The Sovereign Power of Parliaments Part 4, Appendix · Part 8 (4 of 4)

The Sovereign Power of Parliaments Part 4 · Appendix · Part 8 (4 of 4)

p. 183We therefore give all men to underſtand, That having duely conſidered all theſe things, and being preſt by extreme neceſſitie, We have by a generall reſolution and conſent, declared, and doe declare by theſe preſents, the King of Spaine, ipſo jure, to be fallen from the Seigniory, Principalitie, juriſdiction, and inheritance of theſe Countries: And that we are reſolved, never to acknowledge him any more, in any matter concerning the Prince, juriſdictions or demeanes of theſe Netherlands, nor to uſe hereafter, neither yet to ſuffer any other to uſe his Name as Soveraigne Lord thereof. According to the which we declare all Officers, private Noblemen, Vaſſels, and other inhabitants of theſe Countries, of what condition or qualitie ſoever, to be from henceforth diſcharged of the Oath which they have made in any manner whatſoever, unto the King of Spaine, as Lord of theſe countries, or of that whereby they may be bound unto him. And for the abovenamed reaſons, the moſt part of the ſaid united Provinces, by a common accord and conſent of their Members, have ſubmitted themſelves under the command & government of the high and mighty Prince, the Duke of Aniou and Alanſon, &c. upon certain conditions contracted and accorded with his Highneſſe: and that the Archduke of Auſtria, Mathias, hath reſigned into our hands the government generall of theſe p. 184Countries, the which hath been accepted by us. We enjoyn and command all Iudges, Officers, and all others, to whom it ſhall appertain, That hereafter they forbeare to uſe any more, the name, titles, great ſeal, or ſignet of the K. of Spain: and inſtead therof, whilſt that the Duke of Anjou, for his urgent affaires, concerning the good and welfare of the Country, ſhall be yet abſent, for as much as ſhall concern the Provinces which have contracted with his Highneſſe, and touching the reſt by way of proviſion, they ſhall uſe the title and name of the chiefe and Counſell of the Country. And until that the ſaid heads and Counſellors, ſhall be named, called, and really eſtabliſhed in the exerciſe of their charges, and offices, they ſhall uſe our name, except Holland and Zeeland, where they ſhall uſe as they have formerly done, the name of the Prince of Orange, and of the Eſtates of the ſaid Provinces, untill that the ſaid Councell ſhall be in force, and then they ſhall govern themſelves as it is agreed, touching the inſtructions given for the ſaid Counſell, and the accords made with his Highneſſe. And inſtead of the Kings ſeales, they ſhall hereafter uſe our Great Seale, counter Seale, and Signet, in matters concerning the government generall, for the which the Councell of the Country, according to their inſtructions ſhall have authority. And in matters concerning the policie, adminiſtration of Iuſtice, and other private acts of every Province, the Provinciall Councels and others, ſhall reſpectively uſe the name and Seale of the ſaid Province, where the matter ſhall be in queſtion, and no other, upon pain of nullity of the ſaid Letters, or Diſpatches which ſhall be otherwiſe made or ſealed. And to the end theſe things may bee the better obſerved and effected, we have enjoyned and commanded, and do enjoyn and command by theſe preſents, That all the King of Spaines Seales, which are at this preſent with theſe united Provinces, ſhall be dilivered into the States hands, or to him that ſhall have commiſſion and authority from them, upon pain of arbitrary puniſhment. Moreover, We ordain and command, that from henceforth the names and armes of the King of Spain, ſhall not be put nor ſtampt in any coynes of theſe united Provinces: but there ſhall be ſuch a figure ſet upon them, as ſhall be appointed for the coyning of new peeces of Gold and Silver. In the like ſort we enjoyn and command the preſident and Lords of the privie Councel, and all other Chancellors, preſidents, Provinciall Conſuls, and all Preſidents and chiefe Maſters of accounts, and others of all chambers of accounts, being reſpectively in theſe countries, and alſo all other Iudges, and Officers (as holding them diſcharged of the oath which they have made unto the King of Spain, according to the tenor of their Commiſſions) that they ſhall take a new oath in the hands of the Eſtates of the Province where they are, or to their Deputies, by the which they ſhall ſwear to be faithfull to us againſt the King of Spain, and his adherents, according to the form ſet down by us: and there ſhall be given to the ſaid Councellors, Maſters of accounts, Iudges and Officers, remaining in the Provinces which have contracted with the Duke of Aniou, in our name, an act of continuance in their Offices, containing in ſtead of a new commiſſion, a ceſſation or diſannulling of their former, and that by way of proviſion, untill his comming. And to Councellors, Maſters of accounts, Iudges, and Officers, being reſident in Provinces, which have not contracted with his Highneſſe, a new Commiſſion ſhall be given under our name and Seale, if the petitioners were not found faulty, to be of bad behaviour, to have done againſt the priviledges of the Countrey, or to have committed ſome other diſorder.

p. 185We alſo command the Preſident and them of the privie Councell, the Chancellour and Councell of Brabant, the Governour, Chancellour, and Councell of Gueldres, and the Countie of Zutphen, the Preſident and councell in Flanders, the Preſident and councell in Holland, the Governour, Preſident and Councell in Friſeland, the Preſident and Councell at Vtricht, the Bayliff at Tournay and Tourneſis, the Receivors or chiefe Officer of Beooſter cheldt and Beweſterſcheldt Zeeland, the ſcout of Macklyn, and all other Iudges and Officers whom it ſhall concerne, their Lieutenants and every of them, preſently without any delay, to publiſh this our Decree in all places of their juriſdictions, and whereſoever they are accuſtomed to make proclamations, to the end that no man may pretend any cauſe of ignorance: And that they may keep and obſerve, and cauſe to be kept and obſerved inviolably this our Decree, without any favour, ſupport, or diſſimulation; for wee have ſo thought it fit and convenient for the good of the Countrey. For the effecting whereof, we give to every one whom it ſhall concerne, full power and authority, and ſpeciall Commiſſion. In witneſſe whereof, we have cauſed our ſeale to be hereunto annexed. Given at the Hage in our aſſembly the 26 of Iuly 1581. Vnderneath was written, By the ordinance and decree of the ſaid Eſtates, and ſigned I. Tan Aſſeliers.

According unto this declaration of the Eſtates, there was a new forme of an Oath drawn, in manner of an abjuration of the King of Spaine, and promiſe of duty and obedience which every one ſhould owe unto the ſaid Eſtates, by the publike Officers, and Magiſtrates of every Town and Province, as followeth.

I ſweare,The forme of the oath of abjuration of the King of Spaine. That hereafter I ſhall not ſerve nor yeeld obedience to Philip King of Spaine, nor acknowledge him for my Prince and Lord, whom I doe renownce by theſe preſents, and doe hold my ſelfe freed from all Oaths, and bonds, by the which I might bee formerly tyed unto him: whereof finding my ſelfe preſently delivered I ſweare a new and binde my ſelfe to the united Provinces, and namely, to them of Brabant, Gueldre, Holland, Zeeland, and their allies, and to the ſoveraign Magiſtrates that are appointed, to bee faithfull and loyall unto them, to yeeld them all obedience, aide, and comfort, with all my power and meanes, againſt the King of Spaine and his adherents, and againſt all the enemies of the Countrey. Promiſing as a good vaſſall of the Countrey, to carry my ſelf faithfully and loyally, with ſhew of all obedience to my ſuperiors; So help me the Almighty God.

This decree being thus proclaimed, all the ſeales, counter-ſeals, and ſecret ſignets of the King of Spaine, were broken and cancelled with ſolemnity, by all the conſuls of the ſaid Provinces, and others new made, by order of the generall Eſtates, for that which concerned the Government, and the affaires of the generality. And as for matters of juſtice and policie, they uſed the ſeales, names, and titles of private gogernours, and Provinciall conſuls. From that time there was no coynes of gold, ſilver, or copper made with the name or titles of the King of Spaine, but upon ſtamps which the Eſtates had cauſed to be made in every Povince. All governours, ſuperintendents, Preſidents, Chancellours, Councellours, and others Officers, were diſcharged and abſolved from their precedent oathes, and did ſweare fidelity to the generall Eſtates, againſt the King of Spaine and his adherents, according to the forme above mentioned, to whom an act was ſent for the continuation of the Commiſſions.

