Several Discourses Considering the Providence of God, Discourse · Part 1 · Sermon 1
SERMON I.
Epheſ. I. 11.
Who worketh all things according to the Counſel of his Will.
THE Relative Particle [who] in the front of the Text, muſt neceſſarily relate to God ſpoken of verſ. 3. Bleſſed be the God and Father of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, who hath bleſſed us with all ſpiritual bleſſings in heavenly places in Chriſt. Many of theſe ſpiritual bleſſings are enumerated, from that third verſe to my Text. He hath choſen us in him before the foundation of the world, predeſtinated us unto the adoption of ſons, verſ. 5. Made us accepted in him, verſ. 6. And here again, ver. 11. Predeſtinated according to the purpoſe of him, who worketh all things according to the counſel of his will. All this is written to thoſe at Epheſus, who were faithful in Chriſt Jeſus. Epheſus was a City in the lower Aſia: A City famous for Trade, and as famous for their Idolatrous Worſhip of the great Goddeſs Diana. Paul came thither, Act. 18.19, 20. but tarried not, being to keep the feaſt at Hieruſalem, Acts 19. You find him returned thither, where he ſtayeth two years and three months, as you may gather from Acts 20. You may in that Chapter find him forced thence by an uproar of the people; during the time of his abode there, God uſed him to plant a Goſpel-Church. He left the charge of it with Timothy, 1 Tim. 1.3. As I beſought thee to abide ſtill at Epheſus, while I went into Macedonia. We cannot gather from any thing in this Epiſtle, that any ſuch corruptions in Doctrine or manners had crept into this Church, as had done into the Churches of Rome, Corinth, and Galatia; but the bleſſed Apoſtle knew, that although they ſtood, they were concerned to take heed leſt they fell, and that the common temptations of thoſe times might influence them; to obviate which he writeth this Epiſtle unto them. In the Preface contained in the two firſt verſes, he after his manner ſaluteth them. In the third verſe he begins the matter of his Epiſtle, minding them of the wonderful benefits, and acts of Grace, which God had made them partakers of, in, and through Chriſt. He inſtanceth in the Election of them to eternal life, as the end, and the Predeſtination of them to the means in order to that end, ver. 4, 5, 6, 7. Thence he proceedeth to a diſcourſe about Redemption, verſ. 8, 9, 10. In this Verſe he returneth again to the buſineſs of Predeſtination. In whom alſo (ſaith he) we have received an inheritance, being predeſtinated according to the purpoſe of him. — Who worketh all things according to the counſel of his will. Where you have two things affirmed concerning God.
1. That God worketh all things. As he at firſt created all things, ſo he worketh all things; ſome by way of Efficiency, and ſpecial influence, others by way of Permiſſion; or he worketh all things, whatſoever is not ſinful.
2. That he doth it according to the counſel of his will.
I am aware, that there are ſome Divines, who reſtrain the Univerſal Particle all things, to the things before ſpoken of, or at leaſt to all thoſe things which God worketh in a way of Efficiency. The latter is Bellarmine's ſenſe, for which he quoteth Hierome. I do rather encline to thoſe Interpreters, who think, all things, are to be interpreted more generally. Nor is there any fear, that by this interpretation we ſhould make God the Author of ſin: for beſides that, after Bellarmine had ſpit his Venom againſt Calvin and Beza, Bellar. de amiſſ. Gratiae & ſtatu peccati, cap. 15.he could find out a way himſelf to entitle God to all things, yet not to ſin; for he tells us right, Peccatum facere eſt deficere; certainly all actions as things, or natural motions, muſt be from him, in whom we live, move, and have our being; though the irregularity, obliquity, malice and deformity, and crookedneſs of actions (in which alone lyes the ſinfulneſs of them) is not from God, but from the corruption and malice of the ſinners hearts. Now the very eſſe formale of ſin (if it be not improper to ſay ſo) lyeth not in the natural action, but in the obliquity and deviation of the action from the Divine rule; and this neither Calvin nor Beza, nor any valuable perſon, ever aſcribed unto God. And therefore the All things of the Text may ſafely be underſtood, of all beings, natural motions and actions, and to entitle God to them, is no more than to ſay after the Apoſtle, In him we live and move, and have our being. Now the Text doth not only ſay, That God worketh all things, but that he worketh all things according to the counſel of his will, that is, an eternal Decree made in infinite wiſdom. So that two Propoſitions are plain enough in the Text, 1. Prop. 1 That there hath been an eternal purpoſe and counſel of the Divine will concerning all things. 2. Prop. 2 That according to this eternal counſel of the Divine will the Lord worketh all things.
