Treatise of Civil Policy, Treatise · Question 9
QUEST. IX. Whether or no Soveraigntie is ſo from the people, that it remaineth in them in ſome part, ſo as they may in caſe of neceſſitie reſume it?
THe Prelate will have it Babyloniſh confuſion, that we are divided in opinion. Jeſuites (ſaith he) place all Soveraigntie in the communitie. Of the Sectaries; ſome warrant any one ſubject to make away his King, and that ſuch a worke is no leſſe to be rewarded then when one killeth a wolfe: Some ſay, this power is in the whole Communitie: ſome will have it in the collective body, not conveened by warrant or writ of Soveraignty, but when neceſſitie (which is often fancied) of reforming State and Church, calleth them together. Some in the Nobles, and Peeres, ſome in the three Eſtates aſſembled by the Kings writ, ſome▪ in the inferour Iudges.
I anſwer: If the Prelate were not a Ieſuite himſelfe, he would not bid his brethren take the mote out of their eye: but there is nothingBarclaius contr. Monarch. l. 4. c. 10. p. 268. ut hoſtes publicos non ſolù ab univerſo populo, ſed … ſingulis etiam impeti oaedi que jure optimo poſſe tota Antiquitas cenſuit. here ſaid but which Barclaius ſaid better before this Plagarius. To which I anſwer, We teach that any private man may kill a a Tyrant voyd of all title: and a great Royaliſt Barclaius ſaith ſo alſo. And if he have not the conſent of the people, he is an uſurper, for we know no externall lawfull calling that Kings have now, or their familie to the Crown, but only the call of the people; all other calls to us are now inviſible and unknown, and God would not command us to obey Kings, and leave us in the darke, that we ſhall not know who is the King: the Prelate placeth his lawfull calling to the Crown in ſuch an immediate, inviſible, and ſubtile act of omnipotencie, as that whereby God conferreth remiſſion of ſinnes by ſprinkling with water in baptiſme, and that whereby God directed Samuel to annoint Saul and David, not Eliab, nor any other brother. It is the Devill in the P. P. not any of us, who teach that any private man may kill a lawfull King, though tyrannous in his government. For the ſubject of Royall power, we affirme, the firſt, and ultimate,How the people is the ſubject of Soveraigntie. and native ſubject of all power is the Communitie, as reaſonable men naturally inclining to a ſocietie: but the ethicall and politicall ſubject, or the legall and poſitive receptacle of this power is various, according to the various conſtitutions of the policie. In Scotland and England, it is the three Eſtates of Parliament, in other Nations ſome other Iudges or Peeres of the Land. The Prelate had no more common ſenſe for him to object a confuſion of opinions to us, for this, then to all the Common-wealths on earth, becauſe all have not Parliaments, as Scotland hath; all have not Conſtables, and Officials, and Churchmen, Barons, Lords of Councell, Parliaments, &c. as England had. But the truth is, the Communitie orderly conveened, as it includeth all the Eſtates civill, have hand, and are to act in chooſing their Rulers: I ſee not what priviledge Nobles have above Commons in a Court of Parliament, by Gods law; but as they are Iudges, all are equally Iudges, and all make up one congregation of Gods. But the queſtion now is, if all power of governing (the Prelate, to make all the people Kings, ſaith, if all Soveraignty) be ſo in the people, that they retaine power to guard themſelves againſt Tyranny? And, if they reteine ſome of it, habitu, in habit, and in their power? I am not now unſeaſonably, according to the Prelates order, to diſpute of the power of lawfull defence againſt tyranny; but I lay down this maxime of Divinitie; Tyranny being a worke of Sathan, is not from God, becauſe ſinne either habituall or actuall, is not from God, the power that is, muſt be from God; the Magiſtrate as Magiſtrate, is good, in nature of office, and the intrinſecall end of his office, Rom. 13. 4. for he is the Miniſter of God for thy good; and therefore a power ethicall, politick, or morall, to oppreſſe, is not from God, and is not a power, but a licentious deviation of a power, and is no more from God, but from ſinfull nature, and the old ſerpent, then a licenſe to ſinne: God in Chriſt giveth pardons of ſinne; but the Pope, not God, giveth diſpenſations to ſinne. 2. To this adde, If for nature to defend it ſelfe be lawfull, no Communitie, without ſin, hath power to alienate and give away this power: for as no power given to man to murther his brother, is of God, ſo no power to ſuffer his brother to be murthered, is of God; and no power to ſuffer himſelfe (à fortiori) far leſſe can be from God. Here I ſpeake not of phyſicall power, for if free will be the creature of God, a phyſicall power to acts which in relation to Gods law are ſinfull, muſt be from God.
