Treatise of Civil Policy, Treatise · Question 29

Treatise of Civil Policy · Treatise · Question 29

p. 265QUEST. XXIX. Whether, in the caſe of Defenſive warre, the diſtinction of the perſon of the King, as a man, who can commit acts of hoſtile Tyrannie againſt his Subjects: and of the Office and Royall power that he hath from God, and the People, as a King; can have place?

BEfore I can proceed to other Scripture-proofes for the lawfulneſſeThe Kings perſon as a man, in concreto and as a King and his office, in abſtracto, are very different in this diſpute. of Reſiſtance; this Diſtinction, rejected by Royaliſts, muſt be cleered. This is an evident and ſenſible diſtinction: The King in concreto, the Man who is King; And the King in abſtracto, the Royall office of the King. The ground of this diſtinction we deſire to be conſidered from, Rom. 13. we affirme with Buchanan, that Paul, Rom. 13, ſpeaketh of the office and duty of good Magiſtrates, and that the text ſpeaketh nothing of an abſolute King, nothing of a Tyrant; and the Royaliſts diſtinguiſh where the Law diſtinguiſheth not, againſt the Law, l. pret. 10. gl. Bart. de pub. in Rem. and therefore we move the queſtion here, Whether or no to reſiſt the illegall and Tyrannicall will of the man, who is King, be to reſiſt the King, and the ordinance of God, we ſay no: Nor doe we deny the King, abuſing his power in unjuſt acts, to remaine King, and the Miniſter of God, whoſe perſon for his royall office, and his Royall Office both are to be honoured, reverenced and obeyed. God forbid that we ſhould doe ſo as the ſonnes of Belial, imputing to us the doctrine of Anabaptiſts, and the doctrine falſely imputed to Wicliffe, That Dominion is founded upon ſupernaturall grace, and that a Magiſtrate being in the ſtate of mortall ſin, cannot be a lawfull Magiſtrate▪ we teach no ſuch thing. The P. Prelate ſheweth us his ſympathy with Papiſts, and that he buildeth the Monuments and Sepulchres of the ſlaine and murthered Prophets▪ when he refuſing to open his mouth in the Gates for the righteous, profeſſeth he will not purge the Witneſſes of Chriſt, the Waldenſes and Wicliffe, and Huſſe ofSacr. ſanc. Reg. Mai. c. 1. pag. 2. theſe notes of diſloyalty, but that theſe acts proceeding from this roote of bitterneſſe, the abuſed power of a King ſhould be acknowledged with obedience active or paſſive, in theſe unjuſt acts, we deny.

1. Aſſert. It is evident from Rom. 13. That all ſubjection and p. 266obedience to higher powers commanded there is ſubjection to the power and office of the Magiſtrate in abſtracto, or (which is all one) to the perſon uſing the power lawfully, and that no ſubjection is due by that text, or any Word of God, to the abuſed and Tyrannicall power of the King, which I evince from the Text, and from other Scriptures. 1. Becauſe the Text ſaith, Let every ſoule be ſubject to the higher powers. But no powers commanding things unlawfull, and killing the innocent people of God, can be foreign higher powers, but in that lower powers. 1. He that commandeth not what God commandeth, and puniſheth and killeth where God is perſonally and immediatly preſent, would neither command nor puniſh, is not in theſe acts to be ſubjected unto, and obeyed as a ſuperiour power, though in habit he may remaine a ſuperiour power, for all habituall, all actuall ſuperiority is a formall participation of the power of the moſt high. 2. Arniſaeus well ſaith, ThatArniſae. de authoritat. Princip. c. 4. n. n. pag. 96. Every one that commandeth obedience active or paſſive unjuſtly, is eatenus, no higher power. of Ariſtotle muſt be true, It is againſt nature, that better and worthier men ſhould be in ſubjection to unworthier, and more wicked men: but in this when Magiſtrates command wickedneſſe, and killeth the innocent, the non-obeyers eatenus in ſo far, are worthier the commanders (whatever they be in habite and in office) actually, or in theſe wicked acts are unworthier and inferiour, and the nonobeyers are in that worthier, as being zealous adherents to Gods Command, and not to mans will. I deſire not to be miſtaken, if we ſpeake of habituall excellency, godly and holy men as the Witneſſes of Chriſt in things lawfull, are to obey wicked and Infidell Kings and Emperours, but in that theſe wicked Kings have an excellencyArniſaeus 16. Laertius, l. 3. in Plato. in reſpect of office above them; but when they command things unlawfull, and kill the innocent, They doe it not by vertue of any office, and ſo in that they are not higher powers, but lower and weak ones. Laertius doth explain Ariſtotle well, who defineth a Tyrant by this, That he commandeth his ſubjects by violence, and Arniſaeus The perſon or the man who is the Magiſtrate, may lawfully be reſiſted, and the man as uſing the power lawfully, or the office can not be reſiſted.condemneth Laertius for this, Becauſe one Tyrannicall action doth no more conſtitute a Tyrant, then one unjuſt action doth conſtitute an unjuſt man. But he may condemne (as he doth indeed) for this alſo Covarruvias pract. queſt. c. 1. and Vaſquez Illuſtr. queſt. l. 1. c. 47. nu. 1. 12. for this is eſſentiall to a Tyrant, to command and rule by violence. If a lawfull Prince doe one, or more acts of a Tyrant, he is not a Tyrant for that, yet his action in that is Tyrannicall, and he doth not that as a King, but in that act as a ſinfull man, having ſomething p. 267of Tyrannie in him. 2. The Powers, Rom. 13. 1. that are, ordained of God, as their author and efficient; But Kings commanding unjuſt things, and killing the innocent, in theſe acts, are but men, and ſinfull men; and the power by which they doe theſe acts, a ſinfull and an uſurped power, and ſo far they are not powers ordained of God, according to his revealed Will, which muſt rule us. Now the authoritie and officiall power, in abſtracto, is ordained of God, as the Text ſaith, and other Scriptures doe evidence. And this Polititians doe cleare, while they diſtinguiſh betwixt jus Perſonae, and jus Coronae, the power of the Perſon, and the power of the Crown and Royall office. They muſt then be two different things. 3. He that reſiſteth the power, that is, the officiall power, and the King, as King, and commanding in the Lord, reſiſteth the Ordinance of God, and Gods lawfull conſtitution, v. 2. But he who reſiſteth the Man, who is the King, commanding that which is againſt God, and killing the innocent; reſiſteth no ordinance of God, but an ordinance of Sin and Sathan: for a man commanding unjuſtly, and ruling Tyrannically, hath, in that, no power from God. 4. They that reſiſt the power and Royall office of the King in things juſt and right, ſhall receive to themſelves damnation, ver. 3. but they that reſiſt, that is, refuſe, for Conſcience, to obey the man who is the King, and chooſe to obey God rather then men, as all the Martyrs did, ſhall receive to themſelves ſalvation. And the 80 valiant men, the Prieſts, who uſed bodily violence againſt King Ʋzzahs perſon, and thruſt him out of the houſe of the Lord, from offering incenſe to the Lord, which belonged to the Prieſt only: received not damnation to themſelves, but ſalvation in doing Gods will, and in reſiſting the Kings wicked will.