I begin with the firſt of theſe. Nothing hath come to paſs, nor ever ſhall, but what the will and counſel of God hath before determined, that it ſhall be; obſerve that phraſe, That it ſhall be. There are many things have been done, and are every day done, or doing in the world, which the purity and holineſs of God, will allow him to have no efficiency in; but there is no effect which he hath not willed ſhould be done. Indeed concerning the means, the primary efficient, or inſtrumental cauſes of actions, Gods VVill hath moved variouſly. For all good things, motions, or actions that have any goodneſs in them, himſelf hath willed to do 'em, and to concur as a principal efficient cauſe. The A poſtle telleth us, that every good and perfect gift cometh down from above, which is not only true of ſpiritual gifts, habits, and influences, but of natural actions and motions, ſuch as are purely ſo, and abſtractly conſidered from any malice and filthineſs, or irregularity cleaving to them; for the Apoſtle telleth us, In him we live and move. Now whereas all motions and actions, are either good or evil; as to the firſt, it is readily granted, the firſt mover muſt be the efficient of motions. God is the fountain and original of all good. And in this ſenſe that of our Saviour is true, There is none good but God. There is a goodneſs in natural habits and actions, a goodneſs of being conſidering the motions and actions purely as natural, without the tincture of a vitiated will, or affections and paſſions debauched. There is a further goodneſs in ſpiritual habits and actions. All is from God, and concerning every good action or motion in either ſenſe, there hath paſſed an eternal purpoſe or counſel.
The only doubt can be, is concerning evil actions vitiated from the corrupt and debauched will, and affections and paſſions of men. As to which it is on all hands moſt readily granted, That God is not the author of them as ſuch, nor willed to effect them; he hath neither commanded them, nor approved them, but he hath willed that theſe ſhould be done, he hath willed the permiſſion of them. And this is ſo evident, both from Scripture, and from Reaſon, raiſing concluſions from ſcriptural principles, that it can with no modeſty be denied. I will prove it but from one inſtance of Scripture, but that ſo high as nothing can be higher, and ſo plainly aſſerted, as nothing can be plainer. You ſhall find it Acts 4.27, Acts 4.27, 28.28. For of a truth againſt thy holy child Jeſus, whom thou haſt anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the children of Iſrael were gathered together, for to do whatſoever thy hand and thy counſel determined before to be done. There certainly never was, nor is it poſſible there ever ſhould be, an higher act of wickedneſs committed in the world, than the adjudging to death, and crucifying the Lord Jeſus Chriſt, who was the eternal Son of God, and the moſt juſt and righteous perſon that ever was in the world. There was a great Combination, as to this murther, Herod, Pontius Pilate, Judas, the Jews, the Gentiles: Judas betrayed him, Herod mock't him, Pontius Pilate condemned him, the Jews accuſed him, the Jews and Gentiles crucified him. They all did their highly ſinful parts. Now one would think, and may reaſonably conclude, that if there ever had been, or could have been, an action done in the world, which had ſlipped the eternal will, and counſel of God, and come to paſs whiles the watchman of Iſrael had been aſleep, or which God never thought on, it ſhould have been this action. But, ſaith the Apoſtle, they all in this act, this horrid act, did no more than what Gods hand and counſel had before determined to be done. The words are foreign, Gods Counſel determined not to do it, but that it ſhould be done. The word foreign is often uſed in holy writ, and uſually it is tranſlated predeſtinated, as ver. 5. of this Chapter, and in my Text; and ſo alſo Rom. 8.29. Whom he predeſtinated; in 1 Cor. 2.7. it is tranſlated ordained. It apparently ſignifieth a Predetermination of perſons, or things, and is uſed with reference to both, and that both as to good and evil things. I ſhall only further give you the note of a very great Divine upon it, that it ſignifieth ſuch a Predetermination of things, as not only comprehendeth the end, but the means leading to that end. But in a further evidence of this, let us uſe our reaſon a little, though ſtill exerciſing it upon ſcriptural Principles. My firſt argument ſhall be,
Firſt, From Gods certain fore-knowledg of all things. I will open it in three things:
1. God from all eternity did certainly and infallibly foreknow whatſoever ſhould come to paſs in the world. The holy Scripture is very plentiful in aſſerting the perfection of the Divine knowledg, Prov. 5.21. The ways of man are before the eyes of the Lord, and he pondereth all their goings. Prov. 15.3. His eyes are everywhere beholding the evil and the good. Pſal. 139.3. Thou art acquainted with all my ways. Jer. 16.17. Mine eyes are upon all thy ways. Heb. 4.13. Neither is there any creature but is manifeſt in his ſight: but all things are naked and open to that God with whom we have to do. 1 John 3.20. God is greater than our hearts, and knoweth all things. Now all things conſidered from eternity, were either ſuch things which it was poſſible might be, but never were, nor are, nor ſhall be. God knew theſe things: He calleth the things that are not, as if they were, Rom. 4.17. he ſaw them in ſuo potenti, as he was able to have produced them. This Divines call ſcientiam ſimplicis intelligentiae. Or ſecondly, They are ſuch things as have been, now are, or ſhall be. Theſe things alſo God knew from eternity: Divines ſay, God knoweth theſe, In ſuo volenti per ſcientiam viſionis. He from eternity ſaw them in a certain futurity, as things which ſhould certainly be: for God doth not know things as we do by ſucceſſion, one thing to day, another thing to morrow; for then there muſt have been a time when God was ignorant of ſome things, which were blaſphemy to aſſert: but ſuch is the perfect nature of God, that he muſt by the ſame Act, and at the ſame time have a perfect knowledg of all things, that ever were to come to paſs in the created world.
2. Suppoſing now that God from all eternity had ſuch a perfect knowledg of things, it followeth of neceſſity, That they were certainly to be, and have a certain exiſtence: for God could not know, and ſee thoſe things in a future exiſtence, of whoſe future exiſtence there was no certainty; which by the way is a concludent argument againſt the new device of Molina, Fonſeca, Suarez, Leſſius, and ſome other Jeſuites, ſince embraced by Vorſtius, Arminius, Grevinchovius, and their followers, who have deviſed a middle kind of conditional knowledg in God. Thus they ſay, that God knew that if Peter or James were in ſuch circumſtances they would believe. But this is to ſay nothing, for if there were no certainty of Peter's believing from eternity, God could not certainly know, what was not certainly to be.
3. Now I would gladly be inſtructed by any who ſtumbleth at this Counſel and purpoſe of God, what but the will of God determining the event, could give a certainty of being, or exiſtence to any event? If the things that are, might not have been, then (as I ſaid before) God from eternity could not have had a certain knowledg of them as things to be: if there were a neceſſity of their being, what could make it but the will and purpoſe of God? For example: God did from all eternity certainly know, that his bleſſed Son our Lord and Saviour, ſhould be born of the Virgin Mary, in the time of Auguſtus Caeſar, and here live ſome years, and then be crucified; he did certainly know, that Herod ſhould mock him, Pilate judg and condemn him, the Jews crucifie him. Then I ſay from all eternity, theſe things were certainly to be, otherwiſe God could not have known them: God indeed did not decree to put that malice into the heart of Pilate, Herod, or the Jews. But he did decree that ſuch perſons ſhould be, and to ſuffer them to execute that malice of their hearts, yea and to influence them to thoſe actions, ſo far as they were natural actions: without that influence, neither Herod could have opened his mouth to mock him, nor Pilate to condemn him; nor could the Jews have lifted up their hands, to have either made a croſs, or driven a nail. That indeed they uſed this their natural ſtrength, and power, their tongues and hands thus wickedly, and maliciouſly, this was from the Devil, and from their own luſts; but God willed that it ſhould be done, though he did not will to do it in a way of efficiency. This was that which gravelled Vorſtius (a man of a clear head, and great Learning and Reaſon, though corrupt, having not learned to ſubmit his Reaſon to the Word of God), ſo that he confeſſeth it a very great difficulty to fix an immutable cauſe of the certain exiſtence of future contingencies: he reckons up all that is ſaid, and at laſt reckons this for one opinion, The determination of the Divine will, in which God beheld all things as certainly decreed, which were to be effected, as in the firſt efficient cauſe effectually decreeing them. He ſaith, That as this is the moſt received, Vorſtius de Deo, & Attr. Not. ad Diſp. 5. p. 260. V. etiam, 267, 268.ſo it is the trueſt opinion, if it be not extended to all future things, even to ſins, &c. And again he tells us, That whatſoever we fix as the cauſe either of Gods fore-knowledg, or the future exiſtence of things, we ſhall everywhere find Labyrinthum inexplicabilem, an inexplicable Labyrinth. And indeed it is not to be determined, How God ſhould know all things from all eternity, if he had not willed them to be, either by his efficiency or permiſſion. And our adverſaries you ſee in this point, agree it the beſt way to fix it there; only they are afraid, If God willed ſin to be, he muſt needs be the author of it: That we deny, we ſay he did not will the infuſion of any ſinful habit, nor the doing of any ſinful act, only that it ſhould be done; and you heard before, the Scripture ſpeaketh plainly enough in this caſe, That the Counſel of God had determined that ſhould be done, which was done againſt Chriſt by Herod, Pontius Pilate, and the Jews.