p. 186Ninthly, Obſerv. 9.it is evident from the premiſes; That if Emperours and Kings ſhall degenerate into Tyrants, violate their Oathes and Covenants made unto the people, invade their Lawes, Liberties, perſons with armed violence, and inſtead of protecting, make warre upon them; that the Nobles, Magiſtrates, Eſtates, Parliaments and people in ſuch caſes, may without any guilt of Treaſon, Rebellion, Sedition, not only diſobey, but Lawfully reſiſt them with force of Armes, both in point of Lawe & conſcience & are obliged under paine of treachery and perfidiouſneſſe to their Countrey, thus to reſiſt; and in caſes of incorrigibility for the publike weale, and preſervation, may juſtly if they ſee it neceſſary, depoſe them from their Royall Dignities as Enemies, or Traytors to their Kingdoms and people.**De jure Magiſtratus in ſubd…to. p. 2…3. …4 295. Hugo Grotius de … l. 1. c. 4 … p 85. The reaſon is, Becauſe no Kingdome or Nation under Heaven, ever elected or voluntarily ſubmitted themſelves unto any Emperour or King whatſoever (for ought can be proved or imagined) but upon this tacit condition; that they ſhould juſtly governe, defend and protect them for their good, not tyrranize over, pillage, murther, oppreſſe, or make warre upon them at their pleaſures, contrary to the Lawes of God, nature, nations; Nor yet actually obliged themſelves under paine of Treaſon, Rebellion, death, or damnation, not forcilly to reobſiſt or deprive their Princes in any wiſe, though they with open violence ſhould ſet themſelves to ſubvert their Religion, Lawes, Liberties, and Republike; to which unreaſonable condition, no Natian certainty would have conſented, had it been propounded to them by their Kings at firſt, as Grotius well obſerves. This point of greateſt difficulty and concerment, I have largely debated and confirmed already, in the third part of this Diſcourſe, where all contrary Objections againſt it, are refuted; Yet becauſe it ſtill ſeemes a ſeditious unchriſtian Paradox to many Malignants and Royalliſts, I ſhall ratifie it with ſuch new Authorities, of all ſorts, which may happily convince, if not convert them from their inveterate wilfull error.

My firſt Authority of this kinde, is that paſſage of Sozomon (an ancient Eccleſiaſticall Hiſtorian) Eccleſ. Hiſt. l. 6. ch. 2. recited and approved by Nicephorus Calliſtus Eccleſ hiſt. l. 10. ch. 34. where he thus writes of the death of Iulian the Emperor (who turned both a Tyrant, Apoſtate, and Perſecutor of the Chriſtians) reputed to be ſlaine by a Chriſtian Souldier of his own Army, for his Tyranny and impiety. Whereas Libanius writes in this manner; Hee ſeemes to ſay, that the ſlayer of Iulian the tranſgreſſor was a Chriſtian, which peradventure was true; Neither is it incredible, that ſome one of the Souldiers who marched under his colours, had conſidered theſe things thus in his minde: That not only the Heathens, but likewiſe ALL OTHERS are wont to applaud thoſe even unto our Age, who ſlew Tyrants heretofore, as thoſe who for the liberty of all, feared not to undergoe the danger of death, and likewiſe for the ſafety of their Citizens, Kindred and friends, with willing minds. And verily hee CANNOT WELL BE REPREHENDED BY ANY MAN, eſpecially ſince hee ſhould ſhew himſelfe ſo valiant and ſirenuous FOR GOD AND that RELIGION which hee did approve, &c. However it is certaine that he was taken away by Gods divine judgement.**…. Nicepherus addes, that his death was predicted by the Chriſtians, and that his death WAS ACCEPTABLE AND PLESANT TO ALL CHRISTIANS, eſpecially to thoſe of Antioch, WHO FOR THIS HIS MVRTHER, INSTVTED A PVBLIKE TRIVMPH, Wherein they alſo reproached Maximus the Philoſopher, ſinging thus, Where are thy divinations O fooliſh Maximus? A pregnant evidence, that even the Primitive Chriſtians (on whoſe examples and practice our Antagoniſts ſo much depend, though p. 187to no purpoſe, as I have **Part 3. p. 13…. to 143.elſewhere manifeſted) held it not only lawfull for them to reſiſt, but even in ſome caſes to ſlay a perſecuting Apoſtatized Tyrant, bent …o ſubvert Religion, Lawes, Liberties; as may be further evidenced by aaEuſeb. lib. 2. vita Conſtan. & Eccleſist. Hist. l. 8. 9. 10. Scorat. Scholaſt. Hiſt. l. 1. Sozomon. Niceph. Ca…l. Eccleſ. Hiſt l 7. c. 29. 37. 39. 44. 45. Grimſton Eutropius Zonara Sabellicus Valate…anus in the Lives of Conſtantine Maximinus and Maxentius.Conſtantine the great his ayding the oppreſſed Chriſtians, and Romans againſt the Tyranny and Perſecution of the Emperors Maxentius, Maximinus and Licinius, even with force of Armes, with which he Conquered theſe Perſecutors in ſundry open battels fought againſt them, at the Chriſtians earneſt importunity.

To deſcend to later Authoritities, it is the received Doctrine of all Popiſh Schoolmen, Doctors, Lawyers, That tyrannicall Princes who oppreſſe and invade their ſubjects perſons, liberties, eſtates, or religion, may both lawfully with good conſcience bee forcibly reſiſted by their Subjects, and likewiſe by the major part of their People, Nobles, Parliament, for preſervation of the Republike and Religion, bee justly depoſed, and put to death; yea, as ſome of them adde, even murthered by private men, though the generality of their Writers juſtly deny it. Their St. Thomas of Aquin, in his Book, De Regimine Pricipum (dedicated to the King of Cyprus) **Operum. Aut verpiae. 1612. Tom. 17. ſ. 163.cha 6. determines thus, If it belong to the multitude to provide themſelves of a King, the King made by them, may not unjuſtly be removed, deſtroyed, or his power reſtrained, if he abuſe the power of the Realme tyrannically; Neither is ſuch a multitude to bee eſteemed, TO DEALE DISLOYALLY IN DEPOSING A TYRANT ALTHOVGH THEY HAD PERPETUALLY SUBIECTED THEMSELVS TO HIM BEFORE, BECAUSE HIMSELFE HATH DESERVED IT, in not carrying himſelfe faithfully in the Government of the people, as the Office of a King required, becauſe herein he kept not his Oath and Covenant with his ſubjects. And he further affirmes, 2 Distinct. Art. 44. qu. 2. 2. 5^m. 1. 2^ae. Diſt. 44. qu. 2. 2. 5^m. 1. 2^ae. qu. 79. 4. 3^m. 22^ae. qu. 12. art. 2. & qu. 42. 2. 3^m. Opuſc. 10. l. 4. c^o. 1. That in every Countrey, Cities are governed politikely; the power of Kings and Emperours being circumſcribed by the Lawes and people, That a Tyrannicall Prince, if hee invade his Subjects, may lawfully bereſiſted and ſlaine even of private perſons in their own neceſſary defence, and in reference to the publike ſafety; but much more by the Nobles and peoples generall conſent: And that the depoſition or perturbation of the regiment of a Tyrant, HATH NOT THE REASON (or nature) OF SEDITION, unleſſe it be done by private perſons, or ſo diſorderly, that a greater detriment ſhould enſue, BVT IT IS THE TYRANT RATHER WHO IS SEDITIOVS. The ſame Doctrine is taught by Dominicus Soto, de Iuſtitia. l. 5. quaeſt. 1. art. 3. Ludovicus Molina Tom. 4. De Iuſtitia & Iure Tract. 3. diſp 6. to 20. Dominicus Bannes, 2^a. 2^ae. quaeſt. 64. Art. 3. Dub. 2. Petrus de Aragon. 2. 2^ae vu. 64. art. 3. Explicatio. art. p. 248. Michael Bartholomaeus Salon, de Iuſtitia & Iure in 2. 2^ae Tom. 1. qu. 64. art. 3. cont. 1. pag. 385. Petrus de Lorca in 2. 2^ae D. Thomae quaeſt. 