Arg. 5. The lawfull Ruler, as a Ruler, and in reſpect of his office,Arg. …. is not to be reſiſted, becauſe he is not a terrour to good workes, but to evill; and no man who doth Good, is to be afraid of the Office, or the Power, but to expect praiſe, and a reward of the ſame, v. 3. But the man who is a King, may command an idolatrous and ſuperſtitious Worſhip, ſend an Army of Cut-throats againſt them, becauſe they refuſe that Worſhip: and may reward Papiſts, Prelates, and other corrupt men, and may advance them to places of State and Honour, becauſe they kneele to a Tree-Altar, pray to the Eaſt, adore the letters and ſound of the word [Jeſus] teach and write Arminianiſme: And may impriſon, deprive, confine, cut the eares, and▪ p. 268rip the noſes, and burne the faces of thoſe who ſpeake, and preach▪ and write the truth of God: and may ſend Armies of Cut-throats, Iriſh Rebels, and other Papiſts, and malignant Atheiſts, to deſtroy and murther the Iudges of the Land, and innocent defenders of the Reformed Religion, &c. The Man (I ſay) in theſe acts, is a terrour to Good workes, an incouragement to Evill: And thoſe that doe Good, are to be afraid of the King, and to expect no praiſe, but puniſhment and vexation from him; Ergo, this reaſon in the Text will prove that the Man, who is the King, in ſo far as he doth theſe things that are againſt his office, may be reſiſted; and that in theſe we are not to be ſubject, but only we are to be ſubject to his power and Royall authoririe, in abſtracto, in ſo farre as according to his office, he is not a terrour to good workes, but to evill. 6. The lawfull Ruler is the miniſter of God, or the ſervant of God, for Good to the Commonwealth: And to reſiſt the ſervant in that wherein he is a ſervant, and uſing the power that he hath from his Maſter, is to reſiſt the Lord his Maſter, v. 4. But the man who is the King, commanding unjuſt things, and killing the innocent; in theſe acts, is not the miniſter of God, for the Good of the Commonwealth: he ſerveth himſelfe, and Papiſts and Prelates, for the deſtruction of Religion, Lawes and Commonwealth: therefore the Man may be reſiſted, by this Text, when the office and power cannot be reſiſted. 7. The Ruler, as the Ruler, and the nature and intrinſecall end of the office is, that he beare Gods ſword, as an avenger to execute wrath on him that doth evill, v. 4. and ſo cannot be reſiſted without ſinne. But the man who is the Ruler, and commandeth things unlawfull, and killeth the innocent; carieth the Papiſts and Prelates ſword, to execute, not the righteous judgement of the Lord, upon the ill-doer; but his own private revenge, upon him that doth well: Ergo, the Man may be reſiſted, the Office may not be reſiſted: and they muſt be two different things. 8. We muſt needs be ſubject to the Royall office, for conſcience, v. 5. by reaſon of the fifth Commandement. But we muſt not needs be ſubject to the man who is King, if he command things unlawfull: for D. Ferne warranteth us to reſiſt, if the Ruler invade us ſodainly; 2. Without colour of Law or Reaſon; 3. Ʋnavoydably. And Winzetus, and Barclay, and Grotius, as before I cited, give us leave to reſiſt a King, turning a cruell Tyrant. But Paul, Rom. 13. forbiddeth us to reſiſt the Power, in Abſtracto; Ergo, it muſt be the Man, in concreto, that we muſt reſiſt. 9. Thoſe p. 269we may not reſiſt, to whom we owe tribute, as a reward of the onerous worke, on which they, as Miniſters of God, doe attend continually. But we owe not tribute to the King as a man; for then ſhould we be addebted tribute to all men: but as a King, to whom the wages of tribute is due, as to a Princely workman, a King as a King: ergo, the Man and the King are different. 10. We owe fear and honour as due, to be rendred to the man who is King, becauſe he is a King, not becauſe he is a man; for it is the higheſt feare and honour due to any mortall man, which is due to the King, as King. 11. The Man, and the inferiour Judge are different: and we cannot, by this Text, reſiſt the inferiour Iudge, as a Iudge, but we reſiſt the ordinance of God, as the Text proveth. But Cavaliers reſiſt the inferior Iudges as men, and have killed divers members of both Houſes of Parliament: but they will not ſay, that they killed them as Judges, but as Rebels. If therefore to be a Rebell, as a wicked Man, and to be a Iudge, are differenced thus: then, to be a Man, and to commit ſome acts of Tyrannie; and to be the ſupreme Iudge and King, are two different things. 12. Mr. Knox, Hiſt. of Scotland, l. 2.Pag. 141. The Congregation, in a letter to the Nobilitie, ſay: There is great difference betwixt the Authoritie, which is Gods Ordinance, and the Perſons of thoſe who are placed in authoritie. The Authoritie, and Gods ordinances can never doe wrong; for it commandeth that Vice and wicked men be puniſhed, and Vertue, with vertuous men and juſt. be maintained: But the corrupt Perſon placed in this Authoritie, may offend, and moſt commonly doe contrary to this Authoritie: and is then the corruption of Man to be followed, by reaſon that it is clothed with the name of Authoritie? And they give inſtance in Pharaoh and Saul, who were lawfall Kings, and yet corrupt Men. And certainly, the Man, and the Divine authoritie, differ as the Subject and the Accident; as that which is under a Law, and can offend God; and that which is neither capable of Law, nor ſinne. 13. The King, as King, is a juſt creature, and by office a living and breathing Law: His Will, as he is King, is nothing but a juſt Law: But the King, as a ſinfull man, is not a juſt creature, but one who can ſinne, and play the Tyrant: and his Will, as a private ſinfull man, is a private Will, and may be reſiſted. So the Law ſaith, The King, as King, can doe no wrong: but the King, as a Man, may doe a wrong. While as then the Parliaments of both Kingdomes reſiſt the Kings private will, as a Man, and fight againſt his illegall Cut-throats, ſent out by him, p. 270to deſtroy his native ſubjects, they fight for him as a King, and obey his publick Legall will, which is his Royall will, de jure, and while he is abſent from his Parliaments as a man, he is Legally and in his Law-Power preſent, and ſo the Parliaments are as Legall, as if he were perſonally preſent with them.