2. My ſecond proof ſhall be from the actual Providence of God, extending to all motions and actions. The Scripture is full of expreſſions, proving this, In him we live, move, and have our being, Acts 17. My Father worketh hitherto, and I work, John 5.17. My Text ſaith, He worketh all things. The actual Providence of God is a certain Servant to the Eternal Will, Purpoſe, and Counſel of God. It doth but execute the eternal thoughts and decrees. Look as every rational agent firſt thinketh, deliberateth, and determineth with himſelf what to do, and then his hands are employed to execute his purpoſes and deliberations: ſo God being the higheſt rational Agent, doth nothing in time, which did not meet with an eternal thought, nothing but what he had from eternity reſolved, and determined ſhould be done. Firſt, the Counſel of his Will paſſed upon the thing that it ſhould be, then his Providence bringeth it about, though in a different manner ſuited to the purity and holineſs of God: for God cannot be the author of ſin. The Providence of God therefore, as to actions that are evil, only permits the filth and obliquity of them, though it further concurreth to the motion, or action, as it is natural (for ſo it hath a goodneſs in it). As the Writing-maſter guideth the childs-hand in the Writing of its Letters, but guideth it not to make blots, or any crooked or irregular ſtrokes; though it is true of him alſo, that if he pleaſed, he could hold the childs hand ſo ſteady, and ſo far influence it, that it ſhould not make an irregular ſtroke. The Jews ſpit upon our Saviours face, they nailed him to the Croſs; if God by his Providence had not aſſiſted their natural faculties to theſe actions, ſo far as they were natural, meerly natural, they could not have ſpoke or ſpit, nor moved an hand to lift up a crown of Thorns to his head, nor to have driven a nail into his fleſh. God did concur to uphold their natural ſtrength to their natural action: but now, That they ſpake bad words, rather than good, to, and of our bleſſed Lord; that they uſed their natural power to ſpit, (to the uſe of which God by his Providence concurred, rather to ſpit) upon Chriſts face than upon the ground, and their ſtrength rather to drive a nail into Chriſts fleſh than into the bare wood, and to work in their honeſt and lawful occupation; this was from the luſt of their own hearts. Their ſin was not in ſpitting or ſpeaking, or driving a nail, but in ſpitting on Chriſts face, in ſpeaking evil, and blaſphemouſly of Chriſt, in piercing his fleſh with their nails: This God had nothing further to do with, than to permit; for the juſt puniſhment of their former ſin, and for the further working out of his own Glory in the ſalvation of thoſe for whom Chriſt dyed. In the mean time the Providence of God had its place about their ſinful actions, though not cauſing, or any way effecting them, yet permitting, and not hindering the doing of them, in aſſiſting to the actions ſo far as they were natural. And this motion of Divine Providence, (which is but a ſervant to the Divine Counſel), doth certainly conclude ſuch a Divine Counſel, according to the nature of the operation of Providence. And this is enough to eſtabliſh the Propoſition.