40. art. 3. ſect. 3. throughout, ſpecially Diſput. 50. n. 2. & Diſp. 52. 53. Azorius, Tom. 2. l. 21. diſp. 5. qu. 8. &. 5. Franciſcus Victoria. Relectio De Iure Belli. n. 9. 14. Alphonſus Salmeron in cap. 13. Epiſt. ad Romanos. Disp. 5. Fran. Suarez. in Defenſione fidei l. 3. cha. 3. & l. 6. chap. 4. throughout▪ ſpecially, num. 5. 6. 13. 14. 15. 16. Ioan Gerſon de Auferibilitate Papae; where alſo he avers (conſid. 6.) that one who is truly Pope may lawfully bee bound, impriſoned, and put to death for his offences, (though the head of the Church as Papiſts hold, as well as Kings the head of their Realmes.) Dionyſius Cathuſianus de Regim. Polit. Artic. 19. Franciſcus Tollet, in ſumma, l. 5. c. 6. p. 188Leonardus Leſſius de Iuſtit. & Iure, c. 9. dub. 4. Tannerus, Tom. 3. diſp. 4. qu. 8. dub. 3. Emanuel Sa. in Aphoriſm. Verb. Tyrannus, n. 2. Iohannis Mariana: De Rege & Regis Inſtit. l. 1. c. 5, 6, 7, 8. Alvarus Pelagius de Plan. Eccleſ l. 1. c. 21. Simancha Pacenſis, de Cathol. inſtit. tit. 23. n. 11. p. 98. tit. 45. n. 25. p. 209. Gregorie de Valencia, Tom 3. p. 444. Cardinall Bellarmine, de Pontif. Rom. l. 5. c. 6. 7. 8. & Tract de Poteſt. Sum. Pontif. adverſ. Gul. Barcl. p. 97. Iac. Gretzerus Pharetra Tertulliana, & Veſpertilio Haeritico-Politicus, Ludovicus Richehom. Expoſtulatio Aplogetica pro Societate Ieſiu. Vincentius Filiucius Tra. 28. p. 2. diſ. 4. prae. Dec. n. 12. Mart. Becanus Anglicana de Poteſtate Regis & Pontificis, Caspar. Schoppius. Alexi Pharmacum Regium, & Collyrium Regium. Valentine Jacob. An. 1524. and Iohn Tanquerel. Anno. 1561. whoſe opinions are recorded by Bochellus Decreta. Eccleſ. Gal. l. 5. tit 4. c. 6. 8. the Cardinall of Como his Letter from Rome, 30. January, 1584. to Doctor Parrey to murder Queen Elizabeth; Franciſcus de Verona Conſtant. in Apolog. pro Io: Chaſtel, p. 133. Bonarſcius the Ieſuite, Amphith p. 101. Barclay l. 3. adverſ. Monarch. c. 8. l. 6. c. 23. & 24. erarius in c. 3. Iudicum. Hieronymus Blanca Rerum Aragonenſ. Commentarius, paſſim. Cajetan: upon Aquinas his forecited Summes. the Doctors of Salamancha in their Determination, Anno 1602. recorded by G. Blackwell, qu Bip. p. 56. and Doctor John White his Defence of the Way, c. 6. p. 16. Governado Chriſtiano. p. 43. Antonius Maſſa Tract. contra Duell. n. 78. 79. Baldus 3. Conſid. 313. Cavarruvias Quaeſt. Illuſtr. T. 2. 505. n. 1. 399. n. 6. Vaſquius contro. Illuſtr. 16. n. 15. 19. 21. 17. n. 1. 23. 20 n. 344. n. 3. 73. n. 12. 13. 5. 72. n. 7. and elſewhere Hemingius Arniſa us de Authoritate Principum p. 18. 50. 77. 80. 83. 95. 122. Fran. Hotomani Franco-Gallia, c. 6. 7. 10 13. 15. 18. 19. &c. To which I might adde our Engliſh Prieſts and Ieſuites, as Doctor Nicholas Saunders, Viſib. Monarch. p. 70, 71. Doctor Allen, Parſons, Creſwell, Philopater, Roſſaeus, Doleman, p. 32. to 74. ſparſim, with ſundry others, all profeſſedly averring Aquinas his Doctrine, and the premiſſes, yea, farre exceeding them in ſundry particulars; many or moſt of them attributing ſufficient Authority and power to the Pope and Prelates alone, without the Parliaments, Nobles, Peers, or Peoples aſſent, to depoſe, adjudge Haereticall or tyrannicall Kings to death, and devote them to aſſaſſination, which all Proteſtants unanimouſly diſclaim. But wee need not fiſh in theſe unwholeſome Romiſh Streams of Tyber, or make uſe of theſe Popiſh Champions, whom I have onelyonly named, to ſtop the mouthes of all Papiſts, Prieſts, Ieſuites, who now much exclaim againſt the Parliaments preſent defenſive Warre, condemning all for Rebels and Traitors who aſſiſt the Parliament againſt their invading traiterous, Rebellious armed Forces both in Ireland and England, they being in verity ſuch themſelves, yea, the originall contrivers, fomenters, the principall abettors of the preſent bloody, deſtructive, civill Wars in both our Realms. … which moſt confirms me in this beliefe, is a particular late Diſcovery of the horrid Conſpiracy of Con the Popes late Nuncio here, and his Ieſuited Popiſh Confederates, to undermine and extirpate the Proteſtant Religion, to raiſe the Scottiſh, and ſucceeding Iriſh, and Engliſh Wars, thereby to ingage the King to reſort to them for aſſiſtance; & under pretence whereof to riſe up in arms, and work him to their own conditions, or elſe to poyſon him with a Indian poyſoned Nut after the example of his Father, and then ſeize upon the Prince, and train him up in their Antichriſtian Religion, as you may reade at large in Romes Maſterpeece, to which I ſhall referre you for fuller ſatisfaction, from one of the chief Conſpirators own Confeſſion. But paſſing by all theſe, I p. 189ſhall proceed to Authorities of Lawyers and Divines, profeſſing the Proteſtant Religion. Georgius Obrectus, a publike Profeſſor of Law, and Advocate to the City of Strasburge in his Diſputatio Juridica, 1. De Princ…piis Belli, layes down theſe ſeverall Poſitions for Law, Num. 125. to 139. That all the Inferiour Magiſtrates in the Empire or other Kingdoms, collectively conſidered, are above the Emperour and Kings themſelves; that if they be unjuſtly aſſaulted with unjuſt violence by any whomſoever, they may by a neceſſary and juſt warre, defend both themſelves and theirs, and repell and proſecute the unjuſt aſſailants. That if the Superiour Magiſtrate neglect to do his duty, (as if the Turke ſhould invade any Countrey, and the Supreme Magiſtrate would not reſiſt him.) the inferiour Magiſtrate may call the people to Arms, raiſe an Army, and exerciſe all forces policie and devices againſt the common enemy of Chriſtians: Or if the Supreme Magiſtrate ſhould exerciſe manifeſt Tyrannie, it is verily lawfull to the Inferiour to undertake the care of the Republike, which he endeavours to oppreſſe with all his power: That thoſe who repreſent all the people, as the Electors, Palatines, Nobles, Parliament, may admoniſh the Prince of his duty, and ought to ſeek by all means to divert him from his Tyrannicall and impious purpoſe; but if he proceeds, and repenteth not, being frequently admoniſhed, but wilfully ſubverts the Common-wealth, obſtinately perverts Laws; hath no care of faith, covenants, juſtice, piety; and tends onelyonly to this, that he may perpetrate any thing with impunity, and impiouſly reign over mens conſciences, then verily he is accounted a Tyrant, that is, an enemy of God and man; whence, if he hath proceeded to that hight of malice, that hee cannot bee expelled but by armed force, It is Lawfull for the Electors, Palatines and others, to call the people to Arms, and not onelyonly to defend themſelves and others againſt ſuch a one, but plainly to deject him from his Throne: For the intire Government of the Realm is not committed by the people to the Prince alone, as neither the Biſhopprick of the whole Church to the Pope, but to every one of the Nobles or Magiſtrates according to his power: For the Nobles, as they are called into part of the honour, ſo of the burthen of the Commonwealth; which is committed to the Prince, as to the Supreme Tutor, but to them as Fellow-tutors, he having the firſt, they the ſecond place in governing the Republike. The Prince ſwears that he will ſeek the good of the Realm, and all the Nobles promiſe the ſame: therefore if he doth ill, they ought not to do ſo