The Divine Right of Church Government and Excommunication, Religious polemic · Chapter 2

The Divine Right of Church Government and Excommunication · Religious polemic · Chapter 2

p. 192CAP. II.

QUEST. 1.

Whither kneeling or ſitting be the moſt convenient and Lawfull geſture in the Act of receiving the Sacrament of Chriſts Body and blood?

1. Concluſ. SItting is the moſt and only lawfull geſture, That geſture, that Chriſt and his Diſciples uſed upon morall and unalterable grounds, which doth not concern the firſt Supper as firſt, but as a Supper, and that not upon no occaſionall and temporary reaſons, belonging to that Supper, more then to all the Suppers of that kinde, that we are to follow as a pattern, and muſt be moſt Lawfull. But the geſture of ſitting is ſuch, Ergo:

The Propoſition is evident in Scripture, ccProv. 2. …0. Eph. 5. 1. … Theſ. 1. 16. 2 Theſſ. 3. 6, 7. … Cor. …. Phil. 3. 17. 2. Tim. 3. 4. Sitting the only convenient geſture.Prov 2Eph 51 Thess 1:162 Thess 3:62 Thess 3:7Phil 3:172 Tim 3:4.

I prove the Aſſumption. 1. Sitting was either: 1. Miraculous. 2. Cuſtomable. 3. Occaſionall; or 4. Morall. None in reaſon can ſay the firſt; that ſitting was a miracle: 2. Nor is it cuſtomable. For 1. Cuſtomes laudable are grounded upon decency and reaſon, and ſo morall, or grounded upon no reaſon at all.

But Chriſt did nothing in Gods worſhip, nor did he any humane morall actions for the meer fact and will of others going before, for theſe were not reaſonable humane actions, and if it be cuſtomable only, it is not lawfull to put away a cuſtomable action out of worſhip, and to put a morall action of kneeling and Divine ſignification p. 193in the place thereof, for ſo we might change places, times, perſons and all phyſicall circumſtances, and make them ſupernaturall. 2. The action could not be occaſionall: for then the occaſion of the Supper as firſt, and becauſe of ſuch perſons, ſuch time at night, ſuch place, an upper chamber, ſhould have moved Chriſt to ſitting, rather then to kneeling, or to any other geſture; but kneeling or any other geſture might have conſiſted well with that firſt Supper, with the upper chamber, with the time and perſons, as well as ſitting, except the Law givers will had been a reaſon of the contrary.

Some object. Chriſt chooſed an upper chamber, not the Temple, twelve perſons, not ten, not twenty, at night, for he might have celebrated it at dinner, but we are not holden to imitate Chriſt in theſe; Ergo, neither in ſitting.

Anſ. Occaſionall, properly is that which hath a reaſon, not fromWhat is occaſionall in the firſt ſupper. the nature of the thing it ſelf, but from ſuch occaſionall occurrences of Providence, as God will not alter, and its that which hath no morall nor ſacred conveniency with the nature of worſhip, but hath only a conveniency for ſuch a time and place, as Chriſts preaching in a ſhip, when he is at the ſea ſide, and a multitude are to hear him, the ſhip hath no agreement with the nature of preaching, more then an houſe hath, time, place, and perſons are clearly ſuch as agreed with that ſupper, as firſt, not as a ſacred worſhip, and therefore were meerly occaſionall, and ſo not imitable, and though Chriſt might have altered them, yet had they been occaſionall, and they have no ſacred conveniency with this Supper, as this Supper; and if Chriſt had altered theſe for meer will, upon no reaſons that concerneth all Suppers, they had not been occaſionall, but poſitive points of worſhip, and ſo had obliged us; yea, the upper chamber, and theſe twelve perſons by no poſſibility, can concern all Suppers, to the end of the world, but ſitting agreeth kindly and natively to all Suppers in generall, as kneeling to all praying indefinitely. Chriſt might have changed bread and wine, in fleſh, and milk, or water, will it hence follow, we are not to imitate Chriſt in bread and wine? And that bread and wine are occaſionall? Laſtly, Pauls practiſe in paſſing from an upper chamber, and from twelve men, to a Church full of men and women, 1 Cor. 11. 23, 17, 18, 22. warranteth us to paſſe from theſe, we have not the like reaſon to warrant us to paſſe from ſitting.

p. 1942. That geſture which Chriſt chooſed, and that refuſing all other,2. Arg. even kneeling, having the ſame Religious reaſons, at the firſt ſupper as now, that muſt be moſt convenient and lawfull. But ſitting is ſuch; Ergo,

The Propoſition is clear: The Aſſumption is proved from Matth. 26. While they did eat (the Paſſeover) he took bread, Mar. 14▪ 22. As Chriſt ſate at the firſt Supper.they did eat, Jeſus took bread.

But while they did eat the Paſſeover, they ſate. Ergo, while they took the Supper they ſate: I prove the Aſſumption, Matth. 26. 20. And, when the evening was come, he ſate down with the twelve, Mark 14. 18. And as they ſate, and did eat, Jeſus ſaid, &c. v. 22. And as they did eat, Ieſus took bread▪ eating the Paſſeover, and ſitting were co-exiſtent, and taking the Sacramentall bread of the Supper, and eating the Paſſeover were co-exiſtent; Ergo, Taking the bread of the Supper, and ſitting were co-exiſtent.

Paybodie ſaith, Paul expoundeth, (as they did eat) after they hadOf kneeling, part. 2. pag. … ▪ ended eating, and ſo after they had ended ſitting, and poſſibly paſſed to another geſture, 1 Cor. 11. After Supper he took the Cup. Anſ. If you wholly remove the Paſſeover, you remove the Table alſo. 2. Though the Suppers were not mingled, yet the holy Ghoſt expreſſeth the co-exiſtence of ſitting, and taking the Sacramentall bread, as Ezech. 8. 1. As I ſate in mine houſe, the hand of Iehovah fell upon me, 2 Sam. 18 14. Ioab thrust three darts in him, while he vvas yet alive, 1 Sam. 25. 16. The men vvere a vvall to us, all the time that vve vvere vvith them, Dan. 4. 3. and Matth. 26. 47. And vvhile he yet ſpake, Lo, Iudas came, Act. 10. 19. While Peter thought on the viſion, the ſpirit ſaid to him, Act. 22. 6. Rom. 5. 10. If praying interveened betwixt eating and taking the Supper, and the Paſſeover ſitting, to put them to kneeling, this muſt be true, vvhile they vvere not eating, Chriſt took bread, a plain contradicting of Christ. 3. After Supper he took the cup, but they ſay not after Supper he took the bread, for praying, bleſſing, breaking, diſtributing, eating, interveened betwixt the Paſſeover and taking the Communion Cup, and therefore he had reaſon to ſay, After Supper he took the Cup, but not that reaſon, to ſay, after Supper he took the Bread. It is violent to deſcribe Chriſts taking the Bread from the adjunct of time, while as they ſate and did eate, if ſitting and eating were not at this time, but were gone and paſt by many p. 195interveening actions of kneeling, praying, preaching, this were to deſcribe ſupper from dinner. 3. By this, the geſture of no Table action can be cleared from Scripture, for when it is ſaid, Luke 9. Iohn 6. He made the multitude ſit downe and …a…, a cavillator might ſay, praying and bleſſing the meat went before, and poſſibly they ſate on their knees, and Chriſt ſate downe and taught the people; it may bee he roſe and kneeled before Sermon was ended. The Scripture ſaith, While Chriſt and his diſciples did …, and ſo while they did ſit, he tooke bread. This taking of bread, whether it be an Hyſteroſis as many think, in reſpect the Evangeliſts mention but once taking of bread, or if it was preparatorie, and before the act of bleſſing, it was a ſacramentall act performed by Chriſt, while they were ſitting, which is much for ſitting.

That Chriſt paſſed not from paſſeover ſitting, to Supper kneeling, I thinke theſe conſiderations move me. 1. Becauſe the changes of all in the Paſſeover, to that in the Lords Supper, as of fleſh in bread and wine, is poſitively ſet down. 2. No queſtion the change unto an adoring geſture, had been upon the grounds of conciliating more reverence to that Sacrament, then to the Paſſeover, which muſt be morall, and tye to the end of the world. 3. Nor would the Holy Ghoſt have removed an ordinary table geſture into ſo inſolent, and ſupernaturally ſignificant geſture, as kneeling, without a grave reaſon expreſſed, or his owne will onelyonly, which is onelyonly the eſſentiall reaſon, why bread is a Sacrament rather then any other Element, and ſo would ſtand of neceſſary and eſſentiall uſe. 4. Sitting at the Idols table 1 Cor. 8. 10. declareth that in religious feaſts, ſitting was ordinary, and a ſigne indicant of honouring the ſpirituall Lord of the Banquet, and a religious communion with the Lord of the Feaſt was hence ſignified.

But ſaith Paybodie foreign and foreign Mat. 26. 20. Mark.Part. 2. Page 62. 14. 18. Luke 22. 14. Iohn …3. 12. ſignifieth lying, and M. Li…dſ…y …aith, it ſignifieth proſtration on the earth rather then ſitting▪ Por Levit. 18. 23. ſtanding and lying are confounded, and Calvin expoundeth it ſo.

