The Mystery of the Gospel Vindicated and Socinianism Examined, Commentary on text · Chapter 5
CAP. V.
Of Gods Prescience or Fore-knowledge.
HIS next attempt is to overthrow, and remove the Prescience, §. 1.or fore-knowledge of God; with what successe, the farther consideration of the way whereby he endeavours it, will manifest. His Question! (the engine whereby he workes) is thus framed.
As for our free Actions, which are neither past, nor present, but may afterwards either be or not be, what are the chiefe passages of Scripture from whence it is wont to be gathered, that God knoweth not such actions untill they come to passe, yea that there are such actions?
That we might have had a clearer acquaintance with the intendment of this interrogation, it is desirable M. B. had given us his sence on some particulars, which at first view present themselves; to the trouble of every ordinary Read r. As
1. How we may reconcile the words of Scripture given in answer to his preceding Querie, with the designe of this. There it is asserted, that God understands our thoughts (which certainely are of our free actions, if any such there are) afarre off; Here, that he knowes not our free Actions, that are future, and not yet wrought or performed.
2. By whom is it wont to be gathered from the following §. 2.Scriptures, that God knoweth not our free actions untill they come to passe: Why doth not this meere Christian, that is of no Sect, name his Companions and Associates in these learned Collections from Scripture? Would not his so doing discover him to be so farre from a meere Christian, engaged in none of the Sects, that are now amongst Christians, as to be of that Sect, which the residue of men so called, will scarce allow the name of aStegman. Photin. Refut Disput. 1. q. 2. An Photiniani ullo modo Christiani dici queant. Neg. Martin. Smiglec. Jes. Nova monstra, novi Arianis. cap. 1. Aridnos nullo modo Christianos dici posse.Christian unto.
3. What he intends by the close of his Querie, yea that there are such actions; An advance is evident in the words towards a farther negation of the knowledge of God, then what was before expressed. Before he sayes, God knowes not our actions that are future contingent: Here, he knowes not that there are such actions. The sence of this must be, either that God knowes not that there any such actions, as may, or may not be, which would render him lesse knowing then M. B. who hath already told us, that such there be, or else that he knowes not such actions when they are, at least without farther enquiring after them, and knowledge obtained, beyond what from his owne in… perfections, and Eternall purpose he is furnished withall In M Biddles next booke or Catechisme, I desire he would answer these questions also.
Now in this eudeavour of his, M. B. doth but follow his leaders. bƲt ad rationem istam non minus plenè quam planè respondeamus, animadvertendum est, infalsto…em istam Dei praenotionem, quam pro re concessâ adversarii sumunt, a nobis non admitti. Socin Praelec. c. 8. p. 25. Cum igitur nulla ratio, nullus Sacrarum literarum locus sit, ex quo apertè colligi possit, Deum omnia quae fiunt, scivisse ante…uam fierent, concludendum est, minime asserendam esse a nobis istam Dei praescientiam: praesertim, cum & rationes non paucae, & sacra Testimonia non desint, unde eam planè negandam esse apparet: idem c: 11. p: 38.Socinus in his his Prelections, where the maine of his designe, is to vindicate mans free-will, into that latitude and absolutenesse, as none before him had once aymed at, in his 8th Chapter objects to himselfe this fore-knowledge of God, as that which seemes to abridge, and cut short the liberty contended for; He Answers, that he grants not the fore-knowledge pretended, and proceeds, in that and the two following Chapters, labouring to answer all the Testimonyes, and Arguments which are insisted on for the proofe and demonstration of it; giving his owne Arguments against it, Chapter 11. cIta{que} in considerate illi faciunt, qui futura contingentia Deum determinatè scire aiuni, quia aliàs non esset omniscius: cum potius, ideo illa determinatè futura non concipiat, quia est omniscius: Crellius de Vera Relig. lib: 1 c: 24. p: 201.Crellius is something more candid as he pretends, but indeed infected with the same venome with the other; for after he hath disputed for sundry pages, to prove the fore knowledge of God, he cōcludes at last, that for those things that are future contingent, he knowes only, that they are so, & that possibly they may come to passe, possibly they may not. Of the rest of their Associates few have spoken expressly to this thing. dNam si omnia futura qualiacun{que} sunt; Deo ab omni aeternitate determinatè cognita fuisse unquam, humanae voluntatis libertatem, ac porro nec Religi…nem, idem ibid. p 202. Smalclus Resutat. Thes. Franz. disput: 1. de Trinitat. pag: 3. disput. 12. de caus. peccat. p. 428, 429. &c. 435.Smalcius once and againe manifests himselfe to consent with his Masters, in his disputations against Franzius, expressly consenting to what Socinus had written in his Prelections, and affirming the same thing himselfe, yea disputing eagery for the same opinion with him.
For the vindication of Gods fore-knowledge, I shall proceed in §. 7.the same order as before, in reference to the other Attributes of God, insisted on: viz. 1. What M. B. hath done, how he hath disposed of sundry places of Scripture for the proofe of his assertion, with the sence of the places, by him so produced, is to be considered. 2. Another Question and Answer is to be supplied in the roomeof his. 3. The Truth vindicated, to be farther confirmed.
For the First.
In the proofe of the Assertion proposed, Mr B. finds himselfe entangled more then ordinarily; though I confesse his taske in §. 5.generall be such, as no man, not made desperate by the losse of all, in a shipwrack of Faith, would once have undertaken. To have made good his proceeding according to his ingagement, he was at least to have given us Texts of Scripture, expresse in the letter, as by him cut off from the state, condition, and co…erence, wherein by the Holy Ghost they are placed, for the countenancing of his assertion. But here, being not able to make any work in his method proposed, and boasted in, as signall and uncontroleable; no apex, or tittle in the Scripture, being pointed towards the deniall of Gods knowing any thing, or all things, past, present, & to come: He moulds his Question into a peculiar fashion, and askes, whence, or from what place of Scripture may such a thing as he there averrs, be gathered? At once plainly declining the triall he had put himselfe upon, of infisting upon expresse Texts of Scripture only; not one, of the many quoted by him, speaking one word expressly to the businesse in hand, and laying himselfe naked to all consequences, rightly deduced from the Scripture, and expositions, given to the letter of some places, suitable to the eRom. 12. 6.proportion of Faith. That then which he would have, he tells you, is gathered from the places of Scripture subjoyned; but how, by whom, by what consequence, with what evidence of Reason, it is so gathered, he tells you not. An understanding indeed informed with such grosse conceptions of the nature of the Deity, as M. B. hath laboured to insinuate into the minds of men, might gather from his collection of places of Scripture for his purpose in hand, that God is afraid, troubled, grieved, that he repenteth, altereth, and changeth his mind to and fro; but of his knowledge, or sore-knowledge of things, whether he have any such thing or not, there is not the least intimation; unlesse it be in this, that if he had any such fore-knowledge, he need not put himselfe to so much trouble and vexation, nor so change, and alter his mind, as he doth. And with such figments as these, (through the Infinite, Wise, and good Providence of God, punishing the wantonnesse of the minds, and lives of men, by f2 Thess. 2. 10, 11, 12.giving them up to strong delusurs, and vaine Imaginations, in the darknes of their foolish hearts, so far, gRom. 1. 23.as to change the glory of the incorruptible God, into the likenesse of a corruptible, weak, ignorant, sinfull man) are we now to deale.
But let the places themselves be considered. To these heads §. 6.they may be referred, (1.) such as ascribe unto God feare, and being afraid. Deut. 32. 26, 27. Exod. 13. 17. Gen. 3. 22. 23. are of this sort. (2.) Repentance: 1 Sam. 15. 10, 11, ult. (3.) Change, or alteration of mind: Numb. 14. 27, 30. 1 Sam. 2. 30. (4.) Expectation, whether a thing will answer his desire or no: Isa. 5. 4. Conjecturing, Jerem. 36. 1, 2, 3. Ezek. 12. 1, 2. (5.) Trying of experiments, Judg. 3. 1, 4. Dan. 8. 2. 2 Chron. 32. 31. From all which and the like, it may, by M. B's direction and helpe, be thus gathered: If God be afraid of what is to come to passe, and repenteth him of what he hath done, when he finds it not to answer his expectation, if he sits divining, and onjecturing at events, being often deceived therein, and therefore tryes and makes experiments, that he may be enformed of the true state of things, then certainely he knowes not the free actions of men, that are not yet come to passe. The Antecedent M. B. hath proved undeniably from ten texts of Scripture; and doubtlesse the consequent is easily to be gathered by any of his Disciples. Doubtlesse it is high time, that the old musty Catechisms or prejudicate persons, who scarce so much as once consulted with the Scripture in their composures, as being more engaged into factions, were removed out of the way, and burned, that this meere Christian, may have liberty to blesse the growing Generation, with such notions of God, as the Idolatrous Pagans of old, would have scorned to have received.