likewiſe; if the Republike go to ruine, they ſhall not continue: For the Commonwealth is no leſſe committed to them, than to the King, ſo as they ought not onelyonly to do their duty, but alſo to contain the Prince within the limits of his duty: For if the Prince doth ought againſt his Oath, they are not abſolved from their Oaths, but rather then eſpecially ought to manifeſt their fidelity, when the Republike requires it, becauſe they were ſpecially inſtituted for that end, as the Ephori, and every thing ought to be reputed juſt, when it attains its end. Hence Brutus the Tribune, and Lucretius the Governour of the City, called the people to Armes againſt Tarquin the proud, and by their authority expelled him the Ringdom. So the Roman Senate judged Nero an enemy of the Republike, and condemned him to the Gallowes; puniſhed Vitellius with death, ignominiouſly mutilated and dragged thorow the City, and ſpoyled Maximinus of the Empire, ſetting up Albinus in his place. Thus the French by Authority of a publike Councell, thorow the care of the Officers of the Realme deprived p. 190Childericke the firſt, Sigebert, Theodoric, and Childericke the third of the government of the Realm. Neither is it impertinent to pronounce the ſame ſentence of ſuch a one, as was given of Manlius Capitulinus, **Valerius Maxim. l. 6. c. 7.Thou waſt Manlius whiles thou diddest caſt down the Senons headlong; Now becauſe thou art become one of the Senons, thou thy ſelfe art to be precipit…ted from whence thou diddeſt caſt them down. But if perchance moſt of the Nobles collude and connive, and being unmindfull of their duty, take no care of the people; let there at leaſt be one who may admoniſh and deteſt the invading Tyrant, and take care that the Republike ſuſtain no detrimen; For the care of the Republike is no leſſe committed to him, than to the Prince and his Collegues, and he hath plighted his faith to the Republike no leſſe than they. If many have promiſed the ſame thing, the obligation of the one is not taken away by the negligence or periury of the other. If there be many Truſtees, Executors, or Guardians, the negligence default or fraud of ſome of them, doth not diſcharge or diſingage the reſt; yea, unleſſe they to their power diſcharge their truſt and Oath, they become perfidious, yea guilty of the ſame crime, and are ſubiect unto actions for their neglect as well as the others: Therfore thoſe who are bound to the whole Kingdom and Empire, as the Peers of France, the Electors, or to ſome certain Countey or City which makes a part of the Realme, as Dukes, Marqueſſes, Earles, Conſtables, Admirals, and the like, are obliged to ayde the whole Common-wealth, or that part committed to them, againſt the tyranny of the Prince, if they be able, &c. Thus and much more this Lawyer, almoſt verbatim out of Iunius Brutus.

I might add to him the like determinations of Henricus Bocerus, De jure pugnae, hoc eſt, Belli & Duelli, Tractatus Methodicus, Tubingae, 1591. lib. 1. cap. 5. & 29. p. 141 Justus Eccardus, De Lege Regia, the laſt Edition. Alhuſeius Polit. c. 4. p. 146. to 153. Haenon, Diſputat. polit. The Treatiſe De Iure Magiſtratus in Subditos; (where this Poſition is largely and learnedly debated, confirmed, both from Law, Hiſtory, Theology, Reaſon) Hugo Grotius de Iure Belli & pacis, lib. 1. c. 4. ſect. 7 to the end. p. 87. &c. Albericus Gentilis de Iure Belli, l. 1. c. 11. p. 84. c. 25. p. 205. l. 3. c. 9. 22. p. 546. 686. with others. But ſince Iunius Brutus compriſeth the quinteſſence of all the reſt, I ſhall trouble you onelyonly with his Diſcourſe. Vindiciae C…ntr. Tyrannos, Quaeſt. 3. p. 177. to 106. To paſſe by his Diſcourſe concerning the reſiſting of Tyrants, who uſurp a Dominion without any Title, whom every man may juſtly reſiſt and ſuppreſſe, and are bound in duty ſo to doe, as he there proves at large; I ſhall only tranſcribe what concernes them who have a lawfull Title. Firſt (ſaith he) we ought to conſider, that all Princes are born men. We cannot therefore expect to have only perfect Princes, but rather we ought to thinke it well with us, if we have gained but indifferent ones. Therefore the Prince ſhall not preſently be a Tyrant, if he keep not meaſure in ſome things, if now and then he obey not reaſon; if hee more ſlowly ſeek the publike good; if he be leſſe diligent in adminiſtring Iuſtice, or leſſe fierce in propulſing warre. For ſeeing a man is not ſet over men, as if he were ſome God, as he is overbeaſts; but as he is a man, born in the ſame condition with them; as that Prince ſhall be proud, who will abuſe men like Beaſts; ſo that people ſhall be unjuſt, who ſhall ſeek a God in a Prince, and a Divinity in this frail Nature. But truly if he ſhall willingly ſubvert the Republike; if he ſhall wilfully pervert the Lawes, if he ſhall have no care of his faith, none of his promiſes, none of Iuſtice, none of piety; if himſelfe become an enemy of his people, or ſhall uſe all or the chiefeſt p. 191notes we have mentioned, then verily he may be iudged a Tyrant, that is, an enemy of God and men. Therefore we treat not of a Prince, leſſe good; but of the worſt; not of one leſſe prudent, but of a malicious and ſubtile one; not of one unskilfull in Law, but of a contemner of Law; not of an unwarlike one, but of an enemy of the people and waſter of the Realme. A Senate may aſſiſt him with prudence, a Iudge with the knowledge of the Law, a Captain in the skilfulneſſe of warre; but this man wiſheth the Nobles, Senators, Captain… of Warre one neck, that he might cut them off at one ſtroake, neither hates he any more then them. The firſt verily, though he may lawfully be removed, yet however he may be tolerated; the latter contrarily, by how much the longer he is tollerated, the more intollerable he becomes. Moreover, as eueryevery thing is not lawfull to a Prince; ſo often times, that which is lawfull to the people, is not expedient. For frequently it may fall out, that the remedy which is uſed, may be worſe than the diſeaſe. Therefore it becomes a wiſe man to try all things, before he uſe the hot Iron; and uſe all remedies, before he take up armes. If therefore thoſe who repreſent the people perceive any thing to be done againſt the Republike by force or fraud, let them firſt admoniſh the Prince, neither may they expect, till the miſchiefe grow heavie, and acquire forces. Tyranny is like an heptick Feaver, which at firſt is eaſie to be cured, difficult to be diſcerned; afterward it becomes eaſie to be known, but very difficult to be cured. Therfore they ſhall withſtand the beginnings, neither ſhould they pretermit any thing, though the ſmalleſt. But if he ſhall proceed, and not repent though frequently admoniſhed, but tend onelyonly to this, that he may commit any thing without puniſhment; then verily he is really guilty of Tyranny, and they may act againſt him, whatſoever they may uſe againſt a Tyrant, either by Law or juſt force. Tyranny is not onelyonly a crime, but the head, and as it were, the heap of all crimes. A Tyrant ſubverts the Republike, makes a prey of all, lyeth in wait for the life of all, violates faith to all, contemnes all the Religion of a ſacred Oath. Therefore is he ſo much more wicked then any Theefe, murtherer, ſacrilegious