Let me anſwer Royaliſts. The P. Prelate ſaith it is Solomons Sac. ſan…. mac. 2 pag 28. pag. 30. 31.word, By me Kings raign. Kings in concreto, with their Soveraignty, he ſaith not, By me Royalty or Soveraignty raigneth. And elſewhere he ſaith, that Barclay ſaith, Paul writing to the Romans, keepeth the Roman uſuall diction in this, who expreſſe by Powers in abſtracto, the perſons authorized by Power, and it is the ſoriptures Dialect; By him were created thrones, Dominions, Principalities, that is Angels, to ſay Angels, in abſtracto, were created, 2 Pet. 2. 10. They ſpeak ill of dignities, Arniſaen de poteſt. prin. c. 2. 11. 17.Iud. 8. diſpiſe dominion. That is, they ſpeak ill of Cajus, Caligula, Nero; our Levites rail againſt the Lords Anoynted, the beſt of Kings in the world. Nero, Rom. 13. 4. in concreto beareth not the ſword in vain. Arniſaeus ſaith it better then the Prelate, (he is a witleſſe theef. Rom. 13. 4. the Royall Power in abſtracto, doth not bear the ſword, but the Perſon, not the Power but the Prince himſelf beareth the ſword. And the Prelate poor man following Doctor Fern pag. 3. ſec. 5. pag. 30. Royaliſts reaſons that to reſiſt the man or perſon is to reſiſt the King, office or ordinance of God.ſaith, Its abſurd to purſue the Kings Perſon with a canon-bullet at Edge-hill, and preſerve his authority at London, or elſewhere. So ſaith Fern 16. ſect. 10. pag. 64. The concret Powers here are purpoſed as objects of our obedience, which cannot be directed, but upon power in ſome perſon, for it is ſaid foreign, the powers that are, are of God, now Power cannot be foreign exiſtent, but in ſome perſon; and Pag. 69. ſaith Fern, can Power in the abſtract have praiſe? Or is tribute payed to the Power in the abſtract. Yea the Power is the reaſon why we yeeld obedience to the perſon, &c. and the Prelate hath as much learning as to coppy out of Fern, and Barclay, Arniſeus, and others theſe words and the like, but hath not wit to adde the ſinewes of theſe Authors reaſon, and with all this he can in his Preface call it his own, and provoke any to anſwer him if they dare, whereas while I anſwer this excommunicated Pamphletter.

