Goodwill Towards Men, Part 1 · Section 17 – Section 18
Sect. 17.
PROP. XVII. God was under no tye, or Bond, to make Man immutably holy.
IT is very unjust, and unreasonable, for any to complain, that God did not set Man in such a state at first, from whence he could not fall. That Man was endued with such power at first whereby he might have stood, and had stood (had he not been shamefully wanting to himself) this is, (no doubt) sufficient to vindicate the honour of his Maker, though he gave him not that special grace, from which one cannot fall.
It is too much for a creature to be immutable in its own Nature. To suppose such a thing of Man, so far as this property and perfection reacheth, is to make Man equal unto God. Therefore though Man was created holy, yet was he mutable, his holiness such as might be lost.
Now when God made Man upright, and then put him upon the tryal, whether he would stand upright, he did no injury to man at all, Quum Deus hominem permisit sibi, injuriam non fecit homini, sed gloriam suam asseruit sibi. Jun. Surely the Lord had done his part, enduing Man's soul with knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, engaging Man to himself by so many favours, as by so many strong Bands, which his goodness and bounty had laid on him, promulging, and making known his Law, the Rule Man ought to live and walk by, backing the same with a dreadful commination, to warn and deterre him from sin, and with a very ample promise to excite and encourage him to obedience. Thus no moral means were wanting, or denyed to Man's preservation; what could Man reasonably have desired that God would do more for him; If now man miscarrieth, the fault cannot be in his Maker, but in himself. Had he used that power, and those means given him, as he might, and ought, he had been for ever happy. God did not deny him any thing, which was congruous to his present state. I know not how we can say that there was Gratiae substractio, [nam, ut vellet constanter non peccare, Nullam Adamus acceperat, Lapsus desertionis, non desertio lapsus causa fuit.ut autem posset non peccare si vellet vel nullâ indiguit, cum peccandi ratio in volendo sita sit, vel eâ non substractâ potuit peccare. Thes. Salmur. de laps. Ada. Sect. 25. p. 203.] God did not take from Man any ability to perform obedience, given him in his Creation; but only gave not in (as he was not bound) a new supply of further grace.
Certainly, it was no hard or unjust thing, that God should try his Creatures obedience, who stood obliged to him by such wonderful tyes and engagements: and if God would try Man's obedience, Man is supposed not to be in a state of Impeccability: It would not have become the Divine Wisdom to give Man a Law purely for trial whether he would obey, if it was impossible for him to disobey.
Thus indeed while Man was Viator, in a probation state, we must grant, he had a power to obey God in all things, and it was also possible for him to disobey.
Yet observe this, there was no evil inclination, no propensity to sin in Man before, as is found in him now since his fall. That pronity, which is now in us all, to what is forbidden, is certainly sinful: that should we suppose any inordinate concupiscence natural to Man at his first Creation, it would infer, that he came sinful out of Gods hand. This would be to impute folly to our Maker, and make God the Author of Sin. In the regenerate there is a lusting of the Flesh against the Spirit; but in Adam there was no such lustings, and contrary inclinations (while he kept his innocency & integrity) But his natural inclinations were in an absolute subjection to right Reason, and the Rule which God his Creator had given him. As Aquinas sayes well, the Act of the concupiscible faculty is only so far to be accounted natural, as it is subject to right reason, when it rebels and transgresses the bounds of reason, then it is contra naturam, and Vulnus naturae. So this was not in Man before he sinned. That natural inclination in Man to eat of the fruits in Paradise, was Physically or Naturally Good, morally indifferent, neither good nor evil. It was in his Nature as convenient to it, being to live on the fruits of the Earth. But when God by a special positive Law had restrained Man's Natural liberty, forbidding him to eat of such a fruit, what might have been desired Naturally, and innocently before, cannot be desired now without sin; because Man is bound to subject all his desires to the Divine Will and Law. That he had a natural power of eating the forbidden fruit, was no way culpable, or sinful; but that he exerted this power against Gods Law.
Now though a good account may be given, why Man was not created immutably good, he being at first in Statu viatoris, non comprehensoris, a probationer for Heaven. And therefore his obedience being to be tryed; (though he had power to perform sinless obedience, yet it was also possible for him to disobey) yet it will not follow, as (Corvinus would have it) that glorified Saints, who are comprehensors, because they are fully confirmed in good, cannot properly be said to obey, or to be under any Law. [Ʋt verò liberum arbitrium tollatur ab eo, cui lex praescribitur, etiam fieri non potest, quia ubi illud non est legi locus non est, Quare etiam sequitur, iis qui jam in bono sunt confirmati, proprie Legem ferri non posse, neque item eos Deo obedire propriè dici posse, &c. Corvin. Censur. Anat. c. 6 Sect. 1. p. 101.]
This is strange Divinity sure; though it would seem needless that such as are confirmed in a state of happiness and perfection, should be under any Law meerly for tryal. (It would be Actum agere, to give them such a Law, which the wisdom of God would not do.) Yet it will not follow, that therefore they are lawless. And if they cannot be said properly to obey, *Ergo, inquam, is non vult qui non potest non velle; tu ergo, ne vis quidem tibi esse bene, quia non potes velle tibi esse Male. Nam quae voluntatis eadem est obedientiae ratio, &c. Camero Defens. c. 12. p. 205.why are we directed to pray, that the will of God may be done on earth, as it is in Heaven? why are they made patterns of obedience to us? But suppose that Angel, who was sent Acts 12. to deliver Peter out of Prison, had refused (Jonahs like) to go, when God sent him; would it not have been proper disobedience? And what reason can be given, but that his going upon Gods errand was an Act of Obedience?
And this further, Jesus Christ who was anointed with the oyle of gladness above his fellows, to whom God gave not the Spirit by measure, was certainly as much confirmed in Good, as any Saint or Angel in Heaven can be; yet who can have a face to deny, that he truly obeyed? Obedientia non est necessitatis, sed libertatis. says Corvinus. We say though obedience cannot be both free and forced, yet it may be free and necessary too. It may be in some respect necessary, and yet most free. Saints and Angels in Heaven cannot but love God, they see so much excellency and amiableness in him, for which they must love him to eternity; and yet they love him most freely. As on the contrary, the Devils sin necessarily, can do no other, through that insuperable Malice and Wickedness which acteth them, yet they sin freely. According to Corvinus his way of reasoning, the weak, imperfect, obedience of believers, should be more perfect obedience, and more worthy to be called obedience, than that of Angels, and Spirits of just men made perfect; which soundeth strangely. As if that obedience was not most perfect, that had most of the will in it. But I forget my self.
Sect. 18.
PROP. XVIII. God (as he was not bound to prevent Man's fall) had holy, wise, and good ends in permitting him to fall.
THus he takes occasion of manifesting his punitive justice, holiness, and hatred of sin; as also of displaying his rich, and free grace, his wonderful mercy and compassion towards sinners, upon Man's breach of the first Covenant. He bringing in a new and better Covenant, God hath concluded all under sin, that he might have mercy upon all. In the Creation he shew'd his power, in bringing something. Yea, a world of Beings out of nothing; here he manifests his wonderful goodness, in bringing good out of evil; yea, the greatest good out of the greatest evil.