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The Method of Grace in the Justification of Sinners · Benjamin Woodbridge

The Method of Grace in the Justification of Sinners, Chapter 2

CHAP. II.

An Anſwer to Mr. Eyres ſeventh Chapter. What is meant by Gods ſight. Two parts or degrees thereof. Mr. Eyres Expoſition contradicts it ſelfe and the Truth. Gods Will or Purpoſe never called by the name of Juſtification in Scripture. The conſequences which Mr. Eyre denies to follow, upon his doctrine, neceſſary and unavoidable. A large enquiry, whether Juſtification conſiſt in Gods Purpoſe not to puniſh. Imputation and non-imputation, what in the uſe of Scripture. Gods electing love no Juſtification, Rom. 8. 33. anſwered. Several Arguments, proving, that Juſtification is not Gods purpoſe of not puniſhing. The foure objections which Mr. Eyre makes againſt himſelfe, not anſwered by him. Not the firſt. Nor the ſecond. Nor the third. Nor the fourth of Mr. Eyres ſecond and third Propoſition.

SECT. I.

NExt we ſhall enquire, what it is to be juſtified before God, or in Gods ſight. foreign. Gal. 3. 11. or foreign, Rom. 3. 20. by which the Septuagint render the Hebrew, foreign Pſal. 143. 2. a word that hath many faces and ſignifications in aDruſ obſervat. cap. 17.Scripture: But in the matter of Juſtification, (which is a forenſical terme, unleſſe the whole body of our Proteſtants be miſtaken) it ſignifies as much as Gods judgement. As to be juſtified in mans ſight, or before men, is to be juſtified in mans judgement, or for man to juſtifie, and to be righteous in a mans own eyes, is to be righteous in a mans own judgement, or to juſtifie a mans ſelfe: In like manner, to be juſtified in Gods ſight, is to be juſtified in Gods judgement, or for God to juſtifie. Compare 1 Cor. 4. 4. Luke 16. 15. Numb. 32. 22. and many other places. Now this judgement of God, is either a judgement of juſtice, by which no fleſh living ſhall be juſtified, Pſal. 143. 2. or a judgement of mercy and grace, 2 Sam. 22. 25, 26. Col. 1. 22. Heb. 13. 21. by which only a ſinner can be juſtified; or ſtand in the ſight, preſence and judgement of God.

In this judgement of God, we conſider theſe two degrees or parts.§. 2. The firſt is that foreign, as the Apoſtle calls it, Rom. 1. 32. Jus b Vid Joh. Dri…d. de capt. & Redempt. c. 2. mem. 3. & de Reg. & dogmat. Sac. Script l. 3. p. 96, 97.Dei, that Rule, Law, or Conſtitution of God, determining of rewards and penalties, (whence Gods Precepts, Statutes, Threatenings and Promiſes, are ſo often called in Scripture his judgements) The ſecond is the ſentence, which God the righteous Judge ſhall paſſe upon all men, according to this Law, foreign, in the day of judgement. Accordingly, my opinion is, that a ſinner is juſtified in Gods ſight, either ipſo jure, by the Law or Conſtitution of grace, the immediate effect whereof is to give the ſinner a right to impunity, and to the heavenly inheritance; or by the ſentence of the Judge at the laſt day, by which he is adjudged unto the immediate, full and perfect poſſeſſion of all thoſe immunities and bleſſings, which were given him in right by that grand Promiſe of the Goſpel, John. 3. 16. He that believeth on me, ſhall not periſh; but ſhall have everlaſting life. Even as amongſt men, an Act of grace and pardon gives impriſoned rebels a right to deliverance from their preſent, and legally future puniſhments: though the effects of this right he do not poſſeſſe (any otherwiſe then in hope) till his cauſe be tried, and himſelf abſolved in Court, by the ſentence of the Judge. In reference to the former, a ſinner is juſtified preſently upon believing: in reference to the latter, he is not juſtified till the day of judgement. Therefore Peter exhorts the Jewes to repentance, that their ſins may be blotted out, when the times of refreſhing ſhall come from the Preſence of God, And he ſhall ſend Jeſus Chriſt, Acts 3. 19, 20. And Paul prays for Oneſiphorus, that God would grant him, that he may finde mercy of the Lord in that day, 2 Tim. 1. 18. which (queſtionleſſe) is meant of the day of judgement: of which himſelfe alſo ſpeaks a little before, ver. 12. I am perſwaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed to him againſt that day. And in the name of all Chriſtians he tells us, Gal. 5. 5. That we by the Spirit do wait for the hope of righteouſneſſe by faith: that is, Juſtification through faith, as it ſtands in oppoſition to Juſtification by works, ver. 4. and throughout the whole Epiſtle. So doth the Lord Jeſus promiſe to him that overcometh, a white ſtone, Rev. 2. 17. cVid. Paraeum Aretium. Brightman. D…od Eng. Annot. in loc.which having alluſion to the cuſtome of the Romanes in judgement, condemning by a black ſtone, and abſolving by a white, doth therefore ſignifie that eminent, eternal and univerſal abſolution from all guilt, which ſhall be given to the Saints that overcome, and continue faithful to the end. So Rom. 2, 13, 16. Not the hearers of the Law, but the doers of the Law ſhall be juſtified,—In the day when God ſhall judge the ſecrets of me… by Jeſus Chriſt (the 14. and 15. verſes are to be read in a parentheſis.)

This is my opinion in this matter: which I have therefore ſet down the more diſtinctly, that Mr. Eyre may underſtand, how ignorant or impudent his Informer was, that told him, I maintained, that we were not juſtified till the day of judgement, page 19.

Now to Mr. Eyre, he gives us a threefold ſenſe of the ſight of§. …. God in the Queſtion.

1. As it ſignifies Gods knowledge.

2. As it ſignifies his legal juſtice.

3. As it ſignifies his making of us to ſee.

To which, I ſhall need to give no other anſwer then his own words, in the ſame paragraph: of the laſt thus he ſpeaks. This phraſe muſt have ſome other meaning in this debate: for elſe that diſtinctiction of Juſtification in foro Dei, & in foro Conſcientiae, would be a meer tautology. Of the firſt thus. Although in articulo Providentiae, in the doctrine of divine Providence, ſeeing and knowing are all one: yet in articulo Juſtificationis, in the doctrine of Juſtification, they are conſtantly diſtinguiſhed throughout the Scripture, and never promiſcuouſly uſed, the one for the other. Thus of three ſenſes of the phraſe, himſelfe rejects two, as impertinent to the matter in hand, and yet ſtates his anſwer thus. If we take Gods ſight in the laſt conſtruction, (viz. for his making us to ſee) then we are not juſtified in Gods ſight before we believe. 2. If we referre it to the juſtice of God, we were juſtified in the ſight of God, when Chriſt exhibited, and God accepted the full ſatisfaction in his blood. 3. If we referre it to the knowledge of God, we were juſtified in his ſight, when he willed or determined in himſelfe, not to impute to us our ſins, &c.

As who ſhould ſay, If you take Gods ſight in ſuch a ſenſe, in which it is never taken in all the Scripture, by Mr. Eyres own confeſſion (ſuch is the firſt ſenſe, which is here the laſt) then thus. But if you take it in ſuch a ſenſe, in which it may not be taken in the preſent queſtion (ſuch is the laſt of the three, which is here put firſt) then ſo. If ſome other ſenſes of the ſight of God, (as when it ſignifies his favour, his aſſiſtance, his approbation and witneſſing, &c.) had been ſet down, that we might have known when we are juſtified in Gods ſight, in thoſe ſenſes; it had been every whit as conducible to the clearing of the Queſtion. As firſt, to tell us, that Gods ſight doth never ſignifie his knowledge in the matter of Juſtification; and then to adde in the ſame breath, that to be juſtified in Gods ſight, is to be juſtified in his knowledge. 2. Nor is it a lawful diſtinction, becauſe the members thereof do interferre, for Juſtification in the death of Chriſt; and in our own conſciences, is Juſtification in Gods knowledge: for ſurely he knows both theſe no leſſe then his Purpoſe and Determination within himſelfe. 3. We ſhall ſee by and by, that Mr. Eyre maintaines, that the righteouſneſſe of Chriſt is imputed to ſinners, by the eternal Act of Gods Will: I ask then, whether that imputation be Juſtification in Gods legal juſtice? if it be; then there is a farther implication in the members of the diſtinction: if it be not, I would know how God doth juſtifie us in his legal juſtice, and yet not by imputing the righteouſneſſe of Chriſt to us. 4. God knows us not to be juſtified till we be juſtified, for it is impoſſible that the ſame thing ſhould be and not be. Indeed he may well know, that he intends to juſtifie us; but if he know that, then he knows we are not yet juſtified: for he knows that what he intends to do is not yet done.

But becauſe Mr. Eyre refers us to his following diſcourſe; for the better underſtanding of theſe myſteries, I attend his motion, that I may ſpare tautologies as much as I can.

SECT. II.

He therefore delivers his judgement in three Propoſitions. The firſt is this, Juſtification is taken variouſly in Scripture.§. 4.

1. For the Will of God, not to puniſh or impute ſinne unto his people.

2. For the effect of Gods Will, to wit, his not puniſhing, or his ſetting of them free from the curſe of the Law. That Juſtification is put for this latter act, he ſuppoſeth none will queſtion. The only ſcruple is concerning the former, which he confeſſeth he hath been ſparing to call by the name of Juſtification, becauſe ſome groſſe miſtakes have ſought for ſhelter under the wings of that expreſſion. As

1. That abſurd conceit, that Chriſt came not to ſatisfie the juſtice, but only to manifeſt the love of God: whereas (ſaith he) we ſay, that notwithſtanding the Will of God, not to puniſh his Elect, the Law muſt needs be ſatisfied for their ſins, no leſſe then for the ſins of others. And

2. Their notion, who upon this ground have aſſerted the eternal being of the creature, &c.

Anſw. Here is the foundation of all the following obſcure diſcourſe: which I perceive Mr. Eyre had rather we ſhould take for granted, then he be put to prove. I do therefore deny

1. That Juſtification doth any where in Scripture ſignifie Gods eternal Will or Purpoſe not to puniſh: of which more, preſently.

2. That it is any where in Scripture put pro re volitâ, for the thing willed, formally, and under that habitude or relation. Juſtification is the diſcharge of a ſinner from his obligation to puniſhment: whether it were willed or not willed from eternity, is but extrinſecal and accidental to the Act it ſelfe.

3. That Juſtification is any where uſed in Scripture for the effects of Juſtification: though I deny no man the liberty of making uſe ſomtimes of ſuch a trope: but we are now enquiring de nomine, concerning the uſe of the Word. The Apoſtle makes that one Act of Election the cauſe of all ſpiritual bleſſings, Eph. 1. 3, 4. of which our Juſtification is one, ver. 6, 7. no leſſe then Adoption, ver. 5. which is an Act of the ſame common nature with Juſtification, and by ſome eminent dSee Dr. Reignolds Life of Chriſt page 402.Divines made a part of it: and that ſuitably enough to Scripture phraſe, even when it is made conſequent to our faith, John 1. 12. Gal. 3. 25. with 4. 5, 6.

4. Our diſcharge from the curſe is, either our diſcharge from an obligation to it, or from our actual ſuffering it. In this latter ſenſe it is indeed an effect of Juſtification, but in the former ſenſe it is the very life, being and forme of it, unleſſe it be underſtood paſſively, and ſo that alſo may be called an effect of Juſtification: becauſe the immediate effect of a diſcharge active, is a perſon diſcharged. Theſe obſervations (Reader) thou wilt finde uſeful, in the following debate.