This Propoſition in the firſt place ſheweth us the Vanity of thoſe who dream of an incertainty in the effects of Divine Providence: with reference to us there is a great incertainty, Ʋſe 1 we know not what a day will bring forth; but in it ſelf there is none, there is nothing but hath met with an eternal thought. The truth is, a certainty of Divine knowledg doth neceſſarily infer a certainty of events; for God could not have a certain knowledg from eternity of ſuch things, as in themſelves were incertain, whether they ſhould be or no. Vorſtius grants that God is omniſcient; but he expounds it thus, that he doth, Omnia ſcibilia exactiſſime ſcire quo quidem modo ipſa ſcibilia ſunt; Vorſtius de Deo, in Not. ad Diſp. 5. p. 268.That God knows all that could be known, in that manner that they were to be known: ſo then it ſeems there were ſome things that could not be known by him who calleth the things that are not as if they were. I wonder what theſe things ſhould be? he will tell you, Thoſe things which depend upon the liberty of mans will. So then here is another firſt cauſe and mover ſet up, and God knows nothing of the effects and motions of that, till they diſcover themſelves in action. And I beſeech you, conſider how great a part of the Divine Knowledg this takes away. God according to this Doctrine could not from eternity certainly know any thing that depended upon the will of man, ſo that it leaveth God no certain knowledg, but of things in their own nature neceſſary, which is a ſtrange notion of God, yet neceſſary to be held by all thoſe who are the Advocates of free-will, otherwiſe than as freedom is oppoſed to force and coaction: for if man hath a power to believe, or not to believe, God could not from eternity certainly know that man ſhould believe, becauſe he might not believe. I cannot underſtand how this aſſertion of the neceſſity of events, in regard of the Counſel of God concernig them, ſhould (as they ſay) take away the Providence of God: for what do they mean by Providence, but Gods continual inſpection of created Beings; his continual influence upon them to preſerve and uphold their beings and faculties, and to govern their actions. Now ſuppoſing that God hath determined all Events, why he ſhould not yet inſpect all Agents, and uphold their powers and faculties to thoſe actions, which he hath willed to permit or effect, in order to the production of ſuch effects and ends, and to govern all their motions and actions in order to that end, I cannot tell. Do they contend for a liberty for God to alter the ſeries and courſe in which his will hath ſet all things? This indeed were reaſonable for fooliſh man, whoſe ſecond thoughts uſe to be beſt; and whom ſucceſſion of time teacheth knowledg; but not for God, whoſe will never moved, but circumſtanced with that infinite wiſdom, that required not a ſecond thought, and whoſe name is I am, and his will as immutable as his eſſence. But I haſten to ſomething from this Doctrine, which ſhall be more practical.
This notion of the certainty of events from an eternal purpoſe of God, Ʋſe 2 may be of great uſe for the quiet, ſtay, comfort and ſatisfaction of religious ſouls, under the ingrateful contingencies of this life; whether cauſed from the immediate hand of God, or from the malice and wickedneſs of men. There is nothing which cometh ſo to paſs, but there firſt paſſed upon it the Counſel of the Divine Will: Then, a working of Divine Providence, either effecting, or permitting it, immediately influencing the Agent, if it be good; permitting the oblique motions of mans will to it, and in it, his luſts and paſſions in their boyſterous motions, if the thing be evil. We are creatures who are full of paſſions, exceedingly ſubject to the exorbitancies, and over-boylings of them. In reference to evil, that is, things that are not pleaſing to our external ſenſes, there are two or three paſſions, which give us moſt, or all of the trouble of our lives. Fear, that torments us upon the proſpect of ſome great evil probable, or likely to fall upon us. Grief, that drowneth us upon the over-flowing of ſome Divine ſcourge upon our perſons, families, or intereſts in the world. Anger, that corrodes, and conſumes us, becauſe we cannot be revenged upon ſuch as have been the inſtruments of any evil to us.
In the operations of all theſe, our corrupt nature is very prone to exorbitancy. Now under all accidents, apt to elicite, irritate, or inflame theſe paſſions, and ſo to diſorder, and to ſpoil the quiet and compoſure of our minds, it ſhould mightily ſtay us, that nothing is caſual or contingent to God; nothing cometh to paſs in time, but what he hath from all eternity determined, and ſet in order: man hath done, can do no more, than what God hath purpoſed, nor ſuffer more than what he hath fixed by the eternal counſel of his will. There are two neceſſary conſequents of this eternal Predeſtination, and Predeſtination of God, which if duly weighed, will wonderfully relieve, and ſtay the hearts of Gods People under the troubleſom accidents and contingencies of this life.
