The Highest End and Chiefest Work of a Christian, Imprimatur – Errata

The Highest End and Chiefest Work of a Christian · Imprimatur – Errata

Imprimatur.

Tho. Tomkyns R. R^mo. in Chriſto Patri ac Domino Domino Gilberto divinâ Providentiâ Archi-Epiſcopo Cantuarienſi à ſac. Dom.

foreign:

The Higheſt END And Chiefeſt VVORK Of A Chriſtian: Set forth in two plain DISCOURSES, Concerning The Glory of GOD, and our own Salvation.

By J.W.

foreign Pirke Aboth. Lib. 2. §. 12.

foreign. Arriani Epictet. l. 2. cap. 19.

LONDON, Printed by E.T. for R. Royſton, Book-ſeller to the King's moſt Excellent Majeſty. 1668.

A PREFACE To the READER.

THoſe two words defective in the Title Page, by which the name of the Author was deſired to be expreſſed, are ſo inſignificant, as he could not believe they would contribute any thing to his onelyonly deſigns, which he can (with ſome comfort) profeſs to have been no other, than thoſe which are expreſly ſet forth in the Titles of theſe Diſcourſes, viz. The Glory of God, and the Salvation of Men: And Books (ſuch as deſerve the name of Books ( **Lord Verulam his advancement of Learning. l. 1. p. 16.as he ſaid, that hath ſo judiciouſly obſerved the defects of them) ought to have no Patrons, but Truth and Reaſon.

But becauſe moſt Diſcourſes now publiſhed, are thought by the many that are able to judge, and the many more that are willing to cenſure, really to need their accuſtomed Apologies; let this be accepted for the Author of theſe, viz. that he was indiſpenſably ingaged to the publication of them, by a ſacred obligation, (how adviſedly entred into, is now too late to inquire) upon an extraordinary occaſion, which no other man can be concern'd to underſtand. This onelyonly is to be added to complete the Apologie, for the Language and Method; that the faſhion of that plain Veſt wherein they are clothed, was not to be alterd or changed, Lev. 27.10. nor did it ſeem needful for them to whom it was deſigned.

They onelyonly are beholding to the Preacher, that ſtudies to ſeek out acceptable words for them, whoſe judgements are qualified with a capacity of being ſo gratified. Eccleſ. 12.10.Eccl 12:10But neither the Perſons to whom theſe Meditations were firſt preſented, were of that form; nor are they yet intended for any ſuch, as can tell where to ſatisfie their curioſity in the many (perhaps too many) Diſcourſes that are purpoſely laboured for ſuch an end. The Knops, and the Flowers, with which the Golden Candleſtick, that was appointed for the ſervice of the Temple, was ſo curiouſly adorned, could be no advantage to the Lights which they ſuſtained, and yet were preciſely ordained to the glory of the Lord, whoſe dwelling was in that houſe. And they that now are able to offer any ſuch Lamps in Gods houſe, and do it with the ſame deſign, may hope to be accepted; but if they have any other of their own, eſpecially if it be their own glory more than Gods, that they ſecretly aym at, they will fall in with the perſons, of whom our Saviour ſpeaks, Mat. 6.5.Matt 6:5when he ſaith: Verily they have their reward

As in holy Scripture all things neceſſary to the common Duti… foreign: Chryſoſt.of glorifying Gods, and working out our own ſalvavation, are ſufficiently clear and manifeſt, at leaſt in ſome parts or other: ſo ought they to be ſet forth in the Sermons and Writings of them, whoſe office it is to guide men to theſe ends: When the Veil of Moſes his face is taken away by Chriſt, God forbid it ſhould be put on again by any of his Miniſters; which yet ſeems to be unhappily done, in this laſt age, by the overcurious, ſubtile and ſcholaſtick Diſcourſes, and Diſputes about the great Doctrine of Juſtification by Faith in Chriſt Jeſus; which can have no better effect upon the generality of Chriſtians, than to obſcure the matters which they pretend to clear. It was very much in this Authors deſire to ſcatter, or remove thoſe Clouds; which be thought was beſt to be done by abſtracting wholly from the conſideration of them, and by confining his Anſwer to the grand Queſtion, What is to be done to work out a mans own Salvation, to the expreſs reſolutions of holy Scripture, illuſtrated and confirmed with the plaineſt reaſon, without reſpect to the Authoritie of Humane Teſtimonies. A few things onelyonly he hath thought fit to add by way of Preface to each Diſcourſe, which he ſtrives to deliver with as much plainneſs, as the matter will bear.

And firſt to the firſt: That which inclined him to the publication of this familiar diſcourſe (at firſt delivered in a ſmall and popular Auditory) was that he could not finde himſelf prevented by any other upon the ſame Subject, in our own Language. And it was matter of wonder to him, how it ſhould come to paſs, that, that which is acknowledg'd the Supreme End, and Scope of all Religion, ſhould not fall under the Meditations of ſo many Learned and Zealous Writers, as this Age hath produced: Or, how the diſtinct and juſt tractation of that great Duty, could come to be ſo much omitted, that ſcarce any thing to this purpoſe hath come to his knowledge, beſides the brief ſtrictures that are found in the School-men: whilſt the other Point (reſpecting indeed the chief Good, and ultimate End of Mankind, in refeverence to himſelf) hath been the Subject of numberleſs Diſcourſes, as well of Chriſtian as Heathen Philſophers.

But inſtead of what he hath ſought and deſiderated towards the declaring, directing, and preſſing that chief of Duties to the moſt high God, conſiſting in the ſeeking of his Glory; he hath in ſome late Authors, of good Learning, met with odd reflections of diſparagement of this End, as unworthy the excellency and perfection of the Divine Nature, and too much reſembling the vanity of the Humane: Which miſpriſion of Error croſſing the many ſignifications of holy Scripture, and the general ſenſe and expreſſions of all religious minds, may poſſibly be removed, by the conſideration of a double glory belonging to the Divine Majeſty. The firſt is Intrinſecal, and Eſſential; and therefore, infinite and immutable, incapable of receiving Addition, or Diminution. The ſecond is Extrinſecal and Accidental, reſulting from his own Acts, and the Acts of his Creatures; and this is capable of being multiplied, and augmented; as the light of the Sun (which is its glory) though we ſuppoſe it fix'd, and immutable in it ſelf, yet may, and doth receive innumerable varieties of reflection from other Bodies, which are beneath, or about it: Which reflections being agreeable to its glorious Nature, would be gratefully apprehended by it, if it had any ſenſe. So, though God can receive no additions, or variations of his Eſſentiall Glory and Happineſs; yet can be aſſume created Glories, and may clothe himſelf with Glory, and Majeſty, and deſigne to glorifie himſelf extrinſecally, as well by the Acts of his Creature, as by his own, multiplyed and varied, according to the pleaſure of his Will: and ſo may be both glorified, and pleaſed, in ſuch a way, as is ſomething reſembled by the Radiations of the Sun, and their reſpective Reflections: So God can create glories wherewith to glorifie and pleaſe himſelf, as well as to honour, and gratifie his Creature. To this purpoſe doth the Holy Pſalmiſt ſo often pray: Be thou exalted, O God, above the heavens, let thy glory be above all the earth. Pſal. 57.5, 11. & 108.5. Let the whole earth be filled with his glory. Pſal. 72.19.