That abſurd conceit (as he calls it) that ſome have inferred upon§. 5. an eternal Juſtification, (viz. that then Chriſt came not to ſatisfie the juſtice, but only to manifeſt the love of God) is ſo natural a conſequence of his doctrine, that it will never be put off with a cold Negatur. And I preſume Mr. Eyre is not ignorant, that it is a maine principle, upon which the Socinians deny the ſatisfaction of Chriſt. And if he will owne what himſelfe hath wrote in this book, he muſt joyne with them. He affirmes, that Gods eternal Will not to puniſh, is the very eſſence of Juſtification, page 64. 2. That by this Will men are ſecured from wrath, and diſcharged and acquitted from their ſins, that it is a real diſcharge from condemnation, an actual and compleat non-imputation of ſin, page 67. §, 6. upon which premiſes, I demand, Whoſe debt did Chriſt pay? his own? That's little leſſe then blaſphemy. Ours? why, our bond was cancelled long before, and our ſelves diſcharged and acquitted from all ſinne and death, really, actually, compleatly, if Mr. Eyres doctrine be true. And where then is any place left for ſatisfaction? eDe ſatisfact. p. 119.Grotius hath well obſerved. Obligationis deſtructio liberatio dicitur. Hanc praecedere poteſt ſolutio, ſequi non poteſt: quia actus nullus verſari poteſt circa id quod non exiſtit amplius. To the ſame purpoſe fIn tert. Tho. tom. 1. diſp 4. ſect. 8. p. 58. edit. Venet.Suarez, Propriè non dicitur ſatisfactio quae poſt remiſſionem debiti ſit: ſed quae fit ad debiti remiſſionem. Eſt enim remiſſio debiti terminus ſatisfactionis, non principium, ut communi ſenſu omnium hominum conſtat. Nec dici poteſt eandem peccati remiſſionem quae facta fuit gratis ante ſatisfactionem, poſtea etiam fieri per ſatisfactionem: quia repugnat idem debitum gratis remitti & per juſtam ſolutionem. But what need we the teſtimony of man? the teſtimony of God is greater. The text is plain, Heb. 10. 18. where remiſſion of ſin is, there is no more offering for ſinne; Ergo, if ſin were remitted from eternity, Chriſt neither did nor could make any ſatisfaction. If it be ſaid, that God did diſcharge us upon the foreſight of Chriſts ſatisfaction: I beleeve it to be moſt true of all the godly that lived before Chriſt: but Mr. Eyre, that makes this diſcharge to be an immanent (not a tranſient) act in God, will not, may not endure, that it ſhould be cauſed by the foreſight of Chriſts ſatisfaction.

The next groſſe miſtake which Mr. Eyre tells us ſome have faſtened§. 6. upon the doctrine of eternal Juſtification is theirs, who upon this ground have aſſerted the eternal being of the creature, thus. If men are juſtified from eternity, they are from eternity. And I confeſſe Mr. Eyre hath well removed this conſequence, if his principle be good, that eſſe juſtificatum is a terme of diminution. But verily, if the Scriptures have rightly informed us in the nature of Juſtification, I do not ſee how the conſequence can be avoided, for Juſtification is one of the moſt eminent bleſſings contained in that Promiſe, I will be their God. So Paul, Rom. 3. 29, 30. Is he the God of the Jewes only, and not of the Gentiles alſo? yea, of the Gentiles alſo: ſeeing it is one God, who ſhall juſtifie the circumciſion by faith, and the uncircumciſion through faith. Now God is not the God of the dead, but of the living, Matth. 22. 32. And if not the God of the dead (who yet live as to their ſoules) then much leſſe is he the God of them that are not, nor never were. Ergo he doth not juſtifie them that are not. Again, He that is juſtified is bleſſed, Rom. 4. And he that is bleſſed from eternity, is from eternity: for he that is not, is neither bleſſed nor miſerable. To ſay, he is bleſſed from eternity in Gods intention, is no more, then that there was a preparation of bleſſedneſſe for him in Gods intention: which I readily grant, and it profits Mr. Eyre nothing. But it little concernes me to make good the foreſaid conſequence: ſomething more of it the Reader ſhall finde a little below; in the mean time we come to the great Queſtion, whether Juſtification conſiſt formally in the Will or Purpoſe of God, not to puniſh?

SECT. III.

THe Will of God, as Divines are wont to diſtinguiſh, is either§. 7. voluntas beneplaciti, or voluntas ſigni. The former is the Intention, Decree or Purpoſe of God, concerning ſome Act of his owne, to be done by himſelfe in his due time. The latter (to confine it to our preſent uſe) is his ſignal, legiſlative, revealed, royal Will, by which he determines as ſupream Governour of the world, what ſhall be our duty to do or not to do, and what ſhall be due to us, according to our doing or not doing of this Will. Hence the Word and Lawes of God are called in Scripture his Will, in hundreds of places. By this Will of God doth he give Believers a right to impunity, which is their proper Juſtification: whereof his not puniſhing them de facto is the effect. This I ſhall prove (God willing) when I come to the vindication of my firſt Argument againſt Mr. Eyre. In the meane time, the thing which he undertakes to prove is, That the very eſſence and quiddity of a ſinners Juſtification, is Gods Decree or Purpoſe from eternity not to puniſh him. I deny it, and ſhall ſubjoyne ſome reaſons againſt it by and by, beſides thoſe which Mr. Eyre takes notice of in his book. But firſt, let us ſee what he hath to ſay for it. Thus then he begins.

Juſtification is Gods non-imputing of ſin, and imputing of righteouſneſſe to a perſon, Pſal. 32. 1, 2. Rom. 4. 6, 8. but Gods Will not to puniſh a perſon, is his non-imputing ſin to him. Ergo.

Anſw. I grant the major, but I do very much long to ſee what§. 8. definition Mr. Eyre will give of Juſtification, that may include Juſtification in Gods knowledge, and in his legal juſtice, and in our conſciences, that I might know whether theſe three be three ſeveral ſorts, or only three degrees of one and the ſame Juſtification, but let that paſſe. I deny the minor.

For proof of it Mr. Eyre appeales to the Original words, both Greek and Hebrew, both which (ſaith he) doth ſignifie an act of the minde or will.

Mr. Eyre is to prove, that they ſignifie the purpoſe or reſolution of the will: in which ſenſe they appear, not ſo much as once, neither in the Hebrew, nor in the Greek Interpreters: nor do our Tranſlators render them at any time in ſuch a ſenſe: and therefore that obſervation might have been ſpared. 2. An act of the underſtanding they ſignifie often: but it is ſuch an act as will not endure to be called by the name of imputation, but thinking, deviſing, eſteeming, or the like: for example, Iſa. 10. 7. foreign the LXX. foreign. We render it. Neither doth his heart think ſo. Nor doth common ſenſe permit that it be rendred. Neither doth his heart impute ſe. In like manner, Pſal. 41. 7. Againſt me do they deviſe my hurt: where the words are the ſame, both in the Hebrew and the Septuagint. And cannot be rendered, Againſt me do they impute my hurt. So Iſa. 53. 3. He was deſpiſed, and we eſteemed him not, (where the words are ſtill the ſame.) It would be worthy ſenſe, to render them, He was deſpiſed, and we imputed him not. Multitudes of like inſtances might be given. But when the words will beare to be grammatically rendered by the name of Imputation, they then ſignifie, not an immanent act of the underſtanding or will, but a tranſient act, containing an objectum Quod, or ſomething that is imputed; and an objectum cui, ſome perſon to whom it is imputed: who alſo is thereby changed phyſically or morally. And thus the word imputation is uſed in Scripture. 1. When by Law one thing paſſeth in ſtead of another, Numb. 18. 27, 30. This your heave-offering ſhall be reckoned (or imputed) to you, as though it were the corne of the threſhing ſlo…re, and ver. 30. When you have heaved the beſt thereof from it, then it ſhall be counted, (or imputed) to the Levites, as the increaſe of the threſhing floore, &c. Not that the ſaid heave-offering was eſteemed or thought to be the corne of the threſhing floore: (for that had been a fiction, or an errour and imperfection of the underſtanding) but becauſe by the determination of the Law, it was made equivalent thereunto, or equally available to all effects and purpoſes. This is a tranſient act. 2. When a man is charged as the Authour of ſuch or ſuch a fact, 2 Sam. 3. 8. Imputas mihi iniquitatem hujus mulieris. Junius. This alſo is a tranſient act. 3. The giving of a reward to a man, whether the reward be of debt or of grace, is Imputation, Rom. 4. 4. and to puniſh ſin is to impute ſin, 2 Sam. 19. 19. becauſe puniſhment is the wages of ſin, and not to puniſh ſin when puniſhment is due by Law, is the non-imputing of ſin, Pſal. 32. 1, 2. and when the Law denies a man that benefit of an action, which otherwiſe he might have expected, that action is ſaid to be non-imputed to him, Lev. 7. 18. It ſhall not be accepted, neither ſhall it be imputed to him. This alſo is a tranſient act. In the ſame ſenſe is the word uſed in the New Teſtament. Righteouſneſſe ſhall be imputed to us if we beleeve, Rom. 4. 24. foreign. Quibus futurum eſt ut imputetur. Beza. (Mr. Eyres gloſſe upon that text we ſhall meet with in due place) and Paul prayes for them that deſerted him in his troubles, that their ſin may not be imputed to them, 2 Tim. 4. 12. in both which places imputation expreſſeth a future act, and therefore cannot be underſtood of an immanent eternal act of God. See alſo Rom. 5. 13. of which more hereafter. So that I may very well retort Mr. Eyres Argument upon himſelf. If Juſtification be a non-imputation of ſin, then it is a tranſient act (and not an immanent act of Gods Will.) But the firſt is true, ex conceſſis. Ergo ſo is the laſt. And I wonder Mr Eyre ſhould nor foreſee the weakneſſe of his proofe. The original words note an immanent act, when they ſignifie ſome other thing then imputation: Ergo imputation is an immanent act. So much for the firſt Argument.

The ſecond is this: that which doth ſecure men from wrath, and whereby they are diſcharged and acquitted from their ſins, is Juſtification. But by this immanent act of God, all the Elect are diſcharged and acquitted from their ſins, and ſecured from wrath and deſtruction. Ergo.

Anſw. The Propoſition I readily grant: the Aſſumption I deny§. 9. … and deteſt. For 1. It makes void the death of Chriſt: for what ſayes the Apoſtle? Gal. 2. 21. If righteouſneſſe come by the Law, then Chriſt is dead in vain. The caſe is altogether the ſame, as to any other way, by which men may be ſaid to be juſtified: for if they be made righteous in any other way then by the death of Chriſt, then was it a vaine, needleſſe thing, that he ſhould die for our Juſtification. 2. Nor was there any need, as to our Juſtification, that he ſhould riſe again from the dead: whereas the Scripture ſaith, Aroſe from the dead for our Juſtification, Rom. 4. 25. And therefore, ſaith Paul, 1 Cor. 15. 17. If Chriſt be not riſen, ye are yet in your ſins: he ſpeaks to thoſe that did confeſſe his death: but he was out when he told them, If Chriſt were not riſ…n, they were yet in their ſins, ſeeing they were diſcharged and acquitted from them ſo long before. 3. His interceſſion is alſo vain, for he lives to intercede for us, to ſave us from wrath, Rom. 5. 9, 10. Heb. 2. 17. and 7. 25. We are ſecured from wrath before, ſayes Mr. Eyre. 4. Our preaching is vain: for we are to preach to every creature under Heaven, That except they beleeve, they ſhall be damned, Mark 16. 15, 16. and multitudes (even all the Elect) are ſecured from wrath before. 5. It doth alſo imply a contradiction, that a man ſhould be acquitted from ſin, who was never a ſinner: or diſcharged from condemnation, who was never condemned. If it be ſaid, the Elect were ſinners, and condemned in Gods fore-knowledge: Mr. Eyre is better read in Dr. Twiſſe, then to be ignorant of what inextricable inconveniences that anſwer is liable to. But let us heare Mr. Eyres proofes of his Aſſumption: God (ſaith he) loved the Elect from everlaſting, and his love is velle dare bonum, &c.