Anſ. 1. Chriſt▪ his reaſoning to prove that foreign to ſit at meat is a greater honour, then to ſtand: Luke 22. 27. were null, if foreign ſignifie proſtration, for religious bowing is alwaies an act of inferioritie. The ſame I ſay if foreign ſignifie falling downe p. 196to the ground. 2. Sitting or pitching about a place, and ſitting and lying in ſackcloath, may well ſignifie ſimply to be in a place, but table-ſitting and table-inclining on Chriſts boſome muſt be more then ſimply being at the Table. Nor doth Calvin in that place expound ſitting at table, for nothing but ſimply being at table, though elſewhere he doth.

3. Arg. That which repreſenteth the honour of table-fellowſhip of fellow-banquetters with Chriſt, that is of neceſſary uſe; But ſitting at the Lords table repreſenteth this; Ergo, Luke 22. 27. The Minor is made good, to teach the Diſciples humility, he would ſtand and have them to ſit. Whether is greater he that ſitteth, or he that ſtandeth? it is a greater honour to ſit at table, then to ſtand; Ergo it is an honour to ſit, for we may well infer the poſitive from the comparative, Luk. 22. 29. upon the occaſion of their ſtriving who ſhould be greateſt, and Lord Biſhop, he promiſeth a ſort of fellowſhip in a Kingdome. 2. In ſitting on thrones with him, and the meaning that that fellowſhip ſhould quench the fire of their appetite for Prelacy. 3. This ſitting in Scripture, as table-ſitting, is uſed to expreſſe our fellowſhip with Chriſt in the Goſpell, Mat. 22. 1. 2. Luke 22. 30. Mat. 8. 11, 12. Luke 14. 15, 16, 17. Cant. 1. 12. Cant. 5. 1. Rev. 19. 9. Rev. 3. 20. and our Communion with Chriſts body and his blood is ſealed up in this Sacrament, 1 Cor. 10. 16. 4. This is confirmed, in that the Sacramentall food is not ſimply given as food, (though that be a ſpeciall fruit thereof) for then there ſhould be no more required to the eſſence and integrity of the Supper, but eating and drinking, and on his alone, eating and drinking and uſing the words of Chriſt, ſhould receive a Sacrament, and the manner of eating ſhould be accidentall, and in the Churches power; but this food is given as food Table-wiſe, with the ſolemnities of a banquet, and of ſpirituall fellowſhip, which muſt be repreſented of purpoſe here, and that ſitting wayes, ſo to eat and drink with Publicans is a ſigne of fellowſhip, as Chriſts eating and ſitting with Publicans and ſinners made him be conſtrued to be a friend to them, 1 Cor. 5. 11. To refuſe to eat with a fornicator, is to refuſe fellowſhip with him, 1 Cor. 8. 10. 1 Cor. 10. 20, 21. To ſit at the Idols and Divels Table, is to partake of the idoll and Satans worſhip, as having fellowſhip with them; Ergo, to ſit at the Lord▪ table is to have fellowſhip with him. 5. The Holy Ghoſt ſpeaketh p. 197this fellowſhip, Luke 22. 14. He ſate down and the twelve Apoſtles, foreign with him, ſee a fellowſhip, Math. 26. 20. He ſate downe, foreign, with the twelve. 18. And as they did eate (together at Table) Marke 14. 15. Luke 22. 15. With deſire have Sitting a ſigne of our co-heireſhip.I deſired to eat with you, foreign, table-wiſe, as ver. 14. Mat. 26. 29. I will not drinke,—untill I drinke it new foreign. The words carry a reſemblance of drinking with them the well of life, ſo Auguſtine, Hilary, Muſculus, Ameſius expoundneth them, ſo (as I take) he draweth them from 1. This materiall wine. 2. From Sacramentall tabling. 3. From this old fruit of the Wine. 4. From fellowſhip here in the Kingdome of Grace, to 1. New wine in heaven. 2. To heavenly tabling. 3. To new and everlaſting wine. 4. In the Fathers Kingdome. Neither am I much moved with what Paybodie ſaith, that our Saviour led the woman of Samaria, from Iacobs well to thirſt for the water of life, yet is not, for that, Iacobs well made a type by divine inſtitution. I anſwer, this would have ſome colour, if Chriſt did ſpeake of common wine, as he did ſpeake of Iacobs Well, as of common water. But all the three Evangeliſts ſpeake of Sacramentall wine conſecrated by word and prayer, elſe Chriſts calling bread his body ſhould not prove that bread were a ſigne of his body by divine inſtitution, but onelyonly we were to make that ſpirituall uſe of bread and wine, that we make of ordinary bread and wine at our houſes. Formaliſts then muſt ſay that Chriſt ſpeaketh of wine here as common, not as Sacramentall, which is abſurd when Chriſt is expounding the Elements, in their ſpirituall ſignification, Luke 5. 22, 21. But behold the hand of him that betrayeth me is foreign with me, on the table. Mat. 26. 23. Marke 14. 20. If he had been kneeling or ſtanding, (geſtures unpoſſible for them then) he could not have his hand leaning on the table, and if he had not beene ſitting▪ table-wiſe, in a table-fellowſhip with Chriſt, then could not our Saviour have conveniently convinced the ingratitude of Iudas, as he doth. Now if Chriſt aime not to make Iudas his fault the greater, becauſe Iudas and he ſate at one table together, and that as an holy and Sacramentall table, he had in this no more argued Iudas of ingratitude, then any of the reſt of the houſe who communicated not with Chriſt, becauſe Chriſt and they did eate one materiall and ordinary bread together▪ And in this Achitophel was a type of Iudas, as David of Chriſt, and that not onelyonly in p. 198this, that Achitophel did eate bread with David, and ſo had a civill fellowſhip, but that they went together to Gods houſe, in company together, Pſal. 55. 14. So had Chriſt and Iudas fellowſhip together, at that ſame Sacramentall table: And as tabling together ſignifieth civil fellowſhip, ſo muſt fellow-tabling at one ſacred Feaſt ſignifie Spirituall fellowſhip together. 6. Giving and not granting that fellow-ſitting together were onelyonly a common honour, not a miſticall honour by divine Inſtitution, yet ſince to ſit at a table with a Ruler, is an honour, 1 Sam. 20. 5. 2 Sam. 9. 13. Eſther 7. 7. Prov. 23. 1. Mat. 8. 11. Luk… 16. 23. Luke 22. 30. And the Lords Diſciples are admitted to ſit with him, as is cleare in that he ſate down with the twelv…, and he ſate (Luke 24. 30.) at meat with them, and tooke bread and bleſſed it. No power on earth ſhould dare to deprive the people of God of this honour, for this honour was beſtowed on the Lords Apoſtles, as communicants, not as Apoſtles, and the want of Chriſts bodily preſence, diminiſheth nothing of the honour, ſeeing he is really, but in a ſpirituall manner preſent, as the Lord of the feaſt, with us, as he was with them. Paybodie ſaith, When Chriſt ſate at table in the Paſſeover, even then he ſchooled them from looking Part 2. pag. 187.at honour in materiall or outvvard ſitting, vvhile as Luke 22. 26. he would ſtand himſelfe as a ſervant, and vvaſh his Diſciples feet. Anſvv. His non-ſitting and waſhing their feet, being a morall, not a Sacramentall teaching them humility, doth no more ſchoole them from not looking to ſit, then his non-eating, and non-drinking while he ſtood ſervant-like, doth ſchoole them from not looking to the honour of eating and drinking Sacramentally. Chriſt teacheth leſſons of humility, not to learne us not to ſeek the ſpirituall honour of communion with Chriſt, that were to teach us to be proud, and this man is that bold to inſinuate that it was a ſpece of pride, for the Diſciples to ſit at table with Chriſt, and for Iohn to leane on his boſome.

Mr. Paybodie thinketh to cruſh this argument; Becauſe the ſerving of God the Father and giving him glory, muſt be incompatiblePaybodie p. 268. 269. Diſputer againſt kneeling, Arg. 1. c. 6. with a table-fellowſhip with his Sonne. The diſputer (ſaith he) reaſoneth thus; Kneeling importeth an inferiority, therefore it is contrary to the perſon of co-heirs, which perſon we act by table-ſitting, but do you (ſaith he) dream of a co-heirſhip, whereby you ſtand not in an inferiority to Chriſt, then when you take on you the perſon of co-heirs by p. 199ſitting at Table, it were not lawfull either to eſteem, or in a ſhort ejaculation to call Chriſt your Lord and Superiour; yea ſo faith muſt have no working at the Sacrament: for Faith importeth an inferiority and dependance: We reſpect Chriſt in his banquet, as a King inviting us to eat with him; yea, I may kneel and call God my Father, and in ſo doing, I actuate the perſon of a co-heire.

