The Method of Grace in the Justification of Sinners, Chapter 5
CHAP. V.
An Anſwer to Mr. Eyres ninth Chapter, whether faith be the condition of Juſtification? The Affirmative proved from Scripture. Mr. Eyres Arguments to the contrary all invalid.
SECT. I.
TO Mr. Eyres Argument, That if we were juſtified by§. 1. faith, we were not purely paſſive in our Juſtification, I gave this anſwer; That to beleeve is a formal vital act of theſoul in genere phyſico: but the uſe of it in Juſtification is to qualifie us paſſively, that we may be morally & orderly capable of being juſtified by God: or though phyſically it be an act, yet morally it is but a paſſive condition, by which we are made capable of being juſtified, according to the order and conſtitution of God. As the reading of the book, or acceptance of a pardon amongſt men, is a condition without which an offendor is not pardoned. Hereupon Mr. Eyre diſputes largely, that faith is not the condition of Juſtification: wherein I do the more gladly joyne iſſue with him. becauſe upon this aſſertion of ours doth he take occaſion to aſperſe the received doctrine of Proteſtants, with the reproachful names of Popery and Arminianiſme. Here therefore I ſhall ſhew three things. 1. What a condition is? 2. That faith according to Scripture is the condition of Juſtification. 3. That all Mr. Eyres Arguments§. 2. to the contrary are moſt miſerably inconcluſive.
A condition then is diverſly deſcribed by divers Authours. Some deſcribe it thus. aNavar. En…h…r. page …8,.Conditi… eſt ſuſpenſio ali cujus diſpoſitioni…, tantiſper dum aliquid futurum fiat. Others thus, bBaldus apud Joh. Baptiſt. in verbConditio eſt adjectio quaedam per quam diſp…ſitum habet in ſui eſſe pendentium exiſtentiam vel defectum. Others thus, cPet. de Peruſ. ibid.Eſt verb…rum adjectio in futurum ſuſpendentium, ſecundum quam d…ponens vult diſpoſitum regulari. dIn L. 1. F. de …oud & demonſtr.Bartolus thus, Conditio eſt quidam futurus eventus, in quem diſpoſitio ſuſpenditur. Any of theſe will ſerve my turn, theſe things being agreed. 1. That it pertaines to him that diſpoſeth of any thing, to propound upon what condition his will is that it be diſpoſed of, or not diſpoſed of. 2. That the nature of a condition conſiſts mainly in ſuſpending the actual obligation of the diſpoſer, until the condition be performed. 3. That it is the will of him that makes the condition, which is the cauſe of the obligation that comes upon him when the condition is performed: of which we ſhall ſee more anon.
Now that faith is the condition upon which God hath ſuſpended§. 3. his actual donation of righteouſneſſe to a ſinner, is ſo plain and evident to me, that I confeſſe, I cannot but wonder that men acquainted with the Scriptures, ſhould ſo much as queſtion it. Several expreſſions there are, taken notice of by eVide Bartelum. late in L. 1. F. de cond. & Demonſtr. & Azor. Inſt. Moral. par. 3. l. 4. c. 24.Civilians and Moraliſts, as ſignes or notes of a condition: and ſcarcely one can I finde, which the Scripture doth not uſe ſomewhere or other, in deſcribing the order and habitude of faith to our Juſtification. But I ſhall inſtance but in one or two. I begin with that Rom. 10. 6, 9. The righteouſneſſe which is of faith ſpeaketh on this wiſe, That if thou ſhalt confeſſe with thy mouth the Lord Jeſus, and ſhalt beleeve in thy heart that God hath raiſed him from the dead, thou ſhalt be ſaved. That ſalvation here includes Juſtification, appears from the very next words, ver. 10. For with the heart man believeth unto righteouſneſſe. And I appeal to common ſenſe, whether the particle If in this place be not a manifeſt ſigne of a condition upon which Juſtification is ſuſpended, or whether it be poſſible for mortal men to invent any words, that can more plainly expreſſe the matter of a condition. Try it by compariſon with other Scriptures, Gen. 43. 4, 5. If thou wilt ſend our brother with us, we will go down; but if thou wilt not ſend him, we will not go down; and Gen. 34. 22. Only herein will the men conſent to us.—If every male amongſt us be circumciſed. Herein will they conſent foreign, that is, upon this condition will they conſent: as we render that word, 1 Sam 11. 2. on this condition will I make a Covenant with you. See Gen. 18. 26. 28, 30. Exod. 4. 23. Prov. 2. 1, 4. Jor. 18. 8, 10. and hundreds of other places. In all which the particle If is manifeſtly conditional: nor upon the ſtricteſt obſervation, which I have made in reading the Scriptures, am I able to eſpy ſo much as one place, wherein the ſaid particle hath any other uſe, when it ſuppoſeth to any thing that is future, by vertue of a Promiſe. Indeed Mr. Eyre did fChap. 5. §. 6.before mention two places, wherein he will have the particle If, not to propound the condition by which a benefit is obtained, but only to deſcribe the perſon to whom it belongs, viz. 2 Tim. 2. 21. If a man purge himſelf from theſe, he ſhall be a veſſel unto honour, and Heb. 3. 6. whoſe houſe are we, if we hold faſt our confidence unto the end. As to the former place, it ſhould have been proved, and not ſaid only, that the particle If is not a note of a condition; if to be a veſſel of honour be, to be glorified in heaven. Or if to be a veſſel of honour do ſignifie a man ſpecially and eminently ſerviceable unto God, ſanctified and meet for the Maſters uſe, and prepared unto every good work (as the Apoſtle in the ſame verſe expounds it) then the particle If is a note of more then a condition, even of a true proper cauſe, of an effect that follows naturally, and not by Promiſe: for the more a man purgeth himſelf from ſpiritual defilements and defilers, the more prepared and diſpoſed he muſt needs be to every ſpiritual employment. The next place, Heb. 3. 6. is nothing to the purpoſe, if the particle If be there granted to be meerly a deſcription of the perſon; becauſe the conſequent part of the Propoſition is not promiſſory, but ſimply affirmative. The text ſaith not, whoſe houſe we ſhall be if we hold faſt, but whoſe we are if we hold faſt. Nevertheleſſe gParall. l. 3. in loc.Junius upon ver. 14. (which in ſenſe is much the ſame with this) doubts not to affirme the holding faſt of our confidence to be a condition. A nobis verò conditionem unicam deſiderat (ſcil. Chriſtus) nempe ut maneamus in ipſo—atque hanc conditionem n… tat Apoſtolus his verbis: ſiquidem principium illius ſubſiſtentiae, &c. which teſtimony I quote the rather, that Mr. Eyre may know that Junius was no enemy to faiths being a condition, as he doth ſomewhere repreſent him: yea, and on this verſe he is expreſſe, that continuance in the faith, is the condition of our continuing to be Gods houſe.§. 4.
And that the words, Rom. 10. 9. If thou beleeve with thine heart, &c. cannot be a deſcription of the perſon meerly, I prove largely below, in a particular debate of that place. I have here only one word to ſpeak againſt it. Either it deſcribes the perſon from his faith, to ſignifie that as ſuch (that is, as a believer) he is the ſubject of Juſtification, and then faith muſt needs be antecedent to Juſtification: and if it be antecedent as an act required of us in point of-duty, to a bleſſing conſequent by vertue of a promiſe, then is it antecedent as a condition. Or it is a meer deſcription of the perſon, ſhewing, that that is the man that ſhall be juſtified: though his faith have no order nor tendency to his Juſtification, but may as well follow after it as go before it. But 1. This cannot be current ſenſe, if Juſtification be either from eternity, or immediately in the death of Chriſt, or at any time before this deſcription be made: for example, Is it ſenſe to ſay, If thou be the man that doſt, or at any time ſhalt beleeve, thou ſhalt be elected, or Chriſt ſhall die for thee; when both election and the death of Chriſt are long ſince paſt? or if a man ſhould ſay, If thou ſhalt be glorified, thou ſhalt be juſtified, would not ſuch a ſpeech ſuppoſe, that the perſon to whom thoſe words are ſpoken, was as yet not juſtified? though the Scripture is not wont to ſpeak after this manner in any place. 2. Let us take ſome parallel place, and ſee how it will accord with it. As the words of Chriſt, to the father of the childe that was poſſeſt, Mark 9. 23. If thou canſt beleeve, all things are poſſible to him that believeth. Or the ſame words to his diſciples, Matth. 17. 20. If you have faith as a grain of muſtard-ſeed, nothing ſhall be unpoſſible unto you. If faith do here only deſcribe the perſon, and not propound the condition, then whether the father had at preſent believed or no, his childe muſt have been preſently healed notwithſtanding; ſuppoſing him to be a perſon that at any time ſhould believe: and whether the diſciples beleeve or no at preſent, all things are poſſible to them preſently, they being the perſons whoſe property it is to believe ſome time or other. But more of this hereafter.