Anſw. Which (as was obſerved before) is one of the gVid. Croll. Cont. Grot. cap 5. par. 6. & 7. & cap. 1 p. 1.Socinians weapons, by which they attempt the ruine of Chriſts ſatisfaction: againſt which our Divines have provided ſufficient armour. A love of benevolence or good will, moving God to ſeek out a way of ſatisfaction to his own Juſtice, and of Juſtification of a ſinner, we readily grant. hVid Joh. Cameron oper. p. 361. f.But his love of friendſhip, and wellpleaſedneſſe with a ſinner, was not from everlaſting, but in time: as being a conſequent of the death of Chriſt, in whom he hath made us accepted, Eph. 1. 6. as Mr. Eyre doth not only yield, but contend below, from Mat. 3. 17. and ſo ſaith the Apoſtle, Rom. 9. 25. I will call her beloved, who was not beloved: out of the Prophet, Hoſ. 2. 23. and as for the text which Mr. Eyre quotes, Ezek. 16. 6. I cannot divine to what end it is, unleſſe it be to finde me work: ſeeing the love there ſpoken of is manifeſtly temporal, ver. 8. and the life mentioned, ver. 6. in the latter, is the flouriſhing and honourable condition unto which God had raiſed Iſrael, both in reſpect of their Politick and Church-State, who were originally the feweſt and meaneſt of all people: and in a ſpiritual ſenſe, is the life which he breaths into ſinful ſoules. But what Mr. Eyre would inferre from hence, himſelfe beſt knows. In ſhort, I readily grant that Gods eternal love doth concurre, ut cauſa univerſalis prima, as the firſt univerſal cauſe, not only to our Juſtification in time, but to all other our ſpiritual bleſſings: but an univerſal cauſe produceth nothing without particulars: and the quality of the effect is not to be aſcribed to the univerſal, but to the particular cauſe. 2. Mr. Eyre is proving, that Gods velle non punire, is that act, by which we are diſcharged and acquitted from ſin, and ſecured from wrath. I wiſh he had ſhewed me how this Concluſion iſſues from theſe premiſſes. His Argument in forme muſt run thus. Gods eternal love diſcharges the Elect from ſin, and ſecures them from wrath. Gods velle non punire, is his eternal love. Ergo. The major is already diſproved. The minor, if underſtood of the love of God in whole, confounds Election and Juſtification, (which yet Mr. Eyre is careful to diſtinguiſh a little below) for what is Gods Election, but his Love, or his velle dare bonum? If of the Love of God in part, the Argument will run thus. That which is part of Gods eternal love, is a ſinners diſcharge from ſin. Gods velle non punire, is part of his eternal love. Ergo. If the major be true, Gods purpoſe of giving Chriſt, of calling ſinners, of ſanctifying them, yea, of afflicting them, and of adminiſtring any Providence towards them, which in the iſſue proves for their good, may as well be called their Juſtification, as his velle non punire. 3. Mr. Eyre hath already granted (at leaſt verbo tenus) that, notwithſtanding the Will of God, not to puniſh the Elect, the Law muſt needs be ſatisfied for their ſins, no leſſe then for the ſins of others. If this be true, then the eternal act of Gods Election in it ſelfe conſidered, gives the Elect themſelves no more ſecurity from wrath, then if they had not been elected. Surely, that conceſſion will never be reconciled with the doctrine here delivered.

But we come on to Mr. Eyres ſecond proof, and that is from§. 10. Scripture, Rom. 8. 33. Who ſhall lay any thing to the charge of Gods Elect? The Propoſition is either an univerſal Negative, No Elect perſon can be juſtly charged with ſin: or an univerſal affirmative, All elect perſons are free from the charge of ſin.

Anſw. Mr. Eyre ſhould have put in the Apoſtles anſwer to the Queſtion, and then he had prevented mine. The words are theſe, Who ſhall lay any thing to the charge of Gods Elect? It is God that juſtifieth. Hence it follows, either negatively, that no elect perſon being juſtified, can be effectually charged with ſin: or affirmatively, that all the elect that are juſtified, are free from ſuch a charge: free (I ſay) not becauſe elect, but becauſe juſtified: for the charging of ſin is manifeſtly oppoſed, not to their Election, but to their Juſtification: but that their Juſtification is their Election, or any part of it, or contemporary with it (as I may ſo ſpeak) is an inference, without any foundation in the text. 2. Yea, it cannot be inferred according to Mr. Eyres principles, though we ſhould grant the Election here ſpoken of, to be that which is from eternity, (of which preſently) for the Juſtification here ſpoken of, is that which is grounded in the death of Jeſus Chriſt: Who ſhall condemn? it is Chriſt that died. But the eternal Juſtification, which Mr. Eyre is pleading for from the text, is not grounded in the death of Chriſt, (for it is an Act in God from eternity.) Now obſerve (Reader) that Mr. Eyre denies Chriſt to have merited the Act of Juſtification, but only the effects. I would know then, whether the Apoſtle ſpeak of the Act or effects of Juſtification in thoſe words, Who ſhall lay any thing to the charge of Gods Elect? if of the Act, then the Elect were from eternity unchargeable: and whoſe charge then did Chriſt beare? and why doth Mr. Eyre all along tell us, that our diſcharge from the curſe is the fruit of Chriſts merits? yea, and what more (as to the t…rminus à quo of our ſalvation) I ſay, what more could Chriſt merit poſſibly, then that we ſhould not be chargeable with ſin? And if that were done before by an eternal act, there will be no effects of Juſtification left for Chriſt to merit, as to our deliverance from ſin. But if the Juſtification here ſpoken of be meant, not of the act, but of the effects, Mr. Eyre will grant me, without farther diſputing, that this place is inſufficient to prove, that Gods eternal purpoſe of not puniſhing is our Juſtification. 3. But I am out of doubt, that the Elect here, are not ſo called in reference to Election from eternity, but rather in reference to election temporal, (as our lDr Twiſſe. in …orv. defenſ. Arm. Cont. Til. pag. 202.Divines diſtinguiſh:) namely, in reſpect of their effectual ſeparation unto God, and forſaking the converſation of the world, and their admittance through faith, into a ſtate of favour, and precious eſteem with God: as election doth ſometimes ſignifie in Scripture. See 1 Cor. 1. 26, 27, 28. James 2. 5. 1 Pet. 2. 4, 6. The reaſon is plain: becauſe ſuch Elect are here meant, who were the preſent objects of the worlds reproaches, injurious ſentences, falſe accuſations and ſlanders, &c. for whoſe comfort, in this their ſuffering condition, the Apoſtle ſpeaks theſe words: to aſſure them, that all the malice and abuſes of the world ſhould do them no harme, ſo long as God juſtified them, and approved of them▪ Compare ver. 21, 35, 37. And this alſo is the intent of the words in the Prophet, who ſpeaks them as in the Perſon of Chriſt, when he was delivered up into the hands of wicked men, Iſa. 50. 8, 9. Now the Elect themſelves before Converſion, have their converſation according to the courſe of the world, and are not the objects of perſecution from the world, Eph. 2. 23.

SECT. IV.

WE have heard what Mr. Eyre can ſay for himſelf. Before I§. 11. go any farther, I ſhall ſet down a few Arguments to prove, that the eſſence of Juſtification doth not conſiſt in Gods eternal Will or Purpoſe of not puniſhing. And firſt, from the efficient cauſe. Juſtification is ſuch an act, whereof Jeſus Chriſt our Mediatour, as Lord and King, is the efficient cauſe with God the Father. (He is alſo the meriting cauſe as Prieſt, by the offering or ſacrifice of himſelf: But of this we ſpeak not now) Acts 5. 31. John 5. 19, 22, 26, 27. Luke 24. 47. and other places before quoted. But Jeſus Chriſt our Mediatour, as Lord and King, doth not will or purpoſe with God from eternity not to puniſh ſinners. The reaſon is plain: becauſe himſelf from all eternity was purpoſed of God to be Lord and King. Ergo Juſtification doth not conſiſt eſſentially in the Will or Purpoſe of God not to puniſh. 2. Juſtification is an act of God purpoſed. Ergo it cannot conſiſt in his purpoſe. The reaſon is, becauſe elſe God muſt purpoſe to purpoſe, which is inconvenient. The Antecedent is almoſt the words of the Apoſtle, Gal. 3. 8. The Scripture foreſeeing that God would juſtifie the Gentiles through faith, preached before, the Goſpel to Abraham We have ſcarce more evidence of any truth, upon which we lay the weight of our ſalvation, then this text affords us of the point in hand, ſaying, that God would juſtifie, in the future tenſe: making Juſtification the object of divine foreſight: affirming the Goſpel to have been preached to Abraham, many yeares before it. 3. If there be no ſuch act in God (at leaſt that we may conceive of) as velle non punire, preciſely and formally, then our Juſtification cannot conſiſt in that act: the reaſon is plaine, becauſe then our Juſtification were preciſely nothing. But there is no ſuch act in God that we may conceive of, as velle non punire preciſely Ergo. For proof of the Aſſumption. (Reader) thou muſt remember that the foregoing Argument proves, that there was in God from eternity a will to juſtifie believers in time: that is; 1. To diſcharge them from the obligation of the Law: by which that puniſhment becomes legally undue, which before was legally due: and hence it follows, 2. That they are not puniſhed de facto, ſo that impunity ſimply is no part nor effect of Juſtification: but as following upon a legal diſobligation: otherwiſe every ſinner in the world that were not preſently puniſhed, were juſtified. The impunity of a ſinner therfore, that it may be an effect or part of Juſtification, muſt be conſidered with its modus, as the impunity of a perſon diſcharged from the obligation of the Law: for God doth ſo free us from puniſhment, as may be without the leaſt prejudice to the truth, or juſtice or authority of his Law. Accordingly I affirme, that God never purpoſed not to puniſh; preciſely, praeſcindendo à modo, as impunity is ſevered from the manner in which it is given: but he purpoſed not to puniſh modo congruo, in a congruous way: by diſobliging, firſt from the threatning of the Law, and thereby giving them a legal right not to be puniſhed: and not to let them go unpuniſhed, while the Law ſtands in full force againſt them. 1. That which was never executed, was never purpoſed. But never ſinner went unpuniſhed, while the Law ſtood in full force againſt him. Ergo. The Propoſition is unqueſtionable. In the Aſſumption Mr. Eyre will agree with me, for he contends that all the Elect were diſcharged from the Law, and had a right given them to impunity in the death of Chriſt, and no elect perſon ever had, or ſhall have impunity in any other way. Ergo, it was never purpoſed that they ſhould have it in any other way: that is, that it was never purpoſed preciſely that they ſhould not be puniſhed. 2. Gods Purpoſe and his Laws will elſe be at enmity one with another: for if he purpoſe not to puniſh preciſely (praeſcindendo à modo) and yet do puniſh; then he croſſeth his purpoſe: and if he do, not puniſh, the Law being ſuppoſed to remain in full force, he is unfaithful, if not alſo unjuſt, as ſome kDr. O…en. …atr. de Juſt. vindlearned men think. 3. If non-punition lVid. T…oiſſ. …ind. d… pr…deſt. lib. 1. par. 1. digr. 9. c. 1, 2, 3. 4.preciſely tend not to the glory of Gods grace, then did he not will preciſely not to puniſh (for ſuch a will were neither of the end, nor of the meanes,) but non-punition preciſely, is no congruous meanes to glorifie Gods grace. Ergo. For if a man had continued obedient, and had never broken Gods Laws in the leaſt tittle, his impunity had not been of grace, but of debt, Rom. 4. 4. as it is with the holy Angels at this day. Therefore we cannot conceive of any act in God, purpoſing preciſely not to puniſh, in which yet Mr. Eyre placeth the very formality of our Juſtification.

4. If Juſtification be velle n…n punire, then condemnati…n is v…ll… §. ….punire: for oppoſitorum eadem …ſt ratio. But condemnation is not velle punire. Shall I need to prove this? who ever ſaid that Gods eeternal purpoſe of puniſhing men for ſin was condemnation? 'Tis an expreſſion that neither God nor man will owne, ſo farre as I can finde. Dr. Twiſſe is known to reject it often, not without ſome paſſion and deteſtation. Condemnation is every where in Scripture made an act of juſtice, Rom. 3. 8. and 2. 2. Matth. 23. 33. 2 Pet. 2. 3. and multitudes of other places. But Gods purpoſe of puniſhing is no act of Juſtice. Both theſe Propoſitions doth Dr. Twiſſe prove. Vind. lib. 1. par. 1. digr. 10. cap. 1, 2, 3.