1. That although the Will and Counſel of God putteth no force upon rational agents, nor offers any violence to humane will, yet it layeth a neceſſity upon the event. This is what a Generation in the world will not underſtand, but nothing can be plainer to any who have ears to hear, or a mind to underſtand. Gods Counſel (as you heard) predetermined the death of Jeſus Chriſt: the Scripture plainly ſaith, That Herod, Pontius Pilate, and the Jews, did no more than what the Counſel of God had determined to be done, Act. 4.28. I would fain know now, whether (as to the event) it had been poſſible that Pontius Pilate ſhould not have condemned, or the Jews ſhould not have crucified Chriſt; Who hath reſiſted his will at any time? Yet certainly none will ſay, but as to the action Judas was not forced to betray him, nor Pilate to condemn him; they acted freely as to their action, although the event was neceſſary. Gods Counſel influenced the event, but not their wills to move them to the action. But I ſay, the neceſſity of the event, though it doth not juſtifie the Agent, nor authorize the Act; yet it is of wonderful uſe to ſatisfie ſuch, as ſuffer under ſuch events; and that upon a double account.
1. As it letteth us know, That all our trouble and ſollicitude, all our fears, griefs, all our ſuſpicions, jealouſies, and condemnings of our ſelves, for any omiſſions, or neglects of means are in vain, and to no purpoſe. The thing muſt, or will be, it muſt, or would have been; God had determined it, there was an eternal Counſel had paſſed upon it. We are very prone upon ſad events, to torture our ſelves with ſuch reflexions as theſe; If this or that thing had not been done, if this or that means had not been uſed, this thing had not been, ſuch a friend had not dyed, ſuch a miſchief had not befallen me. Lord! (ſaith Martha, John 11.21.) if thou hadſt been here, my brother had not dyed. We are wonderfully miſtaken in theſe things: It is true, that our knowledg that events are certain, is no juſtification of us in the neglect of the uſe of any means in order to the obtaining any good we deſire, or preventing or removing of any evil upon us, or imminent over us: and the reaſon is plain, 1. Becauſe though the event be certain, yet we are not aſſured of it: and as to duty, the caſe is the ſame of things which are not, and which appear not to us. 2. Becauſe that God, who hath willed us any good, or the preventing or removing of any evil, hath willed both the one, and the other to be obtained, in the uſe of ſuch means, as either in a natural way of working, or upon the evidence of reaſon, or direction of Scripture, appear proper for the obtaining it. And 3. It is the Command of God we ſhould uſe means. But ſuppoſing no means neglected, the Predetermination of God ought to ſatisfie us, though we miſs of ſome good, which we paſſionately deſired, or ſuffer under the preſſure of ſome evil, which we paſſionately deſired a deliverance from, and uſed all means in our power to be freed of: it ſhould alſo quiet us as to any fears that are immoderate, and diſtracting our minds concerning any evil likely to befal us, or any who relate to us, when we have it in proſpect, and ſee it hanging over our heads. It may alſo be of great uſe to ſtill our ſpirits concerning means, leſs ſucceſsfully, and ineffectually uſed to prevent ſuch evils; yet, as I ſaid before, and for the reaſons I before mentioned, we muſt take heed of thinking that this certainty of the event, from the Divine Preſcience and Will, giveth us any thing of a ſuperſedeas, as to the uſe of any proper means, which we are equally obliged to uſe, as if the event had been incertain and caſual, and might as well not have been, as been.
2. But there is more yet in this notion, to ſatisfie every good Chriſtian; for if all events (how ingrateful ſoever to us) are according to the eternal purpoſe of God, and the Counſel of the Divine Will, 1. They neceſſarily muſt be good. 2. The products of infinite wiſdom. 3. And of infinite love, and goodneſs to ſuch, as love and fear God.