Anſ. But in this the diſputer and we mean no other thing, thenA ſigne of our coheirſhip may well conſiſt with our inferiority in worſhipping Chriſt that kneeling which is a note of ſubmiſſion, and never uſed in banquets, cannot formally expreſſe, as an apt ſigne, the dignity of fellow-table-ſhip with Chriſt: 2. Poor Logitian, it followeth not in ſitting at table, which is the expreſſing ſigne of the honour of tablefellowſhip, we may not call Chriſt, Lord. David ſitting at Table with his Prince Saul, might well term him (my Lord the King) but if▪ David ſhould be put to his knees at Table, and inhibited to eat at the Table, at which his Prince did eat; no wiſe man will ſay, that Saul had honoured David with fellow-Tabling with him. For the Act of kneeling, and non-eating were no expreſſing ſignes of fellow-Tabling, but by the contrary of no fellow-Tabling; the Diſputer hath no minde to make us every way equall with Chriſt, ſo as there can be a caſe, wherein it is not Lawfull to eſteem or call Chriſt our Lord; King and Superiour, this is Paybodies conſequence; but take away Table-ſitting, an honour put upon us by Chriſt in this Sacrament, Luk. 22. 27. and ſubſtitute kneeling for it, then you take away Gods expreſſing ſigne of Table-Fellowſhip in that geſture: for while the world ſtandeth, kneeling ſhall never be a ſigne of Table-fellowſhip: ſitting at Table is a ſigne, as the Scriptures clear, but ſitting taketh never away our inferiority to Chriſt; you may worſhip and actuate the perſon of a co-heir, but not worſhip in an expreſſing viſible ſigne of co-heirſhip, and then kneel. Farther he reaſoneth with us, as if Table-ſitting inferred an equality betwixt us, and that Lord who is the head of men and Angels; we reaſon for an honour of fellowſhip, not equality. David ſet at King Saul's Table, is not made equall with Saul, but in Table-ſitting, he doth partake of Table-honour to feaſt with his Prince.

If Chriſt ſhould have ſitten and cauſed his Diſciples riſe and waſh his feet▪ in that he could not have ſaid, (I have put the honour of Table-fellowſhip on you, for you ſtand and waſh my feet, and I ſit) this (I ſay) had been no table-honour, but moſt contrary to it: It had p. 200been indeed ſervant-honour, Luk 22. 27. and more then ſinfull men are worthy of. To kneel to Chriſt is an honour, but to kneel at Tabling with him, as kneeling, is no more an expreſſing ſigne of table-honour, nor ſtanding and ſerving Chriſt, while he did eat is an honour of table-fellowſhip. Now if any ſhall take away eating with Chriſt, at that table, he taketh away table-honour, as Papiſts do in taking away drinking with Chriſt from the people, yet eating with Chriſt maketh us not equall to Chriſt, but take away eating, and you take away Table-honour, ſo take away ſitting at Table, and you take away (eatenus) in ſo far the Table-honour.

But by this mean (ſay they) you make it neceſſary to ſit, and of Divine neceſſity. I anſwer, Table ſitting is not ſo neceſſary, as that the want thereof doth annihilate the Sacrament, and make it to be no Sacrament at all, but it is (as I think) many wayes neceſſary, as firſt it is morally or Theologically neceſſary, as being geſture ſanctified by the practice of Chriſt and his Apoſtles, upon Morall grounds, and ſo to be imitated by us: 2. It is neceſſary, by neceſſity of expediency, as free from hazard of Idolatry, of which crime kneeling in this act, is guilty. 3. It is neceſſary, ſacramentally, for the integrity of the Sacrament, as ſignifying our honour of Table-fellowſhip. 4. It is by natures grounds neceſſary, that as this banquet is materiall, having bread, wine, taking, breaking, diſtribution, eating, drinking, ſo the externall ſolemnity of a banquet, ſuch as is table-ſitting, requireth the ſame. And 5. which is our 4. Argument,4. Arg. it is neceſſary by neceſſity of Divine precept (Do this in remembrance of me) that this is included in the precept we certainly believe: 1. Becauſe nothing in reaſon can be excluded, from the precept of the firſt pattern, but what is meerly occaſionall, ſuch as ſitting is not.

2. The practiſe of Chriſt and the Apoſtles cannot be a will-action, and therefore muſt fall under a precept: ſitting cannot be occaſionall, upon the reaſon that it was continued through occaſion of the paſſeover; for if this be good, then eating and drinking, and the Analogy betwixt the ſigne and Chriſt, ſhall be occaſionall, and the ſinging of a Pſalm, as was at the Paſſeover, ſhall be occaſionall: for Chriſt retained what did equally belong to the Supper of the Iews, and this Chriſtian Supper, as concerning the common nature of ſacred Feaſts.

p. 2015. What is proper to a table of ſolemn feaſting, ſhould not be denyed to this, But ſitting was ſuch; Ergo, More of this may be ſeen in the Nullity of Pearth examination, and the re-examination of the five Articles of Pearth.

QUEST. II.

Whether humane Laws binde the conſciences are not?

OUr Argument againſt Ceremonies is▪ that they fail againſtArg. 8. Ceremonies fail againſt the authority of Rulers.the fifth Commandment, and the Authority of Rulers.

What the Civill, or Church-Ruler can command muſt be good, neceſſary, apt to edifie, and not indifferent, or neither good nor evil; Ceremonies are acknowledged by their Fathers to be indifferent, and neither good nor evil; Ergo, They are ſuch as cannot be lawfully commanded. The Propoſition is clear; the Ruler muſt command for good, Rom. 13. 4. He is the miniſter of God for thy good, and all for edification, 1 Cor. 10, 23. 1 Cor. 14. 3. v. 12, 17, 26. And therefore all means injoyned for this end, good, and Edification muſt conduce thereunto of their own nature, and not by the will of men, elſe they edifie not. But that this may be further cleared, it is queſtioned, if humane Lawes binde the conſcience: for which conſider,

1. Diſt. An humane Law is taken in Concreto, when judges command what God commandeth, as when they make a Law againſt murther. 2. In abſtracto, when the judge forbiddeth what may tend to murther, as carrying Armour in a City in the night.

2. Diſt. There is ſome morall equity in right humane Laws.

3. Something poſitive.

4. Diſt. There be four things to be regarded in humane Laws: 1. Publick peace of the ſociety. 2. The credit, honour and Majeſty of the Ruler, even when the Law is unjuſt. 3. Obedience paſſive, and ſubjection, by patient ſuffering. 4. Obedience active by doing, which is now to be conſidered.

Diſt. 5. An humane Law Civill may oblige, Ratione generalis praecepti, In regard of the generall command to obey our ſuperiors, as the fifth Command ſaith▪ But the queſtion is, if a humane Law, as meerly poſitive oblige in conſcience, as if this which the Captain forbiddeth, p. 202as, (not to speak the vvatch-word) be in it ſelf againſt the ſixth Commandment (Thou ſhalt not murther) if no murther follow upon the not speaking of the watch-word, though it be againſt the fifth in the generall.

Diſt. 6. The queſtion is not, whether we be obliged in conſcience to obey ſuperiors in things Lawfull, or whether we be obliged in conſcience to obey Superiors, when they are ſole authoritative relaters and carriers of Gods expreſſe Law to us, for then they bring nothing of their own, to lay upon us, and in theſe caſes their laws are rather Gods Laws delivered by Superiors to us, and binde the conſcience. But the queſtion is, if poſitive laws, in particular matters, negatively only, conform to the word, as in matters of Oeconomy, and policy, as not to eat fleſh in Lent, for the growth of cattell; in matters of Art, and in ordering of war and Military Acts, commanded by Captains, if theſe commandments as ſuch oblige the conſcience. Now to oblige the conſcience, is, when the not doing of ſuch a thing bringeth an evil conſcience; now an evil conſcience, as Pareus aaPareus Com. in Rom. 13. dub. v. 5.Rom 13ſaith, Is the ſenſe of ſin committed againſt God, and the fear of Gods judgement.

Diſtinct. 7. The conſcience i… obliged by doing, or not doing, two wayes: 1. Per ſe, kindly, when the fact of it ſelf obligeth, and for no respect without, as to give almes to the poor at the Commandment of the ſuperior: 2. When the fact obligeth for a reaſon from publick peace, good example, and order.

1. Concluſion. When Rulers command, what God expreſly commandeth, their Laws obligeth the conſcience, Pſal. 34. 11. Come ye children hearken unto me, and I will teach you the fear of the Lord, Prov. 4▪ 1. Hear ye children the inſtruction of a Father.

2. Concluſ. Publick peace in all the commandments of Superiors, in ſo far, as can be without ſin, obligeth the conſcience, as Heb. 12. 14. Follow peace with all men, and godlineſſe, Pſal. 34. 14. Seek peace, and follow after it, Rom. 12. 18.

3. Concluſ. Subjection to the cenſures of Rulers by ſuffering patiently, is an obligation lying upon all private perſons, 1 Pet. 2. 20. But if, vvhen ye do vvell, and ſuffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable to God, Rom. 13. 2. Whoſoever therefore reſiſteth the power, reſiſteth the ordinance of God.

4. Concluſ. Nothing in non-obeying unwarrantable Commandments p. 203muſt be done that redoundeth to the diſcredit of the Ruler or the hurting of his Majeſty and honour, 1 Pet. 2. 17. Honour the King, Eccleſ. 10. 20. Curſe not the King: For even when we deny ſubjection or obedience objective, to that which they command, yet owe we obedience officiall, and all due reſpect and reverence to the perſon and eminent place of the Ruler, as Act. 7. 2. Steven calleth them, Men, brethren, and fathers, Act. 7. 51. And yet ſtiffenecked reſiſters of the holy Ghoſt.