5. That which deſtroys not a ſinners obligation to puniſhment, is not his Juſtification. The reaſon is, becauſe Juſtification is cauſa c…rrumpens obligationis ad poenam: a diſcharge and acquittance from ſin and condemnation, ſaith Mr. Eyre, ſee Rom. 8. 1, 33, 34. and 5. 8, 9. But Gods velle non punire deſtroys not a ſinners obligation to puniſhment, which I thus prove. The obligation which this Will of God deſtroys, either is that which lies upon them from eternity, by ſome immanent act of God: (I ſpeak now in Mr. Eyres Dialect: for to me 'tis very abſurd, to talke of an actual obligation upon a perſon not exiſting) but this will never be endured, that Gods immanent acts ſhould deſtroy one another, or elſe it is the temporal obligation which comes upon them by the Law: other obligation in time there is none. Now the foreſaid Will of God deſtroyes this legal obligation, either from eternity, or in time. How it ſhould do it from eternity I cannot imagine: becauſe neither the Law, nor the ſinner▪ nor the obligation do exiſt from eternity: and what it is to deſtroy an obligation that is not, nor never was; upon a perſon that is not, nor never was; by a Law that is not, nor never was; is a myſtery beyond humane comprehenſion. If in time, I would know when? either as ſoon as the Law is made, or as ſoon as it is broken, or in ſome period of time after? Not as ſoon as the Law is made, for a ſinner is not obliged to puniſhment by the Law, till he hath broken the Law: and where there is no obligation, there can be no deſtruction thereof. If as ſoon as the Law is broken, I would know how? for if notwithſtanding the foreſaid Will and Purpoſe of God, the Law have power to oblige the ſinner to puniſhment; it hath power alſo to hold him under the ſame obligation; notwithſtanding the ſame purpoſe. If it can oblige him for a minute, then for two, then for ten, then for an houre, then for a yeare, then for ever, unleſſe there be ſome other act beſides the bare purpoſe of God, to abrogate or relaxe the Law. Cauſa eadem ſemper facit idem. Gods purpoſes make no changes immediately upon his Lawes, or any other external objects.

6. If there may be a will or purpoſe not to puniſh, where yet there§. 13. is no Juſtification or pardon, (for theſe two words are of the ſame importance in this debate) then Juſtification doth not conſiſt eſſentially in a purpoſe not to puniſh. But there may be a will not to puniſh, where there is no pardon. Ergo. The Aſſumption is manifeſt. There may be hundreds of men at an Aſſizes: ſuppoſe they all reſolve, not to puniſh the Malefactors that are then and there to be tried. Are the ſaid malefactors therefore pardoned? No. Then there may be a will not to puniſh, which is no pardon. Ergo. Pardon is not eſſentially a will not to puniſh. Definitio reciprocatur cum definito. If it be ſaid, that pardon is not an act of the will, as a natural power or faculty, but as the will of a man under ſome other moral condition or qualification, namely, as having jus ad poenam exequendam, a right to inflict puniſhment: which becauſe it is peculiar to the Judge, therefore his will not to puniſh is pardon, but not the will of the reſt that may be preſent in the Court: this is as much as I expect: for hence it follows (if the caſe be applied to God) that the name of Juſtification cannot be given to his eternal Will or Purpoſe. I will not meddle with the Queſtion, An Deus poſſit creaturam immerentem affligere? But jus puniendi, a right of puniſhing accrews to none, whether God or man, but upon ſuppoſition of ſome offence committed. But from eternity there was no ſin. Ergo, the will or purpoſe of not puniſhing, was not voluntas habentis jus ad poenam infligendam. Ergo, it may not be called by the name of Juſtification. When I ſpeak of a right of puniſhing, which reſults from an offence committed, underſtand it not de jure poteſtatis, as if the ſaid offence gave any authority to God or man, which they had not before; but de jure exercitii: inaſmuch as that authority cannot be juſtly exerciſed in the puniſhment of a perſon, but upon ſuch offence committed by him. 7. If notwithſtanding this velle non punire, God be bound in juſtice to puniſh the Elect for their ſins, unleſſe his juſtice be ſatisfied ſome other way, then his velle non punire is not their Juſtification. The reaſon is, 1. Becauſe Gods juſtice doth not binde him to puniſh thoſe whom he hath juſtified: but rather not to puniſh them. 2. Becauſe his juſtice doth not binde him to puniſh another for their ſins, whom he already hath juſtified, (ſuppoſing their Juſtification to be as well in order of nature as of time, before the others puniſhment) But Gods juſtice bindes him to puniſh the elect for their ſin, unleſſe his juſtice be ſatisfied in ſome other way: as namely, by the death of Chriſt. This appears, becauſe de facto Chriſt bare that puniſhment which in juſtice was due to ſinners. Erg…, this velle non punire was not their Juſtification. One thing more I long to know, Whether velle non punire do define Juſtification in general, as it containes theſe two notable ſpecies, Juſtification by works, and Juſtification by faith or grace? or whether it define Juſtification by grace only, particularly, and in ſpecie? If the former ſhew us that ſpecial forme, by which Juſtification by works, and by grace, are immediately differenced and oppoſed; If the latter ſhew us the genus, or common nature wherein they agree; If neither of theſe can be done, (as it is impoſſible either ſhould) then we have here a definition without genus and forma, that is, a thing defined without a definition, or a definition that defines nothing.

SECT. V.

BEſides theſe Arguments, there be found more, which Mr. Eyre §. 14.objecteth againſt himſelfe, as diſproving his poſition, that Juſtification is the Will or Purpoſe of God not to puniſh: which though they be not of my making, yet becauſe they are all very material for ſupport of the truth, I ſhall here undertake their defence.

The firſt objection then, which Mr. Eyre propoſeth againſt his owne doctrine of eternal Juſtification is this, viz. That it confounds Juſtification and Election.

His anſwer is. That Election includes the end, and all the means: but Gods Will, not to puniſh preciſely and formally, only ſome part of the meanes.

Reply. 1. Then the act of Juſtification is preciſely nothing▪ as we have above demonſtrated. 2. And the effects of this act are like it ſelfe, juſt nothing; for never man was, nor ever ſhall be the better for this ſuppoſed Will of God preciſely, of not puniſhing; for if it produce us any good, it is either from eternity, or in time. Surely from eternity we are never the better for it: if in time, what is that good? I ſuppoſe, it will be ſaid, freedome from puniſhment. Well▪ But, doth it effect this freedome mediately, or immediately? mediately it can do nothing: for it is determined preciſely to a non-punition, and containes not a preparation of any ſubordinate cauſe, for the effecting of our deliverance: Election indeed may very well concurre to our diſcharge, wrought by the death of Chriſt: becauſe it is a pre-ordination of Chriſt himſelf, and of all other more immediate cauſes, that work in their ſeveral orders and dependances for our d…ſcharge. If immediately, then the death of Chriſt interpoſeth no cau…ality for the effecting of the ſaid freedome: of which notwithſtanding Mr. Eyre aſſerts it to be the adequate and immediate cauſe in his next Propoſition. 3. To give a peculiar name to the volition of one part of the meanes, as diſtinct from the volition of all the reſt, unleſſe there be ſome ſpecial reaſon of ſuch denomination, is but to impoſe upon our underſtandings: for why may not Gods Will of ſending Chriſt, of publiſhing the Goſpel, of renewing our natures, of raiſing our bodies, of glorifying our whole man, each of them deſerve a more proper and ſignificant name, then Election, as well as his Will not to puniſh? for as to the act of this Will, e…dem m…do ſe habet circa omnia objecta volita, it reſpecteth all the meanes willed equally and in the ſame manner: the perſons to whom this impunity is willed, lay under no other conſideration as the objects of this will, then as they are the objects of the will of calling, ſanctifying, glorifying: ſo that neither from the act nor the object is there any reaſon of ſuch denomination. Indeed the objects (I mean, the media volita) of election and reprobation, being contraries in the utmoſt degree, and irreconcileable in the ſame perſon, our weak underſtandings do therefore conceive of thoſe acts, as differing ſpecie, and accordingly we diverſifie their names. But the objects of Election being amongſt themſelves conſentanies, and ſubordinate in their execution one to the other, and having no other entity or modality before their own exiſtence in time, then preciſely ut volita; it is altogether beyond the reach of my underſtanding, to imagine any reaſon, why the volition of one meanes ſhould have a name proper to it ſelf, incommunicable to the volition of any other means, willed by the ſame act, & to the ſame end. 4, But the anſwer yields as much as the objection ſeeks: for it grants Juſtification to be part of election, namely, Electio ad impunitatem. Whereas, 1. Scripture-Juſtification is a forenſical act, ſay all our Proteſtants againſt the Papiſts. I ſpare quotations, becauſe the thing is too well known to be denied. This cannot be affirmed of Election. 2. The object of Election is neither a ſinner nor a righteous perſon preciſely, but one that is not: for we are choſen before the foundation of the world, Eph. 1. 4. before we have done good or evil, Rom. 9. 11. but the object of Scripture-Juſtification is a ſinner, Rom. 4. 5. whether believing or unbelieving, we diſpute below. 3. Election is not properly an act of mercy, but of abſolute dominion and liberty: Scripture-Juſtification is every where reported as an act of mercy, Pſal. 51. 1. Luke 1. 78, 79. Matth. 18. 33. Luke 18. 13, 14. Heb. 8. 12. Eph. 2. 4, 5. Ergo, Juſtification is not Election, nor any part of it. If it be ſaid, that the name of pardon and Juſtification in theſe and other places, ſignifies not the act, but the effects; I ſhall refer to my vindication of the next objection, which is as followeth.

SECT. VI.

THe ſecond objection therefore is this: Juſtification imports a change in a perſons ſtate ab injuſto ad juſtum. Which cannot be§. 15 attributed to the decrees of God. I ſhall divide Mr. Eyres anſwer into two parts.

Firſt, (ſaith he) if Juſtification be taken for the thing willed, viz. the delivery of a ſinner from the curſe of the Law, then there is a great change made thereby: he that was a childe of wrath by nature, hath peace and reconciliation with God But if we take it for the Will of God not to puniſh, then we ſay Juſtification doth not ſuppoſe any ſuch change: as if God had firſt a Will to puniſh his Elect, but afterwards he altered his Will, to a Will not to puniſh them.

Rep. Plain dealing is beſt in a good cauſe. If Mr. Eyre had told me roundly, that the effects of Juſtification make a change in a perſons ſtate, but the act doth not; I had then known what I had to do. But I know not very well what to make of theſe lines. 1. The objection in forme is this. Juſtification imports a change in a perſons ſtate ab injuſto ad juſtum. But velle nen punire, or any other eternal purpoſe of God, makes no ſuch change of a perſons ſtate. Ergo, To ſay now, that the Will of God not to puniſh ſuppoſeth no ſuch change, is to yield the Concluſion, that therefore it is not Juſtification. 2. What means he by a ſinners delivery from the curſe of the Law? either it. ſuppoſeth that a ſinner doth actually ſuffer the curſe of the Law, or ſome part of it, till Juſtification deliver him: but this he denieth of ſuch perſons for whom Chriſt hath ſatisfied (namely the Elect) page 60. 61. §. 2. or it ſuppoſeth an obligation of ſuch perſons by Law unto future puniſhment, till they be juſtified. But this he denieth too of the ſame perſons, page 110. 111. §. 2, 3, 5. and what it is to deliver a ſ…nner from the curſe, which he neither ſuffers at preſent, nor is obliged to ſuffer for future, I want an Interpreter to tell me. 3. Nor can I tell in Mr. Eyres ſenſe, what it is to have peace and reconciliation with God. If he meane it of peace of conſcience, through the ſenſe of reconciliation, himſelfe will deny that that is the immediate effect of our delivery from the curſe: for faith apprehending reconciliation doth intervene, and that as a true proper cauſe of ſuch a peace. If he mean it of a ſtate of peace and reconciliation before God, he ſhould not need to aſcribe that to the thing willed: ſeeing the erernal Will of God is moſt ſufficient unto that (according to him) as being a real diſcharge from condemnation: an actual and compleat non-imputation of ſin; and he layes it down for an undeniable truth, That the Elect were in Covenant with God before the foundations of the world, page 170, 171. 4. The great change which he ſpeaks of, made by this delivery from the curſe of the Law, viz. That he that was a childe of wrath by nature, hath peace and reconciliation with God, this great change, I ſay, is a huge nothing: for (ſaith he a little below) to be juſt and unjuſt is not properly a different ſtate before God, but a different conſideration of one and the ſame perſon. The Elect themſelves then, even when believers, are children of wrath by nature, yea, of the Saints in glory, conſidered according to what they are by nature, it may be ſaid, that they are children of wrath. And is not that a great change, from wrath to reconciliation, which leaves a man every whit as much a childe of wrath as he was before? 5. I beleeve (with Mr. Eyre) that the Will or Purpoſe of God makes no change in a perſons ſtate: but I wonder what he meanes by the reaſon added. As if (ſaith he) God had firſt a Will to puniſh his Elect, but afterwards he altered his Will to a Will not to puniſh them.] As if God could not will a mutation in the creature, without a mutation in his own Will. He made the world by his Will, and he alſo wills the diſſolution of it, after ſuch a period of time: this is a mutation in the world, but none in God. In like manner, he may will that the elect for a time ſhall ſtand obliged by Law, to the ſuffering of condemnation: and yet alſo will, that after a time this obligation ſhall ceaſe, and all this without any change in his will. But we ſhall prove hereafter, that is not the Will of Gods purpoſe, but his declared Lawes by which a ſinner is conſtituted juſt or unjuſt.