1. I ſay they neceſſarily muſt be good. I mean this of ſuch as God hath willed to effect, not ſuch events as God hath only willed to permit. But of the firſt ſort are all evils of puniſhment. It is not beneath God to be the Author of his own Judgments: Evils of affliction are only nominally, and nuncupatively evil, and called ſo according to the language and apprehenſion of our ſenſe.
2. They muſt needs be the products of infinite wiſdom. The Pſalmiſt ſpeaking of the works of God, ſaith, In wiſdom hath he made them all. It is true of Gods Counſels, in infinite wiſdom God hath eſtabliſhed them all; ſo as all events are fixed in the beſt order imaginable, for the glorifying of God, which is the higheſt end any action can be levelled and directed to. It is the higheſt end which God could act for; becauſe he could work for no higher, he hath wrought, and ſtill worketh for himſelf: it is the higheſt end that we can act for, and that to which as we ought to direct all our actions, ſo we alſo ought to ſubmit all our paſſions. The ſum of all our Prayers is, or ſhould be, Let the Lord be glorified: If God be glorified, every good man hath his higheſt wiſh, his utmoſt deſign, and deſire. Now if all events were from eternity ſet in order, and predetermined by a Counſel of the Divine Will; they muſt be ordered to the Glory of God, becauſe they are ordered by and in infinite wiſdom, which always directeth the beſt means, in order to the beſt end. God could not be deceived in his contrivement, and proportioning of means, in order to his own ends. Although therefore we may, and ought to mourn, and be afflicted, for many things which we ſee done under the Sun; becauſe they are brought to paſs by the luſts, malice, and wickedneſs of men; by their ſinful corruptions and paſſions, by which God is highly diſhonoured, and it may be we cannot underſtand what honour God can have from the event it ſelf; yet we ought at laſt to recollect our ſelves, and get victory over our paſſions, and to ſay, Was not the hand of God in this thing? Was this a ſlip of the eternal Counſel, or was it a product of it? Surely nothing ſlipt the Divine notice; whatever happens, was ordered by him, who was infinitely wiſe in Counſel, who could order nothing but in infinite wiſdom, and in ſubſerviency to the great end of his actions, the Glory of his Name. Every good Chriſtian therefore ought at laſt to ſatisfie himſelf as to what he ſeeth before him in the world, and to ſay, Let come what will of me, and mine, or of a thouſand others little concerns, I am fruſtrated of my expectations and deſires; I thought God might have been more glorified my way, I ſee I was miſtaken. God cannot be fruſtrated of his ends, nor be deceived as to means proper for the compaſſing of them. This thing came not to paſs without the eternal Counſel of the Divine Will. God is true to his own end; he would never have decreed to have permitted it, nor have permitted it actually, if he had not known how to have compaſſed his Glory by, and from it, when done: Surely, the wrath of man ſhall praiſe him. I cannot ſee the Wiſdom of God in it, but there is an infinite wiſdom in it; and when the Lords work is finiſhed, I ſhall then ſee it, and be able to underſtand what I now do not. I cannot look to ſee the bottom of Divine Wiſdom.
3. But this is not all: ſuppoſing this, All events and accidents muſt to thoſe who love and fear God, be not only the products of infinite wiſdom, with reſpect to Gods glory, which is the higheſt end, but with reſpect alſo to their good; and this not only in regard of the Promiſe, That all things ſhall work together for the good of them that love God; but alſo of his fatherly relation unto them, All things are theirs, becauſe they are Chriſts, and Chriſt is Gods. God hath ſaid concerning them, that with an everlaſting love he hath loved them; and having done ſo, all his eternal counſels, all the motions of his Providence, muſt be ordered to the Demonſtration of it; and this every Child of God ſhall firſt or laſt ſee. It falleth out with us, as with an ignorant perſon, which goeth into a Limners Shop; he ſeeth there a rude and imperfect draught of a picture, and thinketh that it looks ugly; but he ſeeth not the Idea of the intended draught in the Limners fancy, and hath not patience to wait, until he hath finiſhed his work, which if he had, he would then ſee it a very beautiful piece. Thus many of us looking upon Gods Works before they be finiſhed, we paſs an ill judgment upon them. But could we but ſee the Platform or Idea of them in the eternal