I anſwer theſe learned Authors, from which he ſtealeth all he hath, and yet he muſt perſwade the King, he is the onelyonly man can defend his Majeſties Cauſe, and the importunity, forſooth, of friends extorted this peece, as if it were a fault, that this Delphick Oracle (giving out railings, and lies for reſponſes) ſhould be ſilent. 2. Not p. 271we onelyonly, but the Holy Ghoſt, in terminis, hath this diſtinction, Act. 4. 19. and 5. 29. We ought to obey God rather then men. Them Rulers (for of Rulers ſitting in judgement is that ſpeech uttered) commanding and tyrannizing over the Apoſtles, are men contradiſtinguiſhed from God; and as they command and puniſh unjuſtly, they are but men, otherwiſe commanding for God, they are Gods, and more then men. 2. From Theophylact alſo, or from Chryſoſtome, on Rom. 13. we have this; The Apoſtle ſpeaketh not (ſay they) foreign. 3. Soveraigntie or Royaltie, doth not properly reign or bear the ſword, or receive praiſe, and this accident doth not bear a ſword; nor do we think, or Paul ſpeak, Rom. 13. of the abſtracted Jew of power and Royaltie, ſubſiſting out of its ſubject; nor dream we, that the naked accident of Royall Authority, is to be feared and honoured as the Lords anointed; the perſon or man who is the King, and beareth the Crown on his head, and holdeth the ſcepter in his hand, is to be obeyed; accidentes are not perſons, but they ſpeak nonſenſe, and like brute beaſts, who deny that all the kingly honour due to the King, muſt be due to him as a King, and becauſe of the Royall dignity that God hath given to him, and not becauſe he is a man; for a Purſevants ſon is a man, and if a Purſevants ſon would uſurpe the throne, and take the Crown on his head, and the ſcepter in his hand, and command that all ſouls be ſubject to ſuch a ſuperior Power, becauſe he is a man, the Lawes of Scotland would hang a man for a leſſe fault, we know: and the P. Prelate was wont to edifie women, and converted ſouls to Chriſt, with ſuch a diſtinction as objectum quod, and objectum quo, in the Pulpits of Edenburgh, and it hath good uſe here, we never took abſtract Royalty to be the King. The Kings of Scotland of old were not ſecond notions, and we exclude not the perſon of the King, yet we diſtinguiſh with leave of the P. Prelate betwixt the perſon in linea phyſica, we muſt take (phyſica) largly heer and in linea morali, obedience, fear, tribute, honour is due to the perſon of the King, and to the man who is King, not becauſe of his perſon, or becauſe he is a man (the P. Prelate may know in what notion, we take the name (Perſon) but becauſe God by the peoples election, hath exalted him to Royall dignity, and for this cauſe ill doers are to ſubject their throats and necks to the ſword of the Lords Annoynteds executioner or hangman with patience, and willingly, becauſe in taking away the head of ill doers, for ill doing, p. 272he is acting the Office of the Lord, by whom he Raigneth; but if he take away their heads, and ſend out the long-tusked Vultures and Boares of Babylon, the Iriſh Rebells to execute his wrath, as he is in that act a miſ-informed man, and wanteth the authority of Gods Law, or mans Law, he may be reſiſted with Armes. For 1. If Royaliſts ſay againſt this, then if a King turne an habituall Tyrant, and conduce an hundred thouſand Turkes to deſtroy his ſubjects upon meere deſire of revenge, they are not to reſiſt, but toGrot. d… iur. belli & pacis. l. 1. c. 4. n. 7. Winzetus Velitat. adver. Buchanan. Barclay, adv. Monarchom. l. 3. c. 8. be ſubject, and ſuffer for conſcience. I am ſure Grotius ſaith, If a King ſell his ſubjects, he loſeth all title to the Crowne, and ſo may be reſiſted, and Winzetus ſaith, A Tyrant may be reſiſted, and Barclay, It is lawfull for the people in caſe of Tyranny to defend themſelves Adverſus immanem ſaevetiam, againſt extreame cruelty: and I deſire the Prelate to anſwer how people are ſubject in ſuffering ſuch cruelty of the higher power, becauſe he is Gods ordinance, and a power from God, except he ſay, as he ſelleth his people, and barbarouſly deſtroyeth by Cut-throat Iriſhes, his whole ſubjects refuſing to worſhip Idolls, he is a man and a ſinfull man, eatenus, and an inferiour power inſpired by wicked counſell, not a King, eatenus, not a higher power, and that in reſiſting him thus, the ſubjects reſiſt not the ordinance of God. Alſo ſuppone King David defend his Kingdome and people againſt Ieſſe his naturall father, who we ſuppoſe cometh in againſt his ſonne and Prince, King David, with a huge army of the Philiſtimes, to deſtroy him and his Kingdome, if he ſhall kill his owne native father, in that warr at ſome Edge-hill, how ſhall he preſerve at Ieruſalem that honour, & love that he oweth to his father, by vertue of the fifth Commandement, Honour thy father and thy mother, &c. Let them anſwer this, except King David conſider Ieſſe in one relation, in abſtracto, as his father, whom he is to obey, and as he is a wicked man, and a perfidious ſubject, in another relation, and except King David ſay, he is to ſubject himſelfe to his father as a father, according to the fifth Commandement, and that in the act of his fathersWe may kill a perſon as a man, and love him as a ſonne, a father, a wife, according to Gods, Word. violent invaſion, he is not to ſubject himſelfe to him, as he is a violent invader, and as a man. Let the Royaliſt ſee how he can anſwer the Argument, and how Levie is not to know his father and mother as they are ſinfull men, Deut. 33. 9. and yet to know and honour them as Parents; and how an Iſraelite is not to pitty the wife that lyeth in his boſome, when ſhe inticeth him to goe a whooring after ſtrange Gods, but is to kill her, Deut. 13. 6, 7, 8. and yet the huſband p. 273is to love the wife as Chriſt loved his Church, Eph. 5. 25. If the husband take away his wives life in ſome mountaine in the holy Land, as Gods Law commandeth, let the Royaliſts anſwer us, where is then the meritall love he owes to her, and that reſpect due to her as ſhe is a wife and a helper. But let not the Royaliſt infer, that I am from theſe examples pleading for the killing of Kings, for lawfull reſiſtance is one thing, and killing of Kings is another; the one defenſive and lawfull, the other offenſive and unlawfull, ſo long as he remaineth a King, and the Lords Anoynted: But if he be a murtherer of his father, who doth counſell his father to come to a place of danger, where he may be killed, and where the King ought not to be, as Abner was worthy of death, who watched not carefully King Saul, but ſlept when David came to his bed ſide, and had opportunity to kill the King, they are Traitors and murtherers of the King, who either counſelled his Majeſty to come to Edge-hill, where the danger was ſo grett, or did not violently reſtraine him from comming thither, ſeeing Kings ſafety and lives are as much, yea more in the diſpoſing of the people then in their owne private will, 2 Sam. 18. 