But I now follow the P. Prelate. Some of the adverſaries, as Buchanan, Sac. Reg. Maj. The ſacred and royall prerogative of Kings c. 9. p. 101. 102.ſay that the Parliament hath no power to make a law, but only a foreign without the approbation of the Communitie. Others, as the the Obſervator, ſay, that the right of the Gentry and Communalty is intirely in the Knights and Burgeſſes of the Houſe of Commons, and will have their Orders irrevocable. If then the commonStollen from Barclaius. people cannot reſume their power, and oppoſe the Parliament, how can Tables and Parliaments reſume their power, and reſiſt the King?
Anſw. The ignorant man ſhould have thanked Barclaius for this Argument, and yet Barclaius need not thanke him, for it hath not the nerves that Barclaius gave it. But I anſwer, 1. if the Parliament ſhould have been corrupted by fair hopes (as in our age we have ſeene the like) the people did well to reſiſt the Prelates obtruding the Maſſe Booke, when the Lords of the Counſell preſſed it againſt all Law of God and man, upon the Kingdome of Scotland, and therefore it is denyed that the Acts of Parliament are irrevocable, the obſervator ſaid they were irrevocable by the King, he being but one man, the P. Prelate wrongeth him, for he ſaid onelyonly,The power of Parliaments. they have the power of a Law, and the King is obliged to confent, by his Royall Office to all good Lawes, and neither King nor people may oppoſe them. Buchanan ſaid Acts of Parliament are not Lawes obliging the people till they be promulgated, and the peoples ſilence when they are promulgated is their approbation, and maketh them obligatory Lawes to them; but if the people ſpeak againſt unjuſt Lawes, they are not Lawes at all, and Buchannan knew the power of the Scottiſh Parliament, better then this ignorant Statiſt. 2. There is not like reaſon to grant ſo much to the King, as to Parliaments, becauſe certainly Parliaments who make Kings under God, or above any one man, and they muſt have more authority and wiſedome then any one King, except Solomon (as baſe flatterersThe Parliament hath more power then the King. ſay) ſhould returne to the thrones of the earth. And as the power to make juſt Lawes is all in the Parliament, only the people have power to reſiſt tyrannicall Lawes, the power of all the Parliament was never given to the King, by God, the Parliament are as eſſentially Iudges as the King, and therefore the Kings deed may well be revoked, becauſe he acteth nothing as King; but united with his great or leſſer Councell, no more then the eye can ſee, being ſeparated from the body. The Peeres and Members of Parliament have more then the King, becauſe they have both their owne power, being parts and ſpeciall Members of the people, and alſo they have their high places in Parliament, either from the peoples expreſſe, or tacite conſent. 3. We allow no Arbitrary power to the Parliament, becauſe their juſt Lawes are irrevocable, for the irrevocable power of making juſt Lawes doth argue a legall, not an irreovocable Arbitrary power; nor is there any arbitrary power in the people, or in any mortall man, but of the Covenant betwixt King and people hereafter.
P. Prelate, If Soveraigne power be habitually in the community ſo, C. 10. pag. 105.as they may reſume it at their pleaſure, then nothing is given to the King but an empty title, for at the ſame inſtant he receiveth Empire and Soveraignty, and layeth downe the power to rule or determine in matters which concerne either private or publick good, and ſo he is both a King and a Subject. Anſ. This naked conſequence the Prelate ſayeth, and proveth not, and we deny it, and give this reaſon, the King receiveth Royall power with the States to make good Lawes, and 2. power by his royalty to execute thoſe Lawes, and this power the community hath devolved in the hands of the King, and States of Parliament, but the community keepeth to themſelves a power to reſiſt tyranny, and to coerce it, and eatenus in ſo far is Saul ſubject, that David is not to compeare before him, nor to lay downe Goliahes ſword, nor disband his Army of defence, though the King ſhould command him ſo to doe.