But let us come to a more cloſe encounter. Juſtification (ſaith the§. 16. objection) imports a change of a perſons ſtate ab injuſto ad juſtum. And if Scriptures be intelligible by the ſons of men, it cannot be denied, Rom. 5. 8, 9. While we were yet ſinners, Chriſt died for us: much more then, being now juſtified in his blood, we ſhall be ſaved from wrath through him. Whether we are juſtified by the blood of Chriſt without faith, or through faith, we reſerve to be debated in its proper place; for the preſent it ſufficeth us to obſerve from hence, that Juſtification makes a change in a perſons ſtate ab injuſto ad juſtum in ſenſu forenſi. And what can mans reaſon require more for proof of it, then theſe words afford? Had the Apoſtle ſaid, You were ſometimes cold, but now you are hot: you were ſometimes ſervants, but now you are free: you were ſometimes enemies, but now you are friends: he would ſcarcely be accounted a reaſonable creature, that ſhould deny ſuch expreſſions, to import a mutation from one terme to another. And muſt not then the like change be ſignified, when he ſaith, You were ſometime ſinners, but now you are juſtified? eſpecially if we conſider (which I perceiv… all men do not obſerve) that the word ſinners, by which the Apoſtle expreſſeth their ſtate before Juſtification, doth not ſignifie preciſely tranſgreſſours of the Law: for even they that are juſtified are in that regard ſinners, 1 John 1. 8, 10. Nor yet only and preciſely ſuch as are under the reigning power of ſin: though it be true, that all the unjuſtified are ſo, becauſe their ſinful condition is here oppoſed, not to Sanctification formally, but unto Juſtification. And they of all men that maintain Juſtification to be perfect in the death of Chriſt, may not ſo underſtand the word ſinners in this place. For theſe Romanes (for example) were not ſinners after their Juſtification, in that ſenſe, in which the Apoſtle tells them, they were ſinners bef…re their Juſtification: for the time of their being ſinners is directly oppoſed to the time of their Juſtification. But if they were juſtified immediately in the death of Chriſt; it is beyond diſpute, that ſin might and did reigne in them after this Juſtification, even until the time of their Converſion unto the faith. By ſinners therefore in this place, are meant ſuch ſinners as were by Law bound over to condemnation, and had not at preſent any right to deliverance from wrath: for that right was given them in their Juſtification, as appears by the Apoſtles arguing à majori ad minus, being now juſtified, foreign how much more ſhall we be ſaved from wrath. Nor is it unfrequent in Scripture, by the word ſinner, to ſignifie a ma… obliged to puniſhment, ſee 1 Kings 1. 21. Gen. 43. 9. Rom. 5. 15 Gal. 3. 22. eſpecially (as (mIn…i…. l. 3. c. 11. …. 3.) Calvin well obſerves,) according t… the Hebrew Dialect, Ʋbi etiam ſceleſti vocantur, non modò qui ſibi conſcii ſunt ſceleris, ſed qui judicium damnationis ſubeunt. Neque enim Berſabe (1 Reg. 1, 21.) dum ſe & Sol…monem dicit fore ſceleſtos, crimen agnoſcit; ſed probro ſe & filium expoſitum iri conqueritur, ut numerentur inter reprobos & damnatos. Hence the Hebrew (nVid. Jo…. Mer…er. & H…u. A…n w. i… G…r. 43 9.) foreign ſin, doth ſometimes ſignifie preciſely an obligation, yea, when it reſults from a fact which is not ſinful. As the Nazarite that was defiled againſt his will by the touch of a dead body, is yet commanded to offer a ſin-offering (the LXX. foreign) and the reaſon is added, becauſe he ſinned by the dead, Numb. 6. 11. that is, Reus eſt tacti cadaveris. And what was offered for the cleanſing of leapers, and of men and women for natural and unavoidable defilements, is called an offering foreign, Lev. 14. 19. and 15. 15, 30.

If now Mr. Eyre ſhall ſay, that when the Apoſtle ſayes, much more §. 17.being now juſtified; &c. he ſpeaks not of the act, but of the effects of Juſtification; I reply, 1. It is not lawful for man to teach the Holy Ghoſt to ſpeak. The Apoſtle tells us, that God commendeth his love towards us, in giving Chriſt to die for us while we were ſinners, that we might be juſtified in his blood, ver. 8, 9. therefore that which in God is the cauſe of our Juſtification, in the blood of Chriſt, is his love, and ſo to be called. 2. If yet it ſhall be ſaid, that that love of God is our Juſtification; then whereas it is ſaid, God ſo loved us, as to juſtifie us in the blood of his Sonne; it muſt be ſaid henceforward, God ſo juſtified us, as to juſtifie us in the blood of his Sonne, which is ridiculous. 3. If temporal Juſtification in the blood of Chriſt, be but the effect of a former Juſtification which was from eternity; what an empty noiſe hath the Apoſtle made, in amplifying the love of God, in giving Chriſt to die for the Juſtification of ſinners and enemies? whoſoever is juſtified is not a ſinner, (in the Apoſtles ſenſe of that word) but righteous: not an enemie, but reconciled. 4. The Apoſtle (if his judgement may be taken) doth thus diſtinguiſh the act and the effects of Juſtification: that the act is that, by which of ſinners we are made juſt: the effect which follows upon it is; that we ſhall therefore be ſaved from wrath. It ſeemes, the diſtinction between the velle and the res volita in the matter of Juſtification was unknown to him. 5. And his diſcourſe ſuppoſeth, that the love and grace of God is nothing ſo much commended by giving the effects, as by putting forth the act of Juſtification: for herein God commends his love towards us, that while we were yet ſinners, he gave his Son to death for our Juſtification: and then (as a leſſer matter) he infers, much more being now juſtified we ſhall be ſaved from wrath. So alſo, ver. 10. Now if by Juſtification in Chriſts blood be meant the effects, and not the act of Juſtification; then the love and grace of God is nothing near ſo great in juſtifying us through the blood of Chriſt, as in juſtifying us before without his blood. But this is moſt notoriouſly falſe; as is manifeſt, not from this text only, but from all the Scriptures, which proclaim that temporal Juſtification, which we have through the blood of Chriſt, to be an act of greateſt love, and richeſt grace, Rom. 3. 24, 25. and 5. 20, 21. Eph. 1. 6; 7. and 2. 4, 5, 6, 7. 1 Tim. 1. 14. Tit. 3. 4, 5, 6, 7, 6. The effects of Juſtification follow upon the act by moral neceſſity, and without impediment. Ergo; the Juſtification here ſpoken of, is not the effect preciſely, but the act. The reaſon of the conſequence is, becauſe the Juſtification mentioned in the text, follows not upon any ſimple precedent act of Juſtification, but is ſet forth as an act of ſuch moral difficulty, that it required no leſſe then the precious blood of the Son of God, to remove the obſtructions and hindrances of its exiſtence, and to make it to exiſt. The Antecedent is proved from his manner of arguing à majori ad minus: being now juſtified, much more ſhall we be ſaved: implying that ſalvation follows, as it were, neceſſarily, upon the poſition of the act of Juſtification. Yea, and I appeal to Mr. Eyre himſelfe, or any man elſe, whether that act be not unworthy of the many glorious titles and epithets, which are every where in Scripture put upon Juſtification, and conſequently unworthy of that name: which being put in actu completo, can yet produce no good effect to a ſinner, nor ſet him one degree farther from wrath then he was before, unleſſe ſome other more ſufficient cauſe do interpoſe to midwiſe out its effects. This mindes me of another Argument, and that is this. 7. Juſtification is not an act of grace ſimply, but of powerful grace, or of grace prevailing againſt the power of ſin: for this is that which creates the difficulty, and ſo commends the excellency of the grace of Juſtification, that it is the Juſtification of ſinners. Were it the Juſtification of ſuch as had never ſinned, but had been perfectly righteous, there were no ſuch difficulty in that. And therefore in the following part of the Chapter, the Apoſtle expreſly declares the quality of this grace in juſtifying us, in that it abounds, and is powerful to juſtifie, above the ability of ſin to condemn, ver. 15, 17, 20, Ergo the Juſtification here ſpoken of, is the very act of Juſtification, or there is no ſuch thing at all: for if we place it in a ſimple eternal volition, there could be no moral difficulty in that, (no more then in the will of creating the world,) becauſe from eternity there could be no oppoſition or hindrance, for an act of grace to overcome. 8. The Juſtification merited by Chriſt, is not the effect, but the act. The reaſon we ſhall ſhew anon, becauſe it is abſurd to make Chriſt the meritour of the effects, when the act is in being before his merit. But the Juſtification here ſpoken of is that which is merited by Chriſt. Ergo, I might alſo argue out of the following part of the Chapter, from the oppoſition between Juſtification, and the act of condemnation, which paſſeth upon all men, by vertue of the firſt tranſgreſſion: (and therefore ſure cannot conſiſt in any eternal act of Gods will) and from the method there uſed in comparing Adam and Chriſt, and of our partaking firſt in the image of the firſt Adam, in ſin and the effects thereof, before we be conformed to the image of the ſecond Adam, in Juſtification and the effects thereof: but theſe Arguments out of the text it ſelf ſhall ſuffice.

Other Scriptures alſo there are in abundance which teſtifie, that Juſtification§. 18. doth make a change in a perſons ſtate, ab injuſto ad juſtum. As Col. 2. 13. You being dead in your ſins, and the uncircumciſion of your fleſh, hath he quickened together with him, having forgiven you all treſpaſſes. To be dead in ſins in this place, is clearly to be dead in Law, that is, to be obliged by Law to the ſuffering of death for ſin; for it is oppoſed to that life which conſiſts in remiſſion of ſin or Juſtification; ſo 1 Cor. 6. 11. ſuch were ſome of you, but ye are juſtified: of which place more hereafter. See alſo Rom. 3. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24. and 5. 18, 19, 20, 21. Eph. 2. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. And indeed all the places of Scripture which ſpeak of Gods juſtifying ſinners. If there be found out a new Juſtification which the Scriptures are not acquainted with, may they have joy of it that have diſcovered it. But I haſten to the ſecond part of Mr. Eyres anſwer.

The change of a perſons ſtate ab injuſto ad juſtum, ariſeth from the Law, and the conſideration of man in reference thereunto: by whoſe ſentence the tranſgreſſour is unjuſt: but being conſidered at the Tribunal of grace, and cloathed with the righteouſneſſe of Chriſt, he is juſt and righteous: which is not properly a different ſtate before God, but a different conſideration of one and the ſame perſon. God may be ſaid at the ſame time to look upon a perſon, both as ſinful and as righteous: as ſinful in reference to his ſtate by nature, and as righteous in reference to his ſtate by grace. Now this change being but imputed, not inherent, it ſuppoſeth not the being of the creature, much leſſe any inherent difference, &c.