Another note of a condition is the particle if not, or except: which§. 5. we finde alſo uſed in Scripture in this matter: for men are threatened, that they ſhall not be juſtified except they beleeve, John 8. 24. If you beleeve not, or except you believe, you ſhall die in your ſins: when men are threatened with damnation except they believe, are they threatened abſolutely, or conditionally? if the firſt, then all the men of the world ſhall be damned: for this is to be preached to all men, that if they believe not, they ſhall be damned. If conditionally, then faith is the condition of deliverance from damnation. And is not God to be thus underſtood in all his ſpeeches of like nature? Gen. 44. 23. Except your youngeſt Brother come down with you, you ſhall ſee my face no more. Joſh. 7. 12. Neither will I be with you any more, except you deſtroy the accurſed from amongſt you. Can the Sun ſhine more bright in the firmament, then it is clear from hence, that their deſtroying the accurſed from amongſt them, was a neceſſary condition of their enjoyment of Gods Preſence? Acts 27. 31. Except theſe abide in the ſhip, you cannot be ſaved. See alſo Luke 13. 3, 5. Rev. 2. 5, 22. and multitudes of other places. In all which the ſame particle is a note of a condition, unleſſe we ſhall have the modeſty, to think that the Scriptures were penned on purpoſe to puzzle and confound our underſtandings.
All thoſe texts of Scripture which promiſe remiſſion of ſins to§. 6. them that believe, prove the ſame thing particularly, Mark 16. 15, 16. Go preach the Goſpel to every creature. He that believeth, and is baptized, ſhall be ſaved; but he that believeth not ſhall be damned, John 3. 16. God ſo loved the world, that he gave his only begotten ſonne, that whoſoever believeth on him ſhould not periſh, but have everlaſting life; and 6. 40. This is the Will of him that ſent me, that whoſoever ſeeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlaſting life, with many places of like nature. To all which I gueſſe what Mr. Eyres anſwer will be, by what he ſaith of the laſt of theſe, chap. 13. §. 14. pag. 135. This text (ſaith he) and others like it, do only ſhew who have the fruition and enjoyment of the benefits of Chriſt, to wit, They that beleeve.
Many ſuch cathedral determinations we have from him, without§. 7. ſo much as a pretence to proof: eſpecially in his anſwers to Scriptures alledged againſt him; yet might he very well think that we would expect ſome ſolid reaſon for this his perpetual wreſting and abuſe of words from their obvious and common ſenſe. 1. It cannot indeed be denied, but that the ſame words which propoſe the condition upon which a benefit is obtained, may alſo conſequentèr declare the perſons to whom the ſaid benefit doth belong, but that ſuch manner of ſpeech as is uſed in theſe texts, doth only ſhew the perſons who, and not the condition or meanes by which a benefit is obtained, is contrary to the perpetual ſenſe of Scripture. Let us tranſcribe a few texts of many, Numb. 21. 8. And it ſhall come to paſſe, that overy one (or whoſoever) is bitten, when he looketh upon it, (namely upon the brazen Serpent) ſhall live. I do the rather inſtance in theſe words, becauſe the Lord illuſtrateth the method of Redemption by them, John 3. 14, 15. As Moſes lifted up the Serpent in the Wilderneſſe, even ſo muſt the Son of man be lifted up, that whoſoever believeth on him, ſhould not periſh, &c. If the protaſis had been full, it had run thus. As Moſes lift up the Serpent in the wilderneſſe, that whoſoever looked on him might be healed: even ſo, &c. And do thoſe words (that whoſoever looked on him) only deſcribe the perſon that was healed, but not propound the condition or meanes of healing? common ſenſe cannot endure it. Their looking up to the brazen Serpent was antecedent to their healing: and a meanes ordained for them to uſe, that they might be healed: and their healing followed by vertue of Gods power and faithfulneſſe. Ergo, it was a condition of their healing. And the diſtributive particle whoſoever, doth ſufficiently ſhew, that it was every one promiſcuouſly, one as well as another, for whoſe healing the Serpent was lifted up, through their looking on it; and not a note of diſtinction to difference one from another. So Mark 11. 23. Whoſoever ſhall ſay unto this mountain (believingly) Be thou removed, he ſhall have whatſoever he ſaith. Is this alſo a deſcription of the perſon, but not a propounding of the meanes by which thoſe works may be obtained to be wrought? ſee the like expreſſions, Matth. 13. 12. and 16. 25. and 18. 4. Mark 9. 41. Rev. 22. 17. and other places without number. To all which, if Mr. Eyre can oppoſe but one that will admit ſuch a ſenſe, as here he puts upon the texts under debate, he ſhall do more then any Authour elſe that I can yet meet with. 2. If theſe and the like places do only deſcribe the perſons that ſhall be ſaved, then do they aſcribe no more to faith in reference to ſalvation, then unto works. Works of righteouſneſſe being as proper and peculiar to them that ſhall be ſaved; as faith it ſelfe: and therefore the deſcription of the perſon might as well be taken from them, as from faith. 3. That which ſerves only to deſcribe a perſon in ſpecie, cannot be propoſed to another perſon as a meanes by which he may enjoy a like benefit, no more then if the ſaid perſon had been deſcribed in individuo; for example, ſuppoſe the Lord had deſcribed them that ſhall be ſaved, not from faith, (their ſpecifick quality) but by their proper names, and had ſaid, God gave his Son to death, that Peter, and Paul, and James, and John, &c. might be ſaved: were it not againſt all ſenſe and ſobriety to go to Geofry, Roger and Anthony, and tell them if they will be Peter and Paul they ſhall be ſaved? or ſuppoſe the deſcription had been from the ſpecies, and the words had run thus, God gave his Son, that whoſoever is borne of Jewiſh Parents ſhould be ſaved: were it not ridiculous, with all ſeriouſneſſe, earneſtneſſe and tenderneſſe of compaſſion, to exhort and beſeech, and charge the Gentiles to be borne of Jewiſh Parents, that they might be ſaved? yea, ſuppoſe they had been deſcribed from their Election, (as they might have been more properly then from their faith) had it not been abſurd to exhort men that they would be elected, that ſo they might be ſaved? I conclude therefore▪ that the texts before us are not a deſcription of the perſon, but a propoſing of a condition, upon which only ſalvation is attainable, words that are meerly deſcriptory, can never be reſolved into a command or exhortation.
SECT. II.
LEt us now ſee whether Mr. Eyre hath done any thing towards§. 8. a proofe, that faith is not the condition of Juſtification.
His firſt Reaſon is this, That interpretation of the phraſe, which gives no more to faith in the buſineſſe of Juſtification, then to other works of ſanctification, cannot be true. But to interpret Juſtification by faith meerly thus, that faith is a condition to qualifie us for Juſtification, gives no more to faith, then to other works of Sanctification; as to repentance, charity, new obedience, &c.
Anſw. 1. If the Propoſition be true, (as I believe it to be moſt true) Mr. Eyre hath hitherto deluded us groſſely in interpreting Juſtification by faith, for a knowledge or evidence that we are juſtified: ſeeing works concur to ſuch an evidence, (and that by his own conceſſion) as was above demonſtrated. 2. The Aſſumption alſo (I preſume) proceeds upon the ſuppoſed principles of thoſe whom he oppoſeth, and not according to his own ſenſe: for I think, he will not ſay, that any works of Sanctification do qualifie us for Juſtification. 3. I deny the Aſſumption. And how doth Mr. Eyre prove it? Why Mr. Baxter and Dr. Hammond ſay ſo. Yet are neither of theſe Authours of ſuch authority with Mr. Eyre in other caſes, as that their word ſhould paſſe for a proof. And yet hath he not fairly repreſented them neither. Dr. Hammond, I confeſſe, is to me leſſe plain and intelligible: but if Mr. Eyre will undertake that his notion is the ſame with Mr. Baxters, he might have ſeen in very many places of Mr. Baxters writings, that he makes works but the ſecondary leſſe principal conditions at moſt, and denies them to be any conditions at all, in reference to our firſt entrance into a ſtate of Juſtification. And muſt we yet believe againſt an Authours owne words, that he aſcribes no more to faith then unto other works of ſanctification, in the matter of Juſtification? 4. I alſo do make repentance a neceſſary condition of remiſſion of ſins, becauſe the Scripture doth ſo, Luke 24. 47. And that repentance and remiſſion of ſins ſhould be preached in his name, Acts 2. 38. Repent and be baptized for the remiſſion of ſins, and 3. 19. Repent and be converted, that your ſins may be blotted out, &c. But I conceive withal, that the one is included in the other, and that their difference is rather reſpective then real, if we ſpeak of faith as it is in the will; partly, as to the object, faith reſpecting Chriſt immediately, and repentance God, Acts 20. 21. partly, as to the termes: the ſame motion of the ſoule, in reſpect of the terminus à quo, (namely, dead works) being called repentance: and in reſpect of the terminus ad quem, (namely God in Chriſt) more peculiarly faith, Heb. 6. 1. Repentance alſo in its formal notion, includes ſhame, and ſorrow, and ſelfabhorrency, &c. which faith preciſely doth not. As to the Concluſion of this paragraph, which concernes my ſubſcription to the teſtimony to the truth of Jeſus Chriſt, (a book ſo called) I do not remember that ever I ſubſcribed it in this or any other County.