P. Prelate. By all Polititians, Kings, and enferiour MagiſtratesC. 16. 105, 106, 107. are differenced by their different ſpecifice entity, but by this they are not differenced; nay a Magiſtrate is in a better condition then a King, for the Magiſtrate is to judge by a knowne Statute and Law, and cannot be cenſured and puniſhed but by Law. But the King is cenſurable, yea diſabled by the multitude, yea the baſeſt of ſubjects may cite, and convent the King, before the underived Majeſty of the community, and he may be judged by the Arbitrary Law thut is in the cloſet of their heart, not only for reall miſdemeanour, but for fancied jealouſies—It will be ſaid, good Kings are in no danger—the contrary appeareth this day, and ordinarily the beſt are in greateſt danger; no Government except Plato'es Republick wanteth incommodities, ſubtile ſpirits may make them, apprehend them. The poore people bewitched, follow Abſolom in his treaſon, they ſtrike not at Royalty at firſt, but labour to make the Prince, naked of the good counſell of great Stateſmen, &c.
Anſ. Whether the King and the under Magiſtrate differ eſſentially,Iudges and Kings differ. we ſhall ſee. The P. Prelate ſaith all Polititians grant it, but he ſaith untruth; he bringeth Moſes, and the Iudges, their power to prove the power of Kings; and ſo either the Iudges of Iſrael and the Kings differ not eſſentially, or then the Prelate muſt correct the ſpirit of God tearming one booke of Scripture foreign Kings, and another foreign Iudges, and make the booke of Kings the booke of Iudges. 2. The Magiſtrates condition is not better then the Kings, becauſe the Magiſtrate is to judge by an knowne Statute and Law, and the King not ſo. God moulded the firſt King, Deut. 17. 18. when he ſitteth judging on his Throne, to looke to a written Coppy of the Law of God, as his rule. Now a power to follow Gods Law is better then a power to follow mans ſinfull will: ſo the Prelate putteth the King in a worſe condition then the Magiſtrate, not we, who will have the King to judge according to juſt ſtatutes and lawes. 3. Whether the King be cenſurable and depoſable by the multitude, he cannot determine out of our writings. 4. The communities law is the law of nature, not their arbitrary luſt. 5. The Prelates treaſonable raylings, I cannot follow; he firſt ſaith, that we agree not ten of us to a poſitive faith, and that our faith is negative, but his faith is Privative, Popiſh, Socinian, Arminian, Pelagian and worſe, for he was once of that ſame faith that we are of. 2. Our Confeſſion of Faith is poſitive, as the confeſſion of all the reformed Churches, but I judge he thinketh the Proteſtant Faith of all the reformed Churches but negative. 3. The incommodities of Government before our reformation were not fancied, but printed by Authority, all the body of Popery was printed, and avowed as the Doctrine of the Church of Scotland and England, as the learned Author, and my much reſpected brother evidenceth in his Ludenſium, foreign, The Canterburian ſelfe conviction. 4. The Parliament of England was never yet found guilty of Treaſon. 5. The good Counſellers of great Stateſ-men, that Parliaments of both Kingdomes would take from the Kings Majeſty, are a faction of perjured Papiſts, Prelates, Ieſuites, Iriſh cut-throates, Strafords, and Apoſtate ſubverters of all Lawes divine, humane, of God, of Church, of State.