5. Concluſ. Humane Laws, whither civill or Eccleſiaſtick, in that particular poſitive matter, which they have of Art, Oeconomy, policy, and in Gods matters of meer humane coyne and ſtamp, do not bindes the conſcience at all, per ſe, kindely and of themſelves.How civill poſitive laws binde not the conſcience. 1. Nothing, but what is either Gods expreſſe word, or his word by conſequence doth lay a band on the conſcience of it ſelf: But not to eat fleſh in L…nt, upon civill reaſons, Not to carry Armour in the night, To wear Surplice, and to Croſſe infants in Baptiſme, are neither Gods word expreſly, nor by conſequence. The major is ſure; becauſe the word is the perfect and adequate object of matters of Faith, and morall practice, which concerneth the conſcience, Pſal. 19. 7. 8. Pſal. 119. 9. Iohn 20. 31. Prov. 8. 9. 2. Becauſe whatever thing layeth a band on the conſcience, the not doing of that would be a ſin before God, if the Ruler ſhould never command it (But the carrying Armour in the night (the not wearing Surplice in Divine ſervice) ſhould be no ſin before God, if the ruler ſhould never command them, as reaſon, Scriptures, and adverſaries teach. The Propoſition I inſtruct from the diffinition of an obligation of conſcience, for to lay a band on the conſcience is defined, to lay a command on the ſoul, which ye are obliged before God to do, as you would eſchew ſin, and obtain eternall ſalvation: So the learned Pareus bbPareus Com. in Rom. c. 13. Dub. 7.Rom 13ſo ccRichard Field on the Church 4. book c. 33.Dr. Field; ſo ddGerſon de vita spir. part. 3. lect. 4.Gerſon, and ſo teach eeGreg. de val. to. 1. diſp. 7. punct. 6. Sect. ….Gregorius de Valentia, and ffSuarez tom. de legibus lib. 3. cap. 22.Suarez. 3. None can lay on a band of not doing, under the hazard of ſin, but they that can remit ſins, for the power that looſeth, the ſame bindeth: But mortall men cannot binde to ſin, nor looſe men from ſin, but where God goeth before them in binding and looſing, for they cannot beſtow the grace of pardoning ſin: But he onelyonly who hath the keys of David, who openeth, and no man ſhutteth, and ſhutteth, and no man openeth. 4. Whoever can lay on bands of Laws, to bring any under p. 204the debt of ſin, muſt lay on bands of obligation to eternall puniſhment, but God only can do this, Mat. 10. 28.

The Propoſition is clear, becauſe ſin againſt God, eſſentially includeth a relative obligation to eternall puniſhment. 5. In matters of Gods worſhip this is clear. The School-men, as hhAquin. 22 q. art. 1. ad. 3.Aquina…, iiSuar. Deoper. 6. dierum Tract. 3. diſp. 5. Sect. 1. num. 2.Suarez, kkFerra. c…. Gente… cap. 21.Ferrarienſis, llConrad. 12. q. 20. art 1. A twofold goodneſſe in things. The will of authority cannot treate goodneſſe in things.Conradus teach us, that there is a twofold good. The firſt is, an objective and primordiall goodneſſe, whereby things are agreeable to Gods Law, if rulers finde not this in that good which they command, they are not juſt, and ſo not to be obeyed. There is another goodneſſe that cometh from the will of authority, & ſo only divine authority muſt make things good; the will and authority of Rulers findeth objective goodnes in them, and therefore enacteth Laws of things, but becauſe they enact Laws of things, they do not therefore become good and Lawfull, It is the will of the Creator of all beings which is the meaſure, rule, and cauſe of the goodneſſe of things, as Adams not eating of the tree of knowledge is good and gratefull obedience, from Gods forbidding will, and it ſhould have been as gratefull obedience to eat of that tree, if God had commanded ſo. Men cannot make worlds; nor can their will create goodneſſe in acts indifferent, nor can their forbidding will illegittimate or make evil any actions indifferent, and therefore things muſt be morally good, and ſo intrinſecally good without the creative influence of humane Authority, and from God only are they apt to edifie, and to oblige the conſcience in the termes of goodneſſe morall.

And this is ſtrengthened, by that which in reaſon cannot be denied, to wit, that it is eſſentiall to every human Law that layeth any obligation on the conſcience, that it be juſt, nor is it to be called a Law, except it be juſt, and juſtice and equity humane Laws have from God, the law of nature, and his word, not from the Authority and will of men; therefore Iuriſts expound that mm…. F. de con…i…. Prineip. Qu…d Principi placuit, legis babet vigorem, eſt verum de placito juſto.What pleaſeth the Prince, hath the vigour of a Law, of juſt things. Alſo the School-men, as nnCarduba in ſum queſt. 18. part 1.Carduba, ooThom. 22. q. 104. art. 6.Thomas▪ ppSoto de inſt. leg. 1. 4. 6. art. 4.Soto, qqMedin… ▪ C. de paenitentia tract. 4. de jujun. c. 7.Medina, rrAdrian quod. 6. art. 2.Adrianus ſſNavar. in ſum. cap. 23. num. 55.Navar ttDriedo l. 3. De liber Chriſt. c. 3. ad. 5.Driedo uuCaſtro lib. 1. de lege pena▪ c. 4.Caſtro, as I gather out of their writings, give ſtrong reaſons, why Rulers cannot lay an obligation on the conſcience, when the matter of the Law is light and naughty, p. 205for this were to make a man a trangreſſor before God, for a word, a ſtraw, a toy, which is unjuſt: Becauſe the juſt weight of the matter is the only juſt ground of the Laws obligation: Ergo, the will of the Lawgiver, except he make a moat a mountaine, cannot lay an obligation of neceſſity on man. 2. It were a fooliſh law, and ſo no law to oblige to eternall puniſhment, and the offending of 2. God for a light thing, for this were to place the way of ſalvation in that wherein the way conſiſteth not. 3. Such a law were not for edification, but for deſtruction of ſoules. 4. This was the Phariſes fault, Mat. 23. to lay on intollerable burthens on mens ſoules. 5. The law of God and nature freeth us in poſitive lawes from guilt, in caſe of neceſſity, as David did lawfully eat Shew-bread. 6. A Civill law may not take away a mans life for a ſtraw, farre leſſe can it bind to Gods wrath. 7. xxAuguſt. De Baptiſ. l. c. 6.Auguſtine ſaith, they be unjuſt ballances to eſteeme things great or ſmall, for our ſole will. Out of all which I conclude, that no law as a Law, doth oblige the Conſcience, but that which hath from the matter morall equity, and not from the intention of the Law-giver, as yyCajet. verbo pracepti tranſgreſsio.Cajetan, zzSilveſt. verbo praecept. q. 9.Silveſter, aaAngelus verb. lex. 11. 3.Angelus, and bbCorduba q. 189. part. 2. rat. 1. 2.Corduba teach, which intention muſt take a rule from the matter of the law, and not give a rule. ccGerſ. de vit. ſpir. lect. 4. c. 7. Nulla lex ſ…reuda eſt tanquam neceſſaria ad ſalutem, qu… non est de jure Divino.Gerſon, No law (ſaith he) is a law to be called as neceſſary to ſalvation, (as all good lavves ſhould be) but that vvhichwhich de jure Divino, is according to Gods lavv, yea, vve are not (ſaith ddDurand. l. 2. d. 44. q. 5. numb. 6. Si Papa praeciperet Monacho ea quae ſum contra ſuam profeſsionem, non motus aliqua necesſitate vel utilitate Eccleſiae, ſed ſola voluntate, & de hoc conſtaret, & Abbas praeciperet, contrarium, obediendum eſſet Abbati, & non Papae.Durandus) to obey the Pope if he command a Monke to doe ſomthing, vvhen he is not moved to command by the neceſſity, the profit of the Church, but by his ovvne free vvill, and if this be knovven. If the Pope (faith he) for his ovvne vvill, and vvithout neceſſity and utility ſhould ſeclude vvorkes of ſupererogation, that command ſhould tend to deſtruction, and vve are to obey Chriſt, vvho is above the Pope. And therefore his mind is, that all obligation of Conſcience, in humane commandments commeth from Gods will and law, that is, from the juſt and neceſſary matter of the law, not from the will of men.

6. Concluſ. All humane or Eccleſiaſtick lawes binding the conſcience, have neceſſarie, and not probable deduction onelyonly, by the warrant of both the M…jor Propoſition and Aſſumption from the p. 206Word of God, and Law of Nature. This concluſion is againſt eeSuarez Tom. de leg. lib. 3. c. 24.Suarez, he ſeeketh onelyonly a probable connexion betwixt obliging Lawes and the Divine law. And ffGreg. de valent. tom. 2. diſp. 7. q. 5. punct. 6. Sect. 1. Humane lawes oblige onelyonly in ſo farre as they agree with the Law of God.Gregorius de valent. is in very deed againſt Gerſon, who teacheth three things of all humane lawes. 1. That they are in ſo farre juſt. 2. That they in ſo farre oblige the Conſcience, as they have neceſſary dependance upon natures law, or Gods word, and therefore compareth them to theſe precepts that Phyſitians give to ſicke perſons, they oblige the conſcience of the ſicke, (as I thinke) from the ſixt Commandement, (Thou ſhalt doe no murther,) for if the patient ſleepe at ſuch a time, or drinke wine in ſuch a caſe, he killeth himſelfe, but they have not obliging power from the fift Commandement, not as if the King being ſicke were obliged by the fift Commandement to obey the Phyſitian, as his ſuperiour. 3. He will have all humane laws that properly obligeth, to be onelyonly declaratory, and to manifeſt onelyonly the Divine law, and to apply it to ſuch and ſuch a matter. The Concluſion is clear from what is ſaid before, becauſe all civil laws as meerly poſitive, in the cafe of non-contempt doe not oblige, and in the caſe of non-ſcandall, as ggMedina tract. De jejunio cap. 7.Medin. hhAlmain. Moral. c. 12.Almaine, iiGerſ. uti ſupra.Gerſon teach. And it followeth from a ſure ground, that kkVaſquez 12. diſp. 158 c. 4. num. 32. Praecipient is intentio non facit praeceptum habere majorem vel minorem obligandi, efficaciam, ſed necesfi…as, diguitas, vel utilitas corum quae praecipiuntur.Vaſquez layeth downe, and he hath it from llDried… de lib. Chriſt. l. 3. c. 3. ad 5.Driedo, to wit, that the efficacy of obligation in humane lawes, cometh not from the will of Lawgivers, or their intention, but from the dignity or waightines of the matter. If then the matter be not from Gods law, juſt, the obligation is none at all; for if the law from mans will, ſhall lay on an obligation of three degrees, whereas Gods law from Gods vvill, before men inacted this in a Law, laid on an obligation of two degrees onelyonly, tying the Conſcience, then the will of man createth obligation, or the obligative power of conſcience in the matter of the Law▪ and by that ſame reaſon he createth goodnes, which is abſurd, for that is proper to God onelyonly.