Anſw. Theſe words are myſteries to me, and I confeſſe have occaſioned§. 19. me more perplexity and vexation of thoughts, then all the book beſides. Before I can give any anſwer to them, I muſt make ſome enquiry into the meaning of them. And for avoiding of confuſion in the words juſt and unjuſt, their importance in this place is no more, then to have or be without a right to ſalvation and life. Now to be unjuſt by nature, or in our ſelves, may be underſtood in a threefold ſenſe. 1. Poſitively, and then the meaning is, that for the ſin of nature, or for mens ſinfulneſſe in themſelves, they ſtand obliged before God, to the ſuffering of eternal puniſhment. This is ſo far from being Mr. Eyres meaning, that I ſuppoſe it is the very thing which he intends to deny by theſe obſcure expreſſions: as he alſo often doth in other parts of this book: for it is impoſſible that a man ſhould ſtand before God, obliged to puniſhment, and diſobliged at the ſame time. 2. Or purely negatively, as denying nature to be the cauſe of our Juſtification. But neither do I think this to be Mr. Eyres meaning, becauſe the ſenſe will be ſo pitifully jejune: for thus to be juſt by grace, and unjuſt by nature is no more, then that it is grace and not nature which juſtifies us: and he that ſayes a man is juſtified by grace, and not by a piece of bread and butter, or by the flying of the clouds over his head, ſpeaks every whit as much to purpoſe. 3. Diminutively, in ſenſu diviſo & ſecundum quid: that if we ſuppoſe there were no act of grace to hinder, men muſt needs be condemned: there being in themſelves ſufficient cauſe of condemnation, and in the Law ſufficient power to oblige them to it: but the grace of God doth hinder both the one and the other from coming forth into act, ſo that they never ſtand actually obliged to the ſuffering of puniſhment, notwithſtanding their own ſinfulneſſe, and the Lawes rigour. This if any thing, muſt be our Authours meaning, as beſt ſuiting with what he ſayes here and elſewhere, as page 111. §. 5. By nature or in reference to their ſtate in the firſt Adam, the Elect were children of wrath, they could expect nothing but wrath from God. And again, beleevers conſidered in themſelves, and as they come from the loines of Adam, are ſinful and curſed creatures. And again, page 113. §. 7. The Law ſhews not who are condemned of God, but who are guilty and damnable in themſelves, if God ſhould deal with them by the Law. Let us ſee then what Mr. Eyre would have: this I think it is. That there is in all men, even the Elect themſelves, ſufficient cauſe of condemnation: that is, ſufficient cauſe on their part, why they ſhould loſe all right to ſalvation and life; and be actually damned: and alſo that there is nothing wanting in the nature and conſtitution of the Law, which is required in a Law, to make it able to binde or oblige men (even the Elect themſelves) unto puniſhment. And all this is true queſtionleſſe. But it is withal affirmed, that the Elect, by the gracious and eternal act of Gods Will, are abſolutely juſt before God: and by the ſame Will is the Law (though broken by them) diſabled from binding them actually unto puniſhment. So that they are ſaid to be unjuſt by the Law, or in themſelves, or by nature, not that they are at any time abſolutely unjuſt, or without all right to life (for they are ſuppoſed to be abſolutely juſt from eternity) but as it were materially, becauſe if the foreſaid act of Gods Will had not prevented, they had been unjuſt ſimply and abſolutely.

Againſt which doctrine I have ſeveral things to oppoſe. 1. In§. 20. general, whereas the intent of it is to prove that a ſinner may be juſtified and unjuſtified both at once, it is manifeſt that theſe words are uſed in ſome other ſenſe, then what the Scriptures are wont to take them in: becauſe to be a ſinner and to be righteous, to be juſtified and to be condemned, to have ones ſins retained and remitted according to Scripture are contraries, and never agree to the ſame perſon at the ſame time, John 3. 17, 18. Rom. 8. 1, 33, 34. and 5. 8, 9. John 20. 23. 1 Cor. 6. 9, 11. and many other places. 2. If an elect ſinner be never unjuſt, but in this reſpective, diminutive ſenſe, then it is impoſſible for the act or effects of Juſtification, to make any change upon him: becauſe it is impoſſible but that he who is juſtified meerly of grace, ſhould be unjuſt in himſelf: even glorified Saints are to all eternity unjuſt by nature, or of themſelves, or in reference to their ſtate in the firſt Adam. 3. If this be the whole of a ſinners unrighteouſneſſe, then by the Law of nature ſinners are not unjuſt ſimply and univerſally, ſo as to have no right at all to life: but only in ſome reſpect, ſo as to have no right by that Law which they have tranſgreſſed. But all ſinners are univerſally unjuſt by the Law of nature, which I thus prove. 1. If Adam, while he continued obedient, had by his obedience a right to life, and had no right at all, but by his obedience according to the Law, then upon his diſobedience he became univerſally unjuſt by the ſame Law. The reaſon's plain, becauſe if there be but one rule of righteouſneſs in being, then he that is not righteous by that rule, is not righteous at all. Sublat â cauſà totali, tollitur effectus totaliter. But Adam whiles he continued obedient, had by his obedience and by the Law a right to life, and had no right at all, but by his obedience. Ergo. The Aſſumption is thus confirmed. If Adam had any other right then by the Law, then it muſt be by ſome grace of God. But this cannot be according to Scripture: becauſe to have a right by grace and works too, is inconſiſtent according to Scripture, Rom. 11. 6. If by grace, then not of works, otherwiſe grace is no more grace. If by works, then not of grace, otherwiſe work is no more work. How long Adam continued innocent, I cannot tell. If but half a day; if but half an houre, it is all one to my purpoſe: it being concluded by Divines, that Adam and Eve, one or both, were ſaved, and therefore were elect: and Adams caſe was then the caſe of all men, one as well as another, he being as it were the epitome of all mankinde in what he did, and in what befell him. 2. The Apoſtle alſo witneſſeth, that the Gentiles, whiles they continued in their Gentiliſme, were all of them equally alienated from God, Col. 1. 21. foreign ſeparate from Chriſt, ſtrangers from the Covenant of Promiſe, and without hope, Eph. 2. 11, 12. till by the faith of that Goſpel which the Apoſtles preached, ver. 20. they ceaſed to be any more ſtrangers and forreigners, and became fellow-Citizens with the Saints, and of the houſhold of God, ver. 19. Had the Apoſtle ſpoke theſe words concerning reprobate Gentiles, I am perſwaded it would never have come into any mans minde, (no, not Mr. Eyres himſelfe) to deny, but that they did ſignifie thoſe Gentiles, to be without all right to life and ſalvation, and other priviledges, immunities and dignities, given by the great Charter of the Goſpel, to the City and Family of God. But the Apoſtle doth here deſcribe the miſeries of a Gentile ſtate, and therefore of every one that was a Gentile: for their condition is equally the ſame, till they turne Chriſtians. Ergo, theſe Gentiles that now beleeved, were yet ſometimes without all right to life, that is, they were univerſally unrighteous or unjuſt: and that by the Law of nature, Rom. 2. 12, 14, 15.

4. If the Elect were never ſimply and abſolutely unjuſt, then Chriſt is not their Saviour. But Chriſt is moſt ſurely the Saviour of the Elect. Ergo. The reaſon of the Propoſition is, becauſe if Chriſt be properly a Saviour, then he ſaves either from that wrath which they do actually ſuffer, (which neither Mr. Eyre will grant, nor my ſelfe without limitation) or from an actual obligation to the ſuffering of wrath when the time is come: and this Mr. Eyre denies. But tell me then how is Chriſt called a Saviour? ſeeing none can be properly ſaved, but ſuch as are ſubject to periſhing, either de jure, or de facto. If Adam had continued righteous, he might well have propagated life to his children, but not ſalvation, becauſe they had never been in danger of death. And he that is ſimply and abſolutely juſt, though in ſome reſpect unjuſt, is not in danger of periſhing, and therefore not capable of being ſaved. If it be ſaid that Chriſt ſaves us from wrath, becauſe we ſhould have been obliged to wrath, if ſome act of grace in God had not prevented, there being matter enough in us, for which we ſhould have forfeited our right to life. The anſwer is, 1. Let that act then which prevents our obligation, be called our Saviour, and not Chriſt. 2. And let the thing it ſelfe be proved, viz. That ſuppoſing the Elect do now at no time ſtand obliged before God to puniſhment, for any or all their ſins: that yet they ſhould have been ſo obliged, if Gods purpoſe had not hindred, that is, ſuppoſing the Law hath now no effect upon their perſons, as to the binding of them under wrath for ſin, that yet it ſhould have had, if the foreſaid purpoſe had not prevented. I deny it: and if it be true, yet I conceive it impoſſible for man to prove it. But we muſt of neceſſity ſpeak ſomething more of theſe matters in another place, and therefore here I ſuperſede any farther arguings.

Let us therefore a little farther demurre upon Mr. Eyres words, as§ 21. he here preſents them to us, and I paſſe on to the next Argument. 1. Whereas he ſaith, that the change ab injuſto ad juſtum ariſeth from the different conſideration of a perſon, he may be pleaſed to conſider, that conſiderations make no changes. Things are to be conſidered as they are, and not by conſideration made what they are not. Our underſtanding will conceive of a man as cloathed with, or abſtracted from all moral qualifications: and ſo conſider him ſometimes as juſt and not unjuſt: ſometimes as unjuſt, and not juſt: ſometimes as neither juſt nor unjuſt. But to conſider an unjuſt man as he is juſt, or a juſt man as he is unjuſt, is to conſider a man as he is a horſe. Obj. A man is not a horſe, therefore I cannot ſo conſider him. Anſw. No more is a juſtified man unjuſt, nor an unjuſtified man juſt before God. Obj. Yes that he is, for he may be unjuſt by nature, and yet juſtified of grace at the ſame time. Anſw. True. But then obſerve (Reader) that to be unjuſt by nature in this ſenſe, is terminus diminuens: and ſo to conſider a man as unjuſt by nature, is not to conſider him as unjuſt ſimply; becauſe to be unjuſt by nature, is not to be unjuſt ſimply (for a man is ſuppoſed to be juſt by grace at the ſame time) therefore when it is argued, a man may be unjuſt by nature, and juſt by grace at the ſame time; Ergo, he may be juſt and unjuſt at the ſame time: I deny the conſequence. He that hath nothing elſe to do, may (if he will) conſider the ſame man as juſt before God, and unjuſt before man: and according to the variety of humane Law, multiply the notions of injuſtice, and ſay he is unjuſt by the Engliſh Law, but not by the Romane Law: or by the Romane Law, but not by the Grecian Law, &c. and when all this is done, he may ſay he hath proved, that a man is juſt and unjuſt at the ſame time before God: but I will not believe him. 2. And as it is contrary to reaſon, ſo to the manner of ſpeech in Scripture (as was noted before) Rom. 5. 8, 9. we were ſinners, but now we are juſtified. He doth not ſay, we are ſinners, but are or were juſtified, 1 Cor. 6. 9, 11. You were unrighteous, but now you are juſtified. Muſt we read it thus, you are unrighteous, but you were or are juſtified? Eph. 2. 3. you were the children of wrath. He doth not ſay you are the children of wrath, Col. 1. 21. You were alienated, but now are reconciled. In all which places we finde a ſtate of righteouſneſſe, ſucceeding a ſtate of unrighteouſneſſe: but of being righteous and unrighteous at the ſame time, we have no mention. 3. And what is it to conſider a man as juſt or unjuſt? either it is a meer ſpeculative conſideration, apprehending in a man rationem juſti, without apprehending rationem injuſti, or è contra: but how unreaſonably is it ſaid, that the change of a perſons ſtate ab injuſto ad juſtum, ariſeth from ſuch a conſideration as this is, which is as compatible to man as unto God, and altogether extrinſecal and accidental to a mans being juſt or unjuſt: or elſe it is a practical, judicial conſideration, in order to Gods dealing with a man as juſt and unjuſt: but ſurely Mr. Eyre will abhorre (as well he may) that God ſhould intend to deal with his Elect as unjuſt. 4. And to what he ſpeaks of an imputed change, 'tis an expreſſion I never heard before. I have read of an imputed righteouſneſſe, which makes a real change (real I mean, not as oppoſed to moral or relative, but to mental or notional) but an imputed change is a meer fiction, and good for nothing as I know, but to give juſt ground to the Papiſts, to reproach us with a putative righteouſneſſe, as they call it in a jeer. But there be no fictions in God at all: and by how much the more they are found in men, by ſo much the more phantaſtical we account them, (unleſſe they be rhetorical fictions uſed for doctrine, or illuſtration, or the like.) 5. And much like all the reſt it is, that he ſaith to be juſt and unjuſt is not a different ſtate: whereas himſelf ſo calls it but juſt before; and immediately after tells us, that men are accounted juſt in reference to their ſtate by grace, and unjuſt in reference to their ſtate by nature. Is a ſtate of nature then, and a ſtate of grace different ſtates? if they be not, why doth Mr. Eyre call them ſo? if they be, then a ſtate of nature is a ſtate of unrighteouſneſſe, and a ſtate of grace is a ſtate of righteouſneſſe: and ſo to be righteous and unrighteous is a different ſtate: or elſe there is no man in the world unrighteous before God, or the unrighteous are in as good a ſtate as the righteous. But I will puzzle my ſelfe no longer with theſe ambiguous Oracles.