But doe not the Scriptures ascribe all the particulars mentioned §. 7.unto God? Can you blame M. Biddle without reflection on them? If only what the Scripture affirmes in the letter, and not the sence wherein, and the manner how it affirmes it, (which considerations are allowed to all the writings, and speakings of the sonnes of men,) is to be considered, the End seeming to be aimed at in such undertakings, as this of M. B. namely, to induce the Atheistical spirits of the sonnes of men, to a contempt and scorne of them, and their Authority, will probably be sooner attained, then by the efficacy of any one engine raised against them in the worldbesides.
As to the matter under consideration; I have some few things in generall to propose to M. Biddle, and then I shall descend to the particulars insisted on.
1. Then, I desire to know whether the things mentioned, as Feare, Griefe, hPaenitentia infert ignorantiam praeteriti, praesentis, & futuri, mutationem voluntatis, & errorem in consiliis, quorum nihil in Deum cadere potest: dicitur tamen ille metaphorice penitentiâ duci, quemadmodum nos, quando alicujus rei paenitet, abolemus, id quod antea feceramus: quod fieri potest sine tali mutatione voluntatis, quâ nunc homo aliquid facit, quod post mutato animo, destruit. Manasseh Ben. Izrael. conciliat. in Gen. 6. q: 23. Paenitentia, cum mutabilitatem importet, non potest esse in Deo, dicitur tamen paenitere, eo qùod ad modum paenitentis se habet, quando destruit quod fecerat. Lyran. ad. 1 Sam. 15. v. 35.Repentance, Trouble, Conjecturings, making trialls of men for his owne information, are ascribed properly to God, as they are unto men, or tropically and figuratively, with a condescention to us, to expresse the things spoken of, and not to describe the nature of God? If the first be said, namely, that these things are ascribed properly to God, and really signify of him, the things in us intended in them, then to what hath been spoken in the consideration taken of the foregoing Querie, I shall freely adde, for mine owne part, I will not own, nor worship him for my God, who is truly and properly affraid what all the men in the world either will, or can do; who doth, can do, or hath done any thing, or suffered any thing to be done, of which he doth, or can truly and properly repent himselfe, with sorrow and griefe for his mistake; or that sits in Heaven divining, and conjecturing at what men will doe here below: and do know, that He whom I serve in my spirit, will famish and starve all such Gods out of the world. But of this before. If these things are ascribed to God figuratively, & improperly, discovering the kind of his workes, and dispensations, not his own Nature or Propertyes; I would faine know what inference can be made, or conclusion be drawn from such expressions, directly calling for a figurative interpretation? For instance, if God be said to repent that he had done such a thing, because such and such things are come to passe thereupon, if this Repentance in God, be not properly ascribed to him (as by M. B's owne rule it is not) but denotes only an alteration & change in the works, that outwardly are of him, in an orderly subserviency to the in mutable …posiof his will, what can thence be gathered to prove, that … screseeth not the free actions of men? And this is the Issue of M. Biddles confirmation of the Thesis, couched in his Query insisted on, from the Scriptures.
2. I must crave leave once more to mind him of the Rule §. 9.he hath given us in his Preface, viz That where a thing is improperly ascribed to God, in some other place it is denyed of him; as he instances in that of his being weary: so that what ever is denyed of him in any one place, is not properly ascribed to him in any other. Now, though God be said in some of the places by him produced, to repent; yet it is in another expressly said, that he doth not do so, and that upon such a generall ground and Reason, as is equally exclusive of all those other passions, and affections, upon whose assignement unto God, the whole strength of M. Biddles plea against the Prescience of God doth depend. 1 Sam. 15. 29. Also the strength of Israell will not lye, no repent, for he is not a man that he should repent. The immutability of his nature, & unlikenesse to men in obnoxiousnesse to alterations, is asserted as the reason of his not repenting; which will equally extend its force and efficacy, to the removall from him, of all the other humane affections mentioned. And this second generall consideration of the foundation of M. B's plea, is sufficient: for the removall of the whole.
3. I desire to know, whether indeed it is only the free actions of men that are not yet done, that M. B. denyes to be knowne of §. 10.God? Or whether he exclude him not also from the knowledge of the present state, frame and actings of the hearts of men, and how they stand affected towards him: being therein like other Rulers among men, who may judge of the good & evill actions of men, so farre as they are manifest and evident, but how men in their hearts stand affected to them, their Rule Goverment, and Authority, they know not. To make this enquiry, I have not only the observation premised, from the words of the close of M. Biddles Query, being of a negative importance, (yea that there are such actions) but also from some of the proofes by him produced, of his former assertion, being interpreted according to the literiall significancy of the words, as exclusive of any figure, which he insisteth on. Of this sort is that of Gen. 22. 12, 10, 11, 12. iEx hac actione propter quam ab omnibus Deum timens vocaberis cognoscent omnes, quantus in to sit timor Dei, & quous{que} pertingat. R. Mos. Ben Maimon: more Nevoch. p. 3. c. 24.where God is said to tempt Abraham, and upon the Issue of that tryall sayes to him, (which words M. B. by putting them in a different character, points to, as comrehensive of what he intends to gather, & conclude from them) NOW I KNOW that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not with-held thy sonne, thine only sonne from me. The collection which M. B. guides unto from hence, is, that God knew not that which he enquired after, and therefore tempted Abraham that he might so do, and upon the issue of that tryall saies, now I know. But what was it that God affirmes, that now he knew? Not any thing future; not any free action, that was not as yet done; but something of the present condition and frame of his heart towards God: viz. His feare of God; not whether he would feare him, but whether he did feare him then. If this then be properly spoken of God, & really, as to the nature of the thing it selfe, then is he ignorant no lesse of things present, then of those that are for to come. He knowes now who feares him, nor who hates him, unlesse he have opportunity to try them, in some such way as he did Abraham: And then what a God hath this man delineated to us? How like the dunghil Deities of the Heathen who speake after this rate. kContigerat nostras infamia temporis aures; Quam cupiens falsam summo dilabor Olympo, Et Deus humanâ lustro sub imagine terras. Ovid.Doubtlesse the description that Elijah gave of Baal, would better suite him, then any of those divine Perfections, which the living, alseeing God, hath described himselfe by. But now if M. B. will confesse, that God knowes all the things that are present, & that this enquiry after the present frame of the heart and spirit of a man, is improperly ascribed to him, from the Analogy of his proceedings in his dealings with him, to that which we insist upon, when we would really finde out what we doe not know; then I would only aske of him, why those other expressons which he mentions, looking to what is to come, being of the same nature & kind with this, doe not admit of yea call for the same kind of exposition and interpretation.
Neither is this the only place insisted on by M. B. where the §. 11.inquiries ascribed unto God, & the tyall that he makes, is not in reference to things to come, but punctually to what is present. Deut. 8. 2. chap. 13. 3. The Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soule. 2 Chron. 32. 31. God left him to try him, that he might know what was in his heart; and Phil. 4. 6. In every thing let your request be made know to God. Let M. Biddle tell us now plainely, whether he suppose all these things to be spoken properly of God, and that indeed God knowes not our hearts, the frame of them, nor what in them we desire and aime at, without some eminent tryall & inquiry, or untill we our selves do make knowne what is in them unto him. If this be the mans mind (as it must be, if he be at any agreement with himselfe in his principles, concerning these scripturall Attributions unto God,) for my part, I shall be so farre from esteeming him eminent, as a meere Christian, that I shall scarcely judge him comparable, as to his apprehensions of God, unto many that lived and dyed meere Pagans. To this sence also is applyed that Property of God, that he tryeth the hearts, as it is urged by M. Biddle from 1 Thes. 2. 4, that is, he maketh inquiry after what is in them, which but upon search and tryall, he knoweth not. By what wayes and meanes God accomplisheth this search, and whether hereupon he comes to a perfect understanding of our hearts, or no, is not expressed. John tells us, that God is greater then our hearts, and knoweth all things; and we have thought on that account, (with that of such farther discoveryes as he hath made of himselfe, and his Perfections unto us) that he had been said to search our hearts, not that himselfe, for his own information, needs any such formall processe by way of tryall and enquiry, but because really and indeed he doth that in himselfe, which men aime at in the accomplishment of their most diligent searches, and exactest tryalls.