perſon, by how much it is the more grievous, to offend many and all, then particular perſons. Now if all theſe be reputed enemies, if they be capitally puniſhed, if they ſuffer paines of death, can any one invent a puniſhment worthy ſo horrid a crime? Moreover,Not…. wee have proved, that all Kings receive their Royall Dignity from the people; that all the people are better and higher then the King, that the King is onelyonly the ſuperiour miniſter and Ruler of the kingdome, the Emperour of the Empire, In Trastat. de Tyranno, & in Tract. de reg. Civit.but the people are the true head. Therfore it follows, that a Tyrant who commits felony againſt the people as the Lord of the fee, hurts the ſacred Majeſty of the Realm and Empire▪ Becoms a Rebel, and therfore falls into the danger of the ſame Lawes, and demerits more grievous puniſhments. Therfore, ſaith Bartolus, he may be depoſed by a Superiour; or be moſt juſtly puniſhed by the Julian Law, for publike violence. Now all the people, or thoſe who repreſent them, as Electors, Palatines, Nobles the Aſſembly of the Eſtates, &c. are his Superiour. But and if he ſhall proceed ſo farre, that he cannot be expelled but by armed violence, then verily it ſhall be lawfull for them, to call the people to Armes, to raiſe an Army, and to practiſe force, policy, ſtratagems, as againſt an adjudged enemy of his Country and of the Common-weale. Neither ſhall the Officers of the Realm in this caſe fall into the crime OF SEDITION; For in a ſedition there muſt needs be two points, which when p. 192for the moſt part they contend about contradictories, it followes, that the cauſe of one is juſt, the other unjuſt; That cauſe muſt verily be juſt which defends the Laws, which protects the common good, which ſhall preſerve the Realme, eſpecially by this meanes; contrarily, that cauſe is uniuſt, which violates the Laws, defends the breakers of the Lawes, protects the ſubverters of the Countrey.**Bartolus Tract. de Guelphis & Gibell A…g. l. 3. §. cum igitur D. de vi & viar. Thom. Aquinas in 2. 2ae qu. 12. Art. 11. in fine l. 1. D. ad leg. Iul. magiſt. Ci…. …arid 4. That is iuſt which will deſtroy tyrannicall government, that uniuſt which would aboliſh iuſt government. That lawfull which tends to the publike good, that unlawfull which tends to the private. Therefore, ſaith Thomas, becauſe a tyrannicall kingdome which is not ordained to the common good, but principally for the benefit of the Governour, is moſt uniuſt; therefore the diſturbance of this Kingdome Hath not the reaſon of Sedidition, nor doe they fall into the crime of Treaſor. This crime is committed againſt a lawfull Prince; Now a lawfull Prince is nothing but a living Law: therefore he who kils the Law as much as in him lyeth, cannot be called by that name; therefore thoſe who take up Arms againſt him ſhall not be guilty of that crime. It is likewiſe committed againſt the Common-wealth, but becauſe the Repub. is there only where the authority of the Law prevailes, not where the private luſt of a Tyrant ſwalloweth the Republike, a Tyrant ſhall be guilty of that crime which offends the publike Maieſty, & thoſe be Vindicators of the Republike, who ſhall oppugne a Tyrant Ex Officio, ſupported with their own authority. Neither in this caſe, I ſay, doth every one, but all the Subiects, but the Lords ſeem to require an account of the government from their agent: no more ſhall they be accounted perfidious for doing it; there is every where between the Prince & people a mutuall & reciprocal Obligation; he promiſeth, that he will be a iuſt Prince: they, that they will obey him, if he ſhall be ſuch a one. Therefore the people are obliged to the Prince under a condition: the Prince, purely to the people: Therefore if the condition be not fulfilled, the people are unbound, the Contract void, the Obligation null in Law it ſelfe: Therefore, the King is perfidious if he reign uniuſtly; the people perfidious, if they obey not him who reignes iuſtly: But the people are free from all crime of perfidiouſneſſe, if they publikely renounce him who reignes uniuſtly; or if they endeavour to evict him with Armes who deſires to retein the kingdome unlawfully.L. 160. D. de reg Iur. Therefore it is lawfull for all or many of the Officers of the Realme to remove a Tyrant. Neither is it onelyonly lawfull; but it lyeth ſo upon them of duty, that unleſſe they doe it, they can no way be excuſed. Neither may Electors, Palatines, Senators, and other Nobles think, that they were created and inſtituted onelyonly for that end, that they ſhould ſhew themſelves once peradventure in the Kings inauguration, attired after the ancient manner, that they might act a certain palliated Fable, or put on the perſon of Rowland, Oliver, Renald, and other Nobles on that day, as if in a Scene, they ſhould in ſome ſhew repreſent the Round Table of Arthur, as they call it; ſo as after that the multitude is diſmiſſed, and Calliopus hath ſaid, Farewell, they ſhould think they had excellently played their parts. Theſe things are not ſpoken in jeſt, theſe things are not perfunctorily done; theſe things are not the paſtimes of children, who as it is in Horace, Vlp. l. 3. D. de adm. & peric. Tut. & curat.created a King in a Play; but rather of Nobles, & Magiſtrates, who as they are called unto part of that honor, ſo likewiſe of the burthen, and ſhew, that the Republike is committed and commended to the King, as to the ſupreme and chiefeſt Tutor, ſo alſo to them as fellow Tutors (even Honorari) aſſigned to him as obſervers of his actions who hath the chief tutelage, who may daily exact an account of him, and p. 193diligently take heed, in what manner he reverſeth; ſo even theſe, that they might obſerve the King (who,L. 27. D. eodem. as to his tutelary providence, is onelyonly reputed in the place of a Lord) that he doe nothing to the detriment of the people. Therefore as the fact of him who acts the Gardian, is imputed to the Co-gardians, unleſſe where they ought and are able, they ſuſpect and likewiſe take care to remove him; to wit, when he communicates not the adminiſtration with them,L. 14. D. de admin. & peric. tut. if he doe not faithfully manage the tutelage or care, if he admits fraud, if he doth any thing ſordidly or perniciouſly to the Pupill,L 3. de ſuſpect. tut. & cur. if he intercept any of the Pupils goods, if he become an enemy to the Pupill; finally, if he be over rude, ſloathfull, unskilfull, &c. So even the Nobles ſhall be held guilty of the Princes deed, unleſſe they remove, or prevent his tyranny, or ſupply his ſloathfulneſſe, with their vigilance and diligence. Finally, as oft as the Gardian doth not doe in the name of the Pupill, that which any fit Maſter of a family would doe, he may not ſeeme to be defended; but that he may be the better defended, his Co-gardians are bound to foreſee: So much more juſtly, if the Prince doth not act the houſholder but the Enemy,L. 10. & 33. D. de admin. & peric. tutor. & Curat. the Nobles may and ought to act againſt him, ſince they are bound by his deed, no leſſe then by their owne. Moreover the Nobles may conſider, that the King in governing the Republike, holds the firſt part, but they the ſecond, third, and every one in his