The ſecond Argument is this. To interpret Juſtification by faith,§. 9. that faith is a neceſſary antecedent condition of Juſtification, gives no more to faith then to works of nature, as to ſight of ſin, legal ſorrow, &c. for if theſe be conditions diſpoſing us to faith, and faith a condition, diſpoſing us to Juſtification, then are they alſo conditions diſpoſing us to Juſtification; for cauſa cauſae eſt cauſa cauſati.
Anſw. This Argument at the long run overthrows all humane contracts: at leaſt, it fights as ſtrongly againſt them as againſt us. Titius gives a hundred pounds per annum to Sempronius, upon conditon he give two pence a week to Maevius. This two pence cannot be paid, unleſſe the ſilver be digged out of the mines, and melted, and ſtamp't, and delivered out of the Coyners hand, &c. Ergo▪ S…mpronius his giving two pence a week to Maevius, is not the condition of his holding his 100. li. per annum: at leaſt no more then the mine or bank is. Is not this gallant Logick? 2. I deny that legal ſorrows, and the ſight of ſin, &c. are neceſſary conditions diſpoſing to faith: becauſe God hath not promiſed to give faith, if we be convicted or legally ſorry. Theſe Preparations are neceſſary phyſically, not morally: becauſe the ſoule cannot ſeek out for life and ſalvation in another, while it hath confidence of ſufficiency in its ſelfe. If any man beleeve without theſe, he ſhall be ſaved notwithſtanding. 3. The anſwer therefore is, that the things which are neceſſary naturally, are not the conditions of gift, but thoſe only which are made neceſſary by the will of the Donour; hL. conditiones eztrinſec. F. de cond. & demonſtr.and ſo doth the Civil Law determine. Caius gives Seius all the fruits that grow upon his farme the next year: it is neceſſary that fruits grow upon the farme, or elſe Seius cannot have them: yet Caius his gift is not conditional, but abſolute. 4. As to that logical axiome. Cauſa cauſae eſt cauſa cauſati. Mr. Eyre knows it muſt have more limitations then one, or elſe 'tis dangerouſly falſe. But in the preſent caſe 'tis altogether impertinent; for neither are legal preparations the cauſe of faith, nor faith the cauſe of Juſtification, but the condition only, and ſo the cauſa & cauſatum may go whiſtle.
The third Argument is this, that by which we are juſtified is the§. 10. proper, efficient, meritorious cauſe of our Juſtification. Faith as a condition is not ſo. Ergo.
Anſw. I deny the major. Mr. Eyre proves it by a threefold Argument. 1. By the uſe of theſe Propoſitions (particles he would have ſaid) by and through in ordinary ſpeech, which note a meritorious or inſtrumental cauſe. As when we ſay, A ſouldier was raiſed by his valour; a tradeſman lives by his trade. 2. From the contrary phraſe: as when the Apoſtle denies that a man is juſtified by works, and by the Law, he excludes works from any cauſal influxe into our Juſtification. Now that which he denies to works, he aſcribes to faith. 3. From other parallel phraſes in Scripture, where we are ſaid to be redeemed, juſtified and ſaved. Per Chriſtum, per ſanguinem, per mortem, per vulnera.
Anſw. Theſe are iDe Juſtif. l. 1. c. 17.Bellarmines wiſe Arguments, to prove that faith doth juſtifie per modum cauſae, dignitatis aut meriti; by way of cauſality, worth or merit; which it ſeems Mr. Eyre accounts unanſwerable, otherwiſe he would not have brought them again upon the ſtage in an Engliſh dreſſe, when our Proteſtants have beat them off ſo often in Latine. 1. To the firſt, I deny that the particles By or Through are alwayes the notes of a cauſe meritorious or inſtrumental. How many times do we finde them in one Chapter, where they are not capable of any ſuch ſignification? Heb. 11. 5. By faith Enoch was tranſlated that he ſhould not ſee death, and ver. 11. Through faith Sarah received ſtrength to conceive ſeed, ver. 30. By faith the walls of Jericho fell down, ver. 33. By faith they ſtopped the mouthes of Lions, ver. 35. Women by faith received their dead raiſed to life again, with many other paſſages in that Chapter. That it is the grace of faith which is here ſpoken of▪ appears from the deſcription of it, ver. 1. will Mr. Eyre grant the Papiſts, that faith was the meritorious cauſe of theſe effects? I hope then he will no more reproach me as popiſhly affected. It may be he will ſay it was the inſtrumental cauſe: But let him ſhew how. What inſtrumental efficacy did faith put forth in Enochs Tranſlation? did it either ſubtilize or immortallize his body? or how was faith an inſtrument in throwing down the walls of Jericho? It is naturally impoſſible agere in diſtans, to act upon an object which the Agent toucheth not, formally or virtually: or what efficiency did faith put forth upon dead bodies, to raiſe them to life again? Theſe effects are no otherwiſe aſcribed to faith, then as the condition upon which they were wrought, and without which they could not have been wrought, according to Gods ordination. As it is ſaid concerning the Lord Jeſus, That he could not do many mighty works in his own countrey, becauſe of their unbelief, Mark 6. 5, 6. with Matth. 13. 58. Not that their faith had contributed any thing to his ability: but that their unbelief, by vertue of Gods ordination, made them uncapable of being the ſubjects, for and amongſt whom thoſe works were to be wrought.
To the ſecond, I deny that Juſtification is aſcribed to faith in the§. 11. ſame ſenſe, in which it is denied to works, though it be the ſame Juſtification, as to its common nature, which is aſcribed to that, and denied to theſe: and therefore cannot be meant of a Juſtification manifeſted to conſcience, as Mr. Eyre interprets it, when he comes to particular places. 'Tis confeſſed, that when the Apoſtle denies that a man is juſtified by works, he excludes works from any cauſal influx into our Juſtification. But it will by no means follow, that when he aſcribes it to faith, he doth therefore acknowledge faith to be a cauſe. No more then the like oppoſition in Scripture doth denote the ſame kinde of cauſe on both ſides, R…m. 9. 8. N…t the children of the fleſh, but the children of the Promiſe are counted for the ſeed, and ver. 11. Not of works, but of him that calleth, and ver. 16. Not of h…m that runneth, but of God that ſheweth mercy, and Rom. 11. 6. Not of works, but of grace. Eſtne inter Pontiſicios quiſquam tam excors, …t audeat affirmare, in iſtis opp…ſitioni…us idem planè genus cauſae utrinque notari? Is any man amongſt the Papiſts ſo ſottiſh (ſaith kBell ene…v. Tom 4. c. 4. p. 3…6. dued.Dr. Ames) as that he will dare to affirme. that in theſe oppoſitions, the ſame kinde of cauſe is ſignified on both ſides? The like I ſay to the third, when we are ſaid to be juſti…ed by Chriſt, by his death, by his blood, &c. the particle By doth denote the proper meritorious cauſe of our Juſtification. But that it may not in other ſentences ſignifie ſome other Argument, as well as a cauſe, muſt remain to be proved, till the time when we are to expect Mr. Eyres Rejoynder.
SECT. III.
THe fourth Argument ſucceeds. To make faith a condition morally§. 12. diſpoſing us to Juſtification, makes us at leaſt concurrent cauſes with God and Chriſt in our Juſtification.
Anſw. I deny it utterly.