And we may by the way see a little of this mans consistency with himselfe. Christ he denyes to be God. A great part of §. 12.his Religion consists in that negative. Yet of Christ it is said, that he knew all men, and needed not that any should testifyin of man, for he knew what was inman, John 2. 24, 25. and this is spoken in reference to that very thing in the hearts of men, which he would perswade us, that God knowes not without inquiry. That is, upon the account of his not committing himselfe to those, as true Believers, whom yet upon the account of the profession they made, the Scripture calls so, and sayes, they believed in his name when they saw the miracels that he did, v. 23. Though they had such a vaile of profession upon them, that the Holy Ghost would have us esteeme them as Believers, yet Christ could looke through it, into their hearts, and discover & know their frame, and whether in sincerity they loved him, and believed in his name or no; but this God cannot do, without enquiry and yet Christ (if we believe M. B.) was but a meere man, as he is a meere Christian. Further, it seemes by this Gentleman, that unlesse we make knowne our requests to God; he knowes not what we will aske. Yet we aske nothing but what is in our thoughts: and in the last querie he instructs us, that God knowes our thoughts, and doubtlesse knowes M. Biddles to be but folly. Further yet, if God must be concluded ignorant of our desires, because we are bid to make our requests, knowne to him, He may be as well concluded forgetfull of what himselfe hath spoken, because he bids us, put him in remembrance, and appoints some to be his Remembrancers: But to returne.
This is the aspect of almost one halfe of the places produced §. 13.by M. Biddle, towards the businesse in hand; if they are properly spoken of God, in the same sence as they are of man; they conclude him not to know things present, the frame of the heart of any man in the world towards himselfe, and his feare, nay the outward, open, notorious actions of men. So it is in that place of Gen. 18. 21. insisted on by lNimis longè a propriâ verhorum significatione recedendum est, & sententiarum vis enervanda, si eas eum definitâ illa futurorum contingentium praescientiâ conciliare velis at Gen. 18. 21. & 22. 12. Quicquid enim aliàs de utrius{que} loci sententiâ statuas, illud tamen. facile est cernere, Deum novum quoddam, & insigne experimentum, illic quidem impietatis Sodomiticae & Gomorrh…, videre voluisse, hic vere pletatis Abrahamicae vidisse, quod antequam fieret, plane certum & exploratum non esset. Crellius de vera Relig. c. 24. p. 209.Crellius, one of M. B's great Masters. I will goe downe and see (or know) whether they have done altogether according to the cry that is come up unto me. Yea the places which in their letter & outward appearance seeme to ascribe that ignorance of things present unto God, are farre more expresse and numerous, then those that in the least looke forward to what is yet for to come, or was so, at their delivery. This progresse then have we made under our Catechist, if we may believe him, as he insinvates his notions concerning God: God, sits in Heaven (glistering on a throne) whereunto he is limited, yea to a certaine place therein, so as not to be elsewhere, being grieved, troubled, and perplexed, at the affaires done below which he doth know, making inquiry after what he doth not know, and many things, (things future) he knoweth not at all.
Before I proceed to the farther Consideration of that which §. 14.is eminently, and expressly denyed by M. Biddle. viz. Gods foreknowledge of our free actions that are future, because many of his proofes, in the sence by him urged, seeme to exclude him from an acquaintance with many things present, as in particular, the frame and condition of the hearts men, towards himselfe, as was observed; it may not be amisse, a little to confirme that Perfection of the knowledge of God as to those things, from the Scripture, which will abundantly also manifest, that the expressions insisted on by our Catechist, are metaphoricall, and improperly ascribed to God. Of the eminent predictions in the Scripture, which relate unto things future, I shall speake afterwards. He knew, for he foretold the Flood, the destruction of Sodome and Gomorrah, the Famine in Aegypt, the selling and exaltation of Joseph. the Raigne of David, the division of his Kingdome, the Babylonish captivity, the Kingdome of Cyrus, the returne of his people, the state and ruine of the foure great Empires of the world, the Warres, Plagues, Famines, Earthquakes, Divisions, which he manifestly foretold. But farther, he knowes the frame of the hearts of men. He knew that the Keilites would deliver up David to Saul if he staid amongst them, which probably they knew not themselves, 1 Sam. 23. He knew that Hazael would murther women and infants, which he knew not himselfe. He knew that the Aegyptians would afflict his People, though at first they entertained them with Honour, Gen. 15. 13. He knew Abraham, that he would instruct his houshold. Gen. 18. 19. He knew that some were obstinate, their neck an iron sinew, and their brow brasse Isa. 48. 4. He knew the imagination, or figment of the heart of his People, Deut. 31. 21. That the Church of Laodicea (notwithstanding her profession) was lukewarme, neither hot nor cold, Rev. 3. 15. Man looketh on the outward appearance, God looketh on the heart, 1 Sam. 16. 7. He only knowes the hearts of all the children of men, 1 Kings 8. 39. Hell and destruction are before the Lord, how much more then the hearts of the Sonnes of men. Prov. 15. 11. so also Prov. 24. 12. Jerem. 1. 9, 10. Ezek. 11. 5. Ps. 38. 9. Psal. 94. 11. Job. 31. 4. Math. 6. 4, 6, 8. Luk. 16. 15. Act. 1. 24. &c. Innumerable other places to this purpose may be insisted on: though it is a superisall to be put to prove, that God knowes the hearts of the Sonnes of men. But to proceed to that which is more directly under consideration.
3. The sole foundation of M. Biddles insinuation, that §. 14.God knowes not our free actions that are future, being laid (as was observed,) on the assignation of Feare, Repentance, Expectation, & Conjecturing unto God, the consideration which hath already been had of those Attributions in the Scripture, and the causes of them, is abundanly sufficient to remove it out of the way, and to let his inference sinke thither, whence it came. Doubtlesse never was painter so injurious to the Deity, who limned out the shape of an old man on a cloth or board, and after some disputes with himselfe, whether he should sell it for an emblem of winter, and then set it out as a representaton of God the Father, as this man is, in snatching Gods own pencil out of his hand, & by it presenting him to the world in a grosse, carnall, deformed shape. Plato would not suffer Homer in his Commonwealth, for entrenching upon the imaginary blessedness of their dunghill Deities; making aHom: Iliad: Rhapsod. foreign P. 431. &c. foreign.Jupiter to grieve for the death of Sarpedon, Mars bHom: Iliad. Rhapsod. foreign Ps: 859. foreign.to be wounded by Diomedes, and to roare thereupon, with disputes & cHom: Iliad. Rhapsod. foreign. in Princip.conjecturs in heaven among thēselves about the issue of the Trojan warre: though he endeavours to salve all his heavenly solecismes, by many noble expressions, concerning purposes not unmeet for a Deity; telling us in the close and Issue of a most contingent affaire, foreign. Let that man think of how much sorer punishment he shall be thought worthy (I speake of the great account he is one day to make) who shall persist in wresting the Scripture to his own destruction, to represent the living and incomprehensible God unto the world, trembling with feare, pale with anger, sordid with griefe, and Repentance, perplexed with conjectures, and various expectations of events, and making a diligent enquiry after the things he knowes not, that is altogether such an one as himselfe; let all who have the least reverence of and acquaintance with that Majesty, with whom we have to do, judge and determine. But of these things before.
4. The proposure of a Question to succeed in the roome of that removed, with a Scripturall resolution thereof, in order §. 15.to a discovery of what God himselfe hath revealed, concerning his knowledge of all things, is the next part of our employment. Thus then it may be framed.
Q. Doth not God know all things, whether past, present, or to come, all the wayes, and actions of men, even before their accomplishment, or is any thing hid from him? What saies the Scripture properly and directly hereunto?