That common piece of Vitioſity which abounds ſo much in men, taxed by the name of vain glory, is juſtly reproveable for its injuſtice, upon diverſe accounts; eſpecially, becauſe it is an affectation of more honour than is due, either without, or above the merits of the perſon that affects it: which may be done, by attributing to himſelf things worthy of honour, which are not at all in him: As, when an ignorant perſon judgeth himſelf, and would be judged wiſe, or learned, Or, by aſſuming to himſelf more of thoſe things (worthy of honour) than are found in him; as when a mean Scholar ſhall deſire to be thought profoundly learn'd: Or, by eſteeming thoſe laudable things which are in him, worthy of greater honour than they are; as, when a witty Man, or fair Woman, ſhall think themſelves to deſerve as much reſpect as a Wiſe, or a Vertuous: Or, by an exceſſive affection to that honour which is due to him, preferring it before other ends, which are more valueable upon a religious and reaſonable account: Or laſtly, by attributing, and aſſuming the merits of honour which are in him, intirely to himſelf, without acknowledgement of the prime and chief Author of them: All which things are branches of iniquity; and the laſt, the greateſt act of injuſtice to God that can be, who, as he is the firſt cauſe of all that's worthy of honour; ſo, and therefore ought he alſo to receive the ultimate reflection thereof.

But none of theſe things (but the direct contrary) is in God; who is infinitely worthy of all the Honour and Glory that is poſſible to be given him; and hath all this merit, intirely and ſolely from himſelf: And therefore, as the attribution of higheſt glory to him, is no more than juſtice to him: So the requiring of it from the Creature, is an Act of Juſtice to himſelf: And the deſigning, and accepting it when it is done, is no other than a delight in the Exerciſe of Juſtice, and Vertue, in thoſe Creatures, which are capable of giving it him, upon ſuch an account: So that Gods requiring integrity, and perfection of Glory from the Creature, and the pleaſure that he takes therein, hath preciſely the ſame reaſon with his requiring and being pleaſed with any acts of Piety or Vertue in his Creature. Thus much may ſuffice to clear the objection that hath been made againſt Gods being ſo much pleaſed with that great Duty of doing all to his honour.

Now the general Precept in the Text, being given by the Apoſtle in a particular caſe of Conſcience (concerning eating things offerd to Idols) gave occaſion to the Author to ſpeak of ſome other Caſes of ordinary occurrence in humane life: whereunto in this Preface, he thinks it not amiſs to add the following reſolutions of a doubtful Conſcience; which he ſhall deliver in a way borrowed from the ordinary Method of Demonſtrations, without pretending that they are exactly ſuch.

Firſt. He takes leave to lay down the following Propoſitions for his Principles.

1. That whatſoever a man doth, ought to be done to the glory of God; that is, (as is declared in the explication of the Precept) a man ought firſt to be careful to the utmoſt of his power, that nothing be done by him, to the prejudice of Gods Glory; and therefore nothing contrary to his Will: 2. That nothing be omitted by him willingly, that is requiſite to the promoting his Glory, in obedience to his known Will.

2. Princip. That whatſoever is done doubtingly (that is, not of Faith) is ſin, Rom. 14.23.

3. That it is abſolutely neceſſary for a man, either to do, or not do an action, notwithſtanding his doubt.

4. That a man is to act as reaſonably as he can in all his actions, and therefore in the moſt doubful.

5. That in doubtful caſes, the ſafeſt courſe is to be choſen.

6. That it is ſafer to do that which I do not doubt to be lawful, than to do that which I doubt whether it be lawful or not.

7. That of things equally evil upon one common account, it is unreaſonable to chuſe that which is more evil upon other accounts, refuſing that which is leſs.

If any of theſe Principles ſeem to be co-incident, the Reader is deſired to pardon that redundancie.

Now the general caſes of doubt to be reſolved by theſe Principles, are theſe three, to which all others may be reduced.

1. Whether a particular action in queſtion be lawful, or not lawful; or, which is all one, whether it be forbidden, or not forbidden.

2. Whether a particular action in queſtion be commanded, or not commanded.

3. Whether a particular action in queſtion be commanded, or forbidden.

In each of theſe Caſes, the doubt is to be ſuppoſed only of the things ſpecified in the Caſe, other conſiderations being ſuppoſed to be out of doubt. Theſe things premiſed, the reſolution is as followeth:

In the firſt Caſe, where the onelyonly doubt is whether the action in queſtion be lawful, or not lawful, (the doubt remaining) the action is to be forborn; by the firſt and ſecond Principle. 1. Becauſe a man is bound to abſtain from all actions contrary to the glory of God; and every ſin is ſo: 2. And every action done doubtingly is a ſin; likewiſe by the fifth and ſixth, becauſe in doubtful caſes the ſafeſt courſe is to be taken. And it is more ſafe to do that which I do not doubt to be lawful, than to do that which I do doubt whether it be lawful or not. Now the doubt being onelyonly whether the action be lawful to be done, or not lawful; and not at all (in this Caſe) whether it be lawful to be forborn, the reſolution is cleer, by the foremention'd Principles; becauſe, if I do this action, I muſt neceſſarily ſin, whether the action in it ſelf (abſtracted from my doubt) be lawful, or unlawful: If it be unlawful, I ſin doubly; 1. by doing an action which in it ſelf is unlawful; 2. by doing it, notwithſtanding my doubt: If it be lawful in it ſelf, as abſtracted from my doubt, yet under it, and with it, it is not, and therefore I muſt needs ſin in doing it; and therefore ought to forbear it. As for Example: Suppoſe a man doubt whether it be lawful to eat blood or bloudings, upon the account of the Apoſtolical Canon, Acts 15.29. and ſome other Canons of Councils, and Opinion of the Primitive Church. In this Caſe, a man ought not to eat ſuch things, becauſe he doubts not at all the lawfulneſs of abſtaining from them, as having no colour of obligation upon him to eat: But whether it be lawful to eat, is his onelyonly doubt, and that doubt makes it a ſin to him: Or, ſuppoſe a man to doubt whether it be lawful to lend money to Ʋſury, or to play at Cards or Dice, or to drink a health upon the reflections of the Fathers upon thoſe things, as not agreeable to Chriſtian ſobriety, or as things ſcandalous, and of no good report. He that doubts the lawfulneſs of thoſe things, though (whilſt he doth no more) he cannot condemn the uſe of them in others, that are free from that doubt; yet is bound to abſtain from them himſelf, becauſe he is perfectly free ſo to do, as he is not in the uſe of them, by reaſon of his doubt.