A double Argument Mr. Eyre preſents us with for proof. 1. We ſhould not be Juſtified freely by his grace, if any condition were required of us in order to our Juſtification: for a condition, whenſoever it is performed, makes the thing covenanted a due debt, which the Promiſer is bound to give: and then Juſtification ſhould not be of grace, but of debt.
Anſw. Gladly am I come to this objection: and I ſhall give it a large anſwer, not for any ſtrength there is in it; but becauſe Mr. Eyre pretends in his title-page, and the inſcription of his book throughout, to oppoſe the ancient Proteſtant doctrine of Juſtification by faith, upon the quarrel of free grace. And it is upon the point the total ſumme of all he hath to ſay for his neoterick notion: but they may be taken with words that will.
The place which he alludes to in the objection is, Rom. 3 24. Being juſtified freely by his grace. But which of theſe two words is it that excludes conditions? foreign or foreign? grace or freely? foreign lVide …riſt. Rhet. l 2. c 7.Grace as it is a vertue or affection in man, is that which enclines us to beſtow of what we have to them that are indigent and neceſſitous: not for any thing we have received, nor for any profit and advantage we expect by what we give from him to whom we give, but that he may be bene…ted by us. Accordingly it is accounted great (and the Scriptures ampliſie the grace of God from the ſame Arguments either in reſpect of the perſons that receive our gratuities, if they be extream mEzek 16. pertot. Rom. 5. 6.indigent and impotent: or in reſpect of the things given, if they be Eph▪ 7. Rom. 5. 7, 8. and v 6. 0 1 John 4. 19. John 3. …6▪great, difficult, or ſeaſonable: or in reſpect of the giver, if …e be the firſt, or only, or principal. But ſurely this grace doth not exclude all manner of conditions. Jacob ſent a preſent to Eſ…u, that he might ſinde grace (…) in his ſight, Gen. 32. 5, 21. and 33. 8. the LXX, foreign. and Prov. 3. 3, 4, Let not mercy and truth forſake thee.—So ſhalt thou finde foreign grace in the ſight of God. And the Apoſtle exhorts that we come to the throne of grace, that we may finde grace, Heb. 4. 16. Is grace any whit the leſſe gracious, becauſe we are required to ſeek it, that we may finde it? Rom. 4. 16. Therefore it is of faith, that it may be by grace. And more places which we ſhall mention below.
The Adverb foreign is but a qualification of the former: and expreſſeth§. 13. the freeneſſe of grace, by removal of worth and ſufficiency in the perſon, who of grace receives a benefit. Thus Mat. 10. 8. Freely you have received, freely give. foreign As their power coſt them nothing, but was freely given them; ſo ſhould they do good with it freely, without payment or recompence. So the Hebrew, foreign expreſſeth an act which is only from the will and inclination of the Agent, without any ſufficient, external, meritorious cauſe, Pſal. 35. 7. Without cauſe have they hid for me their net, Pſal. 69. 4. They hate me without a cauſe, and 119. 161. Princes have perſecuted me without a cauſe. David ſaith, He will not offer to God gratis, or of that which coſt him nothing, 2 Sam. 24. 24. Thus ſervants went out freely, when they did not purchaſe their liberty, but it was given them without price, Exod. 21. 2, 11. as alſo the pL. mandatum F. mand. & contra C. L. 6. 7. §. Non eſt ignotum.Civil Law determines. And what in Iſa. 55. 1. is called a buying without money, is expounded, Rev. 22. 17. A taking of the water of life freely. So that unleſſe it can be proved (of which more preſently) that all conditions whatſoever are meritorious cauſes, proportionable in value to the benefit a man obtains upon performance of the condition, the name of free grace will prove but an empty noiſe, and a cloak of errour.
We muſt therefore with our Proteſtants diſtinguiſh of conditions.§. 14. Thus qIn diſp. de ſatiſfact. p. 365.Cameron. Si multae conditiones requiruntur in juſtificandis, quae habent proportionem cum juſtitiâ Dei, concedo: Sed ſi conditiones quae requiruntur in juſtificandis, nullam habent proportionem cum juſtitiâ Dei, nego inde effici juſtificationem non eſſe ex mera gratia: nam non excluduntur conditiones omnes, ſed eae quae poſſunt habere rationem meriti. The ſenſe of which words is given us by rComment. in Ep 250.Paul Bayne. There are ſome conditions whereon, they only interceding, we promiſe and undertake to do a matter, or beſtow a kindneſſe on any. As, Go with me to ſuch a place, and I will give thee hidden treaſure: or, come to me to morrow, and I will give thee a hundred pounds. There are other conditions which have the reaſon of a cauſe meritorious: ſuch do not only intercede, but deſerve upon contract as much as we promiſe. As, Do my work well, and I will pay you truly, &c. Thus he, sGerhard de Evang. cap. 3. §. 26. Quando Evangelicas promiſſiones conditionales eſſe negamus, non quamvis conditionem, ſed in ſpecie, conditionem noſtrorum meritorum excludimus—Alia igitur eſt conditio fidei à conditione operum: illa non opponitur gratuito dono, haec verò opponitur. In eundem ſe…ſum Rolloc. de vocat. p. 16.and others to the ſame purpoſe. A diſtinction which we are neceſſitated to make uſe of, though it diſtinguiſh rather the matter of a condition, then the formal nature of it; for if any condition be proportionable to the reward promiſed, that is not becauſe it is a condition, but becauſe it is tAliae ſunt conditiones praeter cauſas efficientes. Ameſ. contra Bellarm. de neceſ. oper. ad ſalut. c. 6. circa princip.a cauſe, which is alſo made the condition.
Moreover, we muſt alſo diſtinguiſh of that which Mr. Eyre calls a§. 15. due debt; for uHug. Grot. de jure Belli. l. 2. c. 7. § 4. Covarr… v. 2 ae. part. relect. §. quartus. n. 5 p. 288.Debitum vel ſtrictè ſumitur, &c. A debt is either taken ſtrictly, for ſuch an obligation as ariſeth from commutative juſtice: or largely, for that which is due in point of honeſty and faithfulneſſe, though it be not due in juſtice: ſo that if it be not done there is no injuſtice to any other perſon; but he that doth it not is defective, as what is due by vertue of a free Promiſe. And ſuch an obligation as this God himſelf refuſeth not, 1 John 1. 9. Tit. 1. 2. Heb. 6. 10. and 10. 23. Nor is that which is given by vertue of ſuch an obligation any whit leſſe free, or leſſe of grace, then if it were given without it. xLeſſius de juſt. & jur. L. 2. c 40 d. 8. p. 548.Si obligatio orta ſit ex liberali promiſſione; quod ex eâ datur, etiam gratis datur: non enim obligatio quae naſcitur ex promiſſione liberali repugnat liberalitati, ſed eſt ejus effectus. What is given by vertue of a free Promiſe, is alſo freely given: becauſe an obligation ariſing from ſuch a Promiſe, is not repugnant to grace or liberality, but is the effect thereof. And that conditional promiſes may be ſuch, not only all (I ſay all thar ever I could get ſight of) our Proteſtants ſtand for, but the Papiſts themſelves yield it. ySnarez. opuſ. relect. delib. divin. d 2 n. 44. & A Sanct. Clara. de Nat. Grat. p. 135. 136. Durand. in 2. d. 27. q. 2. n. 12. 13, 14.Promiſſio beneficii ſub conditione alicujus operis requiſiti ſolummodo ex quadam decentia vel diſpoſitione, & non quia in eo invenitur valor reſpectu mercedis, non impedit quin collatio boni promiſſi ſit ſimpliciter liberalis, etiam tali conditione praeſtita, ita ut donum ſit gratuitum: quia tale opus non eſt ſufficiens ad fundandam juſtitiam ac proinde non excludit gratiam. The Promiſe of a benefit, on condition of a work required, only as of decency, or as a diſpoſition, and not becauſe of its worthineſſe in reference to the reward, doth not hinder, but that the giving of the promiſed benefit is ſimply free, even when the condition is performed: becauſe ſuch a work is not ſufficient to ground an obligation of juſtice, and ſo doth not exclude grace.
Theſe things being thus premiſed, we ſhall now caſt Mr. Eyres Argument§. 16. into forme, and turne it going.
If faith be the condition of our Juſtification, then upon our believing we are juſtified of debt, not of grace. The reaſon is, becauſe what is promiſed upon condition, the condition being performed becomes a due debt. But the conſequence is falſe, Ergo, ſo is the antecedent.