P. Prelate. In whom ſo ever this power of Government be, it is the Cap. …5. p. 147 148.onelyonly remedy to ſupply all defects, and to ſet right what ever is diſjoynted in Church and State, and the ſubject of this ſuper-intending power muſt be free from all errour in Iudgement and Practice, and ſo we have a Pope in temporalibus; and if the Parliament erre, the people muſt take order with them, elſe God hath left Church and State remedileſſe. Anſ. This is ſtollen from Barolaius alſo; 1. but the ſame Barclaius Barclaius contra Monarchum. l. 5. c. 12. Idem. l. 3 c. ult pag. 2, 3.ſaith, Si Rex regnum ſuum alien… ditioni manciparit, regno cadit. If the King ſhall ſell his Kingdome, or inſlave it to a forraigne power, he falleth from all right to his Kingdome: but who ſhall execute any ſuch Law againſt him, not the people, not the Peeres, not the Parliament; for this Mancipium ventris & aulae, this ſlave ſaith, p. 147. I know no power in any to puniſh or curbe Soveraignty, but in Almighty God. 2. We ſee no ſuper-intending power on earth in King or people infallible, nor is the laſt power of taking order with a Prince who inſlaveth his Kingdome to a forraigne powerPeople may reſume their power in ſome caſes, not becauſe they are infallable, but becauſe they cannot ſo ea…ily erre as one man. placed by us in the people, becauſe they cannot erre; Court flatterer… ▪ who teach that the will of the Prince is the meaſure of all right and wrong, of Law and no Law; and above all Law muſt hold that the King is a temporall Pope, both in Eccleſiaſticall and Civill matters; but becauſe they cannot ſo readily deſtroy themſelves, (the law of Nature having given to them a contrary internall principle of ſelfe preſervation) as a Tyrant who doth care for himſelfe, and not for the people. 3. And becauſe Extremis morbis extrema remedia in an extraordinary exigent, when Achab and Iezabell did undoe the Church of God, and Tyrannize▪over both the bodies and conſciences of Prieſt, Prophet, and people, Elias procured the convention of the States, and Elias with the peoples helpe killed all Baals Prieſts, the King looking on, and no queſtion, againſt his heart. In this caſe I thinke its more then evident that the people reſumed their power. 4. We teach not that people ſhould ſupply all defects in Government, nor that they ſhould uſe their power when any thing is done amiſſe by the King, no more then the King is to cut off the whole people of God, when they refuſe an Idolatrous ſervice obtruded upon them againſt all Law; the people is to ſuffer much before they reſume their power, but this Court ſlave will have the people to doe what he did not himſelfe, for when King and Parliament ſummoned him, was he not obliged to appeare? Non-compearance when lawfull, royall, and Parliamentory power ſummoneth, is no leſſe reſiſtance, then taking of Forts and Caſtles.
P. Prelate. Then this ſuper-intending power in people, may call a King to accompt, and puniſh him for any miſdemeanour, or act of injuſtice. Why might not the people of Iſraels Peeres, or Sanedrin have convented David before them, judged and puniſhed him for his▪ Adultery with Bathſheba, and his murther of Uriah; but it is holden by all, that Tyranny ſhould be an intended univerſall, totall, manifeſt deſtruction of the whole Common-wealth, which cannot fall in the thoughts of any but a mad man. What is recorded in the Story of Nero his wiſh in this kind, may be rather judged the expresſion of tranſported pasſion, then a fixed reſolution.
Anſ. The P. Prelate contrary to the ſcope of his booke, which is all for the ſubject and ſeat of Soveraigne power, againſt all order hath plunged himſelfe in the deep of Defenſive armes, and yet hath no new thing. 1. Our law of Scotland will warrant any ſubject, if the King take from him his heritage, or invade his poſſeſſion againſt Law, to reſiſt the invaders, and to ſummon the Kings intruders before the Lords of Seſſion for that act of injuſtice: Is this againſt Gods Word, or Conſcience? 2. The Sancdrim did not puniſh David; Ergo, it is not lawfull to challenge a King for any one act of injuſtice: from the practice of the Sanedrim, to conclude a thing lawfull or unlawfull, is logick; we may reſiſt. 3. By the P. Prelates doctrine, the law might not put Bathſhebah to death, nor yet Joab the neereſt agent of the murtheringThat the Sanedrim puniſhed not David, Bathſheha, Ioab, proveth nothing in law, as a fact or non fact is not law. of innocent Ʋriah, becauſe Bathſhebaes adulterie was the Kings adulterie, ſhe did it in obedience to King David: Joabs murther was Royall murther, as the murther of all the Cavaliers; for he had the Kings hand-writing for it. Murther is Murther, and the murtherer is to dye, though the King by a ſecret Let alone, a private and illegall warrant command it. Ergo, the Sanedrim might have taken Bathſhebaes life, and Joabs head alſo: and conſequently the Parliament of England, if they be Judges (as I conceive God and the Law of that ancient and renowned Kingdome maketh them) may take the head of many Joabs and Jermines, for murther; …or the command of a King cannot legitimate murther. 4. David himſelfe, as King, ſpeaketh more for us then for the Prelate, 2 Sam. 12. 7. And Davids anger was greatly kindled againſt the man, (the man was himſelfe, v. 7. Thou art the man) and he ſaid to Nathan, as the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this, ſhall ſurely dye. 5. Every act of injuſtice doth not un-King a Prince before God, as every act of uncleanneſſe doth not make a wife no wife before God. 6. The Prelate excuſeth Nero, and would not have him reſiſted, if all Rome were one neck, that he might cut it off with one ſtroke (I read it of Caligula; If the Prelate ſee more in Hiſtorie then I doe, I yield.) 7. He ſaith, the thoughts of totall everſion of a Kingdome, muſt only fall on a mad man. The King of Britaine was not mad, when he declared the Scots Traytors, becauſe they reſiſted the ſervice of the Maſſe; and raiſed an Army of Prelaticall cut-throats to deſtroy them, if all the Kingdome ſhould reſiſt Idolatry, (as all are obliged.) The King ſleeped upon this Prelaticall reſolution many moneths: paſſions in ſervor have not a dayes raigne upon a man. And this was not ſo cleare as the ſun, but it was as cleare as written printed Proclamations, and the preſſing of Souldiers, and the viſible marching of Cut-throats, and the blocking of Scotland up by ſea and land could be viſible to men having five ſenſes.