In the ſecond Caſe, where the doubt is, whether the action in queſtion be commanded, or not commanded, the action is to be done by the ſame Principles; becauſe the onelyonly doubt ſuppoſed in this Caſe, is whether the action be commanded, or not; and not at all whether it be lawful: ſo that it is ſuppoſed, out of doubt to be lawful to do it, and doubted onelyonly whether it be lawful to omit it. In this Caſe, I ſay, a man is bound to do the action; becauſe if he doth it, he ſuppoſeth himſelf not to ſin, becauſe he doubts not the lawfulneſs of it. But if he doth it not, he muſt needs ſin, by the 2. Principle: Either doubly by omitting that which is commanded, (and ſo obliging him before, and without his doubt, and alſo by omitting the ſame Duty doubtingly): Or at leaſt he muſt needs ſin ſingly, by acting doubtfully without neceſſity, and where a ſafer courſe was in his choice. As for Example: Suppoſe a man doubts whether the Canon, or Cuſtom of the Church to keep the Lent-faſt; or other Faſt-daies appointed by Law, do binde his Conſcience or not, having no reaſonable excuſe for the omitting thoſe obſervances; but doth not at all doubt, but that it is lawful for him to keep them, whether in compliance with the Church, or upon other accounts. The reſolution of this doubt is plain; to wit, that the Faſts ought to be kept in this Caſe, becauſe they cannot be omitted without ſin, whereas it is ſuppoſed they may be kept, without any doubt of ſin. In theſe two Caſes, the reſolution is demonſtrated by the foremention'd Principles.

The onelyonly difficulty is in the third Caſe, where the doubt is double, viz. whether the action in queſtion, be commanded, or forbidden. In this Caſe, (the doubt remaining) it ſeems impoſſible to avoid the neceſſity of ſinning, becauſe the action in it ſelf muſt either be forbidden, or commanded, or neither commanded, nor forbidden: Now if it be forbidden, and I do it with this doubt, I ſin doubly, as before was ſhewed; if I do it not, and it be commanded, I ſin likewiſe doubly upon the ſame account. If it be neither commanded, nor forbidden; yet I cannot but ſin whether I do it or no, becauſe I either do or leave undone a thing which I doubt whether I may lawfully omit, or do: For if a man muſt not chuſe to do a thing, which he doubts whether he may do or not, for that onelyonly reaſon, becauſe he doubts; then neither may be omit an action, which he doubts whether he may omit or no. If then the Caſe be (as is ſuppoſed) that the doubt is whether a thing be commanded or forbidden (either directly and immediately by God himſelf, in his Word, or the Law of right Reaſon, or indirectly, and mediately by his Authority veſted in lawful Governours, not exceeding their Commiſſion): the ſame reaſon that makes it unlawful to do it (viz. the doubt whether he may do it or no) will make it equally unlawful to omit it. As for inſtance, Suppoſe a man doubts of a ceremony in Gods Worſhip, commanded by the Church, whether it be not forbidden by God: In this Caſe the doubt muſt needs fall in both ways: For firſt, the Command of the Church is reaſon enough to doubt whether it be not commanded of God, becauſe that Authority by the Law of God extends to all things not forbidden by God, and the doubt whether it be forbidden or no, ſuppoſeth him not to know, or believe that it is; and therefore muſt needs leave him in doubt whether it be not commanded, becauſe if it be not forbidden, it is commanded. 2. The reaſon of the doubt whether it be not forbidden by God, may be various taken from the Opinion of ſome Learned and good men, or grounded upon ſome dubious interpretation of ſome Texts of Scripture, or upon ſome miſtaken Principle, or ſeeming conſequence from a true one. The queſtion is, what is to be done in this Caſe, it being concluded by the third Principle, that it is abſolutely neceſſary for a man either to do, or not do it; neither of which elections can be made without ſin, by reaſon of the doubt both ways, as is ſuppoſed.

The common anſwer to this ſtreight, is, That a man ought to depoſe his doubt; which anſwer is perfectly unreaſonable in moſt Caſes, becauſe it is for the preſent impoſſible. It being not in the power of any man to ceaſe his doubting the truth of any propoſition immediately, and arbitrarily, without removing or ſolving the reaſons of his doubt: So that this adviſe to a diſtracted Conſcience is no better, than if a Phyſitian called to a ſick Patient, ſhould preſcribe for the onelyonly remedy of his Diſtemper, an Exhortation to ſhake off his ſickneſs, or not to entertain it any longer, which would be taken for no better than a plain mocking the Patient. The onelyonly reaſonable meaning that this advice can have, is, That a man ſhould do what in him lies to reſolve his own doubt, by labouring to underſtand the true reſolution of the Queſtion on either part: But this advice may be impracticabe in many Caſes, and is in all Extempore, where neither means, nor time is allowed ſufficient to effect it. The Queſtion then is, What other advice may be given for the preſent, and what reſolution is to be made thereupon.

This Queſtion is onelyonly capable of being reſolved by the fourth and the laſt Principles, which may be thus applied in all actions (and therefore in this, notwithſtanding my doubt) I am to act as reaſonably as I can; and it being ſuppoſed, that whether I do this action or omit it at this time, I muſt neceſſarily ſin, (becauſe I cannot depoſe my doubt, nor avoid ſin, if I act, or not act with it) I am to inquire what reaſon I have to adventure upon one of theſe ſins rather than upon the other; and if I can finde any ſufficient to turn the Scale, that muſt determine my choice, by the laſt Principle. And in this diſquiſition, the moſt conſiderable Reaſon of the Election to be made on either part, will conſiſt in the degree of the ſin, if any ſuch may appear, or be juſtly ſuſpected: For ſeeing the greateſt Reaſon that can be for the abſtaining from any action, is the avoidance of ſin, the dehree of the ſin, doth proportionably augment the Reaſon: If then the action, whereof I doubt whether I ſhould do it or not, hath to me an appearance of a greater ſin in the doing it, than it can be in the omiſſion; that Reaſon is very ſufficient to reſtrain me from the action, and oblige me to the forbearance, till I can be otherwiſe informed to the better ſatisfaction of my Conſcience: For, 2 Theſſ. 5.22.when we are commanded to abſtain from all appearance of evil, it is moſt reaſonable to conclude, that the appearance of the greateſt Evil, doth moſt ſtrongly oblige my abſtinence. As for Example: Suppoſe the action, whereof I am in doubt, hath an appearance of Idolatry; as in the Corinthians caſe, the eating things ſacrificed to Idols had, and as the worſhipping a piece of bread, or the invocation of Saints departed, may juſtly have: In ſuch caſes, I ſay, it is moſt reaſonable to abſtain from the action, becauſe it is moſt ſafe ſo to do; becauſe by the doing of this action, I do at leaſt ſuſpect, I may be guiltie of Idolatry, which is a far greater ſin, than a bare omiſſion of an Act of obedience to any humane authority can be.