2, 3. for certainly the people might have violently reſtrained King Saul from killing himſelfe, and the King was guilty of his own death, and ſinneth againſt his Office and ſubjects, who commeth out in perſon to any ſuch battles where he may be killed, and the contrary party free of his blood. And here our Prelate is blind, if he ſee not the cleare difference between the Kings Perſon, and the Office as he is King, and between his private Will, and his publicke and Royall Will. 3. The Angels may be named Thrones and Dominions in abſtracto, and yet created, in concreto, and we may ſay the Angell and his power are both created at once; but David was not both borne the Son of Ieſſe, and a King at once: and the P. Prelate, by this may prove it is not lawfull to reſiſt the Divell (for he is of the number of theſe created Angells, Col. 1.) as he is a Divell, becauſe in▪ reſiſting the Divell as a Divell, we muſt reſiſt an Angell of God, and a Principality. 4. To ſpeake ill of dignities, 2 Pet. 2. and Iud. 8. Piſcator inſinuateth is, to ſpeake evill of the very Office of Rulers, as well as of their manners; and Theodat. ſaith, on 2 Pet. 2. that theſe Raylers ſpake evill of the place of Governours and Maſters, as unb… ſeeming beleevers. All our Interpreters, as Beza, Calvin, Luther, Bucer, Marloratus from the place ſaith, It is a ſpeciall reproofe of Anabaptiſts and Libertines, who in that time maintained, that we are all free men in Chriſt, and that there ſhould not be Kings, Maſters, nor any Magiſtrates; however the abſtract is put for the concrete, p. 274its true, and it ſaith we are not to raile upon Nero, but to ſay Nero was a perſecutor of Chriſtians, and yet obey him commanding what is juſt, are very conſiſtent. 5. The perſons are propoſed, Rom. 13. to be the object of our obedience, ſaith D. Ferne, it is very true; but he is ignorant of our mind in exponing the word Perſon: we never meant that feare, honour, royalty, tribute, muſt be due to the abſtracted accident of Kingly Authority, and not to the man who is King. Nor is it our meaning that Royalty in abſtracto is Crowned King, and is anoynted, but that the Perſon is crowned and anoynted. But againe by a perſon we meane nothing leſſe then the man Nero waſting Rome, burning, crucifying Paul, and torturing Chriſtians, and that we owe ſubjection to Nero, and to his perſon in concreto as to Gods ordinance, Gods Miniſter, Gods ſword-bearer in that notion of a Perſon; is that only that we deny. Nay in that Nero in concreto to us, is no Power ordained of God, no Miniſter of God, but a Miniſter of the Divell, and Sathans armour-bearer, and therefore we owe not feare, honour, ſubjection, and tribute to the Perſon of Nero. But theHow the perſon and office …f the Ruler are both theobject of our ſubiection. Perſon thus far is the object of our obedience; that feare, honour, ſubjection, and tribute muſt be due to the man in concreto, to his Perſon who is Prince; but not becauſe he is a man, or a perſon ſimply, or a ſword▪ bearer of Papiſts, but for his office, for that eminent place of royall dignity that God hath conferred on his Perſon. We know the light of the Sun▪ the heate of fire, in abſtracto, doe not properly give light and heat, but the Sun and fire, in concreto; yet the principium quo, ratio qua, the principles of theſe operations in Sun and fire be light & heate, and we aſcribe illuminating of dark bodies, heating of cold bodies to Sun and fire in concreto, yet not to the ſubjects ſimply, but to them as affected with ſuch accidents: ſo here we honour and ſubmit to the man who is King, not becauſe he is a man, that were treaſon; not becauſe he uſeth his ſword againſt the Church, that were impiety: but becauſe of his Royall Dignity, and becauſe he uſeth it for the Lord. It is true, Arniſaeus, Barclay, Ferne, ſay, That Kings leave not off to be Kings, when they uſe their power and ſword againſt the Church and Religion. And alſo it is conſiderable, that when the worſt of Emperors bloody Nero did raigne, the Apoſtle preſſeth the duty of ſubjection to him, as to a power appointed of God, and condemneth the reſiſting of Nero, as the reſiſting of an ordinance of God. And certainely if the cauſe and reaſon in point of duty Morall, and of conſcience before God remaine in Kings, to wit, that while they are enemies and perſecutors as Nero was, their Royall Dignity given them of God p. 275remaineth, then ſubjection upon that ground is lawfull, and reſiſtance unlawfull. Anſ. It is true ſo long as Kings remaine Kings, ſubjection is due to them becauſe Kings, but that is not the queſtion. But theThe queſtion of ſubjection toucheth the perſons as abuſing their power. queſtion is, if ſubjection be due to them, when they uſe their power unlawfully and Tyrannically. What ever David did, though he was a King, he did it not as King, he deflowred not Bathſheba as King, and Bathſheba might with bodily reſiſtance and violence lawfully have reſiſted King David, though Kingly Power, remained in him, while he ſhould thus attempt to commit Adultery; elſe David might have ſaid to Bathſhba, Becauſe I am the Lords Anoynted, it is rebellion in thee a ſubject to oppoſe any bodily violence to my act of forcing of thee, it is unlawfull to thee to cry for helpe, for if any ſhall offer violently to reſcue thee from me, he reſiſteth the ordinance of God. Subjection is due to Nero as an Emperour, but not any ſubjection is due to him in the burning of Rome, and torturing of Chriſtians, except you ſay that Nero's power abuſed in theſe acts of cruelty was, 1. A power from God. 2. An ordinance of God. 3. That in theſe, he was the Miniſter of God for the good of the Common-wealth. Becauſe ſome beleeved Chriſtians were free from the yoake of Magiſtracy, and that the dignity it ſelfe was unlawfull. And 2. becauſe, ch. 12. he had ſet downe the lawfull Church Rulers, and in this and the following chapter the duties of brotherly love of one toward another. So here ch. 13. he teacheth that all Magiſtrates, ſuppoſe Heathen, are to be obeyed and ſubmitted unto in all things, ſo far as they are Miniſters of God. Arniſaeus objecteth to Buchan. If we are by this place to ſubject our ſelves to every power in abſtracto, then alſo to a power contrary to the truth, and to a power of a King exceeding the limits of a King, for De Authorit. princ. c. 2. n. 18.ſuch a power is a power, and we are not to diſtinguiſh where the Law diſtinguiſheth not.