I grant it is hard, becauſe of the variety of ſingular actions in mans life, to ſee the connexion, betwixt particulars of humane lawes and Gods lawes; yet a connexion there is, and for this cauſe the learned worthy Divine, mmPareus com. in Rom. 13. v. 5. Dub. 7. Concluſ. 5.Rom 13:5Pareus will have humane lawes in p. 207particulari, & per ſe, in the particular and of themſelves to binde the Conſcience. Whereas nnCalvin inſt. l. 3. c. 19. Sect. 15. 16.Calvin, and ooBeza in Notis in Rom. 13. A twofold conſideration of humane laws.Rom 13Beza, Iunius, Tilenus, Sibrandus, Whittakerus and others deny this: But the truth is, humane civill lawes are two waies conſidered. 1. As they are meerly Poſitive & according to the letter of the Law. 2. As they have a connexion with 1. The principles of nature, of right and wrong. 2. With the end of the law, which is the ſupream law, The ſafety of the people, as the Civill law ſaith, he who entreth to an inheritance and maketh no Inventory of all his goods, ſhall pay debts above the-whole heritage, this law according to the letter in the Court of conſcience is unjuſt, and ſo cannot oblige in Conſcience; ſo as he is guilty before God, and deſerveth the vengeance of everlaſting wrath, who doth not make an inventory of all his goods, and produce it to the Iudge; ſo he that goeth up to the walls of a City, may by the Law be commanded to be put to death, yet is he not guiltie of eternall death before God, and therefore if the preſumption which is the ground of the law ceaſe, as this; He that maketh not an inventory with a purpoſe to enjoy the whole inheritance and pay no debts, ſinneth before God againſt conſcience, as famous juriſts, to wit ppIaſon.Jaſon, qqBaldus in rubrica▪ F…de acquirendis b… reditatibus nu. 23. & ſeq.Bartolus and others teach: for this Law conſidered as having connexion with a principle of nature, that every man ſhould pay his debts, is a law binding the Conſcience, and the truth is, the end of theſe Lawes oblige the Conſcience, they being divine expreſſions of juſtice and righteouſneſſe, but not the Lawes themſelves; for whatever obligeth the conſcience as a divine truth, the ignorance thereof is a ſinfull ignorance, and maketh a man guilty of eternall wrath, but men are not guilty & lyable to the eternal wrath of God, becauſe they are ignorant of all the civill Lawes in Iuſtinians book; then were we obliged to be no leſſe verſed in all the civill lawes, that bindeth in foro humano, then of the Bible, and law of God.

The adverſaries ſtrive to prove that theſe lawes oblige the conſcience, we may heare rrBellarm. tom. 1. cont. 5. l. 3. c. 11.Bellarmine ssVaſquez tom. 2 in 12. diſp. 152. cap. 2.Vaſquez, ttValent. tom. 2. diſp. 7. q. 5. punct. 6.Valentinian, and the Formaliſt and Arminian, vvDoctor Iackſon on the Creed, lib. 2. cap. 4Doctor Jackſon ſay, To reſiſt the Rulers in giving, and making lawes, is to reſiſt God, as 1 Sam. 8. They have not refuſed thee, but they have refuſed me, that I ſhould not raigne over them. Suarez …aith, An humane law is the neereſt cauſe of obligation of conſcience, as the eternall law is the remote cauſe. And …ackſon as the immediate interpoſition of divine p. 208authority made the killing of Abrahams ſonne, holy, which otherwiſe would have been cruelty; ſo the interpoſition of authority derived from God, make ſome actions that barely conſidered would be apparently evill, and deſperate, to be honeſt and lawfull; to ſtrike a Prophet would ſeem ſin, but when a Prophet cōmandeth to ſtrike, not to ſtrike is diſobedience, 1▪ Kin. 20. 35, 36. to rob a Spaniard is Piracie, but to do it upon the Kings letter of Mart for wrongs done to the State, is obedience to the King. Anſw. To reſiſt the ſervant in that wherein he is a ſervant, and as a ſervant, is to reſiſt God, as 1 Sam. 8. proveth well.How inferiour rulers are ſubordinate to God in commanding. But the aſſumption then is moſt falſe, for rulers in making lawes, and creating by their ſole pleaſure, goodnes morall, in particular matters without the word of God, are not Gods ſervants, nor is humane authoritie as humane, the neareſt cauſe of obligation of conſcience, inſtamped in theſe lawes, nor is it the cauſe at all, and therefore to reſiſt them, is not to reſiſt God. They be Gods inſtruments and Miniſters in 1. Propounding and expounding Gods laws. 2. In executing them, and defending them from the violence of men. 3. In making poſitive and directory civil lawes, for civill government, that are lawes improperly ſo called, which bind the conſcience as above is ſaid, in ſo far, as they have dependance upon Gods Law: for Iames ſaith, There is but one Law-giver. As for Church-canons, all, except Phyſicall circumſtances in them, are to be warranted by the word. Therefore it is a vaine conſequence of Valentia, humane lawes oblige, dependenter a lege aeternâ, as they depend on the eternall law▪ Ergo, they oblige in Conſcience, it followeth not. They oblige in Conſcience as their Major and Minor propoſition, in that which is morall, can be proved out of Gods word, but ſo, in their morallity they are meerely divine, and not humane and poſitive, and ſo the argument concludeth not againſt us. They oblige in Conſcience as they depend upon the eternall law, that is, as they are deduced from the eternall Law of God, in a Major propoſition, without probation of the aſſumption, that we deny, and it is in queſtion now. The people 1 Sam. 8. in rejecting Samuel from being their judge, rejected God, not becauſe Samuel had a power of making lawes, without the warrant of Gods word. Neither Moſes, nor Jeremiah, nor Ezekiel▪ nor any Prophet were in that ſervants ſubordinate to God, for they vvere onelyonly to heare the vvord at Gods mouth. 3. We could have no more at Bellarmines p. 209xxBellar cont. Barclai. cap. 3. Bon… ſenſu Chriſtus dedit Petro poteſtatem faciend… de▪ peccato non peccatum, & de non peccato peccatum. Humane authority is not the neareſt or inſtrumentall cauſe of Lawes.hand, then Jackſon ſaith. For Bellarmine ſaith, In a good ſenſe Chriſt gave to Peter a power, to make that which is ſinne, to be no ſin, and that which is no ſinne, to be ſinne. So Iackſon, the interpoſition of derived authority, maketh that which would be murther other wayes, to bee a good worke; that is, men may doe what God onelyonly can doe. If Iſaac then at the commandement of Abraham his father, offer his ſonne Iacob to God in a bloody Sacrifice, then Abrahams derived authority maketh that a lawfull ſacrifice, as to ſtrike a Prophet of it ſelfe, is a degree of murther, but when a Prophet commandeth another to ſtrike a Prophet, it is lawfull. But can any blaſphemer ſay, that this was humane derived authority without warrant of the word of the Lord, ſuch as are humane poſitive lawes, and our humane ceremonies, ſee the text, 1 King. 20. 35. And a certaine man of the ſonnes of the Prophets, ſaid unto his neighbour in the word of the Lord▪ ſmite me. This was immediate, divine and Propheticall authoritie, and not humane. Doth the Kings letter of Mart make robbing a Spaniard lawfull? Court Paraſites ſpeake ſo, he refuteth himſelfe. The Kings letter of Mart, for wrongs done to the State, maketh that which is Piracy lawfull, then the Kings authority doth not here by a nomothetick power, and a law laid upon the Conſcience, but the wrongs of Piracy by Spaine, done to the State of England, may make the robbing of Spaniards an act of lawfull warre, and an act of juſtice flowing from the King as a lawfull Magiſtrate. Now Iackſon is ſpeaking of mandates of Rulers in that place, which have no warrant of the word of God. Yea, even Stapleton yyStapleton de ſtatu Eccleſ. cont. 5. q. 7 art. 2.a Papiſt ſaith, as Doctor Field alſo zzField on the Church, booke. 4. c. 33.obſerveth, That humane laws binde for the utility and neoeſſity of the matter, and not from the will of the Lawgiver. And ſo ſaith aaGerſonGerſon, bbAlmain oper. moral. cap. 12.Almain, ccDecius namco…upiſcen. lect. 1.Decius, ddMencha queſtionum illuſtrium l. 1. c. 19. num. 1.Mencha, and our owne eeIunius animadv.Iunius ſaith, The plenitude of power of lawes is onelyonly in the princpall agent, not in the inſtrument. ffDoctor Iackſon 16.Doctor Iackſon ſaith, unlimited and abſolute faith or ſubmiſſion of conſcience we owe not to rulers, that is due to God, but we owe to them conditionall aſſent and cautionary obedience, if they ſpeake from God▪ ſuppoſe they fetch not an expreſſe commiſſion from Scripture, for if Paſtors be then onelyonly to be obeyed when they bring evident commiſſion out of Scripture, I were no more bound to beleeve & obey my governours, then they are bound to beleeve and obey in Bellarm. contr. 3. lih. 4. cap. 6. not. 89. p. 210my Governours, then ther are bound to believe and obey me, for equals are oblieged to obey equalls, when they bring a warrant from Gods word▪ and ſo the povver of Rulers vvere not reall, but titular, and the ſame do th ggSutluvius de Presbyter c. 11. 66. Sic non magis Eccleſiae & Synodo log…s ſcribere & promulga…e liceres, quam popul… & ſubditis ſibil…ge… co… de… pr… ter ſui principis▪ & Magiſtratus voluntatem, ſi nimirum Chriſtus eſſet extern… politiae legiſlator.Sutluvius and hhBellar. de interp▪ verbi lib▪ 3. cap. 4. A double obedience due to Rulers, objective and ſubjective.Bellarmine ſay.