place. Therefore if he doth his part ill, they may not follow him: if he deſtroy the Republike, they may not connive; for it is committed to them, as well as to him; and in ſuch ſort truly, that not onelyonly they themſelves ought rightly to execute their office by themſelves, but to containe the Prince within the bounds of his office. Finally, as the King promiſeth, that he will take care of the benefit of the Commonweale, ſo alſo doe they. Therefore if he breakes his oath, they may not thinke, that they are abſolved from theirs, no more then Biſhops, if the Pope ſhould defend hereſie or deſtroy the Church: yea, they ſhould thinke themſelves ſo much the more obliged to performe their oathes, by how much the more he ſhall violate his. Therefore if they collude, they are reputed in the number of prevaricators; if they connive, of deſertors; and TRAITORS, if they vindicate not the Republike from the tyranny of tyrants: as finally they become Patrons, Defenders, little Kings, if they by all meanes protect and defend the Republike, which they have undertaken to protect. Theſe things,Judg. 5.Judg 5 though they are ſufficiently firme of themſelves, yet they may be demonſtrated by examples. The Canaanitiſh Kings, who oppreſſed the people of Iſrael with hard ſervitude, as well corporall as ſpirituall, (interdicting them both commerce and armes) were true tyrants, I ſay in practice, yet not without a title; for Eglon and Jabin reigned quietly almoſt twenty years: Now God extraordinarily ſtirred up Ehud, who ſlew Eglon craftily; and Debora, who routed the army of Jabin; and by that meanes freed the people from tyranny: This was not verily, becauſe it was leſſe lawfull to the ordinary Magiſtrates and Princes of the Tribes, and the reſt to doe it, but Debora rather objecteth their ſloathfulneſſe and careleſneſſe to them, and curſeth ſome of them for this cauſe. But truly God, pittying his people,2 Chron. 10 & 11.2 Chr 10 extraordinarily ſupplyed the negligence of ordinary officers. Rehoboam the ſonne of Solomon, refuſeth to eaſe the people of unneceſſary Tributes, being intreated to doe it in a generall Aſſembly of all the people, he groweth inſolent, and aſſiſted with the counſell of flatterers, even arrogantly threatens more grievous p. 194burdens;Auguſt. l. 1. 7. de Civit. Dei. c. 22. No man doubts, but that according to the covenant firſt made betweene the King and people, the Nobles might have reſtrained this pride: But the ſinne was in this, that they did by ſeceſſion, which was to be done in the Aſſembly; and did a juſt and lawfull thing unjuſtly. Frequent examples of this thing occurre in other Kingdomes: he inſtanceth in Tarquin the proud, expelled by Brutus and Lucretius; who confiſcated his goods, and would have publikely ſentenced himſelfe, had they apprehended his perſon, becauſe he conſulted not with the Senate as former Kings uſually did, becauſe he made warre, peace, and truces at his pleaſure without the Senates and peoples advice, violated the Lawes which he ſhould obſerve, and neglected the covenant eſtabliſhed betweene the King and people: in Nero the Emperour, publikely ſentenced by the Senate, Vitellius, Maximinus; and the ſpeech of Trajan (forecited): Likewiſe the**See Hotoman. Francogallia. c. 6. to 14. French, by authority of a publike Councell through the care of the Kingdomes officers, expelled Childericke the firſt, Sigibert, Theodoricke, Childericke the third, from the Crowne, for their tyranny, and ſet up others of another ſtocke in their places. Yea, for ſloathfulneſſe, negligence, madeneſſe, as alſo for injuries to Forrainers, and yeelding to the impotencie or luſt of flatterers, or women, they have depoſed ſome, and as it were taken away the reines from Phaeton, leſt all men ſhould be burnt with the ſame fire; as Theodoricke for Ebroines ſake, Dagobert of Plectrude, and Theobald his Mignions, with others; reputing it to be all one, whether a woman or an effeminate Prince reigned; or whether a tyrant, or petite tyrants under a ſloathfull Prince domineered: or finally, whether he himſelfe were a Devill, or poſſeſſed by the Devill himſelfe. Thus not long ſince they compelled Lewes the eleventh, a moſt imperious Prince to receive 36. Governours, by whoſe counſell he was bound to governe the Republike. Yea, what other right had either the Carlingi, adopted into the Kingdome in place of the Meruingi; or the Capets who at this day hold it, preferred before the Carlingi by the Decree of a publike Councell;…iſſard. l. 1. c. 1. & ſeq…. A…t. de But. Conſil. quod poſitum inter Conſil. Paul. de Caſtro vol Antiqu. nu 412. in cip. Ʋiſo puncto. Martini. Laudenſis in Tract. de Cardin in 2. qu. 35. Phil. De iniquodam conſilio, cujus verba faerunt Andr. Barbar. in D. conſ. 1. l. …. c. 6. Bald. in l. Olim. col. peri. de reſ…ri. in Decretal. Bonifac. 8 de Mai. & obed. but from the people, repreſented as it were in an Epitome, by the Councell of the Realme, which they call an Aſſembly of the three Eſtates, who might lawfully of right both depoſe thoſe, and by their owne authority eſtabliſh theſe in the Throne? In the ſame manner we read Adolphus deprived of the German Empire, An. 1296. becauſe corrupted with mony, he had made war with France, in favour of the Engliſh: and Wenceſlaus, An. 1400. although theſe may be called, not ſo well evill, as leſſe good Princes. Thus in the Realme of England, Edward the ſecond, for his tyranny to his Subjects, eſpecially the Nobles, whom he deſtroyed without hearing their cauſe, was at his Queenes requeſt, adjudged unworthy of his Crowne by the Parliament. Not long ſince, Chriſtierne in Denmarke, Ericus in Sweden, Queene Mary very lately in Scotland, were deprived: which Hiſtories worthy credit teſtifie, hath beene frequently done in the Kingdome of Poland, Hungary, Spaine, Portugall, Bohemia, and the reſt. But what concerning the Pope himſelfe? The Cardinals, they ſay, becauſe they have choſen him, or if they doe not their duty, the Patriarks, who are Primates next after the Cardinals, may againſt his will, for certaine cauſes call a Councell, and in it judge the Pope, if he ſhall ſcandalize the Church by his notorious offences; if he be incorrigible, if reformation be neceſſary as well in the head as members; if contrary to his Oath he will not aſſemble a Councell, and the like; and de facto, we read that many Popes have beene depoſed by authority of a Councell. But if (ſaith p. 195Baldus) they be pertinaciouſly abuſed; at firſt they muſt uſe words, ſecondly, herbes, that is, medicines; laſtly, ſtones; and where the truth of vertue ſufficeth not, there the defence of weapons ought to prevaile. But and if by the ſuffrages almoſt of all learned men, the Decrees of Councels, and the Acts themſelves done, it be proved, that a Councell, as they ſpeak, may lawfully depoſe the Pope, who yet boaſts himſelfe to be the Kings of Kings, and claimes as much to be above the Emperour, as the Sunne is above the Moone; yea, alſo arrogates to himſelfe an authority of depoſing Kings and Emperours at his pleaſure; who at laſt can doubt, but that by the publike Councell of every Realme, not onelyonly a tyrant, but a King, pernicious to his Kingdome for his madneſſe or folly, may be depoſed or removed?