Anſ. The Law clearely diſtinguiſheth we are to obey Parents in the Lord, and if Nero command Idolatry, this is an exceſſive power; are we obliged to obey, becauſe the Law diſtinguiſheth not? 2. The text ſaith, we are to obey every power, 1. from God, 2. That is Gods ordinance, 3. by which the man is a Miniſter of God for good; but an unjuſt and exceſſive power is none oftheſe three. 3. The text in words diſtinguiſheth not obedience active in things wicked, and lawfull: yet we are to diſtinguiſh.

Mr. Symmons. Is authoritie ſubjected ſolely in the Kings Law, andLoyall Subiects beliefe. pag. 49. no whit in his Perſon, though put upon him both by God and Man? Or, is Authoritie only the ſubject; and the Perſon exerciſing the Authoritie, p. 276a bare accident to that, being in it only more ſeparably, as pride and folly are in a man: Then if one in Authoritie command, out of his own Will, and not by Law: if I neithr actively, nor paſſively obey, J doe not ſo much as reſiſt abuſed Authoritie: and then muſt the Prince by his diſorderly Will have quite loſt his authoritie, and become like▪ another man; and yet his Authoritie has not fled from him.

Anſ. If we ſpeake acurately, neither the Man ſolely, nor his Power only is reſiſted: but the Man clothed with lawfull habituall power, is reſiſted, in ſuch and ſuch acts flowing from an abuſed power. 2. It is an ignorant ſpeech, to ask, Is Authoritie ſubjected ſolely in the Kings Law, and no whit in his Perſon? for the Authoritie hath all its power by Law, not from the Mans perſon; The Authoritie hath nothing from the Perſon, but a naked inherencie in the Perſon, as in the ſubject: and the Perſon is to be honored for the Authoritie, not the Authoritie for the Perſon. 3. Authoritie is not ſo ſeparable from the perſon, as that for every act of lawleſſe Will, the King loſeth his Royall authoritie, and ceaſeth to be King: no, but every act of a King, in ſo far can claime ſubjection of the inferiour, as the act of commanding and ruling, hath law for it; and in ſo far as it is lawleſſe, the Perſon in that act repugnant to Law, loſeth all due claime of actuall ſubjection in that act, and in that act, power actuall is loſed, as is cleare, Act. 4. 19. & 5. 29. The Apoſtles ſay to Rulers, It is ſafer to obey God than Men. What? were not theſe Rulers lawfull Magiſtrates, armed with power from God? I anſwer, habitually they were Rulers, and more then men, and to obey them in things lawfull, is to obey God: But actually in theſe unlawfull commandements, eſpecially being commanded to ſpeake no more in the name of Ieſus; the Apoſtles doe acknowledge them to be no more but Men: and ſo their actuall authoritie is as ſeparable from the perſon, as pride and folly from men.

Symmons. The diſtinction holdeth good of inferior Magiſtrates,Sect. 5. pag. 9. That they may be conſidered as Magiſtrates, and as Men: becauſe their authoritie is only ſacred, and addeth veneration to their perſons; and is ſeparable from the perſon; The Man may live, when his Authoritie is extinguiſhed: but it holdeth not in Kings. King Sauls perſon is venerable as his authoritie, and his authoritie commeth by inheritance, and dyeth, and liveth inſeparably with his perſon: and Authoritie and Perſon adde honour each one to another.