Anſw. We owe to equalls, to Mahomet, conditionall and cautionary faith and obedience; thus, I beleeve what Mahomet ſaith, ſo he ſpeake Gods word, yea ſo Samaritans who worſhipped they knew not what, John 4. 26. gave ſaith to their Teachers in a blinde way, ſo they ſpeake according to Gods word. 2. It followeth in no ſort, if Rulers are onelyonly to be obeyed when they bring Gods Word, that then they are no more to be obeyed then equalls & Infetiours, becauſe there is a double obedience, one of conſcience, and objective coming from the thing commanded; And in reſpect of this, the word hath no leſſe authority, and doth no leſſe challenge obedience of Confcience, and objective, when my equall ſpeaketh it in a private way, yea, when I writ it in my muſe, then when a Paſtor ſpeaketh it by publike authority; for we teach againſt Papiſts, that the word borroweth …o authority from men, nor is it with certainty of faith to be received as the Word of man, but as indeed the Word of God, as the Scripture ſaith: 1. There is another obedience officiall, which is alſo obedience of Conſcience, becauſe the fifth Commandement injoyneth it. Yet not obedience of Conſcience coming from the particular, commanded in humane Lawes, as humane, ſo I owe obedience of ſubjection, and ſubmiſſion of affection, of feare, love, honour, reſpect, by vertue of the fift Commandement to Rulers, when they command according to Gods Word, and this I owe not to equals or inferiours; and ſo it followeth not that the power of Rulers and Synods is titular, becauſe they muſt warrant their mandates from the Word. But its alwayes this mans hap to be againſt ſound(i) 1▪ Theſ. 2. 13. Eſa. 1. 2. …er. 1. 2. Ezek. 2. 7. Objective obedience no more due to Rulers then to equalls.1 Thess 2:13Isa 1:2Ezek 2:7 truth. But 3. That I owe no more objective ſubjection of conſcience to this, (Thou ſhalt not murther) (Beleeve in Ieſus Chriſt) when Rulers and Paſtors command them, then when I read them in Gods word. I prove 1. If this from a Ruler (Thou ſhalt not murther,) challenge faith and ſubjection of Conſcience of ſix degrees, but as I read it my ſelfe, or as my equall in a private way ſaith, (Thou ſhalt not murther) it challenge ſaith and ſubjection of foure degrees onelyonly, then is it more obligatory of Conſcience, p. 211and ſo of more intrinſecall authority, and ſo more the word of God when the Ruler commandeth it, then when I read it, or my equall ſpeaketh it to me. This were abſurd for the ſpeaker, whether publike or private perſon, addeth not any intrinſecall authority to the word, for then the word ſhould be more or leſſe Gods word, as the bearers were publike, or private, more or leſſe worthy. As Gods word ſpoken by Amos a Prophet, ſhould not be a word of ſuch intrinfecall authority, as ſpoken by Moſes both a Prince and a Prophet. 2. My faith of ſubjection of Conſcience, ſhould be reſolved, as concerning the two degrees of obedience of faith to the word ſpoken by the Ruler on the ſole authority of the Ruler, and not on the authority of God, the Author of his own word. 4. I anſwer to Sutluvius, That Chriſt in the externall policy of his owne houſe is a Lawgiver, ordaining ſuch and ſuch officers himſelfe, Ezek. 4. 11. commanding order and decency, and ſetting downe a perfect diſcipline in the New Teſtament, in all particulars that have influence, religious, morall, myſtically ſignificant in Gods worſhip, and there is reaſon that Synods and Paſtors, ſhould rather promulgate Gods Lawes, then the people. 1. Becauſe God hath given to them by office, the key of knowledge. 2. Becauſe by office they are watch-men, and ſo have authority of office to heare the Law at Gods mouth, and in Synods to give Directories or Canons according to that word, which people have not, and that their Canons muſt be according to Gods Word, is ſaid in the word, Nehemiah 10. 32. Alſo we …ade ordinances for us, 34. as it is written in the law of the Lord.

Iackſon ſaith, Of things good in themſelves and apprehended ſo by us, without any ſcruple of evil, every mans conſelence htah ſufficient authorityIbid. p. 259▪ 260. to inioyn it, only the alacrity of doing in what time or meaſure it is to be done, or ſuch circumſtances, cometh within the ſubiect of obedience to governours.

Anſw. Then becauſe faith in Chriſt is evidently good by the Doctors learning, the Paſtor hath no more authority to command the people to beleeve in Chriſt, then the people hath to command the ſame to him. So in preaching all the neceſſary fundamentals of ſalvation, the authority of Paſtors is meerely titular. There be then little neceſſitie of a publike Miniſtery, as Socinians teach us. 2. The ala…rity and manner and meaſure of beleeving, and doing things p. 212evidently good is as particularly ſet downe in Gods Word, as obliging the Conſcience, as the Mandates themſelves, God who commandeth us to love him, and to beleeve in his Sonne, hath not left that power to Prelates, that createth wretched Ceremonies, to command us to love God with all our heart, or not, and to ſerve God with alacrity or not, or to beleeve in Chriſt with all the heart or with halfe a heart; the ſincerity, meaſure and manner of the loving of God, is no more the ſubject of obedience to rulers then the loving of God. Rulers doe command both alike, Pari authoritate, except the man ſay that we obey Gods Law perfectly, when we give obedience to it, according to the ſubſtance of the acts, though we obey not ſincerely.Falſe rules of obedience to Rulers propoſed by Doctor Jackſon refuted.

The Doctor giveth us Rules in obeying Rulers. We are not to adventure on the action, whereof we are perſwaded there be much evil, and no good in it.

Anſ. Then we cannot venture upon Ceremonies, that bringeth adders to Gods word, under all the Plagues written in Gods word.

2. Gods word, not mens perſwaſions of conſcience (except in this alſo he be an Arminian) is the rule of mens actions. The ſervants3. Rule. of Caiaphas may be perſwaded there is no good, but much evil in confeſſing, Chriſt▪ We are to lay aſide the erroneous perſwaſion, and obey, if the action be good in itſelf.

Iackſon. Some actions apprehended as meerly evil, may be undertaken with leſſe danger, then others which are apprehended, partly as evil, partly as good; the action is evil as long as we fear the evil in it, to be greater then the good we can hope for.

Anſ. To do any thing as apprehended evil, of which ſort are humane Ceremonies to us, for any reſpect, is to do with a doubting conſcience, and to ſin, Rom. 14. 23. 2▪ Gods word, not probabilities ſhould lead us in adventuring upon actions.

Iackſon. 3. If the meaſure of the good apprehended, be as great as the evil feared; in private choice, we may adventure upon the action, leaving the event to Gods providence, which favoureth actions, more then privations, works rather then idleneſſe, and following of that which is good, rather then abſtinence from evil: for vvhere this indifference of perſwaſion is▪ authority may caſt the ballance, and ſway the private choice? ſo alſo aaHooker Churchpolicy 5. book p. 197. 198.Hooker.

