Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Chapter 16
CHA…. XVI. Whether diviſions in other parts of Learning be remedied by it.
NExt he ſhews us many doubts in Morall Philoſophy, as well as thoſe precedent in Naturall Philoſophy. But I doe not ſee that his Lordſhips Poſition will help to clear any one of them whatſoever.
Whether the Ʋnderstanding and the Will be Really the ſame, or diſtinct, is nether Materiall nor Determinable, in Morall Phyloſophy: It belongs only to Naturall Philoſophy, viz. to that part of Phyſicks that treats de Animâ.
How the Will may ſomtimes omit the proſecution of the Underſtandings direction; I have already ſhewed, without making the Will an Ʋnderstanding.
He glanceth at Aristotle's maintaining the Eternity of the World againſt Hermes, Orpheus, Anaxagoras, &c. For my own part, I would be thankfull to him, that would ſolidly demonſtrate the Worlds Creation from principles in Nature, and make it appear from Naturall Light, that the World could not have been from Eternity. For though I deny not, but that there may be in Nature, Demonſtrative Arguments; yet I confeſſe, I have not as yet ſeen thoſe (and yet I have examined many) that have given me ſo full ſatisfaction as I deſire concernng an abſolute Impoſſibility; but that I have ſeen (at leaſt ſeemed to ſee) ſome juſt exception.
But if his Lordſhips Opinion be True, I ſhall have more cauſe to doubt then I have formerly had. For if all things did exist in their Beings with God, ab omni aeterno; and their Temporall Exiſtence be onelyonly Imaginary, to our apprehenſion: (as his Lordſhip affirms in his 11. Chapter, pag. 99.) I cannot imagine any hinderance at all, Why that which did really exiſt from all Eternity, might not be without a beginning; Why that which Was ab aeterno, might not (though it did not) ab aeterno Appear to be, and be Apprehended. I will not therefore blame Ariſtotle for maintaining the Worlds Eternity as a diſputable Probleme, till I ſee ſome Light which might have convinced him, whilſt he enjoyed not the benefit of Revealed Light; at leaſt, till this opinion of his Lordſhip be rejected.
In the next place, I grant to his Lordſhip that there are doubts alſo in Metaphyſicks, in Logick, in Mathematicks. But I perceive not how this opinion diſſolves them.
There be doubts alſo in Divinity, (though I do not ſee how this doth clear them▪) Whether Faith, or Repentance be precedent: Whether Faith be a particular application of Chriſt to my ſelfe: or only a bare ſpirituall beliefe, that Christ is the Sonne of God.
I aſ…ent not, to place (the Saving Act of) Faith, either with Mr. Cotton, (as his Lordſhip cites him) in the laying hold of, or aſſenting to that Promiſe, That, Hee that beleeveth that Chriſt is the Sonne of God, ſhall be ſaved; Nor yet in a Particular application of Chriſt to my ſelfe in Aſſurance, or a beleeving that Chriſt is mine: (For though theſe alſo be acts of Saving Faith, yet they are not the Saving Act of Faith.) But I chooſe rather to place it in an act of the Will, rather then in either of theſe fore-named acts of the Ʋnderstanding. It is an Accepting of Chriſt offered, rather then an Aſſenting to a Propoſition affirmed. To as many as [Received] him, &c. that is, to them that Beleeve in his name, Joh. 1. God makes an offer of Chriſt to all, (elſe ſhould not Reprobates be condemned for not accepting of him; as neither the Devils are, becauſe he was not offered to them) Whoſoever Will, let him come, and Take of the water of Life freely Rev. 22. 17. Whereupon the Beleeving Soule replies, I will, and ſo Takes him. When a Guift is Offered to mee; That which makes it to be Mine, is my Acceptation, my Taking it; Not the Knowing that it is Offered; nor the Knowing that it is Mine; For the one of theſe precedeth, the other followeth, the appropriating it to my ſelfe.
If you call this Taking of Chriſt, (or conſenting that Chriſt ſhall be my Saviour▪ a Depending, a Reſting, or Relying upon Chriſt for Salvation; (if you ſpeak of an Act of the Will:) It is all One. For, Taking of Chriſt to be my Saviour, and Committing my ſelfe to Chriſt to be Saved, is the ſame: Both of them being but a Conſenting to this Covenant▪ I will be your God, and you ſhall be my people; I will be thy Father, and Thou ſhalt be my Sonne.
And if you make this the Saving act of Faith; then will Repentance (ſo farre as it is diſtinct from Faith) be a Conſequent of it. Confidence alſo or Aſſurance that Chriſt is mine ariſeth from it: For Chriſt muſt firſt be Ours, before we can Know him ſo to be.