Anſ. 1. If this be true, Manaſſeh, a King, did not ſhed innocent blood, and uſe ſorcerie: he did not theſe great wickedneſſes as a man, p. 277but as a King. Salomon played the Apoſtate as a King, not as a man: if ſo, the man muſt make the King more infallible then the Pope; for the Pope, as a man, can erre; as a Pope he cannot erre, ſay Papiſts. But Prophets, in their perſons, were anoynted of God, as Saul and David were: then muſt we ſay, Nathan and Samuel erred not as men, becauſe their perſons were ſacred and anointed: and they erred not as Prophets, ſure; Ergo, they erred not all. A King, as a King, is an holy Ordinance of God, and ſo cannot doe injuſtice, Ergo, they muſt doe acts of Iuſtice, as men. 2. The inferior Iudge is a Power from God. 2. To reſiſt him, is to reſiſt an ordinance of God. 3. He is not a terrour to good workes, but to evill. 4. He is the miniſter of God for good. 5. He is Gods Sword-bearer; his officiall power to rule, may by as good right come by birth, as the Crown: and the Kings perſon is ſacred only for his office, and is annointed only for his office. For then the Chaldeans diſhonored not inferior Iudges, Lam. 5. 12. when they hanged the Prince, & honored not the faces of Elders. It is in queſtiō, if the Kings actual authority be not as ſeparable frō him, as the actuall authority of the Iudge.

Symmons, p. 24. The King himſelfe may uſe this diſtinction. As a Chriſtian, he may forgive any that offendeth againſt his perſon: but as a Iudge, he muſt puniſh, in regard of his office. Anſ. Well then, Flatterers will grant the diſtinction, when the King doth good, and pardoneth the blood of Proteſtants, ſhed by bloody Rebels: But when the King doth acts of injuſtice, he is neither man, nor King, but ſome in dependent abſolute God.

Symmons, p. 27. Gods Word tyeth me to every one of his perſonall commandements, as well as his legall commandements: nor doe I obey the Kings law, becauſe it is eſtabliſhed, or becauſe of its known penaltie▪ nor yet the King himſelfe, becauſe he ruleth according to Law. But I obey the Kings law, becauſe I obey the King: and I obey the King, becauſe I obey God: I obey the King, and his Law, becauſe I obey God and his Law. Better obey the Command, for a reveren… regard to the Prince, then for a penaltie. Anſ. It is hard to anſwer a ſick man. It is blaſphemie, to ſeek this diſtinction of Perſon and Office, in the King of Kings; becauſe by (Perſon) in a mortall King, we underſtand a Man that can ſinne. 1. I am not obliged to obey his perſonall commandement, except I were his domeſtick: nor his unlawfull perſonall commandements, becauſe they are ſinfull. 2. It is falſe that you obey the Kings Law, becauſe you obey the King: for then you ſay but this, I obey the King, becauſe I obey the King. The truth is, p. 278Obedience is not formally terminated on the perſon of the King; Obedience is relative to a precept▪ and it is Men-ſervice, to obey a Lew, not becauſe it is good and juſt; but upon this formall motive, becauſe it is the will of a mortall man to command it. And Reverence, Love, Feare, being acts of the Affection, are not terminated on a Law, but properly on the Perſon of the Iudge: and they are modifications, or laudable qualifications of acts of obedience; not motives, not the formall reaſon why I obey, but the manner how I obey. And the Apoſtle maketh expreſly, Rom. 13▪ 4. feare of puniſhment, a motive of obedience, while he ſaith, He beareth not the ſword in vaine; Ergo, Be ſubject to the King. And this hindreth not perſonall reſiſtance to unjuſt commandements.

Symmons, p. 27, 28, 29. You ſay, To obey the Princes Perſonall commandement againſt his Legall will, is to obey himſelfe againſt himſelfe. So ſay I, To obey his Legall will againſt his Perſonall will, is to obey himſelfe againſt himſelfe: for I take his Perſon to be himſelfe

Anſ. To obey the Kings perſonall will, when it is ſinfull, (as we now ſuppoſe) againſt his legall will, is a ſinne, and a diſobedience to God, and the King alſo, ſeeing the Law is the Kings will, as King: but to obey his Legall will againſt his ſinfull perſonall will (as it muſt be ſinfull, if contrary to a juſt Law) is obedience to the King as King, and ſo obedience to God. 2. You take the Kings perſon to be himſelf; but you take quid pro quo, for his perſon here, you muſt take not Phyſically for his ſuppoſt of ſoul and body; but morally, it is the King, as a ſinning man doing his worſt will, againſt the Law which is his juſt and beſt will, and the rule of the Subjects: and the Kings perſonall will is ſo far juſt, and to regulate the Subjects, in ſo far, as it agreeth with his legall Will, or his Law, and this will can ſinne, and therefore may be croſſed without breach of the fifth Commandement: but his Legall Will cannot be croſſed without diſobedience both to God and the King.

Symmons, p. 28. The Kings Perſonall will doth not alwayes preſuppone paſſion: and if it be attended with paſſion, yet we muſt beare it for conſcience ſake. Anſ. We are to obey the Kings Perſonall will, when the thing commanded, is not ſinne; but his Subjects as Subjects, have little to do with his perſonall will in that notion. It concerneth his domeſtick ſervant, and is the Kings will as he is the maſter of ſervants, not as he is King in relation to Subjects; but we ſpeak of the Kings perſonall will, as repugnant to Law, and contrary to the Kings will as King, and ſo contrary to the fifth p. 279Commandment; and this is attended often, not onelyonly with Paſſion, but alſo with prejudice; and we owe no ſubjection to prejudice, and Paſſions, or to Actions commanded, by theſe miſordered powers, becauſe they are not from God, nor his Ordinances, but from men, and the fleſh, and we owe no ſubjection to the fleſh.