SECT. VII.

THe third objection ſucceeds, and that is this. If juſtification be§. 22. an immanent act in God, it is antecedent, not only to faith, but to the merits of Chriſt: which is contrary to many Scriptures, that do aſcribe our Juſtification unto his blood, as the meritorious cauſe.

Mr. Eyre anſwers, That although Gods Will not to puniſh, be antecedent to the death of Chriſt, yet for all we may be ſaid to be juſtified in him, becauſe the whole effect of that Will, is by and for the ſake of Chriſt. As though electing love precede the conſideration of Chriſt, John 3. 16. yet are we ſaid to be choſen in him, Eph. 1. 4. becauſe all the effects of that love, are given by, and through, and for him.

Reply. Here again I muſt complain of Mr. Eyres mincing. Had he ſaid, the Act of Juſtification goes before the death of Chriſt, but the effects follow, he had ſpoken plainly. But when we are diſputing, that Gods Will is not our Juſtification, becauſe our Juſtification according to Scripture is a fruit of Chriſts merit, which an immanent act of Gods Will cannot be: to tell us now, that indeed Gods Will is antecedent to Chriſts merits, is to yield the Argument, that therefore it is not our Juſtification: for nothing more certain from Scripture, then that our Juſtification is the fruit of the merits and blood of Chriſt; Rom. 3. 24, 25. and 5. 8, 9. and 4. 25. and 8. 3, 4. 2 Cor. 5. 19, 21. Gal. 3. 13, 14. Eph. 1. 7. Col. 2. 13, 14. Heb. 9. 12, 22. and 10. 14, 18. and ſundry other places. 2. It is alſo unworthy of the precious blood of the Sonne of God, to aſcribe no more to it, then that it merits the effects of our Juſtification: ſeeing it is a farre leſſe matter to purchaſe the effects, then to purchaſe the act which is the cauſe of them: as I have before obſerved from the Apoſtles manner of arguing, Rom. 5. If while we were ſinners Chriſt died for us, much more then being now juſtified, ſhall we be ſaved from wrath. 3. It is alſo no little undervaluing of the glorious bleſſing of Juſtification, to ſuppoſe it ſo impotent, as that it cannot produce its own effects, nor do the ſinner any good at all unleſſe the Son of God interpoſe by his death to make it effectual. I deſire to ſpeak of ſpiritual things with feare and trembling: But I am not afraid to ſay, ſuch a Juſtification as this is not worth grammercy. If it be objected, that I may ſay as much of Gods electing love, for neither doth that produce its effects without the death of Chriſt: I anſwer, no ſuch matter, for the death of Chriſt it ſelfe, and all other particular cauſes of our ſalvation, are the effects of election, which it ſelfe produceth in their reſpective ſubordinations. But Juſtification is a particular cauſe, determined preciſely to a non-punition, which yet it cannot effect. Nor doth Mr. Eyre himſelf make the death of Chriſt an effect of Juſtification, and if he did, he muſt reade the Scriptures backward, but of this more by and by. 4. I deny, that the effects of Juſtification can be merited without the act; for this eternal Juſtification (according to Mr. Eyres theologie) is an actual and real diſcharge from all ſin and condemnation: a compleat nonimputation of ſin and imputation of righteouſneſſe. Therefore it is impoſſible, but that by this act the Elect muſt have a right given them to deliverance from wrath: which is ſo evident, that himſelfe contendeth, that the Elect (even whiles they are in actual rebellion againſt God) have a right to ſalvation, grounded in the Purpoſe of God, page 122. And what then did Chriſt merit for them? Not a right to deliverance from wrath, for that they have already: and oVid. Aqui… 1. q. 62. 4. …. & 12. q. 1 …4. 5. …, & 3. q. 19. 3. ….Nullus meretur quod jam habet, what one hath already, that cannot be afterwards merited. Chriſt is dead in vain, as to the purchaſing of this right, if they had it before. Upon this ground do our pJun. Animad. in Bell. l. 5. c. 10.Divines deny that Chriſt merited any thing for himſelfe, becauſe there was no advancement of ſoule or body, but was due to him upon an antecedent title. Nor yet doth Chriſt merit the continuance of this right: for it is impoſſible it ſhould be forfeited, for a man can forfeit nothing with God but by ſin: and ſin, if it be pardoned, (as here it is ſuppoſed to be, even all ſins, and that from eternity) hath no ſtrength to work ſuch a forfeiture, no more then if it never had been committed. Nor doth he merit the poſſeſſion of that which they have a right to, for the effect of merit is properly acquiſitio juris, the acquiring or obtaining of the right it ſelfe. qDuran…. … 2. diſt. 5 q 3. 8.Nullus meretur id quod eſt ſuum: ſed per meritum facit quilibet, ut aliquid efficiatur ei debitum, & per conſequens ſuum, quod ei prius non erat debitum, nec ſuum. Indeed men may by violence be kept out of the poſſeſſion of that which is their own. But God is not wont to deny poſſeſſion where himſelf hath given a right; and if ſinners have from eternity a firme and valid right to life and ſalvation, Chriſt ſhould not need to have put himſelf to the expence of his blood to have purchaſed poſſeſſion. Wherefore, the effects of Juſtification, being inſeparable from the act, Chriſt merited the act as well as the effect, or elſe he merited neither.

The compariſon brought in for illuſtration makes the matter worſe§. 23. then it was before. For, 1. It is utterly falſe, that all the effects of Gods electing love, are given for the merits of Chriſt: for the giving of Chriſt to death is an effect of Gods electing love; and yet Chriſt did not merit his own ſending into the world. 2. That the parallel may conſiſt, it muſt be firſt ſuppoſed that the intention of particular meanes have particular names, as ſo many particular acts or cauſes, and then determined that Chriſt merited not thoſe acts, but their effects; As for example, That Gods intention to make us his children, is our▪ Adoption, and Chriſt merited not our Adoption, but the effects thereof. His intention to ſanctifie us is our ſanctification; and Chriſt merited not our ſanctification, but the effects of it. His intention to glorifie us is our glorification, and Chriſt merits its effects: even as his intent to pardon us is our Juſtification: and Chriſt doth afterward merit the effects, but not the act. Thus muſt the compariſon run, or it leaves the matter darker then it found it. If Mr. Eyre will not allow of this, let him acknowledge his doctrine to be without parallel. 3. The effects of Chriſts merits are alſo the effects of Gods electing love: becauſe the merits of Chriſt themſelves, are the effects of the ſame love: and the cauſe of the cauſe is alſo the cauſe of the thing cauſed. But if our Lords death had been only from his own will, not pre-ordained of God in the decree of election; all the benefits purchaſed by it, muſt have been aſcribed to it as the firſt cauſe; and Gods Will of beſtowing them had not been cauſal, but meerly concomitant or conſequent. Now his will not to puniſh, containes not a preparation of any ſubordinate cauſe, for the effecting of this impunity. Ergo, if Chriſt merited it, it muſt be aſcribed to him as the principal and only cauſe, and not to Gods Will of not puniſhing, becauſe that Will of God is not the cauſe of the merits of Chriſt, as being determined preciſely to a non-punition. And ſo there will be the effects of Juſtification without an act: or the act of Juſtification produceth its own effects but by accident; or rather doth not produce them at all, but ſtands by without efficacy, whiles another cauſe doth the work. Therefore herein alſo the compariſon halts.

The fourth and laſt objection which Mr. Eyre makes againſt himſelf,§. 24. is this: We may as well call Gods Will to create, Creation; and his Will to call, Calling; and to glorifie, Glorification; as his Will to juſtifie, Juſtification.

His anſwer is, Creating, calling, and glorifying import an inherent change in the perſon created, called, glorified, which forgiveneſſe doth not, it being perfect and compleat in the minde of God.

Rep. 1. The anſwer contradicts it ſelfe; for it yields it to be a proper ſpeech, to ſay, that God doth will or purpoſe to juſtifie: (even as proper, as to ſay, he doth will or purpoſe to create, to call, to glorifie) and yet beares us in hand, that Juſtification is perfect and compleat in the minde of God. Whatſoever is purpoſed is future. If it have already an actual exiſtence, it is not capable of being purpoſed to exiſt. But the immanent acts of Gods minde are not future, but from eternity. 2. Though Juſtification do not make an inherent change, yet it makes an adherent change, (as was largely proved from Scripture but now) even as if a Malefactour be condemned, and afterwards pardoned: his condemnation and pardon make an adherent change, that is, a relative: though he remain the ſame man that he was, and be not changed inherently and really. And I wonder, why the purpoſe of an act which makes an adherent, relative change, ſhould be called by the name of that act: rather then the purpoſe of ſuch an act, which makes an inherent real change, ſhould be called by its name. Ars poſterior utitur prioris oper…. Morality ſuppoſeth nature. 3. It is true, that Creation, &c. do make an inherent change. But the queſtion is, whether we have not as much ground from Scripture to underſtand thoſe words, as ſignifying not the act, but the effect of Creation, &c. as Mr. Eyre hath to interpret the word Juſtification in Scripture, for the effects, not for the act. Suppoſe a man ſhould be ſo void of ſobriety, as to ſay, the words, Creation, Vocation, Glorification, and what of like nature, ſignifie not thoſe ſeveral acts, but their effects; what could Mr. Eyre ſay againſt it? To ſay, Creation, &c. makes an inherent change, is to ſay nothing: for it will quickly be anſwered, that the effects of Creation, Vocation, &c. do make an inherent change, not the acts. If he tell me, the words are never uſed in Scripture, but as importing ſuch a change; I anſwer ſtill as he doth of Juſtification, that the words, where-ever they are to be found in Scripture, are to be underſtood of the effects, not of the act. If he yet ſay, that it is contrary to all our Proteſtant Divines, I ſay ſo too. Et nomine mutato narratur fabula de te. Thus much for the vindication of the foure objections, which Mr. Eyre propoſeth againſt himſelfe. He concludes this diſcourſe thus.

SECT. VIII.

HOwever, were it granted, that there was in God from everlaſting,§. 25. an abſolute, fixed, and immutable will, never to deal with his people according to their ſins, but to deal with them as righteous perſons, this controverſie were ended.

Anſw. Such a purpoſe I acknowledge in God, to juſtifie his Elect, when they ſhould beleeve, and being juſtified, not to deal with them as ſinners but as with righteous perſons; yet ſo, as that they are equally with others obliged by the Law to puniſhment, till they do beleeve, and ſubject actually to the bearing of the temporal penalties of ſin. If this will ſatisfie Mr. Eyre, let him make his moſt of it. But let us ſee how it ends the controverſie.

Firſt, (ſaith he) Gods non-imputation of ſin to his Elect, is not purely negative, but privative, being the non-imputation of ſin realiter futuri in eſſe: as the imputation of righteouſneſſe is Juſtitiae realiter futurae in exiſtentia. 2. This non-imputation of ſin is actual, though the …n not to be imputed be not in actual being. So is the imputation of righteouſneſſe. 3. This act of juſtifying is compleat in it ſelfe.