The ſame reſolution upon parity of reaſon is to be made, where the omiſſion upon due conſideration may appear to be a greater ſin, than the performance of the action which ſeems to be the caſe of refuſing obedience to authoritie; cauſing diſorder, and having at leaſt an appearance of Schiſm, in matters of meer ceremony, or circumſtance in the publick worſhip of God, upon a bare ſuſpition of their want of allowance from God, or being ſome way forbidden: I ſay, That the diſobedience in this caſe, if the action ſhould prove not to be forbidden by God, is a greater ſin than the action would be in obedience to authority, though it ſhould prove to be forbidden; whilſt we have ſo much reaſon to doubt whether it be or no: For it cannot with reaſon be conceived, that the Tranſgreſſion of a Divine Precept (in a matter of circumſtance) ſo obſcurely revealed, as hath not been diſcover'd by the Catholick Church for many Ages, nor yet is by the Rulers, and moſt learned and pious Doctors and Paſtors of the preſent Church, can be ſo great a ſin, as is the tranſgreſſion of ſo plain a Precept, as that of obedience to authori…ie; eſpecially when that diſobedience produceth the effects of Diſorder, Schiſm, Scandal, with ſeparation from the publick Worſhip of God, and privation of the means of his Grace. Theſe things conſidered, I ſay, it is not reaſon able to think, but that the ſin of diſobedience, in caſe the thing ſhould prove to be not forbidden (as by this doubt is ſuppoſed poſſible) is far greater than the doing of the act, though it ſhould prove to be forbidden. And therefore in this caſe, the action is to be done, notwithſtanding the doubt, by way of caution againſt a greater ſin: It being a greater ſin to diſobey doubtingly, than to obey doubtingly in ſuch a matter.

But if for ought appears to me, there is no ſuch difference, but that it may be as great a ſin to omit th… action, as to do it, conſidering my doubt as well whether it be not commanded, as whether it be not forbidden; I am then to conſider what other reaſons may incline me, either to the action, or to the omiſſion, in reſpect of advantage, or diſadvantage to my ſelf or other on either ſide. As for Example: Suppoſe on the onſide, if I forbear the action, I do not onelyonly ſin again… God, (upon one or both of the foremention'd accounts that is, as doing that which is forbidden in it ſelf, … forbidden to me, becauſe I doubt the lawfulneſs of it) but I alſo deprive my ſelf of many advantages which might have by the doing it, and incur conſiderable damage in my Libertie, Eſtate, Reputation, with othe… incommodations to my friends. On the other ſide, if do the action, I do onelyonly ſin againſt God, by acting doubtfully, or it may be by tranſgreſſing ſome unknown command, abſtracted from that doubt (which inconveniences are equally ſuppoſed in the forbearance:) But I avoid the forementioned diſadvantages, without incurring any other of equal concern. In this caſe, I ſay, it will be perfectly unreaſonable to chuſe the more hazzardable reſolution, with rejection of the leſs: And therefore the reſolution will be as clear what is reaſonable to be done in this caſe, as is in any of the former; with this onelyonly difference, That the practice under this duplicitie of doubt cannot be without a neceſſitie of ſin: What then can I, or ſhould I do more in this caſe, than this? commit my ſelf to the MercieMercy of God, with a cautionary profeſſion of my deſire to obey him: And that if I could any way poſſibly avoid the hazzard of tranſgreſſing his Will, I would do it, notwithſtanding any motives whatever, reſpecting my ſelf, or mine own intereſt. But becauſe I cannot ſo do at this time, for want of preſent means to underſtand his Will; I act according to the general Rule, and law of my Nature, that is my reaſon, as far as it will afford me any direction, begging his pardon of my preſent ignorance, and the inevitable effect thereof.

Againſt this reſolution, if it be objected (as was before intimated) that there can be no ſuch neceſſitie of ſinning againſt God: Whilſt every man is bound to depoſe his doubt, and imbrace his Dutie: I anſwer firſt, That this deſtroyes the ſuppoſition of the Coſe, and therefore is no juſt Objection to the anſwer, which is given upon the admiſſion of it. 2. That it is not true that there can be no ſuch neceſſitie of ſinning, or that every man is bound immediately to depoſe his doubt, though it be not in his power ſo to do. For though God doth not put a man upon any ſuch neceſſitie of ſinning againſt himſelf, yet a man may by his own fault, and by his culpable ignorance, bring himſelf into this ſtreight.

But here it muſt needs be obſerved, that the intire reſolution is grounded upon that Principle: That whatſoever is done doubtingly is a ſin: Which Principle I take up in this Diſcourſe, onelyonly upon the account of its common reception, grounded upon the words of the Apoſtle: He that doubteth is damned if he eat. And therefore the reſolution, that ſuppoſeth this Principle, can be ſerviceable to ſuch onelyonly as receive it.

But whether this Maxime be univerſally true, or can be inferr'd from the Apoſtles Words, by the neceſſary ſence of them, and whether it ought to be extended to ſuch actions as fall under the command of Authority, and not rather to be reſtrained to ſuch actions, as the Apoſtle ſpeaks of in that Chapter, viz. ſuch as are indifferent in themſelves, and wherein a man is ſui juris, not ſuppoſed to be under command of authority either way, is a juſt Problem.

For the Apoſtle in the Diſcourſe of that Chapter, wherein he delivers that concluſion: He that doubteth is damned if he eat, &c. ſpeaketh onelyonly of ſuch actions wherein a man is ſui juris, at perfect libertie, on one ſide at leaſt, that is, either to eat, or not to eat. For though he might have reaſon to doubt, whether it was lawful for him to eat ſuch meats, yet he is ſuppoſed to have none at all, to doubt but that it was clearly lawful for him to forbear, and therefore by the premiſed reſolution of the firſt queſtion, he ought not to eat with this doubt.

I ſhall not inſiſt upon the objection from the word foreign, which the vulgar Latine tranſlates diſcernit; that is, maker difference or diſtinction of meats, thinking it not indifferent to eat of that meat: this variation of ſence, was thought fit to be put in the Margent of our Engliſh Bibles, by the laſt Tranſlators. In which Caſe it is evident he muſt needs ſin, and that preſumptuouſly againſt his Conſcience, and ſo is damned; that is, condemned by his own Conſcience, if he eats: But from hence there can be no ſuch concluſion made, as that he muſt needs ſin if he onelyonly doubts; that being not the Apoſtles meaning by this tranſlation. And it is certain, that the word foreign and foreign is ſo uſed in many Texts of ſcripture, as Act. 15.9. 1 Cor. 4.7. & Jude 22. foreign: And of ſome have compaſſion making a difference.

But becauſe the ſame word doth elſewhere as oft ſignifie to doubt, and is ſo renderd in this Text by the Syriack, and moſt other Tranſlators, I adhere to that Tranſlation; and the rather becauſe, the following words are moſt conſonant to this ſence, Seeing he eateth not of faith: For though it be true indeed, that he that makes difference of meats, and eateth that which by ſuch difference, he eſteemeth to be unlawful, cannot cat of Faith, becauſe he eats directly contrary to it; yet is this a more jeune ſence, and not ſo proper, as to ſay, he that doubteth, eateth not of faith.