Anſ. This is the Ieſuit bbSuarez de Relig. tom 4. lib. 4. tract. 9. cap. 15. Conſiderare, …rg… aporte… a… ſecluſo precepto res ſit, utra que ex parte probabilis, & tunc univerſaliter verum erit, adjuncto praecepto, obediendum eſſe.Suarez his doctrine, and ſo ſaith the p. 213Ieſuit of Corduba ccThomas Sanches Jeſuita Cordubenſis in Decalog. tom. 2. l. 6. c. 3. n. 3. Quado ſubditus dubius eſt an res precepta, ſitlicita nec ne tenetur obedire & exeuſatur abpreceptun ſuperioris.Sanches, when the ſubject is in a doubt, whether the thing commanded by the Superiour be lawfull or not, he is obliged to obey, and he is to be excuſed becauſe of the command of the ſuperiour: 1. Becauſe (ſay they) the Commanders condition is better, and for a ſpeculative doubt, he is not to be ſpoiled of his power of commanding, where reaſon, ſaith he, commandeth nothing againſt reaſon: 2. Becauſe the inferiour hath reſigned his will to the ſuperiour, Deut. 17. 2. Paral. 19. Ergo, In things doubtſome, God commanded to ſtand to the determination of the Prieſt, and it is a truth that the will of the Superiour doth not vary and change the nature of a thing in it ſelf; yet it varieth to the inferiours conſcience. Now indifference of perſwaſion is all one to Doctor Iackson with indifferency of the thing, for ſo he dictates. If one have indifferency of reaſons of twelve degrees on both ſides, that Arianiſme, or Arminianiſme, is truth, if authority determine both to be truth, the weight of authority in indifferency of perſwaſion ſhould caſt the ballance, and to believe this, or not to believe it: where Arguments are of twelve grains of light of truth on both ſides, it is to the doubting man, as if the thing were indifferent, ſo is the doubter to give up his ſoul, conſcience, and faith to believe Arianiſme to be truth, not from light of conſcience, (for equally as much light of conſcience are in either ſide, as is ſuppoſed) but for the meer will of humane authority, without Gods word.

Now though the matter here be indifferent in it ſelf, yet not ſo to the doubter; for Ceremonies in our perſwaſion are not indifferent. See here Ignatius Loyola ddIgnat. loyola. cat. Jeſuit lib. 2. cap. 17. & 18. Prudentia non obedicntis, ſed imperantis eſt Item non eſt dignus nomine obedientis, qui legittimo ſuperiori, non cum voluntate judicum ſuum ſubmittit.ſay, Give over your ſelf to your Ruler. Give the Prelate your faith to keep, while ye be in eternity, and at the laſt judgement he will reſtore the pawn; And this is (…aith Gregory de Valent. eeGreg. d… Valentia▪ to. 3. diſ. 7. q. 3. punct. 2. Subditus non ſuo judicio at que authoritati nititur ſuperioris.to give your two eyes to your guide: I had rather they ſtick in my own head. To theſe Ieſuits I oppoſe the minde of ffVaſquez 12. q. 19▪ diſp. 66. c. 9. num. …1.Vaſquez, and ggSalas 12. q▪ 21. tract. 8. diſp. unic. ſect▪ 17. num. 152.Salas, who ſay in that caſe the ſubject ſhould firſt lay aſide his errour, and then obey. 2 God requireth a full perſwaſion by the Lord Ieſus, even in things indifferent, Rom. 14. 14, 22, 23. But poor naked humane authority cannot ingender perſwaſion of faith; and here is doubting▪ 3. It is falſe, That providence favoureth poſitive actions, more then privations, for p. 214Rom. 14. God loveth better abſtinence from meats in themſelves lawfull and clean, as the Apoſtle proveth, ver. 14. Becauſe nothing is unclean of it ſelf, then that the eater doubt, if he be not tranſgreſſing the Law of God in eating, though a great Apoſtle ſay, there is no danger in eating.

And Jackson addeth of the ſame nature theſe; The good of obedience is not a conſequent only of the action, but either an eſſentiallThe good neſſe of obedience to Rulers cannot countervalue the evil in the manner of doing with a doubting conſcience and ſo ſinfully. part, or ſuch a circumſtance and motive precedent, as bringeth a new eſſence for its concomitant, whereby the evil, which we out of private perſwaſions fear, may be countervaled by the goodneſſe that is in the purpoſe of ſincere obedience to lawfull authority, as well as we conceited good probably included in the very obiect of the action, he that doth that which in his private opinion he ſuspecteth to be evil, becauſe injoyned by lawfull authority, doth not evil that good may come of it, ſeeing the goodneſſe of obedience is no conſequent of the action, but a motive precedent—authority maketh actions indifferent to be good and neceſſary.

Anſ. He beggeth the queſtion: The goodneſſe of ſincere obedience to authority (ſaith he) may countervail the evil, that we in our private choice fear to be in the action. But firſt, obedience to authority in things wanting Gods word (whereof he ſpeaketh now) is not obedience, but ſinning, becauſe doing without faith. 2. I take the Doctor at his word, refuſing obedience to mens willworſhip, or to practiſe even to the ruin of the weak, things indifferent, for fear of the greateſt evil, the offending of God, by adding to his worſhip, Rev. 22. 18, 19. is obedience to God, and not a privation; the purpoſe (I ſay) of this obedience to God, may countervail all evil that can be imagined in non-obedience to men, and ſure obedience to God, though probably obedience is as good and better, then obedience to men, though probably obedience.

Jeſuites and Formalists ſay, Rulers are in poſſeſſion to command; Ergo, We cannot thruſt them out of poſſeſſion, where we are not perſwaded that they command againſt reaſon, ſaith Sanches: So I ſay, God is in juſt poſſeſſion commanding us to venture upon no indifferent action, where the conſcience doubteth, and ſhall we not no leſſe contend for Gods juſt poſſeſſion, as time-ſervers do for mortall Rulers unjuſt poſſeſſion in this? 2. I prove that it were Lawfull then to ſin againſt God: A Iew is alike perſwaded, that Maries Son i… the true Meſſiah, and that he is a deceiver: Opinions p. 215about a man, might ſeem indifferent to the Iews, And it is all one (ſaith Jackson) as if the thing be indifferent. Now the Phariſees in a Councell, determine, that Maries Son is a deceiver; Then it is lawfull for the Jew, upon purpoſe of ſincere obedience to Phariſees, who ſit in Moſes chair, to believe, that Maries ſon is a deceiver; becauſe the conceit of ſincere obedience is an eſſentiall motive to tranſubſtantiate unbelief into ſincere obedience, and the Iew may venture upon the faith, that Maries Son is a deceiver, and crucifie the Lord of glory: being commanded thereunto by his Commanders, becauſe Gods providence favoureth more poſitive actions, then privations. 3. He ſaith, He that obeyeth for the ſole authority of Rulers, doth not evil that good may come of it: 1. Becauſe the goodneſſe of obedience countervaileth the evil of the actions: But 1▪ The queſtion is, if it be obedience; Ergo, If it be no obedience, it cannot countervail the evil. 2. If it be the evil of ſin, with a doubting conſcience to do what judges commandeth, having no warrant of faith, but the will and luſt of men, no purpoſe of good, though it were to ſave all the world, can counter-redeem the evil of ſin againſt God. 2. Becauſe (ſaith he) ſuch a one doth not evil, that good may come of it. Then he that ſtealeth moneys to give to the poor doth not evil, that good may come of it, by Dr. Jacksons reaſon, Becauſe the goodneſſe of purpoſing to help the poor is not a conſequent, but a precedent motive of the action, and ſo maketh it good: We all know, the intention of the end goeth in the intention before the action, but not as an eſſentiall cauſe to make an evil action good, or make an indifferent action neceſſary and honeſt: A good intention doth make a good action good and better, but that a good intention (as Idolators are full of good intentions) can never ſo ſeaſon the means, as (this Doctor ſaith) that it can make evil to be good, iiVaſquez in 12. …om. 1. diſp. 68. cap. 2.Vaſquez condemneth the Fathers of ignorance, becauſe they ſaid, Propoſitum bonum excuſat malum opus: ſo Caſſianus kkC…ſſian. collat. 17. cap. 17▪ſaid, It was lawfull to lie for a good end, and llChryſ… ▪ oper. imperf. fi ejus …it opus, homil. 9. cap. 7.Chryſoſto…, and mmAmbr. lib. i…de offic. cap. 30.Ambroſe ſaid the ſame, as Vaſquez ſaith: ſee nnAquin. 12. q. 19. art. 7.Aquinas for this. 3. It is the doctrine of the man of ſin, That Pope or Rulers, ſole and bare authority can make an action indifferent, and ſo neither good nor evil, to be indifferent and good, as ooBellar. de Pont if. Rom l. 4. cap. 16. Quioun que poteſt precipere, poleſt etiam actum indifferentem ſuo precepto facere neceſſarium, & per ſe bonum.Bellarmine ſaith; for God only by his inſtitution createth morall goodneſſe in actions; mans p. 216will is no creatrix of goodneſſe. 4. Neither reſolutions nor skill are to be credited or followed, becauſe private or publick, becauſe authority of man as ſuch, is no light nor warrant to the conſcience to adventure upon moral actions; and the Lord giveth light to private men to obey, Pſal. 25. 8, 9. 1 Cor. 2. 14, 15. Ioh. 7. 17, …8 Ioh. 7. 27. 2 Cor; 3. 18. 2 Cor. 4. 4. As he doth to Rulers to Command. So ppSilveſt. in voce abrogat.Sylveſter, qqTartar. in moral. cap. 5. & 7.Tartaretus, ſo rrRiver. catho. orth. tom. 1. q. 9. tract. 2. q. 2Rivetus, ſſField l. 4. cap. 33.Doctot Field.

