntas imperandi, & voluntas perdendi. Grotius De jur. Bel l. 1. c. 4. What then does he say if he yield this? Why in Rege mentis compote, vix videtur id accidere posse. To frame such a case then, under this double circum…ance, that it must be animo perdendi, and in exitium totius is not to be conceived a thing in the World ever likely to be, and so not to come into the thought, to stumble any on that account. Quid ergo? Nulline casus incidere possunt (says Barclay) quibus populo in Regem arma capere jure suo liceat? Nulli certe quamdiu Rex manet. Duos autem casus invenio quibus Rex ex rege non Regem se facit. Adversus Mon. l. 3. c. 16. In such a case as this then (and he instances in Nero and Caligula) a King ceases to be King with him. Nevertheless I shall not so leave the Objection, nor yet trust too much to the notion of the prince being Unking'd in this case, seeing if he willingly prosecute those ways which will ruine the Commonwealth, whatsover his mind, purpose or intention be in it, as we cannot tell, so it were little odds as to the main. I answer therefore in the first place from Scripture, the Apostle hath set down our duty which is Subjection indefinitely, and we are not to break Gods command for earthly advantage, but we must do our duty, that is perform his command, and leave the issue to him, who can turn all things to the best. We must not do evil that good may come of it. And must we not do good, though evil succeeds? We are to be subject not only for Wrath but Conscience sake; If we resist, we resist the ordinance of God, that is, we do not only break his precept, but as I must inculcate, we would not in effect have him to be the Orderer of things, we would dethrone him of his providence, and be our selves in his room. Now when there is such evil as this at the root, how can we think that the possibility of the evil of misery, can warrant us the evil of sin? In the next place, as to the reason of the thing, I shall offer this consideration. To wit, As there is no mischief can befal a private person, that can stand in competition with the safety of the Commonwealth, or the whole Government it self, that for the prevention thereof, this should be endangered: So is there no mischeif or ruine on one whole Government but it must give place to the safety of all. I pray weigh it, Upon the truth of this proposition, Quod nulla ex causa (in Arnisaeus's words) subditis fas sit contra legitimum principem arma sumere, does the safety of not one, but all the Governments upon Earth depend: and there is no mischeif from the ill courses of any Prince, but is to be held better then such an inconvenience as the infrindgment of the verity of this Doctrine is, which were a Womb of far greater and ampler evils. If there be any case wherein a Subject may take Arms (says Dr. Taylor) there may be some other like it, and who shall be judg hereof? If we our selves be judges, Lo what a gap is opened to Disorder, Warrs, Ruine, ruine of all, ruine with out end. It is true our doctrine dos provide for the security of Governers, even when the comon good is accidentally left open to oppression: yet in regard it is the concern not of one Government but all, and many Governours are good, the most but indifferently bad, and none at the worst so bad, but it is better, or more conducive to the common good, that we should have such as they are, rather then none at all, the security at root is not greater for the Means then the End.
And now I pray let this I have spoken so royally, have its due grains of understanding. When I plead for subjection to Governours, I plead for them as foreign, as the Powers that are, which comprehends the Constitution whereby they Govern with their Persons; foreign I say chiefly, and foreign as from foreign distinguished. The Constitution of Nations hath provided for the good of the Community, or the Community, hath provided for the good of themselves (that is the publick) in their Constitution; foreign. What is not profitable to the Bee-hive, is not profitable to the Bee, says Antoninus. Potest, quod inutile Republicae sit, id cuiquam civi utile esse? says Cicero accordingly in his Book De Officijs often. If Rulers rule not according to their Constitution, they are not the Powers that be (not foreign,) for the Powers that be, are the the Powers so constituted. Those persons who get into Rule without the title which is required to the Ruler in the Constitution, may not be held the Powers that be, upon the same account. Indeed the Ordinance or Will of God is a complex thing, which contains more then one matter in it; It contains in it that there shall be a Government and Subjection, and that those that rule should be rightful and right Governours, to wit, that they should have a due title, and act duely, according to the Constitution. But if any shall not have a right title, I dare not say that this Will is (as to us) there should then be no subjection For this Will of God objectively taken being an aggregate thing, some of the things it contains in it must be greater and