Ans. God is greater then our hearts, and knoweth all things, 1 John 3. 20. Neither is there any Creature that is not manifest in his sight: but all things are naked, and open to the eyes of him, with whom we have to do. Heb. 4. 12. He is a God of knowledge, 1 Sam. 2. 3. Thou knowest my downsitting, and mine uprising, thou understandest my thoughts a farre off. Thou compassest my paths, and my lying downe, and art acquainted with all my wayes, for there is not a word in my tongue but O Lord thou knowest it altogether: Psal. 139. 2, 3, 4, 5. Great is our Lord, and of great power his understanding is Infinite, Psal. 141. 5. Who hath directed the spirit of the Lord, or being his Councellour hath taught him? With whom tooke he Councell, or who instructed him, and taught him in the paths of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and shewed to him the way of understanding? Isa. 40. 13, 14. There is no searching of his understanding v. 28. Ro. 11. 34, 35, 36. of him are all things; And Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the World, Act. 15. 18, &c.
Of the Undeniable evidence and conviction of Gods Prescience §. 16.or Foreknowledge of future contingents, from His predictions of their comming to pass, with other demonstrations of the Truth under consideration, attended with their several testimonies from Scripture, the close of this discourse will give a further Account.
It remaines only, that according to the way and method formerly insisted on, I give some farther Account of the Perfection of God pleaded for, with the Arguments wherewith it is farther evidenced to us, and so to proceed to what followeth.
1. That Knowledge is proper to God, that testimony of the §. 7.Scripture unto the excellency and perfection of the thing it selfe, doth sufficiently evince. oIntellectio secundum se ejus est, quod secundum se optimum est. Julius Petronellus l. 3. c. 4 ex Arist. Metaph. l. 12. cap. 7. Sed et intellectum duplicem video; alter enim intelligere potest, quamvis non intelligat, alter etiam intelligit qui tamen nondū est perfectus, nisi & semper intelligat, & omnia: & ille demum absolutissimus futurs sit, qui & semper, & omnia, & simul intelligat. Maxim. Tyrius. dissertat. 1. Ʋno mentis cernit in ictu quae sint, fuerint, veniant{que} Boeth.I cannot tell (saies the Apostle) God knoweth 2 Cor. 12. 2, 3. It is the Generall voice of Nature, upon relation of any thing that to us is hid, and unknowne, that the Apostle there makes mention of; GOD KNOWETH. That he knowes the things that are past, M. B. doth not question. That at least also somethings that are present, yea some thoughts of our hearts are known to him, eh doth not deny. It is not my intendment to engage in any curious Scholasticall discourse about the understanding, science, knowledge, or Wisdome of God; nor of the way of Gods knowing things, in, and by, his own Essence through simple intuition. That which directly is opposed, is his knowledg of our free actions, which in respect of their second & immediate caudses, may, or may not be. This therefore I shall briefly explain, and confirme the truth of it, by Scripture Testimonyes, and Arguments from right Reason, not to be evaded, without making head against all Gods infinite perfections; having already demonstrated, that all that which is insisted on by M. B. to oppose it, is spoken metaphorically, and improperly to God.
That God doth fore-see all future things was amongst meere pforeign Hippoc. de Princip. To the same purpose is that of Epicharmus, foreign &c. And the Anonymus Author in Stobaeus (vid. Excerpta Stobaei pag. 117.) speaking of God adds—foreign &c. In short, the Pagans generally received custome of consulting Oracles, of using their foreign, their Auguria, and Auspicia &c. by which they expected answers from their Gods, and significations of their will concerning future things, are evident demonstrations that they believed their Gods knew future Contingents.Pagans so acknowledged, as to be looked on as a common §. 18.notion of mankind: So qforeign. &c. Zenoph. foreign.Zenophon tells us; That both Grecians and Barbarians consented in this, that the Gods knew all things present, and to Come. And it may be worth our observation, that whereas rCum ergo Deus omnia noscat, foreign seu certo futura cognoscit ut talia, similiter & foreign, seu veresimiliter eventura, pro ratione causarum unde pendent. Crellius de Vera Relig. l. 1. c. 24. p. 201.Crellius, one of the most learned of this Gentlemans Masters, distinguisheth between foreign and foreign, affirming; that God knowes foreign, which though future are necessarily so, yet he knowes not foreign, which are only (saies he) likely sto to be; Zenophon plainely affirmes, that all Nations consent, that he knowes foreign. And this knowledge of his (saith that great Philosopher,) is the foundation of the Prayers and supplications of men, for the obtaining of good, or the avoiding of evill. Now that one calling himselfe a meere Christian, should oppose a perfection of God, that a meere Pagan affirmes all the world to acknowledge to be in him, would seeme somewhat strange, but that we know all things do not answer, or make good, the names whereby they are called.
For the clearer handling of the matter under considerration, the Termes wherein it is proposed are a little to be explained.§ 12.
1. That Prescience, of Fore-knowledge is attributed to God, the Scripture testifieth. Act. 2. 23. Rom. 8. 29. chap. 11. 2. 1 Pet. 1. 2. are proofes hereof. The terme indeed (Foreknowing) rather relates to the things known, and the order wherein they stand one to another, and among themselves, then is properly expressive of Gods knowledge. God knowes all things as they are; and in that order wherein they stand. sSciendum, qu…d omnino aliter se habet …ntiqua vel aeterna scientia ad ea quae fi…nt & facta sunt, & aliter recens scientia: esse namque rei entis est causa scientiae nostrae, scientia vero aeterna est causa ut ipsa res sit. Si vero quando res est postquam non erat, contingeret noviter in ipsa scientia antiquâ, scientia superaddita, quemadmodum contingit hoc in scientia nova, sequeretur uti{que} quod ipsa scientia antiqua esset causata ab ipso ente: & non esset causa ipsus. oportet ergo quod non contingat ibi mutatio, scilicet in antiqua scientia, quemadmodum contingit in nova: sciendum autem, quod hic error idoirco accidit, quia scientia antiqua mensuratur ab imperitis cum scientia nova, cujus mensurationis modus vitiosissimus est: projicit quippe quando{que} hominem in …arathrum, unde nunquam est egressurus. Rab. Aben. Rost. Interpret. Raymund. Martin. Pugi. Fidei. P. P. cap, 25. Sect. 4, 5. pag. 201.Things that are past, as to the order of the creatures, which he hath appointed to them, and the workes of Providence, which outwardly are of him, he knowes as past: not by Remembrance as we do, but by the same act of knowledge, wherewith he knew them from all Eternity, even before they were. Their existence in time, and being cast by the successive motion of things, into the number of the things that are past, denote an alteration in them, but not at all in the knowledge of God. So it is also in respect of things future. God knowes them in that esse intelligibile which they have, as they may be knowne and understood; and how that is, shall afterwards be declared. He sees and knowes them as they are, when they have that respect upon them of being futures when they loose this respect by their actuall existence, he knowes them still as before. They are altered, his knowledge, his understanding it infinite, and changeth not.
2. tIn Deo simplex est intui tus, quo simpliciter videntur quae composita suntainvariabiliter quae variabilia sunt, & simul quae successiva.Gods knowledge of things is either of Simple intelligence §. 21.(as usually it is phrased) or of vision The first is his knowledge of all possible things; that is, of all that he himselfe can doe. That God knows himselfe, I suppose will not be denyed. An Infinite Understanding knows throughly all Infinite Perfections. God then knowes his own power, or Omnipotency, and thereby knowes all that he can do. Infinite science must know (as I said) what Infinite p…wer can extend unto. Now what ever God can do is possible to be done; that is, whatever hath not in itselfe a repugnancy to being, Now that many things may be done by the power of God, that yet are not, nor ever shall be done, I suppose is not denyed. Might he not make a new world? Hence ariseth the Attribution of the knowledge of simple intelligence, before mentioned, unto God. In his owne infinite understanding he sees, and knowes all things, that are possible to be done by his power, would his good pleasure concurre to their production.