I proceed to anſwer other Arguments: As 1. We muſt not obey, Not only for wrath, but for conſcience, the violation of a ſpeciall Law, neceſſarily draweth with it the violation of the generall Law of the fift Commandment; But the violation of the generall, (ſaith Learned ttPareus.Pareus) hurteth the Conſcience; and the Magiſtrate puniſheth not for generall Violation, but for the Violation of this speciall Law; Ergo, this speciall Law obligeth in Conſcience. And it ſeemeth to carry reaſon. Every juſt puniſhment preſuppoſeth eſſentially a ſin, elſe it is not a juſt puniſhment; but the Ruler doth juſtly puniſh the particular Tranſgreſſion of an humane Law; Ergo, the Tranſgreſſion of a particular Law of Rulers is ſin. The Propoſition is confirmed by grave School-men, uuSoto l. 1. de juſt. q. 6. art. 3.Soto, xxSylveſt. Verb… in obedientia in …i…c.Sylveſter, yyJo: Eſelius, in ezpoſ. Decall. praecept. 4. cap. 36.and Ioan, Eſelius, Who thinke that there cannot be a Law obliging to a puniſhment, and not to a fault; becauſe puniſhment hath an intrinſecall relation to a ſin, nor can it be a juſt puniſhment that is not proportioned to a ſin; for the Law zzCap. 2. De conſtit. Rem, quae culpa caret, in damnum vocari non convenit. Other Arguments for the obligation of humane Laws Anſwered.ſaith, That cometh not under damage, which cometh not under fault.

Anſ. Though the Violation of the generall Law hurteth the Conſcience, it being againſt the fifth Commandment; it followeth not that the Violation of every particular Law, even that that is meerly Poſitive, hurteth the Conſcience before God: For then the carrying of Armour in the Night, Suppoſe no Ruler on earth make a Law there anent, ſhould be a ſin before God, which no wiſe man can ſay. 2. The other reaſon is more important, and draweth with it that School-queſtion agitated by Iurists alſo and Ganoniſts, An ulla detur lox pure paenalis; If there be a Law purely Penall, without ſin in it: And if the Law of Rulers in things meerly Poſitive, be meerly Penall and co-active, and not formally obliging to ſin. But I Anſwer, Rulers do juſtly puniſh the Tranſgreſſion of a Poſitive Law, not as particularly humane and Poſitive: But as 1. It hath connexion with the Morall Reaſon of the Law. 2. As the particular p. 217tranſgreſſion is ſcandalous and againſt order, in which caſe the formall object of the juſt puniſhment inflicted by the Ruler, is in very deed not the ſimple omiſſion of the poſitive act of a particular humane Law, but the violation of the morall goodneſſe annexed to it, and of the ſcandall given. Now in this meaning, the tranſgreſſion of the poſitive humane Law is not kindely, Per ſe, of it ſelf puniſhable, but by accident, and ſo it bindeth the conſcience by accident; And in this ſenſe, great Doctors, as aaAmbroſ.Ambroſe, bbAnſelm.Anſelme, ccTheodoretus in loc. Rom 13.Rom 13Theodoret, ddChryſoſ. in Rom. 13. hom. 23.Rom 13Chryſoſtom, eeNavar. in ſum. cap. 23. numb. 54.Navarra, ffFelinus, cap. 1. de ſponſalib. n. 18.Felinus, ggTaraqu. Prefat de utroque retractu. n. 74. What it is to reſiſt the Ruler.Taraquel ſay, That humane Laws oblige the conſcience. But the moſt learned of the Canoniſts aver, that not to obey civill Laws, laying aſide the evil of ſcandall, is no mortall ſin, and ſo doth not involve the conſcience in guiltineſſe before God.

2. They object. To reſiſt the Laws of the Magiſtrate, is to reſiſt himſelf; and to reſiſt himſelf, is to reſiſt the Ordinance of God.

Anſ. To reſiſt the Laws poſitive and particular in connexion with the morall reaſon of the Law, is to reſiſt the Ruler, true. But ſo the queſtion is not concluded againſt us: for by accident in that ſenſe, humane Laws binde the conſcience; but to reſiſt the particular Laws, as particular Laws, as particular poſitive Laws, is not to reſiſt the Ruler: A Ruler as a Ruler, doth never command a thing meerly indifferent as ſuch, but as good, edificative, profitable, and except you reſiſt the morality of the poſitive humane Law, you reſiſt not the Ruler; yea, nor yet is the Law reſiſted.

3. The Ieſuit Lod. Meratius hhLodovi Merat. par. 1. tract. de leg diſp. 1. Sect. 13.objecteth: Every true Law obligeth, either to guiltineſſe, or to puniſhment, but the civill and Canonick Laws are Laws properly ſo called. But they do not ever oblige to puniſhment only. Ergo, They oblige to ſin.

Anſ. It is denied that Laws civill or Canonicall, as meerly particularly poſitive, do oblige as Laws, or that they are Laws, they be only Laws according to the morality in them, that can promove us to our laſt end, eternall felicity.

It is alſo falſe that the Ieſuit ſaith, If thou wilt be ſaved, keep the Commandments, doth command the keeping of all Civill and Canonick Laws, or that hence is concluded a Law obliging the conſcience, that is, humane and poſitive, as if a Lent Faſt, a Pilgrimage, and not carrying Armour in the night were commanded by Chriſt, as neceſſary to life eternall.

p. 218The ſame iiMerat. ib. Sect. 2.Meratius ſtriveth to anſwer the Argument of Almain and Gerſon, which is this; Who ever can oblige to ſin mortall before God, he can inflict eternall puniſhment, but no mortall man can inflict eternall puniſhment.

1. Saith he, This Argument would prove ſins againſt the Law of nature, as homicide, and adultery, not to be deadly ſins, for by the Law of nature, eternall puniſhment is not inflicted for ſins againſt the Law of nature, but by the poſitive will of God. If any ſay, God is the author of the Law of nature, becauſe he is the Creator of that humane nature, in the which this law is written: So, if that be ſufficient that the law of nature oblige under eternall puniſhment, ſo alſo the civill and Eccleſiaſticall lavv ſhall binde the conſcience, becauſe he is the author of that power which maketh Civill and Eccleſiaſtick laws, for there is no power, but it is of God.

Anſ. 1. By the Law of nature, ſins againſt the Law of nature deſerve eternall puniſhment, and that eſſentially, laying aſide the poſitive will of God, to whom I grant it is free to inflict puniſhment, or not to inflict, and this agreeth to all ſin. But to carry Armour in the night, laying aſide the caſe of ſcandall, and the morality thereof, that no murther follow thereupon, deſerveth neither temporall nor eternall puniſhment. And if this Argument of the Ieſuits hold good, no mortall ſin ſhall oblige to eternall puniſhment, becauſe Gods poſitive will is the neareſt cauſe of actuall puniſhment eternall in all ſins. 2. God is not the Author of a propper no…othetick power in man, for that is the queſtion.

2. He anſwereth, Diſtinguiſhing the Propoſition. None can oblige to a mortall ſin, but he who can inflict the eternall puniſhment of a mortall ſin. It is true (ſaith he) of the puniſhment which wholly dependeth upon the will of the judge who made the Law: but it is not true of that puniſhment, which no way dependeth upon the will of the Iudge, ſuch as is eternall puniſhment, excommunication dependeth upon the vvill of man, and it obligeth to eternall puniſhment, yet man cannot inflict that eternall puniſhment: for a man may command an act, the omiſſion whereof, or the commiſſion whereof, is of ſuch moment, that it ſerveth much for the good of a community, and therefore he vvho of knowledge and vvillingly doth ſuch an act, doth ſin againſt right reaſon, and ſo againſt the eternall lavv of God.

Anſ. 1. The diſtinction of the Jeſuit is but a begging of the queſtion. p. 219He vvho can oblige to mortall ſin by his Lavv, can alſo oblige to eternall puniſhment, if eternall puniſhment depend vvholly on his free vvill, as the Lavv doth; What is that, but the inflicting of eternal puniſhment belongeth to him who maketh a Law obliging to ſin mortal, ſo being the inflicting of eternall puniſhment belong to him; But our Argument is, he who hath dominion and authority to make a Law, hath dominion and authority to inflict a puniſhment anſwerable to the tranſgreſſion of that Law: for it is one dominionWhy men cannot make laws that layeth a tye on the Conſcience. and power to make the Law, and to inflict the penalty of the Law: Man cannot make the penalty of eternall wrath: Ergo, he cannot make a Law obliging to eternall wrath.

2. Excommunication is not done by mans will, but by the power of the keys for a mortall ſin deſerving excommunication, and ſo eternall wrath. If any Excommunicate upon his ſole will, as wicked Popes have done; in that caſe the will of a man obligeth neither to puniſhment, nor to eternall puniſhment, it is but Brutum Fulmen, and not to be feared. 3. If any Commit an act that hurteth a whole Community, and is forbidden by men in Authority, he ſinneth againſt the Law of God, though men had never forbidden that Act: And we deny not but humane Laws agreeing with the Law of Nature, doth oblige the Conſcience both to ſin and eternall puniſhment, but then they are not humane Laws, but Divine Laws, and in that caſe two guiltineſſes, Duo reatus, are Committed, one againſt the fifth Commandment, in doing what Superiors according to Gods Word forbiddeth, and there is another guiltineſſe againſt the matter it ſelf, and a Divine Law, which alſo ſhould ſtand as a ſin before God, thought the Ruler had never forbidden it: But if any carry Armour in the Night, being forbidden by the Iudge, for eſchewing of night homicide, if no homicide follow at all, and the matter be not known, and ſo not ſcandalous, the carrier of Armour is involved in no guiltineſſe before God.