some less, and God Almighty we are to know (and then suppose) does Majus & Minus velle, according to the condition of the things he would have, or wills. It is a greater matter now (or a matter of far greater concern) that there be Government, then that the Governour have a right title, and the greater matter then in the case I judg must take place of the less. The resolution of this will draw in its fellow. If a Prince hath a right title, but acts in some things contrary to the Constitution, those acts of his are to be esteemed indeed with out Power, and if the Subject does not obey him in them he resists not the Power, which Hooker may tell us clearly, if he tell us no more: But when the Subject may forbear to act, he may not resist; As the word in the original is opposed to Subjection, undoubtedly he may not. The Subject is here to be restive (if I may so speak,) not resistive, I mean it as the people in the case of Jonathan was, they would not act, which was the right course they were to take, when they were never the less under due Subjection unto Saul for that. The reason for this is the same here as before. The right the Prince hath to the Government is a greater thing then the right …o such or such a particular act. When I do then not obey him in such an act or thing unto which he has no right, upon the ground (which he perhaps may plead for my doing, to wit) of being subject to the Power that is, I may not take Arms and rise against him for that act (or for the imposing of that, or any such act,) because the right (I say) he hath to the ruling Power in general being a greater thing then this, I must give way in the less for Gods Ordinance sake. I return to what I was saying. The command of God does bind us to the Powers that be. The Powers thus and thus constituted are the Powers that be. We must make no more, nor no less of it then the Apostle. Whatsoever be the Powers then, whether limited or unlimited, arbitrary or regal, conditional or absolute, the inconveniencies that may arise upon the Subject thereby, will not dissolve their Allegiance, so long as they are the Powers that be, according to the Constitution. Thus much I must declare and acknowledg once for all, that the Word of God meddles not with the bounds and limits of the Sovereign Power in any States or Kingdoms, but taking them as it finds them, it requires Subjection to the Power that is. Chemnitius from Luther hath turned this into an Axiom. Evangelium non obolet Politias.
Not but indeed there are diversities of Powers (or States) which must be considered according to their several conditions. The Magdeburgenses who were men of great learning and pains are noted for this opinion. Imperatores & Reges esse primarios vassallos imperij & Regni, & proinde si feloniam contra imperium aut Regnum committant feudo privari, perinde ut alios vassallos. The ground hereof I take it is laid in the nature of other States which are diverse from ours; and we may see, the Empire being the chiefest State of any perhaps with these persons, how they judg of other States thereby, when the German Empire is not an absolute Monarchy, it is prov'd out of Bodin at large, and granted by others. When Luther agreeably had taught that the Magistrate should not be resisted, and some Lawyers proved to him that the Laws of the Empire permitted resistance, he then held they might make a League to defend themselves. Sleidan. Lib. 8. The reason of this satisfaction, was, because the Gospel (said he before Chemnitius) abolishes not the Laws of any Commonwealth. Under this fit construction, what Paraeus hath wrote upon the Romans may find its favourable allowance: whose careful Son excuses his pious Father, that what he had said of a pactionary State or Government, ought not to have been drawn unto an absolute. And to this effect it will not be hard I suppose, to find Divines of the Germane States speaking as Zwinglius (quoted to me by him who shall next be named,) When Kings rule unfaithfully they may be deposed. Which we need not wonder at, when that eminent Prelate Bilson in his Book of the true difference between Christian Subjection and Ʋnchristian Rebellion, wherein he does so stoutly defend the Authority of the Prince against the Pope, and all private Rebellion, he does yet (as it seems out of conviction) express himself with care, yet very plainly. There may fall extremities (says he, speaking of Chilperick deposed for insipiency) wherein Princes are not able to guide themselves, and much less their Realms, p. 420. Again, defending the Protestants in their stirrs in Germany, Flauders, France, and Scotland, I will not (says he) pronounce all that resist Rebels. Cases may fall out even in Christian Kingdoms where the people may plead their right against the Prince and not be charged with Rebellion. I pray let us hear those cases. If a Prince should go about to subject his Kingdom to a forreign Realm, or change the form of a Commonwealth from impery to tyranny, or neglect the Laws established by common consent of Prince and People to