Of the world of things possible which God can do, some things, even all that he pleaseth, are uAd hanc legem animus noster aptandus est, hanc sequatur, huic pareat, & quaecun{que} fiunt debuisse fieri putet. Senec. Epist. 108.future. The creation it §. 21.selfe, and all things that have had a being since, were so future before their creation. Had they not sometimes been future, they had never been. What ever is, was to be, before it was. All things that shall be to the end of the world are now future. How things which were only possible in relation to the power of God, come to be future, and in what respect, shall be briefely mentioned. These things God knoweth also. His science of them is called, of vision. He sees them, as things which in their proper order shall exist. In a word, Scientia Visionis, and Simplicis Intelligentiae, may be considered in a threefold relation; that is, in ordine ad objectum, mensuram, modum. 1. Scientia Visionis hath for its object things past, present, and to come, whatsoever had, hath, or will have actuall being. 2. The measure of this knowledge is his will: because he will, & decree of God onelyonly make those things future, which were but possible be fore, therefore we say scientia visionis fundatur in voluntate. 3. For the manner of it, it is called scientia libera, quia fundatur in voluntate, as necessarily presupposing a free act of the divine will, which makes things future, and so objects of this kind of knowledge. 2. That scientia, which we call simplicis intelligentiae; the object of it is, possible, the measure of it, Omnipotency; for by it he knowes all he can do; & for the manner of it, 'tis scientia necessaria, quia non fundatur in voluntate, sed potestate; (say the Schoolemen) seeing by it he knowes not what he will, but what he can do. Of that late figment, of a middle science in God, arising neither from the infinite Perfection of his own being, as that of simple intelligence, nor yet attending his free purpose and decree, as that of Vision, but from a consideration of the second causes that are to produce the things fore known, in their kind, order, and dependance, I am not now to treat. And with the former kind of knowledge it is, or rather in the former way, (the knowledge of God being simply one and the same) is it, that we affirme him to know the things that are future, of what sort soever, or all things before they come to passe.
3. The things enquired after are commonly called contingent. §. 22.Contingencyes are of two sorts.
1. Such as are only so.
2. Such as are also free.
1. Such as are only so, are contingent only in their effects: such is the falling of a stone from an house, and the killing of a man thereby. The Effect it selfe was contingent, nothing more; the cause necessary; the stone being loosed from what detained it upon the house, by its own weight necessarily falling to the ground. (2.) That which is so contingent, as to be also free, is contingent both in respect of the Effect, and of its Causes also. Such was the Souldiers piercing of the side of Christ. The effect was contingent, such a thing might have been done, or not: and the cause also, for they chose to doe it, who did it, and in respect of their own elective faculty, might not have chosen it. That a man shall write, or ride, or speake to another person to morrow, the Agent being free, is contingent, both as to the cause, and to the effect. About these is our principall enquiry; and to the knowledge of God, which he is said to have of them, is the opposition most expressely made by M. B. Let this then be our conclusion.
God Dixit R. Iuchanan: omnia videntur uno intuitu. Dixit Rab. Nachman filius Isaaci, sic etiam nos didicimus: quod Scriptum est Psal. 33. v. 15. formans simul cor eorum, intelligens omnia opera eorum, quomodo intelligendum est? Dicendum est, dici, Deum adunate simul corda totius, mundi? Ecce, videmus non ita rem se habere: sed sic dicendum est, Formans sive creator videt simul cor corum, & intelligit omnia opera eorum. Talmud. Rosch. haschana: interpret: Jose ph. de Voysin.perfectly knowes all the free actions of men, before they are §. 23. Conclus.wrought by them; all things that will be done, or shall be to all Eternity, though in their owne natures contingent, and wrought by agents free in their working, are known to him from Eternity.
Some previous observations will make way for the cleare §. 24.proofe and demonstration of this truth. Then
1. God certainly knowes every thing that is to be known: that is, every thing that is scibile. If there be in the nature of things an impossibility to be known, they cannot be known by the divine understanding. If any thing be scibile, or may be known, the not knowing of it, is his imperfection if he knowes it nor. To God this cannot be ascribed, (viz. that he should not know what is to be known) without the destruction of his Perfection. He shall not be my God, who is not infinitely! Perfect. He who wants any thing to make him blessed in himselfe, can never make the fruition of himselfe the blessednesse of others.
2. Every thing that hath a determinate cause is scibile, may be §. 25.known, though future, by him that perfectly knowes that cause, which doth so determine the thing to be knwn unto existence. Now Contingem things, the free Actions of men, that yet are not, but in respect of themselves may or may not be, have such a determinate cause of their existence, as that mentioned. It is true, in respect of their immediate causes, as the wills of men, they are contingent, and may be, or not be; but that they have such a cause as before spoken of, is evident from the light of this consideration. In their own time and order they are: now what ever is at any time, was future; before it was, it was to be. If it had not been future, it had not now been. Its present existence is sufficient demonstration of the futurition it had before. I aske then, whence it came to be future; that that action was rather to be, then a thousand others, that were as possible as it? For instance, that the side of Christ should be pierced with a speare, when it was as possible in the nature of the thing it selfe, and of all secundary causes, that his head should be cut off. That then which gives any action a futurition, is that determinate cause wherein it may be known, whereof we speake. Thus it may be said of the same thing, that it is contingent, and determined, without the least appearance of contradiction, because it is not spoken with respect to the same things, or causes.
3. The determinate cause of contingent things, that is, things §. 26.that are future, (for aQuicquid enim est, dum est, necessario est. Aquinas 1. part. Quaest. 19. Art. 3.every thing when it is, and as it is, is necessary) is the Will of bVid Scot. in 1. lib. Sent: dist. 30. quaest. Unica. Durand ibid. Dist 38 Quaest 3. Jo Major in 1. Dist. 38, 39. Quaest: 1. Art. 4. Alua…cz. de Anxiliis lib. 2. Disput. 10 pag. 55. &c. & Scholasticos in Lombardum ibid. Dist 38. 39. quos fusè enumerat Joh Martines de Ripalda in 1. Sent. pag. 127. & 131.God himselfe concerning their Existence and Being, either by his efficiency and working, as all good things in every kind, (that is, that are either Morally or Physically so, in which latter sence, all the actions of men, as actions, are so or by his permission, which is the condition of things Morally evill, or of the irregularity and obliquity attending those actions, upon the account of their relation to a Law, which in themselves are Entitative and Physically good, as the things were which God at first created. Whether any thing come to passe, besides the xQuid mihi scire quae futura sunt? quaecun{que} ille vult, haec futura sunt. Origen. Hom. 6. in Jesum nave. Vid. Frider. Spanhemium Dub. Evang. 33. pag. 272. in illud Math. Totum hoc factum est, foreign. Paul. Ferrium Schol. Orthodoxi. c. 31. & in Vindiciis. cap. 5. Sect. 6.will of God, and contrary to his purpose, will not be disputed with any advantage of Glory to God, or honour to them that shall assert it. That in all events the will of God is fulfilled, is a common notion of all rationall creatures. So the accomplishment of his determinate councell, is affirmed by the Apostle, in the issue of that mysterious dispensation, of the crucifying of his Sonne. That of Jam. 4. 15. foreign, intimats Gods will to be extended to all actions, as actions, whatever. Thus God knew, before the world was made, or any thing that is in it, that there would be such a world, and such things in it: yet then the making of the world, nothing was *Vid. Aquinat. 1. Quaest. 83. Art. 1. ad 3.more free or contingent. God is not a necessary Agent, as to any of the workes, that outwardly are of him: whence then did God know this? Was it not from his own decree, and eternall purpose, that such a world there should be? And if the knowledge of one contingent thing be from hence, why not of all? In briefe, these future contingencyes depend on something for their existence, or they come forth into the world in their own strength and upon their own account, not depending on any other. If the latter, they are God; if the former, the will of God, or old fortune, must be the Principle on which they do depend.
4. God can worke with contingent causes, for the accomplishment §. 27.of his own will, and purposes, without the least prejudice to them, either as causes, or as free, and contingent. God moves not, workes not in, or with any second causes, to the producing of any effect, contrary, or not agreeable, to their own natures. Notwithstanding any predetermination, or operation of God, the wills of men in the production of every one of their actions, are at as perfect liberty, as a cause in dependance of another, is capable of. To say it is not in-dependance, is Atheisme. The purpose of God, the councell of his will concerning any thing, as to its existence, gives a dVid: Di…ac. Alvarez. de Auxilliis Gratiae lib. 3. disput. 25. Aquinat. part 2. Quaest. 112. Art. 3. E. 1. Part Quaest. 19. Art. 8. ad. 3.necessity of infa…libillity to the event, but changes not the manner of the second causes operation, be it what it will. That God cannot accomplish and bring about his own purposes by free and contingent agents, without the destruction of the natures he hath endued them withall, is a figment, unworthy the thoughts of any, who indeed acknowledge his Soveraignty and power.