Goe to now, in this our politicke Ship, the Maſter gluts himſelfe with wine; moſt of his aſſiſtants either aſleepe, or drunke with mutuall cups ſportingly behold an imminent Rocke. The Ship in the meane time, either holds not that courſe which is expedient for the owner, or ſeemes ſpeedily to be wracked; what thinkeſt thou is here to be done under the Maſter, by one who is vigilant and ſollicitous? Shall he pull thoſe by the eares who are aſleepe, or onelyonly jogge them by the ſides? but in the meane time,Plato. l. 8. & 9. de Repub. leſt he ſhould ſeeme to doe ought without their command, ſhall he not afford his helpe and aſſiſtance to the indangered Ship? Truly what madneſſe, or rather impiety will this be? Seeing then (as Plato ſaith) tyranny is a certaine phrenſie and drunkenneſſe, the Prince may utterly ſubvert the Republike, the moſt of the Nobles may collude, connive, or at leaſt are faſt aſleepe: the people who are Lords of the Republike, by the fraud or negligence of theſe miniſters, which is their fault, are reduced into greateſt ſtraights in the meane time there is one of the Nobles which conſiders the incroaching tyranny, and deteſts it from his ſoule, what thinkeſt thou is now to be done againſt him by this man? Shall he onelyonly admoniſh his Colleagues of their duty, who themſelves doe as much hurt as they may? But, beſides, as it is perillous to admoniſh, and in that ſtate of things it may be deemed a capitall crime, ſhall he do like thoſe, who contemning other helps, caſting away their armes, ſhall cite Lawes, and make an Oration concerning juſtice among theeves,L. 3. & l. omne delictum. Sect. ult D. de re milit. in the midſt of a wood? but this truly, is that w^ch is cōmoly ſaid, to be madde with reaſon: What then? ſhall he grow deafe at the peoples groanes? ſhall he be ſilent at the entrance of theeves? or ſhall he finally grow laſie, and put his hands into his boſome? But if the Lawes appoint the puniſhment of a Traytor againſt one wearing buskins on his legs, who counterfeits ſickneſſe for fear of the enemies, what puniſhment at leaſt ſhall we decree againſt him, who either through malice, or ſloathfulneſſe, ſhall betray thoſe whom he hath undertaken to protect? But rather he ſhall command thoſe things that are needfull to ſuch as are wary by a Mariners ſhout; he ſhall take care leſt the Common-wealth receive any detriment, and ſhall preſerve the Kingdome even againſt the Kings wil and reſiſtance, by which he himſelfe becomes a King; and ſhall cure the King himſelfe as a frantick man, by binding his hands and feet,C. nullus in Carthagin. Concil. Doctores Pontificii. if he may not otherwiſe doe it. For, as we have ſaid, the univerſall government of the Realme is not committed by the people to the King, as neither the overſight of the whole Church to the Pope, but to every one of the Nobles according to his power. But certainely, becauſe concord proceeds from unity, that there ſhould be no emulation among Peeres, a King was inſtituted, who p. 196ſhould hold the ſupreme place in the adminiſtration of the Common-wealth. The King ſwears that he will ſeeke the ſafety of the Realme; the Nobles ſwear every one the ſame by himſelfe: whether therefore the King or moſt of the Nobles neglecting their oath, ſhal either deſtroy the Common weale, or deſert it being in danger, ought the reſt therefore to deſert the Republike, or at leaſt be leſſe bound to defend it, as if they were abſolved from their oath? But rather then eſpecially they ought to ſhew their fidelity, when as others neglect it, eſpecially ſince they were principally inſtituted for that end, like the Ephori; and every thing may then be reputed juſt, when it attaines its end: whether truly if many have promiſed the ſame thing, is the obligation of the one diſſolved by the perjury of the other? whether if many be guilty of the ſame ſinne, are the reſt freed by the fraud of one? Whether, if many Co-gardians ill defend their Pupill, ſhall one good man be leſſe bound with the burthen of the wardſhip through their default? But rather, neither can they avoyd the infamy of perjury, unleſſe they endeavour to ſatisfie their truſt as much as in them lieth; neither can thoſe exempt themſelves from the danger and judgement of a Gardianſhip ill adminiſtred, unleſſe they implead the other Gardians ſuſpected;L. 3. D. de adminiſt & peric. tutor. & cur. l. 3. D. deſuſpect. tut. & curat. when as verily one Gardian may not only implead the reſt ſuſpected, and take care of thoſe to be removed, but alſo remove them. Therefore thoſe who have promiſed their aide and aſſiſtance to all the Realme or Empire; ſuch as Earles of the ſtable, Marſhals, Senators, and the reſt; or thoſe who have done it ſpecially to any County or City which may make a part of the Realme; as Dukes, Marqueſſes, Earles, Majors, and the reſt, are bound to aide the whole Commonweale oppreſſed with tyranny, or that part thereof, which the people have committed to them next after the King. And theſe truly ought to vindicate the whole Commonweale from tyranny, if they be able; thoſe as Gardians aſſigned throughout Counties, that part of the Realme whoſe defence they have undertaken: Theſe I ſay, are bound to reſtaine a tyrant, thoſe to drive him out of their coaſts. Therefore Mattathias as one of the Nobles,Maccab. lib. 1. c. 3. v. 45. the reſt partly conniving, partly colluding; when Antiochus tyrannically oppreſſed the Kingdome of Judah, ſpeakes thus to the people ready to take up armes: Let us reſtore the ſtate of our people; let us fight for our people, and our holy places: whence it plainely appeares, that we may not onelyonly lawfully fight for Religion, but for our Countrey; for an hearth I ſay, no leſt juſtly then for our Altars, and take up armes againſt ſuch a tyrant as he was: neither are they blamed by any, for recovering the Kingdome, but that they claimed the royall dignity to themſelves,Juſtin. l. 1. Diodor. l. 2. c. 37. which pertained to the Tribe of Iudah. Many pertinent examples to this purpoſe occurre in Hiſtorians. Arbactus governor of Media, ſlew Sardanapalus ſpinning among women, and ſpending the royall treaſure among whores. Ʋindex Preſident of the French, and Galba of the Spaniards revolted from Nero, together with all France and Spaine, the Senate conniving at his tyranny. But eſpecially that Laconick judgement is obſervable, which verily proceeding from that Senate, ought to paſſe into a thing adjudged among all Nations. When the Lacedaemonians poſſeſſed Byzantium, they made Clearches Captaine of the Army, Governour of the City, who taking corne from the Citizens, diſtributed it to the forraine ſouldiers; but in the meane time the families of the Citizens periſhed with famine. Anexilaus therefore, one of the Magiſtrates of the City, moved with that tyranny, agreed with Alcibiades about the yeelding up of p. 197his Countrey to him, and he ſoone after is received into the City. Anexilaus being accuſed at Sparta for yeelding up of Byzantium, pleaded his cauſe himſelfe, the Spartanes abſolved the man; becauſe they ſaid, warres were to be waged with enemies, not with the nature of things; now nothing is more repugnant to nature, then, if thoſe who are bound to defend a City, became more unjuſt then the enemies. Thus the Lacedaemonians determined juſtly, to whom ſcarce any good Kings will not aſſent; verily thoſe who deſire to rule well, care not at all what is determined concerning tyrants, or what the Nobles or people themſelves may doe by Law. But we muſt yet proceed further. Every one of the Mariners is bound, if the Ship be endangered through the default or negligence of the Ship-maſter, to put to his helping hand: every one of the Nobles is bound, if the Republike periſh by the wickedneſſe or careleſneſſe of the Prince and his Colleagues, to helpe it, being like to fall, and to vindicate the whole Kingdome, or at leaſt that part thereof which is committed to him, from tyranny. But then ſhall it be lawfull for every ordinary ſlave to doe the like? or peradventure ſhall it be lawfull to Herdonius Sabinus, Euno Surianus, Spartacus the fencer, or, I ſay, to any private man to enfranchiſe ſervants, to ſtirre up Subjects to armes, finally to combate with the Prince, if tyranny urge them? No verily. The republike is not committed to ſingle or private men, yea they themſelves are committed to the care of the Nobles and Magiſtrates no otherwiſe then Pupils. Therefore they are not bound to defend the Republike, who cannot defend themſelves. The ſword is not committed to every man neither by God,L. 1. c. de Seditioſis. nor by the people; therefore if they draw the ſword without command, they are ſeditious, although the cauſe may ſeeme to be juſt. Finally, private men doe not make the Prince, but all. Therefore they ought to expect the command of all, or of thoſe, I ſay, who repreſent all in a Realme, Countrey or City, which may make a part of the Realme, or at leaſt of one of them, before they attempt any thing againſt the Prince.L. I. l. 9. D. de autor. & conſil. tutor. & curat. For as a Pupill cannot bring an action without authority