Counſel of the Divine Will, or ſtay with patience till the Providence of God had finiſhed his work, we ſhould then apprehend it beautiful, and very agreeable to the Glory, Wiſdom, Mercy, Truth, and Goodneſs of that God, which it is produced to demonſtrate to the world; and that we cannot ſee this before, is our weakneſs and imperfection. The malice of men in the perſecutions of Gods People, looketh upon us with an horrid aſpect: theſe indeed God doth not effect, but he hath willed they ſhould be, and hath told us, they muſt come, yea, and he worketh too permitting others to bring them about, and ſuffering them in the execution of their malice, whom he could eaſily hinder: but when theſe things are over, we often ſee both infinite wiſdom and goodneſs too in them. How ſhould the ſalvation of Sinners have been purchaſed, if God had not permitted Judas to have betrayed his Maſter, Pilate to have condemned him, and the Jews to have nailed him to the Croſs? had it not been for the perſecution of the Jews, how ſhould the Goſpel have gone to the Gentiles? But yet for a cloſe of this diſcourſe, and that we may not miſtake our Duty, we ought not to be ſo far ſatisfied upon the Contemplation of this great truth; but that,
1. We muſt be piouſly affected with the ſad Providences which God meaſureth out to his Church and People. What ſaith the Pſalmiſt, If I forget thee, O Hieruſalem, let my right hand forget her cunning. The ſad rebukes of Gods Providence ought by us to be laid to heart. Though perſecutions and other puniſhments be contrivances of infinite wiſdom, and products of certain and infinite love; yet to the preſent ſufferers, they may be puniſhments of ſin, and marks of Divine diſpleaſure, and therefore ought not to paſs over our heads, without our taking ſome notice of them, and the cauſing of ſome ſad thoughts within us: the crucifying of Chriſt was the product of infinite wiſdom and goodneſs to the People of God, but yet a juſt cauſe of ſadneſs to the Diſciples of Chriſt. We muſt take things as they appear to us, being not able to ſee to the end and bottom of Gods deſigns. That they ſhall at laſt iſſue in the Glory of God, and the good of his People, is indeed matter of faith, and will be matter of joy to us, when we ſee it; but in the mean time it is matter of ſadneſs to us, to ſee Gods Vineyard rooted up, his People eaten up like bread, and wicked men ſuffered to devour thoſe that are more righteous than themſelves.
2. Again, We have reaſon to be afflicted both for our own ſins, and the ſins of others. Although it be as to the event true, that both our own and others ſins ſhall iſſue in Gods Glory; yet it is as true, that God hath no need either of ours or any others lyes for his Glory, and that God is both by our ſins, and the ſins of others actually diſhonoured. That they are made to iſſue in Gods Glory, is the product of Gods Wiſdom, not our oblique and irregular action or intention, and therefore they ought to be cauſes of ſad reflexion to us. But thus far we may ſatisfie our ſelves, 1. That (as I ſaid before) the event was neceſſary, and nothing that hath come to paſs, could, with our utmoſt care and diligence, have been otherwiſe than it is. We may talk after the manner of men, and reaſon after the meaſures of humane probabilities: If ſuch a thing had not been, another had not followed; but there is nothing iſſued in time, but was ordered from all eternity. 2. We ought again in this to be ſatisfied, That of whatſoever the Lord hath promiſed, nothing ſhall fail. We are full of unbelief, and when we ſee Gods Providence working (as we judg) directly contrary to what he hath promiſed, we are preſently giving up all for gone and loſt; but if every thing be wrought according to the Counſel of the Divine Will, and the Holy Scriptures be ſuch part of this will, as he hath pleaſed to reveal to us, God knoweth both what he hath ſaid, and how he hath laid things in his eternal thoughts, and ſooner ſhall Heaven and Earth paſs away, than any word he hath ſpoke: Prov. 19.21. Iſa. 40.8.The counſel of the Lord ſhall ſtand: and the word of our God ſhall ſtand for ever.
3. And laſtly, As I have before told you, we may be thus far ſatisfied, That whatſoever doth, or ever ſhall come to paſs in the world, ſhall ſerve Gods great ends; becauſe it is ordered by the Counſel of the infinitely wiſe God, and therefore muſt neceſſarily ſerve his deſigns. In the end of the world we ſhall ſay, God could not have had ſo much Glory, but for ſuch a perſecution, ſuch a diſorder. Surely the wrath of man ſhall praiſe him.