5. The Reason why M. B's companions in his undertakings, §. 28.as others that went before him of the same mind, do deny this fore-knowledge of God, they expresse on all occasions to be, that the granting of it is prejudiciall to that absolute independent liberty of will, which God assignes to men; so Socinus pleads Praelect. Theol. c. 8. yCrell. de Vera Relig. lib. 1. cap. 24. Smalcius ad: Franz. difput. 12.Thus farre I confesse more accurately then the Arminians. These pretend (some of them at least) to grant the Prescience of God, but yet deny his determinate Decrees, and purposes on the same pretence that the other do his Prescience, viz. Of their Prejudiciallnesse to the free will of man. Socinus discourses, (wich was no difficult task) that the fore-knowledge of God is as inconsistent with that independent liberty of will, and contingency, which he, and they had fancyed, as the predetermination of his will; and therefore rejects the former as well as the latter. It was zIn has angustias Cicero coarctat animum religiosum, ut unum eligat a duobus: aut esse aliquid in nostra voluntate, aut esse Praescientiam futurorum: quoniam utrum{que} arbitratur esse non posse, sed si alterum confirmatur, alterum tolli. Si eligerimus praescientiam futurorum, tolli voluntatis arbitrium. Si eligerimus voluntatis arbitrium, tolli Praescientiam futurorum. Ipse ita{que} ut vir magnus & doctus, & vitae humanae plurimùm & peritissime consulens, ex his duebus eligit liberum voluntatis arbitrium. Quod ut confirmaretur, negavit praescientiam futurorum, at{que} eita dum vult facere liberos, facit sacrilegos. Religiosus autem animus utrum{que} eligit, utrum{que} consitetur, & fide pietatis utrum{que} confirmat. Quomodo inquit: Nam si est Praescientia futurorum, sequantur illa omnia, quae connexa sunt, donec eo perveniatur, ut nihil sit in nostra voluntate. Porrò, si est a liquid in nostra voluntate, eisdem recursis gradibus eò pervenitur, ut non sit praescientia futurorum. Nam per illa omnia sic recurritur. Si est voluntatis arbitrium, non omnia fato fiunt. Si non omnia fato fiunt, non est omnium certus ordo causarum. Si certus causarum ordo non est: Nec rerum certus est ordo praescienti Deo, quae fieri non possunt nisipraecedentibus, & efficientibus causis. Si rerum ordo Praescienti Deo certus non est, non omnia sic veniunt, ut ea ventura praescivit. Porro, si non omnia sic eventiunt at ab illo eventura praescita sunt, non est, in…uit in Deo Praescientia futurorum. Nos adversus istos sacrilegos ausus, & impios, & Deum dicimus omnia scire antequam fiant; & voluntate nos facere, quicquid a nobis non nisi volentibus fieri sentimus & novimus. August. de Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 9.Augustines complaint of old concerning Cicero, that ita fecit homines liberos, ut fecit etiam sacrilegos. Cicero was a meere Pagan; and surely our complaint against any that shall close with him in this attempt, under the name of a meere Christian, will not be lesse just then that of Augustine. For mine own part, I am fully resolved, that all the liberty and freedome, that as creatures we are capable of, is eminently consistent with Gods absolute decrees, and infallible fore-knowledge. And if I should hesitate in the apprehension thereof, I had rather ten thousand times deny our wills to be free, then God to be omniscient, the soveraigne disposer of all men, their actions, and concernments, or to say that any thing comes to passe, without, against, or contrary to the counsell of his will. But we know through the godnesse of God, that these things have their consistency, and that God may have preserved to him the glory of his infinite Perfection, and the will of man not at all abridged of its due and proper liberty.
These things being premised, the proof & demonstration of the truth proposed lyes ready at hand, in the ensuing particulars;§. 29.
1. He who knowes aCausam quare Deus futura contingentia praesciat damus hanc, quod sit infinita ipsuis intellectus perfectio omnia cognoscentis. Et sicut Deus cognoscit praeterita secun dum esse quod habuerunt, ita etiam cognoscit futura secundum illud esse quod habitura sunt. Dan. Clasen. Theol Natural, cap. 22. pag. 128.all things, knowes the things that are future though contingent. In saying they are things future and contingent, you grant them to be among the number of things; as you do those which you call things past: But that God knowes all things, hath allready been abundantly confirmed out of Scriptures. Let the Reader looke back on some of the many texts and places, by which I gave answer to the Querie, about the Fore-knowledge of God, and he will find abundantly enough for his satisfaction, if he be of those that would be satisfied, and dares not carelessly make bold to trample upon the Perfections of God. Take some few of them to a review. 1 John 3. 20. God is greater then our hearts, and knoweth all things. Even we know things past and present: If God knoes only things of the same kind, his knowledge may be greater then ours by many degrees, but you cannot say his understanding is infinite; there is not on that supposition an infinite distance between his knowledge and ours, but they stand in some measurable proportion. Heb. 4. 13. All things are open and naked before him with whom we have to do. Not that which is to come, not the free actions of men that are future, saith M. Biddle. But to distinguish thus, when the Scripture doth not distinguish, and that to the great dishonour of God, is not to interpret the Word, but to deny it. Acts 15. 18. Known unto God are all his workes from the foundation of the world. I aske, whether God hath any thing to do in the free actions of men? For instance, had he any thing to do in the sending of Joseph into Aegypt, his exaltation there, and the entertainment of his Fathers houshold afterwards by him in his greatnesse and power? All which were brought about by innumerable contingencyes, and free actions of men: if he had not, why should we any longer depend on him, or regard him in the severall transactions, & concernements of our lives?
Nullum numen abest, si sit prudentia: nos te,
Nos facimus fortuna Deum.
If he had to do with it, as Joseph thought he had, when he affirmed plainely, that God sent him thither, and made him a Father to Pharaoh, and his house, then the whole was known to God before; Gen. 45. 5, 6, 7, 8.for known unto God are all his workes from the foundation of the world. And if God may know any one free action before hand, he may know all; for there is the same reason of them all. Their contingency is given as the only cause, why they may not be known; now every action that is contingent, is equally interested therein: a quatenus ad omne valet argumentum. That place of the Psalme before recited Psal. 139. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. is expresse, as to the knowledge of God concerning our free actions, that are yet future. If any thing in the world may be reckoned amongst our free actions, surely our thoughts may: and such a close reserved treasure are they, that M. B. doth more then insinuate in the application of the texts of Scripture, which he mentioneth, that God knoweth them not when present, without search and inquiry. But these (saith the Psalmist,) God knowes afarre off, before we think them; before they enter into our hearts. And truly I marvell, that any man, not wholly given up to a spirit of giddinesse, after he had produced this Text of Scripture, to prove that God knowes our thoughts, should instantly subjoyne a Question, leading men to a perswasion, that God knowes not our free actions, that are future: unlesse it was with a Julian designe, to impaire the credit of the Word of God, by pretending it lyable to selfe-contradiction; or with Lucian to deride God, as bearing contrary Testimonies concerning himselfe.
2. God hath by himselfe and his Holy bPraescientia Dei tot habet Testes, quot fecit Prophet as: Tertull. l. 2. contra Marcionem.Prophets, which have been from the foundation of the world, fore-told many §. 30.of the free actions of men, what they would do, what they should doe, long before they were borne who were to do them. To give a little light to this Argument, which of it selfe will easily overwhelme all that stands before it, I shall handle it under these propositions.
1. That God hath so fore-told the free actions of men.
2. That so he could not do unlesse he knew them, and that they would be, then when he foretold them.
3. That he proves himselfe to be God by these his predictions.
4. That he foretells them as the meanes of executing many of his Judgements, which he hath purposed and threatned, and the accomplishment of many mercyes, which he hath promised; so that the denyall of his foresight of them, so exempts them from under his Providence, as to inferre, that he rules not in the world by punishments and rewards.