Then alſo that, Whether Faith be a beleeving that I am Saved; (he meanes, in ſtatu ſalutis.) or a depending upon God for Salvation, (to be put into ſuch a Condition of Salvation,) will be eaſily reſolved, and Bellarmins Dilemma ſoon anſwered. viz. If Beliefe be to Beleeve that I am ſaved, (that Chriſt is mine,) then was▪ I ſaved without Faith: If it be, to beleeve that God will give me Grace to be ſaved, then do I beleeve before▪ I have Grace, before I have Faith. I ſay, It is eaſily anſwered, by making the Saving act of Faith, an Acceptance or Taking of Chriſt: For although the Guift be mine, before I Know; or am Aſſured, that it is mine; Yet is not the Guift mine, before my Accepting of it, but by my Acceptance it becomes Mine.
If (with Mr. Cotton) we ſhould make Faith to ſave us, only Declarativè (which wee muſt by no means admit;) Then, Why is it ſaid, that we are ſaved by Faith, and not by Works? Why do we allow, that Faith doth concurrere effica…iter ad ſalutem, but deny the ſame to Works? Seeing that Good Works do ſave us Declarativè, as well as Faith.
That we are ſaved not only in the eternall Decree without faith, but even in the Execution, is ſtrange Divinity. For if without Faith, then without Christ; for Chriſt is no further Ours, then apprehended by Faith. As for the Eternall Decree (of Election, he meanes,) it is true, we are not▪ through Faith, Elected to Salvation; but we are Elected, to Salvation through Faith. Faith is not the Cauſe of the Decree, but Faith is decreed to be the Cauſe of Salvation.
To that Queſtion, whether there be a preſcript Form of Church-Government, I ſhall ſay nothing; For it being a Queſtion maintained both wayes, I will not oppoſe either of them, unleſſe I had leiſure, to confirm what I ſay, to proſecute what I affirm. Only to his Argument I may lay an exception. Church-government, (which he preſumeth to be enjoined in the ſecond Commandement,) is not of the nature of Morall Precepts, becauſe not of Perpetuall Continuance: (For ſuch a preſcript Form, as by which the Church ſince Chriſt ſhould be governed, had not its beginning till ſince Chriſt: And therfore not commanded in the ſecond Commandement any otherwiſe then by Conſequence; (as particular temporary duties are.) However, it is like, Church Government is not more expreſly commanded in the ſecond Commandement, then Civill Government in the fift; and yet none ever inferred from thence, a preſcript Form of Civill Government. If he ask therfore, Doe they leave us any latitude in any other Commandements? I ſay, Yes: and I inſtance in That. He muſt ſearch for a Preſcription, in the Evangeliſts, and Apoſtles writings, if he would find it, not in the ſecond Commandement.
(Only, by the way, I wiſh his Lordſhip would do us the favour, from his doctrine of Ʋnity, (which he makes the Salve to cure all Controverſies,) to demonſtrate to us, Whether there be a Preſcript Form, and What it is. And I ſhould then judge his Opinion well worth imbracing, though for nothing elſe. Wherein yet I ſhall wiſh him to beware, that he ſay not of this as of the diviſion of Quantity, pag. 42. that all muſt at laſt be reduced to an Ʋnity; Nor, as pag. 98. that it is diviſibilis in infinitum. Leſt we eſtabliſh Epiſcopacy▪ (which himſelfe likes not;) or become Independent; which others like as ill.)
The diſtinction between Scientia ſimplicis Intelligentiae, and Scientia Viſionis, if it be taken only for diſtinctio rationis (and I ſuppoſe none ever tooke it otherwiſe) may well enough be admitted. By the One, God knows the Nature of All things Poſſible: By the Other he Sees, that Theſe things Are. The Object of the One, is All things Poſſible, all things Intelligible: the Object of the Other is only, Things Exiſtent, either paſt, preſent, or to come
But (ſaith his Lordſhip) If Gods Power, and Will be all one; If God be p…r… Actus and not Potentia; Then all things that ever Shall be, Were ab aeterno under … Decree; and ſo what God Could doe, he Did doe, and Can doe no more. (Hee had ſaid before, pag. 99. That all things did exiſt [in their Beings] ab omni aeterno; And are they now but under … Decree?) But for anſwer.
I grant, that God cannot doe, what he hath not decreed; for then were his Decree either Void, or Imperfect: And, ſuppoſing ſuch a Decree, the Power of God is limited by his Will. But a Conditionall, and Hypotheticall Impoſſibility, doth not inferre an Abſolute Impoſſibility And therefore we affirm, that Deus Potest ea quae non Vult. He Can doe More then he Will, (in ſenſu diviſo, not in ſenſu Compoſito.) God is able (ſaith Chriſt) of theſe stones to raiſe up children unto Abraham; Yet he doth not. Knoweſt thou not that I can pray to my Father, and he will ſend …e more then twelve Legions of Angels? But neither did Chriſt pray, nor the Father ſend them. The God which wee ſerve is [Able] to deliver us (ſaid the three men in Daniell;) yet they were not certain that he Would doe it.
And if Media Scientia, (wherby God is ſuppoſed to know an Hypotheticall Propoſition; as That the men of Keilah would deliver up David, if he ſtayed there) had no other hinderance but this; It might well enough be admitted.