Doct. Ferne, Sect. 9. pag. 58. The diſtinction of perſonall and legall will, hath place in evill actions, but not in reſiſtance, where we cannot ſever the perſon, and the dignitie, or authority, becauſe we cannot reſiſt the power, but we muſt reſiſt the perſon who hath the power. Saul had lawfully the command of Arms, but that power he uſeth unjuſtly, againſt innocent David. I ask when theſe Emperours took away lives and goods at their pleaſure; was that a power ordained of God? No, but an Illegall will, a Tyranny, but they might not reſiſt: nay, but they cannot reſiſt: for that power and ſoveraigntie imployed to compaſſe theſe illegall commandments, was ordained and ſettled in them. When Pilate condemned our Saviour, it was an illegall will, yet our Saviour acknowledgeth in it Pilates power, that was given him from above. Anſw. 1. Here we have the diſtinction, denyed by Royaliſts, granted by D. Fern; but if when the King commands us to do wickedneſſe, we may reſiſt that perſonall will, and when he commandeth us to ſuffer unjuſtly we cannot reſiſt his will, but we muſt reſiſt alſo his Royall perſon. What? Is it not ſtill the King, and his perſon ſacred, as his power is ſacred, when he commandeth the ſubjects to do unjuſtly, as when he commandeth them to ſuffer unjuſtly? It were fearfull to ſay, when Kings command any one act of idolatry, they are no longer Kings; if for conſcience I am to ſuffer unjuſtly, when Nero commandeth unjuſt puniſhment, becauſe Nero commanding ſo, remaineth Gods Miniſter. Why? But when Nero commandeth me to worſhip an Heathen God, I am upon the ſame ground to obey that unjuſt will in doing ill: For Nero in commanding Idolatry, remaineth the Lords Miniſter, his perſon is ſacred in the one commandment of doing ill, as in inflicting ill of puniſhment. And do I not reſiſt his perſon in the one, as in the other? His power and his perſon are unſeparably conjoyned by God in the one, as in the other, 2. In bodily thruſting out of Ʋzzah from the Temple, theſe fourſcore valiant men did reſiſt the Kings perſon, by bodily violence, as well as his power. 3. If the power of killing the Martyrs in Nero, was no power ordained of God, then the reſiſting of Nero, in his taking away the lives of the Martyrs, was but the reſiſting of Tyranny: And certainly, if that p. 280power in Nero was foreign a power ordained of God, and not to be reſiſted, as the place, Rom. 13. is alleaged by Royaliſts, then it muſt be a lawfull power, and no Tyranny; and if it cannot be reſiſted, becauſe it was a power ordained and ſettled in him, it is either ſetled by God, and ſo not Tyranny; except God be the Author of Tyranny, or then ſettled by the devill, and ſo may well be reſiſted; but the Text ſpeaketh of no power, but of that which is of God. 4. We are not to be ſubject to all powers in concreto, by the Text; for we are not to be ſubject to powers lawfull, yet commanding active obedience to things unlawfull. Now ſubjection includeth active obedience of honour, love, fear, paying tribute, and therefore of need force, ſome powers muſt be excepted. 5. Pilates power is meerly a power by divine permiſſion, not a power ordained of God, as are the powers ſpoken of Rom. 13. Gregori. mor. l. 3. c. 11. expreſly ſaith, This was Satans power given to Pilate, againſt Chriſt. Manibus Satanae pro noſtra redemptione ſe traddit. Lyra. A Principibus Romanorum & ulterius permiſſum a Deo, qui eſt poteſtas, ſuperior. Calvin, Beza, Diodatus, ſaith the ſame, and that he cannot mean of Legall power from Gods regulating will is evident; 1. BecauſePilates power to crucifie Chriſt, was no Law-power given by God to Pilate as a Iudge. Chriſt is anſwering Pilate, John 19. 10. Knoweſt thou not, that I have power to crucifie thee? This was an untruth. Pilate had a command to worſhip him, and beleeve in him; and whereas Ferne ſaith, Sect. 9. pag. 59. Pilate had power to judge any accuſed before him: It is true, but he being obliged to beleeve in Chriſt, he was obliged to be perſwaded of Chriſts innocency; and ſo neither to judge, nor receive accuſation againſt him: and the power he ſaith, he had to crucifie, was a Law-power in Pilates meaning, but not in very deed any Law-power; becauſe a Law-power is from Gods regulating will in the fifth Commandment; but no creature hath a lawfull or a Law-power to crucifie Chriſt. 2. A Law-power is for good, Rom. 13. 4. A power to crucifie Chriſt, is for ill. 3. A Lawpower is a terrour to ill works, and a praiſe to good. Pilates power to crucifie Chriſt, was the contrary. 4. A Law-power is to execute wrath on ill-doing, a power to crucifie Chriſt is no ſuch. 5. A Lawpower conciliateth honour, fear, and veneration to the perſon of the Iudge, a power to crucifie Chriſt, conciliateth no ſuch thing, but a diſgrace to Pilate. 6. The Genuine Acts of a lawfull power, are lawfull Acts; for ſuch as is the Fountain-power, ſuch are the Acts flowing therefrom; good Acts flow not from bad powers, neither hath God given a power to ſin, except by way of permiſſion.