Anſw. To the Propoſition I anſwer, 1. In general, that Mr. Eyre himſelf denies it, when he thought it might be for his advantage, pag. 190. No man (ſaith he) will ſay, that the condition required of Adam, was meritorious of eternal life in a ſtrict and proper ſenſe: And yet urgeth here, that if faith be the condition, Juſtification muſt needs be of debt. 2. I diſtinguiſh, if the meaning of the Propoſition be, that Juſtification becomes due in that larger ſenſe, which we ſpake of but now, if faith be the condition of it, then I grant it. But if the meaning be (as I believe Mr. Eyre intends, by quoting Rom. 4. 4.) that it becomes due in juſtice, then I deny it. And what's the proof? why, a condition performed makes the thing promiſed a due debt. The ſubſtance of this axiome I meet with, I think, not leſſe then twenty times in Mr. Eyres book, but no where elſe in all the books I have, Civilians or Canoniſts. And as often as 'tis uſed, he doth not once attempt to prove it, but leaves it naked to the world to ſhift for it ſelfe. Conditions are either cauſal, ſuch as have proportion of worth to the benefit promiſed: and theſe being performed, make the thing promiſed a due debt. As when I promiſe my ſervant five pounds, if he will ſerve me for ſuch a terme of time. Some be meerly illative or diſpoſitive: as when I promiſe a man to give him twenty pounds, if he will come and fetch it. And theſe conditions (of which kinde is faith,) do not make the reward due in juſtice: which I thus prove.
Where there is not aequalitas dati & accepti, an equality between§. 17. the thing received and promiſed, there can be no obligation of juſtice. But it is ſuppoſed, that between theſe conditions and the things promiſed there is no equality. Ergo. I ſuppoſe it will be ſaid, that though the things of themſelves be not equal, yet they are made equal by the promiſe or contract, the condition being performed. To which I anſwer, that it is impoſſible. Indeed I think the Civil Law allowes an action upon ſuch promiſes, when the condition is performed (zVide Vigel. de Dreyſ. Jnſt. Jur. l. 3. c. 8. & Weſſemb. paratit. D l. 50. tit. 12. and ſo it doth alſo in ſome caſes, upon the moſt abſolute promiſe) but we enquire not what is juſt juſtitiâ civili, but what is juſt juſtitiâ naturali. And I ſay again, that a work, which hath of it ſelfe no proportion to ſuch or ſuch a reward, receives no increaſe of worth by the Promiſe, that ſettles ſuch a reward upon it, or by being made the condition of ſuch a Promiſe. If it doth, then the value of the work is to be meaſured by the reward that is promiſed to it, and ſo the mercy and liberality of the Promiſer excludes his mercy and grace in fulfilling his Promiſe. For if the Promiſe make the condition equal to the reward, then in fulfilling his Promiſe, he doth but aequalia aequalibus rependere, proportion the reward to the worth of the action, and ſo cannot exerciſe grace and liberality in performing his Promiſe; for example, A King promiſeth a condemned Traitour, that if he will but acknowledge his offence, and accept of his royal favour, he will not only give him his life, but advance him to ſuch honour, wealth and power, as ſhall make him the ſecond man in the Kingdome, yea, and leave him his ſucceſſour in the Throne: That ſuch a Promiſe is of ſpecial grace and favour, he is not a reaſonable creature that ſhall deny; but if the Traitours acknowledgement and acceptance of the Kings favour, by being made the condition of his deliverance and advancement, become forthwith proportionable thereunto, then is it no mercy nor grace in the King, to beſtow theſe favours upon him. Yea, the ſame work will be of more and leſſe value. Suppoſe another Traitour upon the ſame condition be promiſed his life, and no more. In the former, it is of a great deal more worth and value then in this, becauſe proportionable to a greater reward. Yea, and it will be impoſſible that there ſhould be any cheating in buying and ſelling, or any other contract, if things of themſelves unequal become forthwith equal, by vertue of a contract. Suppoſe a man give a great price for a Jewel, and the Jewel prove counterfeit: yet by vertue of the contract, it becomes equal to the price he gave for it, and the buyer may not complain of the injuſtice of the couzenage. Several other Arguments may the Reader ſee to this purpoſe in learned aDe Juſt. Act. c. 63. & Voſſ. The ſ…de bon. oper merit. p. 72.Davenant.
Here it may be demanded, whether works in the firſt Covenant,§. 18. were proportionable to the reward promiſed? which, with ſome limitations, I ſhall anſwer affirmatively. But becauſe Mr. Eyre gives me here no occaſion to ſpeak to it, but urgeth it ſtrongly in another place, the Reader muſt have patience till he come thither. In the mean time let us ſee whether it cannot be proved, that a gift may be given of grace, and yet upon condition. 1. I put this caſe, Philemon promiſeth Oneſimus, upon condition he will acknowledge, that he neither hath, nor can merit any good of him, but rather that for his thievery and ſeveral other injuries which he hath done him, he hath deſerved to be quite caſt out of his favour, that he will forgive former injuries, and moreover make him heire of all he hath. That he may give it upon ſuch a condition is unqueſtionable, for a man may make what he will the condition of his owu gift. Voluntas regit conditiones, ſaith the bL. in conditionib. F. de Cond & domonſtr.Law. Oneſimus accepts and performes the condition. I do ask, whether he do thereby merit his Maſters favour and eſtate, or no? If not, the queſtion is yielded: if ſo, then contradictions and impoſſibilities may be true. For he confeſſeth, that he neither hath nor can merit any thing of his Maſter: and yet in ſo ſaying, he doth merit, even all his Maſter is worth. Now faith is a condition of like nature: as being an act of ſelf-dereliction, a kinde of holy deſpaire, a renouncing of all worthineſſe in our ſelves, as Mr. Eyre expreſſeth it, page 76. and this doth the Lord require as the condition of our partaking in his pardoning mercy, Jer. 3. 12, 13. I am merciful ſaith the Lord, and I will not keep anger for ever: only acknowledge thine iniquity, that thou haſt tranſgreſſed againſt the Lord thy God.
But let us ſearch the Scriptures. Jer. 18. 7, 8. At what inſtant I §. 19.ſhall ſpeak, concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdome, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to deſtroy it: If that Nation, againſt whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil; I will repent of the evil which I thought to do unto them. A famous inſtance we have of it in Nineveh, againſt which Jonah cries, Yet fourty dayes, and Nineveh ſhall be overthrown. Jonah 3. 4. In the former place, God gives us a general rule to underſtand his threatenings, as having a tacite condition of repentance, by which the evil threatened may be eſcaped. Otherwiſe Janas had ſpoken falſe in the Name of the Lord, in threatening deſtruction to Nineveh within fourty dayes: for the city was not then deſtroyed; but upon their repentance, what the Lord promiſed in Jeremy, he performed upon them, Jon. 3. 10. God ſaw their works, that they turned from their evil way, and God repented of the evil that he had ſaid he would do unto them, and he did it not. cVide Krakevitz. in loc. p. 341.Repentance then (if God be a God of truth, and cannot lie) is the condition of our deliverance from threatened evils: ſuitable to that of our Lord, Luke 13. 3. Except you repent, you ſhall all likewiſe periſh. Yet Gods ſaving men (Nineveh in particular) upon their repentance, is an act of his grace, not of their merit: and unto that grace of God doth Jonah aſcribe it, Jon. 4. 2. I knew that thou art a gracious God and merciful. In like manner is Iſraels deliverance from the judgements threatened, aſcribed to the free grace and mercy of God, as the only cauſe: though not without their own repentance and returning unto God as the condition thereof, Joel 2. 12, 13, 14. So 2 Chron. 30. 19. For if you turne again unto the Lord, (there's the condition) your brethren and your children ſhall finde compaſſion before them that lead them captive, ſo that they ſhall come again into this land: for the Lord your God is gracious and merciful, (there's the cauſe) and will not turne away his face from you, if you return to him, Deut. 4. 30, 31. When all theſe things are come upon thee, even in the latter dayes, if thou turne to the Lord thy God, and ſhalt be obedient to his voice: for the Lord thy God is a merciful God, he will not deſtroy thee, neither forſake thee, &c. So chap. 30. 2, 3. Indeed the word grace or gracious, is not expreſſely mentioned in this text; but mercy is, which is tantamount to it: and likely they go both together, as before, Jonah 4. 2. Joel 2. 13, 14. 2 Chron. 30. 9. Exod. 34. 6. And if their returning unto God, be here denied to be the condition of their deliverance from deſtruction, of which notwithſtanding the mercy and grace of God is aſſerted to be the only cauſe: I muſt profeſſe for my own part I ſhall think it a hard matter to prove, that there is one intelligible ſentence in all the Scripture: yea, and let me ſpeak my judgement freely; though I deteſt the Papiſts doctrine of merits, yet if Mr. Eyre will make good his poſition, dDonationi poteſt apponi conditio; nec ideo minùs pura & vera dona…io dicitur, dummodo ex illa commodum non accedat donanti. Greg. Tholoſ. Syntag juris. l 28 c. 7 §. 7. …x C. L. 8. tit. 55that every condition is a meritorious cauſe, it muſt of neceſſity be granted, that they have done more for the proof of merits, then all the proteſtants on earth will ever be able to anſwer: for I do not know one Proteſtant, but yields, that there are many Promiſes of grace, which yet are conditional. And thus much for the firſt Argument, by which Mr. Eyre endeavours to prove, that we are concurrent cauſes with God in the formal act of our own Juſtification, if faith be made the condition thereof.