Anſw. If the begging of the queſtion be the ending of a controverſie, we have done. It is here ſuppoſed, that the aforeſaid Purpoſe of God is the imputation of righteouſneſſe, and the non-imputation of ſin: which ſhould have been proved, and not begged. And therefore the foundation failing, there needs no more to be done to demoliſh the ſuperſtructure; yet a word or two of that alſo: 2. I ſay therefore, that an eternal, actual, privative non-imputation of future ſin, is either non-ſenſe, or a contradiction, (let Mr. Eyre take his choice, and conſider withal, what he is like to make of Juſtification at laſt) for that which is only future, can be deprived of nothing but its futurity: and if it be ab aeter…o deprived of its futurity, then it is ab aeterno non futurum: and if ab aeterno non futurum, then it is ab aeterno undepriveable of its futurity: for that which is never future, is never capable of being made non-future, unleſſe we could in eternity conc…e one moment wherein it is made future, and another moment wherein it is made non-future: which cannot be, becauſe in eternity there is neither prius nor poſterius. Now this privative nonimputation of future ſin, what doth it privare? Not the futurity of ſin: for then there never was nor ſhall be any ſuch thing as ſin in the world: for nothing exiſts in time, which before its exiſtence was not future. That then which this non-imputation is privative of, muſt be the imputation of ſin to a perſon, cui debitum eſt imputari. (for that is the habit which only is contrary to it): for as the privative nonimputation of ſin preſent, and in actual being is privative only imputationis nunc debitae; ſo the like non-imputation of ſin future, is privative only imputationis futurae debitae. The Argument therefore returnes: for if this imputation be ab aeterno non-futura, then is it ab aeterno undeprivable of its futurity: for nothing but that which is future can be deprived of its futurity: and if it be future ab aeterno, then it cannot be made ab aeterno non-future: for to be future and non-future ab aeterno is a contradiction. 3. But if Mr. Eyre, by his privative non-imputation, mean no more then a poſitive act, by which that puniſhment is kept off, which is, or will become due to a ſinner, I anſwer farther. That the very eſſence of the pardon of ſin, conſiſts in making that puniſhment undue which before was due, and conſequently, in freeing the ſinner from all actual ſuffering for ſin, (for the remiſſion of ſin is oppoſed to the retaining of it, John 20. 23.) or elſe in preventing, that that puniſhment ſhall never become due, which otherwiſe would be due. If in the former ſenſe ſin be pardoned from eternity, (for non-imputation and pardon are all one, both in Mr. Eyres ſenſe, and of the Scriptures, Rom. 4. 7, 8.) then cannot puniſhment become due in time: but it is from eternity, non futurum debitum, even as the pardon of ſin preſent and actually committed, makes that puniſhment remaines no longer due to a perſon, which till then was due. And if it be from eternity a nonfuturum debitum▪ then neither can it be pardoned from eternity, (pardon being eſſentially a diſcharge from puniſhment, due actually, or in futurition) nor if it could, can that pardon be an act of grace: becauſe it is no grace to pardon him, who neither is, nor never will or can be puniſhable. Yet here, Reader, diſtinguiſh of the dueneſſe of puniſhment: which may ariſe, either from the nature of ſin in it ſelf: and in this ſenſe it is impoſſible that ſin ſhould be pardoned, either from eternity or in time; becauſe it is impoſſible, but that ſin ſhould be in it ſelfe puniſhable, or worthy of puniſhment: even as on the contrary, vertue is in it ſelf eſſentially laudable or rewardable: Or it may be the act of God by his Law, making puniſhment due to the ſinner, or obliging the ſinner unto puniſhment for his ſin, and in this ſenſe only is it pardonable: and if it be actually pardoned from eternity, then is puniſhment made from eternity non debita, which, as I ſaid before, deſtroys both the ſubſtance and grace of pardon: let us ſee if we can clear it by Mr. Eyres compariſon. This Will of God (ſaith he) is like the will of a man, not to require that debt, that ſhall, or is about to be contracted. Come on then. Titius knows, that Caius will be indebted to him: and his purpoſe is before-hand not to require this debt. I ask, Is this purpoſe the pardon of the debt or no? if not, the cauſe is yielded; if it be, we will ſuppoſe that Titius makes this purpoſe within himſelf in the moment A: the debt will be contracted in the moment C. All the ſpace of time that is between A and C, the debt is not actually a debt, but only future. If then this future debt be forgiven in the moment A, then from thenceforth it ceaſeth to be future, and ſo cannot exiſt in the moment C, becauſe for a debt to be forgiven, is to be made no debt: if it be forgiven at preſent, it is none at preſent; if it be forgiven for the future, it is not in futurition to be a debt. 4. I will only adde this. That according to Mr. Eyres own principles, puniſhment doth never become due to the Elect, ſo as that they ſtand obliged before God, to ſuffer for any of their ſins: for that which in the protaſ…s of the ſimilitude, is a debt between man and man, is a ſinners obligation to puniſhment in the reddition. Now Mr. Eyre denies, that an elect ſinner is at any time unjuſt ſimply and abſolutely, but only in a diminutive ſenſe: that is unjuſt by nature, or of himſelf (but poſitively juſt by grace at the ſame time) which is but the carcaſſe of unrighteouſneſſe, making the ſinner unrighteous, no otherwiſe then as it were materially, he doing that which on his part is ſufficient to oblige him to condemnation: but he is never formally unjuſt, becauſe the grace of his Judge prevents his actual obligation. Erg…, he doth never ſtand actually obliged to the ſuffering of puniſhment, nor is ever actually and formally indebted. And whoſe debt then it was that Chriſt paid, or what debts they are which we are to pray for forgiveneſſe of, Matth. 6. 12. I muſt confeſſe I cannot tell; which is all I ſhall need to ſpeak of that ſecond ſenſe, in which ſome may take the pardon of ſin. Nor will I adde any more animadverſions upon theſe paſſages (though I had once intended it) becauſe ſome have been mentioned already before, and others we muſt make uſe of in that which follows

SECT. IX.

SO much for Mr. Eyres firſt Propoſition: upon which I have been§. 26. neceſſitated to dwell the longer, becauſe his diſcourſe is ſo perplexed and intricate. In that which follows I ſhall be more brief. His next Propoſition is this.

If Juſtification be taken not for the Will of God, but for the thing willed, to wit, our diſcharge from the Law, and deliverance from Puniſhment; ſo it hath for its adequate cauſe and principle, the death and ſatisfaction of Jeſus Chriſt.

Anſw. The ſubſtance of this Propoſition I could gladly cloſe with▪ but ſomething is firſt neceſſary to be animadverted. 1. Whereas Mr. Eyre here makes the ſatisfaction of Chriſt the adequate, and (as in his Explication he tells us often) the immediate cauſe of our Juſtification: if by adequate and immediate he mean only in genere cauſae meritoriae, I conſent, becauſe there is no other meritorious cauſe that comes between the death of Chriſt and our Juſtification. But if he mean, that the death of Chriſt is ſimply the adequate and immediate cauſe, then I deny it: becauſe the act of God as Juſtifier, comes between the death of Chriſt and our Juſtification, Rom. 3. 25. 26▪ Whom God hath ſet forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood,—that he might be juſt, and the Juſtifier of him that believeth on Jeſus. And the Lord Jeſus himſelfe alſo, as Lord of ſoules, and having all judgement committed to him by the Father, joynes in putting forth the ſame act of Juſtification, which was merited in his blood, as we before obſerved. 2. Mr. Eyre hath been diſputing hitherto, that Gods Will not to puniſh is our Juſtification: That by which we are ſecured from wrath, diſcharged and acquitted from all ſin and wrath: yea, that it was a real diſcharge from condemnation: an actual and compleat non-imputation of ſin. But now he tells us, that the death of Chriſt is the adequate and immediate cauſe of our diſcharge from the Law, and freedome from puniſhment. I think (for my part) it is beyond mans ability to invent or utter more palpable contradictions. To be ſecured from wrath, and not ſecured: acquitted, and not acquitted: diſcharged and not diſcharged: what can be more contradictorious? or who can conceive what is that ſecurity, diſcharge and acquittance from all ſin, wrath, puniſhment, condemnation, which yet leaves a man under the power of a condemning Law, and without freedome from puniſhment, till Chriſt buy it with the price of his blood? 3. Our diſcharge from the Law, and freedome from puniſhment may be underſtood, either de jure, in taking off our obligation unto puniſhment; (and this cannot be the effect of the death of Chriſt; for Mr. Eyre doth over and over deny that the Elect did ever ſtand obliged by the judgement of God, to the ſuffering of puniſhment, as the Reader ſhall largely ſee below in the debate of John 3. 18. and Eph. 2. 3.) or it may be underſtood de facto, in the real and actual removal of all kindes and degrees of puniſhment: but neither can this be the effect of the death of Chriſt, by it ſelf, or with the former. The Purpoſe of Gods Will (ſaith Mr. Eyre, chap. 10. §. 10. pag. 108.) ſecures the perſon ſufficiently, and makes the Law of condemnation to be of no force, in regard of the real execution of it. So that what is left for the death of Chriſt to do, I muſt profeſſe I cannot imagine; ſeeing the act of our Juſtification, and our diſobligation from wrath, and our real impunity do all exiſt by vertue of another cauſe. But for further confirmation of this Propoſition, Mr. Eyre refers us to chap. 14. where we ſhall wait upon him, and ſay no more to it till we come thither: His third Propoſition is this.

Juſtification is taken for the declared ſentence of abſolution and§. 27. forgiveneſſe: and thus God is ſaid to juſtifie men, when he reveales and makes known to them his grace and kindneſſe within himſelfe.

Anſw. Underſtand (Reader) that when we ſay, Juſtification is a declared ſentence of abſolution, it is not meant of a private manifeſtation made to a particular perſon that himſelf is juſtified or pardoned: but of that publike declared Law of faith, namely, the Goſpel it ſelf, which is to be preached to every creature under heaven, He that believeth ſhall not periſh, but ſhall have everlaſting life. By which Promiſe, whoſoever believeth, ſhall receive remiſſion of ſin. 2. I wonder Mr. Eyre will not give us throughout his whole book, ſo much as one text, wherein Juſtification muſt ſignifie a manifeſtation or declaration made to a perſon that he is juſtified: and yet tell us here that Juſtification is ſo taken. If he mean, it is ſo taken in Gods language, let him ſhew where: if in mans, I will not diſpute with him how men take it. And as to that text, Gen. 41. 13. me he reſtored, but him he hanged, (which Mr. Eyre doth here inſtance in, to prove that things in Scripture are ſaid to be, when they are only manifeſted) if he had conſulted Junius, he would have told him, that the word (He) relates not to Joſeph, but to Pharaoh. Me Pharaoh reſtored, but him (that is, the Baker) he hanged.

The following part of this Chapter is ſpent in a diſcourſe concerning§. 28. the ſeveral times and wayes in which God hath manifeſted his Will of non-imputing ſin to his people. In which there is nothing of diſtinct controverſie, but what hath its proper place in the following debate, ſome where or other. And moſt of what he ſayes may be granted, without any advantage to his cauſe, or prejudice to th… truth; there being no act of grace which God puts forth in time, but declares ſomething of his gracious purpoſe, as every effect declares and argues its cauſe. And ſo our Juſti…cation it ſelfe declareth, that there was a purpoſe in God to juſtifie, becauſe he acteth nothing, but according to his purpoſe. I ſhall not therefore make any particular examination of this remnant of the chapter (though there be many things therein, which I can by no meanes conſent to) but ſet down in the following Propoſitions, how far I conſent to each of his. 1. I conſent, that God hath declared his immutable Will▪ not to impute ſin to believers▪ in his Word: and particularly in the Promiſe given to our firſt Parents. The ſeed of the woman ſhall break the S…rpents head. 2. That Gods giving of Chriſt to the death for our ſins, and his raiſing of him up for our Juſtification, doth manifeſt yet more of the ſame purpoſe▪ 3. That baptiſme, ſealing to a believer, (in act or habit) the remiſſion of ſins paſt, and entring him into a ſtate of remiſſion for the future, doth alſo further declare ſomething of the ſame purpoſe. 4. That the ſame purpoſe of God is ſometime or other in ſome meaſure manifeſted, to moſt true Chriſtians by the work of the Spirit. But whether every true Chriſtian hath a full aſſurance of this purpoſe of God towards himſelfe: or any, immediately upon their firſt believing (at leaſt in theſe dayes) I am in doubt. 5. And that our Juſtification in the great day of judgement, doth moſt fully, perfectly and finally declare the ſame purpoſe, as being the moſt perfect, compleat and formal juſtification of all. And ſo much for a diſcovery of the genius and iſſues of Mr. Eyres doctrine: I come next to a vindicaiton of my own.