Covaruv. a▪ great Lawyer, ſaith, 1. that all Civill power is penes (a) Covarruvias, tom. 2. pract. queſt.▪ c. 1. n. 2. 3. 4.remp. in the hands of the Common-wealth. 1. Becauſe Nature hath given to man to be a ſociall creature, and impoſſible he can preſerve himſelfe in a ſocietie, except he being in communitie, transforme his power to an head. 2. He ſaith; Hujus vero civilis ſocietatis & reſp. rector ab alio quam ab ipſamet repub. conſtitui non poteſt juſtè & abſ que Tyrannide. Siquidem ab ipſo Deo conſtitutus non eſt, …ec electus cuilibet civili ſocietati immediatè Rex aut Princeps. Ariſt. polit. 3. c. 10. ſaith, It is better that Kings got by election then by birth; becauſe Kingdomes by ſucceſſion are verè regia, truly Kingly: theſe by birth are more Tyrannicall, maſterly, and proper to Barbarous Nations. And Covarruvias, tom. 2. pract. queſt. de juriſd. Caſtellan. Reip. c. 1. n. 4. faith, Hereditary Kings are alſo made hereditary by the tacit conſent of the people, and ſo by law and conſuetude.
Spalato. Let us grant (ſaith he) that a ſocietie ſhall refuſe to have a Governour over them, ſhall they be for that free? in no ſort: butSpalato de rep. eccleſ. l. 6. c. 2. n. 32. there be many wayes by which a people may be compelled to admit a governour; for then no man might rule over a Communitie againſt their will. But nature hath otherwiſe diſpoſed, ut quod ſinguli nollent, univerſi vellent, that which every one will not have, a Commnnitie naturally deſireth. And the P. Prelate ſaith, God is no leſſe the authorSa. ſa. maj. The ſacred and royall prerogative of Kings c. 7. p. 82, 83, 84. of Order, then he is the author of Being; for the Lord who createth all, conſerveth all; and without government all humane ſocieties ſhould be diſſolved and goe to ruine: Then government muſt be naturall, and not depend upon a voluntary & arbitrary conſtitution of men. In nature, the liveles creatures inferior give a tacit conſent & ſilent obedience to their ſuperiour, and the ſuperiour have a powerfull influence on the inferiour. In the ſubordination of creatures, we aſcend from one ſuperior to another, till at laſt we come to one ſupreme, which by the way pleadeth for the excellencie of Monarchie. Amongſt Angels there is an order: how can it then be ſuppoſed that God hath left it to the ſimple conſent of man to eſtabliſh a heraldrie of ſub & ſupra, of one above another, which neither nature nor the Goſpel doth warrant? To leave it thus arbitrary, that upon this ſuppoſed principle, Mankind may be without government at all, is vain; which paradox cannot be maintained. In nature God hath eſtabliſhed a ſuperiority inherent in ſuperior creatures, which is no ways derived from the inferior by communication, in what proportion it will, and reſumeable upon ſuch exigents as the inferior liſteth: therefore neither hath God left to the multitude, the communitie, the collective, the repreſentative or virtuall body, to derive from it ſelfe, and communicate ſ…veraigntie, whether in one or few, or more, in that meaſure and proportion pleaſeth them, which they reſume at pleaſure.