The ſecond ſucceeds, and that is this. If faith be a condition,§. 20. morally diſpoſing us for juſtification, we ſhould then be concurrent cauſes with the merits of Chriſt in procuring our Juſtification; for the merits of Chriſt are not a phyſical, but a moral cauſe. Now by aſcribing to faith a moral cauſal influxe in our Juſtification, we do clearly put it in eodem genere cauſae with the blood of Chriſt.
Anſw. 1. The merits of Chriſt do not concur in our Juſtification, as any part of that formal act by which we are juſtified. It is God as Supreme Lawgiver, and Judge, and Chriſt as King under him who is our Juſtifier. The merits of Chriſt are a cauſe of themſelves, moving God to put forth that act. 2. I would ask Mr. Eyre, whether the death of Chriſt be no more then a condition without which we are not juſtified? if it be, he doth ill to talke of my putting faith in the ſame kinde of cauſe with Chriſts death: for I aſcribe no more to faith, then that it is a condition, without which not. If it be not, Mr. Eyre, I doubt, will be found guilty of degrading the blood of Chriſt, more then I of advancing faith beyond its due place. 3. By faith we concur to our own Juſtification, not cauſally, but objectively, & terminativè; as the earth concurs to my going, as the thing I walk upon: a viſible object to my ſight, as the thing ſeen: and other objects to the acts that are converſant about them. 4. And the Argument at laſt begs the queſtion: for it ſuppoſeth that we aſcribe to faith a cauſal influxe into our Juſtification, which is the thing I diſpute againſt.
SECT. IV.
THe fifth Argument ſucceeds. That interpretation of this§. 21. phraſe, which makes works going before Juſtification, not only not ſinſul, but acceptable to God, and preparatory to the grace of Juſtification, is not according to the minde of the Holy Ghoſt. But to interpret Juſtification by faith, that faith is a condition qualifying us for Juſtification, doth ſo. Ergo. The tree muſt be good, or elſe the fruit cannot be good, Luke 6. 43, 44. Mat. 12. 33. John 15. 5. So Auguſtine, Pariſienſis, the Articles of the Church of England, &c.
Anſw. The ſubſtance of this is anſwered already, chapt. 5. works are taken largely or ſtrictly: in the former ſenſe faith is a work; in the latter it is oppoſed to works. The Authours whom Mr. Eyre mentioneth, as eAug. Serm. 96. de Temp. Nemo bono operatur niſi fides praeceſſerit. & de Spirit & lit. c. 8. opus non fit niſi à Juſtificato. Juſtificatio autem ex fide impetratur.Auguſtine, &c. Take works as they are oppoſed to faith, whereof the words quoted are an uncontrollable evidence. If Mr. Eyre had ſhewed us, that his legion of Orthodox Writers did as much oppoſe the antecedency of faith as of works to Juſtification, he had ſpoken to purpoſe. The tree indeed muſt be good before the fruit can be good. But the tree is made good by faith, and the Spirit of Sanctification, which is the good treaſure of the heart, which bringeth forth good works, Luke 6. 45. John 15. 5. I never heard before, that Juſtification (which is a grace without us) was the roote and inward principle, of good actions.
The ſixth and laſt Argument is this, To ſay that faith is a paſſive§. 22. condition, that doth morally qualifie us for Juſtification, implies a contradiction.
Anſw. I deny it.
Mr. Eyre proves it thus. To be both active and paſſive in reference to the ſame effect, is a flat contradiction (and yet this alſo ſhould be delivered with a little more caution: a Chriſtian is both active and paſſive in all the good works he doth, but I ſtand not on it.) A condition is a moral efficient cauſe of that which is promiſed upon condition, in the uſe of the Juriſts: though in the logical notion of it, it hath not the leaſt efficiency.
Anſw. And why may not we be permitted to uſe it in its logical notion? the moſt logical ſenſe is the moſt rational. And ſeeing Mr. Eyre confeſſeth, that in its logical notion, a condition hath not the leaſt efficiency; he muſt give me leave to account his Argument illogical, that is, irrational, that proceeds upon ſuppoſition of the contrary. 2. It is alſo notoriouſly falſe, that a condition is a cauſe in the uſe of the Juriſts; for they do perpetually diſtinguiſh a cauſe from a condition: as appears by the very title of the thirty f…fth book of the Digeſts. De Conditionibus & Demonſtrationibus, & Cauſis, & Modis eorum quae in Teſtamento ſcribuntur. Which the fDyon. Gotho▪ …red Not. in hunc tit. W… ſemb. paratit in eund. Cujac. l. 2. obſerv. c 39. G. Tholoſ. Sy…t. juris. l. 42. c. 32.Juriſts thus diſtinguiſh, Cauſa exprimit rationem quae nos movet ut alteri legemus. Demonſtratio rem ipſam legatam notat, deſignat §. 51, 52, 53. Azor. Inſtit. mor. par. 3. l 4. c. 24.ao d…pingit. Conditio ſuſpendit tranſmiſſionem legati, &c. Which differences they fetch out of the Law it ſelfe. 3. If all conditions be cauſes, then ſuch as the Law calls gC. de caduc. tollend. §. Sin autem.contingent and caſual are cauſes alſo: as having as much of the nature and uſe of a condition, as that which they call arbitrary or poteſtative. But that a condition meerly caſual ſhould be the cauſe of a gi…t, is that which the (hVide P. Nic. Moz. de contract. c. 2. de do nat. p. 141. Ratio eſt: quia cum con…itio dependet à ca…u fortuito, non cenſetur dona…s moveri ad donandum contemplatione illius caſus, ſed ex ſuâ liberalitate: non tamen donare vult niſi caſus eveniat. De quo etiam Riminal. Inſtit de donat. in princip. n. 59.) Juriſts will never endure. As if Titius promiſe Seius five hundred, if the ſhip called Caſtor and Pollùx come into the river of Thames by July next. Or if he give him the ſame ſumme with a Proviſo, that if he die before the age of twenty one, then it ſhall come to Caius his younger brother. That an accidental effect ſhould be a meritorious cauſe is not imaginable. 4. The caſe is the ſame again in all arbitrary or voluntary conditions, (If they be meerly ſuch, and have nothing beyond the nature of a condition added or concurring) for the diſtribution of conditions, in caſuales & poteſtativas, is not generis in ſpecies, but ſubjecti in adjuncta: for a condition is one and the ſame in its nature and uſe, whether the act or event which is made the condition, be meerly caſual or voluntary. And therefore when Mr. Eyre ſayes, that if a man do any thing for obtaining a benefit, he is active in procuring it, if he mean phyſically, I grant it; if morally, I deny it: becauſe a voluntary act, when it is a condition, contributes no more to the obtaining of a benefit, then a contingent act, being alſo a condition: and yet by ſuch a caſual condition doth a man obtain a benefit, and yet acts nothing toward it.