Omitting therefore this Objection from the variety of tranſlation, I advance another more conſiderable; that is, whether becauſe he that eateth when he doubteth, whether it be lawful for him to eat, but is at perfect liberty not to eat, is damned? it will follow that whoſoever doth any action (wherein he hath no ſuch liberty of forbearance) with any doubt, be in like manner condemned. As for Example: He that is commanded by lawful Authority to do an action, whereof he doubts whether it be lawful by the law of God or no, to do it: It is certain, this perſon if he were free, ought not to do this action, becauſe of his doubt, whilſt he might forbear it without any doubt: But under this command, he hath no more libertie to forbear this action, than he hath to do it; And therefore it will not follow by this inſtance of the Apoſtle, wherein the caſe is ſo different, that he muſt neceſſarily ſin if he do it, more than if he do it not.

But it may be urged, that although from the firſt words of that Text (he that doubteth is damned if he eat) this Ʋniverſal concluſion, cannot be inferred; yet from the next words, which are added as a reaſon thereof, it may, Seeing he eateth not of faith, and whatſoever is not of faith is ſin. For thus it may be urged: Whatſoever is not of faith is ſin: But whatſoever is done doubtingly, is not of Faith; Ergo, whatſoever is done doubtingly is ſin. The 1. of theſe Propoſit ons is expreſly aſſerted by the Apoſtle; and the ſecond ſeems to be rightly collected from the connection of thoſe words, …, quoniam, ac quia.He that doubteth is damned if he eat, ſeeing (or becauſe) he eateth not of faith: Which reaſon would not be true, if it were poſſible, notwithſtanding the doubt, to eat of Faith. And if that be not poſſible in this inſtance, it may ſeem to be ſo in all others: whence the univerſal concluſion will be inferred rightly.

To this Argument, a rejoynder may be offer'd to this ſence; That there is no neceſſary conſequence, in the deduction of the univerſal Propoſition, from the particular Caſe; admitting the truth of that univerſal Propoſition, whatſoever is not of faith is ſin, without any limitation in the matter; and underſtanding Faith, (as in that Text it can onelyonly be meant) to ſignifie no more than a perſwaſion of the lawfulneſs of the action to him that doth it. May it not be ſaid, that although in that Caſe, he that doubteth onelyonly whether it is lawful to eat, and not at all whether it be lawful to forbear, cannot eat of Faith, becauſe it is at his free choice, to forbear the action that he doubts, and to determine himſelf to that wherein he hath no doubt; yet in another Caſe, where the action is doubful both waies, it may be poſſible, notwithſtanding his doubt, to act in Faith. For, as many things may be lawful to be done, whilſt they are left free, being not forbidden by authoritie, which are not lawful, when they are forbidden, though but by men: So may ſome things be unlawful to be done, when they are not commanded, that yet may be lawful when they are. It may be as great a ſin to diſobey an unlawful command, as to give it; if he that diſobeys, knows no better for his diſobedience, than he that gave the command, did for his giving it. Of this kinde are doubtful actions, which are not to be done, when a man is free, for that onelyonly reaſon, becauſe they are doubtful: The doubt being a ſufficient reaſon to bar the lawfulneſs of the action, as before hath been ſaid: But when a man is not free, but under the obligation of Authoritie, every doubt is not a ſufficient reaſon to make a thing unlawful: So that in ſuch a Caſe a man may, notwithſtanding his doubt, be perſwaded of the lawfulneſs of-his action, unleſs that doubt be grounded upon reaſons, more credible than is the judgement of the perſons, by whom that action is recommended to us, as not onelyonly lawful, but expedient.

But further, that it may be poſſible for a man, notwithſtanding his doubt, concerning the lawfulneſs of an action in it ſelf, to have a juſt perſwaſion that it is lawful for him in a preſent Caſe, I offer theſe grounds of Reaſon.

1. That all manner of doubts do proceed from ignorance.

2. That ſome ignorance may be inculpable, as well as culpable, and that not onelyonly in matters of meer Faith, but alſo in practical matters: For as there are many divine verities, contained in the true ſence of holy Scripture, and the neceſſary conſequences thereof, which are not underſtood by the Learned, much leſs by the Ʋnlearned, and yet that ignorance is inculpable in the Learned, and much more in the unlearned. So may there be divers practical concluſions, inferring the Obligation of juſt Precepts, to them that do or are bound to underſtand them: which, perſons unlearned may be inculpably ignorant of, for want of that underſtanding of the Original Texts, or that faculty of deducing conſecuences, by Art of Logick, or extraordinary perfection of Reaſon, which they are not obliged to have. In this Caſe the ignorance of thoſe practicab Precepts, ſo obſcurely revealed in holy Scripture, may be inculpable, as I ſuppoſe.

3. Where the ignorance is inculpable, the doubt is ſo too.

4. Inculpable ignorance, as well concomitant, as cauſal, doth excuſe the Act that is done with it, (though contrary to a Precept) from ſin, not onelyonly a tanto, but à toto. I uſe the term (inculpable) rather than invincible, becauſe it is more clear, and leſs liable to cavil: Nor are thoſe terms equivalent: For both ſome ignorance may be invincible in ſome circumſtances, which is not inculpable; and ſome ignorance may be inculpable, which is not ſimply invincible; for to render ignorance inculpable, it is not neceſſary that it was not to be prevented by any poſſible induſtry; but it ſufficeth, that it doth not proceed from the neglect of any means, that a man was bound to have uſed; or, from any other fault of the ignorant perſon. Inculpable ignorance, I ſay, excuſeth any action that is done with it from ſin, as well à tanto as à toto, and as well when it is barely concomitant, as when it is cauſal. This concluſion is diſagreeable to the ordinary reſolution of the Schools: and yet ſeems to be true, upon this reaſon, becauſe inculpable ignorance barreth the Obligation of a poſitive law, which cannot oblige, till it be ſo promulged, as obligeth all them that are to be bound by it, to the knowledge thereof: And though actual knowledge of a law be not neceſſary to the obligation of it, yet promulgation is, and that ſuch as is ſufficient to take off all excuſe of ignorance, and therefore to render it not inculpable: And where there is no law actually obliging, there can be no ſin. Therefore inculpable ignorance, as well of the law, as of the fact excuſeth from ſin: and that not onelyonly when that ignorance is a cauſe (ſine qua non) of the action, which a man would not do if he knew of the law, but alſo when the ignorance doth onelyonly accompany the action, which a man would have done, though he had known the Law: The diſpoſition of the will to do ſuch an evil action, though it were known to be ſo, is indeed a ſin; but the action it ſelf cannot be a ſin, whilſt it is not forbidden to the Agent, by any obliging law.