For the first.
1. There need no great search or inquiry after witnesses to confirme the truth of it; the Scripture is full of such predictions §. 31.from one end to the other: some few instances shall suffice: Gen. 18. 18, 19. Seeing that Abraham shall surely become a great and mighty Nation, and all the Nations of the earth shall be blessed in him; For I know him, that he will command his Children, and his houshold after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord, to do Justice and Judgment; that the Lord may bring upon upon Abraham, that which he hath spoken of him. Scarce a word but is expressive of some future contingent thing, if the free actions of men be so, before they are wrought. That Abraham should become a mighty nation: that the nations of the Earth should be Blessed in him: that he would command his Children, and houshold after him to keepe the wayes of the Lord; it was all to be brought about by the free actions of Abraham, and of others; and all this I know saith the Lord, and accordingly declares it. By the way, if the Lord knew all this before, his following tryall of Abraham was not to satisfy himselfe whether he feared him or no, as is pretended.
So also Gen. 15. 13, 14. And he said unto Abraham, know of a surety §. 32.that they seed shall be a stranger in a Land that is not theirs, and they shall serve them, and they shall afflict them foure hundred yeares: And also that Nation which they shall seive will I Judge: and they shall come out with great substance. The Aegyptians affliction on the Israelites was by their free actions, if any be free: It was their sin to do it: they sinned in all that they did for the effecting of it. And doubtlesse if any, mens sinfull actions are free; yet these doth God here fore tell; they shall afflict them.
Deut. 31. 16, 17, 18. you have an instance beyond all possible §. 33.exception. And the Lord said unto Moses, behold thou shalt s…pe with thy Fathers, & this People will rise up, and go a whoring after the Gods of the strangers of the land, whither they go to be amongst them, and will forsake me, and breake my commandements. Then my anger shall be kindled against them in that day, and I will forsake them, and I will hide my face from them, and they shall be devoured, and many evills and troubles shall befall them, so that they will say in that day, are not these evills come upon us, because our God is not amongst us? &c. The summe of a good part of what is recorded in the book of Judges, is here foretold by God. The peoples going a whoring after the Gods of the strangers of the Land; their forsaking of God, their breaking his Covenant, the thoughts of their hearts, & their expressions, upon the consideration of the evills and afflictions that should befall them, were of their free actions: but now all these doth God here foretell; and thereby engages the honour of his Truth, unto the certainty of their comming to passe.
1 Kings 13. 2. is signall to the same purpose: Behold a child shall be §. 34.borne unto the house of David, Josiah by name, and upon thee shall he offer the Priests of the High places, that burne incense upon thee, and mens bones shall be burnt on thee. This prediction is given out 300 yeares before the birth of Josiah. The accomplishment of it you have in the story 2 Kings 23. 17. Did Josiah act freely? Was his proceeding at Bethel by free actions, or no? If not, how shall we know what actions of men are free, what not? If it was, his free actions are here foretold, and therefore (I think) fore scen.
1 Kings 22. 28. The Prophet-Micaiah in the name §. 35.of the Lord, having fore told a thing that was contingent, and which was accomplished by a man acting at a venture, lays the credit of his Prophesy, and therein his life, (For if he had proved false as to the event, he was to have suffered death by the Law,) at stake before all the people, upon the certainty of the Issue fore-told. And Micaiah said, if then returne at all in peace, the Lord hath not spoken at all by me. And he said, heare all yee people.
Of these predictions the Scripture is full. The Prophesyes of Cyrus in Isaiah; of the issue of the Babylonish Warre, and Kingdome, in Jeremiah; of the severall great alterations and changes in the Empires of the world, in Daniel, of the Kingdome of Christ in them all, are too long to be insisted on. The Reader may also consult Math. 24. 5. Mark, 13. 6. Mark. 14. 30. Act. 20. 29. 2 Thes. 2. 3, 4. &c. 1 Tim. 4. 1. 2 Tim. 3. 1. 2 Pet. 2. 1. And the Revelation almost throughout. Our first proposition then is undenyably evident, that God by himselfe, and by his Prophets, hath fore-told things future, even the free-actions of men.
2. The second Proposition mentioned is manifest, and evident in its own Light. What God fore-telleth, that he perfectly §. 36.fore-knowes. The honour and repute of his Veracity, and Truth, yea of his Being, depend on the certaine accomplishment of what he absolutely fore-tells. If his predictions of things future are not bottomed on his certaine Prescience of them, they are all but like Sathans Oracles, conjectures, and guesses of what may be accomplished or not; a supposition whereof, is as high a pitch of blasphemy as any creature in this world can possibly arrive unto.
3. By this Prerogative of certaine predictions, in reference §. 37.to things to come, God vindicates his own Deity; and from the want of it convinces the vanity of the Idols of the Gentiles, and the falsenesse of the Prophets that pretend to speake in his name. Isa. 41. 21, 22, 23, 24. Produce your cause, saith the Lord, bring forth, your strong Reasons, saith the King of Jacob: let them bring then forth, and shew us what shall happen, let them shew the former things what they be, or delare us things for to come: Show the things which are to cme hereafter, that we may know ye are Gods. Behold you are of nothing. The Lord calling forth the Idols of the Gentiles, Divels, Stocks, and Stones, to plead for themselves, before the denuntiation of the solemne sentence ensuing, v. 24. He puts them to the plea of fore-knowledge for the proofe of their Deity. If they can fore-tell things to come certainely and infallibly, on the account of their own knowledge of them, Gods they are, and Gods they shall be esteemed. If not (saith he) you are nothing, worse then nothing, and your worke is of nought, and he is an Abomination that chuseth you. And it may particularly be remarked, that the Idolls, of whom he speaketh, are in especiall those of the Caldeans, whose worshippers pretended above all men in the world to Divination, and Predictions. Now this issue doth the Lord drive things to betwixt himselfe, and the Idolls of the world; If they can fore-tell things to come, that is, not this, or that thing, (for so by conjecture, upon consideration of second causes, and the generall dispositions of things, they may do, and the Divell hath one) but any thing, or every thing, they shall go free, that is, is there nothing hid from you that is yet for to be? Being not able to stand before this interrogation, they perish before the Judgment mentioned. But now if it may be replyed to the Living God himselfe, that this is a most unequall way of proceeding, to lay that burthen upon the shoulders of others, which himselfe will not beare; bring others to that tryall, which himselfe cannot undergoe, for he himselfe cannot fore-tell the free-actions of men, because he doth not foreknow them, would not his plea render him like to the Idolls, whom he adjudgeth to shame and confusion? God himselfe there concluding, that they are vanity and nothing, who are pretended to be Gods, but are not able to fore-tell the things that are for to come, asserts his own Deity, upon the account of his Infinite Understanding, and Knowledge of all things, on the account whereof he can foreshew all things whatever, that are as yet future. In like manner doth he proceed to evince what is from himselfe, what not, in the Predictions of any, from the certainty of the event. Deut. 18. 21, 22. If thou say in thine heart, how shall we know the word that the Lord hath not spoken, when a Prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to passe, that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken, but the Prophet hath spoken presumptuously, thou shalt not be afraid of him.