Let us, for clearing and concluding this diſpute, again reſume the§. 23. inſtance given before. Philemon promiſeth Oneſimus, that if he will confeſſe his fault, he will pardon him, and give him his whole eſtate: which condition Oneſimus performes. I ask now, whether his performance of this condition be the cauſe of his pardon, and of the gift promiſed him. If not, then Mr. Eyre muſt confeſſe this Argument to be nothing: if ſo, then let us know plainly what cauſe it is: (for Mr. Eyre holds me altogether in generals, and determines without one ſyllable of proof, that it is a cauſe, but tells me not what cauſe it is, nor what its cauſality). Is it a meritorious cauſe? That cannot be: becauſe there is nothing in his confeſſion, that can countervaile the greatneſſe of the injury, or hold proportion with the reward; or doth it move meerly objectively? as we ſay poverty moves a liberal man, and miſery a merciful man? But this is very improperly called a motive cauſe, being indeed no cauſe at all, but the exiigency or moral capacity of a perſon, to be the object of an act of mercy or liberality: otherwiſe, by how much the greater mans miſery is, by ſo much the leſſe praiſe-worthy is Gods mercy in relieving us: becauſe, by how many the more cauſes concur to an effect, by ſo much the leſſe praiſe is due to each. That faith moves in this manner, I will not deny, but this will not make it a cauſe, at leaſt no other then à cauſa ſine qua non: and how a meer condition (ſuch as in the inſtance given ſhould be any other) I cannot conceive. Briefly, if the condition aforeſaid, performed by Oneſimus, be the cauſe of his Maſters gift, then either of the Promiſe, or of the execution of it. But the ſaid condition is neither the cauſe of the Promiſe, nor of fulfilling it. Ergo. Not of the Promiſe; for Philemons will is the cauſe of the condition: Ergo, the condition is not the cauſe of Philemons will ſignified in his Promiſe: for the effect cannot be the cauſe of its cauſe. A condition as ſuch, cannot move the Donour to promiſe, becauſe it is his will, and nothing elſe, that makes it a condition, (though I deny not, but there may be ſomething in the condition, which may move the will quoad ſpecificationem, that is, encline it to pitch upon this rather then that: or to make this the condition rather then that) Not of the performance of the Promiſe, for the ſame reaſon: for it is moſt abſurd, that the will ſhould make its own motive cauſes. As if we ſhould ſuppoſe Philemon ſaying thus, I will make his confeſſion the condition of my gift, and then I will be moved by it to beſtow it upon him. If there be not attractive vertue enough, (as I may ſo call it) in the condition, till the will reſolve to be moved by it, then ſurely the motion of the will is from it ſelfe, not from it. Wherefore the cauſe, both of the Promiſe and Performance, is Philemons good will, who of his own accord obligeth himſelf to give ſuch a gift, ſuch a condition being performed, and will not be obliged without it: if he would, he might give it preſently without any condition: but as it is his will, that the Donee ſhall be uncapable of receiving any benefit by him, unleſſe ſuch a thing be done; ſo is it his will which makes him capable of receiving it when it is done.
SECT. V.
THis I did illuſtrate in my Sermon by a double compariſon: of§. 24. an offendor pardoned by reading the book, or upon condition that he accept of the pardon: by neither of which can he yet be ſaid to pardon himſelfe. To the latter inſtance, I do not finde that Mr. Eyre ſpeaks a word; but invades the former reſolutely, and ſayes,
That an offendor ſaved by his Clergy, is not paſſive, but active in ſaving his life, he may properly be ſaid to ſave himſelf. Yea, he doth more in ſaving his life: then either the Law or the Judge: as the welch man that cried, God bleſſe her father and mother that taught her to reade.
Rep. Suppoſing that the reading of the book be a meer condition (ſuch as is the acceptance of the pardon in the ſecond inſtance) abſtracted from all conſiderations of the worth and benefit of learning; I anſwer, 1. That whereas Mr. Eyre ſayes, He that reades may be properly ſaid to ſave himſelfe; I would have granted it, if he had left out the word properly. Becauſe he may be ſaid to ſave himſelfe, who doth that without which he ſhould not be ſaved, though his doing do not cauſe it, and therefore the ſpeech is improper. Nor doth the Scripture abhorre from the like manner of ſpeech: for thus ſaith the Lord, Luke 7. 50. Thy faith hath ſaved thee, go in peace: which ſalvation is before called forgiveneſſe of ſin, ver. 48. and Mark 5. 34. Thy faith hath made thee whole, go in peace. So Luke 18. 42. which though it were a bodily cure, yet was it a repreſentation and aſſurance of ſpiritual bleſſings: and the faith by which ſhe received it, the very ſame by which we obtain remiſſion of ſins, as our (iA…ſ. B…ll. enerv. tom. 4. l. 5. p. 319. 12o, Miracula iſtiuſmodi fuerunt ſingularia D…i beneficia, quibus Juſtificationis b…nedictio fuit adumbra…a. Luke 4. 18. 3. Beneficia iſta ſaepe conjunct… fuerunt cum Juſtificatione. Gerh. de. Juſtiſ. per ſid. §. 158 p. 956. Marc. 5 36. Luc. 8. 50. Quamvis ve…ò ibi…. non agatur propriè de ſide Juſtificante, mani…eſtum tamen eſt fidem ſt…tui unicum illud medium per quod divino…um beneficiorum, ac p…oinde & …e…iſſio…i peccato…um & juſt…tiae reddamur participes, credenti enim omnia poſſibilia. Mark 9. 23. S…e alſo Down. of Juſtif. l. 6. c 15 …. 11, 1….) Proteſtants prove againſt the Papiſts. And yet no queſtion but the ſpeech is improper: for in propriety of ſpeech, it was the power and grace of God, that healed the one, and ſaved the other. In the ſame phraſe of ſpeech are the Jewes exhorted to ſave themſelves, Acts 2. 40. and Timothy to ſave himſelfe, 1 Tim. 4. 16. And the Patriarchs by faith, to have done ſuch things as are quite above all created power, as was hefore obſerved out of Heb. 11. 2. And whereas the welch man bleſſeth his father and mother that taught him to reade: A Chriſtian may with ſeriouſneſſe bleſſe God in like manner, and give thanks unto the father, for making of him meet, (foreign) to be one of the Partakers of the inheritance of the Saints in light, Col. 1. 12. That we performe the condition is from the grace of God, no leſſe then the bleſſings we partake in upon performance of it: and therefore the praiſe of all is due to him only. Yet the grace is greater in giving the latter then the former, by how much the end is better then the meanes. And if the welch man did indeed think, that he was more beholding to his reading, then to the courteſie of his Prince, for his life: his Logick was as ridiculous as his language; for though the Law would not have ſaved him without his reading, (and much leſſe would his reading have ſaved him without that favourable Law) yet his life is a thouſand fold more worth then his reading of two or three lines: and therefore he owes a thouſand times more thanks to his Prince, for giving him his life upon ſuch a condition, then to himſelf for reading, ſuppoſing his reading to have been the purchaſe of his life. If a man ſell a farme to his friend for five hundred, for which another would have given him a thouſand: what more common then to ſay, He hath given his friend five hundred in the buying?
3. But in ſober ſadneſſe, doth Mr. Eyre think the welch man ſpeaks§. 25. properly, in his God bleſſe her father, &c? That were a jeſt indeed. How comes it then to be a ridiculous object, if there be not ſome (h) pleaſing deformity in it, that flatters the fancie, and ſurprizethk See Sie r…de la C…ambre. Charact. of the Paſſions, ch. 4. of laughter. p. 210. the ſoule, ſo moving laughter? And what can that deformity be (except the welch idiome) but the fallacy of non cauſa pro cauſa, putting that for the cauſe which is not the cauſe: as we are wont (out of Cicero) when we ſee a little man girt with a great ſword, to tranſplace the Subject and the Adjunct, and ſay, who tied that man to that ſword? Had the welch man cried as he was bid, God bleſſe the King and the Judge; the propriety of the ſpeech had ſpoiled the jeſt, and deprived it of that facetiouſneſſe and lepidity, which now cauſeth us to make merry with it. A certain diſcovery that the ſpeech is not proper, nor the condition of reading the cauſe of his pardon, the ſpeech becoming ridiculous upon no other account but becauſe it would inſinuate that to be the cauſe, which was no more then a condition. But the ſerious judgement of all offendors, who eſcape death by this means, and the wiſdome of our ſtat… determining it to be an act of royal grace and favour to pardon a man on this condition, might (one would think) be of as much authority, as one welch mans word. It is true indeed, the Law, nor the Judge could ſave him, unleſſe he read: nor will God ſave us unle… we believe, Heb. 3. 19. They could not enter in becauſe of un…eli…f. Not through defect of power or mercy in God (which are both in…in…te) but becauſe he hath confined himſelf in the diſpenſation of pardon and ſalvation, that he will beſtow it upon none but them that believe. Is it therefore not of grace, becauſe not without faith? Whereas the Apoſtle ſayes, It is of faith that it might be of grace, Rom. 4. 16.