To apply theſe Propoſitions to the Queſtion premiſed: ſeeing all manner of doubt proceeds from ignorance, and that ignorance may be inculpable; and where the ignorance is inculpable, ſo is the doubt; and inculpable igrance of a law, takes away the Obligation, and therefore excuſeth from ſin: it ſeems to follow, that when a man is inculpably ignorant of any ſuch law, as forbids the action which he deliberates about, he may act with perſwaſion concerning the lawfulneſs thereof to him: Though he ſhould have ſome reaſon to doubt whether ſuch a Law may not be: For whether there be, or there be not, if he be inculpably ignorant of it, it obliges him not: And therefore he is at libertie to act, or forbear according to reaſon, and may do either of Faith; that is, though he doubts upon ſome uncertain account, (not obliging his belief) whether the action to be done, be not forbidden by ſome Law of God; yet if he be inculpably ignorant of the Law, it doth not oblige him; and therefore leaves him free, till he be ſo far inſtructed, as he can plead no inculpable ignorance. As for Example: Suppoſe the Law forbidding an action be no where in Scripture ſet forth expreſly, and the onelyonly evidence thereof depends upon doubtful interpretations of Scripture, or ſubtle conſequences, diſputed and denyed by good and learned men, of equal credit, and not declared, or determin'd by any Authoritie of the Church. In this Caſe I being no competent judge of the Controverſie, may ſuppoſe myſelf inculpably ignorant of that Law, as well as I am of other verities and points of belief, that have no other, or no better evidence of Scripture; whilſt yet pretenſions of reaſons not cogent, together with the Opinions of Learned men, may be ſufficient to make me doubt, as well of the uncertain Precepts, as of other verities. I inquire now whether notwithſtanding this doubt, I may not act in Faith? that is, believing it ſtill lawful for me to do this action, whether in it ſelf it be forbidden, or not forbidden; becauſe the Law whereby it is forbidden (if it be ſo) under this inculpable ignorance, doth not yet oblige me; and if I believe my ſelf not obliged by a law, I may act in Faith; that is, with perſwaſion that I am free, whether my ignorance be in truth inculpable, or not; yet if I be perſwaded that it is ſo, its certain I may have the ſame perſwaſion concerning the lawfulneſs of the action, that I do againſt no other law than that whereof I think my ſelf inculpably ignorant: It is true, if my ignorance be not inculpable, I ſhall ſin in this action, but ſhall notwithſtanding act in Faith, notwithſtanding my doubt; whilſt that doubt is not whether it be lawful for me to do this action, in this caſe of ignorance (for that would impart a contradiction to my Faith, or perſwaſion, that it is) but onelyonly whether there be not ſome law forbidding the action in general, and obliging all that know it, or ſhould know it; but not obliging me (as I ſuppoſe) becauſe I am as yet ignorant thereof, and that, as I believe, inculpably.

But here it is to be conſidered, that although it be certain, (by the expreſs words of the Apoſtle) That whatſoever is not of faith is ſin; yet it doth not follow that whatſoever is of faith is not ſin. For then St. Paul had not ſinned whilſt he perſecuted the Church: for he ſaith, I verily thought with my ſelf, that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jeſus, Acts 26.9. And therefore though a man, notwithſtanding ſuch a doubt, as hath been declared, may act in Faith, (which was the onelyonly thing indeavoured to be proved) yet it will not follow that he ſins not, except his ignorance be inculpable. And if he onelyonly believes that it is ſo, he may likewiſe for that reaſon believe, that it is no ſin; but can have no more certainly of the innocencie of his act, than he hath of the inculpableneſs of his ignorance.

If this Hypotheſis ſeem to deſtroy the ſecond Principle before delivered, with the reſolutions of the Caſes, made upon it. I anſwer, 1. As before was intimated, that, that Principle in thoſe indefinite termes, wherein it is firſt laid down, was taken up, upon the common preſumption of the univerſal truth of it; and the reſpective reſolutions ſuppoſing it, were accordingly framed. But 2. If that Principle be reſtrained (as I underſtand it) to ſuch a doubt as is made, not onelyonly concerning the being of a poſitive Law, but concerning the Obligation of it to me; that is, if I doubt whether the action be lawful to me, and not onelyonly whether it be lawful in it ſelf, or not forbidden by ſome Law unknown to me; I ſay, If this be the doubt, the Principle will be true, and the Reſolutions upon it certain, without any prejudice to this Hypotheſis. Theſe cautions premiſed, I ſhall proceed to give an inſtance or two of the Caſe; 1. Some Divines have aſſerted the ſecond Commandment to forbid all manner of Ceremonies, not expreſly commanded in Scripture to be uſed in Divine Worſhip: Suppoſe this aſſertion ſhould be true, can it be ſaid to be ſufficiently evident to oblige my belief, or to convict me of any culpable ignorance, whilſt I underſtand it not; being no otherwiſe declared than in the terms of that Commandment, forbidding nothing expreſly, beſides the making and worſhipping of Images, and having no evidence for this comprehenſion of uncommanded Ceremonies, other than from the interpretation of thoſe Divines, contradicted by moſt other Divines of equal judgement at leaſt? whether now is the interpretation of thoſe Divines, that affirm the Prohibition of un-inſtituted Ceremonies from that Commandment, a ſufficient Promulgation of that Law to me. If it be, it muſt certainly be ſuch as obligeth my belief: for, I cannot be bound to obey a Law, which I am not bound to believe to be a Law, becauſe then my obedience could not be grounded upon my faith, as all obedience ought to be. But how can I in reaſon be obliged to believe this interpretation, upon the account of their aſſertion, whilſt I know it to be denyed by others of equal credit, and greater Authority. And if that Interpretation be not a ſufficient Promulgation of this ſuppoſed Law, how am I, that have, either no other, or no better evidence for it, obliged by it, though it were a Law. And if I be not, why may I not act in Faith, (eſpecially when I am commanded by juſt Authority to the Act) notwithſtanding my doubt, whether that interpretation may not poſſibly be true? Why may I not perſwade my ſelf, that if this ſhould be the ſence of the Commandment, I am not at all obliged by it, till I have ſome better evidence thereof.

Or, 2. Let the Queſtion be whether it be lawful to uſe any ſet Forms of Prayer? It is certain, this is no where expreſly forbidden in Scripture: But ſome Divines have judg'd it unlawful, and given ſome reaſons for their opinion, depending upon uncertain Principles, or unneceſſary conſequences: Suppoſe now a weak judgement be induced to doubt the lawfulneſs of any forms, upon the account of theſe Divines Opinion, and Arguments againſt them. This doubt muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe ignorance, becauſe if the truth were known, the doubt could not remain; is then this ignorance culpable, or inculpable? If it be culpable, then the doubt is ſo too; and then the party was bound to believe that Opinion without any doubt, notwithſtanding whatever reaſons he might have to the contrary: If it be inculpable, (whilſt he hath no better evidence to determine his belief) how can he be hound to forbear the uſe of Forms, by any Law whereof he is thus ignorant, notwiſtanding his doubt, which doth not take away, but neceſſarily infer the ignorance, which would be impoſſible without it? May be not therefore, notwithſtanding this doubt, make uſe of Forms, with perſwaſion that to him it is yet lawful… to do, whatever be true concerning the queſtion in general.