execute his own pleasure: In these and other cases that might be named, If the Nobles and Commons joyn together to defend the ancient and accustomed Liberty, Regiment, and Laws, they may not be accounted Rebells, p. 520. In short, the Pope may not meddle, but the whole Realm may defend their rights by Arms against Princes. Let us have his Foundation. I denyed that Bishops had Authority to prescribe conditions to Kings when they Crowned them, but I never denyed that the people might preserve the Foundation Freedome, and Form of their Commonwealth, which they fore-prized when they first consented to have a King, p. 521. Here I will joyn issue with him, according to what we have had before. While a people are yet in forming their Government, singular persons (as well the Eminenter as Formaliter Cives) must be subject to he universal; In the universal then (when States arise thus, at least while they are rising) does lie a real Sovereignty, whose rights are to agree upon what form of Government the Community thinks best, and to appoint the Manner (to borrow that comprehensive phrase of Samuel) of their personal Sovereign, as hath been before. If they be so cautious now as not to consent (which consent is causa sine qua non, or necessary condition, not efficient of Power) to be governed but upon terms, and their Governours shall be accountable upon Mal-administration, ordering some Officer (deriving from them) to that purpose, who can gainsay, but the case is all one as when Princeps and subditi are obliged ex contractu? Arnisaeus will hold Rex pactionatus ubi pactum non servat deponi potest. De jur. Ma. l. 1 c. 6. Upon this account what Luther, Zuinglius, and the Magdcburgenses say, is as good as what is said by Bilson. But here then does lie the question, whether there were indeed any such terms fore-prized (to use that most Reverends own words) in the constituting our Commonwealth of England, that the Prince should be called to account by the Sword in any case whatsoever? That the people have their rights is out of question, why else is the King Sworn when he is Crowned? The sum of which comes to this, that they shall be Governed only according to Law. But whether this be one of their rights that they may take Arms against the Prince if wronged, is, id quod restat probandum, I read indeed in our Chronicles in King John's time and Henry the third's, what a stirr the Barons kept for their rights in those Warrs, but though I think the Subject is beholden to them for the Effect, I do not know how to justifie them in their Cause. If any shall say Bilson does hold indeed that the whole people may defend their liberti…s when a Prince goes about to destroy them, and so take Arms, but he says not they may take Arms against the King, his Person, Authority, Government, or Laws: Let him that will so distinguish, make me that difference clear and sound, I shall honour Bilson, and thank him, and come to this end with both. That it is possible for some Doctrine to be good (at least well-accepted) under Queen Elizabeth, which was hardly approved by King James, became dangerous under King Charles and is now razed by Acts of the late Parliament under his Son.
There is indeed one question lies at the heart of all, and that is, whether the whole people, or their Sovereign be greater? Which question if it may not be baulk'd, I dispatch thus. Distinguish we of the people as a Community, or as a Commonwealth; and of the greater, quoad finem, and quoad authoritatem. That the whole people, as a Commonwealth, are greater then the Magistrate, quoad finem, I think manifest, because he is appointed for their Weal. But that the people, as a Commonwealth, are greater quoad authoritatem, I suppose it so farr from truth that the people as they are under a Commonwealth have indeed no Power at all. The whole Power of the Commonwealth (quâ Commonwealth) lies in the Sovereign, who is the pars imperans, and the people pars subdita only. Nevertheless take the people as a Community it must be acknowledged that the original Grant or Charter from God is conveyed immediately to them, and the Power of their Magistrate comes from that Charter. Consequently, if there happens any such case as that by the act of God or Man, the Commonwealth comes to a dissolution, so that the Prince and Subject (to make something of Barclay) does indeed cease, then may the Ʋniversality challenge (if they will) the greatest authority, and take Arms for their defence against any that shall go to oppress them: But while the Legal Constitution, and Order of Prince and People abides, this Doctrine of Subjection (and that indefinite) must hold good even against the whole Body. Quando agitur de principe supremo non habente Superiorem, non potest ullo modo occidi a subditis, etiam si tyrannice vixerit. Tholosanus de Rep. l. 26. c. 6. Quamdiu Rex est (says Barclay) Superior semper populo est, alioqui Rex non esset, & superiorem ab inferiore judicari posse, contra rationem est, contra{que} naturam. Against him there is no rising up, says a greater Authority.