of his Tutor, although the Pupill be truly a Lord, and the Tutor onelyonly is reputed for the Lord, as farre forth as appertaines to his tutelary providence: So neither may the people doe ought, but by the authority of thoſe, on whom they have transferred their authority and power; whether they be ordinary Magiſtrates, or extraordinarily, created in a publike Aſſembly; whom, I ſay, they have guirded with the ſword for this purpoſe, to whom they have delivered themſelves up to be governed and cared for;Seneca l. 8. de Benefic. who finally like that Pretor of Rome, who judged betweene ſervants and maſters, are truly conſtituted in that place, that if any contention ariſe betweene King and Subjects, they may ſhew themſelves Judges and Redreſſors, leſt the Subjects themſelves ſhould pronounce ſentence in their owne cauſe. Therefore if unjuſt cuſtomes or grievous taxes be impoſed, if things be done againſt pacts or fraudulently, and yet not one of the Nobles ſpeakes againſt or reſiſts it, let them thinke they muſt then ſit ſtill, and thinke, that the beſt Phyſitians to prevent or take away a diſeaſe, doe oft-times preſcribe the opening of a veine, the evacuation of humours, yea and ſcarification. For ſuch is the nature of things, that ſcarce any miſchiefe can be cured without another; ſcarce any good may be acquired without diligent labour. They have the example of the people under Solomon, who refuſed not the grievous tributes impoſed on them for the building of the Temple, and fortifying the Kingdome; p. 198becauſe they judged thoſe things to be impoſed by the publike Councell, to the glory of God, the beauty and ornament of the Republike. They have likewiſe the example of Chriſt our Saviour, who although he were the King of Kings, yet becauſe he then ſuſtained a private perſon, he payed tribute willingly. If the Nobles and Magiſtrates themſelves favour apparent tyranny,John 34 …. 30. or at leaſt oppoſe it not, they may remember, that for the ſinnes of the people, God ſuffers Hypocrites to reigne; whom unleſſe they turne themſelves to God with all their heart, cannot be overturned with any engines. Therefore there is no need of feet or hands, but bended knees. Finally, they muſt ſuffer evill Princes, wiſh for better, and thinke, they muſt beare that tyranny with a patient minde as they doe haile; ſtormes, tempeſts, and other naturall calamities, or change their habitations. David retired into the Mountaines, and ſpared Saul a tyrant, becauſe he was none of the Nobles of the people: Chriſt, becauſe he was not of this world fled into Egypt, to avoyd Herods tyranny. Paul, becauſe he deſcribes the office of private Chriſtians, not of Magiſtrates, teacheth that they muſt obey Nero himſelfe. But if all the Nobles, or moſt of them, or at leaſt one of them endeavour to reſtraine apparent tyranny, or the Magiſtrate to drive it from that part of the Realme which is committed to him, if he be ſuch a one, as under pretext of expelling it, may not introduce another tyranny; then verily aſſembling together, they may run who ſhall goe faſteſt to this choyce man, they may earneſtly aſſiſt with their feete and hands, and as if God himſelfe had given a ſigne from Heaven, of a fight againſt tyrants, endeavour to free the Kingdome from tyranny. For as God puniſheth and chaſtiſeth the people by tyrants,Eccleſ. 10.Eccl 10 ſo likewiſe tyrants by the people: and that is a perpetuall truth which Syrach ſaith; that Kingdomes are tranſlated from Nation to Nation, for the iniquities, injuries, and wickedneſſe of Princes▪ and that every tyranny continues but a ſhort ſpace. Thus the Captaines and ſouldiers carefully executed all the commands of Iehojada the High Prieſt, in revenging the tyranny of Queene Athaliah: Thus all the godly men of Iſrael went to the Maccabees, partly that they might defend the true worſhip of God, partly that they might free the Republike againſt the impious and unjuſt attempts of Antiochus; yea God favoured their juſt endeavours, and gave them proſperous ſucceſſe. What then? May not God likewiſe out of private men themſelves raiſe up ſome avenger of tyranny? Cannot the very ſame who raiſeth up tyrants out of the people, backed with no title, no pretext, to puniſh the people, likewiſe raiſe up deliverers alſo out of the loweſt of the people? Cannot the ſame who enthralled the people to Jabin and Eglon, deliver the ſame people by Ehud, Barac, Deborah, and as it were manumit them when they were deſerted by the Nobles? What therefore ſhould now hinder, thou wilt ſay, but that the ſame God who hath ſent Tyrants on us at this time, ſhould likewiſe extraordinarily ſend revengers of tyrants? Why, if Ahab rageth againſt good men, if Jezabel ſuborne falſe witneſſes againſt Naboth, ſhall not there be alſo a Iehu, which may extirpate the family of Ahab, who may avenge the bloud of Naboth, who may caſt downe Iezebel to be torne in peeces of Dogges? Verily, what I have anſwered before, as nothing hath departed from the juſtice of God at any time, ſo not from his mercy. But yet ſince thoſe evident ſignes, by which God was wont to confirme theſe extraordinary vocations of thoſe Worthies, are for the moſt part wanting to us in this age, p. 199let the people take heed, leſt whiles they ſeeke to paſſe over Sea with a drie foote, ſome Impoſtor being their Captaine, they fall not headlong into a gulfe, which we read ſometimes to have hapned to the Jewes: leſt whiles they ſeeke a revenger of tyranny, they perchance follow one, who, that tyrant being expelled, will tranſlate the tyranny it ſelfe unto himſelfe: leſt finally whiles they ſeeke to deſerve well of the Common-wealth, they militate to the private luſt of any; ſo as that may fall out which hath hapned to many Republikes, eſpecially the Italian, whiles that they endeavour to remove the preſent evill, they bring in a farre greater. I ſhall cloſe up this with three Authorities more; the firſt, of Mr. John Calvin, who pleads as much for obedience to Tyrants and unjuſt Magiſtrates as any man: Inſtit. lib. 4. c. 20. ſect. 31. I alwayes ſpeake of private men: For if there be any popular Magiſtrates conſtituted to moderate the luſt of Kings (ſuch as heretofore were the Ephori, who were oppoſed to the Lacedaemonian Kings, or Tribunes of the people againſt the Roman Senate; or the Demarchi againſt the Athenian Senate, and which power peradventure, as now things ſtand, The three Eſtates in all Kingdomes enjoy, when they aſſemble) I am ſo farre from inhibiting them to withſtand the raging licentiouſneſſe of Kings, according to their duty: that if they connive at Kings outragiouſly encroaching upon, and inſulting over the inferiour common people, I ſhall affirme, that their diſſimulation wants not nefarious perfidiouſneſſe, becauſe they fraudulently betray the liberty of the people of which they know themſelves ordained protectors by Gods ordinance. The ſecond is, Huldericus Zuinglius: Explanatio Artic. 42. Quando vero perfide & extra Regulam Chriſti (Principes) egerint, poſſint cum Deo deponi, conſenſu & ſuffragiis totius, aut certe potioris partis multitudinis. Quaeris quando id fiet, ut major pars populi bono conſentiat? Ad hoc dico quod antea; ſi non conſentiunt ut malum tollant, ferant jugum Tyranni, & demum cum eo pereant. Nec querantur ſibi fieri injuriam, cum ſua culpa id mereantur ut quidvis patiantur. Quis ergo miretur ſi populus ob flagitia & ſcelera Principum paenas luat? Primum, cur non juxta naturae regulam cum proximo agimus? Sic enim omnes fratres eſſemus, & Principe nullo eſſet opus. Deinde, cur non ſummo ſtudio juſtitiam ſectamur, & exoſam habemus injuſtitiam omnes? Sic enim facile fieret ut unanimi conſenſu tyrannum officio moveremus. Nunc cum tam tepidi ſumus in tuenda juſtitia publica, ſinimus ut impune vitia Tyramorum bodie regnent. Merito ergo ab illis conterimur, & tandem cum illis luimus. Non ergo deſunt viae per quas tyranni tollantur, ſed deeſt publica juſtitia. Cavete vobis, O Tyranni, Evangelium enim Jeſu Chriſti late ſparſum vitam multorum innovabit ut innocentiae & juſtitiae plurimi ſtudeant, cui & ſi vos ſtudueritis, ſummo bonore vos proſequantur, ſin furere & vim facere perrexeritis, omnium pedibus conculcabimini. So he

The laſt is the generall Union of the States of the united Provinces, to defend their Liberties and Religion, made at Bruſſels, the tenth of January 1577. thus related by Grimſton in his Hiſtory of the Netherlands l. 10. p. 492. 493.

The States ſeeing themſelves ingaged in warre on all ſides againſt the Spaniards, (who were proclaimed enemies to the Countrey) fearing ſome diſ-union amongſt themſelves, by the inticing perſwaſions of ſuch as ſought to diſmember them, they reſolved, before that Don John ſhould enter into the Countrey, to make a generall union among themſelves, as well Prelates, Noblemen, and Townes, as of others of the ſeventeene Provinces: which was allowed by the Lords of the Councell of State, deputed by the King, for the government generall of the ſaid Countries; whereof, p. 200the Originall remaines in the cuſtody of the States of Brabant. Of which Union, the Tenor followeth.