I am very ſenſible how much theſe Diſcourſes … want of thoſe enlargements of illuſtration, and con…imation, which they might, and perhaps ought to hav… if the occaſion would bear it. But I muſt not forg… that I am writing a Preface to a ſmall Book, where I have already exceeded the bounds of a juſt proportion and therefore am to leave the modeſt propoſal of th… Problems, to them that are beſt able to conſider, a… judge of them, haſtening to a concluſion of theſe prely minary Diſcourſes; which I ſhall finiſh with the addtion of a few things concerning the ſecond Tract, t… wards the further clearing of the Doctrine there delivered, from appearance of contradiction to that St. Paul, concerning juſtification by Faith witho… works. I ſay therefore;

1. That the buſineſs of that Diſcourſe, upon … propoſed Text, was not to determine, what particul… Act it is which God in the New Covenant, doth prin… pally require as the ſpecial condition of juſtification But to inquire what that intire Work is, whereby a… cording to the direction of Scripture, the Salvation … a Chriſtian was to be wrought out.

2. Yet in the Method of the ſame Diſcourſe, a pr… critie is given to Faith, as that which gives the firſt rig… to juſtification, or a right to the firſt juſtification, befor… and therefore without any ſuch works as are conſequ… to that Faith. Ʋndoubtedly, Faith is the Root of … ſuch Works as are truely go…d, in a Theological ſenc… that is, of all ſuch as are done upon any account of … ligion; becauſe it is plain, Faith is the firſt act of Re… gion, and the ground of all the reſt: He that com… to God, muſt believe that he is, and that he is th… Rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him. Heb. 11.6. Whatever good Works can be done by a man without Faith, or not proceeding from Faith, can have no reſpect at all to God, and therefore are not reſpected by him. St. Paul therefore in that Chapter, by many Examples, proves Faith to be the principle of all good Works.

Verſ. 5. By faith (ſaith he) Enoch was tranſlated, that he ſhould not ſee death, and was not found, becauſe God had tranſlated him; foreign: For he had this teſtimony, that before his tranſlation he pleaſed God. So the words I am ſure may, and I think ſhould be read; becauſe it is certain, that Enoch pleaſed God before his tranſlation, but the teſtimony thereof he had not before, but long after his tranſlation, being that which was given him by Moſes, above a thouſand years after, in the words of that Text (Gen. 5.24.) which the Apoſtle refers to; as appears by his uſing the ſame words, which are there uſed by the Septuagint: foreign, &c. And Enoch pleaſed God, and was not found, &c. The ſame tranſlation is quoted by the Son of Syrach, Eccluſ. 44.16. We read, according to the Hebrew, he walked with God, which imports the ſame ſence: For they are ſaid to walk with God in Scripture phraſe, whoſe life is pleaſing unto God, or agreeable to his Will, Amos 3.3. But ſo can no mans life be without Faith; as the Apoſtle adds: But without faith it is impoſſible to pleaſe God: That which makes any mans works pleaſing to God, is his Faith, without which as they could not be done to any ſuch end, ſo neither would they have any ſuch effect: For he that cometh to God muſt believe (at leaſt ſo much) that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him. This is the ſhorteſt Creed that can be; and what acceptance it may have with God, in ſuch as are invincibly ignorant of the Goſpel, we are not concerned to inquire.

But to all them to whom this Goſpel is ſufficiently revealed, the Chriſtian Faith, or Faith in Chriſt, is abſolutely neceſſary to render their works pleaſing to God: And that Faith is undoubtedly the principal… condition of Juſtification, and Salvation. And although other conditions be required to Salvation; yet they are ſubordinate to this Faith, as the proper effects, and verifications thereof, whereby it becomes allowable to God: So that the concurrence, and efficacie, that other Graces, and all good Works have unto Salvation, is by vertue of Faith, from whence they proceed. It is Faith in Chriſt the Saviour that gives us Ʋnion with him, and his Church; and that conſequently gives the firſt right to that Salvation, which is procured by him, and is the onelyonly priviledge of his Church. But this Faith muſt he foreign, a Faith unfained, which it cannot be, unleſs it be joyned with repentance, and worketh by love, and ſo makes a man a new Creature.

Faith is the prime Article of the New Covenant; And in congruity to the deſign of mans Redemption and Salvation by Chriſt; the principal act of this Faith, is to receive him, as the Author of this Salvation, and to depend upon him, and the expiation that he hath made for us by his blood: But becauſe he is alſo propounded to us in the ſame Goſpel, as Chriſt, the anoynted of the Lord, as well for a Prophet and a King, as a Prieſt; and ſent by his Father to declare the Minde and Will of God in his Precepts, as well as to publiſh his Grace in the Promiſes, and is inveſted with all power to rule and govern his people, as well as to ſave them; therefore are all Chriſtians, that expect to be ſaved by him, equally obliged to receive him as Lord, and Chriſt: to obſerve and keep his Precepts, as well as to truſt upon his Promiſes. And thus much is included in the notion of their Faith, given unto him when they are baptiſed for his Diſciples, which is the ſolemn Rite of ingaging our Faith unto him.

For that Faith which is profeſſed in our Baptiſm, is undoubtedly the ſame with that by which we are juſtified and ſaved: But the Faith which is profeſſed in Baptiſm, is not a bare truſt in Chriſt as a Saviour, but a Faith given unto him as our Lord and Maſter, to become his faithful Diſciples, importing our defire to learn, and ſtipulation to obſerve his Precepts: And therefore as S. Paul ſaith, we are ſaved by faith, Eph. 2.8. So S. Peter ſaith, Baptiſm doth alſo ſave us, 1 Pet. 3.21. Interpreting his meaning, in the following words, Not the putting away of the filth of the fleſh, but the anſwer (or ſtipulation) of a good conſcience.

And to this purpoſe it is obſervable, that when our Saviour gave commiſſion to his Apoſtles to go and make Diſciples of all Nations, foreign.baptiſing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the holy Ghoſt, he adds this, as the interpretation of their diſcipleſhip, teaching them to obſerve all things whatſoever I have commanded you: Implying that their Profeſſion to be his Diſciples (which is the import of their Baptiſin) doth ſignifie their ingagement to obſerve his Precepts, and to live like Chriſtians. To believe in Chriſt, is to be a Chriſtian; that is, a Diſciple if Chriſt, which was the firſt Title of Believers, Act. 11.26. But that Title of (a Diſciple of Chriſt) without reſpect to his Precepts, imports contradiction, to believe in Chriſt therefore, and not to obſerve his Commandments is a plain contradiction. As therefore all Chriſtians are obliged to an explicit faith in Chriſt which is the ground of their Title to that name; ſ… are they to do all manner of good Works upon the groun… of this Faith, with deſire and confidence of pleaſin… God through Chriſt; and not expecting any acceptan… of their works, otherwiſe than by and through Chriſt Col. 3.17. Whatſoever ye do in word or deed, d… all in the name of the Lord Jeſus. 1 Pet. 2.5.