4. The fourth Proposition, that God by the free actions of men (some whereof he fore telleth,) doth fulfill his own §. 38.counsell as to Judgements, and Mercyes, Rewards, and Punishments, needs no farther proofe nor confirmation, but what will arise from a meere review of the things before mentioned, by God so foretold, as was to be proved. They were things of the greatest import in the World, as to the good or evill of the inhabitants thereof; & in whose accomplishment as much of the Wisdome, Power, Righteousnesse, and Mercy of God was manifest, as in any of the workes of his Providence what ever. Those things which he hath disposed of, as to be subservient to so great ends, certainly he knew that they would be. The selling of Ioseph, the crucyfying of his Son, the destruction of Antichrist, are things of greater concernment, then that God should only conjecture at their event. And indeed the taking away of Gods fore-knowledge of things contingent, renders his Providence uselesse, as to the government of the World. To what end should any rely upon him, seek unto him, commit themselves to his care through the course of their lives, when he knows not what will, or may befall them the next day? How shall he Judg, or rule the world, who every moment is surprized with new emergencyes, which he foresaw not, which must necessitate him to new counsells and determinations? On the consideration of this Argument doth Episcopius conclude for the Prescience of God, Epist. 2. ad Beverovicium de termino vitae, which he had allowed to be questioned in his cSpeciem & pondus videtur habere haec objectia; nec pauci sunt, qui ejus, vi adeo moventur, ut divinam futurorum contingentium praescientiam negart, & quae pro eâ facere videntur loca, at{que} Argumenta, magno conatu torquere malint, & flectere in sensus, non minus periculos s quam difficiles. Adme quod attinet, Ego hactenus sive Religione quadam animi, sive divinae Majestatis reverentia, non potui prorsus in animum meum inducere, rationem istam allegitam tanti esse, ut propfer eam Deo futurorum contingentium praescientia detrabenda sit: maxime cum vix videam, quomodo alioquin divinarum praedictionum vertias salvari possit, sine ali …ua aut incertitudinis macula, aut falsi possibilis suspicione: Sim: Episcop. Respons. ad secund. Epist. Johan: Beverovi.private Theologicall Disputations, dEpiscop. institut: Theol: lib. 4. cap. 17, 18. Episcop: disput. de Deo Thes: 10.though in his publike afterwards he plead for it. The summe of the Argument insisted on, amounts to this,
Those things which God foretells, that they shall certainly and infallibly come to passe; before they so doe, those he certainly and infallibly knoweth, whilest they are future, and that they will come to passe.
But God foretells, and hath foretold all manner of future contingencies, and free Actions of men, good and evill, duties, and sinnes, therefore he certainly and infallibly knowes them, whilest they are yet future.
The Proposition stands and falls unto the honour of Gods Truth, Veracity, and Power.
The Assumption is proved by the former, and sundry other instances that may be given.
He foretold, that the Aegyptians should afflict his People 400 yeares, that in so doing they would sin, and that for it he would punish them, Gen: 15. 13, 14, 15, 16. And surely the Aegyptians sinning therein, was their own free action. The incredulity of the Jewes, treachery of Judas, calling of the Gentiles, all that happened to Christ in the daies of his flesh, the coming of Antichrist, the rise of false teachers, were all fore-told, and did all of them purely depend on the free actions of men: which was to be demonstrated.
3. To omit many other Arguments, and to close this discourse; §. 39.All perfections are to be ascribed to God, they are all in him. To know is an excellency: He that knowes any thing, is therein better then he that knowes it not. The more any one knowes, the more excellent is he. To know all things is an absolute perfection in the good of knowledge: to know them in, and by himselfe, who so knowes them, & not from any discourses, made to him from without, is an absolute perfection in it selfe, and is required where there is Infinite Wisdome and Understanding. This we ascribe to God, as worthy of him, as by himselfe ascribed to himselfe. To affirme on the other side (1.) That God hath his knowledge from things without him, and so is taught Wisdome and Understanding, as we are, from the events of things, for the more any one knowes the wiser he is. (2.) That he hath (as we have) a successive knowledge of things, knowing that one day, which he knew not another, and that thereupon there is (3.) A daily and hourely change, and alterati…n in him, as from the increasing of his knowledge there must actually and formally be; and that he (4.) sits conjecturing at events, To assert I say, these and the like monstrous figments, concerning God, and his Knowledge, is as much as in them lyeth, who so assert them, to shut his Providence out of the World, and to devest him of all his Blessednesse, selfe sufficiency, and infinite Perfections. And in deed if M. B. believe his own principles, and would speake out, he must assert these things, how desperate soever; for having granted the premises, 'tis stupidity to stick at the conclusion. And therefore some of those whom M. B. is pleased to follow in these wild vagaries, speake out, and say, (though with as much blasphemy as confidence) that God doth only conjecture, and guesse at future contingents. For when this Argument is brought, Gen. 18. 19. I know (saith God) Abraham will command his Children after him, &c. Therefore future contingents may be certainly known of him. They deny the aAnonymus ad 5. cap. priora Math. p. 28. Nego consequentiam Deus dicere potuit se scire quid facturus erat Abraham, etsi id certo non praenoverit, sed probabiliter. Induciturenim Deus saepius humano more loquens: Solent autem homines affirmare se scire ca futura, quae verisimiliter futura sunt &c.consequence, and granting that he may be said to know them, yet say 'tis only by guesse, and conjecture, as we do. And for the present vindication of the Attributes of God this may suffice.
Before I close this discourse, it may not be impertinent to divert §. 44.a little to that, which alone seemes to be of any difficulty, lying in our way, in the assertion of this Prescience of God, though no occasion of its consideration be administred to us by him, with whom we have to do.
That future contingents have not in themselves a determinate truth, and therefore cannot be determinately known, is the great plea of those, who oppose Gods certaine Fore-knowledge of them: and therefore say they, doth the eArist. 1. de Inter p. c. 8.Philosopher affirme, that propositions concerning them, are neither true nor false. But
1. That there is, or may be, that there hath been, a certaine prediction of future contingents, hath been demonstrated, and therefore they must on some account or other, (and what that account is hath been declared) have a determinate Truth. And I had much rather conclude, that there are certaine predictions of future contingents in the Scripture, and therefore they have a determinate truth: Then on the contrary, they have no determinate Truth, therefore there are no certaine predictions of them: Let God be true, and every man a lyer.
2. As to the falsity of that pretended Axiome: This proposition, Such a Souldier shall pierce the side of Christ, with a Speare, or he shall not pierce him, is determinately true, and necessary, on the one side or the other, the parts of it being contradictory, which cannot be together. Therefore if a man before the Flood had used this Proposition in the affirmative, it had been certainely and determinately true; for that Proposition, which was once not true, cannot be true afterward upon the same account.
3. If no affirmative fAlphons. de Mendoza. Con. Theol. Scholast. q. 1. pag. 534. Vasquez. in 1. Tho. disput 16. Ruvio in 1. Interpret. cap. 6. q. unica &c.Proposition, about future contingents, be determinately true, then every such affirmative proposition is determinately false; for from hence, that a thing is, or is not, is a proposition determinately true or false. And therefore if any one shall say, that that is determinately future, which is absolutely indifferent, his affirmation is false; which is contrary to Aristotle, whom in this they rely upon, who affirmes, that such Propositions are neither true nor false. The Truth is, of propositions that they are true or false, is certaine. Truth, or Falseness are their proper & necessary affections, as even and odde of numbers: nor can any proposition be given, wherein there is a contradiction, whereof one part is not true, and the other false.
4. This Proposition, Petrus or at, is determinately true de presenti, Vid. Rod. de Arriaga. disput. Log. 14. Sect. 5. subsect. 3 p 205. Suarez. in Opus. J. 1. de Praescientia Dei cap: 2. Vasquez. 1. Part. disp. 66. cap. 2. Pet, Hurtado de Mend. disp. 9. de Anima. Sect. 6.when Peter doth actually pray: (for quiequid est, dum est, determinatè est) therefore this proposition de futuro, Petrus orabit, is determinately true. The former is the measure and rule, by which we judge of the latter. So that because 'tis true de presenti, Petrus orat, Ergo, This (de futuro) Petrus orabit, was ab aeterno true (ex parte rei) and then (ex parte modi) because this Proposition Petrus orat, is determinately true de presenti: Ergo, This Petrus orabit, was determinately true from all eternity. But enough of this.
M. B. having made a sad complaint of the ignorance and darkenesse that men were bred up in, by being led from the Scripture, and imposing himselfe upon them for a guide of the blind, a light of them which are in darkenes, an instructer of the foolish, and a teacher of the babes, doth in persuit of his great undertakinge, in this Chapter instruct them, what the Scripture speakes concerning the Being, Nature, and Prope…tyes of God. Of his Goodnesse, Wisdome, Power, Truth, Righteousnesse, Faithfullnesse, Mercy, Independency, Soveraignty, Infinitenesse, men had before been informed, by Bookes, Tracts, and Catechismes, composed according to the fancyes and interests of men, the Scripture being utterly justled out of the way: Alas of these things the Scriptures speakes not at all: but the description wherein that abounds of God, and which is necessary that men should know, (whatever become of those other inconsiderable things, wherewith other poore Catechismes are stuffed) is, that he is finite, limited, and obnoxious to Passions, &c. Thou that abhorrest Idolls, dost thou commit Sacriledge.