In that which followes I finde nothing which is not anſwered already,§. 26. or muſt not be anſwered in due place: for whereas Mr. Eyre ſayes, that the performance of the condition makes the conditional grant to become abſolute; the words are ambiguous. If he mean, it makes it abſolute, as that without which it had never been abſolute, I grant it: if he mean, it makes it abſolute by contributing any direct cauſality, I deny it; for upon performance of the condition, the conditional grant doth indeed become abſolute, not by the worth or efficacy of the condition, but by the will of the Promiſer, that upon the exiſtence of ſuch a thing or action, will be obliged, and not without it. We have already given ſeveral inſtances of conditions, which have nothing of worth in them to engage the Donour, and therefore cannot be the cauſe of the gift: for nothing can produce an effect more noble and excellent then it ſelfe. Nor doth it receive any addition of intrinſecal worth, by being made the condition: otherwiſe we might work as rare feats by the influence of our wills, as lMagnet. cure of wounds.Van Helmont thinks may be wrought by the magick of the fancie. 'Tis but willing a pin to be worth a pound, and it ſhall be done.
And when he addes in the next place, that if faith be the condition of the New Covenant in ſuch a ſenſe, as perfect obedience was the condition of the old, man muſt needs be his own Juſtifier: if he mean ſuch in the matter and particular nature of the condition. It is true, if he mean ſuch in the common nature of a condition, it is falſe: for we have ſhewed before, both from Reaſon and Scripture, Divines and Lawyers, that ſome kinde of conditions are ſo far from being inconſiſtent with grace, as that they advance it rather. As ſuppoſe ſome benefit of very great value be beſtowed on a worthleſſe perſon, upon condition that he acknowledge the rich, ſuperlative grace and love of the Donour to be the only cauſe of it.
Finally, thus he ſpeaks. As in the old Covenant, it was not Gods threat that brought death upon the world, juſt ſo in the New (if it be a conditional Promiſe,) it is not the Promiſe that juſtifies a beleever, but the beleever himſelf.
The anſwer is ready. Death came into the world by ſin, as the culpable meritorious cauſe, but ſin could not have ſlain us but by the Law, 1 Cor. 15. 56. Rom. 5. 13, 14. Ergo. It is not warily ſaid, that Gods threat did not bring death upon the world. 2. And when Mr. Eyre hath proved that our performance of the Goſpel-conditions hath the ſame proportion to our ſalvation, as ſin hath to our deſtruction, the Papiſts ſhall thank him, Rom. 6. laſt. The wages of ſin is death: but the gift of God is eternal life, through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord. Mens not-accepting of the grace of God, may make that grace without effect as to themſelves, 2 Cor. 6. 1. Rom. 3. 3. But that therefore their acceptance is the cauſe of Gods being gracious to them, is wilde reaſoning. And as to worthy Dr. Kendal, (out of whom Mr. Eyre quotes theſe paſſages,) he hath publickly enough, (and in Mr. Eyres hearing for one) declared himſelf to be no enemy againſt conditions of Juſtification or ſalvation.
That he that is pardoned upon his reading, doth not pardon himſelf,§. 27. I proved thus: becauſe then he muſt concurre either to the making of the Law, which gives pardon upon ſuch a condition; or to the pronouncing of the ſentence of abſolution upon himſelf according to that Law.
This (Mr. Eyre ſaith) is an impertinent anſwer; becauſe the queſtion is not, whether a man did concur in making the Law and Rule of his Juſtification, but whether he had any cauſal influxe in producing the effect thereof.
Rep. My anſwer (if he will call it ſo) was very pertinent as to the caſe of an offendor ſaved by his Clergy, whoſe pardon is perfected by a Law (which gives the remote right) and ſentence paſſed according to that Law (which produceth his immunity it ſelfe.) If then the ſaid offendor cauſe his own pardon; it muſt be by concurring ſome way or other to the production of one of theſe. The caſe is altogether the ſame in our juſtification before God; which conſiſts in a Law of grace, and in ſentence paſſed according to that Law: which becauſe we muſt purpoſely prove by and by, I ſhall here ſuperſede for a while.
One thing more I added for illuſtration in theſe words. It is God§. 28. that glorifies us, and not we our ſelves; yet ſurely God doth not glorifie us before we beleeve.
Mr. Eyres anſwer conſiſts of two parts: the one is a conceſſion of what I ſay, with an explanation how glory is called a reward: and ſayes, That a reward is for a work two wayes: 1. When a work is proportionable to the wages. 2. When it is not anſwerable to the wages, yet is due by Promiſe; as when a poor man hath twenty ſhillings for an houres labour: though the work be not worth it, yet it is a due debt, and he may challenge it as ſuch.
Rep. Againſt which I have not much to oppoſe: yet if the houres work, neither in reſpect to its ſelfe, nor any circumſtance that attends it, as the Art, Danger, Detriment of the Labourer, or the neceſſity, pleaſure, profit, &c. of him for whom he labours (all which corne into the mLeſſ. de juſt. & jured. 2 c. 18. d. 3.value of the work) deſerve the ſaid twenty ſhillings, then is the reward, though partly of debt, quia & operanti aliquid abeſt, becauſe the workman puts himſelf to expence of time and ſtrength; and he for whom he worketh hath the benefit and advantage thereof: yet is it alſo of grace, nAzor. Inſiit. Mor. p 3. l. 11. c. 3.quatenus excedit meritum, inaſmuch as it exceeds the value of the work. And that the Labourer may challenge it, ariſeth from civil, not from natural juſtice. But I readily grant, that glory is not our reward in this ſenſe. But how then is it a reward?
Becauſe it comes after, and in the place of the work, ſaith Mr. Eyre.
Rep. Of which I ſhall ſpeak more hereafter: for the preſent, what is ſaid ſufficeth me, viz. That the reward follows the act, whereof it is the reward: for hence it follows, that if Juſtification be given as the reward of faith, then muſt it needs follow faith. But we have proved before, that Juſtification (even the imputation of righteouſneſſe) is the gracious reward of faith. Ergo, it muſt needs be conſequent to it.
His ſecond anſwer is this, Though the bleſſings of the Covenant be given us freely, and not upon conditions performed by us, yet God hath his order in beſtowing them: firſt, he gives grace imputed, and then inherent.
Rep. My Argument is à pari, we are not glorified unleſſe we believe;§. 29. yet by beleeving we cannot be ſaid properly to glorifie our ſelves: ſo though we beleeve that we may be juſtified, yet will it not follow, that we may be therefore ſaid to juſtifie our ſelves properly: the reaſon is the ſame on both ſides. Now whereas Mr. Eyre will have us when beleevers, yet to be paſſive in our glorification, meerly becauſe God doth firſt give faith, and then afterwards give glory: I wonder he ſees not the inſufficiency of ſuch anſwers, and how the Arminians get ground by them. Say plainly. Doth God require and charge us to beleeve and repent, that we may be ſaved, or doth he not? If he doth, then doth he require a condition to be performed on our parts, in order to our Juſtification, though he give it us; for (as (o) Dr. Twiſſe obſerves often) Medium ad aliquid obtinendum o Vindic. Grat. de crrat. p. 163.ex contractu vel foedere, illud demum eſt conditio. A means ordained to obtain any thing by Contract or Covenant, is a Condition. If he doth not, what ſhall become of thoſe many places, wherein God exhorts and commands men to repent and beleeve, that they may be ſaved? Then unbelief and impenitency are no ſins: nor are men thereby the cauſes of their own ruine and deſtruction, contrary to Scriptures, John 3. 19, and 8. 24. & paſſim. The reaſon is plain, becauſe mans not being the object of a gift of God preciſely, cannot be meritorious of his damnation. Indeed Mr. Eyre told us before, that he that doth the leaſt work towards the procuring of a benefit, is not only phyſically, but morally active in obtaining it. I wonder at my heart then, why we pray for grace and ſalvation: or why we do or ſuffer any thing for obtaining a Crown and Kingdom. pAuthores elus primi fuere Sadoc (unde Sadducaei) & Baythos. de quibus videſis Joh. Druſ. de trib. ſect. Judaeor. l. 3. c. 3. & 4. & Joh. Cameron. Myroth. in Mat. 22. 23.This very conceit was that which drew many in former ages to deny any reſurrection, other then what was paſt already: and by ſome improvement, may bid faire for a reſurrection of that and like conſequences. The very ſubſtance of Religion, and the vital act of faith, conſiſts in looking to the reward promiſed in Heaven, Heb. 11. 6, 26. 2 Cor. 4. 16, 18. And had I not known ſome Chriſtians fallen and falling off from prayer and ordinances, and other ſpiritual duties, upon this very ground, that they are paſſive altogether in their ſalvation, and that they neither can nor muſt do any thing toward it, I would not have loſt ſo much time as to have taken notice of it.