Anſw. 1. To anſwer Spalato: No ſocietie hath liberty to be without all government, for God hath given to every ſocietie (ſaith aCovarr. to. 4 pract. queſt. c. 1. …. 2.Covarruvias) a faculty of preſerving themſelves, and warding off violence and injuries; and this they could not doe, except they gave their power to one or many Rulers. But all that the Prelate buildeth on this falſe ſuppoſition, which is his fiction and calumnie, not our doctrine, to wit, that it is voluntary to man to be without all government, becauſe it is voluntarie to them to give away their power to on… Government how both naturall, and alſo voluntary.or moc Rulers, is a meere non-conſequence. 1. We teach that Government is naturall, not voluntary; but the way and manner of Government is voluntarie: All ſocieties ſhould be quickly ruined, if there were no Government: but it followeth not therefore, God hath made ſome Kings, and that immediately, without the interveening conſent of the people, and ergo, it is not arbitrary to the people to chooſe one ſupreme Ruler, and to erect a Monarchie, or to chooſe moe Rulers, and to erect an Ariſtocracie. It followeth no way. It is naturall to men to expreſſe their minde by humane voyces; Is not ſpeaking of this or that language, Greeke rather then Latine, (as Ariſtotle ſaith) foreign by humane inſtitution? It is naturall for men to eat; ergo, election of this or that meat is not in their choiſe. What reaſon is in this conſequence? and ſo its a poore conſequence alſo; Power of Soveraigntie is in the people naturally; ergo it is not in their power to give it out in that meaſure that pleaſeth them, and to reſume it at pleaſure. It followeth no way. Becauſe the inherencie of Soveraigntie is naturall, and not arbitary, ergo, the alienation and giving out of the power to one, not to three, thus much, not thus much, conditionally, not abſolutely and irrevocably, muſt be alſo arbitrary. It is as if you ſhould ſay, a father having ſix children, naturally loveth them all, ergo, he hath not freedome of will in expreſſing his affection to give ſo much of his goods to this ſonne, and that conditionally, if he uſe theſe goods well; and not more or leſſe of his goods, at his pleaſure. 2. There is a naturall ſubordination in nature, in creatures ſuperior and inferior, without any freedomeThere is a ſubordination of creatures naturall, and goverment muſt be naturall, and yet this or that forme is voluntary. of election: the earth made not the heavens more excellent then the earth, and the earth by no freedome of will made the heavens ſuperior in excellencie to it ſelfe. Man gave no ſuperioritie of excellencie to Angels above himſelfe: the Creator of all Beings did both immediately without freedome of election in the creature, create the being of all creatures, and their eſſentiall degrees of ſuperiority and inferiority, but God created not Saul by nature King over Iſrael; nor is David by the act of creation, by which he is made a man, created alſo a King over Iſrael; for then David ſhould from the wombe and by nature be a King, and not by Gods free gift. Here both the free gift of God, and the free conſent of the people interveene: indeed God made the office and royaltie of a King above the dignitie of the people; but God by the interveening conſent of the people maketh David a King, not Eliab; and the people maketh a covenant at Davids inauguration, that David ſhall have ſo much power, to wit, power to be a Father, not power to be a Tyrant; power to fight for the people, but no power to waſte and deſtroy them. The inferior creatures in nature give no power to the ſuperiour, and therefore they cannot give in ſuch a proportion power. The deniall of the poſitive degree, is a deniall of the comparative and ſuperlative, and ſo they cannot reſume any power: But the deſigning of ſuch a man, or ſuch men to be Kings or Rulers, is a rationall voluntary action, not an action of nature, ſuch as is Gods act of creating an Angell a nobler creature then a man, and the creating of man a more excellent creature then a beaſt: and for this cauſe the argument is vaine and fooliſh: for inferior creatures are inferior to the more noble and ſuperior by nature, not by voluntary deſignation, or, as Royaliſts ſay, by naked approbation, which yet muſt be an arbitrary and voluntary action. 3. The P. Prelate commendeth order, while we come to the moſt ſupreme: hence he commendeth Monarchie above all governments, becauſe it is Gods government. I am not againſt it, that Monarchie well tempered is the beſt government, though the queſtion to me is moſt problematick; but becauſe God is a Monarch, who cannot erre or deny himſelfe, therefore that ſinfull Man be a Monarch, is miſerable logick: and he muſt argue ſolidly forſooth by this, becauſe there is order (as he ſaith) amongſt Angels, will he make a Monarch and a King-Angell? His argument, if it have any weight in it, driveth at that, even that there be crowned Kings amongſt the Angels.