The Original of the firſt tranſgreſſion, by which th… whole Race of Mankinde fell into a ſtate that neede Salvation, was unbelief. Eve by the temptation of th… Devil, was firſt induced to quit her Faith in Go… Word, that had ſaid, The day thou eateſt there of, thou ſhalt ſurely dye the death. This unbelief was that which made way for the ſin of diſobed… ence to the Command: For, had ſhe not doubted th… truth of Gods Word, ſhe could never have been per… ſwaded to taſte of that forbidden Fruit. Thus w… unbelief the prime cauſe of mans ruine; and there… fore the firſt ſtep and principle of his reſtauration, an… Salvation is Faith: And as unbelief of the threa… ning, by which the firſt Law was fortified, was th… cauſe of our deſtruction; ſo the belief of the promi… of the Goſpel, is the principle of our juſtification: B… believing the Serpent, the Abaddon, and Apollyo… the deſtroyer, we were undon; by believing in Jeſu… the Saviour, we are ſaved. But as that unbelief became deſtructive by its effects, as a practical infidelity, producing diſobedience to the Commandment: So is our Faith effectual to Salvation, then onelyonly, when it is ſincerely practical, reducing us to our duty of obedience to our merciful Saviour.

If that ſaying of the Father muſt ſtand for a Catholick Axiom, bona opera ſunt via ad regnum, non cauſa regnandi, I muſt have leave to interpret the latter Clauſe, ſo, as may import no contradiction to the firſt; that is, that good works are the way to the Kingdom, not the Cauſe (that is, the principle, or meritorious Cauſe) of our raigning; for a Cauſe they muſt needs be; that is, a moral Cauſe, if they be the way; that is, the means of our raigning, as that ſignifies not onelyonly the Term or End of this way, but the Reward of our walking in it.

When therefore S. Paul excludes works from juſtification, I take it, his onelyonly ſcope is, to ſecure the freedom, and aſſert the neceſſity of Divine Grace purchaſed by Chriſt, and promiſed by the New Covenant of the Goſpel. And when he ſaith a man is not juſtified by the works of the Law, he ſometimes means ceremonial works, ſuch as was that of Circumciſion, and the obedience to that whole Law, which a man was made a debtor to keep by his Circumciſion, Gal. 5.3. otherwhiles by the righteouſneſs of works he ſeems to underſtand, perfect indefective obedience to the whole Law, or Will of God: upon which account it is impoſſible for a ſinner (as he concludes all men to be now, Rom. 3.23. Gal. 3.22.) to be juſtified, becauſe his being ſo, imports a contradiction to ſuch Works: Beſides, it is obſerveable, that S. Paul doth never ſay, that a man can be ſaved without Works; but that he is juſtified without them; ſpeaking generally of the firſt juſtification, or being put into a ſtate of juſtification, by the free pardon, Rom. 4.8. 2 Cor. 5.19.Rom 4:82 Cor 5:19or not imputing of ſin… paſt. This Grace he affirms to be obtain'd by a ſincere Faith in Chriſt, not onelyonly without reſpect to Works antecedent to this Faith; bu… alſo without, and before any ſuch works as are duly conſequent unto it. All thoſe who were converted from Heatheniſm, or Judaiſm, unto the Faith of Chriſt were by that firſt act, and profeſſion of this Faith brought into a ſtate of juſtification, before, and there fore without any ſuch works, as remained afterwar… to be done, by the ingagement of this Faith. But becauſe this Faith, if it was unfaigned, did imply an ingagement of the Believer to all good works of love, an… obedience to the commands of the Saviour, the Lor… Jeſus; therefore this right of juſtification, conferr… upon the condition of ſuch an ingagement, could n… be beld without works. And conſequently Salvation which is nothing elſe, but the final conpletion of this juſtification unto life, Rom. 5.18.Rom 5:18… not attainable without them. But ſti… good works have their acceptance, and validity un… the reward of Salvation, by vertue of Faith in Chri… the onelyonly Saviour, and his Merits: So that they … concurr to Salvation, onelyonly as verifications of our ſince Faith in Chriſt. It is this Faith that muſt be the pl… of a ſinner for his final juſtification at the laſt judgment; but this plea can never be made good, unleſs th… Faith be found free from any contradiction, or … faiſance by the works of a mans life.

The two Apoſtles, S. Paul and S. James, will … perfectly cleared from all reality of contradiction; all, or any of theſe three things ſhall be found true; 1. That they ſpeak not of the ſame Faith, 2. Nor of the ſame Works, 3. Nor of the ſame Juſtification. 1. Not of the ſame Faith; S. James ſpeaking of an ineffectual dead faith, not onelyonly abſtracted from works in its notion, but being altogether without them, Jam. 2.14. What doth it profit, my brethren, though a man ſay he hath faith, and hath not Works? And verſ. 17. Even ſo faith, if it hath not works, is dead, being alone. And verſ. 26. Whereas S. Paul ſpeaks of a true and living Faith, working by Love. Gal. 5.6. ſuch as was the Faith of Abraham that offerd up his onelyonly Son Iſaac, at the command of God. 2. Not of the ſame works, S. James ſpeaking of Evangelical works done in, and with the Faith of the Meſſiah, and in obedience to the Goſpel: Whilſt S. Paul ſpeaks of legal works, or works of the Law, as ſuch. Nor thirdly, of the ſame juſtification, S. Paul ſpeaking of the firſt juſtification of a ſinner, upon his ſincere believing in Chriſt, before the confirmation of that faith by his works. S. James underſtanding the continued ſtate of juſtification, as appears by his Example of Abraham. verſ. 21. Was not Abraham our father juſtified by works, when he had offered Iſaac his ſon upon the altar. Abraham was juſtified long before that work; yet he is ſaid to be juſtified thereby, not before men, but before God: Any one of theſe differences in the Diſcourſes of the two Apoſtles, is ſufficient to ſalve them from any reality of contradiction. But the exact diſquiſition of thoſe particulars, not agreeing with the limits of my preſent undertaking, muſt be left to them that are better able to purſue it. It is more than time to relieve the patience of the Reader, which ſhall be done wit… the addition of this onelyonly requeſt, that he will joyn wit… the Author in his hearty Prayer to the Lord of Glory and the God of our Salvation; for ſuch a bleſſin… upon theſe Diſcourſes, as may render them, at leaſt, i… ſome meaſure effectual to thoſe bleſſed Ends, t… which they are intitled.

ERRATA.

REader, you are deſired to take Notice, That the words Part I, in the running Titles upon the head of the pages, in the latter part of the Book, are wholly to be left out. And in the firſt Diſcourſe, Page 16. line 9. read as is, p. 25. l. 21. dele with, p. 41. in the Margent, r. je renie dieu, maugré de dieu malgrádo de dío.

In the ſecond Diſcourſe, Page 10. line 5. read foreign, p. 36. l. 1. r. as is, p. 46. l. 12. r. the work of converſion or repentance to begin in the underſtanding, the ruling faculty, &c. p. 50. l. 10. r. ſuppoſition, p. 57. l. 11. dele as, p. 73. l. 16. r. foreign, p. 91. l. 20. dele by it, p. 108. l. 8. r. prevention.